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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report AUSTRIA  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Unlike some other Member States, Austria has a fairly long history of unfair 
competition law as the first Act against Unfair Competition (UWG) dates back to 
1923.1 The UCPD, as well as the MCAD, was implemented by the so-called UWG 
amendment of 2007.2 Due to the long history of dealing with unfair commercial 
practices, the implementation of the UCPD should, in the opinion of the Austrian 
legislature, not lead to any fundamental changes.3 However, this assessment was 
subject to critique.4 The CJEU’s interpretation of the UCPD led to ‘hidden amendments’ 
of the UWG.5 This is why the UWG has in the meantime been amended twice, once in 
2013 and most recently in 2015.6  
With both amendments, some core regulations of the Austrian UWG were revised, for 
instance the general prohibition of bonus sales in Sec. 9a UWG and the requirement of 
prior approval of clearance sales by a government body (Sec. 33a seqq. UWG).7 
Stakeholders ranging from consumer organisations to government officials indicated 
that the level of consumer protection decreased due to these changes. Admittedly, a 
high level of harmonisation among the Member States may be the positive result of 
the full harmonisation approach of the UCPD, but especially in Member States with a 
highly elaborated tradition of unfair commercial practices law, this leads to a 
deterioration of the protection standard. For example, in Austrian law, the principle-
based approach has been of great importance throughout time. In practice, this 
approach was well recognized since it allows a great flexibility when adapting to new 
developments.8 Over time, it has proven to be an essential tool to properly adjudicate 
new unfair commercial practices. Thus the principle-based approach was and still is 
assessed as effectively preserving fair competition. However, as a consequence of the 
UCPD, the effectiveness of such principle was slightly deteriorated. Further, the 
1  Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “Einleitung UWG”, rec. 8; Handig/Wiebe “Einleitung”, recs. 2-3 in: 
Wiebe/Kodek (2016); the recent amendment to the UWG was announced on 22.04.2015 in the Federal 
Law Gazette I (Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBl) I, No. 49/2015. 
2  Federal Law Gazette I, No 79/2007. 
3  This is the view of the Austrian legislature as expressed in the explanatory remarks accompanying the 
legislative materials, see Regierungsvorlage (RV) 144, Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des 
Nationalrates (BlgNR) Gesetzgebungsperiode (GP) no 23. These materials can be found at 
<www.parlinkom.gv.at>. 
4  Schuhmacher wbl 2007, 557, 558. 
5  Seidelberger (2016) in: Augenhofer/Alexander (eds.), p. 111 and Seidelberger (2014) in: 
Staudegger/Thiele (eds.), p. 263, referring, for example, to the CJEU judgments 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:660 (Mediaprint/Österreich) and ECLI:EU:C:2013:14 (Köck/Schutzverband). 
6  Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 13/2013, which mainly abolished Sec. 9 UWG (general prohibition of 
bonus sales) and altered the rules for the permission of clearance sales by a government authority as well 
as 33a seqq. UWG; and Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 49/2015, which mainly adopted suggestions 
by the Commission after its having instituted treaty violation proceedings against Austria 
(No. 2013/2168) for an insufficient transposition of the UCPD. 
7  Cf. Schuhmacher wbl 2010, 612, 615; Heidinger MR 2013, 135; Prunbauer-Glaser RuW 2013, 4; 
Rungg/Walser MR 2011, 90. 
8  Cf. e.g. Heidinger “§ 1 UWG”, rec. 1 in: Wiebke/Kodek (2016); Kraft/Steinmair “§ 1 UWG”, rec. 1. 
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linguistic and systematic quality of the UCPD has been criticised by Austrian legal 
scholars, as having led to a reduced quality in the transposed law.9 
However, these criticisms do not stem from the principle-based approach of the UCPD, 
which is evaluated rather positively since that approach was already known in Austria 
before the implementation of the UCPD. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Austrian legal scholars attributed a high impact to the black list in regards to it 
promoting legal certainty and clarity in unfair competition law.10 According to one 
view, the black list addresses some practices used especially by online businesses, 
which are the most important businesses when it comes to cross-border trade; hence 
the list is seen as leading to a decrease in internal market barriers.11 
By contrast, stakeholders argue that the black list is barely applied in Austria, since 
most stated practices are covered by the general rules and the application of the black 
list proves to be difficult due to the narrow conditions of the commercial practices 
included in the black list. Hence, courts seem reluctant in applying the black list until 
certain important questions of interpretation are clarified by the CJEU. Moreover, it is 
criticised that the static nature of black lists does not do justice to a very agile area of 
law such as unfair commercial practices. This is considered especially problematic with 
regard to typically country specific practices (e.g. ’Werbefahrten’, which are 
promotional tours organised by businesses and aiming especially at elderly people). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The Austrian legislature did not introduce any explicit provisions with regard to 
financial services, banking and investments in the UWG. Nevertheless, there are 
fragmented provisions in banking and financial services law which effect unfair 
commercial practices law.12  
For instance, Sec. 69 Trade, Commerce and Industry Regulation Act 
(‘Gewerbeordnung’, GewO)13 enables the Austrian government to enact government 
codes of conduct for certain trades, published as ordinances. Particularly relevant in 
the context of Art. 3 para. 9 UCPD are the Ordinances for financial intermediaries 
(‘Verordnung über Standes- und Ausübungsregeln für Personalkreditvermittler‘, 
IMMV)14 and real estate agents (‘Verordnung über Standes- und Ausübungsregeln für 
Immobilienmakler‘, IMMV).15 As far as these codes cover immovables and financial 
services, they are in any event in line with the UCPD as they fall under the exception 
in Art. 3 para. 9 UCPD. Outside the parameters of this exemption clause, it remains to 
be seen in every single case if the ordinances will be treated as bans – therefore 
violating the UCPD – or as mere concretisations of the term ‘professional diligence’ 
under the UCPD. The government codes of conduct regarding financial intermediaries, 
inter alia, prohibit special misleading advertisements. Sec. 4 para. 1 no. 9 IMMV 
contains a prohibition against doorstep-selling of mortgage loans, unless the visit was 
9  Cf. Anderl/Appl “Anhang zu § 2 UWG”, rec. 6 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016); Wiltschek/Majchrzak ÖBl 2008, 4, 
5; Ummenberger-Zierler (2016), p. 25 seqq. 
10  Anderl/Appl “Anhang zu § 2 UWG”, rec. 15 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016); Schumacher wbl 2005, 506, 507. 
11  Anderl/Appl “Anhang zu § 2 UWG”, rec. 18 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
12  For a comprehensive study of the interplay between the UCPD and these exceptions 
cf. Augenhofer (2011), p. 11 seqq. 
13  Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 194/1994, recently amended by Act of 21.08.2016, Federal Law 
Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 50/2016. 
14  Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 505/1996, recently amended by Ordinance of 21.04.2016, Federal 
Law Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 86/2016. 
15  Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 297/1996, recently amended by Ordinance of 25.08.2010, Federal 
Law Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 268/2010. 
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requested by private persons. In summary, with regard to financial services there are 
provisions that take advantage of the minimum harmonisation clause, whereas with 
regard to immovable property no stricter rules exist.16 
It should be noted that there are stricter provisions than the UCPD, especially in the 
field of banking transactions and consumer credit. However, these stricter rules are 
based on the corresponding directives, such as the Payment Service Directive 
2015/2366/EU or the Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC. These rules therefore 
comply with the conflict rule of Art. 3 para. 4 UCPD and hence do not fall within the 
scope of Art. 3 para. 9 UCPD. 
Stakeholders seem to be in favour of the minimum harmonisation clause as it allows 
national legislatures to react to problems causing difficulties in only one specific 
Member State. An example for this would be the charging of extra fees for the 
withdrawal at certain ATMs in Austria. Currently, some American companies providing 
ATM-services are charging an additional fee for every processed money withdrawal 
without properly notifying the user of this extra charge. Instead, the information of 
charging said amount is hidden in small print right at the end of the transaction, 
nearly unnoticeable to the user. A brief prepared by the Legal and Constitutional 
Service of the Federal Chancellory of Austria has already declared that a charge of 
extra fees whilst withdrawing from an ATM machine is not inadmissible under the 
Austrian Consumer Protection Act (‘Konsumentenschutzgesetz’, KSchG)17. Both the 
Minister of Consumer Protection Alois Stöger and the Minister of Finance Hans Jörg 
Schelling have greatly emphasized the need for a statutory ban on charging additional 
fees during a withdrawal from an ATM. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
While environmental claims may violate the Austrian UWG and scholars as well as 
courts have pointed out the importance of references to the environment for the 
decision-making process of consumers,18 in practice there seems to be little 
experience with such cases. One stakeholder reported that in the 
environmental/energy sector, special problems arise from the fact that expensive 
testing might be required before legal action can be taken. This might be a reason for 
the limited amount of court decisions. 
One example in the energy sector is the case ‘VKI/Care Energy’,19 where a company 
claimed to have already concluded a contract with customers and sent them 
personalised post. Claims labelling food as being organic as well as untrue statements 
about environmental sustainability in connection with a purchase have also been 
observed in practice. There seems to be uncertainty with regard to certain means to 
improve consumer standards with regard to the energy market due to full 
harmonisation. An example is provided by the Austrian regulation of price increases 
for motor fuel,20 according to which prices at gas stations can only be changed once a 
day so that consumers can make an informed decision where to buy gas. However, it 
is disputed among Austrian legal scholars whether this regulation violates the UCPD. 
The Austrian Federal Administrative Court (‘Verwaltungsgerichtshof’) requested the 
16 Cf. conclusions of Augenhofer (2011), p. 21 and 29. 
17 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 140/1979, recently amended by Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, 
No. 35/2016. 
18  For example cf. OGH 29.11.2005, 4Ob200/05y (naturrein); Enzinger (2012), p. 100. 
19  OLG Wien 18.04.2016, 1 R 45/16v. 
20  Act on Price Transparency of Motor Fuel (“Preistranzparenzverordnung Treibstoffpreise”) Federal Law 
Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 246/2011, recently amended by Ordinance of 19.12.2013, Federal Law Gazette 
(BGBl.) II No. 471/2013. 
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ECJ for a preliminary ruling in this matter but later, on 02.03.2016, withdrew this 
motion.21 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
Austrian law used to be more consumer protective and also protected the careless 
consumer.22 This interpretation had to change due to the CJEU’s definition of the 
average consumer as ‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect’.23 Austria has the principle of a ‘referring consumer expectation’ (‘Prinzip 
der verweisenden Verbrauchererwartung’). This principle means that a product is 
flawless if it is manufactured in a way that the experts have deemed correct and thus 
the consumer expects the product to be as the experts do.24 The concept is applied 
rigidly and deemed to be compatible with European law.25  
There seem to be no general problems with regard to the average consumer model, 
which seems to work in practice. However, consumer organisations expressed concern 
that Austrian courts are reluctant to apply the special rules for consumers needing 
more protection (as acknowledged by the UCPD). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Sec. 1 para. 2 UWG lists the same criteria as the Directive; there is no indication that 
additional groups have been recognised by jurisprudence within the scope of the 
UCPD.26 Outside the UCPD’s scope some argue that the Austrian Supreme Court in 
context of financial services applies a slightly different notion of ‘vulnerable 
consumers’.27 
Some stakeholders would find it important to leave Member States leeway for new 
categories (e.g. indebted consumers) which are not always defined in advance. 
Moreover, the general concept is criticised by some stakeholders since the context of a 
purchase is deemed more important than the specifically targeted group. According to 
their feedback the law in some situations should take into account rather the 
circumstances of a purchase than the question whether one party is part of a group of 
vulnerable consumers.  
 
21  VwGH 21. 10. 2015, 2012/17/0097 and ECLI:EU:C:2016:227 for the withdrawal of the case. 
22  Enzinger (2012), p. 28 seq. 
23  ECLI:EU:C:1998:369 (Gut Springheide). 
24  Enzinger (2012), p. 29; Wiebe (2016), p. 293. 
25  Prunbauer-Glaser/Seidelberger (2015), p. 28. 
26  Enzinger (2012), p. 31; Prunbauer-Glaser/Seidelberger (2015), p. 28; Wiltschek (2013), 
“§ 1 UWG” rec. 16. 
27  Cf. therefore question 1.4.4. 
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• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Self-regulation is not very common in Austria.28 As one example, one may refer to the 
Austrian Werberat, a self-regulatory body which mainly addresses advertisements 
violating principles and decency.29 One might also consider the Schutzverband – a 
private organisation which is funded by the Wirtschaftskammer (a business 
organisation) – as form of self-regulation.30 
Code of conducts are – since the implementation of the UCPD – defined in Sec. 2 
para. 3 subpara 2 UWG. If a company refers to a code of conduct in its advertisement 
and does not obey it, this constitutes an unfair commercial practice as long as the 
code constitutes a clear, binding obligation for the company.31 However, codes are of 
little practical relevance in Austria.32  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Yes, the fear has been expressed that the black list cannot respond adequately to 
economic developments and therefore might prove outdated rather quickly.33 
Moreover, it has been argued that the black list is too indefinite in its scope and that 
guidelines are more effective for producing legal certainty, though this view is 
disputed.34 Hence, some stakeholders suggest changing the UCPD into a minimum 
harmonisation directive, affording room for national law and reactions to changes. 
Further, the wording of Annex I and the black list was criticised and it was suggested 
that it should be revised. For example, the Austrian Federal High Court of Justice 
recently raised the question whether services are also covered by lit. 28 Annex I 
UCPD.35 
Regarding the proposal of a Regulation ensuring the cross-border portability of online 
content services in the internal market,36 it would have been a reasonable option to 
put the banning of unjustified geoblocking in the Annex to the UCPD instead of 
drafting a separate Regulation, in the view of one stakeholder. 
The following practices have been reported by stakeholders to cause recurring 
problems:  
• In some retail sectors it is common to change the price a number of times a 
day, e.g. the price of gas for cars; 
• Further it has been observed by stakeholders that in the field of the direct sales 
of dietary supplements and non-prescription drugs, aggressive and misleading 
commercial practices are on the rise; 
• In the telecommunication sector, deviation between the actual internet speed 
and the advertised one happen rather frequently. Further, in this sector the 
28  Cf. therefore and for a more comprehensive analysis of self-regulation in Europe after the UCPD 
Augenhofer (2010), p. 19. 
29  Cf. for more information <http://werberat.at> (accessed on the 21.08.2016). 
30  Cf. for more information <http://www.schutzverband.at> (accessed on the 21.08.2016). 
31  Wiebe (2016), p. 358. 
32  Schulze/Schulte-Nölke (2003), p. 19. 
33  Anderl/Appl “Anhang zu § 2 UWG”, rec. 12 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016); Fehringer/Freund MR 2007, 115, 
118. 
34  Gamerith (2011), p. 169. 
35  OGH 15.06.2016, 4Ob126/16g. 
36  Cf. COM(2015) 627 final of 09.12.2015. 
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European legislature should seek coherence with other relevant European 
legislation, such as the BEREC guidelines or Regulation (EU) No. 2120/2015; 
• Some Austrian stakeholders stress that the prohibition of national rules 
generally forbidding sales with bonuses – a prohibition which resulted from the 
UCPD and the ECJ’s interpretation – did serve to lower the level of consumer 
protection.37 Sales with bonuses should therefore be categorised as a per-se 
unfair commercial practice and included on the black list. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
As mentioned above, some stakeholders advocate a modification of the ‘black list’ into 
a ‘grey list’. Such a grey list is considered advantageous: One the one hand, it would 
still provide those countries without long tradition in the area of unfair competition law 
some guidance. On the other hand, a grey list would allow Member States to adopt a 
black list which corresponds to national characteristics. One stakeholder mentioned 
cease-and-desist-letters as a best practice which should be introduced on the 
European level. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
In Austria, the PID was implemented by the Preisauszeichnungsgesetz, (PrAG).38 
Infringements of price indication regulations are enforced by unfair competition law, 
especially if they are usually considered as misleading or misleading omissions.39 
Further, infringements of the PrAG are considered as unfair under the general clause 
Sec. 1 UWG (‘Rechtsbruch’).40 According to Sec. 15 para. 1 PrAG, infringements of the 
PrAG are considered an administrative offence, so that they are enforced by 
authorities of the federal states (Sec. 16 para. 1 PrAG). 
The harmonisation of the indication of a price per unit is well recognised in promoting 
the clarity of prices and enhancing confident consumer decisions. According to a 
biannually conducted study, the so-called ‘Konsumentenbarometer’41, approximately 
two-thirds of consumers are well aware of the basic price and regularly use basic price 
information before making a buying decision. However, according to this study, the 
awareness depends on the age of consumers: Whereas young consumers are less 
aware, elder ones (60 years and older) are significantly more aware than the average 
consumer. However, consumer organisations are concerned that the basic price 
indications are often too small and therefore hardly readable.42  
In order to tackle this problem, the main food, groceries and drugstore retailers 
agreed in a voluntary commitment (so called ‘Charta zur Grundpreisauszeichnung’ of 
37  Cf. ECLI:EU:C:2010:660, which led to the decision of the Austrian legislature to abolish Sec. 9a UWG; 
cf. Appl/Homar MR 2012, 349 for a summary of the long tradition of bonus sales prohibition in Austria. 
38  Federal Act on the indication of prices of 19.03.1992, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 146/1992, 
recently amended by Federal Act of 21.11.2011, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 100/2011. 
39  Kraft/Steinmair (2013), “§ 2 UWG”, rec. 56 and rec. 90; Robertson RdW 2015, 379. 
40  OGH 19.12.2000, 4 Ob 288/00g (Mini-Scooter); Enzinger (2012), p. 210. 
41  KonsumentInnen-Barometer of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection (2015), available at: 
http://www.konsumentenfragen.at/cms/konsumentenfragen/attachments/5/2/9/CH0948/CMS143229779
6248/konsumbarometer_2015_charts_final.pdf (accessed on 26.08.2016). 
42  KonsumentInnen-Barometer (2015), slide 83. 
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01.09.2010) to indicate the basic price in a 4mm font size and to standardise the 
arrangement of the basic price and the selling price.43 It is reported by stakeholders 
that this system works well, but especially from the consumer’s point of view an EU-
wide harmonisation would be preferable.  
Some stakeholders also stated that the effectiveness of the PID is limited by its many 
exceptions, e.g. for various groups of products or small and medium-sized businesses. 
For example, small bakeries fall under this exception, something which concerns 
consumer protection stakeholders as they might also sell dairy products.  
One stakeholder expressed the wish that carpets and tiles should be priced per square 
meter and wallpaper per meter.  
Another stakeholder concern is the commercial practice by some retailers to sell fewer 
units for the same price, this being allowed since the Act on Nominal Quantities of 
Prepacked Goods was liberalised in 2009 in order to comply with Directive 
2007/45/EC.44 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
In Austria, prices of detergents are usually indicated by the performance of the sold 
product. According to one stakeholder assessment, this kind of price indication is 
advantageous, where the performance differs significantly despite the same amount. 
In such cases, a proper comparison based on performance is a prerequisite of a 
confident consumer decision. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Only relevant if you write a report for one of the 
countries that use the derogation for small businesses from the requirement to 
indicate the unit price on the basis of Article 6 of the Directive (AT, BE, EL, DE, FR, 
NL, SI, UK). In this case key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation relevant? 
Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of this? If 
so, approximately how many per year?] 
Austria took advantage of this derogation in Sec. 10b para. 3 PrAG, and this exception 
is indeed used by privileged retailers. The Austrian legislature specified the PID’s 
provisions with quantitative criteria. Under Sec. 10b para. 3 PrAG, the exception 
applies only to enterprises which do not employ more than nine full-time employees 
(No. 1), to those which do not provide self-service, or to ‘mom-and-pop’ stores with 
up to 50 employees (No. 2). Equally, the exemption applies to those businesses that 
have a maximum place of sale of 250 m2 and do not maintain more than ten 
subsidiaries (No. 3), or to market stalls (No. 4). However, as already stated above, 
this may deteriorate the effectiveness of the PID.  
According to stakeholders, no consumer complaints were reported. 
 
43  Cf. “Charta zur Grundpreisauszeichnung” (Charta on price indication) of 01.09.2010, that was signed e.g. 
by Hofer, REWE-Group and SPAR, id. the main Austrian supermarkets. 
44  “Fertigpackungsverordnung”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 867/1993, cf. the amendment of 
20.04.2009, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 115/2009. 
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses  
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD is transposed in Secs. 2 and 2a UWG. Sec. 2 UWG contains a general 
prohibition of misleading commercial practices that include, but are not limited to, 
advertising. Additionally, Secs. 2 und 2a UWG cover B2B- as well as B2C-transactions. 
Insofar, commercial practices in B2B-transactions which do not fall under the 
definition of ‘advertising’ are already covered by Austrian unfair competition law.45 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
According to stakeholders, the application of the MCAD does not cause any relevant 
problems in Austria, since Austrian unfair competition law has been applied to B2B-
transactions since its inception and the Austrian UWG has always been based on a 
principle approach. Further, it can be observed that particularly small enterprises are 
affected by misleading or comparative advertisements. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Austria transposed the UCPD’s provisions also for B2B-transactions. Hence, B2B-
transactions are also regulated by Austrian unfair commercial practices law. Except for 
invitations to purchase in Sec. 2 para. 6 UWG, misleading commercial practices in 
B2B-transactions are subject to the same requirements as commercial practices 
directed towards a consumer. Following the approach of the Austrian legislature as 
well as the common opinion in Austria that unfair commercial practices law should not 
merely protect consumers but rather the fairness of competition itself and therefore 
competitors as well as business customers, a high level of protection is already 
realised.46 That is why stakeholders emphasise the necessity of a minimum 
harmonisation in order to react flexibly and adequately to new developments on a 
national level. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Comparative advertising has an eventful past in Austria. While it was considered 
admissible after the introduction of the first UWG in 1923, it had been considered an 
unfair commercial practice since the 1930s.47 In 1990, the Austrian Supreme Court of 
Justice ruled in a landmark decision that comparative advertising is generally 
admissible. The Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged in its decision that 
comparative advertisement promotes a consumer´s capability to make a rational 
decision and that interests of competitors have to recede in cases where the 
advertisement is objective and true.48 So, comparative advertisement was, following 
this decision, basically admissible in Austria, although the Supreme Court of Justice 
45  Enzinger (2012), rec. 219; Wiltscheck (2013), “§ 2 UWG” recs. 1 and 3; Wiebe (2016), p. 338. 
46  Cf. Wamprechtshamer ÖBl 2000, 147, 148; the Austrian legislature expressed this view in the 
explanatory remarks accompanying the legislative materials of the 1999 UWG amendment, see 
Regierungsvorlage (RV) 1998, Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates (BlgNR) 
20. Gesetzgebungsperiode (GP), p. 38. These materials can be found at <www.parlinkom.gv.at>. 
47  Cf. for a more in-depth historic overview Seidelberger (2004) in: Schutzverband gegen den Unlauteren 
Wettbewerb (ed.), p. 220. 
48  OGH 26.06.1990, 4 Ob 41/90, MuR 1990, 144. 
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tended to be very restrictive in such cases.49 Since the transposition of the MCAD, 
however, there exist some uncertainties especially regarding the scope of Art. 8 para. 
3 MCAD. The Supreme Court of Justice consequently requested a preliminary ruling of 
the CJEU.50 The CJEU then clarified that the Austrian requirements for comparative 
advertisement were stricter then the MCAD’s provision and insofar not in line with a 
full-harmonisation approach.51 In order to reach the European requirements, the 
legislature consequently passed Sec. 2a UWG, in accordance with Art. 4 MCAD.52 
However – again – the legislature did not fully harmonise on account of the meanwhile 
enacted Art. 14 UCPD, that abolished the exception for special offers in Art. 3a 
para. 2 Directive 97/55/EC. But Austrian legal scholars and the legislature considered 
this an editorial mistake and hence still treated the transposition provision in 
Sec. 2a para. 2 cl. 2 UWG as compatible with EU law.53 But since the MCAD clarified 
that Art. 14 UCPD was certainly not a legislative error, the Austrian government 
revised the respective legal provisions with the 2015 amendment of the UWG. 
Therefore, now an adequate legal framework exists. 
As shown above, there have been only minimal changes due to the European 
provisions, and hence stakeholders assess the MCAD’s effect neutrally or positively. 
One also has to note that comparative advertisement is not used by companies very 
often in Austria. However, stakeholders warned against extending the full 
harmonisation to other B2B transactions in general.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Stakeholders did not report any special problems in this regard.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
It is a common opinion among stakeholders that the legal framework protecting 
businesses from misleading and comparative advertising, was sufficient before the 
MCAD and remained efficient after the transposition. Regarding cross-border 
transactions, government authorities mentioned the impact of other directives, such 
as the ID, the E-commerce Directive 2000/32/EC and the Service Directive 
2006/123/EC. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
According to stakeholder assessment, currently of concern are advertisements which 
create the impression of being invoices or a sales confirmation for a recording in a 
public or private business register, and other similar ‘directory scams’.54 This a typical 
unfair commercial practice addressed to businesses. In addition to a claim for 
injunctions or damages, in Austria these practices may constitute an administrative 
offence under Sec. 28a UWG (with a fine of up to EUR 2900).55 Stakeholders believe 
that the private enforcement approach is useful and effective, especially regarding 
49  Cf. Kraft/Steinmair (2013), “§ 2a UWG“, rec. 2. 
50  OGH 19.12.2000, 4 Ob 259/00, ÖBl. 2002, 223 (Brillenvergleich I). 
51  ECLI:EU:C:2003:205 (Pippig Augenoptik), for more references cf. Augenhofer RdW 2003, 682. 
52  Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 79/2007. 
53  Cf. for example Gamerith ÖBl 2006, 204; Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “§ 2a UWG”, rec. 15. 
54  Cf. already Seidelberger ÖBl 2010, 244. 
55  Cf. Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “§ 28a UWG“, rec. 14. 
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costs. Maintaining this system – or maybe even introducing it on a European level – is 
of very high importance in their view. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Stakeholders did not report any relevant experiences thereof. From a purely academic 
view, a different application of the same general clauses is possible and thus capable 
of deteriorating the effectiveness. However, stakeholders argue that language barriers 
and obstacles outside the legal sphere may also prevent consumers from purchasing 
in other Member States. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Cf. the answers given above. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to stakeholders, no problems were reported and traders and retailers make 
– in the view of the stakeholders – reasonable efforts to meet the information 
requirements (at least insofar as the business is not per se fraudulent). Nevertheless, 
especially online-traders often fail to meet the exact requirements and especially the 
indication of the final price often causes considerable problems in practice. Cases were 
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reported especially in the following areas: final prices for rental cars, which often fail 
to inform consumers of the price of comprehensive insurance coverage; and pricing on 
online travel platforms, where additional service fees or additional transaction fees for 
payments with common credit or debit cards, were charged.  
However, it has been repeatedly mentioned that the ‘information-model’ has reached 
its limits, causing too many obligations for businesses. Further, an information 
overload is also harmful for consumers. Since in Austria ‘information overload’ is 
considered a misleading commercial practice (in cases in which the information is not 
legally mandatory), it has been observed that the current legal information 
requirements have reached a level which would result in their being deemed 
misleading if not for their being mandatory.56 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Yes, there are overlaps, but in the view of some stakeholders they are not avoidable. 
The UCTD, the E-commerce Directive and the Service Directive all have different 
scopes and therefore should in the view of those stakeholders coexist. Especially Art. 7 
para. 5 UCPD (transposed in Sec. 2 para. 5 UWG) is essential to enforce information 
requirements of the CRD or other consumer-protective provisions.57 In contrast, other 
stakeholders stressed that the overlap and the multitude of information, make it 
difficult for businesses to comply with legal requirements and cause high costs for 
them. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
From a theoretical perspective, a harmonised law in every Member State might 
promote cross-border trade. However, the interviewed stakeholders were not able to 
provide relevant data regarding this question. According to their assessment, cross-
border claims for using unfair commercial practices are not an issue in practice, and 
other factors (like language barriers) might be more important. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
The Austrian legislature decided to implement the UCPD in the UWG rather than in a 
separate consumer law statute or in the KSchG, with the effect that the UWG in 
general applies to all commercial practices regardless of the involved parties. The 
Austrian legislature justified this decision with the argument that the protection of 
business interests and consumer interests is not separable.58 This effect, however, 
was not carried through entirely, especially with regard to Sec. 1 UWG (general 
clause) and misleading omissions (Sec. 2 para. 6 UWG).59  
56  Anderl/Appl “§ 2 UWG”, rec. 498 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016); also critically towards the current information 
requirements and doubting their effectiveness, Dehn VbR 2015, 22. 
57  Cf. Zemann ecolex 2014, 928, 930. 
58  Regierungsvorlage (RV) 144, Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates (BlgNR) 23. 
Gesetzgebungsperiode (GP) no 23. These materials can be accessed at <www.parlinkom.gv.at>. 
59  Augenhofer EuCML 2016, 92. 
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Prima facie, a harmonisation on the European level would not bring any changes on 
the national level. Nevertheless, business organisations as well as ministries warn 
against harmonising B2B transactions also by a similar full-harmonisation approach. 
They thus refer to experiences with this approach in implementing the UCPD, which 
lead to a decreasing level of protection for businesses. Further, it has to be mentioned 
that the current UCPD was designed with the goal of raising the level of consumer 
protection. But unfair competition law with regard to B2B relations needs to address 
different aims and other commercial practices, such as exploitation, unfair hindrance 
of competitors or advantages gained by breaching the law (‘Rechtsbruch’). 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
As noted above, the Austrian implementation of the UCPD also applies to B2B 
transactions. Hence, unfair commercial practices after the conclusion of a contract in 
B2B relations, are also within the scope of the Austrian UWG.60 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
In Austria, the black list is generally applicable to B2B relations as well.61 However, as 
far as aggressive commercial practices are concerned, only No. 24 and No. 26 are 
applied to B2B situations, as the other numbers explicitly refer to ‘consumers”. 
According to the prevailing view in Austrian legal literature, an extension of the other 
aggressive commercial practices listed in the black list, is impermissible.62 As far as 
misleading commercial practices are concerned, the situation is similar: Generally, the 
provisions listed in the black list are applicable, but only those which do not explicitly 
mention consumers, e.g. Nos. 8, 10, 11 and 14, apply in particular.63 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
The right to sue for injunction for infringements of the UWG is currently laid down in 
Sec. 14 UWG. Under this provision, competitors, business associations and 
government bodies such as the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, the Federal Office of 
Competition, the Federal Labour Chamber, the Austrian Labour Union Association and 
the Chamber of Agriculture are responsible for the enforcement of infringements of 
Secs. 1, 1a, 2 and 2a.64 While competitors will often be interested in pursuing 
infringements of the UWG, in many instances they are neither capable nor willing to 
invest the necessary resources in legal actions. The complementary right of business 
associations to bring legal action is meant to compensate for this problem.65 Under 
Austrian law, business associations have legal standing when they manage to 
demonstrate that either their statutory interests or interests of their affiliated 
members were affected by a misleading advertisement (or any other unfair 
commercial practice). Even associations which have the sole statutory aim of pursuing 
unfair commercial practices (‘Klageverbände’) have standing as long as they ensure 
that their members are representative for all economic sectors.66 This right is similar 
to consumer organisations’ right to sue for an injunction pursuant to the Injunction 
60  Heidinger “§ 1 UWG”, rec. 36 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
61  Cf. Burgstaller “Anhang zu § 1a UWG”, rec. 6 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
62  Cf. Burgstaller “Anhang zu § 1a UWG”, rec. 7 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
63  Cf. Anderl/Appl “Anhang zu § 2 UWG”, rec. 8 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
64  Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “§ 14 UWG”, rec. 1 seq. 
65  Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “§ 14 UWG”, rec. 36. 
66  Kraft/Steinmair (2013) “§ 14 UWG”, rec. 42. 
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Directive. In practice, this system is very efficient, and hence some stakeholders 
recommended that more Member States should introduce such an enforcement 
system. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Regarding contractual consequences, it is referred to 1.1.7. These remarks apply to 
misleading and comparative advertisement too. However, the development of special 
contractual remedies is a sensitive issue. Of course, the contractual consequences in 
some cases are the more decisive consequences than a mere injunction. The interplay 
and coordination with national contract law is thus highly complex.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
As already stated in section 1.1.3, some stakeholders indicated the need to pass rules 
– like Sec. 28a of the Austrian UWG – concerning commercial practices involving 
feigned invoices or a sales confirmation for a recording in public or private business 
register, and concerning other ‘directory scams’ (‘Adressbuch- und 
Verzeichnisschwindel’). Besides that, stakeholders favoured a further observance of 
the status quo. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The Austrian UWG does not provide for any special contractual remedies,67 nor was 
the introduction of such special remedies discussed during the process of 
implementing the UCPD.68 However, despite the lack of special contractual remedies, 
there are still some correlations between unfair commercial practices and the general 
contract law provisions of the Austrian General Civil Code (‘Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch’, ABGB):69 
1. Unlawfulness or unconscionability (‘Gesetzes- und Sittenwidrigkeit’)  
It needs to be considered whether a violation of the UWG may lead to the invalidity of 
a contract between a business and its contractual partner under 
Sec. 879 para. 1 ABGB. Pursuant to the prevailing view, the unlawfulness as defined 
by Sec. 879 para. 1 ABGB has to originate from the content of the contract and not 
from the circumstances of its conclusion.70 Violations of the UWG, however, will mostly 
67  Krutzler (2015), p. 34. 
68  See the statements accompanying the ministerial draft (“Ministerialentwurf”) concerning the UWG 
amendment in 2007, where none of the statements proposed the introduction of special contract law 
remedies. See eg the opinions of the Federal Chamber of Labour (“Bundesarbeiterkammer”, BAK) of 
27.04.2007 and the Federal Ministry of Social Affairs and Consumer Protection of 30 April 2004, where 
the introduction of only a right to claim surrender of profits was proposed. All opinions are available at 
<www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIII/ME/ME_00050/index.shtml>, accessed 22.08.2016. 
69  Most recently amended by Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 43/2016. As general contract law, the 
provisions of the ABGB apply to all contract relationships and therefore not only to B2C relationships. 
70  Riedler “§ 879 ABGB”, rec. 3 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
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be related to issues concerning the formation of a contract. The same applies for the 
unconscionability of contracts, which similarly has to derive from the content of a 
contract in order to lead to the invalidity of a contract under Sec. 879 para. 1 ABGB.71 
In cases of a severe discrepancy between performance and consideration, invalidity 
may result pursuant to Sec. 879 para. 2 no. 4 ABGB. This provision states that a 
contract is void if someone takes advantage of another’s imprudence, predicament, 
inexperience or discomposure in exchange for a consideration to be promised or 
granted which is clearly disproportionate. In addition, in cases with an objective 
disparity of at least 50 percent, the contractual partner may invoke leasio enormis 
(Sec. 934 ABGB).  
Besides the high barriers for Secs. 879, 934 ABGB, it is usually the case that the 
contractual partner has no interest in the contract being labelled completely invalid as 
the consequence of a breach of the UWG. In fact, the contractual partner will normally 
be interested in performance rather than the unwinding of the contract in cases 
concerning unfair commercial practices.72 Something else might be true only where, 
for instance, a product claimed to have health benefits by the manufacturer in fact 
turns out to be dangerous. 
2. Warranty rights (‘Gewährleistung’) 
Unfair commercial practices can also trigger warranty rights when the consumer has 
bought a good not in conformity with the contract. Warranty rights are regulated in 
Sec. 922 et seqq. ABGB.73 The consumer has four remedies in case of non-conformity 
pursuant to Sec. 932 para. 1 ABGB: The consumer can claim for repair, replacement, 
reduction of the price or rescission of the contract. Reduction of the price and 
rescission of the contract are, however, only possible if certain preconditions are met, 
basically if repair and replacement fail or are not possible; and for rescission of 
contract the non-conformity must also be not merely of a minor nature.74 In addition 
to these non-fault based remedies, consumers can – at least since the implementation 
of the Directive on the sale of consumer goods – file for differential damages by 
means of warranty claims.75 An extensive examination of the details would go beyond 
the scope of this study.76 Pursuant to Sec. 933a para. 1 ABGB, a consumer can claim 
damages relating to the non-conformity itself if the non-conformity occurs due to the 
fault of the seller.77 However, Sec. 933a para. 2 ABGB requires (just as Sec. 932 
ABGB regarding reduction of the price and rescission of the contract) that the 
consumer must seek repair or replacement first, and only in cases where these 
remedies have failed is the consumer entitled to claim damages.78 This leads to the 
question of the relationship between tort-like damages under the UWG and contractual 
damages pursuant to Sec. 932 and Sec. 933a ABGB. According to settled case law, 
§ 933a ABGB is lex specialis or higher-ranking than tort law damages pursuant to 
Sec. 1295 et seqq. ABGB.79 Conversely, the law of unfair commercial practices and 
contractual statutory rights have a different scope of protection.80 Hence, it seems 
more convincing to hold both claims as equal and concurrently applicable.81 
3. Law of mistake (Irrtumsrecht) 
71  Riedler “§ 879 ABGB”, rec. 8 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
72  Cf. Sack GRUR 2004, 637. 
73  For details, cf. e.g. Welser/Jud (2001); Faber (2001). 
74  See Sec. 932 paras 2-4 ABGB. 
75  Council Directive (EC) 1999/44 of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees. 
76  For a comprehensive description of the issues involved cf. Augenhofer (2002); Krutzler (2015) p. 45. 
77  Cf. Krutzler (2015), p. 49. 
78  Kolmasch (2015) in: Deixler-Hübner/Kolba (eds.), p. 61, 96. 
79  Cf. OGH 04.07.2007, 2 Ob95/06v; OGH 11.04.2013, 1 Ob184/12h; OGH 23.05.2015, 7 Ob23/13b; 
OGH 27.5.2015, 9 Ob14/14w; OGH 02.09.2015, Ob51/15w. 
80  Cf. Krutzler (2015), p. 49. 
81  Krutzler (2015), p. 59. 
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The use of unfair commercial practices, especially misleading commercial practices, 
may induce misconceptions of reality at the consumer level.82 Such a misconception 
can lead to a consumer’s right to rescind the contract under Sec. 871 para. 1 ABGB.83 
Sec. 871 para. 1 ABGB requires that the misconception concern the transaction as 
such and not its underlying motives (‘Geschäftsirrtum’).84 Furthermore, a person who 
has no intention whatsoever to make a declaration with that content 
(‘Erklärungsirrtum’) can rescind the contract.85 Unfair commercial practices often 
create misconceptions regarding characteristics of the product.86 Such misconceptions 
are legally relevant – that is to say, they qualify as ‘Geschäftsirrtum’ – if these 
characteristics determine the price.87 For example, this can be the case if the 
manufacturer states that the advertised car needs only regular petrol but in fact, the 
car requires super petrol.88 Or, to stick with cars, in the recent VW-scandal consumers 
might want to rescind their purchase contracts for the reason that they had been left 
with a misconception about the low level of emissions or about the fact that the car 
was not manipulated.  
The right to rescind the contract requires that the other party has caused – or at least 
has noticed and did not dispel – the misconception.89 With regard to unfair commercial 
practices, the other party will have caused the consumer’s misconception most of the 
time.90 It has to be noted, though, that the right to rescind a contract pursuant to 
Sec. 871 ABGB does not fully correspond with remedies in the UWG (e.g. ‘misleading’ 
within the meaning of the UWG looks at the average consumer while Sec. 871 ABGB 
requires that the specific person was under a misapprehension).91 Difficulties with the 
preconditions of Sec. 871 ABGB may, however, occur in unfair commercial practices 
originating from third parties,92 e.g. advertising agencies.93 But the other party will 
usually be liable under Sec. 1313a ABGB, as this party is under a duty to inform itself 
about the statements advertised by the agency. Whereas such a right of rescission 
might be useful for the consumer in some cases, it certainly has limitations:  
If the misconception is related to the price, the requirement of a ‘Geschäftsirrtum’ is – 
according to the prevailing view – not fulfilled.94 However, this can be different if a 
misleading statement has caused the misconception relating to the price, and the 
consumer did not realise the full amount to be paid.95 Here, the consumer had no 
intention whatsoever to make a declaration with this content, and was not merely 
mistaken regarding the price.96 In such a case, the misconception qualifies as 
82  Cf. Sack GRUR 2004, 626; see also Bollenberger (2011) in: Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), 
p. 65; Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 173. 
83  Moreover, Sec. 871 para. 2 ABGB allows rescission if the misconception concerns circumstances the other 
party was obliged by law to disclose. This leads to the question if, for example, Sec. 2 para. 4 UWG 
(misleading commercial practices through omission) fulfils Sec. 871 para. 2 ABGB. The limited scope of 
this contribution does not allow for elaboration on this question. For an analysis and further reference, 
see e.g. Bollenberger (2011) in: Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), p. 74-77. 
84  For details, see e.g. Riedler “§ 871 ABGB”, recs. 7 and 12-14 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014); 
Bollenberger (2011) in: Fischer-Czermak and others (eds.), p. 877, p. 880-883; Bydlinski ÖBA 2010, 646, 
647. 
85  Cf. e.g. Bollenberger (2011) in: Fischer-Czermak and others (eds.), p. 881. 
86  Bollenberger (2011) in: Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), p. 72. 
87  Cf. e.g. Bollenberger (2011) in: Fischer-Czermak and others (eds.), p. 883. 
88  See also Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 173.  
89  For further reference, cf. Riedler “§ 871 ABGB” recs. 22-29 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
90  Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 173. 
91  Koppensteiner JBl 2015, 137, 147; Thöni ÖJZ 2010, 698, 702.  
92  Griss JBl 2005, 69, 71 seqq. 
93  Kodek/Leupold “§ 16 UWG” rec. 24 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016); Henning-Bodewig GRUR 1981, 164, 
173 seq; Nennen GRUR 2005, 214, 220 seqq. 
94  Cf. eg OGH 28.03.2007, Ob 111/06h; OGH 28.09.1950, 1 Ob507/50; Riedler “§ 871 ABGB” rec. 19 in: 
Schwimann/Kodek (2014); Fezer WRP 2003, 138 seq. 
95  Cf. Bollenberger (2011) in: Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), p. 73. 
96  Bollenberger (2011) in: Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), p. 73. 
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‘Erklärungsirrtum’.97 By contrast, consumers cannot rescind the contract if they are 
wrong about their underlying motive, e.g. if they order a good to increase his chances 
of winning a competition.98 In this context, it should be noted for the sake of 
completeness that Sec. 5c KSchG states that an entrepreneur who sends promises of 
a prize or a similar notification to a consumer shall deliver such prize to the consumer 
if the design of such notification has created an impression in consumers that they 
have won the prize.99 Moreover, in blatant cases the consumer may be granted a right 
of rescission because of ploy or duress pursuant to Sec. 870 ABGB.100  
Since in Austria the law of mistake is based on the idea that the other party (who 
must have adequately caused the misconception) does not deserve protection, it 
cannot be applied to the detriment of a retailer who himself was unaware of the basis 
of the misconception (cf. Sec. 875 ABGB).101 On the other hand, the non-fault based 
warranty rights allow for claims also against the retailer. 
4. The principle of culpa in contrahendo (precontractual liability) 
The consumer may claim damages for incurred expenses caused by unfair commercial 
practices, particularly by misleading advertising, pursuant to the principle of culpa in 
contrahendo (c.i.c).102 For example, consumers may have expenses for driving to the 
outlet of a retail business, only to find out that the special offer they were looking for 
ran out of stock.103 Some commentators argue that the advertising does not in itself 
create a confidence in the consumer requiring protection.104 However, it seems more 
convincing to apply the principle of c.i.c in such cases.105 The role of pre-contractual 
liability is especially to include the period prior to the conclusion of a contract.106 If the 
seller expresses a certain promise in its advertising, it creates a certain confidence in 
the consumer which deserves protection.107 Consumer cannot be expected to know 
that they cannot trust the promotional statement of the seller.108 If so, there would be 
a conflict between the legal situation prior to the conclusion of a contract and after the 
conclusion of a contract.109 If the parties conclude a contract, a promotional statement 
is indeed relevant provided that it was not merely puffery. As discussed above, it can 
be the basis for claims based on non-conformity, or it can lead to the right of 
rescission in cases of misconception. Therefore, it is not convincing to argue that a 
promotional statement only gains legal relevance at the time of concluding a 
contract.110 It is rather the purpose of the principle of c.i.c. to protect the consumer 
from unfair commercial practices prior to the conclusion of a contract.111 Likewise the 
UCPD applies to unfair commercial practices in B2C relationships prior, during and 
after sales transactions.112 Moreover, the recognition of liability according to the 
principles of c.i.c. does not create an unpredictable liability risk for the business 
97  For more details on “Erklärungsirrtum”: Riedler “§ 871 ABGB”, recs. 8-11 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
98  Cf. Sack GRUR 2004, 630. 
99 See for more information Kolba/Leupold (2014), p. 188 seq. 
100 For further reference, cf. Riedler “Sec. 870 ABGB” in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014); see also 
Bollenberger (2011) in: Fischer-Czermak and others (eds.), p. 887. 
101 Cf. Riedler “Sec. 871 ABGB”, rec. 1 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
102 See also Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175. For the principle of culpa in contrahendo cf. e.g. 
Koziol (1984), p. 70 seqq. 
103 See for example OGH 26.4.2005, 4 Ob 65/05w. 
104 Cf. e.g. Köhler GRUR 2003, 271; see also Alexander (2002), p. 140, 144 seqq. 
105 Sack GRUR 2004, 628; Lehmann (1981), p. 295 et seqq; Lehmann NJW 1981, 1233, 1239 seqq. 
106 Cf. Koziol (1984), p. 70 et seqq. 
107 See also Leupold ÖBl 2010, 164, 169. 
108 This argument has already been brought forward by the author in Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175. See 
for the contrary opinion Köhler GRUR 2003, 271. 
109 Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175. 
110 But cf. e.g. Köhler GRUR 2003, 267; Alexander (2002), p.145 et seqq.  
111 Cf. e.g. Lehmann NJW 1981, 1233, 1239. 
112 See also for the intersection between unfair competition law and contract law Bydlinski (2013), p. 596-
630; Micklitz/Keßler GRUR Int. 2002, 885, 890; Schulte-Nölke ZGS 2003, 41.  
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party.113 Every business party has the freedom to choose whether to act fairly and to 
put (without additional costs) a note on his sales announcement as to how long the 
special offer will last. In the case we began with, the retailer could have indicated on 
his website that the special offer had ended. Moreover, the principle of c.i.c. contains 
pre-contractual informational duties.114 Hence, if consumers trusted the misleading 
advertising statement of the seller, they can invoke c.i.c.115 In this regard, it does not 
matter for the application of c.i.c. if a contract has been concluded or not.116 If 
consumers can prove that they would not have concluded the contract otherwise, they 
have a right to terminate the contract.117 Moreover, the principle of c.i.c. allows the 
claiming of damages if the preconditions of Sec. 1295 ABGB are met.118 In some 
cases, however, consumers will not have suffered economic damages. In the absence 
of the misleading statement or if the seller had provided them with the relevant 
information, they simply would not have concluded the contract.119 Considering that 
the UWG also aims at protecting economic self-determination, the contracting party 
must be allowed to invoke c.i.c.120 For the relationship between c.i.c. and warranty 
rights, this means that they do not exclude each other: While the former aims at 
protecting the freedom of will, the latter protects the equivalence of payment and 
goods.121 
Only consumer organisations showed some interest in the introduction of specific 
contractual remedies for breach of the UCPD. Other stakeholders advocated against 
such contractual remedies. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Standard contract terms were regulated in Austria already prior to the transposition of 
the UCTD, as Sec. 6 KSchG (which dates from 1979) as well as Sec. 897 para. 3 ABGB 
already provided such control long before the UCTD was passed.122 Hence, the 
transposition of the UCTD led only to small changes. The most important change 
results from the codification of the transparency requirement (see Sec. 6 para. 3 
KSchG).123 
As the principle-based approach of the UCTD has been known in Austria since the 
introduction of Sec. 897 para. 3 ABGB, stakeholders did not report any difficulties.  
 
113 See for that argument Köhler GRUR 2003, 271. 
114 Koziol/Welser (1992), p. 206 seq. See also Welser ÖJZ 1973, 282 seqq. 
115 Cf. e.g. Leupold ÖBl 2010, 164, 169. 
116 Cf. Koziol/Welser (1992), 139. 
117 Cf. e.g. Leupold ÖBl 2010, 169. 
118 Koziol/Welser (1992), p. 139. 
119 See also Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175. 
120 Cf. recital 14 to the UCPD. See also Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175. 
121 Cf. Ofner “§ 922 ABGB”, rec. 32 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014); Koziol/Welser (1992), p. 267 (regarding 
the law of mistake and warranty rights). 
122 The criteria for determining whether a standard term became part of a contract are stated in Sec. 864a 
ABGB, cf. Bollenberger, “§ 864a ABGB”, rec. 9 seq. in: Koziol/Bydlinsky/Bollenberger (2014). 
123 Kiendl (1997), p. 220. 
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• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The different terms of the indicative list partly overlap with the provisions in 
Sec. 6 para. 1 and 2 KSchG. This section covers terms which are not binding for the 
consumer (black list) under any circumstances124 (ex tunc effect).125 By contrast, 
Sec. 6 para. 2 KSchG lists terms which are not binding for the consumer unless the 
business proves that the given term was individually negotiated.  
The listed terms provide guidance when interpreting the general clause established in 
Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB.126 Both the indicative list of the UCTD and the provisions in 
Sec. 6 KSchG are considered not to be conclusive, instead being flexible enough to 
ensure that all problematic cases are covered. 
It is important to note that the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice held that a term 
stating that the contract was individually negotiated is void pursuant to 
Sec. 6 para. 1 No. 11 KSchG).127 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The two black lists in Austria work very well in practice: Courts apply the list and the 
general clause extensively. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
According to Austrian law, court decisions have effect only inter partes with regard to 
the subject matter in dispute, Sec. 411 Austrian Civil Procedure Code 
(‘Zivilprozessordnung’, ZPO),128 Sec. 12 ABGB. An extension regarding unfair contract 
terms law is neither in existence nor planned.  
The general clause and the concretisations can only protect the respective parties to 
the contract.129 This applies to private persons submitting an individual lawsuit and 
also to injunction proceedings under Sec. 28 seq. KSchG.130 Therefore, if a term used 
by a business is considered to be void by a court decision, another business using the 
same term is not bound by this specific decision. Nevertheless, the second business 
has to fear subsequent lawsuits as court decisions at higher instances are usually 
highly influential for future cases at first instance.  
124 Schurr “§ 6 KSchG”, recs. 1, 6 in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
125 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 1 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
126 Riedler “§ 879 ABGB”, rec. 35 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
127 OGH 11.10.2006, 7 Ob 78/06f. 
128 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) No. 113/1895, recently amended by Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, 
No. 54/2015. 
129 Riedler “§ 879 ABGB”, rec. 40, in: Schwimann/Kodek (2014). 
130 Langer “§ 28 KSchG”, rec. 1 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015); see also answers given under 1.3. 
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In order to simplify this outcome, standard terms have to be handed over to 
associations who request them, in accordance with Sec. 28 para. 2 KSchG; also, the 
publication of court decisions is codified under Sec. 30 KSchG, Sec. 25 UWG.131 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Since the transposition of the UCTD’s transparency requirement in Sec. 6 para 
3 KSchG, a large number of decisions have been based on this provision. This shows 
that Sec. 6 para. 3 KSchG has become a very important part of Austrian unfair 
contract terms law.132 Due to the high amount of case law in this specific field of law, 
the level of consumer protection has increased noticeably.133 One stakeholder, 
however, expressed the fear that Austrian courts apply Sec. 6 para. 3 KSchG too 
extensively, making it too difficult for businesses to forecast whether a term will be 
considered as transparent or not. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Under Austrian Law, neither Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB nor Sec. 6 KSchG are applicable to 
the main subject matter. This question is rather one of general civil law, 
cf. Sec. 879 para. 2 line 4 and Sec. 934 ABGB.134 
The listed terms in Sec. 6 para. 1 KSchG are considered void, regardless of whether 
they are standard contract terms or individually negotiated terms.135 According to 
some stakeholders, this level of protection assures a certain advantage as the 
respective differentiation becomes redundant. 
An extension of the application regarding the adequacy of the price has not been 
established. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The majority of legal scholars as well as stakeholders consider the effectiveness of the 
sanction as positive overall. In this respect, see also the answers given above.  
However, some stakeholders pointed out that it could be helpful to codify the ex officio 
approach, which has been implemented due to the CJEU Asbeek judgment,136 at least 
in cases that fall under the scope of application of the Directive.137 This ex officio 
approach differs from the general rule of Austrian procedural law that a consumer has 
to plead a procedural defence before court, in order for the term to be declared as 
void. 
131 Prunbauer-Glaser/Seidelberger (2015), p. 254. 
132 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 107 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
133 OGH 17.02.2016, 7 Ob5/16k; OGH 25.07.2014, 5 Ob 118/13h; OGH 30.08.2012, 2 Ob 59/12h; 
Schurr “§ 6 KSchG”, para. 3, rec. 3 seq. in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
134 Bollenberger “§ 879 ABGB“, rec. 22 in: Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (2014).  
135 Schurr “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 7 in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
136 ECLI:EU:C:2013:341 (Asbeek). 
137 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 6a in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015); Schurr “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 12 seq. in: 
Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
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As far as CJEU guidance is concerned, some scholars point out that the guidelines do 
not provide the necessary clarity when applied to individual cases.138 
There is no administrative remedy for consumers in this area. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Some stakeholders pointed out that the question whether a term concerns the main 
subject matter is still heavily discussed in each individual case, which leads to legal 
uncertainty. Therefore, either the whole differentiation should be dropped in the future 
or – subsidiary to that – a clearer definition should be provided in order to facilitate 
legal certainty. 
Furthermore (as mentioned above), according to some stakeholders a legal 
codification and clarification regarding the ex officio approach would be useful. In 
addition, the European view regarding the possibility of reducing an unfair term to its 
legally permitted core (‘geltungserhaltende Reduktion’) should be stated as well. 
However, all stakeholders stressed the importance of the ‘minimum harmonisation’ 
approach of the UCTD. Hence, a change in this matter is not considered to be 
necessary.  
As far as graphical models are concerned, stakeholders doubt their effectiveness in 
practice and therefore do not support their implementation. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
With the exception of the early ruling Freiburger Kommunalbauten,139 the CJEU leaves 
to the national courts the ultimate decision as to whether a particular term is unfair or 
not. As a consequence, it is difficult to develop uniform European standards for unfair 
terms and there is a possibility that disparities may occur. 
However, none of the stakeholders mentioned any disparities in Austria having an 
impact on cross border trade. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
So far no evidence was found. None of the stakeholders mentioned any problems. 
138 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 4 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015) with reference to ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 (Kásler). 
139 ECLI:EU:C:2004:209 (Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter 
and Ulrike Hofstetter). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
25
 1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
As Sec. 879 para. 3 BGB applies to B2B relations too, and Sec. 6 KSchG is used to 
interpret the general clause of that provision (despite the fact that it is not directly 
applicable to B2B relations), no need to further strengthen the protection of 
businesses was reported. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
The answer to this might be yes, as the respective sections are already applicable to 
B2B transactions. The bargaining power and the level of weakness are always 
determined individually and with reference to the current situation.140 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
It has been argued that the need to distinguish whether a term regulates the main 
subject matter or not leads to uncertainty, as no clear definitions are provided. As a 
result, individual court decisions might differ slightly.141 However, as the current 
system regarding B2B transactions seems to work quite well in practice (see the 
answers given above), stakeholders do not report any need for such an extension. 
Hence, an extension is not planned or necessary. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Whether a term in a B2B relationship is unfair or not is more difficult to determine 
than in B2C relationships because it is presumed that neither one of the parties is in a 
weaker bargaining position per se. This is why it is inevitable that the individual 
situation of the contracting parties is taken into account in each case. None of the 
stakeholders indicated that there are any specific contractual terms which could be 
regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Under Austrian Law, the transparency requirement in Sec. 6 para. 3 KSchG does not 
apply to B2B transactions directly. Some scholars have argued that the provision could 
be applied to B2B relationships by way of analogy or that the transparency 
requirement could be read into Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB.142 Businesses can equally be in 
need of protection from non-transparent terms.143 Other scholars reject this approach 
140 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 2 with references to OGH 09.06.1999, 7 Ob 105/99p; and 
“§ 879 para. 3 KSchG” recs. 32, 34 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015).  
141 Langer “§ 879 para. 3 KSchG”, rec. 7 seq. in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
142 Cf. for an overview of the issue with further references Parapatits (2008) in: Knyrim/Leitner/Perner/Riss 
(eds.), p. 35, 37 seq.  
143 Leitner (2005), p. 130 seq. 
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and argue that businesses can be expected to put more effort into understanding 
contract terms.144 The question has also not been decided by the Supreme Court of 
Justice thus far, though one decision mentions that taking transparency issues into 
account when applying Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB in B2B cases is worth considering.145  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Austrian – as well as German – law already knows such an extension. Hence, it seems 
that such an extension would not hinder cross-border trade. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?146  
The ID is transposed into Austrian law by Secs. 28 and 28a KSchG and Sec. 29 
para. 2 KSchG as well as Sec. 14 UWG. However, injunction proceedings were already 
possible prior to the transposition of the ID since the initial version of the KSchG, 
which entered into force in 1979, had already contained a provision on injunctions.147 
According to Sec. 28 KSchG, injunction proceedings may be brought against any 
natural or legal person whose standard terms and conditions contravene a statutory 
prohibition or are contrary to public policy. The organisations with standing include the 
Association for Consumer Information, the Austrian Economic Chamber, the Federal 
Chamber of Labour, the Council of Austrian Chambers of Agricultural Labour and the 
Austrian Trade Union Federation (Sec. 29 KSchG).148 Consequently, individual 
consumers have no locus standi. It should also be noted that an individual consumer 
cannot oblige an organisation to bring a claim. Annex I of the Directive is implemented 
in Sec. 28a para. 1 KSchG. This provision provides for injunctions against traders 
contravening laws in connection with doorstep transactions, negotiations away from 
business premises, consumer loan relationships, package tour arrangements, time 
share relationships, distance sales, the agreement of unfair terms, legal or commercial 
warranties for the purchase of manufacturing of movable tangible assets or in 
connection with IT services in e-commerce transactions, investment and asset 
management services, payment services or the act of issuing e-money as well as the 
laws transposing Directive 2006/123/EC.149 The provision also allows for injunctions 
against a trader who violates the rule on general information requirements 
144 Kath (2007), p. 226 seqq; against an analogous application of Sec. 6 para. 3 also 
Schurr “§ 6 para. 3 KSchG”, rec. 8 in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
145 OGH 15.10.2003, 7 Ob 146/03a. 
146 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
147 Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG”, rec. 2 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
148 Rechberger/Simotta (2010), rec. 156 seq. 
149 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12.12.2006 on services in the internal market 
(OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36). 
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(Sec. 5a KSchG) or the rule regarding payments for phone costs (Sec. 6b KSchG), the 
rule regarding additional payments (Sec. 6c KSchG), the rules regarding the 
performance deadline (Sec. 7a KSchG) or the passing of risk (‘Gefahrenübergang’) 
(Sec. 7b KSchG), the rule on alternative dispute resolution (Sec. 19 ASTG) or the rules 
on online dispute resolution (Art. 14 para. 1 and 2 Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013)150 – 
by covering those violations, as well as with the inclusion of the rules on investment 
and asset management services, payment services and the act of issuing e-money, 
Sec. 28a para. 1 KSchG goes beyond the Directives mentioned in Annex I to the 
UCTD.151 No. 11 of the Annex UCPD has been transposed in Sec. 14 UWG. No. 9 of the 
Annex Directive 2001/83/EC152 has been transposed into Austrian law by Sec. 85a Act 
on medical products153.154 Sec. 28a para. 1a KSchG goes beyond the scope of 
application of the Directive as well and covers nursing home contracts. Contrary to 
Sec. 28 KSchG, Sec. 28a KSchG does not require the use of standard contract 
terms.155 It sanctions certain – unfair – practices.156 However, the scope of 
Sec. 28a para. 1 KSchG is also narrower compared to Sec. 28 KSchG since it 
enumerates the situations covered and presupposes a violation impairing the general 
interests of consumers.157 Sec. 28a KSchG is not subsidiary to Sec. 28 KSchG 
(contrary to the corresponding provisions in German law, Secs. 1 and 2 UKlaG).158 
Accordingly, the use of unfair terms is covered by both provisions if the term in 
question forms part of standard contract terms and also violates one of the provision 
enumerated in Sec. 28a KSchG.159 
Both stakeholders and legal scholars consider the injunction procedure as a very 
helpful tool to combat violations of consumer protection laws.160 They also point out, 
however, the lack of (sufficient) protection for individual consumers regarding the 
consequences of a violation of consumers rights. In particular, there is no claim for 
remedial action under the KSchG.161 This has been especially criticised by 
stakeholders, who highlighted the lack of efficient means to either redress ongoing 
faults or skim profits of the trader (see also the reform proposals below). Some 
stakeholders also argue that the introduction of a remedial action in the KSchG is 
necessary in order to satisfy the effectiveness principle under European law, as only a 
remedial action guarantees effective law enforcement and effective deterrence. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
In Austria, the costs of court proceedings in general (and thereby also injunction 
procedures) are borne by the losing party. Stakeholders point out that this might lead 
150 Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21.05.2013 on online 
dispute resolution for consumer disputes (OJ L 165, 18.06.2013, p. 1) 
151 However, these additions to Sec. 28a KSchG were made to transpose other EU Directives not mentioned 
in the Annex, see Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 32a in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
152 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6.11.2001 on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p. 67). 
153 “Arzneimittelgesetz (ArzneimittelG)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No 77/1983. 
154 See also Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 32a in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
155 Kathrein/Schoditsch “§ 28a KSchG” rec. 1 in Koziol/Bydlinski/Bollenberger (2014); Kühnberg (2005), 
p. 122. 
156 See e.g. Apathy “30 KSchG” rec. 23 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2015). 
157 Donath “§ 28a KSchG” rec. 2 in: Schwimann (2015). 
158 Kühnberg (2005), pp. 127-128. 
159 Eccher “§ 28 KSchG”“ rec. 4 in: Fenyves/Kerschner/Vonkilch (2006). 
160 Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 1 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
161 See e.g. Riss RdW 2007, 395, 398. Sec.15 UWG, conversely, establishes a claim for remedial action.  
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to interim injunctions being pursued reluctantly since organisations with locus standi 
might be afraid of the high costs in the event of losing the case. In this regard, 
particularly interim legal relief is not as efficient as it could be. Due to limited funding, 
organisations have to evaluate which cases to take on. Moreover, the effects of the 
decision are insufficient. Firstly, there is no claim to remedial action. Secondly, a 
decision is not binding on other courts and consumers162 but only inter partes (see 
also the reform proposals, below, being made to the EU legislator). However, the 
‘indirect effect’ of a decision on individual consumer proceedings should be noted: 
pursuant to Sec. 28 para. 1 clause 2 KSchG, traders cannot invoke standard contract 
terms which have been found unlawful. Furthermore, the Austrian Supreme court 
allows businesses a period of about four months in order to adapt contracts163 - a 
practice which is highly criticised by stakeholders.  
By contrast, both stakeholders and legal scholars assess the effect of the publication 
of decisions more positively164 (even though the winning party is obliged to finance the 
publication in advance and can then claim back the costs, which creates (in-)solvency 
risks).165 On the other hand, there are shortcomings in this area, too: if the plaintiff 
loses the case, the defendant has also a right to have the decision published, stating 
that his terms are lawful.166 This again causes high costs and might deter 
organisations with standing from initiating an injunction in the first place. The 
sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order follow from general procedural 
law (Secs. 346 et seqq. Enforcement Act).167 The sanctions can include payments up 
to EUR 100 000 a day. However, in practice the amounts are usually much lower. 
Furthermore, Austria has not introduced a compulsory procedure requiring the party 
who seeks an injunction to achieve the cessation of the infringement in consultation 
with the defendant prior to formal proceedings (see Article 5 of the Directive).168 
However, experts consider such consultation necessary since it is not quite clear 
among Austrian scholars whether – and, if so, under what conditions – a cease-and-
desist statement issued by a trader precludes an injunction (see 
Sec. 28 para. 2 KSchG). Moreover, if prior consultation take place, there is no rule 
determining the allocation of costs. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The scope of application of the injunction procedure has been extended beyond the 
pieces of EU legislation listed in Annex I of the Directive in Sec. 28a para. 1a KSchG so 
as to include nursing home contracts. For further extensions, see the answer to the 
first question above.  
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Again, experts point to the shortcomings with regard to interim legal relief. Moreover, 
several obstacles regarding injunction actions against traders from other countries are 
perceived as rather difficult to overcome (see below). 
 
162 Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 1 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
163 See e.g. OGH 28.01.2009, Az. 10 Ob 70/07b, RdW 2009, 355, 401; Rechberger “§ 409“ rec. 1b in: 
Rechberger (2014). 
164 See e.g. Apathy “§ 30 KSchG”, rec. 2 in: Schwimann/Kodek (2015). 
165 See on the publication requirement Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 10 seqq. In: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
166 See also Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG”, rec. 10b in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
167 “Exekutionsordnung (EO)”, Imperial Law Gazette (RGBl.) I, No. 79/1896, recently amended by Act of 
11.08.2014, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 69/2014 Federal Law Gazette (RGBl.) No 79/1896. 
168 Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG” rec. 40 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
The fact that other courts and consumers are not bound by a decision is one of the 
biggest deficiencies in Austrian injunctions law. Not least due to the CJEU’s decision in 
Invitel,169 the Union’s legislature should consider implementing a rule stating that a 
decision is binding on all consumers concerned.170 Moreover, EU legislation could 
provide for a claim of remedial protection. Such a claim could include the skimming of 
profits. Furthermore, in the area of telecommunication law, judicial relief could be 
enhanced (in particular within the scope of the Universal Service Directive).171 Finally, 
the EU legislature could rethink the requirement that a measure must harm ‘the 
collective interest of consumers.’172 This is often hard to prove. Therefore, this 
requirement should be abolished or at least a rebuttable presumption could be 
introduced. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
This is considered very difficult in practice. First of all, these difficulties include the 
general risks that are known to effect the fight against infringements of the law in 
other countries (difficulties regarding, for example, notification of the claim, difficulties 
of proof, travel expenses for witnesses, translation costs, knowledge of the law/higher 
risk of losing the case etc.). More specific difficulties are listed below. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Practitioners consider cross-border enforcement to be very difficult, since the costs are 
considered as quite high and such court actions are subject to considerable legal 
uncertainty. The risks involved include not only language barriers but also risks due to 
different procedural and substantive laws. Moreover, qualified entities are in need of 
specific rules regarding international jurisdiction and the applicable law in order to 
reduce legal uncertainty. This is especially true for consumer entities who – according 
to the jurisprudence of the CJEU – do not fall under the jurisdiction over consumer 
contracts (Art. 17 Brussels I Regulation).173 
 
169 ECLI:EU:C:2012:242. 
170 See also Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG”, rec. 1 in Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
171 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 07.04.2002 on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services. 
172 Art. 1 para. 2 of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23.04.2009 on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests. 
173 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12.12.2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Stakeholders suggest different means to improve the effectiveness of the Directive, 
including a better enforcement of judgments. This proves problematic with regard to 
subsequent violations, because in some countries penalty payments are already 
included in the judgment, whereas in Austria, for instance, they are determined later 
by a different court. Hence, it remains unclear whether a court from a different 
country can later order this penalty payment, i.e. whether this court has the 
competence to do so. 
Moreover, stakeholders argue that consumer entities should fall under 
Art. 17 seq. Brussels I regulation. At least the mosaic principle established by the 
CJEU174 should be abolished. Equally, it has been suggested that one could consider 
establishing a Europe-wide legal effect of a national court’s decision. Quite problematic 
is the question of the applicable substantive law. This is especially relevant in 
countries such as Germany and Austria, where the provisions regarding the right of 
action in injunction proceedings are part of the substantive law, too. It should be 
clarified that this type of arrangement does not preclude the right of action in different 
Member States. With regard to the question which article of the Rome II regulation 
covers the claim for an injunction, one stakeholder said that from a consumer 
perspective, the application of Art. 6 para. 2 Rom II Regulation175 is preferable. The 
CJEU has just recently decided likewise.176 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Yes, they are regulated in different provisions (UCPD: Sec. 14 UWG, UCTD: 
Sec. 28 KSchG, ID: Sec. 28a KSchG, CRD: part of Sec. 28a KSchG). A general 
coherence is ensured by cross-references between the provisions. Moreover, Sec. 29 
para. 1 KSchG establishes the same right of action with regard to claims under Sec. 
28 KSchG and Sec 28a KSchG.177 In addition, the same civil procedure rules are 
applicable, too. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
In theory, there should be differentiation regarding the question whether it is 
necessary to discontinue the challenged activity unconditionally in response to cease-
and-desist-warnings (‘Abmahnung und Unterlassenserklärung’, Sec. 28 para. 2 
174 ECLI:EU:C:1995:61 (Shevill). 
175 Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of  
11.07.2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. 
176 ECLI:EU:C:2016:612 (Amazon). 
177 Langer “§§ 28-30 KSchG”, rec. 4 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
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KSchG) in order to establish that there is no risk of repetition (‘Wiederholungsgefahr’). 
The Supreme Court of Justice is much stricter on this issue with regard to claims 
under Sec. 28 seq KSchG. However, in practice this difference appears not to be 
relevant, as the statute of limitations regarding UWG claims is rather short (cf. sec 20 
UWG), and consequently cease-and-desist-warnings do not happen very often in this 
context.  
Furthermore, some qualified entities have only a limited right of action under the 
UWG, while there are no limitations with regard to Secs. 28, 28a KSchG.178 One 
stakeholder has considered this as unfitting. With regard to the use of unfair standard 
contract terms, claims can be brought both under the KSchG and the UWG, as the use 
of unfair standard contract terms constitutes an unfair commercial practice, too.179 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
When it comes to substantive law, consumers are well protected against unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms. In this regard, stakeholders 
highlighted the contribution the PID has made to consumer information. In particular, 
they pointed out that the PID not only classifies which information regarding to the 
price has to be indicated, but also how this has to be done. This facilitates the 
comparison of prices, which is particularly important in Austria where consumers in 
areas near the border often shop in other EU states. Stakeholders also consider the 
character of the PID as minimally harmonised as beneficial for consumers as in their 
view each Member State can determine best what its citizens consider as 
‘unambiguous, easily identifiable and clearly legible’. Also the above-mentioned 
‘Charta zur Grundpreisauszeichnung’, a voluntary commitment of several businesses 
that goes even beyond the PID’s scope is noteworthy. 
However, these benefits are compromised by difficulties in enforcing consumer rights. 
In Austria, infringements of both the UCTD and the UCPD are enforced before civil law 
courts either by individual consumers or certain (qualified) organisations which can 
bring an injunction. It has often been analysed that consumers tend to have a rational 
disinterest in exercising their rights. This is, amongst other reasons, due to the fact 
that a court procedure triggers costs while the outcome of the process is uncertain.180 
For example, in a case where the consumers’ claim is dismissed by the court, they 
have to bear the costs of the court proceeding as well as those of the opposing party 
(Sec. 41 para. 1 ZPO). There are some measures to confront this problem. For 
instance, parties before a local court (this is the court of first instance for claims which 
are not higher than EUR 15 000) are not required to be represented by a lawyer if the 
claim does not exceed EUR 5000 (see Sec. 27 para. 1 ZPO). In order not to undermine 
their chances to win the case without legal assistance, the court is obliged to give 
reasonable hints to parties (Sec. 182 ZPO).181 There is also the possibility to apply for 
state aid (‘Verfahrenshilfe’) for people having special financial needs 
178 Competitors can bring claims (for damages as well as injunctions) under the UWG but not under the 
KSchG. 
179 Wiebe (2016), p. 320. It appears that this issue is less contested in Austria than it is, for instance, in 
Germany. 
180 Also Roth (2012) in: Reimann (ed.), p. 69. 
181 Cf. Fucik “§ 182”, rec. 1 in: Rechberger (2014). 
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(Sec. 63 seqq. ZPO). Although Austrian civil procedure law does not provide a special 
procedure for small claims, it is discussed to which extent Sec. 273 para. 2 ZPO 
should be used to ease the procedure in the case of claims below EUR 1000.182 
Moreover, some of the obstacles consumers face in enforcing their rights are 
overcome by the so-called ‘Austrian style class actions’.183 Consumer organisations – 
the VKI and BAK in particular – have used the possibility of collecting several claims 
into one action under certain circumstances (‘objektive Klagehäufung’, Sec. 227 ZPO), 
a process requiring consumers to assign their claims to the organisations in order to 
bring all claims in one action before one court. One of the advantages is the reduction 
of legal fees for the individual consumer. 
One has also to note the new ADR-procedure.184 However, it is too early to assess if it 
will contribute to a more efficient enforcement of consumer law. Furthermore, in 2007 
the Austrian Ministry of Justice presented a draft that provided for a group action 
procedure as well as a test case procedure. The draft faced great resistance and no 
further actions have been taken so far (despite the introduction of a group action as 
part of the government programme).185 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
In theory, harmonization has benefits for traders because it leads to (some) legal 
certainty. This makes it easier to trade across borders, saving costs, avoiding changes 
of practices etc. However, this only applies if traders can rely on a certain level of 
harmonisation, i.e. that there is actually legal certainty and not a profoundly different 
interpretation among the courts or an (undue) interrelation of the harmonised 
consumer rules with the legal system of the other Member State in question. In 
addition, it has to be noted that other factors – outside the law – have important 
impact on cross-border trade as well, e.g. language barriers. 
With regard to violations of the UCPD not only consumer organisations but also 
competing traders can initiate proceedings, which of course can prove to be beneficial. 
With regard to the use of unfair contract terms, however, one stakeholder argued that 
because of the missing claim for remedial action and the fact that there is no 
possibility of skimming unlawful profits either, the dishonest trader can keep the 
profits of the unlawful behaviour to a great extent. This may create an incentive to 
behave unlawfully to the detriment not only of consumers but also of other honest 
traders. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Stakeholders were mostly concerned about compliance costs caused by the multitude 
of information obligations. 
 
182 Cf. Trenker RZ 2015, 74, 78. 
183 This model is often referred to as “Austrian style class actions”. In the view of the author, this label is 
misleading and not well chosen since it suggests similarities with the American class action. Cf. 
Augenhofer (2012) in: Festschrift Simotta, p. 39 seqq. with further references. 
184 Austrian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, p. 105, implementing the 
Directive 2013/11/EU and the Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013. 
185 See Rechberger/Simotta (2010), p. 176 seqq. 
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• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Please note that the enforcement system in Austria relies on the private enforcement 
before civil law courts. There is certainly not any public enforcement. Although the 
Austrian government is the primary funder of some private organisations and insofar 
financially assists private enforcement, this does not make the system a public 
enforcement system. 
First, the BAK (Bundesarbeiterkammer, Federal Chamber of Labour) – which is one of 
the organisations having standing to file actions – employs three members of staff 
dealing with representative actions/injunctions. However, it is difficult to assess the 
exact amount of costs involved. In particular, there is the risk of losing the process 
with the consequence of bearing all costs (see above). The risk of litigation costs has 
been estimated at about EUR 30 000. However, it should be noted that the suits 
brought by the BAK have been highly successful. 
Secondly, the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection 
finances the VKI (Verein für Konsumenteninformation, Association for Consumer 
Information) with around EUR 640 000 a year in order to cover wages and the risk of 
litigation costs. Furthermore, there might be additional funding for some cases. Here, 
too, most of the cases are won with the consequence that actual litigation costs are 
relatively low. In addition to that, the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection employs two academics who are in charge of selecting and 
monitoring the proceedings (costs: around EUR 200 000 per annum).186 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
Regarding the UCTD and ID, some stakeholders would consider the implementation of 
a claim for remedial action to be more cost-efficient approach. It was mentioned that 
abolishing overlapping information duties may reduce costs.  
 
186 Conversely, the also-mentioned “Schutzverband gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb” is funded privately, 
mainly by its members, such as business associations or firms. 
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1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied 
in practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
Stakeholders consider there to be a high level of knowledge amongst organisations 
with standing and amongst businesses and consumers, with regard to the UCPD and 
UCTD (or, more correctly, the national implementation laws). There is also 
comprehensive case law on both directives. Consumers regularly report misleading or 
aggressive practices as well as unfair contract terms to consumer organisations. Whilst 
consumers grasp the unlawfulness of a practice, they do not know the exact legal 
classification of the problem.  
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Austria, (horizontal) consumer law enforcement takes place first and foremost in 
front of civil courts, through proceedings by organisations having standing, in 
particular the VKI and BAK. Pursuant to Sec. 16 para. 1, authorities of the Austrian 
federal states enforce the PID, but they may also be enforced by civil courts (see 
1.1.2). In regulated sectors (telecommunication and energy), traders are obliged to 
notify the regulators about the content of their standard contract terms prior to their 
use.187 The review focuses on sector specific rules. At the same time, apparent 
violations of general consumer law might be also identified. This avoids serious 
violations in advance, and allows organisations with standing – considering their 
limited funding – to focus on other cases. 
 
187 For the telecommunication sector the “Telekom-Control-Kommission” is competent pursuant to 
Sec. 24 para. 1 Telecommunication Act (“Telekommunikationsgesetz”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 
70/2003 recently amended by Federal Act of 26.11.2015, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 134/2015); 
for the energy sector (gas and electricity) “E-Control” is competent pursuant to Sec. 80 Federal Act on 
Regulation and Organization of Electricity Industries (“Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und –organisationsgesetz”, 
Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 110/2010, recently amended by Act of 06.08.2013, Federal Law 
Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 174/2013) and Sec. 125 Federal Act on Regulating Gas Industries 
(“Gaswirtschaftsgesetz”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 107/2011, recently amended by Act of 
14.08.2015, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 226/2015. 
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• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The complementary application of the UCPD and the UCTD in the regulated sectors 
(e.g., energy, telecommunication, financial services and transport) is of high 
importance for consumers – here too it is important to protect consumers against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms. Stakeholders consider the 
general provisions of the UCPD and UCTD as necessary alongside the sector specific 
rules since the latter do not tackle all problematic practices (especially in sectors as 
dynamic as the areas mentioned above). However, stakeholders also stress the need 
for a harmonisation of the different rules and note especially the importance of 
reducing overlaps in information duties. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration). 
Even though stakeholders consider the cases involving C2B relations as quite rare, 
some stakeholders are in favour of extending the UCTD and UCPD to C2B relations. If 
a consumer, for example, sells goods to a trader, it is the consumer who usually is in 
need of protection, as opposed to the trader. Since in Austria standard contract terms 
are (partly) governed by the General Civil Code,188 it should be noted that these 
provisions already apply to C2B relations. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Courts apply the concepts of ‘consumers’, ‘vulnerable consumers’ and ‘average 
consumers’ consistent with the relevant CJEU case law. These concepts are further 
seen, in accordance with Rec. 18 UCPD, as normative legal questions, and certainly 
not as question of facts.189 So, there are no general problems in application of these 
concepts, although there might be some minor issues regarding the definition and 
188 Secs. 864a and 879 para. 3 ABGB. 
189 Wiebe (2016), p. 295; Anderl/Appl “§ 2 UWG”, rec. 71 in: Wiebe/Kodek (2016). 
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classification of specific groups of vulnerable consumers. 190 Further developments at 
EU level in this regard, such as Directives 2009/72/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2012/27/EU or 
2014/92/EU, which also introduced the concept of ‘vulnerable consumers’, have been 
well recognised by Austrian legislators. Nevertheless, some stakeholders emphasised 
the advantage of a definition of the several groups of ‘vulnerable consumers’ based on 
the Member States’ needs and circumstances. Some scholars even doubt the 
competence of the EU legislature to create comprehensive definitions in this context, 
e.g. for the term ‘child’.191  
However, regarding the concept of ‘consumer’ one stakeholder – which is a regulatory 
authority – mentioned that the concept should be extended to small enterprises. The 
characteristic structural imbalance between two parties is also observed in 
transactions among small companies and big ones. Small businesses are often less 
experienced and educated in legal matters, which is why they deserve the same 
protection as consumers. In a similar context, the Austrian legislator recognised the 
need for protection: Sec. 1 para. 3 KSchG extends the notion of ‘consumer’ to persons 
setting up their own business. Generally this complies also with fully harmonisation 
approach of the directives, since those persons are not within the scope.192 However 
there have not been reported any problems with this extension and the directives 
discussed. 
It should be noted that there is some debate among Austrian scholars whether the 
notion of consumer applied by the Supreme Court of Justice in cases pertaining to 
financial services, differs from the general consumer concept. The Supreme Court of 
Justice had to decide in a series of cases, on the applicability of the law of mistake and 
the UWG with regard to misleading statements for investment products. In one of the 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Justice differentiated between consumers who had 
invested previously and consumers who were first-time investors and wanted to invest 
their money in something as safe as a savings accounts.193 While the advertisement in 
question directly approached ‘first-time-investors’ – by showing the particular 
investment opportunity as an alternative to a savings account – it could not be 
excluded that also consumers with prior experience were attracted by the 
advertisement. However, since this judgment falls within the exemption of 
Art. 3 para. 9 UCPD, it complies with UCPD’s full-harmonisation approach; 
nevertheless, it offers an example of an additional category of consumers.194 
Stakeholders pointed out that there may arise legal uncertainties and considerable 
costs for businesses if the concept of ‘vulnerable consumers’ is also applied within the 
scope of the UCTD: Businesses would need to provide different terms and conditions 
and would needed to assess whether a prospective contracting party is a ‘vulnerable 
consumer’ or not. In summary, there is currently no need to intervene in this regard. 
Moreover the Member States’ courts should be put in the position to further concretise 
the concepts for now. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
As already noted above (1.1.1), the UCPD has not led to an increase in consumer 
protection in Austria. To the contrary, stakeholders argue that the level of protection 
decreased since its implementation due to the ECJ’s broad interpretation of the full 
190 Cf. e.g. Kaps/Bräunlich wbl 2013, 614. 
191 Kaps/Bräunlich wbl 2013, 614, 616; Prunbauer-Glaser ÖBl 2008, 164, 166. 
192 Cf. for further details Kosesnik-Wehrle “§ 1 KSchG”, rec. 17 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
193 OGH 20.1.2009, 4 Ob 188/08p. 
194 Cf. for further references Augenhofer (2011), p. 21. 
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harmonisation approach. However, it should be stressed that the level of protection 
against unfair competition was high in Austria before and still remains high.  
As far as the UCTD is concerned, the level of consumer protection increased slightly 
since the introduction of the directive. However, stakeholders doubt that this is a 
result of the Directive (apart from the codification of the transparency rule in 
Sec. 6 para. 3 KSchG) but rather a result of fact that the Austrian legislature could 
maintain and introduce more protective provisions under the directive’s minimum 
harmonisation approach. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
In contrast to the UCPD and UCTD, the effect of the PID was assessed positively, as 
corresponding rules were not known before the implementation of the PID. The 
directive is especially important since the enacted legislation liberalising the quantities 
of prepacked goods (see above). 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Again, Austrian unfair competition law already covered B2B relations before the 
introduction of the MCAD. Due to Austria’s longstanding tradition in the area of unfair 
competition law, a substantial increase in the level of protection of businesses cannot 
be reported. Moreover, the level of business protection might have been decreased by 
the liberalisation of comparative advertising, which was only allowed under narrow 
circumstances prior to the implementation of the MCAD. However, it should be noted 
that comparative advertisement might also work in favour of competition by fostering 
it and enhancing consumer decision-making. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Stakeholders did not report any experiences thereof.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
As already emphasised, the effect of the directive is hard to assess, due to the fact 
that the protection level was high before and the Directive has hardly led to any 
changes. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – AUSTRIA 
Directive Transposition legislation (National law, 
Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Bundesgesetz vom 30.03.1979, BGBl. Nr. 
140/1979 (Konsumentenschutzgesetz), slightly 
extended by Art. 1, Bundesgesetz vom 
10.01.1997, BGBl. I, No. 6/1997 (“KSchG-
Novelle”) 
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Sec. 6 
para. 1 
KSchG 
 
Bundesgesetz vom 30.03.1979, BGBl. Nr. 
140/1979 (Konsumentenschutzgesetz), slightly 
extended by Art. 1, Bundesgesetz vom 
28.10.2003, BGBl. No. 91/2003 
(“Zivilrechtsänderungsgesetz 2004”) 
 'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
Yes Sec. 6 
para. 2 
KSchG 
Please note, that the ‘grey list’ in Sec. 6 
para. 2 KSchG is not identical to the “grey 
list” in European law. 
  Extension of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
Yes Sec. 6 
para. 1 
KSchG 
The terms listed in Sec. 6 para. 1 KSchG are 
void, regardless whether they were 
individually negotiated or can be qualified 
as standard contract terms. Sec. 6 para. 2 
KSchG only applies to standard contract 
terms. 
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  Extension of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
  Application of certain 
unfair contract terms 
provisions to B2B 
relationships 
Yes Sec. 
879 
para. 3 
ABGB 
The Austrian Supreme Court affirmed the 
use of § 6 KSchG as an indicative list for BB 
contracts under certain circumstance 
(“Ungleichgewichtslage”).195 Under general 
civil law all standard contract terms are 
scrutinised under Sec. 879 para. 3 ABGB. 
 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
  Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
No  This derogation is not explicitly taken 
advantage of within the UWG, the statute 
in which the UCPD was implemented. 
However, a comprehensive look at the 
provision regarding the conduct of financial 
intermediaries and real estate brokers 
shows that there are stricter rules to a 
minor extent. 
  Provisions regarding 
immovables going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
Bundesgesetz vom 13.11.2007, BGBl. I, No. 
79/2007 (“UWG-Novelle 2007”), further 
amended and harmonised with the UCPD by 
Bundesgesetz vom 22.04.2015, BGBl. I No. 
49/2015 (“UWG-Novelle 2015”) 
 Application of UCPD to 
B2B transactions 
Yes  Traditionally the UWG aimed at the 
protection of competitors. As the 
legislature did not transpose the UCPD so 
as to limit its application to consumers, but 
rather in the UWG, the UCPD’s provisions 
generally also apply to B2B transactions. 
195 Langer “§ 6 KSchG”, rec. 2 in: Kosesnik-Wehrle (2015). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
40
Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
  Extension of the 
application to other 
sectors (e.g. for immovable 
property) 
No   
Bundesgesetz vom 11.07.2000, BGBl. I No. 
55/2000 (“Preisauszeichungsänderungsgesetz”) 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Sec. 
10b 
para. 3 
PrAG 
 
Sec. 
10c 
para. 3 
PrAG 
Derogation for small businesses  
Derogation for common price indications in 
Member States. 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Bundesgesetz vom 13.11.2007, BGBl. I, No. 
79/2007 (“UWG-Novelle 2007”) 
 Misleading advertisement  Sec. 2 
UWG 
 
Bundesgesetz vom 13.11.2007, BGBl. I, No. 
79/2007 (“UWG-Novelle 2007”), further 
harmonised with the MCAD by Bundesgesetz 
vom 22.04.2015, BGBl. I No. 49/2015 (“UWG-
Novelle 2015”) 
 Comparative 
advertisement 
 Sec. 2a 
UWG 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – AUSTRIA  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen 
by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
in your country separately (as a 
separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive or/and by the Consumer 
Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal 
acts 
 
The UCTD’S procedural aspects are transposed in 
Sec. 28 seqq. KSchG, whereas the ID’s 
transposition concerns both Sec. 28 seqq. KSchG 
and Sec. 14 UWG. Additionally, there has been an 
Act on Alternative Dispute Resolution,196 
regulating aspects of Regulation (EU) 524/2013 
and Directive 2013/11/EU. 
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Competitors 
To the extent injunctions against unfair 
commercial practices (regardless whether 
misleading, aggressive commercial practices or 
comparative advertisement) are at issue, the 
following entities are entitled under Sec. 14 UWG: 
Business associations and government bodies, 
such as the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Federal Office of Competition, the Federal Labour 
Chamber, the Austrian Labour Union Association 
and the Chamber of Agriculture. 
To the extent unfair contract terms are at issue, 
the following entities are entitled under Sec. 29 
KSchG: Austrian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Federal Labour Chamber, the Austrian Labour 
Union Association, the Austrian Farmworker 
Council and the Chamber of Agriculture, the 
“Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI)” and 
the “Seniorenrat”. 
Pursuant to Sec. 14 para. 2 UWG and Sec. 29 para. 
2 KSchG, designated consumer organisations are 
entitled to seek an injunction for, infringements of 
both the UCPD and the UCTD. However, please 
note that even if there are entitled public bodies, 
Austria does not have a public enforcement 
system. The entitled bodies have to bring their 
claims before a civil law court. 
Is the injunction procedure a court or 
an administrative procedure? 
- Court procedure  
196 “Alternative-Streitbeilegung-Gesetz”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 105/2015. 
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Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
- The costs are as 
a rule borne by 
the losing party 
Regarding proceedings instituted by privately 
organised qualified entities, Sec. 40 seqq. ZPO 
establishes that each party has to first bear its 
costs itself unless the costs have been induced by 
both or by the court in the interest of both. In the 
case of the latter, both have to commonly bear 
the costs. The party which loses the case has to 
reimburse the opposite party’s legal costs. Where 
each party succeeds on some and fails on other 
aspect of the case, costs have to be shared 
proportionally.  
Is the scope of application of 
injunctions extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer 
law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
areas of 
consumer law 
that are not part 
of Annex I of the 
Directive 
Sec. 28a KSchG e.g. mentions also the general 
information duties of entrepreneurs and providers 
of services related to financial issues, and so-
called “Heimverträge”. For an extensive list, see 
the answer to the first question on the ID. 
Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure? 
- Yes 
 
This is shown by the right of action of the 
Commercial Chamber and regarding unfair 
commercial practices also by the right of action of 
competitors.  
Is it possible to bring an injunction 
action jointly against several traders 
from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
- No 
 
There is the possibility under Sec. 187 ZPO 
whereby different procedures can be dealt with in 
the same proceedings if they are accelerated or 
their costs are minimized this way. However, this 
is in the discretion of the court. Insofar there is no 
possibility to “intentionally” bring an injunction 
toward one economic sector.  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? 
(not including the consultation stage 
under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes (but not 
obligatory)  
 
As Sec. 28 para. 2 KSchG suggests, there is the 
possibility of conducting an out-of-court 
preliminary process, in terms of demanding a 
cease-and-desist declaration 
(“konventionalstrafbesicherte 
Unterlassungserklärung”). However, this is not 
mandatory, but rather impacts the requirement of 
a risk of first infringement and the risk of recurrent 
infringement (“Erstbegehungs- und 
Wiederholungsgefahr”). Nor is the out-of-court-
procedure in Austria de-facto mandatory since it 
has no effect on the cost bearing question in cases 
of an immediate acknowledgement (“sofortiges 
Anerkenntnis”) under Sec. 45 ZPO.197 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- No 
 
 
Does the national legislation provide 
for measures ensuring summary 
procedure? 
- Yes  Interim injunctions are possible (see below) 
Also Sec. 273 para. 2 cl. 2 ZPO allows for a 
simplified procedure in case of claims below the 
value of EUR 1000, but this is in the discretion of 
the court.  
197 Cf. Langer “§§ 20-30 KSchG”, rec. 42 in: Kosesnick-Wehrle (2015). 
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Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) 
of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, a penalty of 
a fine for each 
day of non-
compliance 
Regarding Art. 2 (1) b: Publication of decisions is 
possible in some cases. (see below) 
Regarding Art. 2 (1) c: The EO foresees, for 
instance, fines as sanctions. (see below) 
Under both the EO and Sec. 220 ZPO, the federal 
government is the beneficiary of the fines. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
Sec. 25 UWG indicates that in certain cases it is 
possible (in other cases mandatory) to order the 
publication of the court’s decision at the expense 
of the convicted party. Via Sec. 30 KSchG this 
provision in the UWG also applies to injunctions 
against unfair contract terms and injunctions 
pursuant to Sec. 28a KSchG. 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
- Yes Pursuant to Sec. 355 EO it is possible after having 
obtained an executory title against the person 
obliged to desist; any subsequent contravention 
can be dealt with a fine. If the contravention 
continues, another fine or imprisonment can be 
imposed.  
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public 
purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No Neither the UWG nor the KSchG foresees such 
possibility. 
Can an action for damages to be paid 
to the qualified entity or the public 
purse be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No Qualified entities do not have a claim for 
damages.  
Can an action for damages or redress 
to be paid to the consumers concerned 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- Yes As far as unfair commercial practices are 
concerned, there are generally no claims for 
damages. However, there is a claim for remedial 
action in Sec. 15 UWG. There is no claim for 
remedial action in the context of Secs. 28 and 28a 
KSchG. 
The question whether individual consumers can 
claim for damages they suffered because of an 
unfair commercial practice is highly disputed.198 
Since they are also not entitled to seek an 
injunction under the ID, the question does not 
matter in this context. It might be possible to seek 
an injunction under general civil law (which is, 
however, barely possible as far as unfair contract 
terms or unfair commercial practices are 
concerned). However, in this event the claimant 
could combine both claims under Sec. 227 ZPO. 
198 Enzinger (2012), p. 239. 
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Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions 
order?  
- Yes Under Sec. 17 ZPO intervening parties can join one 
of the main parties if it is in their legal interest. 
Hence if a qualified entity seeks an injunction, a 
consumer suing for damages could join the 
proceeding and therefore the injunction order 
would be binding. Apart from this, the injunction 
order only has effect among the parties. 
Particularly, there is no such provision such as Sec. 
11 German Act on Injunction Claims.  
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- Yes Pursuant to Sec. 24 UWG, claims mentioned in this 
provision can be secured by issuing interim 
injunctions (“einstweilige Verfügungen”). Sec. 24 
UWG is also applicable in the context of Secs. 28 
and 28a KSchG (cf. Sec. 30 KSchG) Also Sec. 458 
ZPO, referring to the EO (relevant provision: Sec. 
378 seqq. and Sec. 355), mentions the possibility 
of interim injunctions. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- No According to Austrian law court decisions have 
effect only inter partes with regard to the subject 
matter in dispute, Sec. 411 ZPO, Sec. 12 ABGB.  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
Note: Data is not available in this regard.  
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).199  
199 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure EUR 299* EUR 628.42** n.a.*** 
Information is 
not available. 
According to 
Sec. 41 para. 1. 
ZPO, the loser 
has to 
reimburse the 
expenses of the 
winner (for 
legal assistance 
and court fees). 
Further it 
should be 
noted, that in 
Austria lawyers 
are paid for 
every action 
they undertook 
consistent with 
the Attorney’ 
Tariff Act.200 
Insofar the fee 
indicated here 
covers only 
filling and 
preparing the 
lawsuit. It is 
possible that 
there will occur 
further relevant 
fees, such as for 
correspondence 
or waiting in 
court. However 
there are also 
reduced fees 
for simple 
claims.  
200 “Rechtsanwaltstarifgesetz (RATG)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 189/1969, amended by Ordinance 
of 27.11.2015, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) II, No. 393/2015. 
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ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0 
No legal 
assistance 
required 
n.a. Information is not available. 
Pursuant to 
Sec. 13 Act on 
Alternative 
Dispute 
Resolution,201 
the procedure 
does not trigger 
any costs. 
There is the 
possibility to 
foresee a 
“minor cost 
contribution” in 
the respective 
alternative 
dispute 
resolution 
procedure (Sec. 
6 para. 5 AStG). 
Notes: * In Austria this is fixed fee depending on the value in dispute; in this case the range EUR 3500-7000 is applicable 
pursuant to Sec. 3 paras. 1 and 3 No. 1 Court Fees Act202with Annex I.1.I.; ** this is the fee for filling a suit before the 
District Court with a value in dispute of EUR 5000 including taxes, EUR 295.30 according to TP4/BG RATG and 
EUR 333.12 for preparing the suit according to TP3/A RATG; please note that legal assistance before District Courts is 
not mandatory up to an amount in dispute of EUR 5000 under Sec. 27 para. 1 ZPO; *** in the event of a dismissal, the 
claimant has to bear the costs of the opposing party, including fees for legal assistance; therefore the opposing party 
has to file a breakdown of costs according to Sec. 54 para. 1 ZPO; the losing party has the chance to file an objection; 
however, the Court ultimately decides on the precise amount that has to be reimbursed by the losing party (Sec. 52 
para. 1 ZPO), which makes it hard to even estimate this amount.  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There is not sufficient data available. 
 
201 “Alternative-Streitbeilegungs-Gesetz (AStG)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, 105/2015. 
202 “Gerichtsgebührengesetz (GGG)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 501/1984, amended by Federal Act 
of 28.12.2015, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, No. 160/2015. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Wirtschaft 
(Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy) 
 
Ministry 22.07.2016 
Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH (Austrian Regulatory 
Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications) 
 
National Regulatory 
Authority 
22.07.2016 
Finanzmarktaufsicht (Financial Market Authority) 
 
National Regulatory 
Authority 
25.07.2016 
Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb 
 
Association against 
Unfair Competition 
15.07.2016 
Bundesministerium für Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice) 
 
Ministry 25.07.2016 
1. Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und 
Konsumentenschutz (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Consumer Protection) 
2. Verein für Konsumenteninformation (Association for 
Consumer Information) 
3. Europäisches Verbraucherzentrum Österreich (European 
Consumer Centre Austria)  
4. Bundesarbeiterkammer (Federal Labour Chamber) 
1. Ministry 
2. Consumer 
Organisation 
3. Consumer 
Organisation 
4. National Authority 
 
26.07.2016 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Austrian Economic Chamber) 
 
Business Organisation  09.08.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Alexander 2002 “Vertrag und unlauterer Wettbewerb“, Berlin. 
Alexander 2012 “Vertragsrecht und Lauterkeitsrecht unter dem Einfluss der 
Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken. Zugleich 
Besprechung der Entscheidung EuGH, 15.03.2012 – C-453/10 
Pereničová und Perenič/SOS”, WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und 
Praxis), p. 515. 
Appl/Homar 2012 “Zugabenverbot: Das letzte Kapitel einer unendlichen Geschichte”, 
MR (Multimedia und Recht), p. 349. 
Augenhofer 2002 “Gewährleistung und Werbung“, Vienna. 
Augenhofer 2003 “Pippig versus Hartlauer: EuGH klärt offene Frage hinsichtlich 
vergleichender Werbung”, RdW (Recht der Wirtschaft), p. 682. 
Augenhofer 2005 “Individualrechtliche Ansprüche des Verbrauchers aus unlauterem 
Wettbewerbsverhalten des Unternehmers”, in: 
Krejci/Keßler/Augenhofer (eds.), Lauterkeitsrecht im Umbruch: 
Europa – Deutschland – Österreich, Vienna. 
Augenhofer 2006 “Individualrechtliche Ansprüche des Verbrauchers bei unlauterem 
Wettberwerbsverhalten des Unternehmers“, WRP (Wettbewerb in 
Recht und Praxis), p. 169. 
Augenhofer 2010 “State of play of the implementation of the provisions on 
advertising in the unfair commercial practices legislation” (Study 
for the Policy Department A of the European Parliament), Brussels. 
Augenhofer 2011 “Country Report Austria” in: Civic Consulting (eds.): Study on the 
application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial 
Practices in the EU. 
Augenhofer 2012 “Aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen im Europäischen 
Verbraucherrecht“ in Susanne Augenhofer (ed.), Verbraucherrecht 
im Umbruch, Tübingen, p. 19. 
Augenhofer 2012 “Some questions on enforcement and individual redress – the 
example of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004” in: Festschrift Simotta, 
Vienna, p. 39. 
Augenhofer 2016 “Unfair Commercial Practices and Austrian Private Law”, EuCML 
(Journal of European Consumer and Contract Law), p. 92. 
Bollenberger 2011 “Lauterkeitsrecht und Irrtumsanfechtung“ in: 
Schenk/Lovrek/Musger/Neumayr (eds.), Festschrift für Irmgard 
Griss, Festschrift für Irmgard Griss, Vienna, p. 65. 
Bollenberger 2011 “Grundfragen des Irrtumsrechts” in: Fischer-Czermak and others 
(eds.), Festschrift 200 Jahre ABGB, Vienna, p. 877. 
Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit, Soziales und 
Konsumentenschutz 
2015 “KonsumentInnen-Barometer”, Vienna. 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law – 
Country report BELGIUM 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive; 
Among Member States, Belgium was a forerunner in the field of protection against 
unfair practices. This may explain that, in the beginning, there was some reluctance to 
apply the Directive: the old law seemed good enough. Nonetheless, the overall 
assessment is positive. 
From the point of view of enforcers, the added value of UCPD lies in the fact that the 
general clauses enable authorities (the Ministry for the Economy) to intervene in cases 
where, prior to the directive, Belgian law would not have provided a legal basis. 
However, the general clause is considered a mixed blessing.  
The Inspectorate (the section of the Ministry for the Economy in charge of enforcing 
consumer protection rules) is wary of relying on article 5 of the UCPD, because 
inspectors are never quite sure whether they will be able to prove unfairness to the 
requisite legal standard should the case be litigated. The semi-general clauses (art 6 
to 8 of the UCPD) have rarely been used. It is only recently that the Inspectorate 
started relying on article 8 of the UCPD (aggressive practices) in the furniture sector. 
Enforcers consider the list in annex I of the directive as very helpful.  
Judges see both advantages and drawbacks with the general principles. On the one 
hand, they do value the open-endedness of the general clause for the flexibility it 
gives in adapting enforcement to changing commercial practices. One the other hand, 
some wonder whether the EU legislator is always aware of the practical problems 
raised by open textured legislative provisions. The more general the provision, the 
harder it is for consumer to prove the unfair nature of a commercial practice. In this 
regard, black lists are much more convenient because they are more specific and lead 
to a lighter burden of proof for consumers and consumer associations. Moreover, 
precise provisions have a greater preventive effect on businesses, who know that a 
certain commercial practice is per se prohibited, and therefore will refrain from 
engaging in it.  
One judge explains that lower courts tend to rely on general contract law to address 
unfair commercial practices. According to him, they thereby reach the same outcomes 
and level of consumer protection as if they had applied the specific rules transposing 
UCPD. An explanation for this practice of substituting general contract law rules for 
specific consumer law rules could be that lawyers are more familiar with contract law 
and prefer, where possible, to rely on contractual standards rather than on the equally 
open-ended but less familiar standards of UCPD. If this view is correct, it could mean 
that what creates a sense of difficulty is not so much the open-textured nature of the 
provisions in itself as the lack of genuine familiarity among legal actors, which 
develops only over time. 
Government authorities state and case-law shows that it is not always easy to prove 
that both conditions of the general unfairness test are met. This is especially the case 
for the proof of the (potential) material distortion.1 In this regard, additional guidance 
in the form of a typology of distortive practices based on insights from psychology 
1  J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), 
Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 76. 
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could be helpful.2 The limited Belgian case-law that is available shows that 
infringement of article 5 of the UCPD is often invoked in conjunction with an 
infringement of the prohibition of misleading actions and/or omissions.3 Furthermore, 
some authors argue that because of the vagueness of some concepts (‘commercial 
practice’, ‘professional diligence’ and specifically ‘special skill and care’, ‘reasonable 
expectations’, ‘honest market practices’ or ‘good faith’), there is ample room for 
subjective interpretation. This leaves a large margin of discretion to the courts and, it 
is argued, possibly runs against the objective of harmonisation and, therefore, of 
improving the functioning of the internal market.4  
The leading consumer association’s point of view is consistent with that of the 
enforcement authority. They underscore the practical value of the blacklist and also 
agree that broad provisions are necessary to catch practices that may be unfair but 
are not blacklisted. Comparing with the previous state of Belgian consumer law, the 
consumer association notes that the principle based approach creates some practical 
difficulties. They mention problem with door step selling in the energy sector: under 
Belgian law, door to door selling used to be prohibited for transactions above 250€. 
Because of maximum harmonisation, this prohibition was removed and the association 
has to make do with the general clause. They would clearly prefer that this were 
added the black list. Another area where protecting consumers has been made more 
difficult in practice is ‘false sales’, i.e. when traders claim that the price is reduced 
when in fact it is not. Under current legislation, the consumer association regrets that 
enforcement authorities cannot do anything in this regard.  
The same consumer association indicates that, in practice, the UCPD is mostly used in 
injunction procedures. As these are expedited procedures, they do not lend 
themselves very well to the application of open-textured rules. The other context in 
which UCPD is relied on is class actions, where this issue is less acute. 
A business association, for its part, stated that the principle-based approach is 
advantageous compared to very specific and detailed rules, since it leaves room for 
contractual freedom and freedom of trade. General clauses have the advantage that 
businesses still have a margin of appreciation in judging whether a commercial 
practice is unfair and can take specific circumstances into account. 
The fact that the general clause has been rarely applied in Belgium, and that both 
consumers and enforcement authorities are uncertain about what evidence they need 
to provide in order to successfully bring a case under article 5 of the UCPD, should not 
lead to a departure from the principle-based approach. The function of a general 
clause, such as article 5, is to act as a ‘safety net’.5 In the absence of any general 
clause, the risk is that businesses will circumvent any black list by inventing practices 
that are not prohibited per se but are equivalent in their effect. A safety net need not 
be used frequently to fulfil its function. Detailed guidance, such as that published by 
the Commission in May 2016,6 may help enforcers and consumer organisation gain 
confidence in using the general clause. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
2  A-L Sibony, Can EU Consumer Law Benefit From Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of the Unfair Practices 
Directive, European Review of Private Law, 2014, vol. 22, n° 6, pp. 903-942. 
3  See for example Brussels 4 May 2010, NJW 2011, issue 238, (182) 182-184; Pres. Comm. Brussels 8 
June 2009, Jb.Hand.Med. 2009 (142) 142. 
4  J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, cited at footnote 1, 59-60. 
5  L. DE BROUWER and G. SORREAUX, “La nouvelle loi sur les pratiques du commerce et la protection du 
consommateur : une occasion manqué”, TBH 2008, issue 5, (371) 384, no. 48 ; J. GODDAER and E. 
TERRYN, cited at footnote 1, 55. 
6 Guidance on the implementation/application of directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices, 
SWD(2016) 163 final, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/ucp_guidance_en.pdf  
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In principle, a black list has advantages for enforcement authorities, businesses and 
consumers. For businesses, it provides welcome legal certainty. For enforcers and for 
consumers, not having to apply the transactional decision test considerably lightens 
the burden of proof,7 as was confirmed by a judge. However, in order to produce 
these benefits and to ensure uniform application throughout Europe, the blacklisted 
practices should be precisely defined, which is currently not the case.  
As has been noted by a scholar, a number of provisions in the blacklist raise 
questions.8 An example is the unfair commercial practice which creates an impression 
that the consumer cannot leave the premises until a contract is formed (blacklist, 
n° 24). It is not always clear to enforcers how broadly ‘premises’ should be defined, or 
how ‘the impression’ (of an average consumer) should be assessed. Another example 
is the aggressive advertisement toward children. A judge considers the notion of direct 
exhortations to children (blacklist, n° 28) almost impossible to apply in practice. 
Because the black list in the annex of UCPD calls for in concreto assessment by 
national courts,9 it does not always lighten the burden of proof for consumers in 
practice.10 It is noteworthy that a business association also reports that its members 
experience difficulties in applying the black list.  
Presenting the list as a grey list may have been a better option than making its 
application mandatory in cases when it presents real difficulties for courts. That being 
said, some scholars argue that the black list has the virtue that it greatly helped raise 
awareness of certain unfair commercial practices among legal practitioners and 
judges.11 There does not seem to be an agreement among stakeholders as to the 
optimal length of the blacklist. One author argues that the black list is too long and 
should only contain practices that are most common and harmful or which are unfair 
in all circumstances.12 On the other hand, the Belgian Ministry for the Economy would 
like to be able to add items to the black list. 
In Belgian case-law, there are few applications of the black list. This could be due to 
the fact that the black list is dissuasive and/or to the fact that enforcers and courts 
find it hard to apply. The few applications by courts concern especially those practices 
that were already forbidden under the old Belgian law.13  
To conclude, stakeholders do not call into question the benefit of having a black list, in 
particular because it lightens the burden of proof for consumers. Most provisions in the 
current black list do not seem to raise problems. However, several provisions are 
considered too open-ended to be usefully included in a black list.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
For financial services, Belgium does have national provisions that go beyond the level 
of protection provided under the UCPD. For example, joint selling is prohibited for 
financial services. However, the Belgian legislator provided that, in principle, financial 
services should not be excluded from the scope of book VI of the Code of Economic 
Law (hereinafter: ‘CEL’) on ‘market practices and consumer protection’ (where the 
UCPD is transposed). More precisely, the provisions stemming from the UCPD apply to 
financial services where ‘a different treatment serves no purpose and only causes 
7  J. STUYCK, Handels- en economisch recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. A: Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van 
Belgisch Privaatrecht, issue 13, 2013, 286, no. 308. 
8  J. STUYCK, cited at footnote 7, 307-308, no. 345 and 310-315, no. 349. 
9  J. STUYCK, cited at footnote 7, 285, no. 308. 
10 R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, “De implementatie van de Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken in België 
en Nederland”, in TPR 2011, (677) 741, no. 89. 
11 R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, cited at footnote 10, no. 89. 
12 B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, REDC 
2013, issue 2, (233) 261, no. 34; J. STUYCK, cited at footnote 7, 286, nr. 308. 
13 B. KEIRSBILCK, Art. 91 Wet betreffende marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming in X, Handels- en 
economisch recht. Commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, 2013. 
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confusion’.14 It seems that the executive and the legislative branch are not thinking 
along the exact same lines on the issue of maximum harmonisation. The Belgian 
legislator displays a preference for maximum harmonisation, while Belgian 
government authorities are in favour of minimum harmonisation for financial services. 
According to a judge, the national provisions applying specifically to financial services 
are not better known and understood by consumers than the general provisions. On 
the contrary, even professionals, e.g. lawyers, often do not know these provisions. 
Furthermore, this judge pointed out that courts not always apply these provisions ex 
officio, because they would need to invite the parties to debate their application to the 
facts of the case and there is often no time for this. Another judge reports that 
provisions applying specifically to financial services bring real benefits for consumers 
and allow courts to cope with cultural differences. The same judge praised the 
maximum harmonisation of Directive 2002/65 on financial services provided at a 
distance. In short, there does not seem to be a consensus on the issue of minimum 
harmonisation with regard to unfair commercial practices in financial services.   
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?]  
Regarding misleading practices in the energy market, a code of conduct applying 
specifically to the energy market has been adopted.15 It serves the functions initially 
envisaged for codes of conduct in general in relation to the UCPD, namely to give 
guidance as to what constitutes a practice ‘contrary to professional diligence’. It 
reiterates the prohibitions of the UPCD and goes further in some respects. The major 
energy suppliers, who, together, cover a very large part of the retail market, have 
adhered to this code, but two new entrants have not. As an observer notes, a strategy 
of consumer service and cooperation with consumer protection may constitute a 
means for incumbents to resist new competitors. Indeed, suppliers who have adhered 
to the code have agreed that Belgian enforcement authorities may prosecute any 
violation of the code of conduct as an unfair practice. 
Officials from the Belgian Ministry for the Economy regret that two new entrants have 
not adhered to the code and wish it were possible to make the code binding on all 
operators in the sector. They fear that the current solution – a voluntary code of 
conduct – is both damaging in terms of fair competition (the playing field is not level) 
and less effective in terms of consumer protection than binding rules would be. In this 
regard, the maximum harmonisation approach of the UCPD causes some frustration. 
This is especially the case since consumer protection in the energy market is high on 
the agenda of the current minister. Given the choice in favour of maximum 
harmonisation, Belgian enforcement authorities feel that the best solution would be to 
extend the harmonised black list. The industry federation for its part has already 
shown it was reticent to the adoption of codes of conduct and would no doubt resist 
any attempt to extend the black list, let alone ‘Europeanise’ it. The code of conduct is 
being evaluated and the dialogue between stakeholders in the sector is ongoing within 
the framework of a multiparty working group (to whose recommendations the 
Commission referred in its 2016 UCPD guidance notice). 
Concerning environmental claims, very few complaints regarding ‘green washing’ have 
been filed with the Economic Inspectorate (three in five years). There are however 
more complaints about the CO2 emissions of cars, an area that is regulated by 
14 MvT, 24 september 2013, Parl.St. Kamer, DOC 53 3018/1, 19-20. 
15 Accord “Le consommateur dans le marché libéralisé de l’électricité et du gas”, October 2013, 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/accord_electricity_fr_tcm326-41209.pdf (FR), 
http://economie.fgov.be/nl/binaries/accord_electricity_nl_tcm325-41209.pdf  (NL). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
58
another code of conduct.16 It is apparent that some car manufacturers do not respect 
their own environmental codes of conduct, but the Economic Inspectorate feels it 
cannot intervene because the practices that violate the code of conduct not meet the 
criteria of article 6 of the UCPD. Indeed, car manufacturers do not firmly commit to be 
bound by their own codes or indicate to consumers that they are bound by a code.17 
Officials from the Ministry of the Economy whish the violation of a firm’s own code of 
conduct were per se prohibited.  
As to court cases, a judge pointed to a precedent in the Netherlands.18  
The leading consumer association for its part has started a class action based on 
national provisions transposing the UCPD in the ‘Dieselgate’ case. The case is about 
misleading information regarding CO2 emissions. At the time of writing this report, the 
Association was awaiting judgement on admissibility of the action, so that it is too 
early to assess success.  
The most pressing problem with the application of UCPD is not specific to 
environmental claims, the consumer association explains. It is that judges who rule at 
first instance for small claims (juges de paix) are not familiar with consumer 
protection rules. The association identifies a clear need for training of judges. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?]  
Prior to the UCPD, art. 94 of the Trade Practices Act of 1991 (hereinafter: ‘TPA’) 
contained an unfairness test, which referred to the interests of ‘consumers’. When the 
UCPD was initially transposed in 2007, the Belgian Parliament did not adopt the 
terminology of the ‘average’ consumer. A change was deemed unnecessary on the 
grounds that Belgian law, despite its different wording, already complied with the 
directive. Moreover, it was feared that altering the wording in the legal test would 
cause unnecessary confusion as to the continued relevance of the case law applying 
the initial test.19 A scholarly discussion developed as to whether the Belgian standard 
was really equivalent to the average consumer standard. This was less than clear, 
since the Belgian Court of Cassation had ruled that the TPA aimed to protect the ‘least 
informed consumer’ (to the great satisfaction of consumer organisations).20 However, 
several lower courts had relied on a different benchmark, that of a ‘reasonably well-
informed, observant, circumspect and critical consumer’, endowed with a minimum of 
common sense. There was therefore some uncertainty as to what standard was 
applicable.  
The Market Practices and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (hereinafter, ‘MPCPA’), 
which replaced the TPA, brought a welcome clarification. The new law adopted the 
language of the Directive and the general clause, as well as semi-general clauses and 
black list were replicated word for word. The ‘average consumer’ standard was 
therefore introduced in the legal provisions now found at art. VI.93 Book VI of the 
CEL. This legislative change was accompanied by a declaration from the government 
16 Code en matière de publicité pour les véhicules automobiles ainsi que leurs composants et accessoires 
(2014), http://www.febiac.be/documents_febiac/2014/code2014/code%20Febiac%20FR%20-
%202014.pdf (FR); Code inzake reclame voor motorrijtuigen, hun onderdelen en toebehoren, 
http://www.febiac.be/documents_febiac/Pubcode_NL.pdf (NL). 
17 Article 6 paragraph 2 UCPD. 
18 Rechtbank Zeeland-West Brabant, 17 March 2014, Case C/02/275080/ KG ZA 13-837, Stichting 
Brandstofverlies / Louwman en Parqui BV.  
19 MvT, 9 maart 2007, Parl.St. Kamer, DOC 51 2983/001, 24-25; J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C 
commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 66; R. 
STEENNOT, “Consumentenbescherming 2003-2007”, TPR 2009, issue 1, (345) 375, nr. 185. 
20 R. STEENNOT and P. GEERTS, “De implementatie van de Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken in België 
en Nederland”, in TPR 2011, (677) 737-738, no. 85. 
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that Belgian courts have been ‘quasi-unanimous’ in applying the average consumer 
standard for decades and that the new wording should not bring about any change in 
the judicial practice.21 
Scholars have pointed out that the average consumer standard affords enforcement 
authorities and national courts a margin of appreciation, in particular when assessing 
how the average consumer behaves in a given situation22 or how social, cultural and 
linguistic factors play out in relation to cross-border commercial practices.23 National 
courts have to assess whether the commercial practice at stake could have an 
appreciable impact on the decision of the average consumer (in abstracto), but still 
have to investigate the facts and circumstances of a particular case (in concreto).24  
Judges seem to display different sensitivities as to the average consumer standard. 
While one welcomes the flexibility of the standard, another underscores the drawbacks 
of its vagueness. However, both judges and scholars concur in thinking that standard 
is not entirely abstract and should be applied in connection with the specific facts of 
the case.  
In case law, the average consumer standard does not seem to be applied in a way 
that is favourable to consumers.25 For example, in a case about an advertisement for 
an eco-friendly washing product, the question arose whether the advertisement was 
addressed to anyone shopping in a supermarket or whether it targeted eco-conscious 
consumers and so that the proper benchmark would be the average ‘green’ consumer, 
who is sensitive to environmental considerations.26 Applying the latter standard to an 
advertisement that read ‘100% of surfactant of plant origin, 100% biodegradable’, a 
commercial court held that the normally attentive and diligent green (online) 
consumer would be able to understand the link made in the advertisement between 
surfactants and biodegradability and would not be misled by the claim. In other words, 
the court held that the average green consumer would not make the mistake of 
thinking that the advertised product is entirely biodegradable. They would know that 
the claim of total biodegradability relates only to the surfactant agents contained in 
the washing product, not to the product as a whole. This seems a rather formidable 
assumption, not only as to consumers’ technical knowledge but also and more 
importantly as to their level of attention and immunity from predictable errors due to 
mental shortcuts.27  
21 Doc. Parl., Chambre, 2009-2010, DOC 52-2340/005, p. 53.  
22 B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011, 284, no. 345. 
23 J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), 
Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 67; B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial 
Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, 286, no. 347. 
24 R. STEENNOT, “Consumentenbescherming 2003-2007”, TPR 2009, issue 1, (345) 375, nr. 185 
25 Antwerp, Court of Appeal, 21 November 2012, Jaarboek Marktpraktijken, Intellectuele eigendom en 
Mededinging 2012, 458. Consumers should expect that financial services entail risks. For advertisement 
to qualify as misleading it should provide incorrect information or a risk in this sense should exist. 
26 Prés. comm. Nivelles 12 January 2011, case note by C. DESMECHT, Le consommateur moyen: origine et 
portée d’une notion clé, Pratiques du marché, Kluwer, 2011. 
27 There do not seem to be empirical studies demonstrating the behavioural implausibility of the assumption 
of the Court of Nivelles specifically. However, besides common sense, such implausibility would seem to 
result by analogy from a well-documented behavioural phenomenon called ‘attribute substitution’. This 
judgement imperfection refers to the fact that, when confronted with a difficult question, subjects tend to 
answer instead a related but distinct question whose answer comes more readily to mind. For instance, a 
person who is asked “How dangerous is the intersection near your home?” may answer as if they were 
asked how many accidents or near-accidents at that intersection they can readily recall. See A. Tor, The 
Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law (July 11, 2008). Haifa Law Review, Vol. 4, p. 237, 2008, 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1266169, p. 245, citing D. Kahneman and S. Frederick, 
“Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment”, Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman- eds., 2002), p. 
51. In the case of advertisement for the green washing product, the Court assumes that the average 
green consumer is immune from a phenomenon that could be termed ‘predicate substitution’ [i.e. the 
average consumer would assign the attribute (biodegradability) to the correct predicate (surfactant) 
rather than to the incorrect one (washing product), thereby not falling for a shortcut that comes readily to 
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Similarly, in the field of telecom and television contracts, Belgian Courts seem to 
consider that the average consumer is very diligent and attentive. An offer for a TV 
subscription was held not to be misleading if, next to the large font, an asterisk draws 
the attention of the consumer to the terms and condition in small font.28 A footnote, 
however, is not a requirement. In a judgement about an offer for a phone 
subscription, the Court of Appeals of Mons ruled that an advertisement was not 
misleading, even if the mention in large font did not contain a direct reference to the 
details of the offer, as long as the details were available in the brochure, even if in 
small font.29 Only where the advertising slogan in large font makes no reference at all 
to the specifics of the subscription contract, has an offer been considered 
misleading.30 The decisive criterion therefore seems to be whether the consumer has 
been given access to the relevant information. Very little attention seems to be given 
to how consumers typically react to information or how reactions vary depending on 
how the information is given.  
Where an inexact advertising slogan is followed by a comparison table which enables 
the consumers to compare competing offers, the advertisement is not considered 
misleading.31 On the contrary, the average consumer interested in subscribing to a TV 
contract to be able to watch the national football competition can be misled by the 
lack of information regarding the precise content of a TV offer where the content 
differs significantly from alternative offers on the market.32 
In the same vein the Brussels Court of appeals ruled in a case involving an 
advertisement focused on a comparison between a basket of goods sold in two 
competing supermarket chains that the burden of proof on consumers was quite 
heavy. The advertisement is misleading where, considering the factual circumstances 
of the advertisement, a significant number of consumers could be inclined to purchase 
products of the advertiser where the consumers are wrongfully led to believe that the 
product basket mentioned in the advertisement is representative for all the 
advertiser's products and consumers are led to believe that they can save a certain 
amount of money or that all of advertiser's products are cheaper than those of a 
competitor.33 This would seem to require rather specific empirical studies. 
The leading consumer association is of the view that courts apply the average 
consumer standard in a way that is not favourable to consumers, in that they assume 
too much about the average consumer. For instance, in a case where the buyer of a 
house complained that the seller had omitted some important information about the 
property and sued the seller for damages, the seller brought a counter claim against 
his estate broker, arguing that it was the broker’s professional duty to bring his 
attention to the importance of the piece of information which was missing. The court 
held that the seller (a consumer) was jointly liable for the lack of pre-contractual 
information.34 
Given this unfavourable information-only orientation of the case law, it is no surprise 
that a business association has no objection to the ‘average consumer’ standard and 
explains that it is viewed ‘neither positively nor negatively’ by Belgian businesses. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
mind]. On the prevalence of mental shortcuts generally, see. D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow, 
NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. 
28 Bruxelles (9e chamber) 29 april 2015, J.L.M.B. 2015, n°28, 1324. 
29 Mons Court of appeals, Tecteo c. Favco, 16 sept. 2013. 
30 Brussels Court of Appeals, 2006  
31 Brussels Court of Appeals, 28 June 2013. 
32 Brussels Court of Appeals, 27 June 2013. 
33 Court of Appeal Brussels, ALDI v. Delhaize, 29 January 2013, Jaarboek Marktpraktijken, Intellectuele 
eigendom en Mededinging 2013, 431 (our emphasis). 
34 The stakeholder did not share the reference of this unpublished case. 
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enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?]  
Belgium transposed the categories of vulnerable consumers mentioned in the UCPD 
literally. Enforcement authorities have not recognised any other categories. Lower 
courts however use a new category in practice, namely indebted consumers. They 
take the degree of indebtedness of the consumer into account to adapt payment 
schedules.   
Overall, no real problems regarding the concept of vulnerable consumers have 
surfaced in Belgium. A judge explained that it is applied in a flexible manner. Higher 
courts consider that this pragmatic approach is appropriate to address unfair 
commercial practices towards particularly vulnerable consumers and that there is no 
need to recognise additional categories of vulnerable consumers. Indeed, some judges 
think the fewer categories the better. 
Some scholars agree with this opinion and warn that categorisation creates the risk of 
different levels of protection in similar situations. For example, Duivenvoorde asks why 
a vulnerable consumer belonging to an identifiable group, such as young or old people 
with limited cognitive abilities, should enjoy special protection, while a vulnerable 
consumer with limited cognitive abilities for other reasons (genetic, cultural or 
educational reasons), who may therefore not be considered as belonging to a clearly 
identifiable group, should not be similarly protected.35 Therefore, he doubts whether 
the requirement that ‘vulnerable consumers’ belong to a ‘clearly identifiable group’ is 
sound and suggests that a pragmatic approach is more suited when assessing whether 
a consumer is vulnerable in the specific case. 
Other scholars too have criticized the concept of vulnerable consumers, because it 
lacks practical and logical foundations, is slightly arbitrary and causes uncertainty or 
unpredictability.36 In practice, it seems sometimes difficult to identify a group of 
vulnerable consumers, since they are not always ‘clearly identifiable’ or because there 
is still a lot of uncertainties as to what ‘clearly identifiable’ means (identifiable – or 
identified – by traders? identifiable by courts?).37  As Duivenboorde suggests,38 the 
focus should be on whether a commercial practice is designed to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of consumers in a specific case, rather than on identifying groups of 
vulnerable consumers.  
However, a judge suggests that consumers addicted to alcohol should be recognised 
as a category of vulnerable consumers.  
A consumer association for its parts suggests that handicapped persons do not always 
get the special treatment they deserve in Belgian courts. For example, a handicapped 
person experiencing a problem with a wheelchair should in their view deserve special 
attention from courts when it comes to applying rules on warranty.39 
 
35 B. DUIVENVOORDE, “The Protection of Vulnerable Consumers under the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive”, EUVR 2013, issue 2, (70) 79.  
36 J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), 
Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 73; J. STUYCK, Handels- en economisch recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. 
A: Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht, issue 13, 2013, 270, nr. 289;  
37 B. DUIVENVOORDE, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Springer, 
2015, 69-71. 
38 B. DUIVENVOORDE, “The Protection of Vulnerable Consumers under the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive”, EUVR 2013, issue 2, (70) 79. 
39 Stakeholders were not very specific as to what was meant by ‘special attention’, nor did they share a 
specific reference to a court case. 
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• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
In Belgium, there are a number of sectoral codes of conduct: the energy market, the 
telecom market and sport clubs are cases in point.40 There are also codes with a 
broader scope of application, such as a general clients charter adopted in 2010. The 
Belgian Ministry for the Economy is conducting an evaluation on codes at the moment.  
Different stakeholders have diverging views about the virtues of codes of conduct. 
Overall, business organisations prefer self- and co-regulation over regulation and 
favour codes of conducts or guidelines after dialogue between all relevant 
stakeholders.41  
According to the government authorities, codes of conduct are helpful, but not 
sufficient. They are helpful in appraising professional diligence under the general 
clause. The main shortcoming officials observe with existing codes is linked to their 
voluntary nature. When some key actors in a given sector do not adhere to the code, 
be it new entrants in the energy sector or a major chain of sports clubs, the best 
practices are not uniformly applied. This raises both issues of consumer protection and 
unfair competition. Government authorities therefore argue that the violation of a code 
of conduct should be per se prohibited (blacklisted). That would in effect amount to 
making codes of conduct binding and extend their scope of application to all 
undertakings in the sector concerned (or all undertakings trading in Belgium in the 
case of cross-sector codes).  
A judge pointed out that these codes of conducts improve consumer protection in 
some respects, but because they are drafted by business actors, they also display a 
corporatist dimension. Another judge mentioned the Advertising Council (Conseil de la 
publicité) as a successful co-regulation venture. This Council has been in existence 
since 1967. Its members are professional associations representing advertisers, 
communication agencies and media. Together, they are responsible for 95% of the 
advertisements released in Belgium.42 The Council runs an advertisement ethics body 
(Jury d’Ethique Publicitaire, JEP), which is a self-regulatory body.  
According to a business association, self- and co-regulation function very well: 
consumer protection is kept at a high level, without hindering freedom of trade. The 
enforcement authority (Economic Inspectorate) has a long practice of implementing 
guidelines after extensive consultation, discussion and constructive dialogue with 
business associations, as well as with consumer associations. A specific example are 
the guidelines from the Economic Inspectorate regarding marketing at the annual car 
show in Brussels. Compliance is reportedly excellent and this is said to enhance both 
consumer trust in offers made at the car show and consumer protection. 
For its part, the leading consumer associations would prefer less codes and more hard 
law. They see numerous violations of existing codes (especially the one on sun tan 
booths) and little enforcement. 
 
40 For a complete list of codes of conduct (and full text access), see 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/consommateurs/Pratiques_commerce/Codes_bonne_conduite/Coregulation/#.
V7G_ypOLTKI The list includes a code on green advertising, a code on advertising financial products 
targeted at young consumers, a code on advertising for savings accounts and life insurance.  
41 This opinion was repeatedly stated in the interview with a business association, and can also be found in 
documents concerning B2B unfair commercial practices. E.g. X, “Réponses de la Concertation de la chaîne 
agro-alimentaire aux questions dans le cadre de la de la concertation des stakeholders. Livre vert sur les 
pratiques commerciales déloyales dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement alimentaire et non-alimentaire 
interentreprises en Europe COM (2013) 37 final”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-trading-
practices/docs/contributions/individuals-and-others/comeos-fevia-boerenbond_fr.pdf.  
42 Council’s own figure. http://www.raadvoordereclame.be   
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• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Government officials think the black list should be extended and suggest adding the 
following practices:  
• Violation of a code of conduct to which a professional has adhered (it is in itself 
contrary to professional diligence and officials feel 6, §2, b UCPD unduly restricts 
the possibility to sanction the violation of a code of conduct) 
• Any comparative advertising which is illegal within the meaning of Directive 
2006/114/EC 
• Violation of the rules on guarantees contained in Directive 99/44/EC (this should 
be considered unfair in all circumstance rather than only in circumstances set out 
in article 6, §1, g of Directive 2005/29/EC). 
• Forcing consumers to call a premium-rate telephone number should be considered 
unfair in all circumstances. Consumers should be able to reach the seller at no 
cost (other than ordinary costs) in order to report any problem with the contract 
goods or services. 
• Advertising specifically the tied or bonus product or service in order to distract 
consumers’ attention from the main contract product or service should be 
considered unfair in all circumstances (since the UCPD applies to combined offers 
and sale with bonuses, rules about these practices should be included in the 
directive) 
• Refusing certain means of payment, e.g. cash or certain bank notes with high 
denominations (in line with the Commission’s Recommendation of 22 March 2010 
on the scope and effects of legal tender of Euro banknotes and coins43, such 
refusal should be added to the black list) 
A leading consumer association mentions the following as desirable additions to the 
black list (most items would need to be framed with greater precisions): 
• Announcing a price supplement after an initial quote has been accepted 
by the consumer 
• ‘Fake sales’: giving the impression of a reduced price when in fact price 
has not been reduced from what it was [some weeks / months, to be 
determined] before 
• Promoting a food product on the basis of an ingredient which is in fact 
barely present (‘alibi ingredient), e.g. ‘strawberry yogurt’ with minute 
quantity of strawberries in it 
• False environmental claims 
Concerning the procedure to revise the black list in order to reflect future 
developments, Keirsblick has suggested that the Commission should be competent 
under the comitology procedure to quickly adapt the black list in view of new 
economic or technological developments, after consultation of the national 
enforcement authorities and business and consumer organisations.44 Belgian 
authorities are not averse to this idea, but are pessimistic about the prospect since so 
many other Member States are reluctant. In addition, the suggestion to introduce a 
comitology procedure to revise the black list periodically is not welcomed by medium 
size enterprises.  
43 OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 70–71 
44 B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, REDC 
2013, issue 2, (233) 261-262, no. 34 and B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial 
Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011, 391-392. 
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In conclusion on this point, there seems to be no agreement among stakeholders on 
whether or how to amend the black list: while some would trim down the annex on the 
ground that open textured concepts do not belong in a black list (see above), others 
would like to see the black list extended. There is no contradiction between the two 
opinions as open-ended provisions could be deleted from the blacklist while the above 
precisely defined practices could be added to it, but that does not make either position 
consensual among all stakeholders.   
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Officials at the Ministry for the Economy suggest that the following measures would 
improve the effectiveness of UCPD: 
• Further clarifying the definition of consumer to tackle the issue of mixed activities  
• Improve the definition of codes of conduct by including consumer participation in 
drafting the code among the relevant criteria 
• Improve consistency between UCPD, Consumer Rights Directive and 
Directive 98/6/EC on price indications. All of them deal with pre-contractual 
information and offers and legal certainty as well as ease of application would be 
improved by consolidating all these rules and eliminating inconsistencies and 
redundancies 
They also suggest that, in general, greater attention should be paid to the time 
dimension in assessing unfair commercial practices. While this dimension is mentioned 
in the general and semi general clauses, it may not be sufficiently reflected in the 
black list. Accurate information given in an untimely manner can very well distort 
consumer decisions, as is the case with bait-and-switch (already black listed). It is 
suggested that this element needs attention also in online transactions. Another 
general point which has been raised in the interviews is that better coordination 
between the UCPD and other directives (Consumer Rights, E-commerce, Price 
Indication) would be helpful.  
A judge adds that a provision prohibiting misleading environmental claims should be 
added to UCPD. 
The leading consumer association indicated that is in favour of training actions for 
judges. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection 
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
A judge stated that, in his view, the protection afforded to consumers under the PID is 
effective. According to a business association, businesses (especially large ones) 
comply to a very large extent with legal requirements regarding unit selling prices. 
The leading consumer association agrees that this is the case.  The Ministry for the 
Economy agrees that the national rules transposing the Directive are effectively 
applied. Officials regret that this Directive is not applied uniformly across Member 
States (thus causing problems for cross-border transactions), because of its unclear 
scope of application. In their opinion, the Directive should however not be modified at 
this point in time, since a change would only trigger more complications. 
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• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Back in the early 2000s (after the repeal of the former Belgian legislation), Belgian 
producers of detergents had already asked the Belgian legislator to introduce a 
requirement of a per unit price expressed in washloads. At the time, the relevant code 
of conduct recommended this practice, which was widely but not universally used. 
Making it mandatory, it was argued, would level the playing field. In 2012, a per 
performance price indication was indeed made mandatory for detergents under 
Belgian law.45 According to the Belgian enforcement authorities, using this price per 
performance not only makes more sense to consumers, but also to promotes 
concentrated products and thus contributes to reducing waste. 
Public authorities consider that the price per performance measure functions very well 
and the requirement to display such prices should be extended beyond washing 
products. 
The leading consumer association does not seem to have formed strong views on this 
issue. They think that it could be good to have both indications. 
Businesses would not object to such an extension of unit price indication, but would 
want to be able to mention only one price rather than two. They cite high 
(administrative) compliance costs. Where possible, business would prefer the price per 
performance measure rather than the price per unit measure. 
A judge explained that, in his view, making indication of price per performance 
mandatory would go too far.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Only relevant if you write a report for one of the 
countries that use the derogation for small businesses from the requirement to 
indicate the unit price on the basis of Article 6 of the Directive (AT, BE, EL, DE, FR, 
NL, SI, UK). In this case key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation relevant? 
Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of this? If 
so, approximately how many per year?] 
Under Belgian law, traders’ obligations regarding price indication extend to services. 
Courts have ruled that transparent and clear price indications must be given for 
ancillary mandatory services (e.g. add-ons in a cable TV contracts).46 
Under Belgian law, there is a derogation for small convenience shops of less than 150 
sq meters. Businesses who can avail themselves of the derogation do so. This does 
not seem to raise particular problems and no complaints have been received.  
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
45 Ministerial Decree of 09/02/2012 on textile detergents, Moniteur Belge, 17/02/2012. 
46  Cass. (1e k.) AR C.12.0497.N, 5 December 2013 (Belgacom/ Telenet), DCCR 2015, afl. 106, 85; 
Jaarboek Marktpraktijken 2013, 60; Pas. 2013, afl. 12, 2451 (about ancillary services considered 
mandatory); Vred. Arendonk 10 juni 2014, T. Vred. 2015, afl. 9-10, 479 (where ancillary services were 
held not to be mandatory). 
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Under Belgian law, there are specific legal provisions prohibiting misleading 
commercial practices (including advertising) in B2B relationships. Regarding the 
definition of advertising, Belgian law tracks the very broad definition adopted under EU 
Law (e.g. the BEST case).47 ‘Advertising’ is defined as ‘any communication which is 
intended to directly or indirectly promote the sale of goods or services’. Belgian courts 
have developed a respectable body of case-law on the scope of ‘advertising’, in line 
with a broad interpretation of this notion.48  
Regarding specific protection afforded to businesses, the economic code contains 
several specific provisions. For example, advertising including an invoice or a similar 
document is prohibited on the grounds that the true nature of the document is not 
clear and the addressee could be confused as to the consequence of not replying (art. 
VI.106 (1) CEL). Similarly, advertising for listing services in company guides are 
prohibited when they do not unequivocally state that a contractual offer is being made 
and that a payment will be required (art. VI.107 CEL). 
A business association does not call into question the scope of protection. It expresses 
the view that the definition of advertising is appropriate to tackle misleading or 
comparative commercial practices. This is at odds with the opinion expressed by the 
Commission in its Communication ‘Protecting businesses against misleading marketing 
practices and ensuring effective enforcement’ of 2012, where the Commission pointed 
out the shortcomings of the current definition.49  
Government authorities on the other hand think it would be a welcome simplification 
to align rules on misleading practices in B2B relationships with rules protecting 
consumers. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Generally, businesses prefer the principle-based approach because this allows more 
contractual freedom, and hence gives them the opportunity to interpret the legal 
provisions in light of specific circumstances.  
Government authorities, for their part, think that more precise rules would be 
welcome. In particular, price comparisons are difficult to assess because prices change 
all the time. The magnitude of this problem is likely to increase in the future, as prices 
not only vary over time but are also increasingly personalised, at least in e-commerce. 
The main difficulty, whether online or offline, lies in deciding what the correct 
comparator is. For example, if a price is changed just before the advertising campaign 
(e.g. raised to artificially increase the discount offered subsequently), should it be the 
reference price? Or should the price before the last-minute raise be taken into 
account? Another issue arises when prices charged differ from list prices or from the 
recommended prices. Which price should be taken into account for the purposes of the 
comparison? Belgian authorities think it would be helpful to codify the case law and 
adopt guidelines on this point. For such guidelines to be robust, they should include 
the thorny issue of price comparisons in online environments where list prices are a 
thing of the past and prices fluctuate over time and across categories of consumers 
(and where the categories themselves fluctuate with data gathered on consumer 
profiles).  
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which of the national rules that go beyond the MCAD, 
47 Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology NV v Bert Peelaers en Visys NV, EU:C:2013:516 
48 See for a general overview of the notion “advertising”: G. STRAETMANS and S. BENNIS, Art. I.8.13° Code 
of Economic Law in X, Handels- en economisch recht. Commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en 
rechtsleer, 2013, (17) 17-52.  
49 Communication “Protecting businesses against misleading marketing practices and ensuring effective 
enforcement”, COM(2012) 702 final, 9. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
67
if any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Belgium has adopted provisions on unfair commercial practices in B2B transactions, 
thus extending the scope of the UCPD rules. They are found in art. VI.104 – 109 CEL. 
Art. VI.104 CEL is a general provision, prohibiting undertakings from engaging in any 
act that is contrary to ‘honest market practices’ and that causes or may cause damage 
to the business interest of one or more undertakings. The two-pronged test contained 
in this provision differs somewhat from that of the general clause of the UCPD. The 
first prong of the test is similar:  the requirement that the practice be contrary to 
‘honest practices’, while framed differently, does not differ markedly from the 
requirement (under article 5 of the UCPD) that a commercial practice be ‘contrary to 
professional diligence’. The second requirement however is different: it is not 
concerned with alteration of choice (influence) but with economic harm. The question 
asked is not whether the practice has the potential of distorting the average business’s 
decision (which would be analogous to distorting the average consumer’s decision), 
but rather whether the practice causes or is likely to cause potential harm.50  
In addition to this general provision, the B2B section of book VI CEL also contains a 
general prohibition of misleading advertising (Art. VI.105 CEL) and several provisions 
prohibiting specific misleading practices. More precisely, the following provisions of 
UCPD are extended to B2B practices: prohibition of three types of misleading 
advertisement (Articles 6 1. B,51 6.1.d,52 and 6.1.f)53,54 prohibition of one type of 
misleading omission (article 7.2)55 and prohibition of three blacklisted practices: 
pyramid schemes (Annex, n° 14)56, inertia selling (Annex, n° 29),57 and the use of 
invoices or similar documents seeking payment which gives the addressee the 
impression that they have already ordered the marketed product when they have not 
(Annex n° 21).58 This last provision is reiterated with some additional specifics in the 
case of advertising for listing services in company guides in art. VI.107 CEL, 
addressing the illicit practices of the so-called advertising recruiters. All of these rules 
go beyond the MCAD as is clear from the 2012 guidelines.59 
Government authorities would welcome the possibility to apply all rules on unfair 
commercial practices to B2B relationships. The current minister has expressed concern 
that SMEs are not adequately protected. Extending the scope of existing B2C rules is 
one way to address this concern.  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Belgian authorities are not enthusiastic about full harmonisation when it comes to 
comparative advertising. They value precise rules and think that interpretation of 
existing rules should not lose sight of the fact that the aim is not to allow comparative 
advertising (sic). They stress that damage is easily done. In terms of scope, they think 
it is important not to relax rules when it comes to online advertising or when 
consumers use a smartphone. 
50 This is where the provision differs from the general provision on civil liability (tort). Under art. 1382 Civil 
Code, actual harm is necessary. D. MERTENS, “Rules on Advertising and Commercial Practices in B2B” in 
G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, (197) 197. 
51 Art VI.105 a) CEL 
52 Art VI.105 b) CEL 
53 Art VI.105 f) CEL 
54 On these three provisions in the B2B context, see T. BAES, “Misleading Advertising Aimed at Non-
Consumers” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, 204-220. 
55 Art VI.106 2) CEL 
56 Art VI.109 CEL 
57 Art. VI.108 CEL 
58 Art VI.106 1) CEL 
59 Communication “Protecting businesses against misleading marketing practices and ensuring effective 
enforcement”, COM(2012) 702 final, 11-12. 
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 • Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
A business association stated that the current definition of ‘advertising’ is sufficiently 
broad to encompass modern types of marketing and that current rules are adequate. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
A business association states that the current rules on enforcement are not sufficient 
in cross-border cases. They do however point out the positive cooperation of 
government authorities within the Benelux, but specify that more cooperation between 
Member State authorities is desirable, to step up cross-border enforcement. This view 
aligns with the Commission’s desire to strengthen enforcement of the rules in cross-
border cases by a cooperation procedure between enforcement authorities and the 
obligation to designate an enforcement authority in every Member State.60 Belgium 
already has such an enforcement authority, namely the Economic Inspectorate (within 
the Ministry for the Economy), which plays a very active role, according to the 
businesses. 
Government authorities further point out the important role of court decisions. The 
essential problem in advertising cases is establishing the comparative character of 
advertisement. Courts interpret the legal provisions and provide specific criteria on the 
comparative character of the advertisement (e.g. the Lidl v Colruyt-case61, followed by 
Belgian case-law). 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
None of the interviewed stakeholders had specific comments or suggestions on this 
issue. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Business associations made no specific reference to any disparities in the 
understanding of principles contained in the UCPD. Such differences, if they exist, do 
not call into question business associations’ preference for a principle-based approach 
over a rule-based approach.  
Regarding the effect of the uniform black list, a business association noted that it was 
not applied completely uniformly. They gave the example of the prohibition of the 
blackout periods and the prohibition of resale at a loss. A blackout period, in this 
context, is a period (a number of weeks) before the start of the seasonal sales, when 
60 Communication “Protecting businesses against misleading marketing practices and ensuring effective 
enforcement”, COM(2012) 702 final, 11-13. 
61 Case C-356/04, Lidl v Colruyt, EU:C:2006:585. 
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it is prohibited to announce price reductions.62 The black list does not contain a 
provision on blackout periods, but Belgium kept this per se prohibition, in violation of 
the maximum harmonization-character of the UCPD. The CJEU stated that this 
prohibition is precluded, in so far as it pursues objectives related to consumer 
protection.63 The Belgian legislator avoided the application of EU law by expressly 
providing that the regulation of seasonal sales serves fair competition (B2B relations). 
This statement was also made explicitly in relation to the prohibition on resale at a 
loss.64 In other words, Belgium is exploiting a loophole to escape the maximum 
harmonization of the UCPD. Business representatives stress that this causes both legal 
uncertainty (it is still debated whether the regulation of blackout periods is in 
compliance with the UCPD) and disparities in regulation between Member States. 
Actual effect of such discrepancy on cross-border trade is uncertain. On the one hand, 
regulations such as these, because they pertain to certain selling arrangements and do 
not discriminate between domestic and imported goods or between domestic traders 
and traders from other Member States, are presumed innocuous under Keck65. On the 
other hand, the Commission has, not so long ago, objected to the prohibition on resale 
at a loss on grounds of its effect on free movement.66 Business associations in 
Belgium do not seem to have gathered empirical evidence which would go one way or 
another. 
According to the business view, these examples demonstrate that the black list does 
not deliver the intended result of maximum harmonisation and argue this is an 
additional reason to prefer a principle-based approach. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Business associations have not given any example of barriers to trade in these sectors 
attributable to minimum harmonisation. This is not evidence that such barriers do not 
exist, only that the representatives who were interviewed were not aware of them if 
they do exist.   
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
62 See R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. WYSEUR, “Overzicht van 
rechtspraak. Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 173-
198, no. 130-140; J. STUYCK, “Seasonal sales” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, 107-109. 
63 Case C-288/11, Wamo, EU:C:2011:443; Case C-421/11, Inno v UNIZO, EU:C:2011:851 and regarding 
sale at a loss: Case C-343/12, Euronics Belgium CVBA v Kamera Express BV and Kamera Express Belgium 
BVBA,EU:C:2013:154. 
64 P. WYTINCK, “Sale at a loss” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, 
(121) 133-136. 
65 Joint cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, EU:C:1993:905. 
66 See on the Council Recommendation of July 9 2013 on the National Reform Programme 2013 of France 
and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of France, 2012-2017, 2013/C 217/08, OJ C 
217 30 July 2013, p. 27, recommendation 4 (p. 31). Curiously, the same recommendation was not 
addressed to Belgium that same year (Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National Reform 
Programme 2013 of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Belgium, 
2012-2016, 2013/C 217/02, OJ C 217 30 July 2013, p.5). 
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• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Business associations declined to comment specifically on MCAD. They reiterated a 
general statement that they prefer a clear and easily applicable legal framework, to 
reduce uncertainty and compliance costs when operating in different Member States. 
This seems contradictory with another general statement, in favour of a principle-
based approach. It is not clear why businesses would prefer a principle-based 
approach on unfair practices and a rule-based approach on comparative advertising. 
What is clear is that business associations generally prefer maximum harmonisation, 
since minimum harmonisation leads to disparities and different applicable rules in 
different Member States, which cause legal uncertainty and therefore hinder cross-
border trade.  
As already pointed out, businesses see the lack of a cross-border enforcement 
mechanism as a barrier to cross-border trade. More cooperation between Member 
State authorities is desired in this regard. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to a business association, traders are very much aware of the information 
requirements and implement them correctly. A judge agrees with that statement.  
Sectoral business association give abundant guidance to their members on mandatory 
information requirements. They report no specific issue with existing information 
requirements.  
Businesses regret that there is an overlap between the information requirements 
pursuant to art. 7(4) of the UCPD and the more comprehensive pre-contractual 
information requirements of the CRD. Furthermore, they point out that there is a 
crucial difference between the advertising stage and the pre-contractual stage. At the 
first stage, there is no direct dialogue with the consumer and only the essential 
information should be mandatory. Only in the pre-contractual phase, when a one-on-
one dialogue with the consumer starts, should there be a more extensive obligation to 
inform consumers.  
At a general level, this does not seem at odds with existing directives, as article 7 of 
the UCPD on the ‘invitation to purchase’, which applies at the advertising stage, does 
focus on the provision of information deemed essential, while CRD requires more 
extensive information at the pre-contractual stage. However, the business association 
clearly stated that, in general, information requirements are too numerous. According 
to the association, they cause large compliance costs for traders and may not help 
consumers effectively, since most consumers do not pay much attention to the 
information. This view is similar to that of legal scholars relying on economic 
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analysis.67 From a behavioural perspective, there is evidence that, even when 
consumers do read the information, they do not always understand it or act upon it. 
However, businesses and scholars differ when it comes to practical conclusions. In the 
traders’ view, no information requirements should be added to existing ones. 
Behavioural legal scholars for their part argue that information requirements should be 
reconsidered in light of behavioural studies with a view to streamlining them and 
making them smarter, i.e., possibly reducing their numbers but without ruling out 
introducing new ones.68  
The interviewed consumer association is of the opinion that information requirements 
are complementary and any overlaps do not raise issues or generate compliance 
costs. 
On a more juridical note, one author argues that art. 7(4) of the UCPD should be 
repealed.69 Art. 7(4) of the UCPD is a maximum harmonisation provision, while the 
pre-contractual information requirements of the CRD are of a minimum harmonisation 
nature. Theoretically, this is not a problem since art. 3(2) of the UCPD states that the 
UCPD is without prejudice to contract law. In other words, this Directive does not seek 
to set an upper limit on information duties under national contract law. However, 
given the maximum harmonisation character of art. 7(4) of the UCPD, this article can 
constitute a de facto ‘ceiling’ for national pre-contractual information duties, because it 
limits indirectly Member States’ competence regarding national contract law. Hence 
the author concludes, Art. 7(4) of the UCPD should never have been adopted in the 
first place and should be repealed.  
A judge shares this view, i.e. that there should be only one instrument regulating 
information at both the advertising and pre-contractual stages. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations?  
The business association interviewed was not aware of specific problems linked to 
such overlaps.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The majority of stakeholders interviewed approve of an extension of protection to 
SMEs, but not so much because they think it is essential for cross-border trade. 
Rather, those who approve of such an evolution do so because they think there is a 
need to better protect small undertakings. Fair competition and/or fairness in business 
practices would seem to be the main goal in their view (rather than market 
integration).  
Government authorities view an extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions 
favourably. They think it would be a good way to enhance the protection of SMEs. As a 
67 For a radical view along these lines, see O Bar-Gill and O Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in 
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 109. 
68 A.-L. SIBONY and G. HELLERINGER, ‘EU Consumer Protection and Behavioural Sciences: Revolution or 
Reform?’ in A. ALEMANNO and A.-L. SIBONY, Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, Oxford: Hart, 
2015, pp. 209-233. 
69 B. KEIRSBILCK, “Which way forward for the new European law of unfair commercial practices?”, REDC 
2013, issue 2, (233) 266-267, no. 39. 
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rule, business associations on the other hand seem averse to extending B2C 
regulation to B2B transactions, since this leads to extra compliance costs (because of 
a lot of formalities and administrative hassle), which would not enhance trade in 
general and therefore also not cross-border trader. Generally, they prefer contractual 
freedom in B2B transactions. 
One judge shared this view, but based on a different reason: unlike consumers, 
businesses have accepted the risk of being the victim of unfair commercial practices, 
since this is an inherent in doing business with other businesses. It is impossible to 
say that this is the view of the Bench in general. Indeed, another judge is of the 
opinion that SMEs are very similar to consumers when it comes to unfair commercial 
practices and should benefit from the same protection. He cites the Italian example in 
this regard. Referring to the Belgian situation, he stresses that there is a great need 
for protection of small businesses, e.g. small shops (in clothing) vs. big suppliers 
(brands) and refers to problem in case of termination of the contract. Great disparity 
in financial strength do not allow small firms to defend their rights adequately. This 
judge is of the opinion that all of the following measures should be considered:  
• Extending the UCPD to B2B transactions or revising/extending the MCAD 
• Aligning the legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the area of commercial 
practices 
• Extending the scope of the protection in B2B transactions to cover also unfair 
commercial practices during and after the transaction 
• Having a black-list of practices in the business-to-business marketing area  
• Having a cross-border enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area  
• Developing contractual consequences linked to the breaches of the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive, e.g. making a contractual clause inapplicable  
• Adapting the rules on comparative advertising of the current Misleading and 
Comparative Advertising Directive 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Reinforcing the above mentioned opinions of stakeholders, a legal author suggests 
that the scope of the UCPD should be amended to cover both B2C and B2B 
(marketing) practices directly connected with the promotion of products, in the pre-
contractual stage.70 This author suggests abandoning the dualistic approach, which 
distinguishes between the rules on B2C and B2B transactions, because the economic 
interests of consumers, competitors, other market participants and, eventually, the 
general interest in undistorted competition are closely intertwined and most often 
coincide. The same author quotes the European Parliament: ‘consumer protection and 
the promotion of fair trading practices between competitors can often be two sides of 
the same judicial coin’.71  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
70 B. KEIRSBILCK, “Harmonisation of Rules on Business-To-Business Marketing Practices: A Critical Analysis 
of the MCAD Report”, in M.B.M. LOOS and I. SAMOY (eds.), The Position of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in European Contract Law, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2014, 137-159. 
71 B. KEIRSBILCK, cited at footnote 70, referring to: Resolution of the European Parliament of 13 March 
2013 on prospects for legal protection of the consumer in the light of the Commission Green Paper on 
European Union Consumer Protection, P5_TA(2003)0102, consideration L.  
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In Belgium, protection against misleading practices has been applied in cases involving 
two businesses, even where the practice was misleading because it could confuse 
consumers. A case in point involved watches packaged in Lego-like packaging. The 
Brussels Court of Appeals was convinced that the practice could confuse consumers as 
to the origin of the watched and took this into account in a B2B dispute.72 Indirectly 
therefore, the UCPD can help protect the rights of businesses (here Lego). 
In the interview, businesses stated that, should protection in B2B transaction be 
increased, they would prefer rules to concern the pre-contractual, contractual and 
post-contractual stages. 
No further reference was made regarding this issue by other interviewees or 
stakeholders. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Enforcers believe that there is a need for a black list. A business association disagrees. 
Here again, it reiterated its preference for a principle-based approach, self- or co-
regulation (e.g. codes of conduct). One judge was similarly hostile to a black list.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Stakeholders interviewed declined to comment on this point. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Enforcers and a judge in the interviews stated that there is no need for developing the 
law on contractual consequences in this regard. General rules and principles of 
contract law seem to suffice (provisions on error and fraud, general principle of good 
faith). One judge also points to Art. 493 and 494 of the Belgian Criminal Code (on 
abuse of confidence) and to provisions on interests in the Civil code. 
One judge points out that more precise rules on avoidance of a clause would be 
helpful. While avoidance can be a good and efficient remedy, he explains, it may at 
times be too broad and create legal uncertainty. More precise EU rules would be 
useful, but they should leave room for national courts to adapt the remedies to the 
case at hand. 
E.g. even if the bargaining power of two business-parties is very unequal, the remedy 
of avoidance of the contract that has been closed is not always the best remedy. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
As mentioned above, businesses advocate better enforcement mechanisms in cross-
border trade, by setting up cooperation between government authorities, emulating 
what is now already in place in the Benelux.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
72 Brussels Court of Appeal, 11 December 2012 "misleading commercial practices, giving misleading 
information both on the point of the commercial origin of the product as in relation to the fact whether 
there was a direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of the product". 
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• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Belgian law provides a civil law remedy in art. VI.38 CEL: if a contract was concluded 
following certain unfair commercial practices, the court must (practices listed in art. 
VI.38 (1) CEL) or may (practices listed in art. VI.38 (2) CEL) order the reimbursement 
to the consumer of the amounts they have paid, without any obligation for them to 
return the product delivered. If the matter concerns an unfair commercial practice 
listed in the second paragraph, a judge has more discretion and can adapt the 
remedy, taking the concrete circumstances of the case into account, e.g. the gravity of 
the infringement, the degree to which the behaviour of the consumer was influenced, 
the financial implications and the proportionality of the remedy.73 For example, the 
judge could order a partial reimbursement of the sums paid. For practices listed in the 
first paragraph, the Court has no margin of appreciation and must order the complete 
reimbursement.  
The leading consumer association explains that art VI.38 has never been applied in 
practice because consumers on their own do not usually have sufficient incentives to 
go to court. This legal provision may find its first application in a pending class action 
(Dieselgate case, started by Test Achats, pending at the time of writing). In this case, 
the leading consumer association based its claim on article IV. 38 CEL. Another 
reason, this association explains, why this provision is not applied so far is because 
both courts and lawyers are more familiar with general contract law and will usually 
rely on that and/or on specific sectoral legislation (e.g. on travel packages) rather 
than on horizontal consumer protection provisions. A separate point made by the 
same stakeholder about the shortcoming of article IV. 38 CEL is that it only applies to 
goods and not services. 
There is an extensive scholarly discussion regarding the scope of application of 
contractual remedies. One much-debated question concerns the causality 
requirement: to what extent must the consumer prove that the unfair practices caused 
them to conclude the contract?74 According to some authors, a decisive defect of 
consent (vice du consentement) is required, since the purpose of the legislator was to 
create a kind of extrajudicial nullity. In this regard, a contract is only null and void 
(with the consequence that reimbursement must be ordered) if the consumer would 
not have concluded the contract as such in the absence of the unfair commercial 
practice. Other authors state that no causal link needs to be established and that the 
only requirement is that the consumer took a transactional decision that they would 
not have taken otherwise, and therefore under other conditions. Legal certainty, 
equality of consumers and the consistent application of the remedy would benefit from 
a clarification of the causality requirement by the Belgian legislator.75 
In practice, the leading consumer association explains, consumers can be reimbursed 
while keeping the product, but this requires a court case. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
There is no published case-law available applying the above-mentioned specific 
contractual remedies. As mentioned, the ‘Dieselgate’ Case, now pending, will be the 
first relevant case. 
 
73 J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), 
Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 83. 
74 See for a brief overview of the discussion: J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” 
in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 81-83. 
75 J. GODDAER and E. TERRYN, “Unfair B2C commercial practices” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), 
Commercial practices, 2015, (47) 82. 
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• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Judges interviewed did not see a need to develop the law on contractual consequences 
linked to the use of unfair practices. One of them explained that such provisions risk 
being very far-reaching and could possibly lead to abuses. Another pointed out that 
the general contract law provides sufficient ways to address unfair commercial 
practices.  
Court practice to date is scarce but cases can be found, which show that courts do find 
means to grant contractual remedies. A case in point is a judgement by the court of 
Appeals of Antwerp of 2007.76 After recalling that termination clauses, in issue in the 
case, are not normally reviewed under the UCPD, the Court of Appeal left open the 
possibility that even such a clause could be voided when it is contrary to public policy, 
for example because it has a speculative character. Moreover, such clauses are 
examined under Article 31 Trade Practices Act which prohibits creating a significant 
imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties. 
The leading consumer association points to distortions caused by the rule that limits 
the courts’ full powers of review to penalty clauses: courts may reduce the amount 
stipulated in case of breach of contract but they may not review the amount due 
based on a contract clause other than a penalty clause. This leads to sellers trying and 
stretching the notion of withdrawal clauses beyond its natural borders in an attempt to 
make the revision of the clause unavailable for consumers as a remedy. This leads the 
consumer association to recommend that courts should be given the power of full 
review over withdrawal clauses. The same association would also like to see a new 
time limit of two years applicable to B2C contracts. This would for example prevent 
telecom operators from claiming payment of four-year old invoices which consumers 
have not kept. 
More generally, the consumer association explained that the practice regarding 
remedies is only starting to develop as there was little relevant litigation before a class 
action was introduced (in 2014) in Belgian law. It mentioned a pending case it 
introduced about resale of 35 tickets. In Belgium, reselling tickets at a premium is per 
se prohibited. Operators established in the Netherlands, however, resell concert 
tickets online. The class action aims to obtain a court order to the effect that the 
surcharge is not due (and consumers should only pay the original price for the ticket). 
Such a remedy would be based on the specific legislation concerning resale of tickets, 
not on general contract law. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
From the point of view of enforcers, the general unfairness-test contributes to 
consumer protection because the case-law of the ECJ is sufficiently developed.  
Case-law shows that the general unfairness-test serves its purpose as a safety-net or 
back-up to catch the unfair contract terms that do not fall under the national black-
list. An example is the case-law concerning (unilateral) termination clauses77, 
76 Ghent, Court of Appeal, 28 March 2007, NJW, 2008, 174, pp. 32. 
77 Gent 19 November 2014, NJW 2016, afl. 338, 225, note P. BRULEZ; Antwerpen 7 June 2010, RW 2011-
12, issue 30, 1344; Rb. Antwerpen (14e k. B) 26 oktober 2007, RW 2009-10, afl. 36, 1529. 
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jurisdiction clauses78, clauses in insurance contracts79, etc. When these clauses do not 
fall under the black list, they still can be found unfair because they create a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations.  
From the point of view of the judges, the problem with the general principle is that it 
is too vague to always provide effective consumer protection and adequate legal 
certainty. While it does fulfil its function as a safety-net to catch those unfair contract 
terms that do not fall under the black list, it would be helpful to have more precise 
rules. As one judge points out, Courts are obliged to examine of their own motion the 
issue of unfairness in consumer contracts and this is not always easy. At present, in 
case of default (i.e. if one party is neither present nor represented), a judge may only 
consider violations of public policy (but this should change shortly, with the reform 
known as ‘Potpourri V’). 
A consumer association thinks that, overall case law is satisfactory and reports that 
when they contact businesses pointing out that a practice is unfair, they often reach 
satisfactory outcomes without litigation. 
Business associations’ views concerning the UCTD are consistent with their position 
regarding the UCPD: here again, they express a preference for general principles over 
specific black lists, since they leave a margin of appreciation for traders to take 
specific circumstances into account. 
Belgium extended the scope of the UCTD in its national law: the provisions 
transposing the directive (in Book VI of the CEL) apply to all terms and not only to 
non-negotiated terms. In addition, the third exception of mandatory, statutory or 
regulatory provisions in art. 1 (2) of the UCTD been transposed in Belgian law.80 
Furthermore, the place of provisions on unfair contract terms in CEL is, rightly, 
criticised. The general fairness test is situated in art.I.8, 22° CEL (outside of book VI) 
while the criteria guiding the appraisal of unfairness of contract terms (what 
circumstances should be taken into account, time dimension, etc.) are found in art. 
VI.82 CEL. Thus readability of the economic code could be much improved on this 
point.81  
The Belgian general fairness test differs from the UCTD in two respects. Firstly, art. 
I.8, 22° CEL refers to ‘a manifest imbalance’, whereas the UCTD uses the wording ‘a 
significant imbalance’. Most Belgian commentators do not think that this should be 
read as a more demanding standard under Belgian law than under EU Law. They view 
this this as a mere terminological difference, without any practical bearing (a different 
view is expressed in the EC Consumer Law Compendium).82 Secondly, Book VI of the 
CEL contains no reference to the criterion ‘good faith’. This is considered to enhance 
legal certainty83 and lower the burden of proof for consumers.84 Moreover, according 
to scholars, the fairness of contractual terms should be assessed, taking into account 
78 Arrondrb. Brussel 12 december 2012, T.Vred. 2013, issue 11-12, 559, note F. DE PATOUL; Arrondrb. 
Brussel 6 June 2011, T.Vred. 2013, issue 11-12, 220; Vred. Sint-Pieters-Woluwe 24 juni 2011, T.Vred. 
2013, issue 11-12, 556, note F. DE PATOUL; Vred. Sint-Pieters-Leeuw 28 maart 2011, T.Vred. 2013, 218; 
Gent (13e k.) 26 oktober 2012, Jaarboek Marktpraktijken 2012, 286; TGR-TWVR 2013, afl. 1, 46; Kh. 
Henegouwen (afd. Bergen) (1e k.) 9 februari 2016, JLMB 2016, afl. 19, 894. 
79 Bergen 11 January 2011, T.Vred. 2011, 330; Cass. 12 oktober 2007, Arr.Cass. 2007, afl. 10, 1931 en 
DCCR 2008, afl. 80, 61. 
80 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 137.  
81 S. STIJNS and S. JANSEN, “De basisbeginselen van het contractenrecht: kroniek van de recentste 
evoluties”, TBBR/RGDC 2013/1, (2) 14, no. 31. 
82 R. STEENNOT, Onrechtmatige bedingen in de wet van 6 april 2010 betreffende marktpraktijken en 
consumentenbescherming, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2012, 25. 
83 J. STUYCK, Handels- en economisch recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. A: Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van 
Belgisch Privaatrecht, issue 13, 2013, 498, no. 573. 
84 H. SCHULTE-NOLKE (ed.) i.c.w. C. TWIGG-FLESNER and M. EBERS, EC Consumer Law Compendium. 
Comparative Analysis, 2007, 372-379, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf; J. STUYCK, 
Handels- en economisch recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. A: Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van Belgisch 
Privaatrecht, issue 13, 2013, 498, no. 573. 
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not only the circumstances at the time of conclusion of the contract, but also the 
circumstances following the performance of the contract85, which confers courts a 
large margin of appreciation.86  
These deviations from the UCTD contribute to a high level of consumer protection. 
However, practice shows that consumers or their lawyers are not always aware of the 
existence of these provisions.   
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
There was already a list in the TPA of 1991, in anticipation of and inspired by the 
UCTD. Belgium has since transposed the Annex in a blacklist which can now be found 
in art. VI.83 CEL. Belgian law goes further than the UCTD in that its black list is more 
extensive than that contained in the Annex to the UCTD. Some prohibitions, however, 
were not transposed in the black list, e.g. the ban on clauses that oblige the consumer 
to turn to arbitration in case of a dispute (Annex, (q) UCTD). Therefore, according to 
Belgian scholars, these clauses would have to be appraised under the general fairness 
test.87  
According to enforcement authorities, there are no problems regarding the application 
of the indicative list in Belgium. A consumer association concurs: in Belgium there is 
no problem because there is a blacklist. 
Judges too think the black list works well in practice and that it represents a clear 
advantage for consumer protection compared to the purely indicative list of the 
Directive. The black list is very specific, which leads to more legal certainty, is easier 
to use in practice and consequently enhances consumer protection.  
A business association, for its part, considers that the black list as such has little value 
in practice, because its interpretation is uncertain and neither case-law nor The 
Belgian Commission on Unfair Contract Terms (hereinafter: ‘CUCT’)’s opinions provide 
adequate guidance. Indeed, some of the provisions in the blacklist are formulated very 
broadly (using language such as ‘unreasonable’, ‘equivalent’, ‘disproportionate’, 
‘inappropriately’). Courts therefore have a margin of appreciation under the black list, 
which leads a scholar to the conclusion that the Belgian black list displays shades of 
grey.88  
85 P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, 157; J. STUYCK, Handels- en economisch 
recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. A: Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht, issue 13, 
2013, 501, no. 575; P. WERY, “Les clauses abusives relatives à l’inexécution des obligations 
contractuelles dans les lois de protection des consommateurs du 14 juillet 1991 et du 2 août 2002”, JT 
2003, 801. 
86 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 145. 
87 R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. WYSEUR, “Overzicht van rechtspraak. 
Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 242, no. 190; R. 
STEENNOT, “Art. 74, 22° Wet betreffende marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming” in X, Handels- 
en economisch recht. Commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, 2012, losbl. OVERAL 
AANPASSEN 
88 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 145; P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, 214-215, no. 
257. 
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The black list is also used as guidance for assessment of contract terms under the 
general unfairness test.89 Scholars refer to this phenomenon as the ‘reflective function’ 
of the black list).90,91 Business representatives agree that this is the main added value 
of the black list. On a related point, it should be noted that, as recommended by the 
ECJ,92 Belgian courts also rely on the indicative list from the UCTD as a guidance to 
assess contract clauses that are not black listed, such as arbitration clauses.93  
One area for improvement in relation with the indicative list of UCTD and the blacklist 
contained in domestic law may be the CUCT. It delivers guidance on how to apply the 
black list and can give an opinion as to the unfairness of a particular clause, either on 
its own motion or when seized by the Minister, typically after the Inspectorate has 
received numerous complaints. Courts, for their part, may not request an amicus brief 
from the CUCT. The CUCT also makes recommendations on how to extend the black 
list, but it does not have the power to directly update the list. Enforcers regret that the 
CUCT’s opinions are not better known, in particular by courts. Apparently, these 
opinions are not widely circulated. The CUCT seems to be under-used and its work 
could contribute more to consumer protection if it were better known. Drafting a 
citizen-friendly summary of opinions, which are often very technical, would also be an 
improvement.  
Another point worth noting regarding the protection afforded by the black list concerns 
the power of courts. If contract terms are caught under the black list, a court is bound 
to declare them null and void. By contrast, when applying the general fairness test, 
courts enjoy a margin of appreciation.  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Since the ECJ’s judgment in Invitel94, the res judicata of a court decision in an 
injunction procedure should extend to all consumers in a contractual relationship with 
that specific trader.95 This is undoubtedly the case under Belgian law.  
Enforcers did not mention the Invitel case or its consequences in the interview, but 
pointed to a different element, within the Belgian legal order: the King may intervene 
by Royal Decree and prescribe or forbid the use of certain terms in contracts or 
impose the use of standard contracts (provided by art.VI.85 CEL).96 In any event, 
89 P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, 170, no. 199; I. DEMUYNCK, De inhoudelijke 
controle van onrechtmatige bedingen: onderzoek van de wet van 14 juli 1991 op de handelspraktijken en 
de voorlichting en de bescherming van de consument, Diss. PhD Law (not publicized), 371-401. 
90 P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, 170, no. 199; I. DEMUYNCK, De inhoudelijke 
controle van onrechtmatige bedingen: onderzoek van de wet van 14 juli 1991 op de handelspraktijken en 
de voorlichting en de bescherming van de consument, Diss. PhD Law (not published), 371-401. 
91 See the above-mentioned case-law concerning the general fairness test.  
92 See for instance Case C-472/10, Invitel, EU:C:2012:242, paragraph 26. 
93 See the above-mentioned case-law concerning arbitration clauses.  
94 Case C-472/10, Invitel, EU:C:2012:242. 
95 R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. WYSEUR, “Overzicht van rechtspraak. 
Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 287, no. 242. 
96 The King has done this three times concerning the delivery order when purchasing a new car, contracts 
with marriage bureaus and mediation of real estate agents. See the following royal decree’s: Royal 
Decree of 9 July 2000 concerning the mentioning of essential information and the general sales conditions 
on the delivery order for new cars, BS 9 August 2000; Royal Decree of 18 November 2005 concerning a 
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there is therefore a mechanism under Belgian law for extending the prohibition of 
certain unfair terms to all contracts (or all contracts of a certain category).  
A consumer association added that, in addition to the extension of the effects of a 
ruling to all contracts of a trader party to the proceedings, there is de facto a snow 
ball effect reaching the whole sector. Once certain terms have been held unfair, other 
traders in the same sector hear about it and adapt their terms and conditions as 
needed to avoid litigation. 
A judge interviewed also made no reference to Invitel and referred to the limited 
effect of the res judicata. Nonetheless, she shared the view of a business association 
that, in practice, a trader will adapt the terms in their contracts on a long-term basis, 
when it becomes clear that they would not stand up in court. The same business 
association stated that a broader effect on other traders in the same sector is likely 
after multiple court decisions, subject on effective dissemination of the court decision 
in that sector. The interviewee cites as an example a string of court decisions in which 
the contract terms of some energy suppliers were found unfair and were consequently 
declared null and void. This led to a change of these contract terms in the entire 
energy sector.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The transparency principle used to be part of the law on unfair terms.  Since MPCPA, 
its scope has been broadened. Now, the general principle of ‘plain and intelligible 
language’ applies to all commercial practices (art. VI.37, §1 CEL).97 Nonetheless, the 
regulation of unfair terms remains its field of choice and the requirement for 
transparency is explicitly mentioned among the criteria of assessment of unfairness in 
art. VI.82 (2) CEL.  
Enforcers see the transparency principle as very positive. Among judges interviewed, 
one shared the view that the principle of ‘plain and intelligible language’ is too vague, 
and argued that these requirements should be further specified. Another explained 
that this principle is interpreted in a broad manner, leading to solutions which are 
favourable to consumers. There are no published cases in which the lack of 
transparency led to a contract term being held as unfair. There is however one 
published case in which the lack of coherence of contractual terms was held to violate 
art. VI.37 CEL.98 In that specific case, the violation of the transparency principle of 
art.VI.37 is considered as a violation of the law which is distinct from the unfairness of 
other terms in the contract. 
Scholars explain the under-use of art.VI.37 as based on one main reason: the lack of 
a specific civil sanction for breach of the principle of plain and intelligible language.99  
In the view of a business association, businesses are very aware of the transparency 
requirement applying to contract terms.  
A consumer association was of the opinion that transparency requirement work well in 
practice. In important sectors, such as utilities, contracts have evolved a great deal in 
the last years, representatives of the association explained. Negotiation between the 
consumer association and operators has been the means of choice for producing 
compliance with the transparency requirement. 
 
standard contract for marriage mediation, BS 9 March 2006 and Royal Decree of 12 January 2007 
concerning the use of certain terms in contracts of mediation of real estate agents, BS 19 January 2007. 
97 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 139. 
98 Vred. Grâce-Hollogne 25 May 2012, JLMB 2012, issue 40, (1917) 1922-1923. 
99 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 141; S. STIJNS and E. SWAENEPOEL, “Evolutiepolen van de onrechtmatige 
bedingenleer”, DCCR 2013, (141) 148. 
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• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Belgium has extended the scope of the UCTD to individually negotiated terms. A 
scholar explains that this extension was based on the view that the consumer is a 
weaker party in contract conclusions irrespective of whether a contract term is 
negotiated or not.100  A judge, however, pointed out that this extension leads to legal 
uncertainty that is not outweighed by an additional benefit for the consumer. Even 
without this extension, the consumer could rely on general principles of contract law to 
address an unfair individually negotiated term. Indeed, there are no published cases 
where the relevant Belgian provisions have been applied to individually negotiated 
terms. 
A consumer association thinks that price excesses should be controlled. They mention 
the example of plumber’s overcharge for weekend interventions. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?]  
According to the enforcers, it is regrettable that the consumer needs to go to court 
obtain recognition that a contract term is unfair. This is the result of the terminological 
choice made by the Belgian legislator to provide that every unfair clause is ‘prohibited 
and void’ (toute clause abusive est interdite et nulle), rather than ‘deemed unwritten’ 
(réputée non écrite), as other Member States have provided to give effect to the 
Directive’s requirement that the unfair term be made ‘not binding’. This drafting of art. 
VI.84, para. 1 creates a civil law fiction of non-existence,101 which only a court of law 
can trigger.102 Enforcers also point out that Belgian courts have not referred any 
preliminary questions to the ECJ. 
Belgian case-law confirms that national courts do invoke the unfairness of a clause ex 
officio,103 even in cases where the consumer does not show up in court.104 However, a 
judge remarked that Belgian courts sometimes fail to invoke the unfairness ex officio 
for reasons of time. The issue is that Courts must of course respect the audi alteram 
partem-principle. In other words, they must call the parties to debate on the issue of 
unfairness. This causes delays, in a context where delays are already problematically 
long and where courts are under pressure to speed up proceedings. Courts deal with 
this issue by silently performing a proportionality assessment of sorts. They will not 
invoke the unfairness of contract terms of their own motion in every case where it 
would be conceivable to do so, but they will do it in cases the imbalance is striking and 
100 P. CAMBIE, Onrechtmatige bedingen, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, 3-4, no. 3-4 and 71, no. 86. 
101 H. SCHULTE-NOLKE (ed.) i.c.w. C. TWIGG-FLESNER and M. EBERS, EC Consumer Law Compendium. 
Comparative Analysis, 2007, 388, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf. 
102 R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. WYSEUR, “Overzicht van rechtspraak. 
Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 220, no. 169. 
103 See for example: Gent 4 January 2012, NJW 2012, 255, note R. STEENNOT; Gent 26 October 2012, 
Jb.Markt. 2012, 286, note P. CAMBIE, TGR-TWVR 2013, issue 1, 46; Arrondrb. Oost-Vlaanderen 17 
november 2014, T.Vred. 2015, issue 1-2, 21; Vred. Thuin 7 January 2013, DCCR 2013, issue 99, 68, note 
J. LAFFINEUR, T.Vred. 2013, issue 11-12, 572, note R. STEENNOT.; Vred. Charleroi 4 July 2008, JLMB 
2008, 1658. See for more case-law: R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. 
WYSEUR, “Overzicht van rechtspraak. Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-
2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 220, no. 169, footnote 969. 
104 R. STEENNOT, G. STRAETMANS, E. TERRYN, B. KEIRSBILCK en B. WYSEUR, “Overzicht van rechtspraak. 
Consumentenbescherming (2008-2014). Marktpraktijken (2011-2014)”, TPR 2015, (1) 219, no. 169. 
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the consumers did not invoke the legal provisions that protect them. This is confirmed 
by scholars, who note that, even though raising the unfair character of contract terms 
of their own motion represents a substantial effort for judges, they do it in a way that 
contributes significantly to consumer protection. 
A business association confirms that abusive character is invoked ex officio by courts. 
They think nullity is a good and practical sanction. 
A consumer association explains however that most judges only have limited 
knowledge of the law on unfair contract terms. They typically know that conventional 
interest rates cannot exceed legal interest rates and will raise the unfairness of such a 
clause of their own motion, but may well not spot unfairness of other clauses. 
Scholars have discussed extensively whether nullity under art. VI.84 CEL is absolute 
or relative.105 Traditionally, it would have been considered as relative nullity: one 
which can be invoked only by the party which the legislator intends to protect, i.e. 
consumers. The rule that courts have to raise the unfair character of their own motion 
sits ill with the notion of relative nullity. Indeed such a duty is habitually associated 
with absolute nullity. The Belgian Cour de Cassation may have found a compromise by 
laying emphasis on the duty of courts to raise the argument of unfairness of their own 
motion and inviting parties to revise their positions in this light. 106  Following this 
logic, it could be said that courts facilitate the exercise of consumer rights but do not 
take the place of consumers. It remains for them to raise the claim which is only 
suggested to them. Nullity, therefore, can still be considered relative. 
As mentioned, going to court is the only way to have a contract term recognised as 
unfair. In other words, no administrative remedy is available under Belgian law. 
However, as both representatives of the Ministry for the Economy and a business 
association explain, the Economic Inspectorate plays an active role in practice by 
intervening regularly in court proceedings. In addition, the CUCT (see above) is an 
advisory body created in 1993. It issues recommendations about contracts terms in 
B2C contracts, gives advice upon request and may submit proposals to the Minister of 
Economic Affairs.107  The CUCT can act on its own initiative or at the request of the 
competent minister, a consumer organisation or an association of traders.  
As far as court proceedings are concerned, a consumer association raises an additional 
issue and explains that the situation would be improved in terms of remedies if it were 
possible to obtain compensation in the framework of an injunction procedure, rather 
than having to sue separately for compensation. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Representatives of the Ministry for the Economy are not averse to the idea. However, 
they underscore that a graphical representation model with symbols requires a certain 
amount of education. At the moment, symbols are used all around, without the 
guarantee that the consumer knows the meaning all of them. A business association 
stated that such symbols could have an added value, but they should be implemented 
by sectoral auto-regulation. In other words, enforcers and businesses concur in 
105 See for a short overview of the arguments: R. STEENNOT, “Art. 75 Wet betreffende marktpraktijken en 
consumentenbescherming” in X, Handels- en economisch recht. Commentaar met overzicht van 
rechtspraak en rechtsleer, 2012, losbl.  
106 P. CAMBIE, “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (136) 152, footnote 481. 
107 The CUCT has already given repeatedly advice, e.g. concerning the use of certain terms in contracts of 
mediation of real estate agents. The recommendations can be consulted on the internet 
(http://economie.fgov.be/nl/fod/structuur/Commissions_Raden/Commissie_onrechtm_bedingen/adviezen
/#.V7Go_5iLShc).  
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thinking that more graphic representation of information could be a way forward, 
provided there is sufficient standardisation. The idea however seemed relatively new 
to representatives of a consumer association. They expressed that it could be a good 
idea, provided that the overall level of protection would not diminish. The most 
important aspect to improve the effectiveness of UCTD, according to that consumer 
association, is to improve practical information on what concrete steps consumers 
should take when they face a problem (by analogy with passenger rights). 
More generally, a judge stated that national UCTD provisions (whether it concerns the 
general provisions or the black list) contribute little to consumer protection because of 
the ignorance of consumers and also that of their lawyers. Generally, lawyers use 
well-known concepts of general contract law with which they are more familiar. These 
findings are identical with these of the EC Consumer Law Compendium of 2007.108 
However, according to the judge, the way forward would be to specify the prohibitions 
and to focus on black-lists. General principles and indicative lists are vague, which 
necessitates a complete research of all facts in a procedure and for which there is not 
enough time or resources. According to this stakeholder, the more specific the 
prohibition, the more useful it is in practice. Another judge concurs that short and 
clear provisions would be an improvement.  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
A business association stated that because of the active role of the ECJ (in interpreting 
the general principle to ensure a uniform interpretation), the principle presently works 
fine in cross-border trade and has contributed positively to establishing the Internal 
Market. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Business representatives did not mention any adverse effect of black lists on cross-
border trade.  
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Again, no specific obstacle was perceived in connection with extended scope of UCTD. 
 
108 H. SCHULTE-NOLKE (ed.) i.c.w. C. TWIGG-FLESNER and M. EBERS, EC Consumer Law Compendium. 
Comparative Analysis, 2007, 417, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf 
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1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
As already mentioned above, businesses, as a rule, are not favourable to transposing 
rules on consumer protection to B2B transactions. 
Currently in Belgium, there are no general rules on unfair terms for B2B transactions. 
There is however a specific provision in the Act on Late Payment in Commercial 
Transactions,109 namely art. 7, that provides that a contractual term which deviates 
from certain provisions of the Act can be reviewed by a judge if it is grossly unfair to 
the creditor. This for instance can be the case by stipulating a too low default interest 
rate. A judge has to consider all circumstances of the case, including good commercial 
practice, the nature of the product or service, and the fact if the unfair term creates a 
significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties, to the 
detriment of the creditor. There is no requirement that the clause has not been 
individually negotiated, but one author suggests that this will in practice mostly be the 
case.110  
Another author suggests that an extension of the unfairness test of contractual terms 
is justified in contracts where at least one party is an SME.111 The general rationale of 
European contract law is the creation of a well-functioning internal market and the 
protection of weaker parties. Since SMEs, like consumers, are generally in a position 
to conclude a contract on their business partner terms or to not conclude it at all, the 
same rationale applies to them and to consumers. This would seem a valid reason to 
extend protection against unfair terms to SMEs.  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
It is argued in literature that this would be appropriate for B2B transactions and that a 
more stringent fairness test, such as the one suggested in art. 86 of the proposal on a 
Common European Sales Law (hereinafter: ‘CESL’),112  would not be justified. A more 
stringent test would not create more confidence for SME’s to engage in cross-border 
trade, nor would it seem justified on fairness grounds, as SMEs do not need to be 
more protected than consumers.113 Another author strongly suggests that the scope of 
the UCPD should be amended to cover both B2C and B2B (marketing) practices at the 
pre-contractual stage. Thus, scholars agree that the same test should apply to SMEs 
and consumers.  
 
109 Act on Late Payment in Commercial Transactions of 2 August 2002, BS 7 August 2002.  
110 S. VAN LOOCK, “Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses. A Comparative Overview in Light of the 
Common European Sales Law” in M.B.M. LOOS and I. SAMOY (eds.), The Position of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises in European Contract Law, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2014, (83) 125-126. 
111 J. KLIJNSMA, “The CESL and its Unfair Terms Protection for SMEs” in M.B.M. LOOS and I. SAMOY (eds.), 
The Position of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in European Contract Law, Cambridge, Intersentia, 
2014, (73) 73-74. 
112 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law of 11 October 2011, COM(2011) 653 final. Art. 86 states that, in B2B relations, a 
term is unfair if a) it is not individually negotiated and b) its use grossly deviates from good commercial 
practice, contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 
113 J. KLIJNSMA, “The CESL and its Unfair Terms Protection for SMEs” in M.B.M. LOOS and I. SAMOY (eds.), 
The Position of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in European Contract Law, Cambridge, Intersentia, 
2014, (73) 79. 
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
There was no extensive information found regarding these extensions or exclusions. 
Scholars however argued that, contrary to the CESL, a difference in the scope of the 
unfairness test between consumers and small business would not seem justified.114 
Consequently, if individually negotiated terms are excluded from the unfairness test 
for consumers, this should also be the case for small businesses, since the same 
rationale (the weaker party and the internal market argument) equally apply. Under 
Belgian law individually negotiated terms are within the scope of the prohibition of 
unfair terms. Therefore, it would be better if they could also fall within the scope of 
protection for SMEs. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
No specific information was found nor given regarding this question.   
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
No specific information was found nor given regarding this question.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No specific information was found nor given regarding this question.   
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No specific information was found nor given regarding this question.   
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
No specific information was found nor given regarding this question.  
 
114 J. KLIJNSMA, “The CESL and its Unfair Terms Protection for SMEs” in M.B.M. LOOS and I. SAMOY (eds.), 
The Position of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in European Contract Law, Cambridge, Intersentia, 
2014, (73) 80. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?115  
Two specialised judges were of the opinion that the injunction procedure is very 
effective and useful. One commented that it is mostly used by business and not by 
consumers. Indirectly however, consumers benefit from these orders to cease, since 
they lead firstly to fairer competition and secondly to consumer protection.  
A consumer association explained that, in network services sectors (telecom, energy), 
the injunction procedure helped obtain real changes in consumer contracts. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Article 1022 of the Belgian Judicial Code (rules on civil procedure) together with article 
3 of the Royal decree of October 26th 2007 provide that the value of an injunction 
cannot be evaluated in money. This has a bearing on the general rule according to 
which costs are born by the losing party. The amount the winning party can recover 
from the losing party in an injunction procedure is capped at 1440 Euro. However, the 
judge may increase this amount up to 12.000 Euro.116 In the interviews, judges 
underscored the importance of this compensation, explaining further that, where 
necessary, the amount can be adjusted downwards for e.g. vulnerable consumers. 
However, the rule does not address the ex ante obstacle of litigation costs: most 
consumers, irrespective of the merit of their case, will be reluctant to make an 
advance for the litigation costs. 
The representatives of the leading consumer association explained that, in practice, 
the sums awarded to the winning party never cover real costs of the cap. They said 
that, as a result, the consumer association had to choose its cases and could not file 
for an injunction in every case that would merit attention. They indicated that the 
consumer association is doing an enforcement job that should be financed by the 
government and suggested it should be able to recover the true costs of private 
enforcement from the government.  
There is a summary procedure, but, according to a judge, it is seldom used, if at all, 
since the ordinary injunction procedure (before the president of the court) is already 
an accelerated procedure. 
Concerning the prior consultation, in Belgium there is a procedure of reconciliation, 
where parties try to reach an agreement together with the judge. According to a 
judge, this procedure is quick, without any costs for the parties, implies a low 
threshold for the consumer, and is therefore very consumer friendly.  
The publication of a decision or a corrective statement is very effective according to a 
judge, but should not be used lightly, since it could harm the reputation of the 
business over time. In other words, the publication is very effective because of its 
115 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
116 Both caps are indexed. These are the current values at the time of writing. 
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deterrent nature. Another judge concurs and explains that the combination of various 
measure at the courts disposal is sufficient to discipline businesses.  
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Injunction procedures are available under Belgian law for a variety of matters, ranging 
(among others) from remuneration of public notaries to gender discrimination and 
data protection, from appointing experts to granting exequatur and trademark 
infringement.117 The scope of application of injunction procedures under Belgian law is 
therefore far wider than consumer law.  
In the realm of regulation of marketing practices, the Economic Code provides for 
injunction procedures for violations of the rules contained in Book VI of the same code 
(which contains consumer protection rules)118 but also in matters of advertisement 
‘including those not covered by book VI’119,  and matters regarding the protection of 
consumers of mobile telecommunication services.120 This may be seen as an 
‘extension’ beyond the scope of application of the Injunction Directive (with the caveat 
that Belgian lawyers may not perceive this directive as the root of injunction 
procedures in these matters and therefore the wider scope of application of the 
injunction procedure not as an ‘extension’ from that base). The scope of injunction 
procedures in consumer matters is therefore broader under Belgian law than the rights 
conferred by the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction 
Directive.  
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Under Belgian law, injunction procedures are fast-track procedures. Urgency is 
presumed and many procedural delays are abridged (in comparison to ordinary 
procedures). Yet, in practice these procedures too are quite slow. A judge expresses 
the opinion that delays are indeed the main obstacle to effectiveness. He thinks that, 
beyond a much-needed general upgrade of the Belgian judicial system, it would be 
helpful to have specialised courts dealing with consumer protection.  
The interviewed consumer association clearly stated that costs are the main obstacle. 
It did not consider that there has been significant change since 2012. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
From an EU law perspective, the list should at least be updated to include recent 
directives, in particular the Consumer Rights Directive. This is purely a matter of 
consistency.  
117 Listed in the Code of Procedure at art. 585 and 587 (civil matters) and art. 588 and 589 (commercial 
matters). 
118 Article XVII.2. 15° 
119 Article XVII.2. 7° 
120 Article XVII.2. 14° 
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From a Belgian perspective, scholars are sceptical about extending the scope of 
injunction procedures (whether in consumer matters or more generally). The reason is 
that courts are not well resourced and stretching the limited available resources over 
an even greater number of injunction procedures is likely to make matters worse in 
terms of delays. It would also detract resources from the seriously urgent matters.121 
In the past, it has been observed that many of legislative provisions adopted to 
broaden the scope of injunction proceedings have not produced the desired results 
and appear retroactively as demagogical.122 
Another drawback of these procedures is that the judge can only give an injunction. If 
the parties want to claim compensation, they have to start a distinct procedure (for 
which there is no fast-track). The reason or this is that it would be unworkable to keep 
the fast-track character of the injunction procedure if the court had to deal with 
calculation of damages. Nonetheless, this is a serious inconvenience to victims of 
unfair practices or unfair clauses. In the field of gender discrimination, where the 
same injunction procedure also applies, a very innovative measure was adopted to 
alleviate this difficulty: the claimant may opt for a flat-rate compensation (fixed in the 
legislation).123 The compensation may not be exact, but it will be relatively speedy. 
This seems to work well.124 Another more recent initiative to improve the efficacy of 
injunction procedures was introduced in article 186 of the Judicial Code: the King (i.e. 
the government) may give the president of certain courts specialized jurisdiction over 
injunction procedures. 
An issue a revised Injunctions Directive should deal with is the interplay between 
injunctions and collective redress. As a matter of principle, if one takes collective 
redress seriously, it would seem that injunctions should be available not only to public 
bodies in charge of consumer interests and consumer associations (current article 3 of 
the Injunction directive). They should also be available to groups of consumers formed 
in accordance with national law (and relevant EU law if ever adopted) for the purpose 
of group litigation. 
It is true that, in practice, this may not be necessary in all cases. For example, where 
a consumer association or public body applies for an injunction in parallel with the 
class action (or before), the effect of the injunction will extend to all consumers.125 Yet 
there may be cases in which it could make a difference that the class has standing to 
apply for an injunction. This issue should at least be considered when revising the 
Injunctions Directive.  
Regarding measures that could improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a 
high level of consumer protection, the leading consumer association stresses the need 
for a better coordination between the injunction procedure and sanctions. According to 
consumer representatives, it should be possible to apply for a sanction in the same set 
of proceedings (even if in a separate second step), and sanctions collected should go 
to a fund which could finance other applications for injunctions as well as class 
actions.126 
 
121 Interim measure proceedings governed by art. 583 Judical Code. 
122 J-F VAN DROEGENBROECK «Le juge des référés, hors la loi ? », in J. ENGLEBERT (ed.) Questions de droit 
judiciaire inspirées de ‘l’affaire Fortis’, Brussels, Larcier, 2011, p. 154 and reference cited.  
123 Law of 10 May 2007 on fighting discriminations, MB 30 May 2007, p. 29016, section 18.  
124 S. VAN DROOGENBROECK and J-F VAN DROOGHENBROECK, L’action en cessation de discriminations in 
J-F VAN DROOGHENBROECK, Les actions en cessation, Brussels, Larcier, 2006, 324-397 ; G. CLOSSETS-
MARCHAL and J-F VAN DROOGHENBROECK,, La protection judiciaire contre la discrimination : l’action en 
cessation in J. RINGELHEIM (ed.) Le droit et le diversité culturelle, Brussels, Bruylant, 2011, 394-453. 
125 Case C-472/10, Invitel, EU:C:2012:242. 
126 For a similar proposition, See A-L SIBONY, A Behavioural Perspective on Collective Redress in Eva Lein, 
Duncan Fairgrieve, Marta Otero Crespo and Vincent Smith (eds), Collective Redress in Europe: Why and 
How?, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2015, pp. 47-57 at 56. 
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1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
A judge pointed out that, from the point of view of consumers, there are few problems 
since the consumer will try to address the infringement before a Belgian court, so 
there are no real procedural problems as such. The main problem however will be the 
implementation and enforcement of the Belgian court decision in other countries, 
which remains difficult. Another judge interviewed concurs on this point.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
The persons interviewed who work for qualified entities did not have experience with 
injunction procedures before a Belgian court for infringement of consumer rights 
originating in other Member States.  
The leading consumer association pointed to the difficulty of dealing with practices 
originating in another Member State, where the practice is not prohibited (such as 
reselling concert tickets at a premium price).127 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
The main difficulty evoked by several stakeholders concerns the execution of Belgian 
judgments in other Member States. The solution would then seem to consist in 
broadening the scope of instruments facilitating cross-border execution of judgements 
so as to include injunctions within the scope of ID. This would require legislative action 
in the framework of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.  
In addition, the leading consumer association notes that cooperation among national 
enforcement authorities could be improved. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure is regulated by articles of the Judicial Code, which is a 
distinct piece of legislation from the Economic Code, where the directives are 
transposed. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
127 See example described above. 
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procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Belgian rules on injunction are in conformity with the Injunction directive. They do 
beyond the measures foreseen by the Injunctions Directive on one particular issue: 
urgency is irrebutably presumed, thus relieving the claimant of the heavy burden of 
proof under article 584 of the Judicial Code. It should also be mentioned that, in 
practice, periodic penalty payments (under art. 1385 bis of Judicial Code) are almost 
systematically ordered. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
According to a judge, the single biggest hindrance that holds consumers back from 
exercise of their rights under these directives is the cost of litigation. In many cases, 
consumers will not litigate for fear that either upfront costs will be too high or that 
costs may outweigh benefits (if they lose, as mentioned, the losing party must pay a 
standard compensation for the litigation costs to the winning party).  
One author states that according to the European legislator, the harmonisation within 
the internal market increases consumer confidence.128 However one author criticises 
this argument with regard to the UCPD for a number of reasons.129 For instance, even 
if there is a minimum safety net of consumer protection in the internal market, most 
consumers are not aware of the content of their own law. This makes it unlikely that 
the reason why consumers are reluctant to buy across borders is the fear that other 
Members States law may be different from their own law. Another compelling counter 
argument is that the UCPD increases consumer confidence by eliminating obstacles 
stemming from different national regulation of commercial practices, but not by 
addressing other, more important kind of obstacles, e.g. obstacles related to cross-
border dispute resolution (access to justice obstacles), practical obstacles (shipping 
costs, difficulties in exchanging the product and getting it repaired) and natural 
obstacles (the language barrier, geographical distance and unfamiliar consumer 
culture and journey time). 
The leading consumer association stresses that cost of going to court is a serious 
obstacle to the enforcement of consumer rights. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
128 B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011, 186, no. 203-204. 
129 B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011, 186-187, no. 204. 
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In the view of a judge, the regulation on market practices is very beneficial for 
businesses, since it prevents and reduces unfair competition, and therefore levels the 
playing field. Because of this legislation, consumers benefit indirectly from fairer 
competition. A business association agreed with this view and argued that especially 
full harmonisation levels the playing field in cross-border trade, contrary to minimum 
harmonisation, which leads to diversity in national legislation. However, as already 
mentioned, because of some open-textured concepts, for instance in the UCPD, there 
is a large margin of appreciation for the judges, which possibly detracts from the 
effectiveness of harmonisation and thus the functioning of the internal market. A legal 
author agrees with this view and wrote that regulatory diversity would not disappear 
after the implementation of the UCPD.130 The law in action would probably continue to 
differ widely, because of the numerous open-textured concepts, rules and principles in 
the UCPD. In the interview, a business association confirmed this point of criticism and 
gave the example of the regulation of blackout periods in Belgium,131 which illustrates 
ongoing regulatory diversity across Member States. 
As already stated, one business association maintains that only maximum 
harmonisation eliminates those compliance and transaction costs for businesses, but it 
does so only if the harmonised rules are precise enough. Otherwise, harmonised rules 
create legal uncertainty and therefore higher compliance and transaction costs, with 
the effect of possibly hindering cross-border trade.  
According to Keirsbilck, such compliance costs do not constitute the main obstacle to 
cross border trade. Empirical evidence suggests rather that the main obstacle, on the 
traders side, is the divergent consumer cultures throughout Europe. Cross-border 
traders are forced to adapt to these varying contexts, keeping the principle ‘think 
global, act local’ in mind.132  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
In the interview, the business association gave no specific numbers, but stated that 
the compliance and transaction costs mainly consist of the costs of research and legal 
advice, to comply with the national regulation of another Member State.  
On a more general note, a judge pointed out the difference between large companies 
and SMEs: for SMEs, it is much more difficult to comply with the requirements 
because the compliance costs are a heavier burden compared to larger businesses. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Enforcers do not have a precise notion of such enforcement costs because government 
personnel involved in enforcement tasks also enforce national provisions which do not 
originate in directives.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
No specific trait of Belgian enforcement system seems to be wasteful. A judge 
confirmed that, at the moment, there is no margin for significant  improvements. 
A consumer association stresses that out-of-court procedures are also expensive 
 
130 B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011, 185-186, no. 201-202. 
131 On which see above section 1.1.3. page 24. 
132 B. KEIRSBILCK, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011, 186, no. 202. 
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• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
In the view of a judge, the litigation costs (private enforcement costs) could be 
reduced, but this would increase the risk of abusive litigation. What courts do is that 
they exercise discretion as to how private costs are shared between the parties: they 
may for instance lower litigation costs for the losing party by reducing the 
compensation which it has to pay to the successful party at the end of proceedings. 
This does not change the total amount of enforcement costs but may change 
incentives to litigate. To truly lower costs, the legislator would need to lower court 
fees. 
A consumer association stresses that prevention is less costly than litigation. It also 
puts forward that sanctions should be increase to improve dissuasion. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
A judge stated that consumers are not aware of their consumer rights in general. 
However, for certain sectors like e-communications, young consumers display a higher 
level of awareness. Furthermore, as mentioned above, judges stated that, courts 
rarely apply provisions stemming from the UCPD or UCTD, since general contract law 
often suffices and is more familiar to legal practitioners, who are mostly not aware of 
specific consumer legislation.  
From the point of view of one business association, businesses - especially large ones 
- are well aware of the requirements in these specific sectors and comply with them. 
The business association added that businesses generally follow the opinions of the 
CUCT, and they also well informed on the requirements by the sectoral business 
associations.  
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The Economic Inspectorate is in charge of enforcing consumer protection rules 
generally, also in the e-communications and transport sectors. Only in the financial 
sector and in the energy sectors are sectoral regulators in charge of consumer 
protection.  
In the Financial sector, the ‘Financial Services and Market Authority’ (hereinafter, 
FSMA) is in charge (since its creation in 2010). FSMA is responsible for the supervision 
of financial products generally and oversees in particular the provision of mandatory 
pre-contractual information requirements. It also enforces sector-specific provisions on 
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advertisement.133 Both pre-contractual information and advertisements are subject to 
prior approval by FSMA.134 The general perception of the leading consumer association 
is that FSMA prioritises the interest of the sector rather than the interests of 
consumers, however no specific examples were given. 
In the energy sector, the regulatory structure is more complex as the oversight of the 
energy markets is divided between specialised authorities on the federal and regional 
level (the ‘CREG’ and ‘VREG’). These authorities are competent to oversee the 
compliance of the energy suppliers with the specific energy legislation. The Belgian 
Court of Accounts (‘Rekenhof’/’Cours des comptes’) reviewed the functioning of the 
CREG (the federal regulator) in 2015 and concluded that, because of a deficient legal 
framework, insufficient budget and inadequacy between needs and personnel, the 
CREG was not suitably equipped to  exercise its inspection powers effectively or adopt 
effective sanctions.135 This suggests an enforcement deficit for the UCPD and the 
UCTD in the energy sector. 
The leading consumer association considers that, in general, sectoral regulators rely 
on sector-specific provisions more than they do on horizontal rules. This is a reason to 
keep in sectoral rules provisions that overlap with general directives (i.e. repeat 
general provisions and/or go further), as the telecom regulation does. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Book VI of the CEL, containing the provisions on contractual fairness, unfair 
commercial practices and information obligations regarding advertising is applied to all 
sectors unless sector-specific rules depart from this general framework.136  
According to a business association and a judge, there are some overlaps between 
horizontal consumer provisions and sector-specific rules, but no conflicts and the 
existing overlaps do not cause any problems.  
Examples of such overlaps are found in financial services sector, where sectoral 
regulation imposes numerous information requirements upon financial services 
providers.137 For instance, information requirements applicable to credit advertising 
mandate that every advertisement that does not contain numerical information 
regarding the cost of credit should state: ‘please note, borrowing money also costs 
money’ (art. VII.64 (2) CEL).138 In addition, Belgian national provisions on the 
standard information requirements (Book VII of the CEL on Financial Services 
transposing art. 4 of the Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC), regulates 
advertisements for credit in a more general way, outside the scope of harmonisation 
of the Directive and in addition to the provisions on unfair market practices of Book VI 
CEL. This is without prejudice to the above-mentioned Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 
133 Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 Concerning Information Requirements with the Commercialisation of 
Financial Products with non-professional Clients, BS 25 April 2014. 
134 Art. 8 and art. 26 of the above mentioned Royal Decree 
135 X, Rekenhof. Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas (CREG), 66, Nov 2015, 
available in Dutch and in French: https://www.ccrek.be/docs/2015_48_CREG_NL.pdf (NL) 
https://www.ccrek.be/docs/2015_48_CREG_FR.pdf (FR) 
136 For instance for financial law aimed at consumer protection: Explanatory Memorandum 24 September 
2013, Parl.St. Kamer, COD 53 3018/001, p. 21; V. COLAERT en A. VAN IMPE, “Financial Services” in G. 
STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial practices, 2015, (305) 306. 
137 V. COLAERT en A. VAN IMPE, “Financial Services” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (305) 306. 
138 V. COLAERT en A. VAN IMPE, “Financial Services” in G. STRAETMANS and J. STUYCK (eds.), Commercial 
practices, 2015, (305) 314. 
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Concerning Information Requirements with the Commercialisation of Financial 
Products with Non-Professional Clients.139  
To conclude, there are overlaps, but the sector-specific rules on financial services go 
further than horizontal rules and there is no particular difficulty in applying the sector-
specific rules. 
  
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
A consumer association stated that there were benefits in terms of coherence. In the 
association’s view, complementary application of general and sector-specific rues does 
not create extra costs. No further reference was found concerning specifically the 
benefits of the application of the UCPD and UCTD in the regulated sectors. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Stakeholders do not seem to think that overlaps or contradictions between the EU 
sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law are in practice a big problem. 
There does not seem to be an acute need for clarification of the interplay between 
them. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
A judge stated that, even in a C2B relationship, the consumer does not provide goods 
or services on a regular basis, which implies that the consumer should still enjoy the 
benefit of consumer protection. Another judge thinks that it is necessary to prevent or 
sanction abuse on the part of consumers.  
Business associations for their part are in favour of ‘reciprocity’: they think these 
directives should apply (to protect businesses) in C2B transactions. Nonetheless, they 
raise doubts about whether these directives are easily transposable to C2B 
transactions.  
A consumer association thinks that consumers should enjoy equal protection in any 
relation with businesses, whether B2C (where the consumer is the buyer) or C2B 
(where the consumer is the seller) or C2C via B, where the consumer sells to another 
consumer via a platform which qualifies as a business. 
 
139 Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 Concerning Information Requirements with the Commercialisation of 
Financial Products with non-professional Clients, BS 25 April 2014. 
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Representatives from the Ministry of the Economy as well as the leading consumer 
association consider that these concepts are still fit for purpose.  
A judge pointed out that one concept of a ‘consumer’ would suffice. The reason is that 
(especially lower) courts are almost never asked to apply consumer protection rules 
and are able to adjudicate cases brought to them under general contract law. The 
simpler consumer protection rules are, the better chance they stand to be used by 
non-specialist legal practitioners. Another judge disagrees and thinks that these 
concepts are useful and that a consistent body of case law has now developed about 
them. In the view of a business association, there is no indication that these concepts 
are not valid or fit for purpose. Furthermore, businesses are now well aware of these 
concepts and there is some value in not changing the approach and requiring yet 
another learning process. The association estimates that it took about ten years for 
businesses to really switch their mentality and adapt to these standards. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The point of view of enforcement officials is that specific rules concerning vulnerable 
consumers are not a very good idea. The category of vulnerable consumers adds to 
the complexity without creating a clearly identifiable benefit in terms of specific rights. 
They would be very reticent to extend a specific protection of vulnerable consumers to 
UCTD as this would generate a lot of legal uncertainty for contracts.  
Business association and judges did not have specific comments on this point. 
A consumer association says that it is more difficult for handicapped consumers to 
enforce their rights and thinks that special sanctions should be contemplated against 
traders who take advantage of handicapped consumers. This opinion seems to be 
based on direct experience in one case about a wheelchair guarantee. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Representatives from the Ministry for the Economy, who have followed closely the 
legislative changes brought about by the transposition of these directives, say that the 
UCPD has improved the level of consumer protection. However, on one point, the 
Directive has lowered consumer protection. Belgium had to abolish rules on reference 
prices which applied to advertising of discounts. As a result, it has become a lot easier 
for businesses to advertise inflated discounts that do not correspond to reality. As 
criteria are now much broader, it has become more difficult for the Economic 
Inspectorate to take action. Traders in the distribution sector have unfortunately not 
adhered to the relevant code of conduct. Regarding the UCTD, the view of the Ministry 
is that this directive has not benefited Belgian consumers as Belgium was a forerunner 
at the European level on the issues covered in this directive.  
While recognising that, on paper, the directives have improved the level of consumer 
protection, a judge explains that many practitioners (lawyers, judges) are under the 
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impression that consumer law is complex and that there are constant changes. 
Therefore, it seems that theoretically there is more consumer protection, but in 
practice the level of consumer protection only rises gradually over time, as consumers 
and practitioners become more aware of specific consumer protection regulations and 
apply them more regularly.  
Another judge stresses that the protection remains ineffective in many cases, for 
economic reasons. A single consumer will generally not initiate court proceedings even 
if she/he has a good case. In his view, only collective actions can insure effective 
protection of consumer rights. In practice, he says, consumer rules are applied only in 
the context of court cases initiated against consumers on a contractual basis (e.g., for 
failure to pay) and are used as part of a defence strategy (e.g., consumer has not paid 
but terms were unfair and therefore not binding). The same judge notes that, in some 
cases, lawyers of consumers try to abuse the well-intentioned protection provided by 
these rules. On the whole, in his opinion, the main merit of the rules is independent 
from actual enforcement: their mere existence and the threat of enforcement is 
enough to discipline trader’s behaviour.  
A business association agrees that consumer protection has increased significantly 
with the development of EU law. Its view is that, on the whole, Belgian businesses are 
well aware of the consumer protection rules. For instance, their general terms and 
conditions mostly comply with the legislation, although there are some exceptions. 
A consumer association thinks that EU law has brought significant progress in Belgium 
mainly in the field of unfair contract terms.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Both representatives of the Ministry for the Economy and a business association agree 
that this Directive has increased level of protection and made it easier for consumers 
to compare offers. The representative from the Ministry notes that rules on price 
indications are applied by distributors more broadly than is mandatory. 
  
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
A business association stated that businesses made a huge effort to comply with the 
provisions of the MCAD. Especially the Economic Inspectorate and enforcement 
authorities (on a national level and on the level of the Benelux) ensured the 
compliance of businesses with the MCAD. Representatives from the Ministry stress 
that the change has been much more radical for comparative advertising than for 
misleading advertising. Before the Directive, comparative advertising was prohibited. 
It was the law which transposed the Directive which authorised such advertising. A 
number of issues with the interpretation of rules regarding comparative advertising 
have been identified. As explained in detail in a report of 2011, the Ministry thinks the 
rules on comparative advertising should be clarified, especially on the issue of whether 
the price used as a comparator in the advertisement is truly offered by a competitor. 
The case law of the CJEU on this point is not perfectly clear so that the clarification of 
existing rules would need to go beyond a mere codification of the case law. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
One judge thinks the opposite is true. Because of the multitude of rules and frequent 
changes, complexity and legal uncertainty have increased and compliance costs for 
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cross-border trade have gone up. Furthermore, the implementation of the directives 
differs among Member States, which does not facilitate cross-border trader in practice.  
To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
According to a business association, improvements over the last years are largely due 
to the mentioned directives. In its view, further improvements in consumer protection 
would be achieved if the European legislator would systematise maximum 
harmonisation. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Belgium140  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts141 
Code of Economic Law 
(CEL) (Law of 23 February 
2013) 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Art. VI.83 and 
XIV.50 CEL 
 
  'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
No Art. VI.83 CEL 
blacklists most 
items  contained in 
the grey list (among 
others: the Belgian 
blacklist contains 
33 items in total) 
CEL blacklists unfair 
terms that are not 
contained in the 
annex of the directive 
(Art. VI.83. 3°, 5°, 7°, 
8°, 10°, 12°-18°, 28°, 
32°, 33°) 
  Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
Yes Art. I.8, 22° CEL  
 
 
Code of Economic Law 
(CEL) (Law of 23 February 
2013) 
 Extensions of the application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of the price and the 
main subject-matter 
No Art. VI.82 §3 CEL Main subject-matter 
and adequacy of price 
explicitly excluded  
140 The table indicates provisions transposing the directives as they have been codified in the Code of Economic Law. The codification took place in 2013 and took effect in 2014. 
References to statutes initially transposing directives are indicated in footnotes. These pre-codification references are not used in practice.   
141 First transposed by Law of 3 April 1997, modified by Act of 2 august 2002 on misleading advertising, comparative advertising, unfair terms and distance contracts pertaining to 
professions.  
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal 
market142 
Code of Economic Law – 
Book VI (Law of 21 
December 2013) 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   BE has not made 
explicit use of Article 
3(9) UCPD  
  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   BE has not made 
explicit use of Article 
3(9) UCPD 
  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions Yes (in part) Art. VI. 104-109 However some 
provisions regarding 
unfair practices apply 
to B2B only (see 
below)  
142 First transposed by Laws of 5 June 2007 as modified by Law of 6 April 2010 on Market practices and Consumer protection (LPMC).  
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Code of Economic Law – 
Art. VI.3 - 6  CEL (Law of 21 
December 2013) 
 Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
No Art. VI.3 à 6  CEL  
Code of Economic Law – 
Book VI (Royal Decree of 
30 June 1996, 
implemented by an 
amendment decree of 21 
September 2004)  
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations Yes Art. VI. 7 Price per unit 
indication not 
mandatory for sellers 
whose commercial 
premises are smaller 
than 150m2. Price per 
unit indication not 
mandatory  for the 
following types of 
food items: 1) pre-
packaged food sold at 
a discount close to the 
best-before date; 2) 
food items offered for 
on-premises 
consumption in 
restaurant, cafés, 
hotels, hospitals, 
cafeterias and similar 
establishments; 3) 
wine conditioned in 75 
cl bottles; 5) pre-
packaged sweets and 
snacks and ice cream 
offered for immediate 
consumption of the 
whole unit; 6) packs of 
products in special gift 
packaging 
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Code of Economic Law  - 
Book VI 
 Unfair market practices in relation to persons 
other than consumers 
 Chapter 2, Art. 
VI.104-109 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Law of 6 April 2010 on 
Market practices and 
Consumer protection  
     
Law of 26 December 2013 
Belgian Code of Economic 
Law – Book XVII 
     
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
101
Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – BELGIUM 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
Rules on injunctions can be found in the 
Judicial Code - not in the Code of 
Economic Law (CEL) where EU 
Consumer directives are transposed. 
Belgian rules go beyond the ID, in that 
urgency (a necessary condition to apply 
for an injunction under Belgian law) is 
irrefutably presumed in all matters 
falling within the scope of the ID.  
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking 
an injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Individual 
consumers 
Persons who can apply for an injunction 
are listed in XVII.7 CEL.  
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure  
 
The President of the Commercial Court 
is competent in procedures against a 
trader (Art. XIII.1. CEL). The President of 
the Court of First instance is competent 
if an injunction is requested against a 
member of liberal professions (Art. 
XIII.1. CEL, as amended by Law of 15 
May 2014). 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain 
the characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- Costs are borne 
by the losing party 
 
 
The Judge may however take 
circumstances into account and exempt 
the losing party from paying part of the 
costs. 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
areas of consumer 
law that are not 
part of Annex I of 
the Directive 
Belgian injunction procedure applies 
well beyond the scope consumer law 
(e.g. competition and intellectual 
property, designation of experts and 
much more). Regarding consumer 
protection, the injunction procedure 
also applies to the protection of 
consumers of mobile 
telecommunication services.  
Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- Yes 
 
Art. XVII. 7 CEL: a professional 
authority, professional or inter-
professional organizations can bring 
proceedings provided they are legal 
entities, defending their members’ 
interests. There is no restriction as to 
types of business interests covered.  
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Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their associations 
- Yes 
 
Art. XVII. 12 of CEL provides that the 
proceeding can be brought, jointly or 
separately, against companies from the 
same economic sector or against a 
business association that recommended 
the practice at stake. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage 
in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under Art. 
5 of the ID) 
- Yes A preliminary reconciliation procedure 
is available (art. 731 §1 Judicial Code) 
but not mandatory. It is never used in 
practice.  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Injunctions are granted under a 
summary procedure (Art. XVII.6 CEL). 
Judgement granting an injunction is 
enforceable notwithstanding appeal 
(Art. XVII.6, Art. XVII. 18 CEL). The 
defendant trader must bring the 
evidence requested by the president of 
the commercial court within one month 
maximum (Art. XVII.13) 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine is 
foreseen, please specify in the comments 
column to whom exactly should they be 
paid 
- Yes, other 
sanction (please 
specify) 
 
If the losing party does not comply with 
the injunction, the President of the 
commercial court may, at the request of 
the plaintiff, impose a penalty payment. 
The fine is paid to the public purse.   
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
At the request of the plaintiff, the 
President of the commercial Court may 
order the publication of his decision or a 
summary of it (Art.XVII.4 CEL). 
Publication may be ordered only where 
it contributes to the cessation of the 
infringement (Art.XVII.4 CEL §2) 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No The President of the Court granting an 
injunction cannot award damages.  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No The injunction procedure (fast-track 
procedure) is distinct from other 
enforcement proceedings such as 
collective redress or class actions  
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Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
Actions for damages may follow up on 
an injunction.  
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No Except asking for private penalties (as 
indicated above)  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- Yes Note: The President of the Commercial 
Court can issue an order even when the 
infringement has ceased ‘as long as the 
risk of repetition of the infringement 
cannot objectively be excluded’.143   
143 Case 1986-87, Court of cassation, 14 November 1986; Court of cassation, 29 May 2009.  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 Court statistics 681 cases 0% 2% 0% 0% 98% 
Total of 
percentages 
should add 
up to 100% 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).144  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other costs, if 
any (national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 200 EUR 2000 EUR 1080 
(compensation to 
pay when losing) 
8 hours  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 5000 EUR 2000  8 hours  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
No information is available. 
 
144 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
VBO/FEB Business association 29 July 2016 
Judiciary Judge 11 August 2016 
Judiciary  Judge 17 August 2016 
Judiciary Judge 9 November 2016 
SPF Economie, P.M.E., Classes moyennes et Energie  Enforcement authority 4 August 2016 
Test Achats Consumer organisation 17 January 2017 
 
Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Ministry for the 
Economy 
Updated 
regularly 
Codes of conduct 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/consommateurs/Pratiques_commerce/Cod
es_bonne_conduite/Coregulation/#.V7G_ypOLTKI 
Jules Stuyck 2013 Handels- en economisch recht. 2. Mededingingsrecht. A: 
Handelspraktijken in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht 
Gert Straetmans 
and Jules Stuyck 
2015 Commercial practices 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report BULGARIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The Bulgarian legislator transposed the UCPD with an amendment of the Consumer 
Protection Act (in a new Section III of the Chapter IV) enacted in 2007. Prior to this 
amendment the national legislation had not had any special provisions on unfair 
practices in B2C transactions. The rules of general contract law on pre-contractual 
obligations and liability were applied to consumer contracts, which application however 
had not been accepted without critics in the legal literature.1 
The set of rules on unfair practices between traders and consumers, enacted in 2007 
with the transposition of the UCPD, provided a legal framework more suitable for 
tackling the specific issues in B2C transactions. This conclusion has been drawn based 
on the various data collected for the purposes of this country report. The legal authors 
and the interviewed stakeholders share the opinion that the principle-based approach 
of the UCPD proves to be effective in achieving the goals set as it ensures flexible and 
broad interpretation of the concept ‘unfair commercial practice’, which facilitates legal 
enforcement and combating unfair practices not enumerated in the list annexed to the 
Directive.2 On the other hand, some of the interviewed stakeholders raise concerns 
about the language of the Directive (and the national laws transposing it) used for 
describing behaviour that can be labelled as an ‘unfair practice’. It is reported that 
some provisions seem to be too general in their formulation, with conditions requiring 
too much subjective assessment, which apparently causes problems in interpreting of 
legal provisions and their enforcement, for instance, in the provision on misleading 
commercial practice the part ‘… to take a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise’. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; 
Based on the opinions of the interviewed stakeholders it can be concluded that the 
black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to the UCPD facilitates the legal 
enforcement by serving as guidance for consumers, businesses and enforcement 
authorities.  
For instance, consumers can easily check the list and find out whether certain 
behaviour of a trader may be suspected as unfair, before they decide whether to file a 
complaint or not. 
Furthermore, the list looks to be beneficial also for traders.  The relevant enforcement 
authority reports that some  Bulgarian traders, before undertaking certain marketing 
1  More specifically, the general requirement to parties of pre-contractual relations to act in good faith – 
Article 12 the Obligations and Contracts Act. Some authors expressed in the legal literature hesitation if 
this rule could be applied to consumers contracts due to the specifics of the latter – Стойчев, Крaсен 
Преговори за сключване на договор и преддоговорна отговорност, 2005, с. 54 [Stoychev, Krasen 
Negotiations for Formation of the Contract and Pre-contractual Liability, 2005, p.54] 
2  Варадинов, Огнян Луканов Нелоялни търговски практики в отношенията търговец - потребител : 
анализ на глава четвърта, раздел IV от Закона за защита на потребителите, 2014, с.86 [Varadinov, 
Ognyan Lukanov, Unfair Commercial Practices in transactions between trader and consumer: Analysis of 
Chapter IV, Section IV consumer Protection Act, 2014, p.86] 
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actions (for example, discount campaigns3), are proactively checking the list to 
determine if the planned actions can be treated as being one of the unfair practices 
included into the black list, and are in addition searching for advice from the 
competent authorities regarding this matter. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property 
have so far brought no practical benefits for Bulgarian consumers, because the 
national legislation does not generally provide consumers in these two areas with 
protection at levels higher than the level provided by the UCPD. 
Of course, this is with the exception of those areas of consumer financial services 
where the European legislator has intervened with special and more stringent 
regulation in the form of sector-specific directives and regulations.4 
As far as the area of immovable property is concerned, the level of protection is 
similar to the one of the UCPD.5 The question about the necessity of higher protection 
in this area is not a straightforward one, bearing in mind the very complex and formal 
legal regime of transactions involving immovable property (i.e. involving a notary 
proceeding as well as adding a record into the public register of immovable property). 
Therefore any measure for increasing the level of consumer protection needs to 
ensure a good balance between the interests of consumers and legal certainty, as 
suggested by one of the interviewed stakeholders. The latter also recommends that 
before any legislative intervention is taken, the scale of the issue must be thoroughly 
analysed and discussed, since the majority of transactions for transfer of titles on the 
Bulgarian real estate market, are between natural persons, hence would fall outside 
the scope of application of consumer protection rules. On the other hand, there have 
already been some reported cases of unfair commercial practices related to immovable 
property.6 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The application of the UCPD to environmental claims in Bulgaria does not seem to be 
very extensive, as only a few cases of unfair practices related to false or misleading 
environmental claims have been reported by the stakeholders and found in the 
practice of the enforcement authorities, namely: an offer for rental apartments in 
3  See e.g. Decision No 6336 30.05. 2016 of the Supreme Administrative Court, Adm. case No 1635/2016, 
VII department (it is an unfair commercial practice when the message for price reduction includes the 
starting prices of the goods and not, as required by the law, the previous (already reduced) prices that 
the trader applied for a period not less than one month before the start date of the current discount 
campaign; as a result the discount percentage looks higher than the actual reduction, which may 
influence consumers economic behaviour and can lead to consumers making a decision to purchase, 
which decision the average consumer would not have taken without such misleading practice) 
4  Civic Consulting, 2011, Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices 
in the EU part, Country report (Bulgaria), p.58 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-
marketing/files/ucpd_study_country_reports.pdf 
5  Civic Consulting, 2011, Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices 
in the EU part, Country report (Bulgaria), p.63 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-
marketing/files/ucpd_study_country_reports.pdf 
6  For instance one large real estate agency operating on Bulgarian market binds their customers with an 
obligation to pay a commission fee of 3% of the (potential) transaction value, but not less than 1,000 
EUR excluding VAT, even when they decide to buy the viewed property from another person – See an 
interview with the Chairman of the Commission for Consumer Protection for the Bulgarian National 
Television on 14.07.2016 - https://kzp.bg/novini/dimitar-margaritov-golyama-agenciya-za-nedvizhimi-
imoti-obvarzva-klientite-si-s-komisionna-i-bez-da-sklyuchi-sdelka-s-tyah [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
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Plovdiv, misleadingly claimed to be built with ecological materials;7 few cases of 
misleading information about bio-products;8 a case of misleading information about 
capacity of a device (‘Electricity-saving Box’) to save electricity (trader claims the 
device saves from 10% up to 30% electricity, whereas the technical tests proved only 
0.05% saving).9 
The relevant public authorities regularly conduct checks on the market on the 
requirements for labeling white household goods with energy-efficiency rating, and no 
major infringements have been observed so far.10 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
No particular problems regarding the concept ‘average consumer’ have been reported 
by the stakeholders, and the case law does not reveal any particular disputes in its 
practical application. Bulgarian courts define the average consumer as ‘reasonably well 
informed, observant enough and cautious’,11 which seems to be in line with the 
European standard, as defined in the case law of the ECJ and in the Preamble of 
Directive 2005/29.12 When the commercial practice is targeted at a specific group of 
consumers (for instance, children, elderly people and disabled persons), the relevant 
benchmark is the average consumer within this certain group – Article 68g (2) CPA.13 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
In Bulgarian practice ‘vulnerable consumers’ are mainly considered to include elderly 
people,14 children15 and disabled persons (the latter mainly in passenger transport). 
This interpretation may be stemming from Article 68g (2) CPA, which lists in this 
category only people due to their mental or physical disability, age or credulity.16  
7  See Order #554/14.06.2015 of the Commission for Consumer Protection for prohibiting of unfair 
commercial practice, namely providing false and misleading information on the website 
www.milchevi.com on the type of rental apartments claiming that the apartments are ECO (built with 
ecological materials), without providing evidence to support the claim / missing documents certifying 
building as ECO / - https://kzp.bg/aktove [last visited 17.07.2016] 
8  See publications in the press - http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=1367540 [last visited on 
17.07.2016] 
9  See Order #430/07.07.2014 of the Commission for Consumer Protection - 
old.kzp.bg/download.php?mode=fileDownload&p_attached_file_id=15053 [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
10 The Annual Reports of the Commission for Consumer Protection for 2013, 2014 and 2015 - 
https://kzp.bg/godishni-dokladi [last visited on 20.07.2016] 
11 Decision № 2313/16.12.2013, Com. Case № 897/2013 the Court of Appeal - Sofia; Decision № 
11954/27.09.2011, Adm. Case № 4275/2011 the Supreme Administrative Court; Decision № 
10298/23.07.2014, Adm. Case № 15845/2013 the Supreme Administrative Court; Decision № 
43/07.01.2016 Com. Case № 2443/2014 Sofia City Court. 
12 In this sense see also Civic Consulting, 2011, Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU, Country report (Bulgaria), p.57 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-
marketing/files/ucpd_study_country_reports.pdf; See Varadinov, op.cit., p.66. 
13 Decision No 7746 5.06.2013 the Supreme Administrative Court, Adm. Case No 14873/2012, VII 
department. 
14 Decision No 7746 5.06.2013 the Supreme Administrative Court, Adm. Case No 14873/2012, VII 
department. 
15 Decision № 8485/13.06.2012 Adm. Case 7915/2011 The Supreme Administrative Court, VІІ Division. 
16 Article 68g (2) CPA states that “fairness of a commercial practice, which is likely to materially distort the 
economic behaviour of a clearly identifiable group of consumers, particularly vulnerable to the commercial 
practice or to the goods or services covered by commercial practice due to their mental or physical 
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Apart from the categories mentioned above, no other categories of ‘vulnerable 
consumers’, such as poor/indebted persons, have currently been recognised in 
Bulgarian legal literature17 and case law. This, however, may change any time soon, 
given the amendment from 2012 of the Energy Act (EA), which introduces a definition 
of ‘vulnerable customers’ in the energy sector (Para. 1, item 66v of the Additional 
Provisions). 18 Taking into account these provisions as well as the fact that a 
significant part of Bulgarian population is below the threshold of ‘energy poverty’ 
(meaning facing difficulties such as keeping their homes warm in the winter and cool 
in the summer)19, it may be expected that a new category of vulnerable consumers in 
the energy sector gets recognized in Bulgarian case law and legal literature in the 
coming years (‘energy poor’). 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Self/co-regulation does not seem to have extensive application on the Bulgarian 
market. The interviewed stakeholders point out only two publicly known examples of 
self-regulation, namely those of advertising agencies and breweries. None of the 
stakeholders though is able to comment what their impact has been on combating 
unfair commercial practices. 
The leading role in the self-regulation of advertising in Bulgaria is played by the 
National Council for Self-Regulation (NSS), which is a non-profit organisation.20 The 
members of the NSS are representatives from the advertising industry, advertising 
agencies, media, advertising professionals and any other natural or legal persons who 
voluntarily accept the goals and statutes of the NSS. Its main goal is to unite the 
advertising industry and ensure compliance with the Code of Ethics in favour of fair 
competition and above all, consumer protection. The NSS activities consist of 
providing preventive and follow-up control on advertising, securing respect for 
professional diligence in advertising and commercial communications, as well as 
prohibition of misleading and unlawful comparative advertising. The review of 
application of the Code of Ethics reveals its effectiveness – in 2014 the Ethical 
Commission issued 32 decisions, namely 29 in 2015 and 12 in 2016 (until June).21 In 
a few cases the Commission found that the commercial communications addressed to 
consumers were unclear or untrue.22 The practical importance of self-regulation in 
disability, age or credulity and if the trader could predict that distortion, is to be assessed from the 
perspective of the average member of this certain group targeted by the practice”. 
17 See Varadinov, op.cit., p.72 
18 Pursuant to this norm, vulnerable customers are households that receive allowances for electricity, 
heating or natural gas under the Social Assistance Act (SAA) and regulations for its implementation. 
According to the SAA, through the Ordinance # RD-07-5/16 May 2008 on purposive benefits for heating, 
such allowance is given once a year to persons or families whose average monthly income in the last six 
months is lower or equal to differentiated minimum income. These citizens are eligible for heating 
benefits according to Articles 10 and 11 of the Regulation for Application of the SAA. 
19 See the data provided in “Energy poverty and vulnerable consumers in the energy sector across the EU: 
analysis of policies and measures”, May 2015, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/INSIGHT_E_Energy%20Poverty%20-
%20Main%20Report_FINAL.pdf [last visited on 17.07.2015] 
20 See http://www.nss-bg.org/read.php?id=208 [last visited on July 10, 2016] 
21 See list of decisions http://www.nss-bg.org/view_concl.php [last visited on July 10, 2016] 
22 Decision № 166 of the EC of 16.01.2014 (Complaint about Christmas promotion of Bulgaria Mall); 
Decision № 167 of the EC of 02.04.2014 (Complaint about commercial communication of the company 
"Novomes" Ltd.); Decision № 168 of the EC of 13.02.2014 (Complaint about television advertising of 
"Karnobatska grape") Decision № 169 of the EC by 13.02.2014 (Complaint about advertising on the TV 
show "Frontline" broadcast on television TV7); Decision № 172 of the EC of 03.04.2014 (Complaint about 
headsets advertised on the site WWW. MIKROSLUSHALKA.BG); Decision № 175 EC of 24.04.2014 
(Complaint about radio advertising plasterboard advertiser: "Gigi 1" LTD); Decision № 176 of the EC of 
15.05.2014 (Complaint about television advertising of product for weight lost “Shot for Slim” with 
advertiser "TELESHOP" Ltd. ) Decision № 197 of the EC of 30.01.2015 (Complaint about media campaign 
"Bulgartabac Holding" JSC in partnership with the Ministry of Finance, the Agency "Customs", "National 
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advertising appears to be positively appraised by the Commission for Protection of 
Competition, which in some of their decisions refers to the practice of the Ethical 
Commission of the NSS.23 
Additionally, self-regulation has been initiated by the Union of Brewers in Bulgaria (the 
UBB) as it is a representative organisation of the brewing industry in the country. In 
accordance with the principles and rules of the prestigious organisation ‘The Brewers 
of Europe’, the Union has adopted a Code of Responsible Commercial Communication 
and Ethical Standards, applicable for its members, beer producers. The Code excludes 
the promotion of excessive or irresponsible consumption of beer as well as aggressive 
or antisocial behaviour; advertising of beer cannot be directed at persons of age under 
18 years nor at tolerant attitude towards driving after consumption; it states that 
commercial communications to consumers may not claim that beer cures or increases 
mental or physical abilities, etc. Among the main goals of the Code are also providing 
better information to consumers about products and principles of the industry as well 
as securing the protection of their interests.24 A Council for Self-Regulation of the UBB 
is also established, having the following main tasks: monitoring compliance, updating 
and developing of self-regulatory system of the national brewery industry.  
Some attempts of business associations to draft a model Code of Conduct for their 
members, are reported by the stakeholders.25 The model Code contains a requirement 
for businesses to provide their clients with clear, truthful, complete and readable 
information about the goods and services (Article 4.12.2. of the Code). However, there 
is no survey/analysis on whether this model Code has ever been applied in practice 
and how effective it is in addressing unfair commercial practices. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Some interviewees have suggested adding to the list practices related to the digital 
contracts. Currently they are only popular among certain groups of consumers (mainly 
young people) and for certain goods (mainly clothes, books, event tickets, etc.), 
however the importance of online purchasing increases gradually and is expected to 
play a more significant role in the coming years.26 Because of this trend, greater 
protection against unfair commercial practices will be needed for consumers 
purchasing online. 
When it comes to the mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the 
UCPD black list, the interviewed stakeholders are almost unanimous that there is a 
need for regular reviews and updates of the list, however they appear to have various 
opinions on how this can be done – some of them support having a special mechanism 
included in the Directive and applied only for updating the black list; the others tend 
to see the generic legislative procedures for amendment of the EU/national legislation 
as effective enough, and being sufficient for handling this matter (thus, no special 
mechanism is needed). 
 
Association of Tobacco Growers 2010" and "Association of oriental tobaccos" under the slogan "Do not 
buy contraband! It is harmful to all. ") - http://www.nss-bg.org/view_concl.php [last visited on July 10, 
2016] 
23 Decision № 1195 /18.09.2013 the Commission for Protection of Competition. 
24 See http://www.library.pivovari.com/main/codeadvertise-2.html [last visited on July 10, 2016] 
25 See http://www.vsa.bcci.bg/files/custom/2013/BusinessEthicsCode.pdf [last visited 01.07.2016] 
26 See http://www.investor.bg/web/456/a/vse-poveche-bylgari-pazaruvat-onlain-199450/ [last visited in 
16.07.2016]; 
http://www.capital.bg/biznes/kompanii/2016/04/17/2742612_onlain_pazaruvaneto_raste_no_fizicheskite
_magazini_ne/ [last visited on 16.07.2016] 
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• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
No best practices or lessons learnt seem to exist in Bulgaria that can be considered 
relevant for other EU countries. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection 
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
The majority of interviewed stakeholders agree on the fact that in the last few years 
there has been a significant improvement in informing Bulgarian consumers about the 
unit selling price, especially in relation to packaged goods. The enforcement authority 
points out that during the early years after entry into force of the first set of rules on 
price indication (1999), quite a large volume of the work of the authority was related 
to violations of these rules, whereas such cases are rarely encountered in their 
practice nowadays27. The trend of decreasing number of complaints related to price 
indication has been observed by the other interviewees, and that the credit for these 
positive results should be attributed to the strict control performed by the enforcement 
authority. 
As far as the unit selling price of services is concerned, some of the interviewees 
express concerns about traders’ adherence to the price indication requirements. 
Some minor infringements seem to still exist for non-packaged goods.28 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The interviewed stakeholders are not unanimous about this matter. The majority of 
them thinks the unit price per performance could at times be misleading for 
consumers, who seem to be used to the kilogram/litre measurement. Furthermore, it 
was pointed out that the measurement ‘unit price per performance’ could be very 
relative, as it depends on how the product is used by individual consumers, namely, in 
the example with the detergents, various consumers may use a different quantity for 
washloads, hence the number of washloads may differ (it will be higher for consumers 
using less quantity per washload and lower for the ones using a larger amount). 
One of the respondents is in favour of the price indication approach, referring to a 
survey on prices of detergents conducted on the Bulgarian market. It revealed quite a 
big price fluctuation between the unit price per kilogram and the unit price per 
27  Recent examples can be found in the case law - Decision No 164 13.06. 2012 of the Vratsa 
Administrative Court (packaged goods offered to consumers must contain labels with information about a 
total selling price/a price per unit or such information must be placed in close proximity to goods; such 
price indication cannot be replaced by “price checker” devices available in the shop) and Decision No 45 
dated 30.01.2015 of the Pleven Administrative Court (it is an infringement of price indication rules when 
prices of goods (of mobile devices without services) are not separately announced, but consumers 
receive information only about their prices when purchasing is combined with contracts for 
communication services). 
28 For instance, for gold jewelry, for which the price for gram gold is indicated, but not the total price of the 
each piece of jewelry - Annual report for 2014 of the Commission for Consumer Protection - 
http://www.cpc.bg/General/Publications.aspx [last visited on July 10 2016]; for misleading unit price of 
non-packaged food in supermarket - Decision № 2906 /16.12.2013 Adm. Penal. Case № 2653/2013 the 
Administrative court - Plovdiv; different prices for same good as well as unit price not matching the 
selling price - Decision № 891 / 12.06.2014 Com. Case № 4023/2013 Sofia City Court. 
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performance of some of the products. Noteworthy, was the conclusion of the survey 
based on the conducted tests, that the most objective way of presenting the prices of 
detergents is the price per performance (per single washload).29 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not applicable for Bulgaria. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses; 
The Directive 2006/114 was transposed in the Bulgarian Protection of Competition Act 
2008 (PCA), which contains a legal definition of advertising very similar to the one in 
the Directive.30 Nevertheless there are no indications that the limited scope of the 
MCAD (and the national legislation) has a negative impact on how effectively the rules 
are achieving the goals they are aimed at, namely protection for businesses, and 
indirectly, for consumers interests as well.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive; 
It is proven by the rich case law31 that the approach to misleading advertising under 
the MCAD works well in practice and ensures a good legal framework for protection of 
both business and consumers. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The Bulgarian legislator does not seem to use the advantages of the minimum 
harmonisation on misleading advertising – PCA does not provide a level of protection 
that goes beyond the one of the Directive. 
Some specific acts from the national legislation however introduce a full ban of 
advertising of certain products (tobacco,32 direct advertising of distillates,33 some 
medicines)34 and of some activities (advocate services)35. 
29 More details about the tests and the survey please find on - http://aktivnipotrebiteli.bg/ [last visited on 
17.07.2016] 
30 Pursuant para.11 of the Additional provisions of the Consumer Protection Act advertising is "means any 
form of communication in connection with a trade, business, craft or profession, which aims to promote 
the supply of goods or services, including immovable property, rights and obligations”. 
31 For the last five years the cases of misleading and comparative advertising are among the most 
frequently handled by the Commission for Protection of Competition - See the annual reports of the 
Commission http://www.cpc.bg/General/Publications.aspx [last visited on July 10 2016] 
32 Тobacco and Tobacco Products Act - Article 35; Radio and Television Act - Article 75 (6) 
33 Health Act – Article 55 (1) 
34 Medicinal Products in Human Medicine Act, Chapter XI “Advertising of medicinal products” 
35 Bar Association Act – Article 42 (1) 
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 • The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising; 
The national legislation transposing the provisions of comparative advertising seems to 
work well in practice and no particular problems in its application have been 
reported.36 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified; 
This seems to be the case. In the practice of the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition, there are a significant number of cases related to online 
misleading/comparative advertising,37 including social media marketing.38 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Although misleading advertising appears to be among the most frequent infringements 
investigated by the Commission for Protection of Competition,39 in the practice of the 
Commission there have only been few cases with a cross-border dimension, namely: 
• Misleading advertising on the www.emag.bg online shop (for big sales 
campaign ‘Black Friday’) operated on the Bulgarian market by a company 
registered in Romania (Dante International S.A.);40 
• Misleading advertising (via electronic messages) of a business directory (‘EU 
Business Register’) misleadingly appearing as if it was connected with the 
European Union (the name contains the abbreviation “EU” and the logo – on a 
blue background 12 stars positioned in a circle)41 distributed by a company 
registered in Nevis, West Indies, with contact address in Utrecht, the 
Netherlands;42 
• Advertising of tapes with special use (barrier, warning, etc.), which were 
distributed by some Bulgarian companies on the local market and appeared 
very similar to the tapes produced by a company registered in Germany 
(Kelmaplast G. Kellermann GmbH);43 
• Misleading advertising case between Renault, France, and a Bulgarian company 
‘Nemex Service’. The latter was using Renault’s advertising materials and 
36 See in this regard the opinion of the Commission for Protection of Competition expressed in its Decision 
№ 58404.05.2011. 
37 Decision № 501/20.04.2011 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 273 / 05.03.2014 
the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 329 / 18.05.2016 the Commission for 
Protection of Competition; Decision № 1478 / 26.11.2014 the Commission for Protection of Competition; 
Decision 06.01.2012 `Civil Case. № 58/2011 Sofia City Court. 
38 Decision № 1137 / 18.09.2013 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 791 / 
29.09.2015 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 250 / 18.03.2015 the Commission 
for Protection of Competition; Decision № 291 / 11.05.2016 the Commission for Protection of 
Competition; Decision № 331 / 16.04.2015 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 
860 / 04.11.2015 the Commission for Protection of Competition 
39 See the annual reports of the Commission for Protection of Competition - 
http://www.cpc.bg/General/Publications.aspx [last visited on July 10 2016] 
40 Decision № 1478 / 26.11.2014 the Commission for Protection of Competition; Decision № 329 ОТ 
18.05.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition; 
41 See http://www.eubusinessregister.com/about.php [last visited on July 10, 2016] 
42 Decision № 500 / 03.05.2012 the Commission for Protection of Competition 
43 Decision № 882 /22.07.2010 the Commission for Protection of Competition (the complaint for misleading 
advertising is overruled) 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
115
misleadingly looked like an authorized Renault service station, which in reality 
was not true.44 
It has been reported that the current rules of enforcement in the MCAD do not seem 
to be effective in tackling misleading online advertising on websites registered outside 
the EU.45 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No best practices or lessons learnt seem to exist in Bulgaria in terms of combating 
misleading/unlawful comparative advertising, and that can be deemed relevant for the 
other EU countries. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; 
The interviewed stakeholders are not reporting any obstacles faced by Bulgarian 
traders in cross-border transactions, and that are caused by differences in the 
application/implementation of the UCPD in the different Member States. This does not 
necessarily mean that such difficulties do not exist; they may simply not be recorded 
or raised as an issue by the businesses. No relevant evidences have been found in this 
regard in the course of preparing the country report. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services; 
Based on the opinions of interviewed stakeholders, it is hard to assess the extent to 
which Bulgarian businesses are informed about the existence of the uniform black list 
of unfair commercial practices, or what is the impact of the list on their cross-border 
transactions. 
On one hand, some of the interviewed stakeholders report that the businesses do not 
seem to be aware of any such provisions, hence the impact of the black list on their 
strategies appears to be insignificant. On the other hand, it has been pointed out by 
the relevant enforcement authority, that there have been cases in which traders, 
before undertaking any marketing actions, consult with the authority as to the 
compliance of each planned action with the requirements for fairness, which is 
essentially a sign of awareness of existence of the prohibition of unfair commercial 
practices (and perhaps, of the black list as well) and a sign of their willingness to 
adhere to it. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
44 Decision № 601 / 29.05.2012 the Commission for Protection of Competition (the complaint for misleading 
advertising is overruled) 
45 See the Annual Report of The National Council for Self-regulation (in advertising industry) for 2014, p.8 - 
http://www.nss-bg.org/files/NSS_Booklet_2014.pdf [last visited on July 10 2016]; same problem has 
been reported by some of the interviewed stakeholders. 
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No such problems have been reported; however this may simply be because of a lack 
of statistical data available, and does not necessarily mean that such problems do not 
exist. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; 
The interviewed stakeholders are not reporting any obstacles faced by Bulgarian 
traders in cross-border transactions and caused by differences in the 
application/implementation of the MCAD in the Member States. 
No other relevant data has been found either in the literature or in the press. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade; 
No information has been found in support of the hypothesis that minimum 
harmonisation represents a barrier to cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified; 
There is a lack of data about the impact on cross-border trade of full harmonisation of 
provisions on comparative advertising. As mentioned above, so far the Commission for 
Protection of Competition has only dealt with a few advertising cases with a cross-
border dimension, and they are all regarding misleading, not unlawful comparative 
advertising. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The interviewed stakeholders do not mention any difficulties in cross-border trade 
caused/influenced by the lack of the public cross-border enforcement mechanism in 
the field of advertising. 
Moreover, self-regulation offers such a mechanism via The European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA).46 According to the rules of procedure of the NSS,47 if the 
complaint relates to advertising originating outside Bulgaria, it will be treated as a 
cross-border complaint. This means that it will be directed by the EASA to a self-
regulatory body in the country of origin and the local ethical rules will be applicable. 
The procedure is free of charge. The country of origin is considered to be the country 
where the headquarters of the broadcasting platform is located; in the case of 
Internet/digital advertising – the country where the headquarters of the advertiser is. 
The following countries are included in the system of the EASA cross-border 
complaints: Austria, Romania, Belgium, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, United Kingdom, 
Turkey, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Lithuania, France, 
Netherlands, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. 
EASA maintains contacts with some countries outside Europe. These are: Australia, 
India, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa. Whenever needed, a 
complaint can be routed for resolution by the local authority for self-regulation in 
46 See http://www.easa-alliance.org/Home/page.aspx/81 [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
47 See http://www.nss-bg.org/trials_howto.php [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
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these countries. The EASA cross-border reports and statistics give the impression that 
the self-regulated cross-border enforcement mechanism works well in practice.48 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments 
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The majority of interviewed stakeholders state that businesses in Bulgaria are aware 
of this information requirement in pre-contractual relationships with consumers and to 
a significant extent adhere to it. Disagreement with this statement was expressed by 
only one of the interviewed stakeholders.  
According to the competent regulator until recently this rule was not applicable to the 
energy sector as ‘invitations to purchase’ were not used in this sector,49 whereas the 
traders in the passenger transport sector are reported to be very compliant with the 
requirement to provide information to consumers at this early stage of their 
relationships. However, as mentioned by the relevant regulator, this appears to be 
mainly due to the sector specific legislation, not as a result of adherence to the 
provision of Article 7(4) UCPD (and this seems to be the case both in passenger road 
and air transport). 
The interviewed stakeholders share the opinion that the provision is useful as it 
regulates a specific aspect of the B2C relationship and is not redundant even in the 
light of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements of the CRD. 
The enforcement authority expresses more general concern about the way the 
provisions of the sectoral directives are transposed into Bulgarian legislation, for 
instance the directives in energy sector and electronic communications. Apparently, it 
is difficult to tell general provisions from specific ones, which creates obstacles for 
interpretation and application of the provisions (it is hard to apply the doctrine Lex 
specialis derogat legi generali). 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The national provisions transposing Article 7(4) UCPD and the Services Directive have 
some similarities, however their scopes do not seem to overlap. Article 7(4) UCPD is 
transposed to Article 68e (4) CPA and is applicable to invitations for purchasing both 
of goods and services (pre-contractual stage) of only B2C transactions. It appears 
similar to some of the pre-contractual information requirements for service providers 
under Article 22 of the Services Directive (transposed in Article 24 of the Service 
Activities Act (SAA)), however these provisions have different scope and goals, 
namely: 
48 See http://www.easa-alliance.org/page.aspx/249 [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
49 This might change as, in connection with opening of the electricity market, the SEWRC adopted in 2013 
rules for trade with electricity. These rules are providing a procedure for changing electricity supplier, 
hence invitations to purchase can be applied in the supply of electricity sector.  
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• The requirement under Article 7(4) UCPD is applicable only to B2C transactions 
and aims at protecting consumer interests, whereas the requirements under 
Article 22 of the Services Directive applies to all types of transactions (B2B and 
B2C) and its focus is not on the consumer protection; 
• According to the Services Directive some of the pieces of information are to be 
supplied only at the recipient’s request (for instance, the method for calculating 
the price when the price is not pre-determined), whereas the information 
enumerated in Article 7(4) UCPD has to be conveyed to consumers even 
without explicit request from their side. 
Furthermore, some resemblance can be found between the requirement of Article 7(4) 
UCPD and the information requirements of Article 5, 6 and 10 Directive on electronic 
commerce (transposed to Articles 4, 5 and 8 the Electronic Commerce Act (ECA)), 
however these two sets of norms are not overlapping, again due to characteristic 
scope and goals of the provisions. 
The interviewed stakeholders also find no overlapping between the provisions in 
question. 
No extra costs are reported to be incurred either by businesses or by public authorities 
as a result of these multiple information obligations. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions 
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade; 
Theoretically, it looks like such an extension could facilitate cross-border trade, 
however to what extent this will happen in practice is hard to predict. The extension to 
B2B transactions may repeat the scenario of application of these sets of rules to B2C 
ones – the provisions on unfair commercial practices and misleading/comparative 
advertising prove to be effective in tackling with domestic transactions, however in the 
domain of cross-border trade, despite some positive trends from the last few years,50 
the current status is far from being very successful. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned; 
It would be better to keep the legal regimes for B2C and B2B separate, as these two 
types of transactions each have their specific characteristics, and a uniform legal 
regime for both, if achievable at all, may impede application of the law. This is also 
the opinion shared by some of the interviewed stakeholders. The latter additionally 
suggest avoiding administrative procedures for controlling and rectifying unfair 
commercial practices in B2B relationships (if so, the state intervention into trade and 
commercial transactions will be drastic, which may have negative impact on the 
market) and entrusting the control to courts. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction; 
50 See annual reports of ECC - Bulgaria for 2013 and 2014 - http://www.ecc.bg/ [last visited on 17.07.2016] 
as well as cross-border cases of the Commission for Protection of Competition for misleading advertising 
mentioned earlier in the report. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
119
The appropriate scope of protection would cover the whole life-cycle of the transaction 
as the practice reveals a need for it.51 Bulgarian legislation and case law already tend 
to secure such protection against unfair practices in B2B transactions, as the following 
examples are showing. 
Firstly, since 2015 there has been a new rule aiming at protecting the weaker party in 
B2B transactions from unfair acts or omissions of the party with the stronger 
bargaining position – Article 37a the Protection of Competition Act. Following a 
number of cases in which big retail chains put pressure on their suppliers to accept 
contract conditions and clauses favorable mainly for the retailer, this new provision 
has been enforced. According to it, any act or omission of a company with a strong 
bargaining position, which is contrary to fair trade practice and harms or may harm 
the interests of the weaker party in the negotiation and consumers, is prohibited. 
Unfair are those actions or omissions that have no objective economic justification, 
such as unjustified refusal to supply or purchase goods or services, imposing 
unreasonably onerous or discriminatory conditions or unjustified termination of trade 
relations. The presence of a strong bargaining position is determined by the 
characteristics of the structure of the market, as well as the specific relationship 
between the undertakings concerned, taking into account the degree of correlation 
between them, the nature of their work and the difference in its scale, the probability 
of finding alternative trading partners, including the existence of alternative sources of 
supply, distribution channels and/or customers. 
Secondly, some courts in their decisions extend the application of the rules about 
unfair commercial practices between trader and consumers also to contracts between 
traders, when one of the parties is a ‘one man company’, acting outside their 
professional field, for instance concluding a contract with a bank for a bank loan.52 The 
legal literature accepts even broader application – where the unfair commercial 
practice is targeted at both consumers and other traders, it falls within the scope of 
application of the UCPD (the national legislation transposing it).53 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area; 
The stakeholders seem to be divided regarding this matter.  Notably, the public 
authorities warn about potential risks from state intervention in B2B transactions (for 
example by introducing in B2B transactions protection against unfair commercial 
practices, using the model for B2C transactions), whereas some of the other 
respondents believe that such protection would bring some benefits to small and 
middle-size enterprises. In support of this position, one of the interviewed associations 
gives the recent example of problematic negotiations between small delivery 
companies and a big supermarket chain. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area; 
Enforcement should be entrusted to courts and performed in litigation procedures, as 
per the opinion of some of the interviewed stakeholders. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive; 
51 Pre-contractual phase (unjustified refusal to prepare an offer)– see Decision № 365 / 26.05.2016 the 
Commission for Protection of Competition; during the transaction (supermarket chain unjustified remove 
from the racks the products of a supplier as a means of pressure for decrease of selling price) – Decision1 
№ 194 /23.03.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition 
52 Decision № 159 /11.12.2013 Com. case № 99/2012 District court- Pazardzhik. 
53 See Varadinov, op.cit., p.31 
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That would be beneficial, however those consequences have to be under court control 
in the litigation procedure – no state administrative body should be able to intervene 
into B2B relationships as this may affect negatively the freedom of trade. This is also 
the opinion of some of the interviewed stakeholders. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No evidences justifying the need for such adaptation have been found in the course of 
preparing this country report. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices 
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
There is such a provision – Article 68m the Consumer Protection Act, which states that 
the consumer has the right to terminate a contract with the trader, concluded as a 
result of using an unfair commercial practices, and to claim damages under the 
general procedure, when an order prohibiting the application of the unfair commercial 
practice of the Commission for Consumer Protection has been enacted and entered in 
force. The right of termination can be exercised by an out-of-court unilateral notice 
from the consumer to the trader.54 The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
confirming an order prohibiting the unfair commercial practice of the Commission for 
Consumer Protection under this provision, shall be binding for the civil court when 
deciding on whether the order is valid and lawful. A prohibition order of unfair trade 
practice, which has not been appealed or the appeal against which was withdrawn, has 
a binding power, as valid and lawful, for the civil court. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
According the interviewed stakeholders, this provision does not have any practical 
impact as it is not applied very often, even though it has a potential to be very 
beneficial for consumers. No relevant case law has been found. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Such consequences are provided for in Article 68m the Consumer Protection Act, 
however currently this redress does not have any use in practice. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
54 Сукарева, Златка Потребителско право, 2015, с. 58 [Sukareva, Zlatka Consumer Law, 2015, p.58] 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
121
The stakeholders that have any experience with the practical application of Bulgarian 
law transposing the UCTD, express very positive assessment of the Directive and its 
principle-based approach. 
The national enforcement authority expresses the opinion that the provisions of the 
UCTD are correctly transposed in the Bulgarian legislation, however  their broad scope 
of application (to all contracts in all economic sectors) is not commensurate to the 
capacity of the authority to perform effective control for their application. 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the provisions exclude from control for 
unfairness contractual terms based on the legal acts, an exception which creates some 
impediments in the practice. For example, currently there are discussions regarding 
terms in contracts used by ‘Central Heating Company’ Sofia (Toplofikacia Sofia) and 
based on the legal act provisions. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The Bulgarian legislator introduced a ‘black list’ of unfair terms, and the stakeholders 
with practical experience with the list give a positive assessment of this legislative 
approach. They share the opinion that the list very much facilitates the application of 
the law, as with its clear language, it provides guidance to enforcement authorities, 
consumers and businesses regarding the (un)fairness of certain contract terms. As 
reported by the interviewed stakeholders, it has had significant practical importance, 
especially in the first couple of years after the transposition of the UCTD, when there 
was a lack of case law, as well as insufficient expertise in the field. 
Of course, the black list does not prevent the enforcement authority or courts from 
checking any term in consumer contracts for compliance with the general principle of 
good faith and the requirement for balance in the parties’ rights and obligations (and 
on finding unfairness declaring the term as null and void), i.e. the term in question 
need not fall under any of hypotheses enumerated in the list in order to be 
controlled.55 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
See above. 
Furthermore the national enforcement authority has explicitly stated that the list of 
unfair terms is clearer and easier to apply in practice than the list of unfair commercial 
practices (which sometimes suffers from vagueness). It serves as a clear guidance in 
law enforcement, but also is useful for business and consumers when they would like 
to check if a certain term can be considered unfair. 
 
55 See Decision № 212 / 17.12.2015 Civil case № 381/2015 the Court of Appeal - Varna – terms for 
amending the credit contract by including the obligation for consumer to pay compound interest and 
introducing a new scheme for debt calculation and payments which increase the final amount due by the 
consumer. 
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• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In Bulgarian law the court decision has legal effect only for the parties participating in 
the court proceeding, with a few exceptions. 
One exception relates to court decisions on claims for protection of collective interests 
of consumers, which have legal effect for the parties as well as for all consumers 
damaged by the same infringement who did not exercise their right to opt-out – 
Article 386 (1) Code of Civil Procedure. 
Consumers who opt-out and go for an individual litigation can still refer to the court 
decision granting the collective action56 in support of their claim, when the subject-
matter of both proceedings are the same contractual terms – Article 386 (1) of Code 
of Civil Procedure. Without such a decision on collective action, each consumer who 
brings an individual lawsuit against a trader, asking for certain terms to be proclaimed 
unfair, has to provide enough evidences in support of the lawsuit. 
A court decision on one individual case for proclaiming certain terms unfair, can be 
used as a reference in another individual case only regarding the same contractual 
terms. The court that is hearing the second case is not obliged to take this decision 
into consideration; it has been reported though that it usually does. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive; 
The interviewed stakeholders assess this requirement very positively and consider it 
useful. No particular problems in its application are reported and the overall 
assessment is that businesses adhere to it. Noteworthy is the fact that there is case 
law on unfairness of contract terms due to lack of transparency – contractual terms 
allowing for a unilateral change of the interest rate in a contract for bank credit,57 and 
a contractual clause dealing with correction of bills for electricity, but with unclearly 
stated conditions.58 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD] 
No such extension is provided in Bulgarian legislation. 
 
56 The court decision for rejection of lawsuit is not considered binding for consumers who opted-out – article 
386 (1) Code of Civil Procedure, see also Markov, Metodi “Collective actions for consumer protection”, in 
“Society and Law”, 2007/9, p.21 
57 Decision № 424 /02.12.2015 Civil case № 1899/2015 ІV Division, the Supreme Court of Cassation; 
Decision № 2939 / 10.07.2014 Civil case № 12334/2011 Regional court – Plovdiv; Decision № 5229 / 
13.07.2015 Civil case № 4881/2015 Sofia City Court; Decision № 266 / 17.10.2014 Com. case № 
414/2014 the Court of Appeal – Varna. 
58 Decision № 344 / 16.07.2013 Civil case № 725/2013 the District court – Veliko Tarnovo. 
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• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The sanction is good, however it does not seem to work very effectively in practice. 
Although consumers can claim that the unfair term is not binding for them, the 
stakeholders share the opinion that they are hesitant to do so (either in court 
proceedings or in out-of-court contacts with businesses) fearing the unsuccessfulness 
of such a claim and its legal consequences (such as penalties for non-performance of 
contract, etc.) 
There is no statistical data on how many consumers are refusing to adhere to a 
contract term, after it has been proclaimed unfair, and hence void, in a collective 
action proceeding. 
According to the opinion of some stakeholders the Bulgarian legislation have no law 
provision explicitly obliging the court to exercise ex-officio control over terms in 
consumer contracts. Nevertheless, the enforcement authority and some other 
respondents report that such ex-officio control is happening in some court 
proceedings.59 The interviews leave the impression that the guidance of CJEU in this 
regard is not very well known. 
There is no administrative remedy in this area. Unfairness of contract term can be 
invoked in court proceeding – either by the national enforcement authority with a 
collective action, or proactively by consumers with a claim for unfairness or as an 
objection to business’s claim (like a defence action). 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The interviewed stakeholders recommend the following measures: 
• Introducing a provision clearly stating the obligation of courts to perform ex-
officio control over unfair terms in consumer contracts; 
• The unfairness control to be extended to contract terms amended with the 
approval of the state authority as well as on those coming from the legislation.60 
The application of the provision for amendment of standard T&Cs (Article 147b 
59 See Decision № 102 / 06.07.2010 Com. case № 283/2010 the Court of Appeal - Varna – from the motives 
of this court decision appears the court invoked ex-officio control for unfairness. 
Same with Decision № 266 / 17.10.2014 Com. case № 414/2014 the Court of Appeal - Varna; Decision 
№ 159 / 11.12.2013 Com. case № 99/2012 District court - Pazardzhik (with good justification). 
60 In this regard see also Колева, Рая „Основните права на потребителите – теоретични и практически 
въпроси“, сп. „Търговско право“, 2009/2, с. 83 [Koleva, Raya “Rights of consumers – theoretical and 
practical aspects”, in “Commercial Law”, 2009/2, p.83]; in this regard – see also Decision No 86 17.08. 
2015 of the Supreme Court of Cassations, Com. case No 616/2015, 2nd panel of the Commerce 
Chamber. 
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(2)(3) CPA)61 is reported to be not very successful and to create problems in 
practice (legal uncertainty) – it causes situations in which various standard T&Cs 
(old version and amended version) are applied to the contracts between a trader 
and consumers, (depending only whether some consumers have been more 
proactive in exercising their right under Article 147b (2) CPA to object to the 
amendment of the T&Cs or the standard terms and conditions have been 
amended as a result of an order or instruction of the competent public authority); 
• In some cases (for example, the payment schedule in financial services) a 
graphical presentation model could improve the readability and comprehension of 
the T&Cs by consumers. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
The interviewed stakeholders are not reporting any such problems and no other 
relevant evidence has been found. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
The interviewed stakeholders are not reporting any such barrier for cross-border 
transactions and no other relevant evidence has been found. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The interviewed stakeholders are not reporting any such barrier for cross-border 
transactions and no other relevant evidence has been found 
 
61 Art. 147b. CPA (1) The trader must inform the consumer of any change in the standard terms and 
conditions of the contract within 7 days from the occurrence of this circumstance of indicated by the 
phone, email or mailing address. 
(2) When disagrees with changes in the standard terms and conditions, the consumer can cancel the 
contract without giving any reason and without obligation for paying compensation or penalty, or to 
continue to perform it according to the standard terms and conditions before the amendment. 
(3) The consumer exercising its right under par. 2 sends to the trader written notice within one month of 
receipt of the notification under par. 1. Paragraph 2 shall not apply in cases where the amendment of the 
standard terms and conditions is a result of an order or instruction of the competent public authority. 
(4) Changes in the standard terms and conditions is binding on the consumer under the contract, where the 
consumer is notified of them under par. 1 and has not exercised its right under par. 2 and 3. 
(5) The trader must establish the fact of notifying the consumer about the change of the standard terms 
and conditions. 
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1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions 
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms; 
The interviewed stakeholders express contradicting opinions on this matter. The state 
authorities think that if such protection was introduced this would have to be done 
very carefully and without any restriction of autonomy and freedom of contract.  Other 
respondents express the need for such protection, given already existing problems on 
the market (between big store chains and small delivery companies). 
As mentioned earlier, some steps for protection of businesses with weaker bargain 
power have already been undertaken by the Bulgarian legislator, i.e. the enforcement 
of Article 37a of the Protection of Competition Act, which prohibits the abuse of a 
stronger position in negotiations. Although it is a relatively new rule (in force since 
2015) it already finds application in the practice of the Commission for Protection of 
Competition,62 nevertheless there is still not enough case law to allow for a deeper 
analysis as to how effective the rule is. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions; 
The requirements of good faith and fairness are fundamental for Bulgarian contract 
law and must be respected in all contracts, including B2B transactions.63 Therefore a 
system of protection based on the concept of good faith and the significant imbalance 
in the parties' rights (unfairness), is very suitable for control for unfair terms in 
business-to-business transactions. 
This conclusion is also supported by decisions of some Bulgarian courts and in the 
legal literature.64 Some Bulgarian courts already justify the extended application of 
consumer protection legislation to terms in contracts between businesses. When 
checking the fairness of standard T&Cs of a certain trader this control may affect all 
contracts concluded between this trader and its customers, both consumers and legal 
entities (including, other traders). When a term in T&Cs used by the trader is 
proclaimed as unfair and void, as per some courts decisions, it is impossible to limit 
this legal effect only to contracts under the T&Cs which the trader concluded with 
consumers and to exclude the ones concluded with other traders under the same 
standard conditions.65 
 
62 See Decision № 365 / 26.05.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition and Decision № 194 / 
23.03.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition 
63 In this sense is Article 9 Obligations and Contracts Act (“The parties are free to determine the contents of 
the contract insofar as it is not contrary to mandatory rules of law and good morals”) and Article 12 
Obligations and Contracts Act (“In negotiating and contracting parties must act in good faith. Otherwise 
they owe compensation.”), applicable also to B2B transactions in accordance with the 288 Commercial Act 
referring to general provision of the Private Law. 
64 Марков, Методи Развитие на уредбата на договора при общи условия, "Съвременно право", 2000/3 
[,Markov, Metodi Development of the legal framework of contract under general terms] 
65 See in this sense - Decision № Т-372 / 13.07.2010 Com. case № 111/2010 III Division the Court of 
Appeal - Sofia; also Decision № 102 / 06.07.2010 Com. case № 283/2010 the Court of Appeal - Varna 
and Decision № 216 / 16.07.2012 Com. case № 255/2012 the Court of Appeal -Varna. On the opposite 
position - Decision № 283 / 17.07.2015 Com. case № 155/2015 the Court of Appeal - Plovdiv (unfairness 
under CPA only for B2C contracts), also Decision № 332 / 25.11.2014 Com. case № 469/2014 the Court 
of Appeal – Varna. 
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price; 
The interviewed stakeholders do not express any particular opinion on this matter, but 
they are warning that any such intervention could harm freedom of contract. 
Extending protection to individually negotiated terms, the main subject-matter of the 
contract and the adequacy of the price of B2B contracts can also be considered as 
restriction of freedom of contract, therefore would not be very welcome among 
interviewed stakeholders. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair; 
The following practices in B2B relationships on Bulgarian market can be considered as 
unfair in all circumstances: 66 
• Restriction in the use of trademarks and parking places; 
• Restriction or sanction for offering third parties the same or better commercial 
terms (i.e. ‘most favored nation’ clause); 
• Limiting the possibility of supply or sale to third parties as a whole; 
• Unilateral amendment of the contract; 
• Introduction of payments without any real consideration (often cited as a fee 
‘Birthday’); 
• Transfer of unjustified or disproportionate commercial risk to one party (e.g. 
stipulating reimbursement of expenses related to the withdrawal and the 
destruction of goods with expired date); 
• Payment within a period longer than 30 days from the delivery or the receipt of 
the invoice for the sale of any kind of food regardless of the length of the cycle 
of their realization; 
• Limiting the right on transferring the claims to a third party under a contract 
for delivery of goods; 
• Unjustified refusal to prepare an offer for purchase.67 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Such transparency requirement would be very beneficial, especially for some B2B 
contracts that, due to industry characteristics, are rich in terminus technicus and 
unreadable for the laity. For instance, in B2B contracts for financial services, energy or 
heating supply, even when the recipients of financial services or of energy service are 
traders themselves, one cannot expect them to have such a level of professional 
expertise in these fields so that they can understand the jargon used in standard T&Cs 
of banks or energy suppliers. 
The interviewed stakeholders do not express any particular opinion on this matter. 
 
66 As reported by the interviewed stakeholders; see also - 
http://www.capital.bg/biznes/vunshni_analizi/2015/07/12/2571094_regulaciia_na_turgoviiata_ne_samo_
na_turgovskite_verigi/ [last visited 17.07.2016]; 
http://www.regal.bg/tema_na_broia/2014/07/18/2345934_globi_za_zloupotreba_s_po-silna_poziciia_pri/ 
[last visited on 17.07.2016] 
67 Decision № 365 / 26.05.2016 the Commission for Protection of Competition. 
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• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade; 
It seems hard to predict what the effect would be of such an extension for cross-
border trade. According to one of the interviewed stakeholders it will probably bring 
benefits. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers; 
Such an extension may help innovation by micro68 and small69 enterprises. Some 
studies reveal that for 57% of the Bulgarian SME the big companies with dominant 
market position represent a barrier for innovations.70 Admittedly, this is not the most 
significant obstacle to innovations by SME, yet it looks as a hindrance that should not 
be neglected. Should the control for unfair terms in contracts between SME and bigger 
enterprises contribute to balancing of bargaining power of parties then that measure 
may have a positive effect on innovations by and market positions of SME. 
For the interviewed stakeholders it is hard to assess what such effect would be. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension. 
As per the opinion of some of the respondents the answer to this question requires 
deep and very detailed analysis of all potential benefits and disadvantages of the 
extension before drawing the conclusion as to which one will prevail – positive impact 
or negative consequences of such extension. As long as the fairness is respected and 
the balance between parties’ rights and obligations is observed, the gain of such 
intervention in B2B transactions would exceed its potential negative impact. 
 
1.3. Injunctions 
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?71  
The assessment of effectiveness provided by the interviewed stakeholders varies. The 
common opinion is that the ID measures work relatively well on the national market, 
but not for the cross-border infringements. 
Some measures are more effective in practice when applied by public authorities than 
by consumer organisations (for instance, collective actions) – the information collected 
for the purpose of this country report reveals that since 2010 the national 
enforcement authority has filed around 90 collective actions, whereas consumer 
organisations around 8. 
68 Micro enterprise is the one with personnel less than 10 people and annual turnover and/or assets less 
than 3,900,000 BGN – Article 3 (3) Small and Medium Enterprise Act 
69 Small enterprise is the one with personnel less than 50 people and annual turnover and/or assets less 
than 19,500,000 BGN – Article 3 (2) Small and Medium Enterprise Act 
70 See the Study on Innovations of SME in Bulgaria (p.356) conducted by the Applied Research and 
Communications Fund - www.arcfund.net/fileSrc.php?id=2529 [last visited on 20.07.2016] 
71 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
128
Collective actions are more effective for ending, hence reducing, infringements, 
however they do not work well in practice when it comes to reduction in consumers' 
detriment, as per a stakeholder experience shared during the interview.72 This is 
caused by amendments of some provisions of national law, namely Article 188 (3) 
CPA. Before 2008 this provision required the court to award damages based on the 
concept of fairness (without proofs for the exact amount of the loss); in 2008, with the 
new Code of Civil Procedure the provision was abrogated and nowadays the exact 
amount of loss incurred by each consumer has to be substantiated in the court 
proceeding. This creates procedural obstacles in the collective action proceedings.73 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order? 
The prior consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive) is reportedly used very 
often by the national enforcement authority prior undertaking any other measures and 
is deemed effective. 
Mixed assessment also applies in relation to the summary procedure – although the 
latter is used very often in practice (especially by the national enforcement authority) 
it does not appear to be that fast for making a real difference when compared with the 
normal proceeding. 
The interviewed stakeholders (both consumer organisations and public authorities) 
point out that the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a corrective 
statement represents a measure that could be very useful and effective after some 
adjustment of its application in practice, namely – the language of publication needs 
to be more understandable for consumers (legal terms to be avoided as much as 
possible) and the notification to be published in more popular newspapers with better 
circulation. This may face some obstacles though if between such a newspaper and 
the business infringed the law exists adverting contract or other business relationship, 
making the editors reluctant to publish such notifications. Existence of these obstacles 
is reported by one of the interviewed stakeholders. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The scope of application of the injunction procedure is extended beyond the legislation 
from Annex I to any ‘other legislation that protect the interests of consumers’ – Article 
186 (2) p. 9 the Consumer Protection Act. 
Additionally according to Article 186 (2) p. 10, ‘g’ and ‘p’ (in Bulgarian: ‘г’ ‘п’) the 
Consumer Protection Act in the scope has also been included national legislation of 
any EU member-state transposing the following two directives: 
• Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision 
of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive); 
• Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
72 See also Decision № 10 / 06.08.2013 Com. case № 998/2012 І commercial division, the Supreme Court 
of Cassation. 
73 See for instance Ruling № 63 / 04.02.2016 Civil case № 3/2016 the Court of Appeal - Plovdiv and Ruling 
№ 4284 / 03.11.2015 Civil case № 2295/2015 the District court – Plovdiv. 
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Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on 
consumer ADR). 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012. 
The interviewed stakeholders enumerate the following obstacles for the effective use 
of the injunction procedure: 
• The amount of court expenses, namely state fees, which for non-tangible 
claims may vary between 80 BGN [approx. EUR 40] and 1600 BGN [approx. 
EUR 820] and for tangible claims – 4% from the claim; lawyers fee as well – in 
average, 500-600 BGN [approx. EUR 255-307];74 
• The length of court proceeding – in general, the length is sufficient to affect the 
effectiveness of the court decision (it is reported that in a few cases the unfair 
practice or the unfair term ceased long before the final court decision was 
announced).75 Even the summary procedure is not securing any faster remedy, 
as reported by the interviewees; 
• Lack of judges sufficiently well trained and experienced in the specifics of 
legislation for consumer protection. Reportedly some progress has been made 
in this regards in the last couple of years (consumer protection law is now 
included in the training curriculum for judges), but it is not sufficient yet; 
• The amendment of the CPA in the sense that in collective actions damages are 
awarded to consumers by the court only when the exact amount of the loss is 
substantiated (in the past the amount of compensation was determined by the 
court in accordance with the principle of fairness and no proofs for the exact 
amount were needed); 
• The Bulgarian Administrative Infringements and Penalties Act (AIPA) was 
enforced approximately 60 years ago, and some of its provisions are not 
compatible with the provisions of the consumer protection legislation, which 
makes application of the latter cumbersome. The national enforcement 
authority explains that some of their orders for ceasing of infringements were 
overruled by the court only based on formal procedural grounds rooting in the 
incompatibility mentioned above. For instance, according AIPA the order for 
ceasing of infringement needs to state the place where the infringement was 
committed, which in some cases is challenging to specify i.e. in distant selling 
transactions, as per the relevant authority opinion; 
• In addition, the legal authors suggest improvements/removal of inconsistencies 
between proceedings for appeals against various acts of the Commission for 
Consumer Protection. Nowadays appeal against orders for cessation of unfair 
commercial practice and orders for imposing on traders administrative 
sanctions for unfair practice are governed by two separate legal acts, the Code 
for Administrative Procedure and the Administrative Infringements and 
Penalties Act, respectively, which is not an optimal solution for law enforcement 
and may lead to contracting court decision regarding one and the same law 
infringement.76 
74 The Commission for Consumer Protection dues court fees – see Ruling № 937 / 25.11.2011 Com. case № 
825/2011 ІІ commercial division, the Supreme Court of Cassation. 
75 See for example Decision № 69 / 19.03.2015 Com. case № 28/2015 the Court of Appeal - Varna (the 
Commission for Consumer Protection recommended removing of an unfair term in August 2013, as it was 
not done, collective action was filed and the claim was upheld with a court decision in November 2014; 
meanwhile new T&Cs of the defendant company were drafted and approved by the respective regulator 
and as they didn’t contain the term in question, the court procedure was terminated in March 2015, 
almost two years after the recommendations). 
76 See Varadinov, op.cit., p.218 
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level? 
The interviewed stakeholders are not happy about an extension of the coverage of the 
Injunctions Directive and do not see a need for such. 
One of the interviewed stakeholders would welcome collective actions for protection of 
interests of small enterprises. 
The national enforcement authority recommends any measures that can encourage 
and facilitate consumer organisation to file more collective actions. 
One of the interviewed stakeholders suggests introducing a mechanism for better 
coordination and information exchange between consumer organisations within 
various EU Member States in the cases when one infringement affects consumers from 
multiple Member States or the same business commits the same type of infringement 
in multiple Member States. This mechanism would aim at defining which court in 
which country would have jurisdiction to hear the collective action, measures for 
informing affected consumers and allowing them to be represented in the court 
proceeding as well as for assessment of damages. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country? 
Theoretically, such procedures are possible, but they are not applied in practice as 
they raise complicated legal questions and require significant resources. The 
interviewed stakeholders almost unanimously state that the injunction procedure is 
not very effective in addressing infringements originating in another EU country. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
As per the interviewees, it is not effective (not working well) and it only seems to exist 
as a theoretical option. No cross-country injunction proceedings have been reported 
and none appear to be completed or pending – neither initiated by qualified Bulgarian 
entities against traders from another EU member state and brought in Bulgarian or 
foreign jurisdiction, nor of foreign qualified entities seeking an injunction before 
Bulgarian courts or enforcement bodies. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
One of the respondents introducing a mechanism for better coordination and 
information exchange between consumer organisations within various EU Member 
States in the cases when one infringement affects consumers from multiple countries 
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or the same business commits the same type of infringement in multiple Member 
States – see above 1.3.1. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law 
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
All enforcement procedures are regulated in one legal act – the Consumer Protection 
Act, Chapter 9. There are also provisions on collective actions in the Code of Civil 
Procedure, chapter 33. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Apart from the extended scope of application of the injunction procedure (for ‘any 
other legislation that protects the interests of consumers’) the procedures in the 
national legislation do not go beyond measures foreseen in the Injunctions Directive. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues 
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
There is clear statistical evidence (from the annual reports of the Commission for 
Consumer Protection77 and information provided by the relevant public authorities) 
that the number of consumer complaints have significantly increased over the last few 
years – from approximately 2000 per year a few years ago to more than 20,000 in 
2015. This trend is a result of increased consumer awareness of their rights, and their 
confidence to seek protection. A certain benefit is a free-of-charge procedure for filing 
a complaint as well as the fact those can be sent via email without a requirement to 
use a digital signature. 
The situation with court procedures looks different. There is no relevant statistical data 
about consumer court disputes (those seem to be included under the statistical 
category ‘civil law cases’)78 and it is onerous to find out how many civil law 
proceedings for damages are following the procedures for ceasing the unfair practices 
or terms. However as per stakeholders’ opinion, such proceedings are unlikely to be 
77 Annual reports for 2013, 2014 and 2015 can be found here https://kzp.bg/godishni-dokladi [last visited 
on 08.07.2016]. 
78 Statistical data can be found here - http://www.vss.justice.bg/page/view/1082 [last visited on 
08.07.2016]. 
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many. Court proceedings require more resources (time, efforts and financial means) 
than administrative procedures and this factor can make consumers reluctant to file 
civil claims. Consumers must pay state fees and, if they use the services of an 
attorney, they have to pay the lawyer’s fee as well. The analysis of the case law 
reveals that consumers are seeking damages for both material and non-material loss 
resulting from unfair practices.79  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
There is not such evidence. On the contrary, one of the stakeholders gives an example 
of unfair practices of mobile operators. All three mobile operators have in their T&Cs a 
term stipulating that if consumers want to terminate, before the agreed upon end 
date, contracts concluded for a defined period of time they are obliged to pay all fees 
for the complete duration of the contract. The Commission for Consumer Protection 
recommended removing this term from the T&Cs. Following the recommendation, one 
of the mobile operators complied immediately with it; the second one – after a certain 
period, the third one did not react and the Commission started a court proceeding. 
The latter operator, which seems to be the most incompliant one out of three, is 
actually benefiting the most from its infringement as it will continue collecting fees 
based on the unfair term while the court proceeding is running. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
 The relevant stakeholders report that no information about such costs is available.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
No relevant information has been found about the public costs related to the 
enforcement of these rules. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
Probably this is the case as the court fees seem to be an obstacle for consumer 
organisation (in some cases even for public authorities) for filing collective actions. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
Decreasing the amount of court fees due for consumer litigations would have twofold 
effect – reducing the cost and encouraging consumer organisations for using more 
actively this redress mechanisms for protection of consumers’ interests. 
 
79 Damages caused by unfair practice - Decision № 4914 / 07.07.2015 Civil Case № 20213/2014 the Sofia 
City Court; Decision № 895 / 09.02.2015 Civil case № 10538/2014 the Sofia City Court („СМС за 
милиони“ “SMS for millions”). 
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1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation 
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied 
in practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?] 
This is the case, especially in financial services, electronic communications and 
energy, not that much in passenger transport. 
For instance in 2013, 2014 and 2015 the Commission for Consumer Protection 
reviewed thousands of T&Cs for unfairness in the sectors mentioned above and among 
them have found unfair terms, as follows:80 
 
Sector 2013 2014 2015 
Financial Services (banks) n/a 5 out of 890 196 out of 3300 
Financial Services (other than banks) 56 31 out of 1066 351 out of 4253 
Energy (central heating) 37 n/a 4 out of 228 
Energy (electricity) 8 n/a 1 out of 10 
Energy (gas) n/a 1 out of 230 n/a 
Electronic Communications 24 115 out of 2653 89 out of 1808 
Transport 4 n/a n/a 
 
The most common unfair terms found are: 
• Inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of consumers; 
• Performance of obligations of the trader is subject to conditions whose 
realization depends on trader’s own will alone; 
• Authorising the supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where 
the same facility is not granted to the consumer; 
• Requiring the consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation; 
• Bundling multiple contracts with the same consumer in a way that non-
performance of the consumer of one of the contracts entitles the trader to 
refuse to perform all contracts; 
• Excluding the supplier’s responsibility even in case of failure in a network under 
their control; 
80 See the Annual Reports of the Commission for Consumer Protection for 2013, 2014 and 2015 - 
https://kzp.bg/godishni-dokladi [last visited on 08.07.2016]. 
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• Consumers are obliged to pay the sum even when there is a pending 
proceeding based on their complaint against the sum. 
 
In quite a few cases the courts have reviewed the terms in contracts between 
consumers and providers of electronic communication services,81 central heating 
delivery companies,82 electricity delivery companies,83 financial services84 and have 
declared some of them unfair. 
Unfair commercial practices in the same sectors (electronic communications,85 
passenger transport,86 energy87 and consumer financial services)88 have also been a 
subject to court proceeding. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?] 
According to Bulgarian legislation different authorities are competent for enforcement 
of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, namely: 
• The Commission for Consumer Protection – the UCPD and UCTD (transposed in 
the Consumer Protection Act); 
81 Decision № 2396 / 22.12.2014 Com. case № 3502/2014 the Court of Appeal – Sofia. 
82 Decision № 312 / 11.12.2015 Civil case № 412/2015 the Court of Appeal – Veliko Tarnovo; Decision № 
26 / 23.02.2015 Civil Case № 1479/2014 the Court of Appeal – Plovdiv; Decision № 312 / 11.12.2015 
Civil case № 412/2015 the Court of Appeal – Veliko Tarnovo. 
83 Decision № 103 / 10.08.2015 Com. case № 1112/2015 ІІ commercial division, the Supreme Court of 
Cassation; Decision № 86 / 17.08.2015 Com. case № 616/2015 II commercial division, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation; Decision № 79 / 11.05.2011 Com. case № 582/2010 II commercial division, the 
Supreme Court of Cassation; Decision` № 115 / 20.05.2015 Civil case № 4907/2014 IV commercial 
division, the Supreme Court of Cassation; Decision № Т-397 / 21.07.2010 Civil case № 138/2010 VI 
division, the Court of Appeal – Sofia; Decision No 86 17.08. 2015 of the Supreme Court of Cassations, 
Com. case No 616/2015, 2nd panel of the Commerce Chamber; Decision No 38 15.05.2014 of the 
Supreme Court of Cassations, Com. case No 5/2013, 1st panel of the Commerce Chamber (unfair is a 
contract term enabling the electricity supplier unilaterally to amend the bill for already delivered and paid 
electricity without a valid reason, for instance non-excused non-performance from consumer’s side). 
84 Decision № 77 / 22.04.2015 Civil case № 4452/2014 III commercial division, the Supreme Court of 
Cassation - unfair is a contractual term granting a bank the right to unilaterally alter annual fee for 
administering of loan without specifying any valid reasons, beyond bank’s control, that could justify a 
change in the fee amount. 
85 Decision № 4914 / 07.07.2015 Civil case № 20213/2014 the Sofia City Court; Decision from 06.01.2012 
Civil case № 58/2011 the Sofia City Court; Decision No 9525 18.08.2016 of the Supreme Administrative 
Court, Adm. case No 11791/2015, VII department - unfair commercial practice (aggressive practice) is 
considering, without any legal grounds, three separate contracts concluded with a certain consumer as a 
single framework agreement only for justifying the refusal to provide services on all these contracts, even 
for those on which the consumer is a perfect payer, and by this means to force the consumer to pay their 
obligations under one of the contracts for which there is a dispute; Decision No 534 18.01. 2016 of the 
Supreme Administrative Court, Adm. case No 4078/2015, VII department (it is a misleading commercial 
practice when a trader fails to disclose to a certain consumer information about technical characteristics 
of a product, even when such information is available on the trader’s website), on the contrary – if all 
relevant details on tariffs are available on the trader’s website and they are comprehensible for the 
average consumer, the way the information is presented cannot be considered as a misleading practice 
(for instance the fact that a part of the information is provided in pop-up boxes, which open by clicking on 
the sign “?”) – see Decision No 4570 2.04. 2013 of the Supreme Administrative Court, Adm. case No 
642/2013, VII department. 
86 Comparative adverting as unfair practice in providing taxi services - Decision № 6951 / 20.10.2013 Civil 
case № 63/2011 the Sofia City Court. 
87 Decision from 04.02.2014 Civil case № 3912/2008 Regional court - Sofia (Collective Action against 
Toploficacia Sofia). 
88 Decision from 11.04.2011 Civil case № 3407/2007the Sofia City Court. 
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• The Energy and Water Regulatory Commission – energy, gas and water sector 
specific rules;89 
• The Commission for the Regulation of Communications – electronic 
communications specific rules;90 
• The Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communication, The 
Directorate General "Civil Aviation Administration" – passengers’ air transport 
specific rules;91 
• The Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communication, 
Executive Agency "Car Administration" – passengers’ auto transport specific 
rules.92 
The cooperation between all these authorities is regulated by legal provisions in 
multiple legal acts, namely: 
• Ministry of economy has a general responsibility for coordinating activities of all 
other public authorities with competence in the field of consumer protection 
(Article 164 (1) p.5 the Consumer Protection Act); 
• The Energy and Water Regulatory Commission before approving T&Cs for 
delivery of central heating and electricity, is obliged to send to the Commission 
for Consumer Protection drafts of T&Cs for review for unfair terms (Article 148 
(2) the Consumer Protection Act); 
• The interviewed regulators report that the Commission for Consumer Protection 
forward to them consumers’ complaints for infringements in the sectors with 
specific rules, for instance delivery of central heating and electricity, air and 
road passengers transport (legal basis is Article 178 (6) the Consumer 
Protection Act), except for complaints for unfair terms and unfair commercial 
practices, which are deemed to belong to the domain of the Commission for 
Consumer Protection. On the other hand, the regulators forward to the 
Commission for Consumer Protection those of consumers complaints sent to 
them, but falling within the scope of competence of the Commission for 
Consumer Protection (for instance, in road passengers transport when non-
authorized company, acting as if it is a representative of a bus company, sold 
an invalid ticket to a consumer). 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?] 
The interviewed stakeholders assess overall positively the legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness and unfair commercial practices provided by the combination of 
horizontal consumer provisions and sector-specific rules. 
89 DIRECTIVE 2009/73 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2009/72 / EC,  DIRECTIVE 2004/67 / EC, REGULATION (EU) № 
994/2010, Regulation (EC, Euratom) № 833/2010, REGULATION (EC) № 715/2009, REGULATION (EC) № 
714/2009  
90 DIRECTIVE 2009/73 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2009/72 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2004/67 / EC, REGULATION (EU) № 
994/2010, Regulation (EC, Euratom) № 833/2010, REGULATION (EC) № 715/2009, REGULATION (EC) № 
714/2009,  DIRECTIVE 2009/140 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2009/136 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2009/114 / EC, DIRECTIVE 
2006/24 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2002/77 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2002/58 / EC, IRECTIVE 2002/22 / EC, DIRECTIVE 
2002/21 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2002/20 / EC, DIRECTIVE 2002/19 / EC. 
91 REGULATION (EC) No 261/2004 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 February 
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied 
boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulatiodelivery of n (EEC) No 
295/91; REGULATION (EC) No 1107/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 5 
July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by 
air 
92 Regulation (ЕС) № 181/2011. 
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There is one particular issue reported by the interviewed stakeholders, namely 
disputes about application of para.1 of the Additional Provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act, stating that in case of contradicting legal provisions the one which 
guarantees the highest degree of consumer protection is to be applied. In practice this 
requirement clashes with another legal doctrine Lex specialis derogat legi generali and 
creates difficulties for law interpretation and application. This has been reported as a 
significant problem in the energy sector. One of the interviewed stakeholders claims 
that when it comes to consumer protection, the Energy Act is lex specialis and has 
priority over the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act as a general law. Other 
interviewees as well as case law93 on the contrary state that the provisions of the 
Energy Act can have priority only where they provide a higher degree of protection for 
consumers’ interests than the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. 
Another example is the rules on payments services.94 They cannot derogate the 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act if the latter provides a higher level of 
consumer protection.95 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
No information available on this matter has been found in the course of preparing the 
country report. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law. 
There is such need and this opinion is also shared by some of the interviewed 
stakeholders. Especially given the issue about application of para.1 of the Additional 
Provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, as described above, as well as the fact that 
one of the interviewed regulators admitted that they heard about existence of the 
UCPD and the UCTD only after having been contacted for opinion on the current study. 
Better knowledge on rules about unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms 
in consumer contracts would be beneficial for the regulators in sectors with specific 
rules for consumer protection, in spite of the lack of competence to handle such 
issues. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration). 
The stakeholders either do not have opinion on this matter or express negative 
attitude to such application. They think this will create confusion and raise 
unnecessary questions about the need of such protection. 
 
93 Decision № Т-372 / 13.07.2010 Com. case № 111/2010 III division, the Court of Appeal – Sofia: “EA and 
CPA regulate a diverse range of public relations and … cannot be seen as special and general legislative 
act”. 
94 Payment Services and Payments Systems Act 2009, transposing the Directive 2007/64/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal 
market. 
95 In this sense see - Decision from 23.02.2015 Civil Case № 69055/2014 Regional court – Sofia. 
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Yes, and this is almost anonymously confirmed by the interviewed stakeholders. 
The legal definition of the term ‘consumer’ is provided in § 13, item 1 Additional 
Provisions of CPA, namely: ‘Consumer means any natural person who acquires goods 
or uses services that are not intended for commercial or professional activity, and any 
person who, under a contract under this Act acting outside his trade or profession’. 
This definition is general for the whole Consumer Protection Act (transposing various 
EU directives, including the UCP one) and is criticized in the legal literature as 
contradicting the definition from Article 2 ‘a’ of the UCPD96 due to introduction of an 
additional characteristic, which does not exist in the Directive i.e. goods and services 
should not be ‘intended for commercial or professional activity’. Legal authors see this 
as not being compliant with the requirements of the Directive, because outside the 
protection against unfair practices would remain cases in which natural persons are 
acquiring professional goods for their personal activity (i.e. hobby), for instance 
professional photographic technic and materials acquired by amateur photograph and 
used only for his hobby. Therefore legal authors suggest either correction of the 
current definition of ‘consumer’ or introducing a new one, applicable only for unfair 
commercial practices.97  
The concept of ‘consumer’ is interpreted broadly in the case law – not only for 
transactions and practices regulated in the Consumer Protection Act, but also all other 
recipients of services that are not intended for commercial or professional activity, 
such as supply of electricity for households.98 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The summarized opinions of interviewed stakeholders reveal uncertainty about the 
fitness of existing rules for providing adequate protection of vulnerable consumers. 
Only one respondent evaluates the rules as adequate, at the same time pointing out 
one significant exception, namely for transactions performed online. Other 
stakeholders also express the need of more suitable rules for protection of vulnerable 
consumers, especially children, in Internet purchasing. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Based on the interviews conducted for this country report, it is concluded that the 
protection of consumers has improved. Prior to the transposition of the UCPD (in 
96 “Consumer’ means any natural person who, in commercial practices covered by this Directive, is acting 
for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession”. 
97 See Varadinov, op.cit, p.35. 
98 See Sukareva, op.cit., p. 227 and Ruling № 710/30.10.2012 Г., Civil case № 613/2012,  ІІІ Civil Division,  
the Supreme Court of Cassation. 
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2007) and the UCTD (in 1999)99 in Bulgarian legislation no special rules tackling with 
such infringements existed. Although the provisions of general contract law provided 
consumers with, to a certain extent, suitable remedies in such cases, the transposition 
of these two directives played a key role for improving the protection of consumer 
rights and interests. As reported by the interviewed stakeholders, the lists of unfair 
terms and unfair practices served as a clear and useful guidance for the enforcement 
authority and courts when deciding on consumer cases, especially in the early years of 
law enforcement, when there was a lack of knowledge and sufficient case law on these 
topics. Furthermore, the application of the rules on unfair practices and unfair terms 
into practice and the information campaigns in these areas, seem to increase 
consumers’ awareness of their rights and encourage them proactively to seek for 
remedy for infringements – as reported by the relevant enforcement authority 
currently approximately 20000 consumers’ complaints per year are addressed to 
them, whereas only a few years ago this number was around 2000. Nevertheless, the 
respondents point out that there is still room for improvements, especially in 
increasing the level of control on how the law provisions are applied in the practice as 
well as for protection of consumers purchasing online. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation? 
It has improved for packaged goods. This is the prevailing opinion of the interviewees, 
including the enforcement authority and consumer organisations, which have observed 
a significant decrease of number of complaints and cases of violations of the unit price 
indication requirements since the national legislation transposing the PID entered into 
force.  
As far as non-packaged goods and services are concerned, the application of the 
information requirements regarding unit prices still needs improvement, as reported 
by the respondents. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation? 
Some of the respondents express such an opinion, emphasizing the key role the 
Commission for Protection of Competition plays in tackling with unfair marketing in 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian legislation has however had provisions on misleading advertising 
since 1999,100 therefore it is difficult to assess what has been the impact of the 
transposition of the MCAD in this regard. 
The reviewed case law reveals that mainly cases of misleading advertising have been 
invoked before the relevant enforcement authority and courts. Cases related to 
comparative advertising can rarely be found in the legal practice. No other evidence 
has been found on the impact of the transposition of the MCAD on the protection of 
businesses against comparative advertising. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
99 First rules on unfair terms in consumer contracts were part of the Consumer Protection and Business 
Practices Act (enacted in 1999 and abrogated in 2006 with the Consumer Protection Act) and were quite 
similar to some provisions of the UCTD. 
100 Articles 29-33 of the Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act (enacted in 1999 and abrogated in 
2006 with the Consumer Protection Act) similar to some of the provisions of Council Directive 84/450/EEC 
of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising. 
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No explicit evidence has been found for substantiating a response in one direction or 
in another. According to one of the interviewed stakeholders, there is increased 
confidence of Bulgarian traders to offer goods and services cross-border, which can 
mainly be attributed to the advantages provided by the internal market (namely, due 
to absence of custom duties).  Harmonized law of consumer protection to a certain 
extent contributes to this result, even though it does not seem to be considered by the 
respondents as a primary factor. 
As far as consumers’ confidence to purchase cross-border is concerned, based on the 
summarized opinions of the interviewees it can be concluded that it has slightly 
increased for the last years. Only one exception to this trend seems to exist, namely 
online purchasing, due to some negative examples of goods purchased online from 
countries outside EU, which cases have reportedly made consumers in Bulgaria more 
reluctant to enter into cross-border online transactions. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives? 
The directives certainly have very positive impact in this regards, but they are not 
considered by the interviewed stakeholders as the most influential factor for these 
improvements. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – BULGARIA 
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
The Consumer Protection 
Act (2005), Chapter 6 “ 
“Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts”, 
Articles 143 – 148a 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Article 143 The Consumer 
Protection Act (2005) 
 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
No   
 Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
No   
 Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
The Consumer Protection 
Act (2005), Chapter 4 
“Commercial Practices and 
Methods of Trade”, 
Section III “Unfair 
Commercial Practices”, 
Articles 68b-68m 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No   
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
The Consumer Protection 
Act (2005), Chapter 2 
“Information for 
Consumers”, Section IV 
“Indication of prices of 
goods and service”, 
Articles 15 – 31 
 Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
No   
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations No   
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
The Competition Act of 
2008, Chapter 7 
“Prohibition of Unfair 
Competition”, Articles 32-
34  
     
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
The Consumer Protection 
Act (2005), Chapter 9 
“Consumer Disputes”, 
Section IV “Collective 
Actions. Injunctions. 
Damages”, Articles 186 -
190 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – BULGARIA 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No, single 
procedure  
Extended list of provisions to which 
injunction procedure is applicable – to 
“any other legislation that protects the 
interests of consumers”  
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking 
an injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
- Court 
procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
- The costs are 
as a rule borne 
by the losing 
party 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to 
cover consumer 
law in general 
Any “other legislation that protect the 
interests of consumers” – Article 186 (2) 
p. 9 the Consumer Protection Act; 
National legislation of any EU member-
state transposing the following two 
directives (Article 186 (2) p. 10, “g” and 
“p” (Bulgarian “г” ”п”) the Consumer 
Protection Act): Directive 2010/13/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive) 
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on alternative dispute resolution for 
consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on 
consumer ADR)  
Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure? 
- No  
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Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their associations 
- Yes Only in accordance with the rules for 
joined cases – Chapter 16, Section I, 
Articles 215-217 the Civil Procedure Code 
2008 – there must be a connection 
between actions (common rights and/or 
obligation or rights and/or obligations 
with one the same ground) against the 
traders, otherwise the request for joining 
them will be denied. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including 
the consultation stage under Art. 5 of the 
ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- Yes Chapter 25 „Summary Procedure“, Article 
310 (1) p.4 the Code of Civil Procedure – 
claims for infringements of rights under 
the Consumer Protection Act: Time limits: 
1. The court must review for admissibility 
the claim by the end of the day it has 
been filed and send a copy of it to the 
defendant for reply; 2. The public hearing 
must be scheduled within three weeks 
period after the reply has been filed to 
the court; 3. The court decision must be 
announce no later than two weeks after 
the final public hearing. 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of 
a fine for each 
day of non-
compliance 
Article 226 the Consumer Protection Act – 
fine with an amount from 5000 BGN up 
to 25,000 BGN. The penalty is paid to the 
state. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes According to Article. 187 item 1 CPA. 
When consider that a commercial 
practice or action constitutes a violation 
of acts listed in Article  186 (to which the 
injunction procedure is applied), the court 
may  oblige the manufacturer, importer, 
trader and supplier to announce publicly  
the decision or part thereof and / or to 
make a public corrective statement to 
remove the effect of the infringement. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
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Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes It is possible to join for examination in the 
same proceedings the action for 
injunction and the action for 
compensation of collective interests of 
consumers, or the representative action 
under Article 189  CPA. Quite often courts 
divide both actions in separate 
proceedings.101 
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes It is possible to join for examination in the 
same proceedings the action for 
injunction and the representative action 
under Article 189 CPA. Quite often courts 
divide both actions in separate 
proceedings.102 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes The court decision on the collective action 
for injunction has legal effect for 
consumers who did not opt-out; those 
who opt-out still can base their individual 
claims for damages on the decision for 
granting the collective action (Article 386 
(1) CPC) 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- Yes Article 187 p.3 the Consumer Protection 
Act – the qualified entities may claim any 
other measure suitable to cease and 
desist the infringement 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
- No  
101 International Consulting / European Commission, 2011, Study on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers ’ interests, p.61 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/documents/study_on_injunctions_directive_final_report-
18_12_2011_en.pdf; see Ruling 31.10.2007 Civil Case №4275/2006 Г. Sofia City Court. 
102 International Consulting / European Commission, 2011, Study on the application of Directive 2009/22/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers ’ interests, p.61 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/documents/study_on_injunctions_directive_final_report-
18_12_2011_en.pdf 
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B. Data tables 
Number of B2C disputes 
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available). 
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available) 
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(number 
of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2013 Various sources103 25 cases
104 8% 92% 0% 0% 0%  
2014 Various sources 29 cases 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%  
2015 Various sources 20 cases 15% 85% 0% 0% 0%  
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).105 
103 The Annual Reports of the Commission for Consumer Protection for 2013, 2014 and 2015 - 
https://kzp.bg/godishni-dokladi [last visited on July 8 2016] and information provided by interviewed 
consumer organisation. 
104 Only collective actions as no court statistic data available for individual B2C disputes. 
105 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 400 BGN [approx. 
EUR 205] 
830-900 BGN 
[approx. 
EUR 425-460] 
200-250 
BGN106 
[approx. 
EUR 102-128] 
Up to 10 hours  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
Free of charge n/a n/a Up to 3-4 hours  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Such statistical data is not available. Court statistics do not have a separate category 
‘consumer disputes’, but they are included under the broader category ‘civil law 
disputes’. 
106 For court expert. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Business association 13.06.2016 
The Commission for Consumer 
Protection 
National consumer enforcement 
authority 
20.06.2016/21.06.2016 
 
State Energy and Water 
Regulatory Commission 
National regulatory authority 16.06.2016 
 
The Ministry of Transport, 
Information Technology and 
Communication, The Directorate 
General "Civil Aviation 
Administration"  
National regulatory authority 21.06.2016 
Executive Agency "Car 
Administration" 
National regulatory authority 29.06.2015 
Ministry of Economy Ministry 10.06.2016 
ECC Bulgaria European Consumer Centre 14.06.2016 
Federation of Consumers in 
Bulgaria (FCB) 
Consumer organisation 14.06.2016 
Bulgarian National Association 
Active Consumers – BNAAC 
Consumer organisation 13.06.2016 
Commission for the Regulation of 
Communications 
National regulatory authority Interview invitation declined – 
topics of the study are outside the 
competence of the commission; 
official statement sent (attached 
to the report) 
Commission for the Protection of 
Competition 
National enforcement authority Interview invitation declined – 
topics of the study are outside the 
competence of the commission; 
Bulgarian Industrial Association- 
Union of the Bulgarian Business 
Business association interview invitation declined due 
to lack of enough 
knowledge/information about the 
consumer protection legislation in 
Bulgaria and its enforcement in 
practice 
Bulgarian Industrial Capital 
Association 
Business association interview invitation declined due 
to lack of enough information 
about the consumer protection 
legislation in Bulgaria and its 
enforcement in practice 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Варадинов, Огнян 
Луканов [Varadinov, 
Ognyan Lukanov] 
2014 Нелоялни търговски практики в отношенията търговец – 
потребител : анализ на глава четвърта, раздел IV от Закона за 
защита на потребителите [Unfair Commercial Practices in 
transactions between trader and consumer: Analysis of Chapter IV, 
Section IV consumer Protection Act] 
Златка 
Сукарева[Sukareva, 
Zlatka] 
2015 Потребителско право[Consumer Law] 
Марков, Методи 
[Markov, Metodi] 
2000 Развитие на уредбата на договора при общи условия 
[Development of the legal framework of contract under general 
terms] 
Марков, Методи 
[Markov, Metodi] 
2007 Колективни искове за защита на потребителите, сп. „Общество и 
право“, 2007/9 [Collective actions for consumer protection”, in 
“Society and Law”, 2007/9] 
Колева, Рая [Koleva, 
Raya] 
2009  „Основните права на потребителите – теоретични и 
практически въпроси“, сп. „Търговско право“, 2009/2 и 3 [“Rights 
of consumers – theoretical and practical aspects”, in “Commercial 
Law”, 2009/2,3] 
Стойчев, Крaсен 
[Stoychev, Krasen]. 
2005 Преговори за сключване на договор и преддоговорна 
отговорност [Negotiations for Formation of the Contract and Pre-
contractual Liability] 
Комисия за защита на 
потребителите 
[Commission for 
Consumer Protection] 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Годишни доклади [Annual Reports] 
Комисия за защита на 
конкуренцията 
[Commission for 
Protection of 
Competition] 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
Годишни доклади [Annual Reports] 
Национален Съвет За 
Саморегулация 
[The National Council for 
Self-regulation] 
2013 
2014 
Годишни доклади [Annual Reports] 
Фондация приложни 
изследвания и 
комуникации [Conducted 
by the Applied Research 
and Communications 
Fund]  
 Иновациите в малките и средните 
предприятия в България 
[Тhe Study on Innovations of SME in Bulgaria] 
Pye, Steve and Audrey 
Dobbins, et. al. 
2015 Energy poverty and vulnerable consumers in the energy sector 
across the EU: analysis of policies and measures 
Десислава Фесенко 
[Dessislava Fessenko] 
2015 Регулация на търговията, не само на търговските вериги 
[Regulation of commerce, not only of retail chains] (Press release) 
 
Маргаритов, Димитър 
[Margaritov, Dimitar], the 
Chairman of the 
Commission for Consumer 
Protection 
2016 Голяма агенция за недвижими имоти обвързва клиентите си с 
комисионна и без да сключи сделка с тях [Large real estate 
agency bind customers with commission even without a deal with 
them] (Interview) 
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Владимиров, Влади 
[Vladimirov, Vladi]  
2014 Спират от продажба фалшиви еко и био продукти и мамещи ни 
хранителни добавки [Cessation of selling fake green and organic 
products and deceiving supplements] (Press release) 
Кирилова, Елена 
[Kirilova, Elena] 
2015 Все повече българи пазаруват онлайн [More and more Bulgarians 
are shopping online] 
Georgieva, Mara 
[Георгиева, Мара] 
2016 Онлайн пазаруването расте, но физическите магазини не 
изчезват [Online shopping is growing, but physical stores do not 
disappear] 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law – 
Country report CROATIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing 
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
According to the consumer associations and the ECC the principle-based approach 
under the UPCD has proven to be effective.  
In the opinion of the relevant ministry overall, the UCPD has been efficient in 
regulating unfair commercial practices of traders towards consumers. Nevertheless, 
the relevant ministry has pointed out that the somewhat general approach of the 
UCPD is not successful in covering all cases of unfair commercial practice (see infra). 
Also, in the legal literature it was emphasized that although the introduction of a 
general clause provided in Art 5 (2) of the UCPD was aimed at ensuring a high level of 
harmonization of the national clauses on unfair commercial practices, it cannot be 
considered to be effective. Namely, the application of the UCPD has shown that the 
use of the general clause which is open to different interpretations, may be 
problematic. Its application is very limited due to the fact that in an overwhelming 
number of cases the unfair commercial practice is recognized and determined under 
the black list of unfair commercial practices or the special clauses regarding 
misleading or aggressive commercial practice under Art 5 (4) of the UCPD.1 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; 
Consumer Associations and the ECC consider the black list of the unfair commercial 
practices as the most significant benefit of the UCPD. 
As the practical experience of the consumer association shows, if Croatian judges are 
involved in resolution of B2C disputes, they are often reluctant to decide on the 
unfairness of the commercial practice if the practice at hand is not included in the 
black list. 
As emphasized by the consumer associations and the ECC, the list covers a wide range 
of most common situations which are treated as unfair commercial practices. Since 
the situations are defined as unfair, there is no need for the consumer (or the 
consumer’s representative at court) to demonstrate the consequences, but only the 
existence of the situations listed in the Annex I (and transposed in the Croatian 
Consumer Act (Official Gazette 41/14, 110/15)), in order for the practice of the trader 
to be considered unfair.  
The black list also enables traders to be more aware of the practices which are unfair. 
In practice, this has resulted in a decreasing number of unfair practices in Croatia.  
Due to the unambiguous wording of the black list the consumers are able to detect 
unfair commercial practice and therefore, they are more likely to report them. Overall, 
the black list contributes to the better functioning of the market. 
1 Zlatović, Dragan, Nepoštene poslovne prakse u hrvatskom, bosansko-hercegovačkom i slovenskom pravu, 
Glasnik prava, 5(2014)2, p. 12-29, pp.17) (hereinafter: Zlatović (2014)). 
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At the same time, there are views expressed in the legal literature that, the fact that 
in keeping with the UCPD, the Croatian legislator has implemented Annex I of the 
UCPD and provided for two black lists of unfair commercial practices - the black list of 
aggressive commercial practices (Art 38 of the Consumer protection Act) and the 
black list of misleading commercial practices (Art 35 of the Consumer Protection Act), 
does not provide practical benefits for consumers. According to some legal theorists, 
the black list contains too many practices which do not necessarily influence consumer 
choices, the terms of the black list are not defined in a clear and understandable 
manner and the black list is static and cannot be considered as exhaustive of all unfair 
commercial practices which occur at the Market.2 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
One important example suggests that there have been limited practical benefits. In 
Croatia, cases have been reported to the Croatian State Prosecutor's Office for the 
Suppression of Organized Crime and Corruption (USKOK). These involve property 
developers engaged in misleading advertising by making various misrepresentations 
about the characteristics of a property and in particular omitting to disclose that 
properties sold would continue to be subject to prior mortgages for present and future 
bank loans contracted for by the developers. After the bankruptcy of the developers, 
this led to attempts to evict homeowners who bought their property from the 
developers (and paid for it) (the attempted evictions were by the banks with which the 
developers had obtained the loans from). For now, individual civil proceedings are 
pending. At the same time, there was no reaction from the Croatian State Prosecutor's 
Office for the Suppression of Organized Crime and Corruption or other authorities. This 
is the only example reported in relation to practices at the immovable property market 
in Croatia.  The stakeholders are not familiar with any other Croatian examples of 
situations where national rules beyond the minimum harmonisation clause for 
immovable property have or would have made a difference.3 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
In Croatia, there have been practical benefits for consumers in the application of the 
UCPD’s rules in tackling misleading environmental claims.  
For example, prior to its transposition in the Consumer Protection Act, food 
producers/traders used the terms ‘healthy’, ‘natural’, ‘homemade’ and ‘eco’ in order to 
mislead consumers and justify higher prices for the products. There were cases of 
‘natural’ fruit juices which did not contain fruit and ‘homemade’ or ‘eco’ products which 
were misrepresented as ecologically grown products, although they were grown in 
accordance with conventional farming practices which also include the use of 
pesticides. These cases of misleading practices have been addressed under the 
Consumer Protection Act which gives consumers the right to submit written complaints 
(Art 10 of the Consumer Protection Act) and instigate procedures before the Market 
Inspectorate at the Ministry of Economy. 
Also, in the Croatian energy market recently there has been an initiative to install 
heating cost dividers in households which are users of the district heating system. The 
installation of heating cost dividers to all radiators in house should ensure that every 
2 Zlatović (2014), p. 16.     
3 This can be supported also by the responsible ministry’s comparison of the market performance indicator 
(MPI) for 2013, according to which MPI for immovable property market at EU level was 70.6 (a rise of 
1.2), the MPI for immovable property market in Croatia was 61.1 (9.6 under the EU average -28) 
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household pays for heat energy consumption based on individual counting system.   
First steps have been made, but as reported by consumer associations, there were 
misleading environmental claims on the side of the traders. Namely, traders have 
made claims that installation of heating cost dividers is obligatory, that they are 
energy efficient and that in saving energy, they also save money. Firstly, their claims 
were not supported by scientific evidence. Secondly, consumers were not given 
sufficient information in an accurate and unambiguous manner, on how the heating 
cost dividers actually work and what their costs and benefits are. In fact it turned out 
that households which installed heating cost dividers had higher bills at the end of the 
month than the ones which did not install them. Thus, a question was referred to the 
Commission regarding the claim as to the obligatory nature of the installation of the 
heating cost dividers. The initiative was suspended and before additional steps could 
be taken, a Working group at the Ministry of Economy should provide a detailed 
analysis of all of the aspects of installation of heating cost dividers in households in 
Croatia. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The consumer association explained their understanding of the concept of an ‘average 
consumer’ as an indicator of the level of understanding of: 
• Fundamental consumer rights in national law and EU documents (regulations, 
directives); 
• Fundamental principles of EU consumer policy; 
• Knowledge of the reclamation procedure as a reflection of the financial literacy, 
legal literacy, literacy in the sector of electronic communications, and literacy in 
the sector of energy and other sectors. 
According to the consumer associations and the ECC, in cases of national extra-judicial 
resolution of consumer disputes, the issue of the concept of an ‘average consumer’ 
has been invoked rarely.  
The only situation where it was necessary to assess whether certain consumers should 
be considered as ‘average consumers’ was during a dispute which originated from a 
cross-border internet purchase of the products, where the price was wrongly indicated 
due to a system error on the webpage. Due to the system error, the indicated prices 
were much lower than the actual ones. Before the error was removed, a large number 
of consumers ordered the products at the lower prices indicated on the webpage. The 
trader, however, refused to fulfil the contract claiming that the ‘average consumer’ of 
the products placed on that particular webpage was aware/should have been aware, 
that the lower prices were the result of a system error because he/she should have 
known that these particular products could not be sold at such low prices. A key 
debate here was whether the concept of ‘average consumer’ should be assessed 
generally or in relation to a particular situation (e.g. should the concept of the 
‘average consumer’ be understood in terms of a consumer who buys products online 
or a consumer who purchases that particular brand of products). This shows that the 
concept of an ‘average consumer’ may be confusing and difficult to define in practice 
and may vary depending of the legislation in the Member State of the trader’s 
residence. 
According to the legal literature, since the concept of an ‘average consumer’ is not 
legally defined, it provides for the possibility of different understandings and 
interpretations in legal systems of Member States. In Croatia it is for the courts to 
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establish how the concept of an ‘average consumer’ should be applied.4 For now, there 
are no available court decisions regarding the matter.   
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
According to a consumer association, the concept of a ‘vulnerable consumer’ is an 
indicator of real level and efficiency of consumer protection at the Market. The fact 
that ‘vulnerable consumers’ are recognised as a separate category which needs special 
protection points to both strengths and weaknesses of EU consumer law. The 
weakness is reflected in the acknowledgment that consumer law does not afford 
sufficient protection to all categories of consumers. At the same time, the strength is 
visible in providing additional level of protection to those categories of consumers 
which cannot be adequately protected under ‘basic’ provisions of consumer law by 
ensuring a special treatment for vulnerable consumers.    
In Croatia, there are still a large number of consumer complaints and at the same 
time, a lack of court legislation in the field of consumer protection. 
The concept of ‘vulnerable consumers’ has been introduced in Art 32(2) of the 
Consumer Protection Act. In Croatia, enforcement authorities have recognised that the 
concept of ‘vulnerable consumers’ relates also to elderly consumers who are also very 
often both poor and indebted (due to the economic crisis).   
The relevant ministry underlines that in Croatia a (free) legal aid system was 
established (Legal Aid Act (Official Gazette 1143/13) in order to provide legal advice, 
assistance and representation before court to socially and economically endangered 
categories of citizens (including ‘vulnerable’ consumers). In granting legal aid to 
citizens, the administrative bodies take into account the means test in order to check 
if citizens are financially eligible. Also, special regard is given to the inquiry as to 
whether the citizens are owners of immovable property and therefore whether the 
court proceedings would threaten their livelihoods. In this sense, it can be argued that 
the authorities have recognised the need to protect new categories of consumers 
(poor, indebted).  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
As was pointed out both by the stakeholders and the legal literature,5 incentives for 
the self-regulation actions provided for by the UCPD, have had only limited effect both 
at the national and EU level. Codes of conduct are still the most widely introduced 
self-regulation mechanisms. In this context, they may be considered as the most 
effective mechanisms for addressing unfair commercial practice. 
In Croatia, rules of customary practice for traders (‘uzance’) were first introduced by 
the Croatian Chamber of Economy in 1995. They may be considered as predecessors 
of the Code of conduct, and they were the basis for the promotion of contractual 
fairness and good practice of traders in Croatia. In this sense, it may be argued that 
Croatian traders have experience with self-regulation mechanisms. However, this does 
not mean that their practice and behaviour is always in accordance with the promoted 
fairness and good practice. Nevertheless, there is awareness that adhering to rules of 
Code of conduct contributes to high standards in their business activity.  
4 Zlatović (2014), p. 28. 
5 Pavillon, C.M.D.S., The interplay between the unfair commercial practices directive and codes of conduct, 
Erasmus Law Review, 5(2012)4, p. 267-288. (hereinafter: Pavillon (2012)) 
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The rules of Code of conduct of the Croatian Chamber of Economy were introduced in 
2005 (Kodeks etike u poslovanju (Official Gazette 71/05)). There are currently 1015 
traders who are signatories to the Code of conduct of the Croatian Chamber of 
Economy.6 Although this may not seem a particularly large number of signatories in 
comparison to the total number of traders in Croatia, still it should not be disregarded 
that there are also traders who adhere to these rules in practice even though they are 
not signatories of the Code.  
According to a business association, the use of the Code of conduct in practice has 
proven to be effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. Namely, in case of 
breaches of the rules of the Code of conduct, alternative dispute resolution is practised 
at the Court of Honour of the Croatian Chamber of Economy. Until now, most of these 
disputes were initiated by consumers and concerned breaches of provisions of the 
Consumer Protection Act, including provisions regarding unfair commercial practice, as 
well as practices contrary to the principle of conscientiousness and honesty (načelo 
savjesnosti i poštenja).   
An initiative for the introduction of the similar Code of conduct of the Croatian 
Chamber of Trade and Crafts, dates back to 2002. For now, there is only a draft of the 
Code of conduct. From the experience of the Chamber of Trade and Crafts, 
introduction of a self-regulation mechanism, such as a Code of conduct, would be 
especially beneficial for traders and craftsmen who are members of the Chamber, for 
example dry cleaning services, hair-dressers, manufacturers of furniture etc. In their 
business they could benefit from the detailed regulation of their general T&Cs, 
complemented by a certificate of trade and craft quality and a guide for consumers, 
which would all be available for the traders and craftsmen who would adhere to the 
Code of conduct.  
However, according to the regulatory authority, self-regulation (and to an extent, co-
regulation) have not been effective enough in certain sectors. In its opinion, the 
pressure of obtaining good business results, often overcomes the traders wish to “play 
by the book”. Nevertheless, the best results are obtained if the detected problem is 
regulated based on the previous discussion and agreement among traders and the 
regulator of the specific sector. This conclusion confirms that introduction of the rules 
which are usually provided in the Codes of conduct are still considered as the most 
acceptable self-regulation action in Croatia. 
Also, in 2014 the Ministry of Economy has initiated the introduction of ‘trustmarks’ for 
Croatian online stores as a measure for ensuring transparency in their transactions 
and enhancing the level of consumers’ trust. The online traders would be subjected to 
certain requirements in order to obtain the ‘trustmark’.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
According to the consumer associations and the ECC, the current list is extensive 
enough to encompass situations which most often occur in practice.  
As for the mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD black 
list, consumer associations and the ECC would be in favour of this, due to the fast 
development of online purchasing, where new problems (which cannot be predicted at 
this stage) might occur.  
The relevant ministry is also of the opinion that the black list should be extended. 
Namely, the availability of new products and services should be taken into account, 
especially in terms of the developments of the digital market. 
6 Information available at the official website of the Ministry of Economy, http://www.mingo.hr/, 30 July 
2016.  
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 • Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
One of the measures suggested by the consumer associations and the ECC that would 
be adequate for improving the effectiveness of the UCPD, would be the organization of 
educational campaigns and raising awareness of consumers as well as traders about 
unfair commercial practices. Such a campaign has already been initiated in Croatia in 
2009 during the process of transposition of EU Directives in Croatian legislation. A mini 
guide was published for the business community (the traders) in the framework of the 
‘BIZ impact project’ (EU CARDS project) in order to raise awareness in regard to the 
changes in the national legislation concerning consumer protection, including unfair 
commercial practices.   
The experience of the consumer associations shows that although there is a legislative 
framework provided through the transposition of the UCPD in the Croatian Consumer 
Protection Act, compliance of traders with the requirements of the Act regarding unfair 
commercial practice cannot be adequately ensured in practice, until the enforcement 
mechanisms become effective in sanctioning traders. Enforcement mechanisms put in 
place by the Ministry of Economy include supervision of compliance with the Act 
through the competent inspectors of the Ministry of Economy. However, the situation 
in which lodging of a complaint to the trader constitutes a first step and only after the 
trader’s (negative) response the consumer is entitled to initiate a procedure through 
the Market Inspectorate, the traders are left with sufficient time to remove the 
evidence of their unfair commercial practice in the meantime. Also, consumer 
associations consider that the procedure before the Market Inspectorate at the 
Ministry of Economy, is long, overly expensive and complicated, and creates a general 
impression that the Market Inspectorate protects traders more than it protects 
consumers. Until now, consumer associations have recorded only a single situation in 
which the Inspectorate published the results of analysis of fuel sold by a trader 
(Crodux) at Croatian market. The analysis showed that the fuel was not of the quality 
which was indicated 
In Croatia, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in consumer disputes also 
cannot be deemed as effective. As these are voluntary procedures, the authority 
conducting the procedure is not entitled to request the traders to stop their practice or 
impose sanctions on them for not complying with the request. For example in its 
decision the Court of Honour of the Croatian Chamber of Economy is only entitled to 
determine the responsibility of the trader for the unfair commercial practice and issue 
a warning (Art 36 of the Ordinance on the Court of Honour at the Croatian Chamber of 
Economy (Official Gazette 66/06, 114/06, 129/07, 8/08-consolidated text, 74/15). 
Consequently, consumer associations would be in favour of introducing lists (“black 
lists”) of those traders whose commercial practices constitute unfair commercial 
practice as a mechanism of warning for consumers.  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
Consumer associations and the ECC are of the opinion that consumers are effectively 
informed of the unit selling price. However, there are still a large number of 
complaints from consumers to competent bodies regarding the issue, which is a clear 
indicator that there is still a lot of work to be done in order to make even more traders 
act in compliance with the national law transposing the PID. 
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Most of the problems are detected in regard to in-store shopping where the traders 
use small letters to indicate the unit selling price, which is therefore not easily 
readable. As a consequence, there are misunderstandings on the side of the 
consumers, which result in disputes with the traders (and sometimes even 
altercations).  
According to the relevant ministry, some of the traders have indicated unit selling 
prices in 100 g instead of 1 kg. The question is whether this can be regarded as a 
misleading practice, since the consumers could be under a false impression that the 
price might be lower than it actually is.  
On the other hand, a business association considers that consumers are effectively 
informed about the unit selling price since in Croatia there is an Ordinance on 
indication of wholesale price and the unit selling price (Pravilnik o načinu isticanju 
maloprodajne cijene i cijene za jedinicu mjere proizvoda iusluga (Official Gazette 
66/14)) which prescribes the conditions of price indication in a clear and 
understandable manner. But, since the Ordinance has been introduced in May 2014 it 
should be noted that for now it is not possible to conclude on its effect in informing 
consumers of the unit selling price. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
From the perspective of the consumer associations and the ECC indicating the ‘unit 
price’ per ‘performance’ measurement units rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre for certain 
types of products might be a more accurate indicator when it comes to consumption 
recommended by the manufacturers of such products. However, indicating the exact 
weight or quantity of the product is still more transparent, because it is easily 
comparable with other similar products. Namely, different manufacturers might charge 
differently for the same quantity, or some might even charge more money for less 
quantity (putting less quantity of product within a unit price in order to increase the 
number of units per product). 
At the same time, according to a business association, traders as members of the 
business association at hand have suggested that the price should be indicated both 
per 1 kg or 1 litre and per ‘performance’ measurement units. The relevant ministry is 
of the opinion that the price on detergents should be indicated per 1 kg or 1 litre but 
that indication of the price per ‘performance’ measurement units would be welcome as 
additional information for consumers.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
In Croatia, if the trader’s sales area is less than 50 square meters, the trader is not 
obligated to indicate the unit selling price. Since the introduction of this measure in 
2010, there were no consumer complaints regarding the issue. 
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses; 
With the introduction of the Unpermitted Advertising Act (Zakon o nedopuštenom 
oglašavanju) (Official Gazette 43/09)) in 2009, Croatia has successfully transposed 
the MCAD into Croatian legislation. The aim of the Act was to protect businesses from 
misleading advertising and the negative consequences of misleading advertising as 
well as to provide the conditions for the use of comparative advertising.  
According to the business association the MCAD provides effective protection for 
businesses.  
However, a problem revealed in a recent case of a dispute between RWE Energy and 
HEP regarding distribution of electrical energy in Croatia should not be disregarded. 
This problem illustrates the limitations of the scope of the MCAD to the notion of 
'advertising' in regard to effective protection for businesses.  
Namely, according to RWE Energy advertisements in media by HEP warned citizens of 
unfair and misleading practices of certain traders (without indicating who these 
traders are) in the distribution of electrical energy. This constitutes abuse of a 
dominant market position (Art 13 of the Competition Act) as well as an unfair 
commercial practice (Art 64 of the Trade Act and Art 30 of the Consumer Protection 
Act) and misleading advertising (Art 4 of the Unpermitted Advertising Act). It is 
problematic to delineate the scope of practices in this case, or similar cases which 
harm trader' interests from the ones which harm consumers’ interests. Namely, it 
should be taken into account that in some cases misleading advertising also harms 
consumers’ interests, even if only indirectly. However, while it is necessary to seek 
protection of trader’s interests against unfair practice under several acts, since the 
MCAD is limited only to misleading advertising, the UCPD provides for protection of 
consumers against all unfair commercial practices that harm the consumers' economic 
interests. At the same time, the rules on misleading advertising in the MCAD mix up 
the protection of B2C and B2B relations, which makes it more difficult to limit the 
protection which is sought under the MCAD only to traders’ interests. This dispute has 
revealed overlaps and inadequacies which do not help in protecting consumers. So, it 
seems that instead of protecting traders and indirectly also consumers, the limited 
scope of the MCAD decreases the legal certainty and protection provided to both 
consumers and traders. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
According to the relevant ministry, in Croatia so far there were no (national) court 
proceedings initiated at the commercial court regarding misleading advertising.  Also, 
there is no additional national horizontal legislation which regulates advertising as a 
special category in Croatia.  
Still, it has to be mentioned that the principle based approach to misleading 
advertising may prove to be challenging for courts, due to the fact that the general 
clause is open to different interpretations on a case-to case basis. The weakness of the 
principle-based approach is mainly connected to the general criteria for assessment if 
practice is misleading. Different interpretation of the practice under the criteria 
provided in Art 3 of the MCAD might lead to different court practice which could result 
in legal uncertainty for businesses.  
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The Croatian Unpermitted Advertising Act introduced a wide definition of the concept 
of ‘trader’, similar to the definition incorporated in the Consumer Protection Act, in 
order to include persons and entities from the so-called ‘grey areas of the economy’ 
and advertising agencies acting in the name and on behalf of a trader.7 
Additionally, in accordance with the provision of Art 5(2) of the MCAD, a system of 
collective protection of traders was introduced in the Unpermitted Advertising Act, 
meaning that certain organizations (such as the Croatian Chamber of Economy, the 
Croatian Chamber of Trades and Crafts, the Croatian Banking Association, the 
Croatian Employers’ Association and the Croatian Insurance Bureau) are ex officio 
entitled to initiate proceedings before the Commercial court against any suspicious 
advertising. An important feature of this system is the fact that persons or 
organisations regarded under national law as having a legitimate interest in combating 
misleading advertising or regulating comparative advertising, may initiate legal 
proceedings against misleading advertising; and that a judgment rendered in these 
proceedings has an erga omnes effect, due to which the advertiser is obligated to 
refrain from such a practice in regard to all businesses (traders). This system 
constitutes an effective mechanism which provides protection of all businesses against 
misleading advertising of the advertiser.  
In Croatia, there are no rules that go beyond the MCAD. Still, the following recent 
example from February 2016 shows that there is a greater level of awareness in 
determining if advertising is misleading and may be considered as unfair commercial 
practice in Croatia.  
HAK (Croatian Autoclub) has informed the public about advertising of the product 
Magnufuel, as a product recommended by Croatian Autoclub for use to drivers as a 
product which lowers fuel consumption. According to the Croatian Autoclub, such 
advertising is regarded as misleading advertising and it violates both provisions of the 
Unpermitted Advertising Act as well as the provisions on unfair commercial practices 
of the Consumer Protection Act.  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Assuming that full harmonization ensures a more unified and at the same time a more 
restrictive approach of national legislators in Member States towards regulating 
comparative advertising, it can be presumed that it also contributes to more credibility 
of such advertising. Namely, only if there are strict rules on comparative advertising, 
there is also a higher probability that claims made by traders convey useful 
information. Only such comparative advertising is capable of increasing competition 
among traders and at the same time protecting consumers, which was the aim of the 
EU legislation in the field.   
Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a competitor 
can be identified;  
The comparative advertising rules should be further clarified in order to provide an 
effective legal framework for modern types of marketing. 
 
7 Zlatović, Dragan, Grupna tužba zbog nedopuštenog oglašavanja kao modalitet kolektivne zaštite trgovaca, 
Hrvatska pravna revija, (2009), p. 42-46, pp. 44). (hereinafter: Zlatović (2009)) 
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• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
In a dispute between Kraft Foods and Kraš the High Commercial Court in Zagreb in its 
judgment from 2013 found that due to the use of the colour lilac which is 
characteristic for the Kraft brand Milka by Kraš for their brand of sugar-free candy for 
diabetics, there was misleading advertising as well as unpermitted use of a trademark 
by Kraš. In this sense, both consumers and traders were protected from unpermitted 
advertising in national and cross-border transactions. However, this is the only 
available case on misleading practice in Croatia. 
Generally, in Croatia there is a lack of practice in regard to collective proceedings, 
including collective protection of traders against misleading advertising, so the 
enforcement framework cannot be considered as particularly effective.  
Especially in the context of cross-border transactions the existing enforcement 
mechanisms cannot be considered as providing an effective enforcement framework. 
This can be attributed to the fact that collective redress mechanisms are still not 
adequately developed in Member States.  
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
One of the measures which could provide effectiveness would be a black list of 
misleading marketing practices. Even at the moment some of the practices included in 
the Annex I of the UCPD (point 13 and 17) can be considered as examples of 
prohibitions which protect traders. 
Also, measures should be taken to improve effectiveness of cross-border enforcement 
by strengthening cooperation among competent authorities of Member States. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
According to a business association, the only problem which Croatian consumers face 
in cross-border trade concerns non-delivery of goods to Croatia. Also, in cases in 
which goods are delivered to Croatia, the prices for delivery are much higher in 
comparison to delivery to other Member States.   
Due to the fact that the principle-based approach under the UCPD allows different 
interpretation of its principles in Member States, different understanding and the 
application of the principles should be expected. But, as Croatian legal literature has 
emphasized, most of the cases of unfair commercial practice are detected under the 
black list, which provides for uniform application of the UCPD in practice. In this sense, 
the disparities should not have a great impact on cross-border trade. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Although the inconsistencies in the transposition, interpretation and application of 
prohibitions of unfair commercial practices prescribed in Annex I of the UCPD in 
Member States cannot be disregarded, still based on the information provided by the 
stakeholders, it is possible to conclude that the black list has had a positive effect  on 
the free movement of goods and services. 
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 • Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Relevant stakeholders in Croatia are not aware whether the minimum harmonisation 
derogation under this directive allowing national rules on financial services and 
immovable property represents a barrier to cross-border trade. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this report it is 
concluded that the principle-based approach under the MCAD shows disparities in the 
understanding of what misleading advertising is in different Member States, and it has 
a negative impact on cross-border trade.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
According to the opinion of the stakeholders the minimum harmonisation character of 
provisions does not represent a barrier to cross-border trade.  
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The relevant stakeholders did not respond to the question. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade; 
Business association assesses that the lack of enforcement mechanisms regarding 
disputes in B2B relations constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. Mechanisms 
should be introduced in a form of institutionalized cooperation of public authorities in 
the interpretation of the legislation transposing the MCAD, detecting and informing of 
new practices under MCAD, and assisting in disputes in B2B relations regarding the 
MCAD. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The consumer associations and the ECC consider the level of awareness of traders to 
be high, as regards information requirements at the advertising stage, especially if 
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larger traders (companies) are taken into account. However, in their experience, SMEs 
have also made substantial progress with their level of awareness in this field.  
In practice, when advertising a certain product, traders usually indicate all the 
relevant information required in Art 7(4), if that is possible taking into consideration 
the nature of the product and the advertising itself. However, most problems occur 
with the indication of (all) expenses that the consumer might have, since consumer 
associations and the ECC have often encountered with the practice of some traders to 
leave out some of the expenses that are subsequently charged to consumers.  
Taking into consideration the difference in means used for providing information from 
the Art 7(4) to consumers, the information is useful. The information should not be 
too comprehensive because the consumers might be overwhelmed with too much 
information thereby missing the most important ones. Naturally, it can hardly be 
compared to the extensive information requirements provided in the CRD, due to the 
different medium through which the contract is concluded in the first place.  
The only provision mentioned by consumer associations and the ECC which might be 
added to the Art 7(4) could be the existence of the legal guarantee as well as 
manufacturer’s warranty (if the latter exists). 
According to a business association, although there is no separate regulation on 
advertising in Croatia, there are self-regulation mechanisms in the field (Codes of 
conduct) as well as activities conducted by the sector-specific advertising associations 
which provide for high ethical standards in advertising. Also, there are special courts 
of honour which contribute to maintaining high standards.  
The relevant ministry assesses that transactions of most of the traders comply with 
the legislative framework, but that difficulties in meeting the standards still exist in 
certain sectors, such as electronic communications (price indication) and distance 
selling over the internet.  
In practice, when invitation to purchase is made to consumers (depending on the 
means and manner of communication) the traders inform consumers in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the law.  
According to the relevant ministry, since pre-contractual information requirements are 
regulated in detail in the CRD, information requirements under Art 7 (4) of the UCPD 
cannot be considered as useful. It would be more meaningful to apply the provisions 
of the CRD.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
According to the relevant ministry, there is overlap of the provision of Art 7 of the 
UCPD with the provision of Art 6 of the Electronic Commerce Act (which transposed 
provisions of the E-commerce Directive (EU/2000/31)). However, this overlap cannot 
be considered as potentially problematic and there are no additional costs arising for 
public authority and/or business.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The relevant ministry is of the opinion that since in Croatia there is no legislative 
framework which regulates unfair commercial practices in B2B transactions an 
extension of the UCPD would be beneficial. At the same time, there should be no 
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extension of the MCAD. Instead, the UCPD should cover B2B and B2C transactions. 
Also, members of the business community in Croatia (especially manufacturers) 
consider the introduction of legislation which would regulate unfair commercial 
practice in B2B transactions as crucial. In their opinion there is no system of 
surveillance or regulation of competition at the market. Such a system would mean 
that it would not be possible for the trader to impose its own costs or risks on the 
other trader nor would it be permitted to unilaterally cancel the contract or threaten to 
cancel the contract, which is the case at the moment in Croatia.   
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
According to a business association it is not appropriate to keep separate legal 
regimes for B2B and B2C transactions. Namely, in their experience SMEs and micro 
enterprises often find themselves in situations in which their position is equal to the 
position of consumer in B2C transactions and therefore they expect the same level of 
protection.  
According to the relevant ministry legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the 
area of commercial practices could and should be aligned.   
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
The relevant ministry assesses that it would be appropriate to extend the scope of the 
protection in B2B transactions to cover also unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction. 
As to whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-
business marketing area, in the opinion of the relevant ministry there is indeed such a 
need. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Although the relevant ministry supports the idea of an enforcement cooperation 
mechanism in the business-to-business marketing area, there are no suggestions on 
what that mechanism should be.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
According to the relevant ministry, there is no need to develop contractual 
consequences linked to the breaches of the MCAD. Namely, the Obligations Act 
provides for a possibility of including provisions on the contractual consequences (i.e. 
compensation) in the contract. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
The relevant ministry assesses that there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative 
advertising of the current MCAD.  
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1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Consumer associations and the ECC are not aware of any corresponding national 
provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches to the UCPD or 
national provisions on the avoidance of the contract. 
In Croatia, if breaches to the UCPD have caused damage, the damaged party is 
entitled to initiate court proceedings and request compensation under the general 
provisions on liability for damages prescribed in the Obligations Act. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
To the best of the knowledge of the consumer associations and the ECC, there are not 
any enforcement decisions or court rulings which provide for contractual consequences 
for above mentioned breaches of the UCPD.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The opinion of the stakeholders in Croatia regarding this matter differs. From the 
perspective of consumer associations and the ECC, contractual consequences against 
unfair commercial practices should be introduced in regard to certain cases of unfair 
commercial practice (e.g. existence of the product, nature of the product, obligation of 
the trader, price), due to the fact that the conduct of the trader (the unfair commercial 
practices) led to the conclusion of the consumer contract. 
However, the experience of the regulatory authority in the telecommunications sector 
shows that there is no need to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of 
unfair commercial practices since at the moment, in cases where the provisions based 
on the UCPD were applied, the regulatory authority rendered a decision in favour of 
the consumer. Also, the contract can be terminated on the basis of the UCPD without 
any penalties for the consumer.   
A business association agrees with the view of the regulatory authority and 
emphasizes that there is no need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
use of unfair commercial practices.  
The relevant ministry also support the view that there is no need to develop 
contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices.   
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
In Croatia, due to the transposition of the UCTD there are two parallel systems of 
control of unfair contract terms. Along with the transposition of the UCTD in Art 46-56 
of the Consumer Protection Act, during the implementation of the UCTD some of the 
provisions of the Croatian Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima) (Official 
Gazette 35/05, 41/08, 125/11, 78/15) were also changed and harmonized with the 
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approach of the UCTD regarding unfair contract terms. Accordingly, although general 
rules on obligations prescribed by the Obligations Act differ from the specific 
provisions of consumer law, the existing Obligations Act provisions on general contract 
conditions (Art 295-296) were aligned with the UCTD. In this sense, Croatian law of 
obligations and contracts provides for a set of rules and principles which are influenced 
by principles of consumer law which derive from EU Directives (including the UCTD).8 
Consumer associations and the ECC are of the opinion that the UCTD would be more 
effective if an obligation of the Member States was introduced to sanction the 
incorporation of unfair commercial terms. Namely, in Croatian Consumer Protection 
Act Article 55(1) prescribes that ‘an unfair contract term is null and void’. However, 
due to the fact that Consumer Protection Act as lex specialis does not contain detailed 
rules on nullity the relevant provisions of the Obligations Act (Art 322 and seq) apply 
which put the consumer in the same position as every other party to the contract in 
invoking nullity of the term of the contract at hand. 
At the same time, a business association assesses that since the implementation of 
the UCTD in Croatian legislation there were no cases of significant breach of national 
laws transposing it. Hence, the principle-based approach may be considered to be 
effective. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
According to the consumer associations and the ECC the ‘grey’ list (in Art 50 of the 
Consumer Protection Act, which contains nineteen contract terms enlisted in lit. a-q in 
Annex No. 1 of the UCTD) presents a strong basis for detecting potential unfair 
contract terms by the court or other dispute resolving entity in each individual case, 
on the basis of conditions prescribed in Art 50 of the Consumer Protection Act. 
Nevertheless there is no sanction for the trader who incorporated unfair term/s in the 
contract. The appropriate sanction could be a fine, a penalty or other means of 
correction which have a deterrent effect and could serve as a ‘repressive’ mechanism 
to pressure the trader into refraining from incorporating unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.   
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
In Croatia a ‘grey’ list was adopted in Art 50 of the Consumer Protection Act which 
represents an advantage for consumer protection compared to the purely indicative 
list of the UCTD. In one case collective redress proceedings were initiated against 
unfair contract terms concerning bank loans in Swiss francs (‘Franak’ case) in regard 
to which application of the ‘grey’ list was relevant. The proceedings were initiated 
against banks which concluded loan agreements with consumers in the period from 
2004 onwards. At the time, Consumer Protection Act from 2003 was in force and it 
was followed by Consumer Protection Act from 2007. The provision of Art 97 
Consumer Protection Act from 2007 which corresponds to the provision of Art 50 
8Josipović, Tatjana, Enforcement Activity in Consumer Protection Regulation in Croatia, Journal of Consumer 
Policy (2013)36, p. 287-314 (hereinafter: Josipović (2013)); Mišćenić, Emilia, Usklađivanje prava zaštite 
potrošača u Republici Hrvatskoj, Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske 4 (1), p. 145-176 pp. 10 
(hereinafter: Mišćenić (2013)), Mišćenić, Emilia, Consumer Protection Law, in: Josipović, Tatjana, 
Introduction to the Law of Croatia, Kluwer Law International, 2014, p. 279-290, pp. 282-283. 
(hereinafter: Mišćenić (2014)). 
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Consumer Protection Act (from 2014) stipulated that ‘terms which could be considered 
as unfair, for example, are’. In his first instance judgment the court ruled on the 
unfairness of contract terms on currency clause in Swiss francs and interest rate based 
on the provision of Art 96 and 97 Consumer Protection Act from 2007, without stating 
the specific subparagraph under Art 97 Consumer Protection Act which covers the 
object or effect of the term which can be considered as unfair.  They were declared 
null and void on the basis of the fact that consumers were not given full, timely and 
adequate information on the terms of the contract prior to its conclusion and that the 
banks unilaterally changed the height of the interest rate during the period of the bank 
loan repayment.    
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
According to the relevant ministry the effects of the court decision establishing the 
unfairness of a contract term have been extended erga omnes under Art 117 of the 
Consumer Protection Act. However, this extension has been introduced in regard to 
injunctions under Art 7(2) of the UCTD and it does not affect the inter partes effect of 
the court decisions establishing unfairness of a contract term rendered in an individual 
civil proceedings. The judgment in “Franak” case which has an erga omnes effect has 
made an impact on the practice of banks in drawing up terms of the contracts, which 
are now more fair and transparent.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
According to consumer associations and the ECC the contractual transparency 
requirements under the UCTD are effective. 
In Croatia, the Obligations Act does not contain a specific provision on contractual 
transparency. At the same time, the Obligations Act provides for a general provision 
under which the terms whose content has been determined by one party shall be 
interpreted contra proferentem. However, contractual transparency requirements from 
the UCTD have been transposed into Consumer Protection Act (Art 53, 54 (1)). In 
regard to B2C relations Croatian legislator has additionally raised the level of 
protection of consumers by extending the contractual transparency requirements in 
Art 53 of the Consumer Protection Act also to ‘terms which are easily noticeable’.  
Regarding the effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements, the legal 
literature warns of the fact that is for the court to establish if consumers have been 
informed appropriately. Since the assessment of the court will depend of its 
understanding of the concept of a consumer as a ‘vulnerable consumer’ or ‘average 
consumer’ and the balance between the interests of a trader and a consumer, this 
may cause disparities in the court practice.  
Also, in practice, different interpretations and application of Art 5 of the UCTD, may be 
caused by the unresolved matter as to whether contractual non-transparency should 
result in declaration of the term as unfair or non-existent.9 
9 Petrić, Silvija, Koncept nepoštenih ugovornih odredbi s posebnim osvrtom na potrošačke ugovore, in: 
Tomljenović, Vesna, Petrić, Silvija, Mišćenić, Emilia, Nepoštene ugovorne odredbe, Europski standard i 
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• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD] 
In Croatia, the extension of the application of this Directive (to individually negotiated 
terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-matter) was not 
put in place but the possibility of the introduction of the extension has been analysed 
and it is favoured by the legal literature. (See infra) 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
According to the consumer associations and the ECC, the sanction foreseen by the 
UCTD is not proven to be especially effective in practice. Although it does help a 
consumer in a specific case, it does not have a deterrent effect against the practice of 
the trader of incorporating unfair contract terms.  The experience of the consumer 
associations and the ECC shows that the guidance from the CJEU is not sufficient. In 
their opinion the issue requires a different approach (a detailed regulation in the 
UCTD).  
The national courts do not take the active role required by the CJEU in invoking 
unfairness ex officio and taking measures of instruction.  Namely, the court practice 
regarding the UCTD is scarce in Croatia. One of the main obstacles to a more 
significant development of court practice is the lack of knowledge and understanding 
of the consumer law and requirements of EU consumer legislation, which results in a 
considerable lack of court decisions based on the Consumer Protection Act and 
consumer protection provisions of other legal acts. The courts provide the same level 
of legal protection to consumers as every other natural person. There are a number of 
cases concerning unfair terms in standard contracts under Obligations Act while there 
is a lack of decisions based on the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.10 
However, circumstances are changing due to the fact that a number of judges 
participate in alternative dispute resolution before the Courts of Honour of the 
Croatian Chamber of Economy and the Chamber of Trades and Crafts. According to a 
business association this offers judges an opportunity to gather knowledge and 
experience in consumer dispute resolution and the use of the broad range of 
instruments for consumer protection. 
As for the guidance from the CJEU it should be emphasized that due to the recent 
succession of Croatia to the EU Croatian judges are not familiar with the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU in regard to consumer legislation and they rarely turn to it for guidance. 
Also, Croatian judges are not inclined to submitting requests for preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU. This is evident from the recent procedure on protection of collective 
interests of consumers against banks regarding the bank loans in Swiss Francs. The 
Croatian Constitutional court did not find it appropriate to request a preliminary ruling 
from the CJEU concerning the application of EU consumer law. At the same time, due 
to the inability of the Constitutional court to reach a decision, the procedure is still 
pending and in the meantime Croatia has been warned by the EC of the possibility of 
initiating a procedure before the CJEU for the breach of EU legislation.  
In Croatia there is no administrative remedy in this area for consumers.  
hrvatska provedba, Pravni fakultet u Rijeci, Rijeka, 2013, p. 15-60, pp. 58-59). (hereinafter: Petrić 
(2013)) 
10 Mišćenić (2014), p. 289. 
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Consumer associations and the ECC are of the opinion that in order to reach a high 
level of consumer protection in Croatia, it is necessary to impose certain sanctions for 
incorporating unfair contract terms in the contract. Additionally, due to the fact that 
the information provided in T&Cs is usually excessive, they are not confident that any 
kind of graphical model would improve the readability and comprehension of the T&Cs, 
however, they would welcome any attempt to make T&Cs more comprehensible.  
According to a regulatory authority, there are measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
Croatia. An example of such measures which were taken by the regulatory authority, 
concerns contracting outside the business premises of the operator (something which 
is generally regulated within the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act). The 
regulatory authority additionally regulated the process and took into account the 
specific services offered by the operators. The operators are obligated to define and 
include all the fixed expenses in the contract and provide all other information which 
could be considered important for transparency of the terms of the contract. This 
provides for protection against any additional (hidden) expenses for the consumers. In 
case of a dispute between an operator and the consumer the expenses indicated in the 
contract are relevant even if the pricelist contains higher expenses.  
According to the legal literature, extensions of the application of the UCTD (to 
individually negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for 
consumer protection (Belgium, Czech Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia 
and France).  
In practice, the exclusion of the application of the UCTD to individually negotiated 
terms is abused and contracts are concluded with consumers which contain a clause 
that all or some of the terms are individually negotiated, although this was not the 
case.  
In this sense, it was suggested that since UCTD is a Directive of minimum 
harmonisation, extension of the application of the UCTD (to individually negotiated 
terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-matter) should 
be introduced in Croatian consumer protection legislation.11 
 
11 Petrić (2013), p. 38.    
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1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
There is no available information from the stakeholders regarding these issues. 
Nevertheless, several aspects need to be considered. First of all, the problem of the 
insufficient level of cross-border trade involving Croatian businesses (especially 
e-trade which in 2013 was 8% of the total cross-border trade of Croatian traders)12 
could be addressed by further removing of the obstacles to cross-border trade at EU 
level. However, for now it does not seem as if the awareness of traders in regard to 
disparities of the application of the general fairness clause in different Members States 
have influenced their business strategy. It seems that traders are more concerned if 
their additional cost of delivery will put consumers off, or if payment methods and 
security of internet transactions or privacy are adequately ensured in e-trade.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
There is no available information from the stakeholders regarding this issue. One of 
the main goals of the solutions provided for under UCTD was to help increase 
consumer confidence in cross-border trade. As emphasized in the UCTD, consumers do 
not know the rules of law which, in Member States other than their own, govern 
contracts for the sale of goods or services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter 
them from direct transactions for the purchase of goods or services inanother Member 
State. Having that in mind, indicative list has been introduced in the UCTD as a 
valuable guide to courts and administrative authorities in their application ofthe UCTD 
and national implementing legislation. So,it may be the case that disparities in the 
terms under an extended indicative list, ‘black’ and/or ‘grey’ lists in Member States 
could represent barriers to cross-border trade.  
However, this research revealed that Croatian consumers are not adequately informed 
of the national consumer law or the transposition of EU consumer law in the national 
legislation and still this does not affect their decision to acquire goods or services. So, 
it does not seem justified to presume that disparities in the terms under an extended 
indicative list, ‘black’ and/or ‘grey’ lists in Member States could affect consumer 
confidence and represent barriers to cross-border trade.  
Then there is the question whether the other extensions of the application of this 
Directive (i.e. to individually negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy 
of price and main subject matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to 
cross-border trade. Having in mind the arguments provided in the two previous 
answers, it does not seem that from the perspective of Croatian consumers and 
traders, extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually negotiated 
terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject matter) in 
certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
 
12 See http://www.mingo.hr/public/trgovina/Stanje_internetske_trgovine_RH.pdf 
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1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions 
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Although the business associations remained silent on the matter, experience of 
consumer associations shows that there is a need to strengthen protection of 
businesses, especially SMEs and in particular micro enterprises. Namely, there were 
situations in which micro enterprises have turned to consumer associations in search 
of help and guidance. They have even requested that national law transposing the 
UCTD should be applied to their contracts with other businesses in Croatia. This has 
occurred mainly when micro enterprises bought electronic equipment (1 or 2 pieces) 
or other similar goods. 
According to the legal literature, although these problems occur in a lower intensity 
when it comes to the B2B contracts between traders and SMEs and/or micro 
enterprises, they should be resolved. Since they concern situations in which SMEs and 
micro enterprises conclude contracts of adhesion (standard form contracts) with 
traders and due to the particular manner in which such contracts are concluded, SMEs 
and micro enterprises are put in an almost identical situations to that of consumers, 
solutions provided for protection of consumers against unfair contract terms could 
prove to be efficient.13 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
An unequal position of the contracting parties and the possibility of exploiting a 
position of power in relation to the weaker party which is typical for B2C transactions 
can also occur in B2B transactions. In most of these situations in which there is an 
unequal position of power between the parties to the contract ,also unfair commercial 
practice in B2B transactions occurs. This is especially noticable in situations in which 
one of the traders is a monopolist at the Market. In this sense, Croatian legal 
literature considers the system of protection established by the UCTD to be 
appropriate for B2B transactions and the approach taken by Croatian legislator in this 
regard as adequate.14 
Therefore, the Croatian legislator has assessed it to be appropriate to extend the 
protection guaranteed against unfair contract terms under the UCTD also to traders in 
B2B transactions. In Croatia, due to the fact that provisions of the Obligation Act have 
been harmonized with consumer protection Directives (including the UCTD) the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations as well as the concept of the endangering of the purpose of the contract 
are applied in order to establish if the terms of the contract in B2B transactions are 
unfair.15 
The Trade Act (Official Gazette 87/08, 96/08, 11/08, 114/11, 68/13, 30/14) has 
introduced prerequisites for all traders to do their business free and under the same 
conditions at the market in a manner which does not prevent, limit or impair the 
competition. Each party to a contract is obligated to respect the principle of good faith. 
13 Petrić (2013), p. 34. 
14 Tepeš, Nina, Petrović, Siniša, Kontrola nepoštenih ugovornih odredaba s posebnim osvrtom na trgovačke 
ugovore, in: Tomljenović, Vesna, Petrić, Silvija, Mišćenić, Emilia, Nepoštene ugovorne odredbe, Europski 
standard i hrvatska provedba, Pravni fakultet u Rijeci, Rijeka, 2013, p. 61-80, pp. 69-80) (hereinafter: 
Tepeš, Petrović (2013)). 
15 Petrić (2013), p. 46-47. 
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Above all other Market participants, the traders are obligated to respect the principle 
of fair competition and the rules of trade. 
Also, the Competition Act (Official Gazette 79/09, 90/13) prescribes the rules and a 
system of measures for protection of competition as well as powers, tasks and 
organization of the authority for the protection of competition and the application of 
Competition Law. It is applied to all forms of preventing, limiting or impairing 
competition in Croatia and abroad, if such conduct has effect at Croatian territory.  
The competent body for the application of the Act is the Competition Agency.  
Having in mind the presence of unfair commercial practice at the European Single 
Market and the market in Croatia, especially in the food supply chain, in 2016 the 
Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with the Competition Agency and the relevant 
stakeholders has initiated intensive activity in the delivering of an Act against unfair 
business terms in the food supply chain in order to establish protection against unfair 
business terms between all participants in the food chain. The stakeholders are 
currently working on the Proposal of the Act.    
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
According to the legal literature, the protection against unfair contract terms should 
not be extended to individually negotiated terms, the main subject-matter of the 
contract and the adequacy of the price.16 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
According to a business association there is no specific contractual terms often used in 
B2B transaction which could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to 
be unfair.  
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
From the perspective of a business association there is no need for contractual 
transparency requirements in B2B transaction since contracts are concluded between 
businesses on the basis of their business policy.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
According to a business association, the extension of the UCTD to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade.  
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Since there have been problems between traders and SMEs and/or micro enterprises, 
such an extension would have an effect on market opportunities for SME 
providers/suppliers. 
 
16 Petrić (2013), p. 38. 
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• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension. 
Based on the information provided by the stakeholders it is possible to conclude that 
there should be regard to the issues whether the extension could influence the basic 
principles of the contract law, such as the freedom to regulate obligations 
relationships, freedom of contract and the equality of the parties to the obligations 
relationship but the benefits for traders, especially SMEs could exceed negative 
consequences of such an extension. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?17  
In Croatia, the injunction procedure is regulated in Art 106-122 of the Consumer 
Protection Act. However, qualified entities for initiating injunctions procedure 
(consumer organisations and public authorities) are regulated by a separate Decision 
of the Government of the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette 105/14). These entities 
are entitled to initiate both national injunctions actions regarding national 
infringements as well as injunction actions regarding infringements originating in 
another EU country.  
Qualified entities are: Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Maritime, 
Ministry of Health and Agency for Electronic Media, HAKOM, Croatian Union of 
Consumer Protection Organisations-Potrošač and Union of Organizations for Protection 
of Croatian’s Consumers.   
In Croatia so far, there was very limited use and success of the injunction procedure. 
There are several factors which need to be taken in account here:  
Although Croatia had implemented the ID in the Consumer Protection Act, the 
application of the legislation on injunction procedure was suspended (according to Art 
155 of the Consumer Protection Act from 2007 and Art 81 of the revised Consumer 
Protection Act from 2009) until Croatia  became a Member State (it occurred on 1 July 
2013). 
Also, among qualified entities there are 4 Ministries entitled to initiate procedures and 
only two consumer protection organizations (these are in fact Unions of consumer 
protection associations, so none of the consumer protection associations are entitled 
to initiate injunction procedure by themselves, only as unions). However, Ministries 
are not interested in initiating injunction procedures.  
Until now, only an injunction procedure initiated by the Croatian Union of Consumer 
Protection Organisations-Potrošač and Association Franak (against banks because of 
the unfair terms in bank loan agreements (in Swiss francs)) was partially successful. 
At the moment there is an injunction procedure against HT- Croatian Telekom. 
 
17 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order? 
Based on the information provided by the stakeholders, it is possible to conclude that 
measures regarding the cost of the procedure could not be considered particularly 
effective, especially if we take into account the duration of the procedure. Namely, 
procedures in Franak case as well as HT-Croatian Telekom case cannot be considered 
as summary procedures due to their length. In Franak case there was also an appeal 
procedure (2nd instance) and a revision procedure (3rd instance).  
Publication of the decision/of a corrective statement was not ordered by the court in 
Franak case (26.P -1401/2012). As there are no other injunction procedures - there is 
no relevant information at the moment.  
The most effective measure was in fact the effect of the injunction order which forced 
the banks to change their practice and remove an unfair standard contract term.  
According to the relevant ministry, also in certain cases, the formal (written) prior 
warning according to Art 108(1) of the Consumer Protection Act has proven to be 
effective. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
According to Art 106 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act injunction procedure is also 
provided against persons who act against provisions of Act for the application of the 
Regulation (EU) no. 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
February 2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, so additionaly rights of consumers as bus or 
coach passengers (as weaker parties to the transport contract) are covered. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Since the introduction of the injunction procedure in the Consumer Protection Act 
2003, there has been no application of the procedure until 1 July 2013. Given that 
there was no application of the procedure, the only obstacles and difficulties to the 
(potential) effective use of the injunction procedure which could be detected concern 
legislative solutions provided in the Consumer Protection Act:  
According to Consumer Protection Act from 2003 only condemnatory actions for 
injunctions were available, but at the same time no declaratory actions. Without a 
declaratory relief which establishes responsibility of the trader for the contested 
infringement there was no possibility to seek damages in a follow-on (individual) 
procedure which is available under the current provisions of Consumer Protection Act.   
Under the Consumer Protection Act from 2007 it was not clear whether the qualified 
entities are entitled to initiate the procedure or only suggest it to the State 
inspectorate which should initiate the procedure (which would be contrary to the ID). 
These obstacles were removed with the introduction of Art 55 of the revised Consumer 
Protection Act from 2009 when detailed provisions regarding qualified entities, court 
jurisdiction and the prior consultation procedure were prescribed.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
173
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Experience with the protection of collective consumers’ interest has not been 
significant in Croatia. In order to improve effectiveness of the ID, additional measures 
at EU level should include a more unified approach to the regulation of collective 
redress mechanisms which would contribute to their operation in Member States. This 
would also enhance consumers’ trust at the Market. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country? 
According to the stakeholders, so far, there was no experience with the injunction 
procedure in addressing infringements originating in another EU country. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State(Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
For now, the stakeholders confirm that Croatian qualified entities made no attempts to 
seek injunctions in another Member State, so it is not possible to make assessments 
on the effectiveness of the possibility.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Since there is a lack of experience of Croatian stakeholders with the injunction 
procedure in addressing infringements originating in another EU country, there are no 
best practices which could be relevant for other EU countries. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure is regulated within the provisions of the Consumer Protection 
Act from 2014 as a separate procedure which may also be used against infringements 
of the UCPD, UCTD and Consumer Rights Directive. Commercial court has jurisdiction 
in injunction procedures. The Market Inspection at the Ministry of Economy is the 
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authority authorized for market surveillance as well as the application of the Consumer 
Protection Act.  
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Injunction procedures as designated by Consumer Protection Act do not go beyond 
measures foreseen in the ID. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
According to the relevant ministry the transposition of the Directives at hand has 
provided a higher level of consumer protection in comparison to the period prior to 
their transposition. Mechanisms of enforcement put in place in Croatia do not impose 
costs which limit benefits for consumers stemming from minimum harmonised and 
fully harmonised rules.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
In the opinion of the relevant ministry, the traders which apply consumer protection 
legislation have been recognized by the consumers in Croatia. It seems that, through 
combating unfair B2C commercial practices, the market position of honest traders is 
automatically strengthened. 
In practice, it seems that enforcement mechanisms under the Directives have come to 
rely not only on consumers’ willingness to initiate proceedings against traders who 
apply dishonest market practices, but also on other traders at the market and their 
interest in ensuring that insufficient interest on the part of consumers would not result 
in the failure to eliminate or constrain the dishonest practice at the Market. 
Mechanisms which are put in place under the UCPD do not exclude the possibility of a 
Member State to grant protection to a trader by enabling him to take legal action 
against unfair B2C commercial practices. If jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding 
preliminary ruling on the application of the UCPD in the Member States is examined 
closely, it can be shown that in half of the cases in which a request was referred to 
CJEU, the dispute before the national court was initiated by traders.  
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• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
The relevant stakeholders did not respond to the question or provide information.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
The relevant stakeholders did not respond to the question or provide information.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
The relevant stakeholders did not provide information.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation 
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
According to a business association, traders are regularly informed of the changes in 
national laws transposing the UCPD and UCTD and they are obligated to align their 
practices with the new requirements.  
According to a regulatory authority responsible for electronic communications, postal 
services and railway transport which evaluates standard contract terms, price lists and 
terms of usage in order to make sure that they meet requirements of the UCPD and 
UCTD, businesses and specific public enforcement bodies are generally aware of the 
requirements of the horizontal EU consumer legislation.  
At the same time, consumers show lack of knowledge of their rights as well as 
obligations of traders.  
According to the relevant ministry all traders, consumers and the specific enforcement 
bodies in the relevant sectors (regulatory authorities) are aware of the provisions of 
the UCTD and the UCPD. However, further activities which strengthen the awareness 
of the consumers regarding their rights are advisable.   
The regulatory authority responsible for electronic communications, postal services 
and railway transport is also responsible for dispute resolution between users 
(consumers and businesses) and traders offering the service. However, this type of 
dispute resolution is available to users of electronic communications only after the 
procedure with the operator was completed. In case of an unfavourable answer from 
the Consumer Complaints Commission with the operator, a written request for the 
resolution of the dispute may be submitted to the regulatory authority, within 30 days 
from the date of the receipt of the Commission’s answer. The decision of the 
regulatory authority is obligatory for the operator. The user (consumer) is also entitled 
to initiate court proceedings.  
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Although the decisions of the regulatory authorities and courts are undoubtedly based 
on Croatian legislation which implemented the UCPD and UCTD, there is no systematic 
monitoring and therefore there are no statistics available of the application of the 
UCPD and UCTD in Croatia. This has been confirmed by the Ministry of Economy, 
Ministry of Justice and the regulatory authorities (HAKOM and HERA), as provided in 
the Annex.  
However, some illustrative examples of the court proceedings can be provided. 
1. In the judgement delivered at the Municipal court in Zagreb in 2013 the court found 
that the standard terms of a contract between a consumer and an operator (HT 
telekom) were unfair due to the fact that the consumer was charged with additional 
instalments of the contract although the contract was terminated before its expiry. 
The judgment was delivered on the basis of the Croatian Consumer Protection Act. In 
the explanation of the judgment it was emphasized that the consumer should not be 
charged for a service that was not provided to him. (Ferdinand Major v HT telekom, 
2013)   
2. On 13 November 2014 Administrative court in Rijeka found that the operator (HT 
telekom) was responsible for imposing a non-contractual barrier to switching to 
another operator (VIP net) and unduly delay of the migration of the consumer to the 
other operator. Also, the court found that the regulatory authority (HAKOM) was not 
authorized to dismiss the written request of the consumer for dispute resolution.(3 
UsI-1723/13-14 Zlatko Petranović v HAKOM and HT telekom, 2014) 
Also, some of the judgments of the Administrative courts regarding proceedings 
initiated by consumers against both - the regulatory authority (HAKOM) and the 
operators can be provided. They mainly concern situations in which there was unfair 
commercial practice of the operator and/or unfair standard terms in contracts, but the 
regulatory authority dismissed the request of the consumer for dispute resolution 
based on the procedural formalities or found the request to be unfounded, so 
proceedings were initiated at the Administrative courts. In most cases the court 
recognized that consumer rights were infringed by the unfair commercial practice or 
standard terms in contracts and instead of a dismissal of the request of the 
consumers, adequate protection of consumer rights should have been provided in a 
procedure conducted by HAKOM. For example:  
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Rijeka, Ref. No. 3UsI-1180/14-26 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision – From the judgment it 
is obvious that misleading information have been provided to the consumer 
regarding the monthly cost of the service. Although the phone calls were free of 
charge the operator failed to mention that consumer will be charged for making 
every single call. 
Other similar judgments: 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Split, Ref. No. 1 UsI-47/14-10 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Split, Ref. No. 1 UsI-2442/13-12 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Zagreb, Ref. No. UsI-1425/14-15 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
• Judgment of the Misdemeanour court in Zagreb, Ref. No. 29 PpG-8010/12 
concerning a misdemeanour referred to in Article 119.1 (59) and Article 119.2 
of the ECA; 
• Judgment of the High Administrative Court in Zagreb, Ref. No. Usž-1764/15-2 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Zagreb, Ref. No. UsI-4384/13-9 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
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• Judgment of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, Ref. No. 
UsII-46/14-8 concerning a complaint submitted by the plaintiff Hrvatski 
Telekom d.d. against HAKOM's decision on the determination of fees in the 
reference offer for the service of the unbundled access to the local loop; 
• Judgment of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, Ref. No. 
UsII-56/14-9 concerning a complaint submitted by the plaintiff OT-Optima 
Telekom d.d against HAKOM's decision on resolution of a dispute concerning 
the establishment of the right to charge for additional services; 
• Judgment of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia Ref. No. 
UsII-81/13-10 concerning a complaint submitted by the plaintiff Hrvatski 
Telekom d.d. against HAKOM's decision concerning the imposition of regulatory 
obligations; 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Rijeka, Ref. No. 3UsI-1180/14-26 
concerning a user's complaint against HAKOM's decision; 
• Ruling of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia Ref. No. UsII-
14/13-10 in an administrative dispute initiated by the plaintiff Hrvatski Telekom 
d.d. against the defendant HAKOM concerning the resolution of a dispute 
between operators; 
• Judgment of the High Administrative Court o the Republic of Croatia, Ref. 
No.UsII-147/15- in an administrative dispute initiated by the plaintiff K3 Keter 
Telekom d.o.o. from Zagreb against the defendant, HAKOM,  concerning the 
revocation of the license for use of the RF spectrum; 
• Judgment of the Administrative Court in Rijeka, Ref. No. 4UsII-1613/13-14 in 
an administrative dispute initiated by a user against HAKOM's decision in a case 
concerning the resolution of a dispute between a user and an operator; 
• Judgment of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia Ref. No. 
UsII-8/12-10 in an administrative dispute initiated by the plaintiff Hrvatski 
Telekom d.d. against HAKOM's decision concerning the resolution of a dispute 
between a user and an operator. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Croatia different authorities are responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal 
EU consumer law and the sector specific rules. Ministry of Economy is responsible for 
enforcement of the rules provided by the Consumer Protection Act as a general 
consumer protection act and HAKOM and HERA are responsible for the enforcement of 
the sector specific legislation in their sectors. There is an institutionalised cooperation 
between them and in case of consumer complaints they cooperate on case by case 
basis.  
In Croatia, the Market Inspection at the Ministry of Economy is authorized for 
surveillance of the application of the Consumer Protection Act. The application of the 
legislation in specific regulated sectors is under surveillance of authorized entities: 
• In the field of electronic communication - the regulatory authority (HAKOM);  
• In the field of financial services - the Market Inspection at the Ministry of 
Economy, Ministry of Finance, Croatian National Bank (HNB), Croatian Financial 
Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA); 
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• In the field of passenger traffic – Ministry of the Maritime Affairs, Transport and 
Infrastructure, Croatian Civil Aviation Agency and Croatian Regulatory 
Authority for Network Industries (HAKOM); 
• In the field of energy - Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (HERA). 
According to the relevant ministry, the competent authorities have an institutionalised 
cooperation in regard to unfair commercial practices.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal frame work concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?] 
According to the regulatory authorities, sector specific rules clarify and set additional 
detailed rules concerning specific rules set by the Consumer Protection Act. Also, they 
set the legal framework for sector specific challenges not covered by horizontal 
provisions. In this sense, the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provides for a clear and coherent legal framework and although 
there may be some overlaps (regarding sector-specific rules for natural gas) there are 
no conflicts.    
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
Since relevant stakeholders cannot make an assessment regarding the issue, it is not 
possible to provide an answer or quantitative information. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law. 
According to the regulatory authority clarification of the interplay between the EU 
sector-specific rules on natural gas and horizontal EU consumer law would be needed. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD)to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
A detailed analysis provided in the legal literature of the provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act from 2009 (which remains relevant for the Consumer Protection Act 
from 2014) shows that unlike the UCTD which applies exclusively to B2C relations, the 
Consumer Protection Act does not impose any restrictions of the application of the 
relevant provisions to C2B relations. Namely, restriction of the UCTD to B2C relations 
derives from Art 1 of the UCTD according to which the purpose of this Directive is to 
approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a 
consumer.18 Based on the difference in the regulation it is possible to conclude that 
18 Baretić, Marko, Markovinović, Hrvoje, Nepoštene ugovorne odredbe – opća i posebna uređenja, in: Barbić, 
Jakša, Giunio, Miljenko (eds.), Zbornik 50. susret pravnika, Opatija 2012.; Zagreb, Hrvatski savez udruga 
pravnika u gospodarstvu, 2012,p. 57-132.(hereinafter: Baretić, Markovinović (2012)). 
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the Croatian legislator enabled the application of the standards of the UCTD also to 
C2B relations. 
However, according to a business association these situations occur seldom in Croatia. 
So, from the perspective of consumer associations and the ECC as well as a business 
association there is currently no need to apply the UCPD and the UCTD to consumer-
to-business (C2B) relations. Also, according to the relevant ministry, there is no need 
for the application of the consumer law directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to C2B 
relations since in practice there were not many cases to which consumer law directives 
could be applied in Croatia.  
It is unclear if the lack of practice regarding these situations is indicative of whether 
there is a genuine lack of these situations. It might be that it was not significantly 
recognised in practice that according to Consumer Protection Act protection against 
unfair contract terms could also be provided to consumers who sell or supply to 
businesses in Croatia. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The concept of ‘consumer’ as currently defined in the consumer law directives and 
relevant jurisprudence (of the CJEU) and as applied by national authorities and courts 
in Croatia is not regarded to be valid and fit for purpose.  
In the legal literature it is emphasized that the UCTD as well as Consumer Protection 
Act contain a narrow definition of the term consumer (Art 2 p. b, Art 5 p. 15) which is 
also common to many other EU Directives and it is accepted in the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU. However, situations in which a protection of a ‘weaker party’ in a contract 
should be provided, concern both natural and legal persons. Namely, these are 
situations in which a contract is concluded between a trader and a legal person (SMEs, 
trade and crafts) but the economical and legal substance of the contract points to the 
fact that in its nature it is a consumer contract. So, the concept of consumer should be 
widened in order to encompass situations in which legal persons conclude contracts 
but their position is equal to that of a consumer.19As suggested in the legal literature, 
the approach of Directive 2011/83/EU (Recital 13 and 17) should be used in order for 
the definition of consumer to cover NGOs, SMEs and micro enterprises and natural 
persons concluding dual purpose contracts.20 
Consumer associations and the ECC consider the abovementioned concepts to be 
inadequately defined and therefore often disregarded in practice. Namely, according to 
their experience, in most sectors (apart from e.g. energy sector or finance), the 
difference between the concepts of ‘consumer’, ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average 
consumer’ is vague or non-existent.   
Having that in mind, a consumer association has made additional efforts in order to 
clarify the concept of a consumer to the citizens in Croatia: 
19 Petrić (2013), p. 34-35. 
20 Mišćenić (2013), p. 153. 
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 The picture above presents a citizen/a consumer as a human being whose human 
rights protection should include= a guarantee of human dignity + the right to fair trial 
(adequate legal protection) + protection of the economic interests 
Translation Croatian to English language: 
‘Građanin potrošač nije broj, već prije svega, ljudsko biće apsolutne vrijednosti’ – ‘A 
citizen who is a consumer is not a number, he/she is before all else a human being of 
absolute value with its own universal rights and obligations” 
‘Ljudsko dostojanstvo, parvo na pravičnu pravnu zaštitu I zaštitu gospodarskih 
interesa’ – ‘Human dignity, right to a fair trial and protection of economic interests’ 
From the position of the regulatory authority in the telecommunication sector the 
concept of ‘consumer’ is still valid and fit for the purpose.  
At the same time, the concepts of ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ are 
harder to implement since it is difficult to provide for their uniform application which 
would meet the purpose of the terms.  
According to the regulatory authority, the concept of the ‘vulnerable consumer’ is 
defined in Art 39 of the Energy Act (Official Gazette 120/12, 14/14, 102/15). At a 
proposal of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth the 
Croatian Government sets the criteria for achieving the status of a vulnerable 
consumer and determines protection measures in order to provide for their adequate 
supply. The competent authority in charge for social welfare determinates the status 
of vulnerable consumer and the level of social support to vulnerable consumer in the 
administrative procedure.   
Generally, it may be said that neither of the concepts seem to still be valid and fit for 
purpose in Croatia. However, the main problems are clear in regard to the concept of 
‘vulnerable consumers’ and ‘average consumers’, since their adequate protection 
depends on the understanding of the concepts by the legislator which provides for 
statutory or sectoral protection, as well as authorities which need to apply them on a 
case-to-case basis. Additionally, the meaning and the understanding of the concept 
may vary depending on the situation in which the consumer finds himself, that is, the 
sector in which there was a B2C transaction at issue.  
In some sectors there is a higher level of protection guaranteed (such in the case of 
Art 39 of the Energy Act). According to the consumer association ‘Croatian Association 
for Consumer Protection’ (Hrvatska udruga za zaštitu potrošača, HUZP) there are 
several categories which can be detected at the financial sector. Namely, due to the 
economic crisis in Croatia many people have lost their jobs at the age of 40-50. This 
population may be considered ‘vulnerable’, since they are excluded from the job 
market and consequently also from access to credit. Other category of ‘vulnerable 
consumers’ are people at the age 25-55 who work, but their income has decreased 
during the years of economic crisis or they do not receive a monthly income from their 
employers at all, although they work. This category of consumers is over indebted or 
facing bankruptcy due to which their access to financial services is limited (‘blokirani’). 
The third category is young unemployed people between the ages of 18-25 who are 
usually supported by their parents, have no income and access to financial services. A 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
181
fourth category is retired people, aged 60- with insufficient understanding of the ‘new’ 
financial services, very low pension and often indebted. So, the problem of invalidity 
of the concepts should be addressed at EU level and comprehensive legislation should 
be introduced which takes into account different characteristics, needs and 
circumstances of consumers, but also situations in which specific categories of 
consumers can find themselves. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
From the position of the consumer associations and the ECC, certain provisions 
regarding the older population as well as young people should be introduced; 
however, such introduction would require a very systematic and detailed analysis of 
the existing state of play in each Member State. 
According to the relevant ministry, the existing rules of the UCPD are not adequate to 
protect vulnerable consumers, especially the older population. In their opinion, the 
provisions of the UCPD are general and do not cover specific situations such as 
distance selling, telephone selling as well as off the premises selling. Therefore, 
specific provisions which would enhance protection of the older population of 
consumers should be introduced.  
In addition to introducing specific provisions in other directives concerned, in particular 
the UCTD, also adequate mechanisms for sanctioning the practice which harms 
interests of vulnerable consumers should be provided.  
Namely, vulnerable consumers are entitled to initiate civil proceedings in which it is 
not necessarily ensured that the vulnerability would be taken into account and that the 
consumer will be adequately protected. If such proceedings are initiated, the only 
sanction available is nullity of the contract, according to the Obligations Act. So it does 
not seem that there is too much incentive for the vulnerable consumer to initiate court 
proceedings. On the other hand, although consumer associations should be able to 
effectively protect the interests of vulnerable consumers by initiating collective redress 
proceedings and requesting the end of unlawful practice and obtaining damages, due 
to the insufficiencies in the regulation of collective redress in Croatia which were 
already discussed in detail (see supra), it is obvious that the application of the existing 
rules of the UCPD in protection of vulnerable consumers has not been satisfactory in 
Croatia.  
 
1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
According to the consumer associations, the ECC and the relevant ministry, the 
protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms 
in contracts has improved in Croatia since the implementation of the UCPD and the 
UCTD in Consumer Protection Act. 
The experience of the regulatory authority in the telecommunications sector shows 
that implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD has improved protection of consumers 
against unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in Croatia 
even in the period prior to the country’s accession to the EU. Namely, as an acceding 
country, Croatia made efforts to harmonize its consumer legislation with consumer 
and marketing law directives. 
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• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Consumer associations, the ECC and the relevant ministry confirm that since the 
implementation of the PID in the national legislation, the information to consumers 
regarding unit prices has improved in Croatia. 
Also, a business association considers that information to consumers has improved 
since the implementation of the PID in the national legislation. In this regard, 
introduction of Ordinance on indication of wholesale price and the unit selling price has 
contributed to the transparency of price indication in Croatia. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
According to the relevant ministry, the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in Croatia. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
According to a business association, although in the recent years it has become easier 
for businesses in Croatia to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in 
other EU countries, still additional improvements can be made.  
According to the consumer associations, the ECC and the relevant ministry from the 
date of accession to the EU (1 July 2013), it has become easier for consumers in 
Croatia to directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries. 
However, the consumer confidence in cross-border purchase in Croatia is still very 
low, especially taking into consideration the fact that there are still many cases of 
geoblocking against Croatian residents. Namely, many Croatian consumers often 
encounter difficulties while shopping online due to the fact that certain number of 
traders residing in other EU countries still do not deliver their products to Croatia, and 
even if such delivery is enabled, there are significant unjustified price differentials. 
Such practices have a very negative impact on consumer confidence in Croatia and 
present one of the reasons due to which the percentage of cross-border purchase is 
fairly low in Croatia. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
For consumer associations and the ECC it is very difficult to assess what are the exact 
reasons for the improvements; however the introduction of the Directives has surely 
favoured the awareness raising trend in the respective field. 
Business associations consider the improvements to be partly the result of the 
mentioned directives.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law–Croatia 
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in consumer 
contracts 
Zakon o zaštiti potrošača (NN 
41/14, 110/15) 
(Consumer Protection Act) 
(hereinafter: CpA) : Article 49-
56 
 'Black list' of terms considered 
unfair in all circumstances 
No   
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
Yes Article 50 of the 
Consumer 
Protection Act 
(hereinafter: CpA) 
 
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually 
negotiated terms  
No Article 296 (3) of 
the Obligations Act 
(hereinafter: OA) 
 
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive terms on the adequacy 
of the price and the main subject-
matter 
No Article 52 of the 
CpA 
 
Directive 2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in 
Zakon o zaštiti potrošača (NN 
41/14, 110/15)  (Consumer 
Protection Act) (hereinafter: 
CpA): Article  30-38 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
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the internal market  Provisions regarding immovable 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection in 
the indication of the 
prices of products offered 
to consumers 
Zakon o zaštiti potrošača (NN 
41/14, 110/15)   (Consumer 
Protection Act) (hereinafter: 
CpA): Article  7 
 Extension of the application to 
other sectors (e.g. for immovable 
property) 
No   
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
No   
Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading 
and comparative 
advertising 
Zakon o nedopuštenom 
oglašavanju (NN 43/2009) 
(Unpermitted Advertising Act)  
(hereinafter: UaA) 
     
     
 a wide definition of the concept of 
“trader” 
 Article 3 of the 
Unpermitted 
Advertising Act 
(hereinafter: UaA) 
The definition includes persons 
and entities from the so-called 
“grey areas of the economy” and 
advertising agencies acting in the 
name and on behalf of a trader 
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' 
interests 
Zakon o zaštiti potrošača (NN 
41/14, 110/15)(Consumer 
Protection Act) (hereinafter: 
CpA): Article 106-122 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Croatia 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in a 
single legal act 
 
The injunction procedure is regulated in Art 
106 CpA et seq. as procedure for the 
collective protection of consumers. 
The procedure does not exclude the 
possibility of initiating individual procedure 
for declaring the contract null and void, 
consumer’s right to written complaints (Art 
10 CpA), administrative procedure or 
traders misdemeanour responsibility(Art 
138-140 CpA) 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
 
- Other  
1. Designated public bodies: Ministry of 
Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Maritime, Ministry of Health and Agency 
for Electronic Media  
2. Croatian Union of Consumer Protection 
Organisations-Potrošač 
 Union of Organizations for Protection of 
Croatian’s Consumers 
3. HAKOM as a regulatory authority is 
entitled to initiate proceedings 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
areas of consumer 
law that are not 
part of Annex I of 
the Directive 
 
According to Art 106 (1) of the CpA 
injunction procedure is also provided 
against persons who act against provisions 
of Act for the application of the Regulation 
(EU) no. 181/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 
February 2011 concerning the rights of 
passengers in bus and coach transport and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, 
so additionaly rights of consumers as bus or 
coach passengers (as weaker parties to the 
transport contract) are covered. 
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Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
- Yes 
 
Under Art 106(2) CpA the procedure can be 
initiated against an individual trader  or a 
group of traders coming from the same 
economic sector, who violate the provisions 
prescribed in Art 106(1) CpA, against 
chambers and trader interest associations 
promoting unlawful conduct, or against a 
drafter of trader’s code of conduct which 
promotes unfair business practices   
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including 
the consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
 
Under Art 109(1) CpA before initiating the 
procedure designated public bodies, 
regulatory authority or the  specified 
consumer associations  as the plaintiff and 
the defendant are entitled  to initiate 
mediation procedure at the Mediation 
Centre 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement 
for party seeking 
injunction to 
consult with the 
defendant 
 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- No  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day of 
non-compliance 
 
According to Art 116 (4) CpA a fine (money 
penalty) will be paid to the state treasury 
(the public purse) 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
According to Art 115 the court may order 
the defendant to publish the decision at its 
own expense   
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No Only sanction in terms of a fine can be 
requested for non- compliance with the 
court decision under Art 116(2) CpA 
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
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Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
According to Art 118 CpA consumers can 
base their individual claims for damages on 
the injunctions order 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices(of 
other traders)? 
- No Under Art 117(1) CpA the effects of the 
decision in which there is an individual 
injunctions order is also extended to the 
future infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices of the  trader against which 
the procedure was initiated  towards all 
consumers 
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B. Data tables 
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(number 
of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comment 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2014 
Statistics 
provided by 
the Market 
Inspectorate 
at the 
Ministry of 
Economy 
5 20%  20% 40% 20% 100 
2013 
Statistics 
provided by 
the (former) 
State 
Inspectorate 
/now 
Market 
Inspectorate 
7 28.6%  14.9% 28.6% 28.6% 100 
2012 
Statistics 
provided by 
the (former) 
State 
Inspectorate 
/now 
Market 
Inspectorate 
12 8.3%   91.7%  100 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).21 
21 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
For submitting a 
claim: 500kn 
[approx. EUR 67] + 
1% for disputes 
over 15 000 kn 
[approx. 
EUR 2000] = 750 
kn [approx. 
EUR 100] 
 
For rendering of a 
judgment: 750kn 
[approx. EUR 100] 
1000kn [approx. 
EUR 133] for 
each procedural 
action 
0 
If the 
proceedings are 
initiated before 
a court in 
Zagreb it should 
take up to 6 
months for a 
first instance 
court to deliver 
a judgment: 
6x30x24=  
4 320 hours 
 
(if the 
proceedings are 
initiated before 
a smaller court 
the duration 
may increase) 
However, hours 
spent on filling 
paperwork, 
appearing at 
court, 
consulting a 
lawyer cannot 
be assesed due 
to the different 
level of 
knowledge, 
available funds 
and preparation 
of consumers 
for conducting 
the procedure 
before court. 
When 
submitting a 
claim the 
plaintiff is only 
requested to 
pay for 
submitting a 
claim and only 
upon delivering 
of a judgment is 
the plaintiff 
requested to 
pay for 
rendering of a 
judgment 
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ADRor other 
relevant 
procedure 
Costs of delivering 
of a decision 
/payment to the 
judge of 
first/second 
instance 100kn 
[approx. EUR 13] 
for conducting a 
procedure + 200kn 
[approx. EUR 27] 
for delivering a 
decision 
 
Cost of gathering 
of documentation 
500kn [EUR 67] 
 
Travel costs and 
accommodation of 
judge/s  
funded from the 
state budgets 
Only cost which 
occurs for the 
consumer is the 
cost of attorney 
representation 
(if the consumer 
has an attorney) 
- 
1000kn [approx. 
EUR 133] for 
each procedural 
action 
0 
It should take 
up to 90 days 
for the Court of 
Honour to 
deliver a 
decision: 
3x300x24= 
2 160 hours 
However, hours 
spent on filling 
paperwork, 
appearing at 
Court of 
Honour, 
consulting a 
lawyer cannot 
be assesed due 
to the different 
level of 
knowledge, 
available funds 
and preparation 
of consumers 
for conducting 
the procedure 
before the 
Court of 
Honour. 
This is estimate 
cost for ADR 
before the 
Court of 
Honour of the 
Croatian 
Chamber of 
Economy 
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
In Croatia, due to the lack of the surveillance of the court and ADR procedures it is 
very difficult to estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used for invoking 
the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract terms. 
However, it can be concluded that the procedures are not used often, perhaps couple 
of time per year, and mainly as ADR procedures.    
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Hrvatska gospodarska komora 
(HGK)/Croatian Chamber of Economy 
Business association 
 
13 July 2016  
Uprava za inspekcijske poslove u 
gospodarstvu/Directorate for Economic 
Inspection (Market Inspectorate) 
National consumer 
enforcement authority 
22 July 2016 
Hrvatska regulatorna agencija za mrežne 
djelatnosti (HAKOM)/Croatian Regulatory 
Authority for Network Industries 
 
(Telecommunications regulatory 
authority) 
National regulatory authority 8 July 2016 
Ministry of Economy Ministry 22 July 2016 
European Consumer Centre  
ECC – Croatia 
European Consumer Centre 30 June 2016 
Društvo za zaštitu potrošača Hrvatske – 
Potrošač/Croatian Union of Consumer 
Protection Organisations 
Consumer organisation 4 July 2016 
Hrvatska obrtnič kakomora 
(HOK)/Croatian Chamber of Trade and 
Crafts 
Business association 18 July 2016 
Hrvatska energetska regulatorna agencija 
(HERA)/Croatian Energy Regulatory 
Agency 
National regulatory authority 6 July 2016 
Ministry of Finance Ministry Not available  
Hrvatska udruga za zaštitu 
potrošača/Croatian Association for 
Consumer Protection 
Consumer organisation 19 July 2016 
Ministry of Justice  Ministry 1 July 2016  
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Mišćenić, Emilia 2013 The Harmonization of Consumer Protection Law with European Law in 
The Republic of Croatia 
Mišćenić, Emilia 2013 Usklađivanje prava zaštite potrošača u Republici Hrvatskoj 
Mišćenić, Emilia 2014 Consumer Protection Law  
Josipović, Tatjana 2013 Enforcement Activity in Consumer Protection Regulation in Croatia 
Government of the 
Republic of Croatia 
2013 A Report on Application of a National Programme of Consumer 
Protection in the Period 2009-2012 
Government of the 
Republic of Croatia 
2013 A guide for the National Programme of Consumer Protection in the 
Period 2013-2016 
Government of the 
Republic of Croatia 
2013 The National Programme of Consumer Protection in the Period 2013-
2016 
Zlatović, Dragan 2009 Grupna tužba zbog nedopuštenog oglašavanja kao modalitet 
kolektivne zaštite trgovaca 
  
Zlatović, Dragan 2014 Nepoštene poslovne prakse u hrvatskom, bosansko-hercegovačkom i 
slovenskom pravu 
Pavillon, C.M.D.S. 2012 The interplay between the unfair commercial practices directive and 
codes of conduct 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report CYPRUS 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The Regulator of the Competition and Consumer Protection Service, the body 
entrusted with monitoring compliance with and enforcing consumer protection 
legislation in Cyprus (hereinafter called ‘the Regulator’) considers the UCPD to be the 
most powerful legislation for the protection of the interests of the consumers. The 
Regulator also considers the principle-based approach to be effective. The Regulator 
issued a total of forty four (44) Decisions on the UCPD (or more accurately, the 
Cypriot law transposing it, namely Law 103(I)/2007). Thirty-eight (38) of those 
decisions involved an application of the principle-based approach of the Directive, 
something that shows that the Regulator does not hesitate to reach a finding of an 
unfair commercial practice, when the latter is not included in the black list. Six of 
those decisions involved use of a paragraph of the black list in addition to an 
application of the principle-based approach. Given that the total number of decisions 
involving a use of the black list is eleven (11), it seems that the Regulator often 
combines the black-list with the principle-based approach, thereby ensuring that even 
if the relevance or applicability of the black-list in a given case is disputed, the practice 
could still be justified as an unfair commercial practice. Moreover, there are cases in 
which the Regulator found an unfair commercial practice under both the general 
clause and the provisions dealing specifically with misleading actions and omissions 
(eg. 2016/16(ΑΠ), 24/10/2016, Alpha Bank Ltd). During the interview, the Regulator 
called for guidance on the application of the ‘professional diligence’ requirement in the 
general clause, which the Regulator described as abstract and/or vague. None of the 
forty one (41) Decisions of the Regulator involved a specific or detailed application of 
this particular requirement. A self-regulatory body interviewed also raised an issue 
with the ‘transactional decision’ requirement stating that it reduces the effectiveness 
of the law. Of course, according to relevant European Commission guidance, the 
concept of ‘transactional decision’ is quite broad and not limited to a purchase or 
payment. So, the issue raised by the self-regulatory body may be taken as an 
indication of the fact that the relevant concept is perceived to be much narrower than 
it really is.   
Case law on the UCPD in Cyprus is very limited. More specifically, there is: 
• One decision in the context of an interlocutory application that led to the 
issuance of a court order sought by a business against another which imported 
products bearing its trademark without authorisation. Law 103(I)/2007 has just 
been one of the laws comprising the legal basis of the application and is not in 
any way discussed or analysed in the relevant decision (C. Α. PAPAELLINAS CO 
LTD ν. YAKUMO ENTERPRISES LTD, Case no. 1962/2014); 
• One very important decision by the Cyprus Supreme Court in the context of a 
criminal appeal. That case discusses in depth the maximum harmonisation 
nature of the UCPD and opines that a Cypriot law prohibiting sales and 
discounts except from during certain specified periods of the year goes beyond 
the UCPD and could not thus be applied against the defendants. The Supreme 
Court thus quashed the criminal conviction of the defendants based on that law 
and its ruling meant the liberalisation of sales in Cyprus (Ermes Department 
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Stores Plc and others ν. Attorney General of the Republic, (2012) 2 C.L.R. 
655); 
• Two decisions of the Cyprus Supreme Court involving judicial review 
applications against the decisions of the Regulator. In the first, the Regulator 
refused to examine a complaint against practices employed by non-profit 
associations of doctors on the ground that such associations do not comprise 
‘traders’. The Supreme Court approved the judicial review application and citing 
CJEU case law (in particular, C-59/12), it opined that such associations do 
comprise ‘traders’ and any commercial practices they employ should be 
examined under the law transposing the UCPD (Akis Ioannou ν. The Republic of 
Cyprus, through the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Case No. 
136/2011). The second concerned an application for a preliminary ruling to the 
CJEU filed in the context of a judicial review against the decision of the 
Regulator to fine a trader for operating a multi-level marketing sales system 
contrary to point 14 of the black list. The decision relating to the judicial review 
application has not yet been issued but the application for a preliminary ruling 
has been rejected for reasons pertaining to the law governing such 
applications. (AF MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS LTD and others ν. the Republic 
of Cyprus, through the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 
Competition and Consumer Protection Service, Case no. 88/2011). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The black-list is considered a very useful tool of application of the law by the Regulator 
but they think it should be reviewed or a mechanism of adding practices to the list 
should be introduced. This is because the Regulator faced many cases that were not 
falling within any of the paragraphs of the black list and the Regulator had to resort to 
the principle-based approach. Indeed, out of the total of forty four (44) decisions of 
the Regulator, only eleven (11) involved a use of the black list. Additionally, out of 
those eleven (11) decisions, only five (5) decisions involved a finding of unfairness 
solely on the basis of a paragraph of the black list. The view that there should be a 
mechanism of adding practices to the list is shared by other stakeholders such as the 
ECC and consumer protection associations. The latter as well as the Regulator pointed 
out that most consumer complaints refer to a refusal by traders to repair or replace a 
product in compliance with the two-year guarantee period of Directive 99/44/EC. It 
should perhaps be examined whether a relevant commercial practice could be added 
in the black list. A business association interviewed stated that it has been observed 
that certain traders do not state the dual price of products (the initial price and the 
discounted price) in sales periods. This is considered a common problem in Cyprus, 
hence a different law prohibits the omission of the dual price. This could be another 
practice that could be placed in the black list. As the black-list of the UCPD now stands 
(which does not include the relevant practice) it creates issues with regards to the 
compatibility of the Cypriot law which prohibits the omission of the dual price and thus 
goes beyond the provisions of the UCPD, which does not black list the relevant 
practice.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
There are no rules concerning immovable property that go beyond the UCPD in 
Cyprus. As for financial services, some rules on advertising do exist in other statutes 
but those are not extensive (for more details see below Section 1.1.4 in this report). 
Some practical benefits however do arise particularly from the fact that those duties 
are specific to financial services and address specific commercial practices that are 
employed in the particular domain. Additionally, other supervisory authorities such as 
the Central Bank of Cyprus and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission are 
entrusted with their application, something that may be translated into more effective 
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and/or rigorous enforcement. The law transposing the UCPD in Cyprus does not 
contain any additional rules for financial services or immovable property. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
There has not been an application of the UCPD in relation to environmental claims in 
Cyprus. There have been complaints however relating to advertised fuel-saving 
properties of fuel. The advertising was not sufficiently disclosing the conditions to 
which those fuel-saving properties were subject. The Regulator sent the fuel 
companies warning letters and instructions as to how to adjust that advertising 
derived from the UCPD. The fuel companies amended their advertising accordingly and 
as a result, no case has officially been opened against them.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
This is answered in section 1.4.4 of this report. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
This is answered in section 1.4.4 of this report. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
There is one active self-regulatory body, the Cyprus Advertising Regulation 
Organisation but it works totally independently from the Regulator and there is very 
little (non-institutionalised) co-operation between them. For more on this issue as well 
as for specific proposals as to how such actions can be improved, see below Sections 
1.1.3 and 1.4.1 of this report. There are no well-developed co-regulation actions. The 
aforementioned self-regulatory body took an issue with the fact that Cyprus did not 
transpose Article 10, UCPD into Cyprus law something that harms the development of 
self-regulation and co-regulation in Cyprus.  Indeed, in the relevant law, there is no 
provision corresponding to Article 10 of the UCPD. 
The Regulator does not consider this particular self-regulatory body to be powerful 
enough because not all TV stations or other relevant advertising media are members 
of that organisation. Furthermore, its decisions are not binding on the parties and it 
cannot impose any penalties. The said body is not a qualified entity either so it cannot 
seek injunctions. Still the Regulator said that it co-operates with the said body when 
appropriate. On the other hand, the said self-regulatory body stated that businesses 
that are not its members often co-operate with it and that it will explore whether it 
can become a ‘qualified entity’ given that its decisions relating to advertising benefit 
the collective interests of consumers. Moreover, it often opens cases against 
businesses following complaints by consumers.  
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• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Please refer to answer to second question of 1.1.1.  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
No best practices or lessons from Cyprus; the application of the UCPD is not 
particularly widespread, though the Regulator started increasingly to apply the 
particular measure. However, there are issues relating to the practical effectiveness of 
the law which mainly relate to the way it works in Cyprus rather than to the UCPD or 
even the transposition law as such. More specifically, the Cyprus Advertising 
Regulation Organisation referred to the Regulator’s Decision 55/2015 against Camelot 
International Health Organisation (Cyprus) Ltd which led to an administrative fine 
against that trader in 2015. It highlighted the fact that despite the fine, the trader 
continued openly to employ the relevant commercial practice. It should be stated that 
this has to do with the fact that the Regulator has never utilised the injunctions 
procedure, which is discussed later in the report concerning the Injunctions Directive. 
Another complaint by stakeholders, namely the Cyprus Advertising Regulation 
Organisation and consumer protection associations, is that the administrative fines 
imposed are later reduced by the Minister; however from the list of all Decisions of the 
Regulator, only two are stated to have undergone a reduction of the initially-imposed 
fine following resource by the trader to the Minister in accordance with Section 12 of 
Law 103(I)/2007 which empowers the Minister to review the decision of the Regulator. 
The relevant list of the Decisions can be found on the website of the Regulator.1 There 
is another Decision of the Regulator in which the initially imposed fine of EUR 200 000 
was reduced to EUR 100 000 by the Minister. An application for judicial review of the 
decision of the Minister is currently pending (WIN AE ν. Service of Competition and 
Consumer Protection and others, Case no.1827/2012, 26/3/2015).       
It should also be stated that several of the imposed fines are not paid on time or there 
is delay in their payment due to the fact that traders file judicial review applications 
against the decision of the Regulator to the Cyprus Administrative Court in accordance 
with Section 146 of the Cyprus Constitution. While these judicial review applications 
are pending, the fine is often not paid by the trader, according to the Regulator. It 
should be stated however that the Regulator is entitled to immediate payment of the 
fine and could seek its recovery right away. Indeed, it is settled law in Cyprus that the 
filing of a judicial review application does not automatically stay the enforcement of 
the administrative decisions. Moreover, interim applications seeking a court order 
putting enforcement of the administrative decision on hold, only succeed in very 
special and rather rare circumstances as Cyprus case law (Praxoula Antoniadou 
Kyriacou v. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation through the Attorney General Case No. 
128/2013) clearly indicates. The Regulator does not however take any measures for 
the recovery of the unpaid fines if a judicial review application is pending. 
Understandably, this situation limits the deterring properties of the administrative 
sanctions and adversely affects the overall effectiveness of the law.  
 
Finally, it should be added that in one very recent case, the Regulator has for the first 
time issued an order for the cessation of the unfair commercial practices in addition to 
the administrative fine it imposed (2016/16(ΑΠ), 24/10/2016, Alpha Bank Ltd). 
 
1 http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/cyco/cyconsumer.nsf/page51_gr/page51_gr?opendocument?OpenDocument 
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1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
There is consensus amongst the stakeholders interviewed that consumers lack 
sufficient understanding of the function of the unit price. The Regulator has pointed 
out that various stakeholders have organised relevant seminars and information 
campaigns, yet at least one business association has emphasised the need for more 
effective consumer education on the meaning and function of the unit price. Consumer 
associations state that a few traders totally omit the unit price and in quite a few other 
cases, the unit price is stated but in very small print so that it can easily be missed. 
They have also pointed to examples of a misleading use of the unit price and 
specifically to the case where only the unit price (unaccompanied by the selling price) 
is stated so that consumers perceive it to be the (total) selling price.  
One business association has said that inspections concerning the sufficient indication 
of prices by the Regulator have revealed certain issues, mainly with the obligation of a 
dual display of prices when products are on sale, a requirement that does not arise 
from PID but from a different Cypriot statute. According to the same business 
association, businesses tend to comply with their obligation to state the unit price and 
where omissions are observed, these are mostly accidental and are remedied in 
response to relevant observations of the Regulator without further official action 
against the trader being necessary. The Regulator stated that big businesses, 
especially supermarkets tend to comply with their obligations under the PID or co-
operate towards compliance and indeed, neither a court decision (except one to a 
relevant judicial review application) nor a decision by the Regulator exists on the PID.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
All stakeholders agree that the unit price should be indicated per such ‘performance’ 
measurement especially where the weight or volume of a product is not relevant to its 
performance. This holds true for example in relation to detergents: concentrated 
detergents are of much smaller volume than non-concentrated ones, yet they may 
have the same or even higher performance in terms of number of washloads. The 
Regulator believes that this approach is appropriate especially in the light of the fact 
that consumers tend not to pay attention to the price per litre or understand the 
function of traditional unit price (as mentioned above). The Regulator observes 
however that if that approach is to be followed, it must be made a legal obligation so 
that it is used by all relevant traders. In a different case, the comparison function of 
such a unit price will significantly be weakened. Alternatively, both unit prices should 
be stated (traditional and ‘performance’) as one consumer association has suggested. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Cyprus initially made use of this derogation but this has long ago been abolished, 
specifically by Article 2 of Law 136(I)/2005 amending the PID transposition law. Yet, 
the Regulator has disclosed that they are more lenient towards small businesses and 
inspections are mostly conducted in large stores such as supermarkets. There have 
been no consumer complaints. Yet, this could be expected given the existing 
consensus that consumers in Cyprus tend not to fully understand and thus, use the 
unit price.  
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
There is absolutely no case law on the particular measure in Cyprus and no decision 
by the Regulator either. This is revealing of the limited role and thus effectiveness of 
the said measure. The Regulator explicitly stated that they have never made use of 
the particular measure and expressed the view that businesses are in much less need 
for protection, all focus having to be on consumer protection, which needs to be 
improved in Cyprus. They have received no relevant complaints either. This seems to 
be consistent with what a business association has stated, namely that businesses 
tend to settle any disputes between them (including disputes concerning comparative 
advertising) out of court and through their lawyers.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Please refer to answer in the previous question. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Cyprus has not extended the UCPD to B2B transactions and the view of the Regulator 
is that businesses do not require the same level of protection as consumers. As for 
national rules going beyond the MCAD, the Trade Descriptions Law, Law 5/87 contains 
provisions (specifically, Section 5(2) and (3)), comparable to the ones on misleading 
omissions of the UCPD and to this extent, goes beyond the MCAD which does not 
touch upon misleading omissions. It should be noted however that the applicability of 
the Trade Descriptions Law, Law 5/87 to B2B relations is uncertain. On the one hand, 
except those of its provisions that refer to misleading descriptions of the price (the 
term ‘price’ being defined in Section 2(1) as the amount that has to be paid by the 
consumer) the provisions of Law 5/87 do not seem expressly to be confined to B2C 
transactions. In the literature however, the said law is said to have been enacted to 
protect consumers.2 Moreover, the limited case law existing on Law 5/87 consists of 
applications for preliminary injunctions by a trader against another (HABANOS SA κ.α. 
ν. Vahe Zadoian, action no.7685/06, 16.5.07) and criminal prosecutions concerning 
trade descriptions used in the context of commerce (Stavros Mavrosavvas ν. Cyprus 
Popular Public Co Ltd κ.α., Case no. 18567/12, 11/7/2014; Leontios Kostrikis ν. 
4MOTION AUTOMOTIVES LTD κ.α., Case no. 226/2014, 10/7/2015) without a clear 
distinction being drawn between B2C and B2B.  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Given that Cyprus did not have in place any specific rules on comparative advertising 
prior to the law transposing the MCAD, the relevant full harmonisation provisions have 
only increased the level of consumer protection and have at least in theory provided 
the Regulator with a tool specifically designed to examine the fairness of comparative 
advertisements. Yet, it has not been used in practice as yet and the Regulator has 
stated that in their opinion, comparative advertising can be examined under the UCPD 
alone. However, the permissibility of comparative advertising is subject to Article 4 of 
2  Glykis and Anastasiou, Torts, in Andreas Neocleous & Co LLC (ed.), Introduction to Cyprus Law, 2010, 
pp.803-840 at p.833. 
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the MCAD, which lays down conditions of permissibility that are additional to the 
fairness of the advertising under the UCPD. The Regulator suggested that the 
comparative advertising rules of the MCAD should be brought within the UCPD so that 
this fragmentation of the relevant law ceases to exist. It is true that such an approach 
could significantly increase the effectiveness of the relevant provisions as by bringing 
them within a legislative measure that is frequently applied by the Regulator, the 
relevant move will render the said provisions more accessible to the enforcement 
body. 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
In theory, the relevant rules do provide a comprehensive and potentially effective 
legal framework, yet in the absence of case law on the matter and given that the 
relevant rules have not been applied by the Regulator either, their practical 
effectiveness is difficult to assess or comment upon. Comparative advertising is not a 
particularly widespread mode of advertising in Cyprus and this may be a reason 
behind the limited use of the relevant rules. Another reason is that there is active self-
regulation in the domain of advertising which deals with several relevant disputes. 
More specifically, the Cyprus Advertising Regulation Organisation examines disputes 
with regards to advertising and has issued some decisions involving comparative 
advertising. The relevant Organisation has provided six decisions that it has issued 
referring to comparative advertising. Three of them involved an application of 
Regulations 11 and 12 of the Cyprus Advertising Ethics Code and not the provisions of 
the MCAD. Importantly however, those rules of the Code seem to adopt the provisions 
of the MCAD verbatim. In two of these decisions, the Organisation found a violation of 
Regulation 11(ii) which corresponds to Article 4(c), MCAD. In another case, a violation 
has been found of Regulation 11 in general, yet a closer look at the decision reveals 
that it was mainly Regulation 11(ii) that was considered to have been violated. The 
Organisation has not raised any issues with regards to the effectiveness of the legal 
framework governing comparative advertising. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
As already stated, the MCAD has not been utilised by the courts or enforcement 
authorities in Cyprus.  
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A good practice that is followed by the Cyprus Advertising Regulation Organisation in 
the context of self-regulation involves the use of so-called ‘helpnotes’ issued by the 
Organisation and distributed to all of its members. These are in the form of short 
notes that simplify the rules of the Ethics Code and aim at assisting their members in 
understanding and thus complying with the rules. One such ‘helpnote’ has been issued 
also for the Code rules on comparative advertising. Another good practice employed 
by the same Organisation is the offer of free ‘copy advice’, that is, a prior assessment 
of advertising material and the provision of an opinion as to what changes, if any, 
should be made to ensure compliance with the Code. Similar practices could be 
adopted by public authorities in relation to the MCAD (and also the UCPD). 
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1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Business associations appeared to not have specific or detailed knowledge on the 
provisions of the UCPD and none raised any issues with cross-border trade. At a 
theoretical level, it appears natural that any disparities in the application of the 
principle-based approach will tend to have an adverse impact on cross-border trade. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Please see answer to previous question. This list, however, to the extent that it leaves 
too little to interpretation, is less likely to have an adverse impact on free movement. 
As it is amenable to a truly uniform application, it is more likely to facilitate free 
movement of goods and services. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Cyprus law does not impose requirements with specific regard to the promotion and/or 
advertising of immovable property and therefore, the relevant minimum 
harmonisation derogation under the UCPD has no practical effect in Cyprus law. In 
relation to financial services, other laws specific to financial products do impose certain 
requirements relating to advertising but do not appear to be so extensive as to be able 
to have any (substantial) effect on cross-border trade. More specifically, Section 44 of 
Law on Consumer Credit (Housing loan agreements and Hire-purchase agreements), 
Law 39(I)/2001 requires that advertisements contain information on the APR and on 
any restriction to the availability of the credit facility. Section 40, Law 39(I)/2001 
requires that certain basic information regarding the credit agreement are 
communicated on the first page of a credit agreement and Section 39, Law 39(I)/2001 
requires that any document informing about or approving a housing loan application 
contain certain warnings such as that of the possible loss of mortgaged immovable 
property in case the loan installments are not paid in accordance with the agreement. 
Furthermore, Section 6(1) of the Business of Credit Institutions, Law 66(I)/1997 
prohibits any advertising or promotion aiming at convincing people to make deposits 
in institutions that are not ‘authorised credit institutions’ under the relevant law, yet 
Section 6(3) of the same law specifically clarifies that this prohibition does not affect 
the movement in Cyprus of newspapers or magazines that contain advertisements of 
financial institutions operating abroad. Additionally, Chapter C of Investment Services 
and Activities and Regulated Markets Law, Law 144(I)/2007 contains provisions for the 
protection of investors. Article 36(1) imposes general duties of professional diligence 
and non-misleading advertising that do not go beyond the UCPD (Article 36(1)(a)). It 
however also imposes more specific information duties (Articles 36(1)(b) that mostly 
adjust the UCPD to the particularities of the financial domain rather than extending 
the said measure. Additionally however, it lays down obligations to receive information 
from potential investors, amongst others, as to their knowledge and experience in 
relation to investment so that the investment firm can recommend the appropriate 
investment product (Articles 36(1)(c)). 
The interviews of business associations led to no information regarding the existence 
of barriers to cross-border trade.  
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
As already stated, there is no experience on the application of the MCAD in Cyprus. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
In theory yes, given that minimum harmonisation effectively means greater disparities 
in the laws of the various member states, but again, there is no experience on the 
application of the MCAD in Cyprus. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
This is correct, as the fully harmonised provisions effectively mean that a comparative 
advertisement that complies with the law in Cyprus can freely move within the EU as it 
is more likely to comply with the laws of the rest of the Member States. Though as 
said, the Regulator has not made use of the comparative advertising rules of the 
MCAD, the Cyprus Advertising Regulation Organisation is making use of identical 
provisions existing in the Code of conduct it applies. The existing full harmonisation in 
this area renders the role of the relevant Organisation, especially its free copy advice 
service described in Section 1.1.3 of this Report, which is particularly important as 
businesses can benefit from it in relation to advertisements that they intend to 
address to consumers in more than one Member States. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Theoretically yes. However, with B2B relations comprising an area that is rather 
‘neglected’ by stakeholders in Cyprus, the lack of cross-border enforcement 
mechanism could not be regarded as one of the most important barriers to cross-
border trade. In other words, disputes between businesses with regards to advertising 
(especially cross-border ones) do not comprise an acute problem in Cyprus and 
therefore, there is not a pressing need for a relevant enforcement mechanism.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The general impression of the Regulator is that traders are not fully aware of these 
requirements and some of them omit to provide all information required by Article 
7(4). The main characteristics of the product and the price are usually provided but 
the same is not true of the right of withdrawal when applicable. However, the 
Regulator has issued two decisions on the basis of Article 7(4) which corresponds to 
Article 6(4) of the Cypriot transposition law. Both of them found a violation of Article 
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6(4)(c) amongst others, that is, an omission to state the price. These cases did not 
involve standard consumer products (or goods) but advertisements communicated to 
consumers by SMS regarding a telecommunication service (voicemail service) in the 
Case 19/2014 and a dating-line service in the Case 07/2014. Importantly, none of the 
relevant advertisements stated the price of the relevant service and therefore, they 
should not have been considered as invitations to purchase triggering the relevant 
provision (see definition of ‘invitation to purpose’ in Section 2 of the Cypriot 
transposition law which is identical to that in Article 2(h), UCPD). As a result, they 
should have been decided based on the general provision on misleading omissions, 
namely Article 6(1) (corresponding to Article 7(1), UCPD) alone.  
The Regulator agreed that, despite the existence of more detailed duties in the CRD, 
the information duties of Article 7(4) are considered useful as they target the specific 
stage of advertisements (that qualify as  invitations to purchase) whereas the CRD 
imposes broader pre-contractual duties which can be complied with by traders at any 
stage before contract conclusion. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Given that the information duties of Article 22 of the Services Directive refer to all 
information that should be available to service recipients in general and do not target 
the advertising stage, a more direct overlap exists between the UCPD and the E-
Commerce Directive. Article 6 of the latter measure does, to some extent, overlap 
with Article 6 of the UCPD. The Regulator does not consider this to be a problem 
noting that the E-commerce Directive applies to online traders only whereas the UCPD 
applies to all traders. Yet, it should be stressed that given that the service (the 
Industry and Technology Service of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism) that is entrusted with the application of the E-commerce and Services 
Directives is different from the one responsible with the application of the UCPD, there 
may be co-ordination issues that tend to increase costs. Costs can also arise for 
businesses, as this fragmentation in advertising law requires resort to and review of 
multiple laws and regulations for reliable advice as to the compliant nature of 
advertising to be offered to businesses.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Business associations did not show any particular concern in relation to cross-border 
trade and academic literature on the subject is virtually non-existent.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
It is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes as the needs of the average consumer 
are certainly different from those of the average business. Yet, the two regimes can be 
aligned for example by including a provision on misleading omissions in the MCAD. It 
arose from the various interviews that business protection against unfair commercial 
practices is not considered a pressing need in Cyprus. As a business association noted, 
businesses usually solve relevant disputes between themselves or through their 
lawyers.  
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 • The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
This depends on the level of protection that is intended to be afforded to businesses. If 
it covers all stages, then the relevant regime will be more aligned with the regime for 
B2C but would perhaps mean taking what stakeholders would consider an overly 
protective approach for businesses. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Again this depends on whether there is experience on a sufficient number of unfair 
practices that are commonly utilised in the B2B marketing arena. If such unfair 
practices do exist, a black-list should be included as it is a very useful tool of 
application of the law that facilitates the tasks of enforcement authorities and thus, 
improves the effectiveness of the law, as the Regulator has confirmed in relation to 
the UCPD. One unfair practice in the context of B2B relations concerns trademark 
registration. More specifically, when a business (or a professional party) files an 
application for the registration of a trademark, businesses dealing with the 
administration of trademarks somehow find out its details and the fact that it has filed 
a trademark application and send to the relevant business marketing material 
requesting the payment of fees for the taking up of the administration of the 
trademark. This marketing material however appears as an official notice coming from 
the official authority to which the trademark application has been submitted. Such 
practices would deserve a place in a relevant black list. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Enforcement cooperation mechanisms could be injunctions and perhaps also 
administrative fines, the latter for cases of repeated (and serious) violations of the 
law. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
No. Standard contract law remedies should be considered sufficient for businesses. A 
different approach would perhaps comprise a dramatic step towards blurring the line 
between businesses and consumers or treating businesses the same as consumers.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No such need arose from stakeholder interviews. 
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1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
A breach of the law transposing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in Cyprus is 
not associated with any contractual consequences and there is also no private right to 
seek compensation. This is considered a major gap in the law by the majority of 
stakeholders. However, the Contract Law, Cap.149 contains provisions on the 
avoidance of the contract. More specifically, Sections 14 to 20 render a contract 
voidable if it has been concluded as a result of coercion, undue influence, fraud or 
misrepresentation.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Given the absence of legal provisions specifically linking a breach of the UCPD to 
contractual consequences, there are no relevant enforcement decisions or court 
rulings. Court rulings do exist however on the aforementioned provisions of Cap.149 
on the avoidance of contracts. A ruling by the Cyprus Supreme Court (Ioannou Arestis 
Michael v. Annas Andrea Charalambidou (1998) 1 C.L.R. 555) found a transaction 
involving immovable property voidable on the ground of undue influence. The ruling 
made it clear that the vitiating factor of undue influence is relevant not only in the 
context of special relationships (such as between spouses) but also where the parties 
are in no special or close relationship. The difference is that in the latter case, the 
burden of proving undue influence is on the party alleging that his or her consent has 
been given as a result of undue influence while in the former case it is on the party 
who benefited from the transaction to prove the absence of undue influence. Thus, a 
consumer can allege undue influence by a trader in order to avoid a contract but the 
consumer will bear the burden of proving that his or her consent has been obtained as 
a result of undue influence exercised by the trader. Allegations of undue influence are 
frequently put forward by borrowers in the context of legal proceedings with banks 
whereby they seek to avoid their obligations under credit agreements, however these 
allegations are often rejected by the courts (ΑLPHA BANK LTD ν. Philippou 
Raptopoulou and others, Civil Action no. 2256/04; ALPHA BANK LIMITED ν. MOUNTIS 
ELECTRONICS AND SYSTEMS (CYPRUS) LTD and others, Civil Action no. 983/06; 
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE (CYPRUS) LTD ν. ZOES (ZOOULAS) EFSTATHIOU 
Lambros Nicolaides genus and others, Civil Action no. 2082/08; Martha Litra v. Ellinas 
Finance Ltd an others, Civil Action no. 7417/2002).  
Misrepresentation has been relied upon in a case involving the sale of a car but the 
plaintiff (consumer) failed to prove his case and thus, his action failed (Peter John 
Franco Carlevero v. P. Limniotis & Sons Ltd, Civil Action no. 610/2004). In another 
case involving the sale of a car to a consumer, the consumer succeeded in avoiding 
the contract both on the ground of undue influence and on the ground of fraud; the 
seller sold the consumer a car involved in an accident (which he previously repaired) 
and represented it to the consumer as one which had never been involved in accident 
before and had no mechanical or other problems (Valentina Koursoumpa v. Marios 
Satsias, Civil Action no. 189/2005) 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Given the existence of Sections 14 to 20, Cap.149 mentioned above, there is no acute 
need to develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial 
practices. A contract entered into as a result of an aggressive practice can potentially 
be avoided by operation of the provisions of Cap.149 on coercion and undue influence. 
Likewise, a contract entered into as a result of a misleading practice can potentially be 
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avoided by operation of the provisions of Cap.149 on misrepresentation or fraud. 
Indeed, under certain circumstances, even misleading omissions can qualify as fraud 
or misrepresentation under Cap.149. It is worth noting that according to Section 
18(b), Cap.149, any breach of duty that (even unintentionally) misleads another to his 
or her detriment qualifies as misrepresentation rendering the contract voidable. One 
such duty can obviously be the duty of traders to provide to consumers all material 
information imposed on them by Section 6(1) of the law transposing the UCPD 
(corresponding to Article 7(1) of the UCPD).  
On other hand, the relevant contract law provisions which apply to B2B and B2C 
contracts alike are subject to certain limitations. For example, by virtue of Section 
18(3), in case of misrepresentation or omission amounting to fraud, the contract is not 
voidable if the party complaining about the misrepresentation or omission could 
discover the truth by exercising usual care. If the breach of the UCPD (which is a B2C-
focused measure and thus relies on the notion of the consumer as the weaker party) 
were linked to contractual consequences, it is likely that a more consumer-friendly 
approach would be followed that does not burden the consumer with duties of 
attempting to discover the truth.  
Moreover, the fact that the UCPD is not specifically associated with a right of private 
action is considered as a major disadvantage by almost all interviewed stakeholders. 
This means either that the relevance of the above-discussed provisions of Cap.149 is 
not fully appreciated by stakeholders who are not lawyers after all or that a consumer-
specific right of private redress, (be it contractual or tortious) is considered by them to 
have the potential of increasing the effectiveness of the UCPD and hence, the level of 
consumer protection.  
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts Law, Law 93(I)/96 transposes into 
Cyprus law, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts largely verbatim except from a couple of very recent amendments to the 
Cypriot law which are not derived from the Directive. Law 93(I)/96 has first appeared 
in case law in around 2007,3 that is, ten years after it passed into law. Case law does 
exist but is rather limited and reveals  that there are gaps in the understanding of the 
philosophy and aim of the law on the part of courts and lawyers representing 
consumers and also limited knowledge or at least, use of the relevant case law of the 
CJEU which does not find representation in Cypriot case law.4  
It is noteworthy that no court ruling involves a thorough application of the principle-
based approach in Section 5(1), Law 93(I)/96 or an application of all relevant factors 
listed in Section 5(2), Law 93(I)/96 (corresponding to Article 4(1), UCTD) and Section 
5(3), Law 93(I)/96 (corresponding to Recital 16, UCTD, which refers to the factors 
relevant to the requirement of good faith). The few relevant Cyprus Supreme Court 
judgements exhaust the application of the test in a few lines stating that there has not 
3  Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limted v Vasileiou Koupa and others, legal action no. 4162/06. 
4  Christiana Markou, “Consumer Contracts an Unfair Terms: the Cypriot Reality”, Conference ‘Civil law and 
economic crisis’, 8/5/2015, European University Cyprus, Cultural Centre. In the case Vasileiou Koupa, 
supra n.11, the court said that because the consumer signed the contract and did not dispute his or her 
signature, the consumer is estopped from putting forward allegations with regards to the existence of 
unfair terms in the said contract. 
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been any bad faith or undue influence in agreeing upon the terms and that therefore, 
the terms cannot be regarded as unfair (Syrimi v. Pancyprian Finance Public Co Ltd 
(2010) 1(Β) C.L.R. 1131). This ruling has been followed by the Supreme Court in 
subsequent cases mainly concerning investment plans and contracts of loan financing 
the participation of investors in the plan and suggest that in the absence of specific 
evidence of bad faith (or absence of good faith), any allegations relating to unfair 
contract terms are rejected by Cyprus courts (Gregoriou Gregoris ν. Euroinvestment 
Finance Ltd, (2011) 1 C.L.R. 2229; Giorgos Koullapis ν. National Bank of Greece 
(Cyprus) Ltd, Appeal No. 141/2010; Antonis Georgiou ν. ELLINAS FINANCE LTD and 
others., Appeal No. 351/2010). Another decision by the Cyprus Supreme Court 
concerned a standard loan agreement and term therein giving the bank an unfettered 
right to terminate the agreement at any time and without notice (FRAKAPOR COURIER 
LTD, ΠΡΩΗΝ FRAKAPOR COURRIER LTD κ.α. ν. Bank of Cyprus, Civil Appeal no. 
9/2011, 15/6/2016). The argument about the unfairness of the term has again been 
rejected on the ground that the plaintiffs-appellants have not put before the court any 
evidence of bad faith. Remarkably, this is a decision in which the court did inquire into 
the unfairness test of the law by reference to the corresponding provision in the UCTD 
while the plaintiffs-borrowers were a company, i.e., not a consumer meaning that the 
relevant law was inapplicable and should not have been examined at all. 
Also lower courts confine themselves to a very quick reference to the relevant law 
stating that in the absence of an allegation that the consumer entered into the 
contract involuntarily, the law can afford the consumer no defence to claims by 
financial institutions (National Bank of Greece (Cyprus) Ltd ν. Theokli Livadioti estate 
companies Ltd and others, Case No. 1973/2012) 
Various rulings of lower courts reveal limited understanding of the law. More 
specifically, there are rulings opining that from the moment the claimant does not 
dispute their signature on the agreement or because they knew of the terms 
beforehand and did not seek to negotiate them, they are estopped from raising an 
issue of unfair contract terms (Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd v. Vasiliou Koupa 
and others, Case No: 4162/06, 23 of January, 2007; Nicoletta Evdokimou, minor via 
parent and natural guardians of Evdokimou and Marias Evdokimou ν. PASCAL 
EDUCATION [LARNACA] LTD, Case No: 30/2010, 30/4/2014).  
Quite a few rulings have been given in the context of applications by financial 
institutions seeking registration of an arbitration award with the respondents often 
alleging that the arbitration clause that resulted in the dispute being decided by an 
arbitrator is unfair. These allegations have invariably been rejected with the courts 
which have emphasised that any such allegations should have been raised in the 
context of an appeal against the arbitration award (or decision) under Section 52, Law 
22/85 and not in the context of an application for the registration of the arbitration 
award in relation to which there are only limited grounds of objections (Limassol Co-
operative Savings Society LTD ν. YIANNOS HADJIMITSIS MOTORS LIMITED κ.α., 
General Application no.639/14, 18/5/2016; Limassol Co-operative Credit Society Ltd, 
ν. PANIKOS STYLIANOU and others, General Application no. 59 /15, 29/10/2015; Co-
operative Central Bank LTD ν. Sotiri Kaplani and others, General Application no. 
158/2014, 2/4/2015).  
Several applications seeking a reference of the case to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the application of the unfair contracts terms law have been filed both in the 
context of appeals against arbitral decisions and in the context of applications for 
registration of arbitral decisions but have been rejected on the ground that they did 
not meet the conditions governing such referrals to the CJEU (Limassol Semi-serine 
Co-operative Credit Society ν. Phani Michael and others, general application no: 
240/13, 27/4/2015; Aggeliki Taki Charalampous and others ν. Limassol Co-operative 
Savings Society Ltd, Joint Applications/Appeals, 115/13, 114/13 363/13, 25/2/2016). 
Overall, Law 93(I)/96 has successfully been invoked only in very limited cases before 
the courts of Cyprus something that indicates that it is rather of limited effectiveness. 
There only appears to be one court ruling (by a lower court) which found a contract 
term unfair and thus non-binding (Menelaos Herakleous, case no 492/08, 12/1/2009) 
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and another more recent one in which a lower court has granted an interim injunction 
having adopted the CJEU in C-26/13 Kasler and Rabai. This case was against the bank 
and concerned a loan in Swiss-Francs (Christakis Chysostomou and others ν. Hellenic 
Bank Public Company Ltd, Civil Action no. 4274/15, 30/9/2016) 
The Regulator has issued a total of fifty (50) decisions on the law transposing the 
UCTD (Law 93(I)/96). All of those decisions however were issued between 2014 and 
2016, something that confirms the fact that all of the previous years the law was not 
being utilised. It is worth noting that forty seven (475) of those decisions concerned 
terms in contracts for the sale of immovable property, two (2) concerned terms in a 
loan agreement between borrowers and a bank, and another one involved terms in a 
telecommunications contract between an electronic communications service provider 
and its customers, which is discussed below in this report. All of the decisions involved 
a finding of unfairness, however the Regulator has never sought an injunction through 
filing a relevant court application and therefore, these decisions have not been of any 
practical effectiveness. This is reinforced by the fact that there is also no 
administrative sanction that is imposed on traders when they are found to have used 
unfair contract terms. In fact, the Regulator had been under the impression that its 
decisions with regards to unfair contract terms comprise administrative decisions 
having immediate and binding effects on the party against which they were issued 
who would therefore have to comply with them. The Cyprus administrative court 
however has recently ruled that Law 93(I)/96 (transposing the UCTD) and in particular 
Section 9 which lays down the procedure for the protection of collective consumer 
interests, does not confer on the Regulator a power to decide on the unfairness of 
contract terms but only to ask a civil court, namely the competent District Court 
(through an application for an injunction) to do so, should it consider that a contract 
term is unfair. Accordingly, the administrative court has, in the context of that ruling, 
rejected an application for the judicial review against the Decision 56/2015 of the 
Regulator on the ground that the said Decision does not comprise an administrative 
action or decision with immediate and binding effects and is thus not amenable to 
judicial review (ALPHA BANK CYPRUS LTD ν. Cyprus Trade, Industry, Tourism and 
Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism and 
others, Case No. 1549/15, 30/6/2016). 
It should be added that the Regulator emphasised the fact that the concept of ‘good 
faith’ is an unknown legal concept in common law countries such as Cyprus and this 
presents difficulties in the application of the unfair contract terms law. Indeed, one 
notices that in many of the older decisions of the Regulator, good faith is mentioned 
but never analyzed or specifically applied. More recently however, the Regulator took 
the view that the content of the requirement of ‘good faith’ is the one adopted in 
continental civil law countries such as Greece and Germany and has thus started to 
apply the relevant requirement by citing rulings of Greek and German courts. This 
approach is most obvious in the Decision 56/2015 against Alpha Bank Ltd. The 
Financial Services Ombudsman stated that it follows the same approach, i.e., resorting 
to the principles of good faith as exemplified in civil law systems. In the literature, it is 
stated that the relevant requirement should indeed be interpreted by reference to 
European and continental standards, an approach that is also adopted by English law.5 
Finally, it should be stated that unlike the Cyprus courts, the Regulator frequently 
refers to and relies on the relevant case law of the CJEU. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
5  Polyvios Polyviou, The Law of Contracts, Kypriakes and Kyprologikes Publications House, 2014 at pp.441-
444. 
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Case law does not reveal a substantial use of the indicative list by the courts. 
However, in one case, a term allowing the bank to alter the interest in a loan 
agreement has been found not to be unfair despite the fact that it was too general and 
vague (BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD ν. ANDREA ANDREOU CHR. alias 
ANDREA CHR. ANDREOU and others, case no. 1331/2008, 30/10/2014). The court’s 
opinion has been influenced by para 2(b) of the Annex to the law (corresponding to 
para 2(b) of the Annex to the UCTD). As paras 2(a) and (b) of the Annex tended to be 
perceived as ‘exceptions from unfairness’ to the benefit of financial service providers 
whose relevant contract terms tended as a result to be considered permissible, Law 
136(I)/2014 amended Law 93(I)/96 thereby deleting paras 2(a) and (b) of the Annex. 
The fact that the said paragraphs were considered as inappropriately lowering the 
level of consumer protection in the domain of financial services is explicitly stated in 
the said amending law which deleted and removed them from the main law. 
By contrast, the Regulator makes heavy use of the indicative list. More specifically, the 
Regulator issued a total of fifty (50) decisions involving the UCTD and all of them 
involved an application of the list by an operation of which several terms at issue were 
found to be unfair. The Regulator considers the list as a very useful tool in the 
application of the unfair contract terms law, though the Regulator appreciates that it is 
not a black list 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
As the UCTD has been transposed almost verbatim in Cyprus, the list of terms in the 
Cypriot transposition law is stated to be indicative just as in the Directive. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In the few cases where a term has been found by the court to be unfair (this research 
only located one such case, UNIVERSAL BANK PUBLIC LTD ν. HERACLEOUS 
MENELAOS, Case No.: 4923/08, 12 January, 2009), no extension to any contract 
other than the one involved in the particular case has been made. The matter is not 
expressly tackled in the law and the cases finding a term as unfair are first instance 
rulings and not ones of the Cyprus Supreme Court. Rulings of the Cyprus Supreme 
Court would operate as binding precedent to be followed by courts dealing with 
subsequent similar cases, yet given the ‘good faith’ requirement which requires an 
inquiry into the specific facts of each case, it is unlikely that a previous court finding of 
unfairness will lead to similar or even, identical terms automatically being found unfair 
in subsequent cases.  
The above observations refer to findings of unfairness in the context of civil legal 
actions and not to findings of unfairness in the context of an injunction application. As 
for the latter, the Regulator has confirmed during the interview, that there has never 
been an injunction issued for unfair contract terms. However, the law allows for such 
an injunction to be sought against multiple traders and even associations of traders 
(Article 9 (6), the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Law 93(I)/1996).  
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 • The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
In case law, the contractual transparency requirements contained in Section 7, Law 
93(I)/96 have only been applied once and that was in the only case in which the term 
has been found to be unfair and non-binding, UNIVERSAL BANK PUBLIC LTD ν. 
HERACLEOUS MENELAOS, Case No. 4923/08, 12 January, 2009. It was about a term 
affording the bank the freedom to increase the interest charged in the context of a 
loan agreement. The bank relied on that term claiming an interest higher than the one 
stated in the agreement. The court opined that the term was so vague and unclear 
that the court could not give a clear interpretation of it. As a result, the court found 
the term to be non-binding, something that meant that the bank was only entitled to 
the interest stated in the agreement (9%) and not to the interest as increased by the 
bank in reliance on the aforementioned relevant term (11.25%). 
The Regulator on the other hand applies the contractual transparency requirements in 
the majority of its decisions involving an application of the UCTD and considers a 
violation of them as rendering the relevant terms as ‘non-transparent’ (see for 
example, 2016 /62(ΚΡ), 21/01/2016, Alpha Panareti Public Ltd). It should be stressed 
out that the Regulator expressed uncertainty over whether a violation of the 
requirements of transparency amount to unfairness or is just a factor to be taken into 
account when applying the principle-based test of the law. However, in one of its 
recent decisions, namely Decision 56/2015 against Alpha Bank Ltd, the Regulator has 
adopted the view of the Highest Greek Court that the lack of transparency leads to a 
significant imbalance contrary to the requirement of good faith.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
No such extension has been put in place in Cyprus. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
As it arises from the answers to the previous questions, there is not much evidence as 
to how the sanction of non-binding terms works in practice but the practical effect of 
the ‘unfairness’ finding of the court in HERACLEOUS MENELAOS, Case No.4923/08 is 
described in the answer to the fifth question of section 1.2.1 of this report. As for 
whether the national courts take up the active role imposed by the CJEU, the answer 
is that they do not. Except the one case in which the court found a term to be unfair, 
there is no other case in which the court has examined the fairness of contract terms 
on its own initiative. On the contrary, there is case law indicating that the courts seem 
to take the view that this is a matter that cannot be examined if not raised. These are 
cases in which the court refused to examine the issue of unfairness because it was not 
pleaded in the appeal notice or because in the context of an application to set aside a 
judgement in default against the applicant, this applicant has not adequately justified 
or given enough details of the alleged unfairness (Kallikas Yiannakis ν. Hellenic Bank 
Ltd, (2010) 1 CLR. 1238; HELLENIC BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LTD ν. ANDRONIKOU 
EVAGORA ANDRONIKOU alias ANDRONICOS EVAGORA and others., case no: 3715/12, 
19/12/2013). Moreover, the CJEU case law imposing an ex officio invocation of 
unfairness does not find any representation in Cyprus case law (it is not mentioned at 
all), except in the ruling of the administrative court discussed in point 1 of section 
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1.2.1 of this report; in discussing the law transposing the UCTD (Law 93(I)/96) in the 
context of deciding an application for judicial review of a relevant decision of the 
Regulator, the administrative court simply referred to CJEU case law referring to the 
ex officio role of courts in invoking unfairness. 
It should be stressed out however that it is a deeply-rooted civil procedure rule in 
Cyprus that the hearing must take place strictly in accordance with the pleadings and 
that the courts cannot examine issues not pleaded by the parties (Courtis and others 
v. Iassonides (1970) 1 C.L.R. 180). The CJEU guidance that says otherwise is not 
sufficient as the relevant case law is not put before the courts by the parties and is 
thus easily missed by the courts. In a future amendment of the Directive, the 
obligation of the courts to examine the fairness of contract terms in their own initiative 
should be made express so that it appears expressly in the national (transposition) 
laws.  
As already stated, there is no administrative remedy in this area for consumers. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No best practices in Cyprus. Cyprus lawyers and judges would appreciate education 
initiatives designed to update them with regards to the application of the UCTD 
especially given that the ‘fairness’ control of contract terms in Cyprus solely derives 
from the UCTD and there is therefore no (general) experience with the use or 
application of similar legal tests. As for consumers, the emphasis should indeed be 
placed on how terms and conditions (and other information) is presented to them so 
that the effectiveness of the various information and transparency duties imposed by 
EU law can be improved. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
No relevant evidence exists for Cyprus though given that the law has only recently 
started becoming known and being utilised, it is unlikely that issues relating to its 
uniform implementation across the EU have affected the behaviour of businesses or 
consumers. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Please see answer to the previous question. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
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Please refer to the answer to the first question of 1.2.2. It should be added however 
that on a theoretical level, any disparities between national laws relating to trade tend 
to adversely affect cross-border trade, in the case of the UCTD, because it will require 
a trader to draft and use different contracts depending on the Member State in which 
he or she intends to sell his or her product. Alternatively, traders will have to deal with 
the uncertainty regarding whether their contracts will be considered legally-compliant 
and acceptable in a given Member State, something that tends to discourage freedom 
of movement. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Given that the use of the UCTD is still not very mature even in the B2C context, there 
is acute need to improve the utilisation and practical effects of the law in that context 
and no discussions took place on any need to strengthen the protection of businesses. 
The stakeholders interviewed expressed no particular views on this matter. 
  
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
There are no factors making this particular system of protection not appropriate for 
B2B transactions. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
No, as according to stakeholders, this would be a rather paternalistic approach. The 
Regulator is generally of the opinion that businesses are not in any particular need for 
protection. Moreover, the said approach could also be considered to entail an 
inappropriate intervention in the freedom to trade and conduct business. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Credit agreements can contain terms that could be presumed to be unfair and these 
include vague interest alteration clauses, terms conferring on the banks the right to 
terminate the contract at any time and without reason, and terms that permit banks 
to calculate the annual interest in the context of a loan agreement by taking a year to 
consist of 360 instead of 365 days. Potentially unfair contract terms also exist in 
agreements concerning the listing of businesses in magazines or websites comparable 
to the Yellow Pages. Those often contain terms providing for the automatic renewal of 
the listing in return for a fee – terms which are in fine print and lack transparency so 
that the business is surprised when the company administering the magazine or 
websites asks to be paid the listing fee and claims to be entitled to it based on such 
“hidden” terms. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
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The need is certainly not as acute as in B2C transactions. However, if the protection of 
the UCTD were to be extended to B2B transactions, such transparency requirements 
must inevitably be part of the overall unfairness test. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
It could bring benefits only because certain Member States do have a system of 
protection comparable to the UCTD for B2B transactions. The remedying of this lack of 
uniformity would certainly benefit cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Yes, as it would certainly strengthen the position of SMEs vis-à-vis large enterprises. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
This question is not amenable to a simple answer as it would require in-depth 
economic and other analysis. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?6  
The injunction procedure has never been utilised in Cyprus. There is no relevant case 
law. The Regulator has asked the attorney-general’s office which represents the 
government to file one such application for an injunction against a bank based on its 
Decision No. 56/2015 according to which fifteen contract terms in its credit 
agreements have been found unfair under the law transposing the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive. The first such application is, according to the Regulator, expected to 
be filed soon. The other qualified entities in Cyprus are two consumer protection 
associations, both of which have been interviewed and have stated that they do not 
possess the resources or necessary know-how to proceed with any such application to 
the court. Most of the consumer complaints received by them are referred to the 
Regulator. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
As already mentioned, the injunction procedure has not been tested at all in Cyprus. 
Yet, according to the Regulator, all of the above measures are of particular 
6  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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effectiveness. It should be added that the summary procedure is of utmost importance 
and can be regarded as particularly effective. Legal proceedings in Cyprus are 
notoriously slow and thus comprise a weak incentive for compliance with the law. The 
summary procedure required by the Directive ensures that injunctions will be able to 
be secured fast, something that understandably also increases the effectiveness of the 
prior consultation process. The effects of the injunction order are also particularly 
effective. Section 6 of the law transposing the Injunctions Directive states that a 
violation of an injunction amounts to a contempt of court pursuant to the Courts Law, 
Law 14/60. Section 42 of Law 14/60 empowers the court, amongst others, to impose 
a fine or imprisonment on persons who have intentionally failed to comply with a court 
order and also to order the payment of compensation to any person who suffered 
damage as a result.  
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
No it has not. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Please see answer to first question in this section of the report where it is stated that 
the procedure has not yet been utilised in Cyprus. There have been three amendments 
to the original law, the latter having taken place in 2015. All three of them merely 
purported to add a law into the Annex I to the law. The 2008 amendment added the 
unfair commercial practices law, the 2010 amendment added the law transposing the 
Services Directive and the 2015 amendment added Law 133(I)/2013 transposing the 
Consumer Rights Directive.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
No need for an extension of the Injunctions Directive by including additional legislation 
into Annex I has been identified by stakeholders, yet the said Annex I could potentially 
accommodate all EU legislation in the area of consumer protection.  
The measures that are primarily needed to improve the effectiveness of the ID in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in Cyprus are primarily measures 
aiming at the education of the Regulator, qualified authorities and the attorney-
general’s office on the injunction procedure as such education is understandably a 
condition precedent to its utilisation in the first place.  
As already stated, stakeholders do not consider that business protection should be 
improved and therefore, they have not pointed towards the need to extend the scope 
of the ID to the protection of collective business’ interests. Businesses have the means 
to protect themselves and can utilise standard injunction procedures to guard their 
interests, the need for an authority or qualified entity to do that on their behalf 
collectively being less acute.  
Moreover, by collectively protecting consumer interests especially against unfair 
commercial practices and unfair contract terms, the current ID also simultaneously 
(and inevitably) protects collective business interests (in the sense that unfair 
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commercial practices, for example harm not only consumer interests but also 
(indirectly) the interests of competitors.  
Of course, in Member States where small or medium-sized businesses qualify as 
consumers the current scope of the ID can already directly protect their collective 
interests. In Cyprus, no business can qualify as a consumer and therefore, the 
extension of the ID to collective business interests would make a material difference. 
Yet, given that there is not at EU level a body of legislation specifically aiming at 
protecting business interests (comparably to the body of consumer protection 
legislation), the potential in practice of such an extension of the scope of the ID 
sounds highly uncertain for the time being. In any event, the MCAD lays down a 
distinct injunction procedure, which does not find representation in Cyprus case law 
however, yet it is very similar to that laid down in the ID (Sections 7-9 of the Control 
of Misleading and Comparative Advertisements Law 92(I)/2000). 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
No experience at all in Cyprus. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
No experience at all in Cyprus. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
No experience at all in Cyprus. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
It is regulated separately in the law transposing the Injunctions Directive. The laws 
transposing the UCPD, the UCTD and the Consumer Rights Directive have been added 
in the Annex to the law transposing the Injunctions Directive however. So, while the 
laws transposing the UCPD, the UCTD and the Consumer Rights Directive have been 
added to the Annex to the Injunctions Directive, the provisions on the injunction 
procedure existing in the said individual measures have been retained. In the law 
transposing the UCTD, the provision allowing persons having an interest in the 
protection of consumer interests (e.g. consumer associations) to utilise the injunction 
procedure has been deleted by the amending Law 95(I)/2007, however, the 
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corresponding provisions in the laws transposing the UCPD (Section 16, Law 
103(I)/2007) and the Consumer Rights Directive (Section 29, Law 133(I)/2007) have 
been retained. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The injunction procedures in the law transposing the UCPD, the UCTD and the 
Consumer Rights Directive are almost identical and they are largely the same with 
Section 5 of the law transposing the ID. The same has also been observed by the 
administrative court in the case of ALPHA BANK CYPRUS LTD ν. Cyprus Trade, 
Industry, Tourism and Consumer Protection of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, 
Industry and Tourism and others, Case No. 1549/15, 30/6/2016 where the court 
stated that injunction procedures in the law transposing the ID and in that transposing 
the UCTD do not differ materially. It is worth noting that the said court ruling (which is 
in the sphere of administrative law) is the only one in Cyprus referring to the Law 
transposing the ID. Certain differences between the individual injunction procedures 
and the ID procedure do exist, the main one being that the injunction procedure of the 
ID has a prior consultation obligation imposed on the qualified entity which is to apply 
to the court for an order, which does not exist in the injunction procedures of the 
three individual Directives. This comprises an obvious source of conflict as when the 
Regulator bases an application for an injunction on the relevant provisions of one of 
the individual Directives such as the UCTD, it seems uncertain whether the Regulator 
will have to comply with the prior consultation obligation of the law transposing the 
ID. The administrative court in the aforementioned case stated that the provisions of 
the law transposing the ID complements and particularise the injunction-related 
provisions of the law transposing the UCTD, yet this approach seems to regard the 
general ID law as lex specilis to the laws transposing the individual Directives. The 
issue can only be resolved by the civil courts (and conclusively by the Cyprus Supreme 
Court) but understandably this will not happen before the first injunction application is 
filed with the competent civil court by the Regulator. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
No quantitative evidence is available for Cyprus but the Regulator expressed the 
opinion that there are certainly benefits for consumers. To the extent that the 
consumers invoke these rights through a complaint to the Regulator there are no 
particular costs for consumers, yet consumer expectations are frustrated when they 
are informed that the Regulator can only take administrative action and/or seek an 
injunction and not order the trader to pay compensation to the consumer or 
order/enforce a solution to a given private dispute. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
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eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
No quantitative evidence is available for Cyprus but the Regulator expressed the view 
that traders tend to view the rules stemming from the Directives as hostile to their 
interests and do not seem to appreciate any benefits. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
No quantitative evidence is available for Cyprus but traders are naturally burdened by 
the costs inherent in the taking of legal advice and the time necessary for them to 
comply with the Directives. It should be stressed out however that there is not a 
mature consumer protection culture in Cyprus and many traders do not invest in legal 
compliance beforehand. Compliance is rather achieved on a ‘trial and error’ basis, that 
is, if the Regulator or other stakeholder approaches them with particular evidence of 
lack of compliance (for example, because there has been a complaint), they will 
respond to that and probably, correct their specific practice.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
No quantitative evidence is available for Cyprus but the Regulator emphasised that the 
costs involved are high in the sense that they have limited resources and are also 
understaffed. This would seem to explain a self-regulatory body’s allegation stating 
that cases of violations are examined and decided upon by the Regulator very slowly – 
a year or more may pass before the Regulator issues a relevant decision. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
No such indications were provided by stakeholders 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
It seems that there is no room for further reduction of the costs inherent in the 
implementation and enforcement of the rules of the Directives covered by the study 
given that the Regulator has stated that they already have very limited resources. A 
solution to improve cost-effectiveness is to take better advantage of self-regulation. A 
very active self-regulatory body interviewed (the Cyprus Advertising Regulation 
Organisation) indicated that it takes them 10 to 15 days to issue a decision on the 
fairness or acceptability of advertising. They also stated that their members and even 
non-members comply with their decisions. In this respect, the Regulator could refer 
cases falling within the scope of the UCPD to self-regulation and only step in 
afterwards and only provided that the speedy intervention and decision-issuing of the 
self-regulatory body provides no solution to the manner. Currently, self-regulation is 
not exploited in such a matter. According to the self-regulatory body interviewed, 
there has only been one case in relation to which there has been some co-operation 
between them and the Regulator that involved the manner in which terms and 
conditions applicable to commercial offers should be presented in TV advertisements.  
On a more general note, stakeholders and in particular, the Regulator, the European 
Consumer Centre (ECC) and a consumer protection association pointed to the fact that 
consumer protection legislation exists in a piecemeal fashion (distributed amongst 
various statutes). They perceive this as a weakness of the law and called for a single 
consumer protection legislative act similar to the approach followed in Greece. In their 
opinion, this approach would make enforcement easier and more cost-effective and 
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would also facilitate consumer education, thereby improving the effectiveness of 
consumer protection rules. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
No statistics are available but much of the case law on the UCTD involves contracts of 
financial services particularly credit agreements and share investment plans. Also, the 
most important decision of the Regulator on the UCTD, namely Decision 56/2015 
involved foreign-currency loan agreements. Moreover, the Financial Services 
Ombudsman interviewed stated that in almost all of its decisions, the Ombudsman 
refers and/or applies the UCTD. It has to be noted however that these cases did not 
involve financial services falling with the sector-specific Directives relevant to this 
study, namely Directive 2002/65/EC and Directive 2008/48/EC. 
The Regulator also applied the UCTD in a case against an electronic communications 
service provider and found terms furnishing the provider with an unfettered discretion 
to amend contract conditions as unfair (2014/16(ΚΡ), 30/10/14, Cablenet 
Communication Systems Ltd). No application of the UCTD has been made in the 
sectors of energy and passenger transport.  
Case law on the UCPD is extremely limited and mostly consists of judicial review 
applications against administrative decisions of the Regulator. The Regulator issued a 
total of forty one (41) decisions on the UCPD and very few of them concerned the 
regulated sectors. More specifically, Decision 3/2012, Cyromania Group Ltd, 
15/6/2012, concerned an advertising sign in a petrol station stating that the relevant 
trader was offering the cheapest prices for fuel, something which was proved to be 
untrue. The Regulator found that the use of the sign constituted a misleading action 
contrary to Section 5(2)(d) of Law 103(I)/2007 which corresponds to Article 6(1)(d) of 
the UCPD.  
There have also been a few decisions in the electronic communications sector against 
telecommunication companies for persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone 
(a black-listed aggressive practice) (Decision 43/2015, MTN Cyprus Ltd) and for 
misleading actions with regards to how special offers relating to telephony services or 
the content of cable TV services were advertised or presented (Decision 5/2015, MTN 
Cyprus Ltd; Decision 18/2014, CYTA). Another decision of the Regulator found a 
misleading omission contrary to Section 6 of Law 103(I)/2007, which corresponds to 
Article 7 of the UCPD specifically on the ground that the provider was inviting 
consumers to use its voicemail service without disclosing the fact there were charges 
involved (Decision 19/2014, MTN Cyprus Ltd).  
The Regulator also applied the UCPD in one case falling within the financial services 
sector specifically with regards to an announcement by the Bank of Cyprus about a 
new upgrade to its electronic platform for the administration of transactions including 
loan repayments. The announcement gave the impression that there would not be any 
effects on the economic position of customers as a result of the introduction of this 
new system while in fact it led to a small increase in the APR to the benefit of the 
bank. As a result of the investigative proceedings conducted by the Regulator, the 
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bank refunded all extra charges to the customers. The Regulator still found an unfair 
commercial practice (specifically a misleading action) contrary to Sections 4(1) and 
4(2)(c) in conjunction with Section 5 of Law 103(1)/2007 which correspond to Articles 
5(1), 5(4)(a) and 6 of the UCPD (Decision 2/2015, Bank of Cyprus Public Company 
Ltd). Again, this case did not involve a service governed by the sector-specific 
Directives relevant to this study. 
Business and consumer associations showed particular awareness of the relevance of 
horizontal consumer legislation, specifically the UCTD, in the sector of financial 
services. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
For financial services in general, the competent (supervisory) authority is the Central 
Bank of Cyprus, though it arose from the interview that the Central Bank of Cyprus 
does not consider itself as having a (statutory) power to deal with consumer 
protection issues. Before the Financial Services Commissioner has started receiving 
complaints against banks, the Central Bank of Cyprus was receiving complaints from 
customers of commercial banks and was asking for the position of the commercial 
bank involved, which was then being forwarded to the complainant. In 21/12/2015, 
the Central Bank announced that it was no longer to be receiving complaints with 
regards to private disputes between banks and their customers and that any such 
complaints would have to be submitted to the Financial Services Commissioner.  
It should be clarified however that for the financial services sector that falls within the 
scope of Directives 2002/65/EC and 2008/48/EC, the authority responsible is the 
same as the one responsible for the horizontal EU consumer law, i.e. the Regulator.7 
In relation to the latter however, the duties and powers of the Regulator are stated to 
be subject to the provisions of the banking legislation which designates the Central 
Bank of Cyprus as the competent supervisory authority.8 This comprises a clear source 
of overlap calling for some institutionalised arrangement for co-operation or authority-
sharing. However, given that the Regulator examined no case relating to the law 
transposing 2008/48/EC and the Central Bank of Cyprus does not consider to itself to 
have a power to deal with consumer protection issues, there has not been a case in 
which the issue arose as to how competence between the two authorities is shared in 
practice and no relevant conflict has arisen.  
In the passenger transport sector, the Department of Civil Aviation and the 
Department of Merchant Shipping are the relevant public enforcement authorities in 
relation to the rights of air passengers and sea and inland waterway passengers 
respectively. The latter has not published any decisions and has not dealt with any 
relevant complaint as yet. Still, in 2015, the Implementation of European Community 
Regulations and European Community Decisions Law of 2007, Law 78(I)/2007 was 
amended introducing a mechanism of imposition of administrative fines in case of 
infringement of certain provisions of Regulation 1177/2010.9 
In relation to air passengers, during 2015, the Department of Civil Aviation received a 
total of 293 complaints. More generally, the vast majority of the complaints that are 
7  This derives from Section 19 and Section 2 of Law 242(I)/2004, which transposes Directive 2002/65/EC 
into Cyprus law and Sections 2, 21-27 of Law 106(I)/2010 which transposes Directive 2008/48/EC into 
Cyprus law. 
8  Section 21, Law 106(I)/2010. 
9 The amending act is the Implementation of European Community Regulations and European Community 
Decisions Regulations of 2015, P.I. 195/2015. 
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received by the said Department relate to Regulation 261/200410 and as it arises from 
an earlier annual report of the Department, these mainly relate to flight delays or 
cancellations and boarding refusals. 11 Notably, since the ruling of the CJEU in the 
cases C-145/15 and C-146/15, the Department of Civil Aviation informs complaints 
that the Department is not responsible for the application of Article 16 of the 
Regulation and does not therefore have to take measures forcing the air carrier to pay 
the compensation provided for by the Regulation. It seems that the Department did 
not get to deal with the price transparency provisions of the Regulation and, as the 
relevant stakeholder has informed us, when a complaint pertains to consumer 
protection, they ask the complainant to contact the Regulator instead. The European 
Consumer Centre Cyprus (ECC Cyprus) has an increased activity in the domain, given 
that from the total of complaints received by the Centre in 2015, 39% referred to 
transport services, in particular air transport and car rentals.12 The Centre believes 
that air carriers often invoke the existence of emergency circumstances to justify 
delays and refuse compensation and that this comprises a deficiency of the 
Regulation. 
For bus and coach transport regular services, the competent public authority is the 
Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works but it does not have any substantial 
activity with regards to the handling of complaints under Regulation 181/2011. 
Passengers must first complain to the bus or coach company and can resort to the 
enforcement authority only if they are unsatisfied by the action taken by the company. 
As it arises from the report of the relevant Ministry published in compliance with 
Article 29 of the Regulation,13 the Ministry monitors compliance with the Regulation 
through a system of management and control of the public contracts awarded (by the 
Ministry) to the various  companies that operate buses and coaches providing regular 
transportation services. The vast majority of the complaints concerns the behaviour of 
company personnel, while in relation to intercity services, complaints most frequently 
relate to overbooking. Complaints are dealt with by the companies and the sanctions 
imposed are communicated to the Ministry.14 The enforcement authority in relation to 
bus and coach occasional services is the Department for Road Transport of the 
Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works and has, during 2013-214, received 
no complaints against companies provision occasional bus or coach transportation 
services.15 
In the area of electronic communications, the responsible authority is the Office of the 
Commissioner of Electronic Communications and Postal Regulation. In the context of 
their interview, they have stated that they have no competence to apply any of the 
rules stemming from the horizontal Directives which are the focus of this study. When 
they receive complaints relating to these rules they refer them to the Regulator. One 
example they gave concerned a practice of an electronic communications service 
provider which charged consumers an extra fee if they decided to pay their bill at the 
cashier desk of the company instead of electronically. They considered this complaint 
to relate to the means of payment rather than to the service itself and as such, as 
falling outside the scope of competence of the Commissioner.  
10 Department of Civil Aviation, Annual Report 
2015,http://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/dca/dca.nsf/All/B84FD938D76FF8D8C2257FFC001E3CCE/$file/ΕΤΗΣΙ
Α%20ΕΚΘΕΣΗ%202015.pdf at p.7. 
11 Ministry of Transport and Works, Department of Merchant Shipping-Annual Report 2011, 
http://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/mcw.nsf/All/5613B01D76A94AC0C2257A30002DE135/$file/%CE%95%CF
%84%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%95%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7%CE%
A5%CE%A3%CE%952011.pdf, pp.117-170 at p.121. 
12 ECC Cyprus, Annual Report 2015,https://issuu.com/ecc-
cyprus/docs/areport_eccc__15/29?e=8341200/36508786 at pp. 8, 12. 
13 Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works, Activity Report for the years of 2013-2014 of the 
Ministry of Transport, Communications and Works as body for the enforcement of the provisions of 
Regulation 181/2011 concerning the rights of passengers in bus and coach transport, 
https://www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/mcw.nsf/190426a57db2acf6c2257678002e2824/901026d36309b04ac225
7e700029c096?OpenDocument. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
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In the area of energy, the competent authority is the Energy Service of the Ministry of 
Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism but it has not engaged in substantial 
activity with regards to consumer protection as yet. So far, they have received only a 
few anonymous complaints which led to no official decision or the imposition of a fine. 
The only non-anonymous complaint they have received was by a competitor (rather 
than a consumer). The said complaint has been investigated but no violation of the 
relevant legislation was found. The relevant competent authority is now in the process 
of upgrading their website so that consumers will be able officially to submit 
complaints.  
There is no institutional arrangement for co-operation but the competent authorities 
unofficially co-operate, this co-operation mainly involving mutual consultation and 
each authority referring any cases that fall within the competence of another authority 
to that other authority. This has been confirmed by all competent authorities involved. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
The Regulator stated that there are grey areas and that relevant guidance with 
regards to the matters that specifically fall outside its competence (and within that of 
the sector-specific authorities) is necessary. This seems to be confirmed by the 
information given by the Office of the Commissioner of Electronic Communications and 
Postal Regulation. More specifically, the Commissioner referred to Section 20 of the 
Law on Electronic Communications and Postal Services Law, Law 112(I)/2004 which 
empowers the Commissioner to regulate all consumer protection issues pertaining to 
electronic communications by issuing decrees or decisions. On this basis, in 2013, the 
Commissioner issued a decree (the Consumer Protection Decree, 42/2013) with 
regards to the appropriate content of contracts between consumers and electronic 
communications service providers as well as the provision of information to consumers 
and complaint handling by relevant providers. Understandably, these matters are 
closely connected and even overlap with issues governed by the UCPD and the UCTD 
for which the Regulator is responsible.  
Overlap and confusion may also result because of Section 18 of Law 112(I)/2004 
which obliges the Commissioner to act in a way that promotes consumer interests 
especially with regards to the price and the quality of electronic communications 
services. The Commissioner referred to a Supreme Court judgement in a judicial 
review application against a decision of the Commissioner who, resolving a dispute 
between various electronic communications service providers, indirectly set the retail 
price of certain telecommunication services provided by one such provider with the 
largest market share to the rest. The Supreme Court annulled that decision opining 
that the Commissioner did not have the power to set retail prices (CYTA v the 
Commissioner of Electronic Communications and Postal Regulation, Case no. 
752/2006, 23/1/2008). The Commissioner perceives this judgement as urging the 
Commissioner to strictly confine its activity within the framework set by Law 
112(I)/2004, thereby indirectly asserting that the Commissioner should refrain from 
interfering with broader areas such as the one referring to unfair commercial 
practices. Still, some overlap that may cause confusion over the exact boundaries 
between the competence of the Regulator and that of the Commissioner does exist. 
This is confirmed by a decision of the Commissioner in a case that the Commissioner 
assumed competence while the matter at stake clearly comprised an unfair 
commercial practice. That case was about excessive charges incurred by consumers 
when they were replying to messages sent by a four-digit number administered by an 
electronic communications service provider. The Commissioner ordered the relevant 
provider to cease this practice and also refund all charges it received from consumers 
opining that the provider omitted to inform consumers about the terms of use 
including the relevant charges beforehand and has thus misled them contrary to 
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relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Decree 2013. The relevant decision is 
the Gravity Solutions Ltd, 23/9/2013. 
Overlaps between the UCPD and sector-specific legislation may also be observed with 
regards to the Regulations on passenger rights and the Directives on energy, to the 
extent that the latter contain rules relating to price transparency and the provision of 
information. The UCPD resolves any conflict as it specifically states that those sector-
specific rules shall prevail. Yet, as the Regulator has stated during the interview, the 
existing overlaps mean that it would be particularly useful, if not necessary, to provide 
guidance as to the exact issues that escape its competence.  
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
No quantitative information is available. However, the complementary application of 
the UCPD and the UCTD in the regulated sectors has clear benefits. First of all, these 
two Directives complete the protection afforded by sector-specific legislation by being 
there to fill in any gaps in the protection of consumers afforded by the sector-specific 
legislation which is not intended to  address comprehensively all potential consumer 
protection issues. On a different level, this complementary application can be of great 
assistance to the Regulator who is responsible for a vast variety of legislation and is 
thus expected to have to cope with increased workload. Especially in the area covered 
by the UCPD, the existing overlaps can mean that a significant amount of cases 
especially relating to the sector of passenger transport and having to do with price 
transparency issues and the provision of information to passengers, can be dealt with 
by other authorities, thereby lifting some of the burden of the  Regulator. It should be 
noted however that the sector-specific public enforcement authorities have not had to 
deal with issues relating to transparency and information so far.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
As is explained in the answer to the previous questions, the indisputable existence of 
overlaps between EU sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law creates the 
need for clarification, which can be given through guidance issued by the European 
Commission.  
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Businesses inviting consumers to sell their jewellery to them have recently seen 
growth in Cyprus but very soon afterwards most of them ceased to exist. ‘Electric 
appliances’ businesses also invite consumers to offer them their old appliance at a 
given price and buy a new one in the context of a single transaction. Other than those 
however, C2B is not very widespread in Cyprus and as a result the need or potential 
for the application of consumer law Directives in this context is not topical in Cyprus 
and is not being discussed. Some of the stakeholders required an explanation of the 
C2B concept. 
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Cyprus adopts the definition of the term ‘consumer’ exactly as is provided for in the 
Directives and has not extended that definition in any way. The narrow ‘consumer’ 
definition adopted in Cyprus reflects the view of stakeholders as derived from the 
interviews, namely that there is no pressing need to afford any special or additional 
protection to businesses.  
The definition of ‘consumer’ in the UCTD has been applied in recent court decisions 
and has led to the inapplicability of the UCTD on the ground that the party seeking to 
rely on it was not a ‘consumer’ but a professional or commercial party (Alpha Bank 
Cyprus Ltd ν. Paul Steven Smith and others., case no 870 / 2013, 29/7/2015; ΚΟΚΙΤΑ 
(ERGOSTASIO ZOOTROFON) LIMITED ν. GEORGIOU PROKOPI GEORGIOS, case no 
1718/2015, 22/2/2016) or a legal person (K. SPYROU GENERAL BUSSINESS LTD ν. 
ALPHA INSURANCE LTD, case no: 34/15, 25/5/2016). The Regulator on the other 
hand has in its Decision 56/2015, opined that the investment nature of a purchase 
does not exclude the ‘consumer’ label unless the person engages in investment 
systematically and for the purposes of profit or livelihood. 
As for the concept of ‘average consumer’, this is mentioned mainly in case law dealing 
with trademark-related disputes and is not defined in detail. The Regulator often refers 
to the said concept but it does not define it. When it does such as in Decision 
56/2015, it does not analyse or apply it. During the interview, the Regulator admitted 
to tend not to inquire into the details of the concept and explained that they apply the 
concept in a very consumer-friendly manner so that anything that could detrimentally 
affect the behaviour of a consumer who is not totally credulous or irresponsible, is 
considered an unfair commercial practice. In other words, the said concept is not 
applied rigidly at all.  
As for the concept of ‘vulnerable consumer’, this does not find representation in 
Cypriot case law and the same holds true in relation to the decisions of the Regulator. 
The Regulator referred to two decisions, namely Decision 56/2015 against Alpha Bank 
Cyprus Ltd (dealing with unfair contract terms) and Decision 1/2012 against Netsmart 
(Cyprus) Ltd (dealing with unfair commercial practices). In the first case the 
complainants were retired persons and the second concerned promotional contests or 
games addressed amongst others to children. In both of these decisions however, no 
connection is made with the concept of ‘vulnerable consumer’ which is not expressly 
mentioned, let alone analysed or applied. In the second case, no reference to 
‘children’ is made either.  
It is worth noting that the Code administered by the Cyprus Advertising Regulation 
Organisation contains an appendix specifically covering advertising directed to children 
which states that the Organisation will take into account the age and experience of 
children and that advertising which is acceptable for teenagers is not necessarily 
equally acceptable for younger children. 
It should be noted that as the Cyprus Advertising Regulation Organisation observed, 
the part of Article 5(3) of UCPD which states that ‘this is without prejudice to the 
common and legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or 
statements which are not meant to be taken literally’, has not been included in the 
Cypriot law transposing the UCPD. Stakeholders did not however point to any practical 
effects that this omission may have. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
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experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Given that the UCPD lays down a special test for vulnerable consumers, its rules are 
adequate in theory. As for their adequacy in practice, there is not enough evidence for 
Cyprus as neither the concept of ‘vulnerable consumers’ nor the test referring to them 
has ever been utilised by the courts or the Regulator 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Yes. This is especially so with regards to the UCTD as there was no comparable 
legislation in place before the law transposing the UCTD into Cyprus law. Before the 
law transposing the UCPD came into effect, only the Trade Descriptions Law of 1987 
was in force in Cyprus.  That law covers misleading but not aggressive practices and 
contains no black list of unfair commercial practices. It also concerns goods and 
services but not immovable property. In this respect, the protection of consumers 
again certainly improved in Cyprus as a result of the implementation of the UCPD.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Yes as this led to relevant information campaigns and also inspections of businesses 
by the Regulator. Of course, the stakeholders interviewed expressed the opinion that 
consumers do not appreciate the value or potential function of information on the unit 
price of a product. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Not really, because this is not a law that is being utilised by the Regulator. Moreover, 
given that it does not find representation in case law either, it seems that it is not 
really appreciated by businesses or their legal representatives. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
According to the European Commission only 12% of Cypriot online retailers sell cross-
border and only 24% of consumers buy online from other EU countries. 16  More 
generally, it must have become easier, though there is no evidence demonstrating 
whether these capabilities are exploited in practice and to what extent. It is definite 
that the numbers of consumers who buy from traders in other EU countries are 
constantly increasing, however the same is not certain in relation to businesses selling 
directly to other EU countries.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
It is difficult to consider the increase in cross-border trade as being the result of the 
various directives discussed. The main factor that brought about this increase is the 
16 European Commission, Cyprus factsheet –Digital Contract for Europe, December 2015,     
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/digital_contracts/digital-contracts_factsheet-cy_en.pdf 
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increased popularity of the internet and the fact that people in Cyprus are increasingly 
becoming technology-savvy and seek to exploit the possibilities afforded to them by 
the internet. Average consumers and businesses in Cyprus are unlikely to be aware of 
the details and effects of harmonisation at EU level so as for this harmonisation to be 
able to affect their behaviour. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Cyprus 
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Law 93(I)/1996 as 
amended by Law 69(I)/1999, 
Law 95(I)/2007, Law 
136(I)/2014 and Law 
49(I)/2016 
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Article 5 (5) It is not a black list but rather a 
“black term” introduced by the 
amendment law of 2016.  Article 
5(5) states that a term calculating 
the interest based on 360 days or 
any number of days other that 365 
or (in case of leap year) 366 days is 
considered an unfair contract term. 
'Grey list' of terms which may 
be considered unfair 
Yes  This is an indicative list of terms 
that ‘may be considered unfair’ that 
also exists in the Directive  
Extensions of the application 
of Directive to individually 
negotiated terms  
No   
Extensions of the application 
of Directive terms on the 
adequacy of the price and the 
main subject-matter 
No   
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Directive 2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial practices 
in the internal 
market 
The Unfair Commercial 
Practices of Businesses 
towards Consumers Law of 
2007, Law 103(I)/2007 as 
amended by Law 81(I)/2013 
and Law 135(I)/2013 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes - Section 39, 40 and 44 
of Law on Consumer 
Credit (Housing loan 
agreements and Hire-
purchase agreements), 
Law 39(I)/2001 
- Section 6(1) and 6(3) 
of the Business of 
Credit Institutions, Law 
66(I)/1997 
 
Provisions regarding 
immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection 
in the indication of 
the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
The Indication of the selling 
price and of the Unit Price of 
goods that are offered to 
Consumers Law of 2000, Law 
112(I)/2000 as amended by 
Law 119(I)/2005 and Law 
136(I)/2005 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
No   
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
The Control of Misleading and 
Comparative Advertisements 
Law of 2000, Law 92(I)/2000 as 
amended by Law 98(I)/2007 
and Law 42(I)/2008 
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Directive 2009/22/EC 
on injunctions for 
the protection of 
consumers' interests 
The seeking of an injunction to 
protect the collective interests 
Consumer Law of 2007, Law 
101(I)/2007 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Cyprus 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as 
foreseen by the Injunctions Directive 
regulated in your country separately 
(as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives 
(the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
The main difference is the prior 
consultation obligation that exists 
in the law transposing the ID but 
not in the laws transposing the 
individual Directives. Another is 
that the injunction procedure under 
the law transposing the UCTD 
allows for an injunction to be 
sought against trader associations 
while the law transposing the ID 
does not do so. There is no 
provision in any of the relevant 
laws that seeks to ensure 
coherence and this is problem 
identified in the report.    
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer associations  
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or 
an administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees 
both forms of the procedure, please 
explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure  
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer 
organisations are entitled to an 
exemption   of some/all cost related 
to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in 
the comments column. 
- The costs are as a rule borne by 
the losing party 
But by virtue of Section 43 of the 
Courts Law, Law 14/60, the court 
has full discretion to decide who 
(and to what extent) is to bear the 
costs of civil proceedings. 
 
Is the scope of application of 
injunctions extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer 
law in general? 
- No, scope of the Directive not 
extended 
 
Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions 
procedure?  
If scope of application extended to 
the protection of business' interests, 
please provide details in the 
comments column regarding  type of 
business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure 
- No  
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Is it possible to bring an injunction 
action jointly against several traders 
from the same economic sector or 
their associations 
- Yes/No 
The question is not eligible to a 
definite answer. Section 3(1) of 
Law 101(I)/2007 states that an 
injunction can be sought “against 
any person” involved in or 
responsible for the violation 
without restricting the relevant 
possibility to one such person. 
Yet, the law does not expressly 
provide for the possibility of an 
injunction action against multiple 
traders and certainly, it does not 
refer to trader associations. 
This is unlike the separate 
injunction procedure provided for 
in the law transposing the UCTD 
which specifically allows for such 
applications against multiple 
parties or associations (Section 9 
(6), Law 93(I)/96). 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? 
(not including the consultation stage 
under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No It is not provided in the law.  Yet, in 
practice there is some consultation 
prior to the court procedure.  
Moreover, Section 9(3), Law 
93(I)/96 provides that the Director 
can take into account any 
commitment undertaken by a 
person in relation to the use of 
unfair contract terms. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement for party 
seeking injunction to consult with 
the defendant 
 
Does the national legislation provide 
for measures ensuring summary 
procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of 
the procedure (subject matter/time 
limits) in the comments column. 
- No A summary procedure in Cyprus is 
available through the filing of 
originating summons but the law 
transposing the Directive does not 
make specific reference to this 
procedure, unlike the injunction 
procedure provided for under the 
Control of the Misleading and 
Comparative Advertisements Law, 
Law 92(I)/2000 Section 7(1) which 
does specifically refer to the 
particular procedure.  In my view, 
this is the procedure to be followed 
also under the law transposing the 
Injunctions Directive.  Such 
originating summons usually take 
at least one year before they are 
heard and decided upon by the 
court. 
Are there sanctions for non-
compliance with the injunction order 
(Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the 
comments column to who exactly 
should they be paid 
- Yes, other sanction (please 
specify) 
Fine, imprisonment or confiscation 
of property.  Fine is paid to the 
public purse. This is according to 
Section 42, Law 14/60, which is 
adopted for the purposes of the 
injunction procedure by Section 6 of 
the law transposing the ID 
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Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of 
a corrective statement? 
- No No other than mentioning the 
power of the court to order such 
publication 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public 
purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid 
to the qualified entity or the public 
purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- Yes/No 
This is uncertain. The Law 
101(I)/2007 (transposing the ID) 
does not provide for this 
possibility. However, Section 5(1) 
of Law 101(I)/2007 expressly 
subjects the power of the court to 
issue injunction to compliance 
with the provisions of the Courts 
Law, Law 14/60. Section 42 of Law 
14/60 empowers the court to 
order the payment of 
compensation to any person to 
the benefit of whom the 
injunction has been issued. It is 
however uncertain whether this 
provision would in practice mean 
the payment of compensation to 
the public purse or the qualified 
entity bringing the injunctions 
proceedings. 
 
Can an action for damages or redress 
to be paid to the consumers 
concerned be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No However, Section 9 of the law 
transposing the ID specifically 
states that the injunction 
procedure is without prejudice to 
the right of parties who have 
suffered damage as a result of the 
violation to bring a legal action 
against the non-compliant trader.  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions 
order?  
- Yes In the sense that the Injunction can 
serve as strong evidence of the 
wrong committed by the trader. 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No  
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Are the effects of individual 
injunctions orders extended to the 
future infringements and/or same or 
similar illegal practices (of other 
traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
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Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comment 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation
) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2016 
Consumer 
Protection 
Service 
(CPS) 
statistics 
7 cases 
1 case 
14.28% 
5 cases 
71.42% 
0% 0% 
1 case 
14.28% 
 
2015 same 51 cases 
11 cases 
21.56 % 
36 
cases 
70.58% 
0 % 
1 case 
1.96 % 
3 cases 
5.88 % 
 
2014 same 18 cases 
4 cases 
22.22% 
14 
cases 
77.77% 
0% 0% 0%  
2013 same 8 cases 
8 cases 
100% 
0% 0% 0% 0%  
2012 same 5 cases 
5 cases 
100% 
0% 0% 0% 0%  
2011 same 1 case 
1 case 
100% 
0% 0% 0% 0%  
2010 same 1 case 
1 case 
100% 
0% 0% 0% 0%  
Note: It should be clarified that the above numbers concern only decisions by the enforcement authority (the 
regulator).  As stated in the report, case law on the UCPD and the PID is extremely limited and does not involve an 
application of the provisions of the said law.  As far as the UCTD is concerned, case law started emerging from 2007 
onwards and is continuously increasing.  Most of this case law is summarised and discussed in the report.  It may 
however be useful to add that for 2016 so far, we have located 18 rulings of lower courts and 4 Supreme Court rulings 
involving a discussion of the law transposing the UCTD.  For 2015, the numbers are 14 and 2 respectively, something 
that confirms the increasing invocation of the relevant law. It is worth noting that though according to stakeholders, the 
bulk of problems and consumer complaints relate to the 2-year guarantee for goods, we have located only very few 
cases applying Law 7(I)/2000 which transposes Directive 1999/44/EC into national law. 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).17  
17 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 72.21 
stamp duty 
fees (for 
claims 
between 
EUR  2000 -
10 000) 
 
Please note 
that all fees 
stated here 
increase with 
the increase 
of the claim. 
So they are 
different for 
claims 
between 
EUR 10 000 -
50 000, for 
example 
EUR 516 legal 
fees based on 
the relevant 
official rules of 
the Cyprus Bar 
Association 
(plus fees which 
are similar to 
what is stated 
below regarding 
the fees for the 
case the 
consumer is the 
defendant and 
depend on 
appearances 
before the 
court, interim 
applications and 
hearings that 
will take place) 
EUR 11-23 
for serving 
the writ of 
summons, 
EUR 15 – 20 
for any 
additional 
application 
that may 
need to be 
filed 
If a lawyer is used 
then the time for 
the consumer is 
approximately an 
hour (to explain the 
case to the lawyer, 
furnish them with 
all relevant 
documentation and 
sign the relevant 
retainer which will 
enable the lawyer 
to file the legal 
action). If no lawyer 
is used it is very 
difficult to estimate 
the time that would 
be necessary as this 
would depend on 
the level of 
knowledge and 
sophistication of 
the consumer but it 
would definitely be 
a time-consumer 
process for 
consumers acting 
personally. 
It should be 
noted that if no 
lawyer is used, 
these fees can 
be avoided, yet 
court 
procedures are 
not easily 
manageable by 
non-lawyers 
and therefore, 
lawyers are 
used in the vast 
majority of 
cases 
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ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
Fees for 
applying for 
arbitrator 
procedure: 
claimed 
amount up to 
EUR 500: 
EUR 5 
 
Up to 
EUR 1000: 
EUR 9 
 
Up to 
EUR 2500: 
EUR 13  
 
Up to 
EUR 5000: 
EUR 17 
A lawyer is not 
necessary 
EUR 85 
arbitrator’s 
fees (for 
claims EUR 0 
– EUR 2500) 
 
EUR 170 
arbitrator’s 
fees (for 
claims 
EUR 2500 – 
EUR 5000) 
It is very difficult to 
estimate time as 
that would depend 
on the level of 
knowledge and 
sophistication of 
the consumer. 
However, ADR 
procedures are 
much simpler and 
consumer-friendly 
than court ones and 
it is therefore 
expected that it 
would be much less 
time-consuming for 
consumers than the 
court procedures.  
 
As for the time 
needed to obtain a 
decision to the 
dispute, the law 
does not allow for 
an accurate 
estimation of time 
but given that the 
arbitrator must set 
a hearing date 
within 20 days from 
the date they are 
assigned the case 
and issue a decision 
within 15 days from 
the date the 
hearing ends, it is 
expected that the 
whole process will 
not exceed 3-6 
months. 
No ADR or 
other relevant 
procedure of 
private dispute 
resolution was 
followed in 
Cyprus.  The 
information 
given to the left 
is based on Law 
148(I)/2015 
which 
transposes into 
Cyprus law 
Directive 
2013/11/EU 
and which has 
not been tested 
as yet. 
Notes: It should be noted however that almost invariably consumers invoke unfairness of a standard contract term in 
civil proceedings instituted against them by claimants who are often financial institutions.  The time for obtaining 
redress is the standard time needed for civil actions to be tried and decided upon.  If the claimant does not file an 
application for summary judgement, that time may exceed 4-5 years.  If an application for summary judgment is filed 
then the time needed is usually 2 years approximately. The legal fees for the defendant in civil actions based on the 
relevant guide of Cyprus Bar Association are approximately EUR 601 (this amount contains fees for filing an appearance 
to the action, drafting and filing a defence, appearances before the court, drafting of affidavits, preparation for hearing 
and the hearing and it is an approximate minimum amount). If judgement is secured against the defendant then they 
will be ordered also to pay the claimant’s costs. It also be clarified that these are the costs that will be ordered by the 
court or approved by the registrar. 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
No case was found in which the consumer in his or her capacity as plaintiff sued a 
trader for damages and also raised an issue of unfair contract terms.  In this respect, 
the answer to this question must be that such cases in Cyprus are rare, if not non-
existent. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Cyprus Association of Retail Trade Enterprises 
 
Business association 17/06/2016 
Cyprus Workers Confederation National Consumer 
Organisation 
01/06/2016 
Department of Merchant Shipping National Consumer 
Enforcement  
Authority 
12/07/2016 
Competition and Consumer Protection Service of the Ministry 
of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism 
Ministry/Regulator 23/06/2016 
European Consumer Centre Cyprus European Consumer 
Centre 
28/06/2016 
Cyprus Consumer Organisation Consumer Organisation 10/06/2016 
Cyprus Advertising Regulation Organisation Business Association 07/07/2016 
Cyprus Consumer Union and Quality of Life National Consumer 
Organisations 
05/07/2016 
Office of the Commissioner of Electronic Communications and 
Postal Regulation 
National Independent 
Authority 
22/06/2016 
The Financial Ombudsman of the Republic of Cyprus National Independent 
Authority 
18/07/2016 
Department of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transport, 
Communications and Works 
Ministry 27/07/2016 
Central Bank of Cyprus Independent Authority 29/07/2016 
Department of Road Transport of the Ministry of Transport, 
Communications and Works 
Ministry 26/8/2016 
The Energy Service of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, 
Industry and Tourism 
Ministry 26/8/2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Christiana Markou 2015 Consumer Contracts an Unfair Terms: the Cypriot Reality 
(Conference Presentation) 
University of Bielefeld 
European Commission 
2007 EC Consumer Law Compendium  
European Commission 2012 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Injunctions for the 
Protection of Consumers’ Interest 
Polyviou Polyvios 2014 The Law of Contracts 
Andreas Neocleous & Co 
LLC 
2010 Introduction to Cyprus Law 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report CZECH REPUBLIC  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Most interviewed stakeholders state that the UCPD is the most relevant Directive to 
promote a high level of consumer protection in the internal market. Regarding the 
principle-based approach, experts underline that the only applicable way to combat all 
unfair commercial practices, including new ones (e.g. those engaged in by online 
shops), is a principle-based approach. Authorities and national courts are used to 
performing the unfairness test according to Art. 5 UCPD,1 even if the first decision 
from the Supreme Court with harmonising effect regarding the application of the 
unfairness-test is from the end of 2014.2  
Czech law transposed the UCPD in Act. 634/1992 Sb. on consumer protection in 20083 
(further Act. 634/1992 Sb.), but the implementation was not complete. On 23.1.2014, 
the European Commission found that several provisions of the Czech transposition 
were not in compliance with the Directive.4 This incorrect implementation related to 
many provisions (e.g. on ‘product’, ‘business-to-consumer commercial practices’, 
‘undue influence’, ‘invitation to purchase’, ‘materially distort the economic behaviour 
of consumers’ etc.), but also the approach to the temporal application of the Directive 
according to Art. 3 (1) (before, during, and after a commercial transaction) was not in 
accordance with the Directive. The Czech legislature finally increased the standards,5 
and since 28.12.2015 the UCPD is fully transposed into Czech law by Act. 378/2015 
Sb.  
The enforcement of this Directive is carried out in the Czech Republic mainly by 
administrative authorities, like the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, Czech 
Telecommunication Authority, Czech Energy Authority, and also by the Czech National 
Bank and seven other authorities.6 Civil enforcement against unfair commercial 
practices and the right to claim damages in cases of misleading advertising and 
misleading identification of goods and services is ensured by § 2988 Czech Civil Code7 
1  See: § 4 Rn 14, Blanka Vítková: Zákon o ochraně spotřebitele, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, Praha. 
2  Judgement Highest Administrative Court 7 As 110/2014-54. 
3  By the Act. 36/2008 Sb.  
4  European Commission formal notice (2013/2204) from 23.1.2014 regarding Art. 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,and Annex 
I  8, 11, 14: the Commission criticised further that some Czech legislation including norms regarding 
commercial practices are more prescriptive than the Directive. See also EU Pilot project 2514/11 from 
15.12.2011.  
5  Act. 378/2015 Sb.  
6  § 23 634/1992 Sb. delegates the enforcement of the consumer protection to more than 17 authorities. 
The competences are very fragmented, horizontally and vertically, and the consumer has many problems 
to find the competent authority. The biggest problem is that the authorities do not delegate the consumer 
complaints further in the case they are not competent, see: Rita Sik-Simon: správněprávní sankce za 
porušování spotřebitelských práv v České Rebublice a v Maďarsku  in Luboš Tichý (ed.) Ochrana 
Spotřebitele CPK, PF Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 2014 v nakladatelství Eva Rozkotová, p. 207. 
7  Act. 89/2014 Sb. Translation is available http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf  
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(further CzCC) for the consumer, but this law does not play a highly relevant role.8 
Also consumer organisations can file an injunction action according to § 25 (2) Act 
634/1992 Sb., to combat unfair practices, but it is very rare9 in practice. What is more 
common – predominant – is when the consumer initiates administrative proceedings 
according to §26 634/1992 Sb., because this is the cheaper and faster solution with 
the greatest sanctioning effect on the traders. Administrative enforcement plays a 
dominant role in the Czech Republic, i.e. the Czech Trade Inspection Authority 
processes ca. 23 000 consumer complaints annually.10 The maximum imposable fine is 
5 million CK (approx. EUR 185 000) under § 24 (14) d) Act 634/1992 Sb.,11 which has 
a strong dissuasive effect on traders.12 
Regarding sector specific fields, the Czech National Bank added that in the financial 
area, they cannot assess the effectiveness of the UCPD, because they are used to 
applying the sector specific rules, not the UCPD. Only in the absence of a ‘lex specialis’ 
do they have scope for application of the UCPD.  
   
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
According to the stakeholders, if something appears on the black list, it is practically 
non-existent on the market. This is the most important benefit for the consumer. The 
black list is very easy to understand for the traders and controlling it is easy for the 
authorities. The main trade chains stopped engaging in all the practices which were on 
the black list, because the Czech Trade Inspection Authority monitors these unfair 
practices very often, and sanctions them very strictly. According to the control bodies, 
the most common unfair practices involved giving incorrect information. 
Inspectors can most easily control those commercial practices that are blacklisted or 
fail to fulfil the information requirements. In relation to misleading and aggressive 
commercial practices (Art. 6 to 9. UCPD), the inspectors must examine the 
circumstances further, but the most complicated aspect to review is the general 
unfairness test under Art. 5 (2) UCPD.13 Stakeholders generally underline the 
difficulties with the application of Art. 5 (2). The Czech Trade Inspection Authority, the 
main enforcer of the UCPD norms, added that uniform application of the general 
unfairness test according to Art. 5 (2) UCPD by 350 inspectors - who are not lawyers - 
is nearly impossible. The main problem is the fulfilment of the criteria. To ensure 
unified application in every regional inspection office, it would be necessary to have 
personnel trained and guidelines provided.  
A sector specific authority, the Czech National Bank, added that the application of the 
black list is difficult on the financial market.   
Regarding the implementation of the black list (Annex I) it should be added that with 
Act. No 378/2015 Sb., the Czech legislature finally transposed all 31 unfair commercial 
practices. Newly corrected or added practices (December 2015) include the following: 
No. 8, 11, 14, and 31 of the Annex. Because the Czech legal definition of ‘product’ is 
not used for services,14 only exclusively for goods, see § 2 (1) f) Act 634/1992 Sb., it 
8  Even if we can find some cases NS 23 Cdo 3704/2011, NS 23 Cdo 466972010 etc. regarding the former 
Czech Civil Code, there are still no cases according to § 2988 of the new Civil Code, which is in force since 
1.1.2014. 
9  See chapter injunction 1.3. 
10 The number of yearly controls done by the Czech Trade Inspection is over 40 000. Annual reports 
http://www.coi.cz/en/about-ctia/annual-reports/annual-reports-on-ctia-activities/  
11 But in some special cases also 50 million CK (approx. EUR 1 850 000).  
12 Regarding some unfair commercial practices f.e. at banned consumer lottery the Czech Trade Inspection 
Authority cannot impose fine, see 8 As 136/2015-51 
13 See court advices on unfairness test 7 As 110/2014-52 
14 This is a separate definition under § 2 (1) g Act. No 634/1992.  
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was necessary to rewrite the definitions to include the word services in many 
descriptions on the black-list. 
  
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
There are no practical benefits for the Czech consumer. The Czech Republic did not 
implement any further restrictive or prescriptive requirements in relation to financial 
services regarding UCPD. In relation to financial services is necessary to remind that 
many sector specific directives go significantly beyond the UCPD. If this sector specific 
European legislation on financial services permits the national legislature, the national 
rules go in some cases beyond the UCPD and lays down detailed rules for the conduct 
of financial institutions with consumer. The Financial Arbitrator underlines that the 
regime of minimum harmonization in respect of financial services should be retained in 
the UCPD, otherwise it may cause conflict with other EU directives, of which some are 
based on minimum harmonization, others on targeted harmonization and others on 
full harmonization.15  
    
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The UCPD has not yet been applied in the context of environmental claims. Neither the 
Czech Trade Inspection Authority nor Ministerial experts have seen in their practice, 
misleading environmental claims. Consumer organisations’ experts add that the Czech 
consumer may not be fully aware of the importance and the practical benefits of these 
types of claims. Business organisations added Czech traders do not stress 
environmental benefits of their products in their marketing yet. 
    
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
The ‘average consumer’ is not a relevant reference point in the Czech consumer 
protection Act. The reference point regarding unfair commercial practices is still the 
consumer according to § 4 (1) 634/1992 Sb.: ‘the commercial practice is unfair if it is 
contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and it materially distorts or is 
likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the consumer to whom is it 
addressed.’  But the new standard from 2016 finally adopted the average member of 
the group as the reference point when the commercial practice is directed to a 
particular group (§ 4 634/1992 Sb.). Experts of Ministry of Trade and Industry 
highlight, that the § 4 (1) of 634/1992 Sb. refers to the average consumer, even if the 
norm is not using the expression ‘average’.16 
The consumer concepts are not defined in Czech commentaries. Not even one of the 
three main Civil Code commentaries say a word about consumer concepts regarding § 
419 ‘consumer’ CzCC. Also the commentary on the Act on consumer protection 
remains silent about situational or normative models, not to mention the different 
15 Also regarding Directive 2014/17/EC on Mortgage Credit, it was not obvious that the legislature would like 
to ensure a higher consumer protection level than the Directive prescribes. 
16 See: Highest Administrative Court 3 As 29/2007, Highest Administrative Court 8 As 83/2010, Supreme 
Court 23 Cdo 784/2010. 
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consumer concepts applied by the CEUJ depending on whether the judgement regards 
unfair competition practices or contract law.17 
Academics are criticizing18 that in the Czech jurisdiction the average consumer is only 
briefly mentioned. Previously the average consumer was cited in trademark law 
regarding brand collisions, where the court examined how the consumer compares 
and visualises different brands. In many cases courts transfer this consumer ‘model’ to 
consumer law cases, or they do not define the term 'consumer' further.19 Another 
trend can be reported whereby the courts use the phrase: ‘the observance of the so 
called average consumer nowadays should be judged more strictly than earlier (not 
only superficially, with the usual attention, - see in Rn 18. of the preamble of 
UCPD)’.20 Some of the judgements state that ‘the benchmark is the average consumer 
who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking 
into account social, cultural and linguistic factors, as interpreted by the CJEU’21 or that 
‘national courts should exercise their own faculty of judgement, having regard to the 
case-law of the Court of Justice’.22 Further citation of concrete CJEU case law is still 
missing in the majority of the Czech jurisdiction.  
Also, consumer organisations indicated the problem that the consumer model applied 
by the Czech courts has not yet crystallised enough.23 They also underlined that the 
courts usually expect a relatively high intellectual potential on behalf of the average 
consumer, which reduces the protection level accordingly. The Czech National bank 
reported no problem with the consumer concept, and stated that it applies the concept 
according to the circumstances of each case. Only the Financial Arbitrator (i.e. the 
Czech Financial Ombudsman) underlined the importance and difficulty of the 
application of the average consumer model. In the ‘account maintenance fees’ cases,24 
the right application of this model depended on which service should have been 
understood as an account maintenance service and which not. 
Some experts also claimed that the new Czech Civil Code envisages a very high level 
of intellect of all contracting parties, because according to § 4 CzCC ‘Every person 
having legal capacity is presumed to have the intellect of an average individual and 
the ability to use it with ordinary care and caution, and anybody can reasonably 
expect every such person to act in that way in legal transactions.’25 This principle can 
lead in judicial practice to a fictional, ideal consumer, rather than to an average 
consumer which is the reality. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The Czech judicature is also very reluctant to define a consumer group as a vulnerable 
consumer group. Even in the Proenzi case,26 regarding misleading advertising of a 
dietary supplement, the Supreme Court did not define the group to whom the 
17 Sik-Simon Rita: Fogyasztókép és szabályozás MTA Law Working Paper 2/2016 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/2016_02_Sik-Simon.pdf  
18 NS 23 Cdo 3773/2010, 23 Cdo 4384/2008, 32 Cdo 3895/2007. 
19 NS 33 Cdo 930/2006, NSS 6A 61/2002-52.  
20 NS23 Cdo 4384/2008, NS 32 Cdo 3895/2007. 
21 NS 32 Cdo 3895/2007. 
22 NS 32 Cdo 3895/2007. 
23 See Jakub Jedlinský: Koncept průměrného spotřebitele v českém a evropském právu, 2012,  Martina 
Kousalová: Koncept průměrného spotřebitele 2013. 
24 181/SU/2012, 19/SU/2013. 
25 http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf  
26 NS 32 Cdo 1721/2012. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
244
advertisement was addressed as a vulnerable consumer group. The court found that 
the average consumer can differentiate between the effect of a medicine and a dietary 
supplement.27 In a later decision, in multiMun AKUT,28 the court stressed that ”it 
should be considered, that physically unhealthy persons maintain lower criticism and 
higher belief in advertisements”. 
Control authorities apply § 4 (2) of 634/199229 more often, where Art. 5 (3) of UCPD 
was transposed. The Czech Trade Inspection Authority and the Czech 
Telecommunication Authority apply these norms to achieve a proportional protection 
for children, pregnant women and pensioners. The inspectors should be aware of the 
uniqueness of the individual cases, with regard to whether or not a particular group 
has been affected. However, new vulnerable consumer groups, such as indebted or 
poor, have not been shown up in practice yet. Fines can be imposed e.g. in cases of 
omission of information according to Directive 2008/48/EC. Whether a particular 
consumer group has been affected by the omission of information has not been further 
analysed. The recognition of vulnerable groups was not considered necessary in the 
practice.  
In financial cases there is no application of this consumer model in the Czech Republic. 
  
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The tradition to combat unfair commercial practices with self-regulation existed before 
the communist period in the Czech Republic, but this trend was interrupted, as stated 
by business organisations. Nowadays there are more and more new initiatives e.g. the 
Association for electronic commerce (APEK) created an E-shop codex.30 But the 
number of these initiatives is still very low. The existing Ethical Codex is valid just for 
a limited group of traders, because membership in chambers or associations is not 
obligatory. Usually as summarized by consumer organisations, the traders join an 
association and are concerned more about their reputation, and therefore do not 
perform unfair commercial practices. In the opinion of business associations this kind 
of self-regulation should be supported in the future. Also the main consumer 
organisation DTest is active and gives certification for reliable e-shops. 
Some authorities are also active in influencing the self-regulation of the traders, e.g. 
the Czech Telecommunication Authority published the second edition of its 
recommendation of fair contract terms and commercial practices for the operators.31  
However, e.g. the Czech National Bank, supervisory authority of financial markets, did 
not create many recommendations in the consumer protection field.   
The Financial Arbitrator is rather sceptical regarding self-regulation, because the 
market – as cases have shown32 - is not ripe for it. Even if a Codex exists, the 
association is not able to sanction those members who fail to comply with the Codex. 
Some self-regulation norms, like the Codex ‘Client mobility’ dealing with bank account 
switching procedures, are not real self-regulation norms since they were adopted 
27 NS 32 Cdo 1721/2012, see also Martina Kousalová: Koncept průměrného spotřebitele 2013.  
28 4 As 98/2013-88 
29 The new provisions of the Consumer Act of 2016 (188/2016 Sb.) completely transposed Art. 5 (3) of 
UCPD via the “copy and paste” method.  
30  https://www.apek.cz/kodex-terminologie-lhut-dodani  
31 The recommendation contains 48 pages. See: http://www.ctu.cz/doporuceni-ctu-k-navrhum-smluv-o-
poskytovani-verejne-dostupnych-sluzeb-elektronickych-komunikaci  
32 Case OVB Allfinanz- Helvag; Lukáš Štork. 
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under the pressure of the European Commission. Moreover, this agenda is now subject 
to European ‘hard law’.33 
The Czech National Bank added that these types of actions could be effective but they 
also have their limits. In the financial sector the actions work especially in situations 
where sellers are also responsible for the behaviour of their distribution channels (e.g. 
intermediaries). 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
The majority of the stakeholders suggested that there is no need to modify the black 
list. In the last 20 years traders, courts, and also consumers had experience in 
combatting unfair practices. 
Some presently problematic commercial practices are:  
• Unilateral change of contract requirements without right to termination; 
• Contract switches with prolongation of the contract in an ‘uninvited’ doorstep 
selling situation. (A typical case in the telecommunication or energy field would 
be: intermediary of the service provider comes to check the monthly invoice, 
and recommend a ‘better’ service package - the consumer signs a temporary 
contract including the changes with binding effect for 2 to 3 years); 
• Organised selling events (also business organisations added that at these 
selling events the withdrawal right should be guaranteed for the consumer at 
least for 3 or maximum for 6 months from signing the contract); 
• ‘Tying lending’ of technical equipment with a punitive lending fee in case the 
customer does not return the equipment at the end of the contractual 
relationship (e.g. lending a modem for the time period of the internet service 
contract - for not returning it the consumer should pay ca. 5 000 CZK [approx. 
EUR 185], but the new acquisition value is just 1 000 CZK [approx. EUR 37]). 
  
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
In the Czech Republic the consumer protection level is ensured by frequent control by 
the authorities. Despite the fact that the administrative enforcement of consumer 
rights is not the preferred method for every Member State, frequent controls 
contribute to a higher level of consumer protection.  
Regarding best practices, the Czech legislature reacted to the problem of organised 
selling events. First the legislature stipulated in 201334 that these kind of events 
should be registered in advance at the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, according to 
§ 20 Act 634/1992 Sb. Not only the address and the exact date of these events had to 
be previously announced at the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, but also the goods 
or services to be offered. At the end of 201535 the legislature amended the list of such 
required information to include also the price of the good/service (without any 
33 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability 
of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with 
basic features 
34 See 476/2013 Sb.  
35 378/2015 Sb.  
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discount). Furthermore the new § 20b of 634/1992 prohibits the seller from receiving 
compensation during this event, and also prohibits the seller before the expiry of 
seven days from contract signing, to seek or request fulfilment of the contract or of a 
part of it. This prohibition includes also the deposit for payment of fees or any other 
fee. The norm clarifies further that this prohibition shall not affect the provisions 
regarding withdrawal under another act.  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The transposition of the PID was carried out in 200336 with the Act on prices 526/1990 
Sb. Stakeholders agree that it functions effectively, that consumers are well informed 
and that traders are complying with the rules. 
  
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
A measurement unit for a product’s performance exists in very few products, with the 
exception of washloads. Also consumer organisations and ministerial experts underline 
that the 1 kg or 1 litre price unit is more precise and informative, and also easier to 
count for the producer, than a unit for a product's performance. On the basis of unit 
price, consumers are able to compare the products and choose according to their 
preferences. 
  
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
The Czech legislature allowed in § 13 (9) 526/1990 some derogation from unit pricing 
in the following circumstances (the citation follows the letters of the legal source):  
b) If the product was sold in person;  
c) If the product was sold by self-service in a shop smaller than 400 m2; 
j) If the product was sold in a vending automate. 
These derogations were valid until 1.5.2014. Since then there are valid derogations 
just in special cases, like art and antiquity, or because of the risk of devaluation of a 
product (e.g. if it is perishable).    
There are no consumer complaints in relation to these special cases.  
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
36 See 124/2003 Sb.  
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• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
Business organizations and ministerial stakeholders stated that the current legal 
regulation for advertising is sufficient. Until recently, sales and marketing companies 
were often unsure of what exactly would be deemed as ‘permissible’ advertising in the 
phase of transposition of the MCAD, especially regarding comparative advertisements, 
but now companies are implementing the rules without any difficulties.  
The MCAD was transposed in the Czech Republic in the former Czech Commercial Act, 
whose norms were almost unchanged when transferred into the new CzCC. The rules 
about misleading advertising are in § 2977 and 2979 CzCC and the rules on 
comparative advertising in § 2980 CzCC among the rules of unfair competition. In 
misleading advertising cases the competitors can sue in civil courts, and, as 
mentioned in the part on commercial practices in B2B transactions, the competitors 
can request the violator according to § 2988 CzCC to refrain from competing unfairly 
and to return the injured party to the position they were in before the harm occurred. 
The definition of advertising and the allocation of the control-competencies of 
authorities are regulated in Act. 40/1995 Sb. on the regulation of advertising.37 The 
notion of ‘advertising’ according to § 1 (2) Act. 40/1955 Sb. is wide: ‘Advertisement 
means a notice, visual presentation or other presentation that is distributed primarily 
through the mass media.’ This Act also lists the most important communication media 
in § 1 (3),38 but the list is not exclusive.39  The allocation of the control-competencies 
is very fragmented. According to § 7 Act. 40/1995 Sb. the Council for Radio and 
Television Broadcasting is competent if the advertising is on radio or television, 
otherwise eight other authorities are responsible, for example the Office for Personal 
Data Protection, State Agricultural and Food Inspection Authority, State Authority for 
the Control of Pharmaceuticals, Ministry of Health, etc. In case there is no entity that 
would be competent or the advertisement is in print papers, the Trade Licensing 
Authority is competent. All these authorities can impose a fine for misleading 
advertising, according to § 8 (5) c) Act. 40/1995 Sb. maximum 2 million CZK [approx. 
EUR 74 000]. Companies can appeal the decision in administrative courts.40   
Regarding misleading advertising rules, there are many previous cases concerning the 
former Czech Commercial Code,41 but as of yet no cases are available concerning the 
new CzCC. Also there are cases on the regulatory activity of the authorities.42 
Statistical data are not available. (Courts do not publish all their decisions, and they 
do not collect statistical data, and the authorities do not publish details on cases in 
their annual reports.) 
In B2C cases the rules of Act 634/1992 Sb. are valid where the UCPD was transposed.  
 
37 The English translation of some provisions is available here: 
http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/files/live/Czech%20Republic/Czech%20Republic%20-
%20Law%20No.%2040-1995%20on%20Ads%20.pdf  
38 (3) A communications medium whereby the advertising is disseminated, means the medium that enables 
the dissemination of the advertisement, particularly printed periodicals 2) and non-periodical publications, 
3) radio and television broadcasts, audiovisual production, 4) computer networks, audiovisual media, 
posters and leaflets. 
39 See: Aleš Rozehnál: Mediální zákony, Komentář, 2008, Praha, Wolters Kluvers, § 1  
40 On 20.5.2016 the Highest Administrative Court confirmed a 300.000 CZK fine imposed by the State 
Agricultural and Food Inspection Authority against Lidl, because of a misleading advertisement called the 
“right Czech feast”. The reason was the origin of the meat, which included German meat.   
41 Most important: NS 28 Cdo 4755/2009, NS 23 Cdo 2749/2008, NS 32 Cdo 229/2006, VS v Praze 3 Cmo 
380/2005, 9 As 38/2010-71 etc.  
42 Rc 7 A 54/96, SJS 11 A 263/2010 – 42, SJS 9 A 111/2011- 55, SJS 45 A 60/2012 – 58, Arbitrážní komise 
Rady pro reklamu (ADR) 013/99/Stríž 
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• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The interviewed stakeholders add that the principle based approach is very effective to 
combat misleading advertising. ‘Unfairness’ is a key question in the court decisions.43 
Also, an important orientation point is the average consumer and their interpretation 
of the advertisement.44 Regarding vulnerable consumer groups, like children or 
physically unhealthy  persons, there are also a few judgements, but only very few.45 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Experts of the Ministry of Industry and Trade add that Czech national rules don´t go 
beyond the MCAD. The level of protection ensured by the MCAD is sufficient. The 
Czech legislature has no interest in stricter norms. The MCAD provided protection level 
is satisfactory also for business organizations. Companies can understand these rules 
well and operate based on them. Business organizations add that in cross-border 
transactions consumers from different Member States have different knowledge about 
products. Czech consumers for example are well-informed regarding any beer product, 
so the advertising rules can be less strict in the Czech Republic towards these 
products. The minimum harmonization provisions can take into account these national 
differences, so for this reason the current rules are satisfactory. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Comparative advertising was not permitted for a long time in the Czech Republic.46 
Because of the uncertainty of the companies most questions regarding the 
transposition of the MCAD were brought to the authorities on this topic. The full 
harmonization provisions are accepted by all stakeholders including companies.  
Ministerial experts add that there are very few Czech cases regarding comparative 
advertising, only one or two annually.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
The rules provide an effective legal framework also for modern types of marketing. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
The current rules on enforcement seem to be effective for all stakeholders in the 
Czech Republic.   
In a cross border context, ministerial experts say they get very few questions 
regarding advertising. Some French and Polish companies asked for advice regarding 
advertising on billboards, but such requests are very rare. 
 
43 See VS v Praze 3 Cmo 380/2005,  
44 NS 32 Cdo 229/2006 or NS  23 Cdo 2749/2008. 
45 SJS 5 A 114/2010-10 baby food, SJS 4 AS 98/2013 –88 multiMun AKUT 
46 Petr Hajn in Jiří Švestka, Jan Dvořák, Jozef Fiala a kolektiv Obcanský zákoník Komentář, § 2980 Wolters 
Kluwer.  
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• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The Czech companies can orientate themselves well based on the rules and are 
satisfied with the ensured protection level. They did not feel the need for further 
improvement.   
Regarding vitamin and food supplementary trading business organizations, 
stakeholders add that a stricter evidence requirement on the effect of those products 
would be appreciated, similar to the USA’s rules (the case of B12 vitamins), before the 
effect of such products could be promoted in an advertisement.  As a relevant best 
practice, the self-regulation of the Codex of Advertising of the Association for 
Communication Agencies (AKA)47 must be mentioned, to which more than 30 
Advertising Agencies have joined. Interestingly the Czech Advertising Standards 
Council makes decisions on wheatear the members of the Association comply with the 
Codex. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Regarding different business strategies, stakeholders added that the majority of Czech 
traders are not active in other countries, so they did not expect disparities having an 
impact on cross-border trade.  
On the other hand business organisations underline that disparities create costs (legal 
advice, different web content etc.) which will be paid in the end by the consumer as an 
additional cost.  For this reason traders would prefer a standardised European system 
of unfair commercial practices throughout all Member States, like a traffic light. 
  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Uniform lists all over Europe are applied effectively for traders. But the formulation of 
the black list of the UCPD, and also the formulation of misleading commercial 
practices, is not easy to understand, according to stakeholders. 
  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No problems were observed. 
 
47 See http://www.aka.cz/samoregulace/.  
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The majority of Czech traders are not active in other countries, and do not apply the 
MCAD with cross-border effect. There are no disparities observed regarding the 
advertising of foreign traders in the Czech market. 
  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No barriers were observed. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The legal framework is considered to be appropriate by stakeholders. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The majority of Czech traders are not active in other countries, so they cannot 
evaluate barriers to cross-border trade. But cross-border enforcement seems to be 
very expensive for all parties (higher legal costs, translation, travelling etc.), and for 
this reason Czech traders would hesitate to bring claims in other countries.   
Regarding CPC cooperation the Czech Trade Inspection reported about 3-4 cross-
border B2C cases since 2004, which is also extremely few. About B2B cases no 
statistic is available.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Answers of stakeholders show different awareness levels amongst traders. The 
majority of bigger traders, trade chains, and entities supervised by the Czech National 
Bank have an awareness of provision § 5a (3), which transposed Art. 7 (4) UCPD. On 
the other hand e-shops are heavily criticised by consumer organizations, who say that 
just 1/5 of the web-shops comply with the information requirements. Also the Czech 
Trade Inspection Authority confirms that the information requirements are the main 
subjects of control for the inspectors and in 60% of the cases they find deficiencies. 
The Czech Telecommunication Authority also added that the bigger operators more or 
less comply with the information requirements, and the smaller firms copy their web-
pages.  
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Regarding to CRD, ministerial experts add that the CRD clarified the information 
requirements, and the traders focus now on complying with these new rules. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
No costs and practical problems were reported. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The majority of the stakeholders do not see a need for revision or extension of UCPD 
or MCAD to B2B transactions (see below).  
The Czech norms extend the scope of both Directives practically also to B2B 
transactions according to § 2976-2990 CzCC48 and provide contractual consequences 
in case of breaches of the UCPD (see the next question). 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
The CzCC norms49 extend the scope of the UCPD in many areas also to B2B 
transactions. According to § 2976-2990 CzCC,50 in the cases of a) misleading 
advertising, b) misleading identification of goods and services, c) creating a likelihood 
of confusion, d) free-riding on the reputation of an enterprise, product or services of 
another competitor, e) bribery, f) disparaging a competitor, g) comparative 
advertising, unless allowed as admissible, h) breach of business secrets, i) unsolicited 
advertising, and j) threat to health and the environment,  competitors and consumers 
can request the violator according to § 2988 CzCC to refrain from competing unfairly 
or to return the injured party to the position they were in before the harm occurred. 
Not only can adequate satisfaction be requested but also compensation for damage 
and restitution of unjustified enrichment can be awarded. It is interesting that CzCC 
entitles also a legal person who is defending the interests of competitors to bring an 
action against the violator according to § 2989 (1) CzCC. It is a relief in these cases 
that civil courts do not need to conduct the unfairness test according to Art. 5 UCPD. 
It is furthermore a relief that in all these cases the violator must prove that he or she 
did not compete unfairly according to § 2989 (2).  
Furthermore the new Czech Civil Code Act 89/2012 Sb. enshrines the protection of the 
weaker party as a general principle according to § 433.51 The protection of the weaker 
party52 is automatically strengthened in all B2B relationships, not just SMEs, but it 
48 http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf 
49 Petr Hajn in Jiří Švestka, Jan Dvořák, Jozef Fiala a kolektiv  Obcanský zákoník Komentář, § 2988 Wolters 
Kluwer 
50 http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf 
51 Havel in Melzer/Tégl a kol. Občanský zákoník, Velký komentář, 2014-2017, Leges, § 433.   
52 Josef Bejček: Smluvní Svoboda a ochrana slabšího obchodníka, Acta Universitatis Brunensis, iuridica 
edition Scientia vol. 557, Masarikova univerzita, Brno 2016, p 43 ff. 52 
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only ensures a situational protection. Because of this general protection, national 
courts can apply more protective rules to balance the differences between the 
contractual parties. An extra extension for all B2B transactions is considered to be not 
necessary in the Czech Republic.  
On the other hand, some academics53 criticise the distinction between B2C and B2B 
enforcement. In the case of unfair competition, competitors and consumers can 
enforce their interest at civil courts. In case of unfair commercial practices, consumer 
rights are protected mainly administratively, by authorities, with exception of the § 
2988 CzCC regarding misleading advertising and misleading identification of goods 
and services. 
  
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;   
See above. An extra extension for all B2B transactions is not considered to be 
necessary in the Czech Republic, according to stakeholders. 
   
• Whether there is a need to have a black list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
A black list of practices in the business-to-business marketing area is not considered 
to be necessary, according to stakeholders. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Czech law allows enforcement via arbitration and regular courts, and also legal 
persons entitled to defend the interests of competitors can bring an action against the 
violator. Competitors or business clients can also bring complaints to authorities. All 
these different types of enforcement have different costs and outputs for the 
participants. 
  
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
According to § 2988 CzCC in conjunction with § 2977 (misleading advertising) and § 
2980 (comparative advertising), the Czech legal system has developed contractual 
consequences. ‘A person whose right has been jeopardised or violated by unfair 
competition may request the violator to refrain from competing unfairly or to remove a 
defective state.’ Not only can adequate satisfaction be requested, but also 
compensation for damage and restitution of unjustified enrichment. 
  
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
There is no need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the current 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive, according to stakeholders. 
 
53 Marta Ptačková: Veřejnoprávní regulace obchodních praktik, 2015.  
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1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
In the case of breaches to the UCPD, the consumer should bring complaints to 
authorities (administrative enforcement), where the trader will be sanctioned, but he 
or she cannot automatically file a lawsuit as a follow up procedure for compensation of 
damages at civil court. In the Czech Civil procedure actio popularis are missing with 
compensation claims or follow up compensation claims – likewise for collective redress 
or so called Musterklagen. If consumers wish to be compensated for their damages, 
first they should bring a complaint to the traders and then they could file an individual 
claim at regular courts and bring all the evidence before the courts. Consumer 
organisations underline that even aggressive commercial practices are very 
complicated to substantiate, not to mention misleading omissions or misleading 
actions.  
Since February 2016 consumers can also initiate an ADR-resolution at the Czech Trade 
Inspection Authority54 according to § 20d 634/1992.   
In some cases there are contractual consequences for breach to UCPD, but just in 
several cases, e.g. misleading and comparative advertising, and misleading 
identification of goods and services – in those cases the consumer can file a lawsuit 
according to § 2988 CzCC at the regular civil court. In these cases the consumer is in 
a better position regarding evidentiary burdens since according to § 2989 (2) the 
violator must prove that he did not compete unfairly. And if a consumer asserts his or 
her right to compensation for damage, the violator must prove that the damage was 
not caused by unfair competition.  
In the special situation of unsolicited performance (if an entrepreneur has supplied a 
thing to the consumer without the consumer’s order and if the consumer assumed the 
possession thereof, the consumer is considered to be a possessor in good faith) the 
CzCC provides contractual consequences. According to § 1838 CzCC, the consumer is 
not obliged to give anything back to the entrepreneur at his own expense in return for 
the unsolicited performance.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Regarding § 2988 no consumer law cases have been decided. Regarding § 183855 
there were two court decision published. It should be mentioned, that these rules have 
been in force since 1.1.2014. 
  
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
It seems to be unjustified to allow in B2B transactions regarding unfair competition 
reversal of the burden of proof and not to allow it at all in unfair commercial practices 
against consumers. The legislature could easily resolve this discrepancy by extending 
contractual consequences linked to the use of all unfair commercial practices (not just 
acc. to § 2988).  It would also possibly be useful for the legislature to consider 
reversing the burden of proof in certain cases concerning unfair commercial practices.  
54 Since February 2016 till the end of June more than 1400 ADR proceedings have been initiated by 
consumers (!) 
55 KS v Praze 22 Co 177/54 (Rc 135/1954), KS v Českých Budějovicích 10 A 181/2014 – 69.  
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 1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach under the UCTD is generally evaluated by the 
stakeholders as effective. While the general principles build a solid foundation for the 
judicature, the European grey list (from which Czech law formed a black list, see 
below) allows an easier control-mechanism primarily for the sector-specific authorities 
(Czech Telecommunication Office, Financial Arbitrator, Czech Energy Office) and also 
for the retailers. The average consumer is mainly protected by the general provision. 
Regarding the sector-specific directives, e.g. financial services and electronic 
communications, there is little room left for the application of the general principles of 
the UCTD. Authorities and also business organizations suggested that the majority of 
sector specific traders should prepare their general business terms according to the 
sector-specific rules, but the necessity of application of UCTD are often unclear.  
The new Czech Civil Code, Act. No. 89/2012. Sb.,56 which entered into force on 
January 1, 2014, defined and/or corrected most of the remaining incomplete and 
incorrect transpositions from the past.57 The new Civil Code extends the application of 
the Directive in many cases, i.e. to individually negotiated terms under § 1813 CzCC, 
and to implied and unwritten contracts under § 1812 CzCC.58 The limitation of No. 2 
Annex of the Directive is not applied for financial services. Some mechanism of 
contract control is also applicable in B2B relations in favour of the weaker party under 
§ 433 CzCC. Nevertheless there are still some imperfections, i.e. the indicative list of 
the UCTD Annex is not completely reflected, actions for injunction to prevent the 
continued use of unfair terms according to Art. 7 are not visible in the Czech Republic, 
not to mention the lack of existence of other collective redresses. The formulation of 
consequences of unfair terms according to § 1815 caused uncertainties, even if the 
literature emphasises ‘non negotium’, the non-binding effect of unfair terms unless 
they are invoked by the consumer.59  
Regarding the judicature in the decisions of the lower Czech Courts, we cannot find 
references to CJEU judgements relating to the UCTD – this was emphasised by 
consumer organisation stakeholders, and also ministerial experts. Higher courts, like 
the Czech Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, refer rarely to CJEU decisions 
(II.ÚS 1512/12, II. ÚS 3/06, I.ÚS 3512/11, NS 33 Cdo 1201/2012), but the courts still 
do not base their argumentation on the Directive in case of uncertainty regarding the 
Directive’s conformity with the interpretation of national rules. In some cases it is one 
of the lawyers who informs the court that it is necessary for national rules to be 
56 Of 3. February 2012, in force since 1.1.2014 see: http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-
Code.pdf  
57 After a letter of formal notice in 2007, the European Commission sent on 8.10.2010 a reasoned opinion 
(IP/09/1451 of Brussels, 8 October 2009) to the Czech Republic because contrary to the Directive, a 
consumer in the Czech Republic was bound by an unfair contract term as long as he did not actively 
invoke its unfairness. The Czech legislature reacted to the infringement proceeding with Act no. 155/2010 
Sb. 
58 Švestka/Dvořák/Fiala/Pelikánová/Pelikán/Bányaiová a kolektiv: Občanský zákoník, Komentár, Svazek V 
(§1712 – 2520) Wolters Kluwer, 2014 p. 189.  
59 Lavický, Petr, a kol. Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo (Obecná část § 1721-2054). Komentář. Praha, 
C. H. Beck, 1. Vydání, Beck, 2014, § 1815.  
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interpreted in conformity with the Directive,60 courts sometimes being unaware of the 
necessity. It should be noted that the court reasoning usually does not reflect 
awareness of this necessity.  
In the reasoning of the higher courts in the last few years, concrete consumer 
protection norms have been more frequently cited,61 but still many decisions apply 
general civil principles such as good faith. Interestingly, we can also find decisions of 
the Constitutional Court regarding contractual penalties (I.ÙS 3512/11), which extend 
the applicability of B2B commercial norms regarding the burden of proof on the 
traders, to ensure the same level of protection also for the consumer.62 
Stakeholders also emphasised problems with the ex officio review, which is more 
questionable in contracts of telecommunications service providers, where the Czech 
Telecommunication Office has exclusive competences instead of the court regarding § 
129 (5) Act. no 127/2005. Some stakeholders add that professional training in EU 
consumer law would be essential for the improvement of the work of national judges 
at the lower court level. 
Although the Czech Courts referred 48 cases63 for preliminary ruling to CJEU, there is 
just a single case (from August 2014)64 which deals with the interpretation of the 
UCTD (see further at ex-officio). On the other hand, other institutions, like the 
Financial Arbitrator, are fully aware of CJEU’s decisions and in relevant cases these 
decisions create a solid base for Financial Arbitrator’s decisions.65 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list of the UCTD is interpreted in § 1814 of the Czech Civil Code66 as a 
black list, but Czech regulation does not include all terms of the Annex. The terms that 
are not transposed are 1. e), h), m), n), and p), and not fully transposed are terms 1 
b), i), k), l), o). The main problem with the Czech black list is that the terms do not 
deal with such defaults as delay of delivery, exclusion from the right to withdraw, 
reduction of interest upon delay, etc. In these cases, or where the indicative list was 
not fully transposed by the Czech legislature, the consumer should file a lawsuit based 
on the general terms of § 1813 of the CzCC (i.e. the general test of unfairness), which 
was fully implemented.67 
Regarding the scope of subparagraphs g), j) and l) of the Annex, the Czech rules do 
not allow exclusion for financial services, so the Czech Code provides greater 
protection for the consumer in the financial sector without considering the fluctuations 
60 28 Cdo 4556/2010. 
61 Some cases: 35 C 175/2014, 19C 215/2014, 33 Cdo 1956/2007, 9 As 8/2011- 63 I. ÙS 3512/11. 
62 According to the argumentation the trader must bear the burden of proof regarding the opportunity for 
the consumer to become acquainted with the contract penalties before the conclusion of the contract 
63 The main topics of the civil law cases of the 48 referred Czech cases are: mutual assistance by the 
competent authorities, mutual assistance for the recovery of claims, taxation, interconnection obligation, 
cartel, imposing of measures on the operators of online marketplace, insolvency proceedings and 
consumer credit, see:   
http://www.nsoud.cz/judikaturans_new/ns_web.nsf/Edit/InternationalRelations~CzechPreliminaryReferen
ces?Open&area=International%20Relations&grp=Czech%20Preliminary%20References&lng=EN  
64 CJEU C-377/14, Radlinger, ECLI:EU:C:2016:283. 
65 Financial Arbitrator 19/SU/2013.  
66 See Petr Lavický a kol.:Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo. Obecná část 831721-2054) 1. Vydání, 
Beck, 2014 p 450-473 
67 Even if the requirement of “good faith” is only explicitly mentioned in the general rules of the Civil Code in 
§ 1 (1) CzCC. 
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or other changes in the financial market. Art. 15. 2) of Directive 2002/65/EC was also 
transposed into the Czech black list as § 1814 k).68  
Regarding the practical effectiveness of the indicative list, some stakeholders 
mentioned that it was very complicated for the legislature to find the right formulation 
for certain subparagraphs, which are sometimes not required. The courts often have 
difficulties interpreting the particular subparagraphs and they prefer to apply the 
general terms of § 1813 CzCC. In the literature it is criticised that during the 
recodification of the Czech Civil Code, the legislature applied a barely changed text of 
the old black list from the former Code Act No 40/1964 Sb. Even if the reasoning of 
the adaptation focused on continuity and it was only a secondary goal to transpose the 
UCTD-Annex by the European legislature  (see: KOM (2008) 614. final), in the end the 
Czech legislature did not fully conform to the directive but created a more practical 
amendment of the black list in the new Civil Code.69 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
To have a black list mainly benefits the businesses, and secondly the courts, because 
the latter does not have to rely on applying the general test of fairness only, according 
to stakeholders. In the judicial decisions the opposite approach is evident: the courts 
prefer to apply the general test of fairness. In case of unfair contract terms in the 
telecommunication sector, where the Czech Telecommunication Office also has the 
power for contract ‘litigation’, a black list can be very helpful. Since the black list is in 
force in the Czech Republic, the biggest traders are making an effort to eliminate 
unfair terms from their contracts (according to experts from consumer organisations). 
When a consumer is complaining at a consumer organisation about an unfair contract 
term, it is easiest to handle those terms that are on the black list, because due to 
legal advice from the European Consumer Centre some of the major businesses who 
care about their reputation, are disposed to change the contract terms. (Note that the 
ECC in the Czech Republic is instituted and co-financed by the Czech Trade Inspection 
Authority, which increases their power and prestige.) Another consumer organisation 
reported ‘cosmetic’ changes of contract terms by the traders after the new Civil Code.  
Regarding the black list, the Czech courts have dealt mainly with two types of unfair 
terms: arbitration agreements70 and agreements about court competence (MS v praze 
93 Co 214/2014). Both issues were so intensely discussed that the legislature also 
reacted. With the new modification71 of the Czech Civil Procedure72 (further: CzCP), 
the applicability agreements about court competence have been limited just to B2B 
litigation (in B2C cases it is not possible), and the Act on arbitration 216/1994 Sb. 
introduced consumer protection rules (§ 25 2) and 3) and § 31 g) and h)), which have 
been in force since January 1, 2014. The applicability of this kind of agreement was 
controversial, and regarding the review of the Act on Consumer credit,73 members of 
68 § 1814 The prohibition particularly applies to stipulations which: k) pass onto the consumer the burden of 
proof that the entrepreneur has fulfilled his duty imposed on him by the provisions of a contract for the 
provision of financial services. 
69 See Lavický, Petr, a kol. Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo (Obecná část § 1721-2054). Komentář. 
Praha, C. H. Beck, 1. Vydání, Beck, 2014 p. 469. 
70 ÙS II. ÙS 2164/10 KS v Ostravě 38 ICm 178/2010,  VS 12Cmo 496/2008, 33 Cdo 1201/2012, 30 Cdo 
3712/2012 and see a long list on Lavický, Petr, a kol. Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo. Obecná část 
(§1721-2054) 1. Vydání, Beck, 2014 p. 464-466. 
71 Act. 293/2013 Sb. 
72 Act. 99/1963 Sb.  
73 Parlament print version 679 (Sněmovní tisk 679).  
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the Czech Parliament tried to completely eliminate arbitration agreements in consumer 
credit contracts.74 But there have also been many cases decided before Czech courts 
concerning compensation upon withdrawal and compensation for product liability.75  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
All stakeholders emphasized that the Czech Court decisions can only have a legally 
binding effect on individual relationships between the specific trader and the consumer 
according to § 159a) (1) CzCP. Ministerial experts added that it is hard to imagine how 
the extension of the binding effect erga omnes could function in a court decision, even 
if in other Member States the extension of res judicata is possible to all affected 
consumers. Despite this general position of the stakeholders, § 159a) (2) CzCP allows 
a collective effect for decisions in special cases: ‘2) An opinion of a final judgment, 
which ruled in the cases mentioned in § 83, paragraph 2, is not only binding for the 
parties, but also for other persons entitled against the defendant for the same claims 
from the same act or condition. Special legislation states in which other cases and to 
what extent the verdict or final judgment is binding on persons other than the parties.’ 
Matters considered in § 83 are: a) rights breached or threatened by unfair competition 
conduct, b) protection of consumer rights, c) consideration in a squeeze-out d) other 
cases.76 Regarding consumer protection, only injunction actions are allowed. While the 
commentaries77 note more cases regarding squeeze-out and unfair competition 
conduct, they remain silent about cases regarding consumer protection.  
Between1993-2008 the consumer protection organisation SOS filed 10 injunction 
actions in civil courts but in most of the cases the organisation abandoned the action 
because the disputes should have been solved by alternative dispute resolution. There 
are two injunction cases that had legal effect, one from 2005, the ‘gift card’ case,78 
and the other from 2013, the ‘bank charging’ case.79 In both cases the consumer 
organisation lost the suit, so there is no evidence how a court would deal with the 
extension of the legal effect.  
Regarding the follow up effect of individual binding decisions, it should be mentioned – 
as stakeholders underline it - that the bigger traders are well informed and follow the 
judicature, especially if the case does not solely belong to the court’s competence but 
also to another body. The reason is that those other bodies i.e. the Financial Arbitrator 
or the Czech Telecommunication Office could not only award compensation to the 
consumer but also impose a fine on the trader. Regarding contract law, there are 
overlaps according to court competences in financial issues. The consumer can file a 
suit in court or initiate a more friendly, fast and cheap ADR-procedure at the Financial 
Arbitrator according to § 1 (1) Act no. 229/2002 Sb., where the Arbitrator can impose 
74 See Act. 257/2016 Sb. and Act. 258/2016 Sb.  
75 Regarding product liability, special norms are also in force, so the general terms of § 1813, 1814 have not 
been applied too often.  
76 http://www.czechlegislation.com/en/99-1963-sb  
77 Bohumil Dvořák in Petr Lavický a kol. Občancký soudní řád, Praktický komentár, Wolter Kluvers, Praha, 
2016 § 159a bod 32-35. 
78 NS 33 Cdo 1956/2007. 
79 OS pro Prahu 5  10 C 49/2013. 
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a fine. In telecommunication contract issues, the CTO has an exclusive decision 
making power according to § 129 (5) Act no. 127/2005 Sb. Both of these authorities 
underline the ‘domino-effect’ of their decisions and the willingness of the traders to 
self-correct contract terms.  
The Czech ECC stressed that they are using the judicature of CJEU and the Czech 
courts as ‘case law’, and relying on their legal opinions. Most of the traders take their 
critical remarks regarding consumer contract law seriously. Banking and other 
associations are warning and informing their members after failed judgements. On the 
other hand, it is possible to recognise a so called ‘wear out strategy’ of the traders, 
before a legally binding judgement, which can take several years. Even if it is 
foreseeable that the Financial Arbitrator will decide the case in favour of a consumer, 
the banks wait for the result of the court decision and hesitate to eliminate the unfair 
term.  
It must be underlined that even if in its written form Czech law includes the possibility 
of extending the effect of a court decision, it is not practised in consumer cases. The 
self-correction of the traders happens more or less in cases where an administrative 
sanction is expected. A further problem is the inactivity of the consumers in terms of 
filing a lawsuit. Here there is not a domino-effect. Reasons for refraining from that are 
the following: relatively high court costs, costs associated with legal action, risk of 
unfavourable judgement, cases taking too long. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Stakeholders generally underline the positive effect of the UCTD and the Consumer 
Rights Directive on contractual transparency. Consumer organisations add that many 
of the unfair agreements have disappeared from the market, like hidden arbitration 
agreements or hidden contract fines. Unilateral contractual changes, however, are still 
causing many problems for the consumer.  
At the implementation of the Consumer right directive and the improved transposition 
of UCTD the Czech legislature codified in § 1811 (1) a clause for general transparency: 
‘All of an entrepreneur’s communications with a consumer must be made clearly and 
understandably in the language in which the contract is concluded.’ 
Also, former court practice interpreted80 the definition of transparency and requires 
‘readable, synoptic and logical ordering’ of consumer contracts, especially of template-
contracts. In sector-specific consumer litigation, it is not clear what should be the 
appropriate expectation regarding contractual transparency. It is questionable whether 
the absence of calculation mechanisms regarding consumer credit agreements81 can 
lead to non-transparency. As regards consumer credit agreements, the Financial 
Arbitrator also added that the courts have major difficulties regarding the 
understanding and application of the annual percentage rate of charge.82 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
The Civil Code has extended the application of the Directive in many places: first 
regarding individually negotiated terms according § 1813 CzCC, and second regarding 
80 ÙS III. ÙS 3725/13, I. ÙS 3512/11, VS v Praze 76 ICm 876/2010, 103 VSPH 84/11. 
81 PE CONS 25/13 -2011/0062, 32 Cdo 191/2014. 
82 FA/SU/112/2014, 264/SU/2013. 
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implied and unwritten (or oral) contracts under § 1812 CzCC. The intention of the 
Czech legislature, in extending application, was to make it easier for the consumer to 
appeal to court in cases where an unfair term was agreed individually between an 
unreliable trader and the consumer.  
Regarding the price and main subject matter, there are not evident extensions. On the 
contrary: Czech law is very restrictive regarding the possibility of price control. The 
literature reveals a fear of the ‘atomization of the contract-control’. This problem was 
highly visible regarding the banking fee cases. Referring to the German BGH decision 
regarding the account maintenance fees,83 Czech consumers also filed several similar 
lawsuits and in November 2013 Czech consumer submitted 93139 petitions to the 
Financial Arbitrator to start proceedings.84 Some city courts of Prague struck down the 
fees,85 some others allowed86 it, as long as the Supreme Court defined the fees as 
part of the price,87 with a unifying effect of this decision. Also the Constitutional Court 
refused88 a consumer claim. The Financial Arbitrator mentioned an actual case 
regarding his decision of 19/SU/2013, where the City Court Prague misinterpreted the 
definition of the price as main subject matter under Art. 4 (2) UPCD. The City Court 
eliminated the necessity of the unfairness-test regarding the unilateral change of a 
banking fee with the argument that this also falls under the main subject matter of the 
contract.89  
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The non-binding character of unfair contract terms is anchored in Czech Civil law 
according to § 1815 CzCC. This norm also allows a relativisation of the nullity if the 
consumer insists on the validity: ‘Disproportionate stipulations are disregarded unless 
invoked by the consumer’.   
Regarding the foreseeability of the sanctioning of unfair terms, stakeholders of 
consumer organisations criticize the excessive length of court procedure and the 
differences in the application of the norms in § 1813, 1814 CzCC by several lower 
courts, which causes uncertainty for the consumer, but also for the traders, as in the 
banking-fee case.  
The unfairness control ex officio is not satisfactory in the Czech Republic. We can 
detect two main problems. Firstly there is a discrepancy between ex officio and so 
called dispositions maxima according to § 153 99/1963 CzCP,90 which is one of the 
main principles of civil procedure. The second problem is the application of ex officio 
control in the ‘quasi litigation-procedure’ by sector specific authorities, like the Czech 
Telecommunication Authority.  
Consumer organisations emphasise the problem that courts regularly order contract 
penalty payment in favour of the traders without applying the unfairness-test 
83 BGH XI ZR 388/10. 
84 See: http://www.finarbitr.cz/cs/informace-pro-verejnost/tiskove-zpravy/tiskova-zprava-prubezna-
informace-k-hromadne-podanym-navrhum-na-zahajeni-rizeni-o-poplatek-za-spravu-uveru-330.html  
85 OS pro Prahu 5 25 C 261/2012, Ks v Plzní 25 Co 60/2013. 
86 OS pro Prahu 5  10 C 49/2013. 
87 NS Cpjn 203/2013. 
88 III. ÙS 3725/13. 
89 The case is pending and not published yet.  
90 The commentary does not deal with the question and possibilities of ex-officio, see Bohumil Dvořák in Petr 
Lavický a kol. Občancký soudní řád, Praktický komentár, Wolter Kluvers, Praha, 2016 § 8. 
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regarding penalty clauses, unless the proceeding was initiated by the consumer. Also, 
ministerial experts are concerned that lower courts are not adequately performing ex 
officio control, as required by the CJEU judicature. Other experts add that in the Czech 
Republic consumers should have proper legal knowledge to be able to enforce their 
rights.  
The problems with invoking unfairness ex officio are clearly visible in Radlinger case 
C-377/14.91 The Regional Court of Prague referred mainly to the necessity of the 
application of ex-officio control, and partly to the non-binding effect of unfair contract 
terms.92   
Regarding the ‘quasi litigation’ competence of sector specific authorities according to § 
129 of 127/2005 Sb. for the Czech Telecommunication and according to § 96 b) 
458/2000 Sb. for the Czech Energy Authority, it must be added that this bodies are 
even more inadequately performing of unfairness-test ex officio, than in the regular 
courts. Stakeholders of these authorities are not certain if they should invoke 
unfairness automatically.  On the other hand, the Financial Arbitrator applies ex officio 
an unfairness-test even in cases related to the period (contracts signed before 1st 
August 2010) in which due to incorrect transposition of the UCTD the contracts were 
not ‘absolutely’ but only ‘relatively’ void, i. e. the consumer had to claim it.  
Stakeholders agree that the Czech judicature does not apply the CJEU guidance 
because of the judges' lack of knowledge of it.   
Administrative remedies do not exist in this area for the Czech consumer.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The transposition of the UCTD in the Czech Republic and the rules of the new CzCC 
impacted consumer contract law very positively. Illegible fine print and unexpected 
contract terms have disappeared from the majority of contracts, but the provision of 
quality information by the traders is still problematic in practice.  
Other measures: Regarding the indicative list, experts of ministries and the Financial 
Arbitrator agree that Chapter V of the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council  on consumer rights of 2008 from 8.10.2008 COM(2008) 
614 final, 2008/0196 (COD)93 contained elaborate requirements for contract terms, 
requirements which should be applied in the future. These requirements could build 
the basis/foundation of possible future EU legislation. 
Some best practices can be reported in the Czech Republic:  
• The Czech judicature requires that agreements on contract penalties cannot be 
contained in T&Cs, rather they should be a separate paragraph or provision of 
the contract; 
• Regarding § 6 (1) 145/2010 Sb. Act on consumer credit, only the applied T&Cs 
part should be cited in the contract, if T&Cs are part of it. In that case the 
printed presentation of applied T&Cs should not be smaller than other parts of 
the contract;  
91 ECLI:EU:C:2016:283. 
92 See ECLI:EU:C:2016:283 remarks 51,54,56,58,59,60,66,74,77,97,100,100 (!) Further question was the 
calculation of the annual percentage rate according to 2008/48/EC Directive. 
93 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2008)0614_/com_ 
com(2008)0614_en.pdf 
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• The Czech telecommunication authority published the second edition of its 
recommendation of fair contract terms (containing 48 pages);94 
• The Association for electronic commerce (APEK) created an E-shop Kodex;95 
• The main consumer organisation DTest gave certification for reliable e-shops; 
• The Czech organisation People in Need recommended to compose a codex of 
fair consumer credit contract rules (not realised yet). 
Nonetheless the Financial Arbitrator added that the effectiveness of application of 
UCTD rules still can be much better in the Czech Republic. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
Business organisations agree that traders are now used to applying the provisions of 
the UCTD. But the traders would prefer a standardised system of fairness clauses all 
over the Member states, like a traffic light. Regarding further questions of necessity of 
full harmonisation of rules, the business stakeholders stated they would not need 
major changes, but expressed that unified rules would be great.  
Disparities create costs (legal advice, different web-content etc.) which will be paid in 
the end by the consumer as an additional cost.   
Regarding different business strategies, stakeholders add that the majority of Czech 
traders are not active in other countries, so they cannot estimate the extent of costs 
incurred.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Respondents did not notice such cross-border trade barriers. Ministerial experts and 
the Financial Arbitrator would  exclude the indicative list according to Chapter V of the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European  Parliament and of the Council on consumer 
rights of 2008 from 8.10.2008 COM(2008) 614 final, 2008/0196 (COD).96  
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The extension to individually negotiated terms is possible in the Czech Republic. 
Experience in the Czech Republic regarding extension of the application to individually 
negotiated terms could be recommended for other Member States.  
94 http://www.ctu.cz/doporuceni-ctu-k-navrhum-smluv-o-poskytovani-verejne-dostupnych-sluzeb-
elektronickych-komunikaci  
95 https://www.apek.cz/kodex-terminologie-lhut-dodani  
96 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2008)0614_/com_ 
com(2008)0614_en.pdf 
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 1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Similar to other European Codes the new Czech Civil Code Act 89/2012 Sb. enshrines 
the protection of the weaker party as a general principle according to § 433.97 The 
protection of the weaker party98 is automatically strengthened in all B2B relationships, 
not just SMEs, but it only ensures a situational protection. ‘(1) A person who acts as 
an entrepreneur with respect to other persons in economic transactions may not 
abuse his expertise or economic position to create or take advantage of the 
dependence of the weaker party and to achieve a clear and unjustified imbalance in 
the mutual rights and duties of the parties. (2) It is presumed that the person who, in 
economic transactions, acts with respect to the entrepreneur in a manner unrelated to 
his own business activities is always the weaker party.’ The decisive factor is whether 
the entrepreneur’s act is unrelated to his business. (This is a praesumtio iuris tantum, 
the burden of proof is on the weaker party.)  
Besides this general term, the new CzCC also covers special cases for protection of the 
weaker party against abuse, such as:  
• Usury (§ 1796); 
• Lesion, disproportionate shortening (§ 1793 et seq.); 
• Contracts of adhesion (§ 1798 et seq.); 
• Inability to negotiate a shorter or longer deadline to the detriment of weaker 
parties (§ 630 paragraph. 2); 
• Limitation or exclusion of rights to compensation under § 2898.  
It must be mentioned that the weaker party is not protected per se, rather only in 
case of abuse or exploitation of his right to his disadvantage (until now there were no 
civil court decisions regarding this norm).99 Regarding the level of protection of the 
weaker party, commentaries underline that the upper level of the protection cannot 
exceed consumer protection rules and that stipulations on the subject of performance 
or price cannot be controlled.100 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
The protection level for the weaker party in B2B transactions is ensured in the Czech 
Republic by CzCC. Business organisations underline that B2B regulation should be 
light-handed, otherwise competition law provisions may be compromised. Excessively 
widespread regulation brings the risk of overregulation. Czech Act. 395/2009 Sb. on 
the significant market power in the sale of agricultural and food products is an 
example of that. According to the regulation, the Czech Competition authority has too 
97 Havel in Melzer/Tégl a kol. Občanský zákoník, Velký komentář, 2014-2017, Leges, § 433.   
98 Josef Bejček: Smluvní Svoboda a ochrana slabšího obchodníka, Acta Universitatis Brunensis, iuridica 
edition Scientia vol. 557, masarikova univerzita, Brno 2016, p 43 ff. 52. 
99 Havel in Melzer/Tégl a kol. Občanský zákoník, Velký komentář, 2014-2017, Leges § 419-645, p. 35.  
100 Lavický, Petr, a kol. Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo. Obecná část (§1721-2054) 1. Vydání, Beck, 
2014, § 1798. 
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broad and too flexible a scope for intervention by which not only SMEs but also big 
retail chains can be protected. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
The protection of the weaker party in Czech civil law is a general principle. 
Theoretically it is also applicable for individually negotiated terms depending on the 
subject-matter, but only in cases – and it should be underlined - where there is a clear 
and unjustified imbalance between the mutual rights and duties of the parties. The 
literature emphasises that individual agreements express the will of the parties better 
than T&Cs,101 which should be taken into account and the level of the protection 
should be lower.    
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Czech Act. 395/2009 Sb. on the significant market power in the sale of agricultural 
and food products includes not just a general prohibition of abuse of significant market 
power over suppliers but also a black list regarding unfair contract terms and unfair 
commercial practices (see the annexes of the act). This practice could be used also in 
other Member States, but practical problems show that the protection should be 
limited exclusively to SMEs, not all suppliers or retail-chains. Otherwise the regulation 
would be a partially overreaching intervention in the autonomy of the traders i.e. in 
statutory payment periods. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
According to stakeholders, these requirements could be extended also for B2B 
transactions. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
According to business organisations, unified norms bring the most benefits for cross-
border trade. In a real cross-border perspective, business organisations add that 
Europe should stress the merit of European norms also for traders from third 
countries. Otherwise the European traders may suffer from relative competitive 
disadvantage.  
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
This might be possible, but the extensions – as experience in the Czech Republic 
shows – should be applied only for SME traders or for weaker business partners, and 
then only in cases of clear and unjustified imbalance in the mutual rights and duties of 
the parties. 
 
101 See also Lavický, Petr, a kol. Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo. Obecná část (§1721-2054) 1. 
Vydání, Beck, 2014, According to § 1751. 
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• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
It is important to mention that the main purpose of the protection of B2C and 
(theoretically) B2B is different - this should not be misinterpreted.102 B2B transactions 
involve a different professional level of participants than B2C transactions. This 
concept is stated in § 5 (1) of CzCC: ‘A person who offers professional performance as 
a member of an occupation or profession, whether publicly or in dealings with another 
person, demonstrates his ability to act with the knowledge and care associated with 
his occupation or profession. If the person fails to act with such professional care, he 
bears the consequences.’ 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?103  
According to the changes of the Czech Act on consumer protection on 21.3.2002, only 
consumer associations are now entitled to file an injunction action at regular courts 
according to § 25 (2) Act No. 634/1992.104 This right of the protection of the collective 
interest of consumers was extended in 2006105 to certain entitled bodies as well which 
protect consumer rights after getting authorisation by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. Since 23.2.2011,106 the Czech Act on consumer protection allows also for 
professional organisations to file an action. Actually the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
names six specific organisations107 which are entitled for injunction action. The 
interest of organisations is increasing. Other public authorities or organisations cannot 
file injunction actions.  
Despite the correct transposition of the ID in the Czech Republic, injunction actions do 
not play any (relevant) role in reduction of the number of infringements or reduction 
in violating consumer rights. The number of cases in the last 13 years was only 11.  
Between 2003-2008, the consumer protection organisation SOS filed 10 injunction 
actions, most of them against ASKO furniture, Sky Europe Airlines, Eurocomm Group, 
and Exim Tours. The SOS consumer organisation withdrew the actions in most of the 
cases, because the dispute was resolved through alternative dispute resolution, which 
actually shows the positive effect of injunctions. In the so-called ‘gift card’ lawsuit 
against Kasa.cz108 where the SOS organisation complained that the company did not 
refund the purchase price after the expiration of the gift-card, the organisation lost the 
case. It was the last injunction sought by this organisation, because the procedure’s 
costs (including the lawyers’ fees) represent a significant economic burden for the 
102 See Reich/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner: European Consumer Law, Chapter 1, p. 6. 
103 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
104 The subparagraph was inserted by Act No. 151/2002 from 21.3.2002 in force from 1.1.2003. 
105 Act 229/2006 Sb.  
106 28/2011 Sb.  
107 1. Sdružení českých spotřebitelů, z. ú, 2. DTest o. p. s., 3. Sdružení obrany spotřebitelů – Asociace, z. s, 
4. Společná obrana, z. s, 5. Unicampus 6. HELP – Sdružení práv podvedených (HELP - Cheated 
Consumers' Rights Association). 
108 NS 33 Cdo 1956/2007. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
265
organisation. (In ADR cases the parties bear their own costs, so the cost of the legal 
representation must be borne by the consumer organisations).  
In 2013, DTest – the most active consumer organisation in the Czech Republic - also 
sought an injunction action against Unicredit Bank about bank account fees, but the 
organisation lost the case.109 Due to financial difficulties, DTest could not file the suit 
at the second level of the jurisdiction. 
Other organisations have not yet sought any injunctions. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Regarding the transposition of Art. 2 ID, it should be added that the Czech law § 83 
(2) Czech Civil Procedure110 ensures only the cessation or the prohibition of the 
infringement, according to Art. 2 (1) a). The Czech norms do not include any special 
rule for the publication of the decisions according to Art. 2 (1) b. According §351 on 
Czech Civil Procedure exist a general  sanction in the case of failure to comply with the 
decision. The maximum of the sanction is CZK 100 000 (approx. EUR 3700). A prior 
consultation before seeking an injunction – as Art. 5. ID allows it – is not a necessary 
condition under the Czech law.  
It is interesting that a judgement on an injunction action according to § 159a of Czech 
Civil Procedure, is a single type of judgement which is, however, binding for the 
collective: ‘An opinion of a final judgment which ruled in the cases mentioned in § 83, 
paragraph 2, is not only binding on the parties, but also on other persons entitled 
against the defendant for the same claims from the same act or condition. Special 
legislation states in which other cases and to what extent the final verdict is binding 
on persons other than the parties.’ This protection of the collective interest is possible 
not only in consumer law but also in cases of unfair competition and so called 
squeeze-out (crowd-out) cases.111  
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The Czech Republic extended the scope of application in general, to all consumer 
protection fields which are under the scope of the Act on consumer protection 
634/1992 Sb. The reason for the extension was that the legislature did not want to 
change the Act in the future and rebalance the scope of the national norms according 
to future changes of the Annex. 
For example, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights is covered.  
  
109 OS Praha 4 7C 308/2013-140. 
110 Act 99/1963 Sb. on Czech Civil Procedure 
111 Bohumil Dvořák in Petr Lavický a kol. Občancký soudní řád, Praktický komentár, Wolter Kluvers, Praha, 
2016 § § 83 Nr. 15. 
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• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Even if the transposition grants the right of action to entitled organisations, invoking 
such rights is not common in the Czech Republic. The main obstacle is the lack of 
financial means of consumer organisations. Stakeholders also added that a lost suit 
can even cause insolvency for the consumer organisation. The acquisition of a lawyer 
and payment of court costs should be secured in other ways. Furthermore, the Czech 
injunction model does not make it possible to append to the injunction a request to 
pay back the amounts received from consumers as a result of an unlawful practice. 
This could raise the significance/weight of the injunction action remarkably. Similarly, 
sanctioning the failure to comply with the decision is recommended.  
After 2012 the situation has not changed in the Czech Republic, and still not after the 
recommendation of the Commission of 11 June 2013 on the common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States 
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU).  
A further obstacle that should be removed is competence in telecommunication 
contracts. In this contract type regarding B2C disputes, the Czech Telecommunication 
Office has exclusive competence instead of the court under § 129 (5) Act 127/2005 
Sb. But injunction cases do not fall under these types of disputes, and the legal 
justification for an injunction action is based on different rules, on § 25 (2) Act 
634/1992 Sb. in conjunction with § 83 (2) b) Act 99/1963 Sb. on Civil Procedure.  The 
consumer organization DTest failed on 15.7.2016 in a T&Cs injunction action against 
O2, seeking to prohibit a T&Cs condition, because the promoted ‘unlimited internet 
service’ was limited by some conditions in the T&Cs. The Civil Court Praha 4 rejected 
on 18.7.2016 the injunction claim with the argument of lack of competence.112 DTest 
filed an appeal. The Czech Telecommunication Office is arguing also on the basis of 
lack of competence, because there is no contractual relationship between DTest and 
O2. It remains to be seen how this key question can be solved.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that a request to pay back the amounts received from consumers based 
on unlawful practice should be ensured, either in the same procedure or as a follow-up 
process. Also, sanctioning in case of failure to comply with the decision should be 
generally recommended.  
Because of the difficulties of seeking an injunction in Czech Republic non-legislative or 
legislative procedural measures should be urgently taken to improve the effectiveness 
of the injunction procedure, including: clarifying the court competences, financial 
support of legal cost of consumer organisations, which seek an injunction (consumer 
organizations are asking to relieve their injunction costs or to support their litigation 
costs.) Other possibility is the ensuring of authorities of the right to seek injunction 
actions. Also actio popularis collective redresses, like in Hungary, could be 
recommended.   
112 OS Praha 4 40 C 196/2016-48  
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Regarding the protection of collective business interests, § 2989 (1) of the Czech Civil 
Code ensures the protection of B2B in the case of unfair competition. ‘(1) The right to 
have the violator refrain from competing unfairly or to have the violator remedy the 
situation to its original state may, in addition to the cases under § 2982 to 2985, be 
also asserted by a legal person entitled to defend the interests of competitors or 
customers.’113 In this case the legislature protects the competitors (and the 
consumers) also by the reversal of the burden of proof. This norm was adopted from 
the former Czech Commercial Code (§ 54 (1)) into the Civil Code. Relating to the old 
norm of the former Commercial Code, there are many cases, but none relating to 
§ 2989 of the new Czech Civil Code yet.  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Czech stakeholders reported that no injunction procedures had been sought in another 
EU country by Czech entitled organizations.  
Czech consumer organisations lack the financial resources and are not active in filing 
injunction actions even within the Czech Republic. Seeking such actions in another 
Member State would be even more difficult, risky, costly, and would require extensive 
legal knowledge about the legal system of the other EU country.  
The only entity that is very active and successful in cross-border-relations is the 
European Consumer Centre, but it is not entitled to file injunction actions.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Here, a similar lack of activity can be reported. However, it is easy to address the 
infringements in another EU country with the help of the European Consumer Centre, 
whose service is free of charge. Stakeholders reported that national consumer 
organisations suggest the consumer in cross-border issues to contact the ECC in 
Prague. The ECC in Prague has resolved 926 consumer disputes with traders.114 In 
2015 they reported a significant increase in cross-border disputes when compared 
with 2014.  
On the other hand, to address ‘intra-Community’ infringements in the Czech Republic, 
according to Art. 3 b), Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 is incorporated in Czech law. 
Qualified entities can apply not only to court, but also to the sector specific 
administrative authorities, as sector specific rules ensure that.115 Experts of the Czech 
Trade Inspection Authority added that the Inspection has addressed some 
infringement actions to other national authorities in the framework of the CPC 
Regulation, and also issued one final decision on the request of an authority of another 
Member State. (Two other decisions are not yet final). 
 
113 http://obcanskyzakonik.justice.cz/images/pdf/Civil-Code.pdf  
114 http://www.evropskyspotrebitel.cz/files/ecc-cz-activities-of-2014.pdf 
115 F.e. see § 7c 64/1986 Sb. concerning the Czech Trade Inspection or §44a (3) Act 6/1993 concerning the 
Czech National Bank 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Regarding injunctions, there are no best practices in the Czech Republic.  
Non-legislative or legislative procedural measures should be taken to improve the 
effectiveness of the injunction procedure in general and also to address infringements 
originating in another EU country. The lack of financial resources of the consumer 
organisations hinders their ability to file an injunction action or to address 
infringements in cross-border relationships. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The right of consumer protection and other organisations to file an injunction action is 
regulated in the Act on consumer protection 634/1992, where norms are laid out to 
protect against unfair commercial practices and concerning alternative dispute 
resolution and administrative enforcement. The transposition of the UCPD and the ADR 
Directive is placed there. The UCTD and the Consumer Rights Directive were 
implemented in the Czech Civil Code, where many other provisions are transposed.  
But the rules about the injunction procedure are regulated in the Czech Civil Procedure 
according to § 83 (2) Czech Civil Procedure. In the Czech Republic there is a 
distinction between civil and administrative enforcement. The rules for civil 
enforcement are regulated in the same Act, in the Civil Law Procedure, but the 
administrative enforcement rules are regulated in several sector specific rules. In § 23 
Act on consumer protection, there are more than 12 authorities named which control 
and enforce consumer protection. Administrative enforcement plays a key role in the 
Czech Republic.116 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
We should distinguish between civil law enforcement and administrative law 
enforcement. Regarding civil law enforcement, entitled organisations and consumers 
file and finance their lawsuits according to the general rules of the Civil Procedure. 
Administrative enforcement can be initiated either ex officio or based on a complaint 
from a consumer organisation, or from a consumer. In all cases the procedure is free 
of charge, but regarding § 26 634/1992, the administrative authority should inform 
116 See http://www.andrassyuni.eu/publikationen/nr-32-dr-iur-sik-simon-rita-ll-m-kollektive-durchsetzung-
der-verbraucherrechte-in-ungarn-und-tschechien.html or http://www.andrassyuni.eu/pubfile/de-80-39-
di-wp-sik-simon-verwaltungsrechtliche-sanktionen-abgenommen.pdf  
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the consumer organisation about the initiated process within 2 months. (The Authority 
is not obligated to start a process). 
The main differences between administrative and civil enforcement are the cost of the 
procedure and the output of the procedure. In administrative cases, unfair practices 
will be not only prohibited but also an administrative fine will be issued (which can 
also be effective and can motivate the trader). In civil enforcement an unfair contract 
term or practice can be prohibited.  
For compensation of consumer losses the consumers should file a law suit themselves. 
Upon injunction it is not possible to seek compensation.  
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues 
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; 
The main benefit for the consumer is the lack of black listed, unfair commercial 
practices and an increasing contractual transparency. All stakeholders state that these 
two developments are due to these directives. Consumer organizations add that 
without European Directives the Czech consumers would not be able to exercise half of 
the rights which they can exercise nowadays. From the perspective of the costs for the 
consumer while exercising their rights, they should be differentiated regarding the 
enforcement type of these rights. In case of administrative enforcement (UCPD, PID, 
MCAD) the exercising of the right has no cost, but the consumer cannot be 
compensated for his damages or get refunded for overpayments. Regarding 
contractual disputes under civil enforcement (UCTD or damage claims regarding unfair 
commercial practices), the consumer should file a suit, but the risk and the cost of 
litigation can be higher than the damage the consumer is trying to replace through the 
suit.  
The risk and cost of the litigation is raised by two factors. At courts, the consumer 
usually stands against a bigger bank or telecommunication company, which can easily 
pay for adequate legal support, and in case the consumer loses the suit, it can be very 
expensive to pay the legal cost of the attorneys hired by the bank or other major firm. 
The second problem is the uncertainty of the decision. Consumer organizations add 
that the Czech Highest Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court are 
consumer friendly, but the Supreme Civil Court - which has competence in contractual 
disputes - is not. These organizations also underline that the civil courts have in 
general less knowledge about very specific sectoral issues, like details of a 
telecommunication contract or a mortgage contract. For this reason, it is safer for the 
consumer to turn to the administrative authorities or to the Financial Arbitrator. But if 
the telecommunication company or the bank files an appeal against their decision then 
the civil or administrative courts will decide these disputes. The Financial Arbitrator 
added that in these cases the court does not inform the Financial Arbitrator about the 
litigation, and never asks questions regarding special financial questions, e.g. 
calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC). Regarding the litigation 
risk and costs, it can be assumed that the inaction of the consumer is rational and 
reasonable.  
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Effective collective actions and collective redress mechanisms do not exist in the Czech 
Republic, and to seek an injunction is very complicated in practice.117 The ensuring of 
authorities of the right to seek injunction actions could be recommended. Consumer 
organizations are asking to relieve their injunction costs or to support their litigation 
costs.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Business organizations summarize that honest traders are trying to fulfil all national 
rules and see their client as a partner. Dishonest or ‘catch and go’ traders have short 
term goals and different attitudes. Even these directives cannot change their 
mentality, but e.g. high administrative fines which the authorities can impose in case 
of unlawful action can be restraining. Consumer organizations claim that the 
implementation of these directives helped traders to see the consumer from another 
perspective, which practically helped them to be more consumer-friendly.  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
The traders have two types of cost: legal advice and defence costs in case of 
administrative investigations. Both these costs increased in relation to the directives. 
To what extent the cost for legal advice increased could not be stated by business 
organizations. The Czech Trade Inspection Authority stated that for typical Czech 
traders - which are mostly small and medium sized companies - to follow all 
information requirements which are laid down by the directives is almost impossible. 
The Czech legal rules are very fragmented, hard to understand and follow. These 
companies are used to joining professional associations which help them and advise 
them on how to fulfil the requirements. According to the Czech Trade Inspection 
Authority, it is obvious that even an honest trader – with high probability – will violate 
some requirements, not because they want to, but because of missing information or 
uncertainty. The cost of legal advice needed in such cases rose significantly.  
Consumer organizations added that while bigger traders are able to pay for legal 
advice reading consumer law, smaller traders just copy the T&Cs of the bigger ones on 
their web-pages.   
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Administrative enforcement is in general free of charge for consumers and consumer 
organizations. With public enforcement the consumer cannot reclaim their damages, 
as he is not part of the procedure. The consumer could in theory use the declaratory 
decision of the authority on the unfair or unlawful practice of the trader in court to 
claim their damages, but it could be a long procedure. The second problem is that the 
consumer is not part of the administrative procedure, so the consumer has an 
information gap. 
117 Luboš Tichý, Jan Balarin: Kolektivní ochrana procesních práv v ČR. Sen či skutečnost? (Návrh právní 
úpravy a jeho odůvodněni), Bulletin advokácie 3/2013,   Sik-Simon: Verwaltungsrechtliche Sanktionen 
der Verletzung der Verbraucherrechte in der Tschechischen Republik und Ungarn, Donau-Institut Working 
Paper No. 39, 2014 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
271
In telecommunication cases, where the Czech Telecommunication Authority is a ‘quasi’ 
litigator, the consumer should pay at least CZK 100 (approx. EUR 3.70) as a process 
fee (in the second instance, at least CZK 200 (EUR 7.40) or 4% of the value of the 
claim), which can deter the consumer from initiating an administrative claim, 
especially in  small or low value cases.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
No, ministerial experts add that in the Czech Republic this is not possible. All 
competent Ministries should implement the European rules solely in a cost-effective 
manner.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
All interview subjects said no to this question.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
The awareness of sector specific requirements in the Czech Republic in general is 
higher than the knowledge of general horizontal EU consumer legislation, stakeholders 
emphasize. There are many reasons for this. Firstly the fragmentation of the 
competences of the authorities leads to more awareness of the sector specific rules. 
(As mentioned in 1.1.1, in the Czech Republic there are more than 17 authorities 
involved in the enforcement of consumer protection according to § 23 Act 634/1992 
Sb.) Secondly, the legislature tends to delegate the sector specific tasks to the 
authorities first, and often forgets to solve the issues in general, like the control of 
unfair contract terms in a specific field – adds the Check Trade Inspection Authority.  
Because of the fragmented competence of the authorities, in practice the negative 
competence conflicts between the authorities are not unknown, but this phenomenon 
in the end eliminates the protection of consumer rights.  
Consumer organizations underline that in the field of telecommunication, the 
awareness of horizontal EU consumer legislation and sector specific rules is getting 
better and better, and the Czech Telecommunication Authority applies both types of 
rules at the same time. But in the field of energy, there is not a similar awareness. Not 
only is the control authority uncertain of the relevance of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (UCPD) in the energy field, but the consumers are also not sure which 
general rules are valid regarding energy supplier contracts – adds a consumer 
organization.   
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In the field of financial services there are so many sector specific rules, adds the 
Financial Arbitrator, that the relevance of general consumer legislation like UCTD is 
very narrow.  
Traders also have the same (lack of) awareness. First they are trying to fulfil all the 
sector specific requirements, but the traders have much less awareness of the 
requirements of the general consumer rules.   
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The main authority which is responsible for the enforcement of UCPD is the Czech 
Trade Inspection Authority, while sector specific rules are part of the competence of 
sector specific authorities. The Czech Trade Inspection Authority underlined that they 
are also not competent if no other sector specific authority has competence. In many 
cases the competence is problematic in practice. The distribution of the competences 
seems to be logical – adds the Czech Trade Inspection Authority – but it is not very 
clear, and often very complicated. For example, in financial services, the Czech 
National Bank has competence in UCPD cases involving all financial institutions, but 
not towards financial institutions like HOMECREDIT which belongs to the competence 
of the Czech Trade Inspection Authority. With the transposition of the Mortgage Credit 
Directive118 this distribution of competences will be modified, and from 2017 the Czech 
National Bank will have all competence also towards non-financial institutions. 
Regarding advertisement of financial products, authorities are also more competent 
depending on which media was used for the advertising. 
There is a trend of redistribution of competence to sector specific authorities – asserts 
the Czech Trade Inspection Authority. Otherwise the competence is very often given 
according to product types, like petrol or labelling of products. There are cooperation 
contracts between the sector specific authorities and the Czech Trade Inspection 
Authority, and they very often organize joint control campaigns, particularly regarding 
relevant topic-controls, which are yearly planned in advance.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
All stakeholders had a problem with answering these questions. They could not point 
to too many overlaps or conflicts, but reported uncertainties and difficulties in 
application. They couldn’t assess whether the difficulties in application are due to the 
European legislation or rather to the Czech legislation, but both could use a review 
and simplification to ensure more transparency.  
The Czech Trade Inspection Authority underlined as the main problem not the overlaps 
but rather the still existing competence gaps between different authorities. However 
there is a question whether such competence gaps can be bridged in practice. 
 
118 See 257/2016 Sb. on Consumer Credit and will take into force from the 1st December 2016.  
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• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
The possibility of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD provides 
safety also in regulated sectors. Similar to the principle-based approach the 
complementary application is important – underline stakeholders, even if it is 
becoming less and less important with the rising number of sector specific rules. 
Stakeholders are not sure if there are costs due to the complementary application. But 
to eliminate the duplication of the national rules, which were caused by the 
transposition of the sector specific rules and the UCPD and UCTD legislature could 
create a lot of work.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
In practice it is necessary to:  
• Regulate the content of energy supply contracts;  
• To clarify the overlaps between the information requirements of Directive 
2011/83/EU and other sector specific information requirements. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The majority of the stakeholders see a very different protection aim between B2C and 
C2B relations, and do not find it necessary to regulate C2B relations. Business 
organizations add that in C2B relations the business should be informed in the same 
way the consumer is informed in B2C relations.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
As mentioned in 1.1.1 the commentaries remain silent on the different consumer 
models, and in Czech case law the average consumer is only briefly mentioned. Even if 
some of the judgments state that the benchmark is the average consumer, as 
interpreted by the CJEU, there is still a lack of further citation of concrete CJEU case 
law in the majority of Czech cases, not to mention absence of further judicial analyses 
of the average consumer. Consumer organizations and also Financial Arbitrator 
underlined that the courts usually expect a relatively high intellectual potential on 
behalf of the average consumer, which reduces the protection level accordingly.  
Cases where a vulnerable consumer group is defined are completely missing in the 
Czech judicature. The consumer models which are applied by Czech courts have not 
yet crystallized enough.  
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National authorities apply both consumer models more often than courts, but in the 
majority of the complaints and control, they base their decision on the average 
consumer definition. 
Even in financial cases, there was no application of the vulnerable consumer model in 
the Czech Republic.  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
All stakeholders state that the existing rules are adequate to protect vulnerable 
consumers, but judicial practice and also the practice of the national authorities shows 
the application of these rules is missing.   
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
All stakeholders state that the role of these two EU directives is crucial for 
improvements in consumer protection in Czech Republic. Consumer organizations add 
that as long as the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, the Financial Arbitrator and also 
the Czech Telecommunication Authority implement these Directives in a consumer-
friendly way, then Czech judicial practice should improve in the future.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Overall yes, in Czech Republic there has been a significant improvement in this field. 
  
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Overall yes, however it is not just thanks to the MCAD but also rather mainly to the 
requirements of fair competition rules.   
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
For consumers it has become much easier to directly purchase cross-border from 
traders located in other EU countries. The Czech European Consumer Centre 
underlines that the cross-border enforcement of consumer rights is still very limited. 
More and more consumers make use of the services of the ECC, but they are often not 
inclined to file a consumer complaint against a foreign trader, not to mention to file a 
suit in another EU country. The risk and the cost of the litigation in another EU country 
is too high for the consumer. 
Regarding businesses, stakeholders added that the majority of Czech traders are small 
and middle sized companies which are not active in other countries. They have mainly 
national business strategies, so this part of the question cannot be answered.  
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 • To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
All stakeholders state that the role of the EU directives is crucial for improvements in 
consumer protection in Czech Republic.  
 
 
 
 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
276
Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Czech Republic  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Act 89/2012 Sb.  'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes § 1814  
  'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
No   
Act 89/2012 Sb.  Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
Yes § 1813  
  Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Act 634/1992 Sb.   Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
No § 4 -8a Enforcement at 
administrative 
authorities  
  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
Act 89/2012 Sb.   Application of UCPD to B2B transactions Yes (but the 
norms did not 
target the 
transposition 
of UCPD) 
§ 2976-2990 Enforcement at 
civil court, 
reverse burden 
of proof   
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Act 634/1992 Sb.  Black list  Annex Nr. 1   
Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Act 526/1990 Sb.    Extension of the application to other sectors 
(general application for products , 
performances, works and services in every 
sector § 1 (1), and also  for transfer of right and 
of immovable property § 1 (3)) 
yes § 1 (1) and (3)  
  Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations Yes § 13 (9) Derogation for 
antiquity, art, 
perishable 
goods etc.  
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Act 89/2012 Sb.   …  § 2977 misleading, § 2980 
comparative advertising 
 
Act 40/1995 Sb.     Administrative 
enforcement 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Act 634/1992 Sb.       
Act 99/1963 Sb.       
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Czech Republic  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the Injunctions 
Directive regulated in your country separately (as a 
separate procedure or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer 
Law Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No, single procedure  
 
The procedure do not 
go beyond measures 
foreseen by the ID 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction? - Authorized/registered 
consumer associations 
(6 organizations) 
1.Association of Czech 
Consumers, 2.dTest, 3. 
Consumer Defense 
Association – 
Syndicate, 4. Common 
defense, 5. Unicampus, 
6. HELP - Cheated 
Consumers' Rights 
Association 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative procedure 
is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
Problem: in the field of 
telecommunication the 
Civil court denies its 
competence in favour 
of the Czech 
Telecommunication 
Authority. As far as we 
know the court 
decision regarding its 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction has been 
challenged but we 
have no information on 
the final decision of the 
appellate court 
(Municipal Court of 
Prague). 
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   of 
some/all cost related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the comments column. 
- The costs are as a rule borne 
by the losing party 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to cover 
areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
 
e.g. Directive 
2011/83/EU is also 
covered 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the comments 
column regarding  type of business' interests covered by 
the injunctions procedure 
- Yes 
 acc. § 2989 (1) Act 89/2012 
Sb. In conjunction with § 83 
(2) a) Act 99/1963 Sb. 
But the norm did not 
target the 
transposition of the 
Injunction Directive 
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Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
- Controversial   
§ 91 (2) in conjunction with § 
112 99/1963 Sb.   would  
allow it, but the prevailing 
judicial view deny this 
possibility 
No practice until now 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the injunction 
procedures? (not including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
 
- No 
 
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the prior consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
- No such requirement  
Does the national legislation provide for measures ensuring 
summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
- No  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should they 
be paid 
- Theoretically yes, § 351 (1) 
Act 99/1963 Sb.  
Max. 100.000 CZK 
(approx. EUR 3700) 
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Theoretically yes, but the 
claimant should ask in his 
petition for publication 
§ 155 (4) Act 99/1963 but just 
regarding unfair competition 
cases (incl. Unfair business 
practices)  
A  publication provision 
of court decision in 
general is missing  
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure for 
sanctions for the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a 
result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other beneficiary 
be brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified entity 
or the public purse be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- Theoretically yes, if the two 
claims are connected in same 
procedure.  
No existence of 
practical experiences 
Can individual consumers base their individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
- Theoretically the injunction 
order could be one of the 
evidences for the individual 
claim for damages, but we 
cannot speak about basing 
the claim on the injunction 
order 
 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond the 
injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
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Are the effects of individual injunctions orders extended to 
the future infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
To the same illegal practice of 
the same traders to other 
consumers - Theoretically yes 
according § 159a (2) Act 
99/1963 
No existence of 
practical experiences  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number of 
B2C 
disputes 
(number 
of cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
Czech 
Telecomm
unication 
Authority 
285       
2015 Ministry of Finance    5    
2014 Ministry of Finance    6    
 
Court statistics could not be obtained. The court decisions are not public in Czech 
Republic, just the main decisions are published.  
Regarding the statistics of the Czech Telecommunication Authority, it is not possible to 
share the disputes according to the different EU Directives.  
The enforcement of the UCPD is carried out mainly by Czech Trade Inspection 
Authority, which starts a procedure ex officio in some cases based on the consumer 
complaint. But this Authority did not solve B2C disputes until the ADR regulation from 
378/2015 Sb. From 1.2.2016 the Authority registered 1215 initiative on ADR-
procedure by consumer.  
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).119  
 
119 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure Ca. CZK 6 750 (approx. 
EUR 250) 
CZK 15 000 
(approx. 
EUR 555) 
Losing party 
pays all costs 
Civil law 
litigations may 
last from 1-3 
years 
 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
No fee at ADR 
procedure 
ca. CZK 10 000 
(approx. 
EUR 370) 
Expertise 
costs, if 
necessary 
Ca. 5-6 
months 
Regarding § 
20u Act 
634/1992 Sb. a 
successful ADR 
ends with an 
agreement. If 
no agreement 
is 
accomplishable 
the involved 
time is lost 
time.   
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Since 1.2.2016 the Czech Trade Inspection Authority registered 1215 initiative on 
ADR-procedure by consumer on UCPD.  
In 2015 were 962 ADR procedure initiated by the consumer at the Financial Arbitrator. 
In the time period 1.1.2016 – 30.6.2016 the number of initiated ADR procedure rose 
to 1450.   
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Union of Trade and Tourism 
Czech Republic  
Business association 14.6.2016 
Czech Trade Inspection Authority National consumer enforcement 
authority 
3.6.2016 
Czech Telecommunication 
Authority  
National regulatory authority 7.6.2016 
Ministry of Industry and Trade Ministry 8.6.2016 
Ministry of Finance Ministry 10.6.2016 
Czech National Bank National regulatory authority Written answers delivered on 
15.6.2016 
Financial Arbitrator National consumer enforcement 
authority 
14.6.2016 
Czech European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 7.6. 2016 
SOS Consumers Protection 
Association 
Consumer organisation 
 
3.6.2016 
Czech Consumer Association 
DTEST 
Consumer organisation 
 
6.6.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Josef Bejček 2016 Smluvní Svoboda a ochrana slabšího obchodníka, Acta Universitatis 
Brunensis, iuridica edition Scientia vol. 557, masarikova univerzita, 
Brno  
Jakub Jedlinský 2012 Koncept průměrného spotřebitele v českém a evropském právu  
Martina Kousalová 2013 Koncept průměrného spotřebitele 
Petr Lavický a kol. 2014 Občanský zákoník V. Závazkové právo (Obecná část § 1721-2054). 
Komentář. Praha, C. H. Beck, 1. Vydání, Beck,  
Filip Melzer, Petr Tégl a 
kol. 
2014-
2017 
Občanský zákoník, Velký komentář, Leges,   
Petr Lavický a kol 2015 Občancký soudní řád, Praktický komentár, Wolters Kluwer, Praha, 
2016 § 159a bod 32-35. 
Marta Ptačková 2015 Veřejnoprávní regulace obchodních praktik 
Aleš Rozehnál 2008 Mediální zákony, Komentář, Praha, Wolters Kluwer 
Jiří Švestka, Jan 
Dvořák, Josef Fiala a 
kolektiv 
2014 Obcanský zákoník Komentář, Wolters Kluwer 
Rita Sik-Simon 2014 Kollektive Durchsetzung der Verbraucherrechte in Ungarn und 
Tschechien, Donau-Institut Working Paper No. 32 
Rita Sik-Simon  2016 Fogyasztókép és szabályozás MTA Law Working Paper 2/2016 
Markéta Selucká, Jaromír 
Tauchen, Gregor Stein, 
2009 Entwicklungstendenzen des Verbraucherschutzes in der 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report DENMARK 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
In national law, Denmark had a principle-based approach within marketing law before 
the UCPD. Thus, it seems – according to stakeholders – to work fine, even though 
some of the concepts are new and to some extent unclear. 
ECC Denmark noted that the most disturbing (cross-border) cases they have concern 
rogue traders that have no intention of playing by the rules (fraudulent practices) and 
thus, where the UCPD provides no real protection, as the rogue traders simply ignore 
threats or action taken by enforcement bodies. ECC Denmark primarily deals with 
unfair commercial practices in a civil law setting, e.g. the trader’s failure to perform in 
conformity with the contract. 
A business organisation noted that the inherent vagueness of the principle-based 
approach could have implications in connection with criminal sanctions, where a clear 
prohibition is required under national law (Section 1 of the Danish Criminal Code). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Generally speaking, the feeling among stakeholders is that the blacklist does not 
include many situations that would not be caught by the Directive’s general 
prohibitions. It is noted by the Danish Consumer Ombudsman that the list entails 
procedural benefits with regard to its relative clarity, i.e. in particular, there is no need 
to prove that the economic behaviour of consumers is materially distorted by the 
practice (as is required under the general clause (article 5 (2) (b)). One business 
organisation has said that the list is beneficial in the context of advising businesses. 
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman has used the blacklist’s Item 31 in connection with 
subscription traps and emphasised that the blacklist has some importance in cross-
border enforcement. 
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority noted that some of the items on the 
blacklist are quite peculiar and not relevant for the situation in Denmark. It was 
emphasised that it could be problematic if the same list of per se prohibitions applied 
in all Member States. It was also noted that it was unclear at the time when the list 
was negotiated, whether sales promotions were comprised in the scope of the UCPD. 
That in itself would be a proper reason to revise the blacklist. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
None reported. 
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• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
Generally speaking, there is little case law in which the national implementation of the 
UCPD has been applied. One reason is that most cases are dealt with by the Danish 
Consumer Ombudsman and that cases are likely to be settled in that process, 
including cases where the trader accepts an administrative fine. One case (initiated by 
a competitor) has reached the Danish Supreme Court, where it was found that inter 
alia environmental claims were not sufficiently substantiated.1 In another case, the 
Danish Maritime and Commercial Court established, also with reference to the ICC 
Code, that high standards must be applied for the use of environmental statements in 
order to avoid unfair competition. Such statements must be clear, truthful, concrete, 
and not misleading. And it must be possible to substantiate the statement by an 
independent expert.2 In light of these cases, it seems that the current legislation is in 
fact effective (also) in the context of environmental claims. 
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman has issued Guidance on Environmental and Ethical 
Marketing Claims (August 2014).3 The Danish Consumer Ombudsman has dealt with a 
number of cases concerning the use of environmental aspects in marketing. It was 
found that it was misleading to state that there was no CO2 emission from an electric 
car without noting that there is CO2 emission from the production of electricity.4 In 
another case it was found problematic to use the brand ‘PlantBottle’, when the bottle 
contained only 15 per cent plant material. However, the case was not pursued 
further.5 In the marketing of a gasoline product, it was emphasised that an 
environmental benefit must be documented if flowers, grass, and green colours are 
used in the marketing.6 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
In assessing whether marketing is likely to mislead consumers, a court must apply a 
particular standard for the due care that is expected by consumers. The use of some 
sort of average consumer has always been applied implicitly or explicitly; also as a 
consequence of consistency in the application of the MCAD, which according to earlier 
CJEU case law also relies on reasonable expectation from an average consumer. In 
that vein the introduction of the average consumer concept in the UCPD seems more 
like a codification rather than the introduction of a new concept with particular (new) 
benefits for consumers. Generally speaking, the reference to the average consumer is 
usually made implicitly in Danish case law. There are only a few examples of explicit 
reference, including in an administrative case decided by the Danish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. 
It appears that the Member States have gained more flexibility in the assessment of 
the average consumer, when compared with the MCAD.7 It follows from Recital 18 
1 Case 267/2013 of 30 April 2015. The case is reported in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2015.2565. 
2 S.H.D. 30 December 2011, Case H-9-10. The case is reported in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2012 977. 
3 See http://www.consumerombudsman.dk/Regulatory-framework/dcoguides/Environmental-and-ethical-
marketing. 
4 Case 12/00351. 
5 www.forbrugerombudsmanden.dk, case no n/a. 
6 www.forbrugerombudsmanden.dk, case no n/a. 
7 See Trzaskowski, Jan, Lawful Distortion of Consumers’ Economic Behaviour – Collateral Damage Under the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, European Business Law Review, 2016, pp. 25-49. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
287
that National courts and authorities will have to exercise “their own faculty of 
judgement” and that social, cultural and linguistic factors must be taken into account. 
It was noted by the Danish Consumer Council that the average consumer in real life is 
not reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect – and it is 
usually acting under time constraints. It is argued that the many consumer protection 
rules primarily benefit “stronger” consumers and not more vulnerable consumers who 
really need the protection. It was emphasised that we do not know how the provision 
on vulnerable consumers will play out in practice. It is suggested that a lower standard 
for the average consumer should be applied. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The concept of vulnerable consumers has not been applied by the Danish courts and 
has not as such proven to provide practical benefits for consumers. No new groups of 
vulnerable consumers have been identified. In Denmark, the primary focus has been 
on children and young people. Recently, in the administration of the law, there has 
been a focus on micro loans that poor people may be more susceptible to. It has been 
stated by a number of stakeholders that the meaning and consequences of this 
provision is unclear. 
ECC Denmark has noted that there are a number of cases where vulnerable 
consumers fall prey to fraudulent practices. In many cases, these disputes can be 
resolved through charge back-rules relating to the used payment instrument; such 
charge back-rules allow consumers to have the paid amount returned to e.g. their 
credit card, unless the trader demonstrates that the amount is actually due. The 
Danish Competition and Consumer Authority emphasised that it finds it unfortunate 
that it remains unclear whether the list of vulnerabilities is exhaustive or not.  
The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority noted that there are a number of products 
that may be targeted towards more vulnerable consumers, including in particular 
young people and indebted people (e.g. micro loans). It was noted that much of the 
consumer protection in the financial sector is focused on (standardised) information 
that consumers in general, and vulnerable consumers in particular, are not likely to 
read and (fully) comprehend. Better protection of vulnerable consumers may be 
achieved through the regulation of particular financial products. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman can issue guidelines after negotiations with 
business and consumer organisation. This guideline-institution seems to work very 
well and to the stakeholders’ overall satisfaction. In addition, the Danish Consumer 
Ombudsman can issue guidance that provides its interpretation of the law or 
assessment of facts. The conclusion is that self/co-regulation works very well in 
Denmark. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
The general opinion among stakeholders was that it could be beneficial to revise the 
blacklist and in that process to examine the need for further blacklisted practices. It 
was noted that it seems to be a challenge that there is only one blacklist for all 
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Member States as there is a vast diversity in traditions and marketing cultures in 
various Member States. The Danish Consumer Council suggested that provisions 
concerning subscriptions and consent could be added to the blacklist. 
It was the general impression that the stakeholders needed more time to prepare 
specific suggestions for amendments. Hence there seems to be a need for a separate 
and open discussion of the blacklist. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
It was emphasised by several stakeholders, including the Danish Competition and 
Consumer Authority, that there should be a much more open process in connection 
with the European Commission’s work on the UCPD guidance. It was noted that a 
working group of some sort would benefit future revisions.  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
There is agreement among stakeholders that consumers in general are effectively 
informed about price and that there are very few cases on this matter. However, there 
are issues in connection with misleading information about discounts etc., but 
generally traders seem to comply with the requirement of price indications. 
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman, who administers the rules, noted that there are 
very few inquiries etc. concerning the Danish rules implementing the PID. The Danish 
Competition and Consumer Authority noticed that the rules are from a time, where e-
commerce was not widespread. There is a need for clarification of price indication in 
this context and it should be considered to harmonise the rules with those concerning 
price indication for services. 
The Danish Consumer Council has observed that there is a rise in the use of different 
package size for similar or identical products; and that these are used to offer 
discounts (on particular size packages). However, this is probably more a question 
about whether the practice is misleading. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Stakeholders’ input with respect to this question does not allow for an answer to be 
provided. There is no legislation addressing this issue directly. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Stakeholders’ input with respect to this question does not allow for an answer to be 
provided.  
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The Danish Marketing Practices Act applies also to B2B. The MCAD does not play an 
important role in the daily life of Danish law, but there is general satisfaction with the 
minimum level it provides in the context of cross-border marketing. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach works fine. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The general provisions of the Danish Marketing Practices Act does not make much of a 
distinction between B2B and B2C situations, but it is implicitly expected that different 
standards for fair competition apply when marketing is directed at consumers and 
businesses, respectively. The Danish law has particular provisions on trade names 
(Section 18) and trade secrets (Section 19) that concern B2B situations. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
There seemed to be an overall satisfaction with the rules. Denmark does not have 
well-developed traditions for comparative advertising in Denmark. The enforcement 
authorities have more focus on provision on misleading commercial practices rather 
than comparative advertising (which requires that the advertising is not misleading). 
  
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
There is no unambiguous answer to this question and no problems seem to have 
surfaced in courts, administrative practice, or the practical life of traders. The Danish 
cases concerning comparative advertising has focused on whether the advertising was 
misleading or unlawfully trading on another trader’s goodwill. Both situations are, in 
addition to the rules on comparative advertising, addressed in specific provisions in 
the Danish Marketing Practices Act. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
There is no unambiguous answer to this question. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No. Generally speaking there is not much awareness of the MCAD in Denmark after 
the introduction of the UCPD. 
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1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The business organisations, as well as the Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority, have emphasised differences in the implementation, interpretation, and 
enforcement of – as well as the assessments under – the Directive. The differences 
entail that Danish businesses are met with ‘unfair’ competition from foreign 
businesses. This relates in particular to the use of sales promotions. The Danish 
enforcement authority (the Danish Consumer Ombudsman) has confirmed certain 
problems with the cross-border enforcement of marketing that is considered unfair 
under Danish law, but not under the law where the trader is established. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
There is no unambiguous answer to this question. However, see answers above 
concerning the blacklist as such. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No problems have been identified. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No problems have been reported.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No problems have been reported.  
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
No problems have been reported. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No problems have been reported. 
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1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The rules seems to work well, but there are some uncertainty concerning the definition 
of invitation to purchase and how it should be understood in connection with situations 
where the medium used to communicate the commercial practice imposes ‘limitations 
of space or time’ (Article 7(3)); could this rule e.g. apply to print advertising? Several 
stakeholders have emphasised that because of the amount of information that must 
be given, the mandatory information requirements may to some extent both fail to 
properly inform consumers and result in cluttered marketing material. There seems to 
be a general understanding that it would be worthwhile to reconsider the amount of 
mandatory disclosure and to convey a smarter means of properly informing 
consumers. 
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority emphasised that Annex II of the 
UCPD is unclear and that there seems to be too many different rules on information 
requirement. There is a need to coordinate and reconsider these information 
requirements; this includes attention to where in the contractual process the 
information is to be provided. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
No problems have been identified or reported. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The UCPD is designed to protect consumers and it does not seem suitable to just 
expand the scope to B2B situations. The general provisions on unfair, misleading, and 
aggressive practices may be applicable to B2B situations, which is the situation in 
Denmark. There seems to be general satisfaction with the (minimum) harmonised B2B 
rules in the MCAD and none of the stakeholders has encouraged an broadening of this 
scope. No cross-border problems in B2B marketing have been identified under this 
study. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
It seems to work well as it is. Both the UCPD and MCAD provide appropriate 
‘backbones’ for national marketing law. 
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• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
There is general satisfaction with the rules the way they are now; i.e. minimum 
harmonisation with a focus on misleading and comparative advertising. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
There seems to be no urge. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
In Denmark, public enforcement is focused on the situations where the need for 
consumer protection is dominant. Businesses are encouraged to take possible issues 
concerning unfair competition in B2B situations to court themselves. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
This does not seem to be the case. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No such need has been identified by stakeholders. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
There is no direct link between unfair commercial practices and the 
validity/enforceability of a contract entered in that vein. However, preceding 
advertising may play a role in the assessment of product defects and the fairness of 
contract terms (‘conditions at the time of conclusion’). Furthermore, according to 
Section 20 of the Danish Marketing Practices Act, concurrently with a prohibitive 
injunction or subsequently, the court is authorised to issue such mandatory injunctions 
that may be considered necessary to ensure (1) compliance with the prohibition, 
including injunctions to the effect that agreements entered into in conflict with a 
prohibition be invalid, and (2) restitution of the status quo ante, including e.g. not 
only correction of statements but also court orders to pay back money received. An 
example is found in a judgment of 31 January 20138 from the Danish Maritime and 
Commercial Court demanding a parking company to pay back an unlawful reminder 
fee to all car owners from whom it had claimed the fee. 
Most of the stakeholders, except the Danish Consumer Council, did not find a need to 
introduce (additional) civil law consequences. 
8 Case SHD N-2-10. The case is reported in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2013.1181. 
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 • Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Only the Danish Consumer Council expressed the wish for enhancing such a link. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Stakeholders expressed a general satisfaction with the rules as to their effectiveness. 
The Ministry of Justice, who is responsible for the Danish rules implementing the 
UCTD, noted that they have not received any report of dissatisfaction from consumer 
or business organisations (and they would be likely to hear about possible problems). 
It was emphasised that Denmark has a provision on unfair contact terms (Section 36, 
the so-called General Clause, of the Danish Contracts Act) that goes beyond the 
protection awarded through the UCTD. It applies to contracts in general, including B2C 
and B2B. All types of contract terms are within the scope (including individually 
negotiated terms) and certain terms such as e.g. the main subject matter and the 
remuneration are not excluded. 
Public enforcement of the UCTD is carried out by the Danish Consumer Ombudsman 
under the powers conferred in the Danish Marketing Practices Act. In that vein, the 
use of unfair contract terms is perceived as an unfair commercial practice. The Danish 
Consumer Ombudsman noted that they have very few cases on this matter.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list has only limited practical importance in Denmark, although it may 
provide some guidance for courts, law enforcers, and businesses. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
There is no black or grey list. 
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• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Legally, a court decision applies only between the parties. However, the trader is 
expected by authorities to resolve other disputes in light of losing such case.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
This provision seems to work well. The provision has become particularly relevant in 
the context of online consumer contracts where many consumers are not likely to 
spend much time on reading the finer details. This has led to a number of cases 
concerning subscriptions, including so-called subscription traps where a decoy (e.g. a 
gift) removes attention from the contractual details. These cases are characterised by 
a very favourable offer, e.g. a free phone, where credit card details must be provided 
to pay for delivery. It follows from the fine print that the consumer agrees to pay for a 
subscription of a service. Usually the proper details are provided, but it is not obvious 
– unless one reads the fine print – from the presentation of the offer that acceptance 
involves the subscription to a service.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
As mentioned above The General Clause applies to contracts in general, including B2C 
and B2B and all types of contract terms are within the scope. The criteria for applying 
the General Clause are considered flexible enough to allow such differences to be 
taken into account to the extent it is appropriate in view of the facts of the individual 
case. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The rules seem to work fine in helping the consumers, not least in cases brought 
before the rather easily accessible Consumer Complaint Boards. However, there must 
be many consumers who are unaware of their rights and thus, many cases that are 
not taken to court or brought before the Consumer Complaints Boards. The courts and 
the Consumer Complaints Board will invoke unfairness rules ex officio. Stakeholders’ 
input with respect to this question does not allow for a more thorough answer to this 
question. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No suggestions have been proposed or otherwise identified during this study. It is 
difficult to see how a graphical presentation model can be elaborated for provisions 
that require individual assessment. It should be emphasised that concern about the 
amount of mandatory disclosure rules have been raised by several stakeholder, 
representing both consumers and traders. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
These rules do not appear to play a significant role in cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
No problems reported. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No problems reported. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
As mentioned above the General Clause of the Danish Contracts Act) also applies to 
B2B situations. There seem to be no interest in expanding the scope of the UCTD. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
See the answer to the previous question. 
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
As mentioned above the General Clause of the Danish Contracts Act applies to all 
types of contract terms, also when they are individually negotiated. As mentioned, 
there has not been expressed a wish to extent the EU rules on this point. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
During this study, no suggestions for contractual terms to be presumed unfair have 
been made. Most court cases on the application of the Danish provision in B2B 
relations concern contractual penalties.  
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
According to stakeholders there is no such need. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
This has not been suggested by any of the stakeholders. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No clear answer to this question has emerged. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
This will depend of the nature of such provision. As mentioned above, none of the 
stakeholders interviewed under this study have found the need for such an extension 
of the UCTD. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?9  
The injunction procedure is not widely used by Danish authorities to enforce consumer 
protection law. Cross border issues concerning marketing law are mainly resolved 
through the Cross-border enforcement and cooperation (CPC). If this procedure 
cannot resolve the issue, the ID is not likely to be useful (it has been considered in 
one case with the Netherlands, but the practice in question was not unfair under Dutch 
9  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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law). The Danish Consumer Ombudsman noted that there are substantial variations in 
the attention of and speed involved in authorities’ handling of cases under the CPC. 
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman reported one instance, where he successfully had 
an injunction issued by the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court against a trader 
established in Estonia.10 Hereafter, the individual consumers were encouraged to 
make individual claims against the trader. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The benefits of the injunction procedure lie primarily in the fast procedure and the 
sanctions for non-compliance; as well as the applicant’s liability in case the injunction 
is later found not to be justified. 
Courts can order natural or legal persons to act, refrain from acting, and/or tolerate 
certain acts. Preliminary injunction can be ordered if the applicant establishes or 
renders probable that 1) s/he has the right that is sought to be protected by the 
injunction, 2) that the other party requires that injunction is issued, and 3) that the 
applicants’ possibility to seek justice will be spoiled if the party was to await normal 
judicial procedure.  
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The national injunction procedure that was in place before the ID covers basically the 
infringement of all laws, not only those listed in the ID. Therefore there is access to 
the injunction procedure beyond the scope of the ID, but the ID cannot as such be 
said to be extended. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
No observations made by the stakeholders. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
It was a common opinion that the ID does not provide any added value and that 
cross-border issues should be resolved under CPC, which is currently under revision. 
 
10 Case N-1-13, decision of 25 February 2014. 
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1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Not effective according to stakeholders. Cross border issues concerning marketing law 
are mainly resolved through the Cross-border enforcement and cooperation (CPC). 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Not effective according to stakeholders. Cross border issues concerning marketing law 
are mainly resolved through the Cross-border enforcement and cooperation (CPC). 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
The CPC has proven to be a much better solution than the ID. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure designed by the ID is implemented in one law (separated 
from national procedural law to which it is linked).11  
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The injunction procedure does not go beyond the ID. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
11 See Act no. 1257 of 20 December 2000. 
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unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
The principles found in the UCPD and UCTD were already known in national law. Hence 
the directives do not provide substantial benefits for consumers (to some extent to the 
contrary), but this fact also suggests the justification for such regulation. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Because the rules are harmonised, it is both easier to resolve disputes across borders 
and the legislation provides a level playing field for businesses; though it has been 
emphasised that there are differences in how the rules are applied and enforced in 
various Member States. Danish business organisations find that to some extent the 
rules under the UCPD are applied and thus, enforced too efficiently in Denmark 
compared to some other Member States. This has been confirmed in one cross-border 
case concerning the Netherlands, where it was not possible for the Danish Consumer 
Ombudsman to prevent a particular commercial practice as it was not found unfair 
under Dutch law. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
It has not been possible to obtain detailed information on this point, but it seems that 
the business organisations generally find the cost of compliance fair. It should be 
noted that traders also benefit from such standards. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
It has not been possible to obtain detailed information on this point. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
No. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
No suggestions from stakeholders. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
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their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
There seems to be a good awareness, understanding, and application of the horizontal 
EU consumer legislation. However, it has not been possible to obtain statistics on this 
matter. The Danish Consumer Ombudsman has emphasised that sector specific 
regulation only prevails, when there is a conflict. No such conflicts are identified during 
this study, and thus, no problems in the interplay between the UCPD and sector 
specific regulation are reported. 
It is noted by the Danish Consumer Ombudsman that clarification of the scope of the 
rules concerning unsolicited communication in the ePrivacy Directive is needed. There 
are substantial differences in the understanding and implementation of these rules. 
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority suggested that it would provide more 
clarity, if the rules on unsolicited communication were moved to the UCPD. 
For the financial sector, it has been pointed out that the UCTD does not play an 
important role, as there is much sector specific regulation and that politicians, 
generally speaking, are not reluctant to regulate. The Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority has used the UCTD twice; and in one case it lead to new legislation. Also for 
the area of the UCPD, there is a substantial amount of sector specific regulation. There 
is specific regulation on financial services which to a large extent follows the rules 
found in the Danish Marketing Practices Act, and thus, also the UCPD.12 
The Danish Consumer Council has noted that in the energy field, awareness of the 
requirements is growing in both business and enforcement bodies. The telecoms field 
which was liberalized earlier, has already been through a process of aligning the 
different protection rules. The energy field has only recently seen a proper 
convergence and coordination. In the wake of the liberalization of energy markets 
traders are to a larger degree testing the limits of consumer protection which calls for 
a coordinated approach to implementation and enforcement of general consumer 
protection and sector-specific consumer protection. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The UCPD is primarily enforced by the Danish Consumer Ombudsman across all 
sectors. The financial sector is an exception, but there is a well-functioning (and 
formalised) institutional cooperation between the two authorities involved. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
No reports on conflicts have been noted during this study. Thus the legal framework 
seems to be coherent, but it has been noted that it is not always clear and to some 
extent too fragmented. 
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority has emphasised that there are many 
different information requirements that could need coordination and revision. This is 
12 See Order No. 330 of 7 April 2016. 
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also the situation for the various terms used for marketing (commercial practices, 
commercial communication, advertising etc.). 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
No unambiguous response has been obtained. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
There is a real need for clarification. It is found that the new European Commission 
guidance on the UCPD provides helpful insight to understand the interplay. Generally 
speaking, business organisations seem to be very capable of understanding these 
issues and communicating this information to their members. 
It was emphasised by several stakeholders (including the Danish Competition and 
Consumer Authority and the Danish Consumer Council) that there are a number of 
unfortunate uncertainties as to the UCPD’s scope of application, including taste and 
decency and C2B situations as discussed immediately below in this study. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
It is the general impression that the directives should (and actually do) apply to these 
situations.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The principle-based approach is, as mentioned above, generally accepted and the 
concepts leave a sufficient amount of flexibility for the assessment. Generally 
speaking, the concepts are considered valid and fit for purpose. 
It has been noted that there is a significant inconsistency in the terms concerning 
consumer protection which in literal interpretations provides ambiguity. That being 
said, this inconsistency does not pose significant problems in interpretation. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
There has been so little use of the provision on vulnerable consumers that it is not 
possible to answer this question. The provision in the UCPD is relatively ambiguous 
and further interpretation by the CJEU is needed. It is not possible to determine 
whether the UCTD provides sufficient protection. 
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Generally speaking, there is an increased need to focus on consumer vulnerabilities 
(not only vulnerable consumers as such). This is in particular true for e-commerce, 
where it may difficult for consumers to understand and adapt to new developments 
that happen at a fast pace. Studies within behavioural sciences reveal insights in 
bounded rationality that can be exploited by traders and used by legislators to protect 
consumers better.13 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The protection of consumers has not improved significantly as Denmark had similar 
rules before. To some extent, the protection concerning sales promotions have been 
lowered. Benefits due to harmonisation have been noted. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
The protection of consumers has not significantly improved. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
The protection of businesses has not significantly improved as Denmark had similar 
rules before. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
It seems to be the general impression among stakeholders that cross border trade has 
become easier. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
Much of these improvements are due to the abovementioned directives as they 
provide a common framework (‘backbone’) and, therefore, understanding of consumer 
protection in other countries. It has been emphasised that businesses still need to 
conduct market research, as there are different cultures and traditions in various 
Member States. 
 
 
13 See e.g. Trzaskowski, Jan, Lawful Distortion of Consumers’ Economic Behaviour – Collateral Damage 
Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, European Business Law Review, 2016, pp. 25-49. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – DENMARK 
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Sections 36 and 38A‒38D of 
the Danish Contracts Act 
(‘aftaleloven’) 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair 
in all circumstances 
No   
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
No   
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually negotiated 
terms  
Yes Consolidated 
Act No. 193 of 2 
March 2016, 
Section 36. 
 
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main subject-
matter 
Yes Consolidated 
Act No. 193 of 2 
March 2016, 
Section 36. 
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
The Danish Marketing 
Practices Act 
(‘markedsføringsloven’) 
The UCPD provides full 
harmonisation. There is ongoing 
work in order to ensure that the 
Danish Marketing Practices act is in 
compliance with that fact. A 
Commission Report has just been 
published (July 2016) and a new act 
is expected to be adopted by the 
end of 2016 (entry into force in mid-
2017). Thus, a number of provisions 
are currently not fully compliant 
with this requirement, but this is not 
in the form of specific provisions 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation. 
Provisions regarding financial services 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
Yes Order No. 330 
of 7 April 2016 
 
  Provisions regarding immovable 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
Yes Act No.526 of 
28 May 2014 
and Order No. 
1230 of 21 
November 2014 
 
  Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Section 13 of the Danish 
marketing practices act 
(‘markedsføringsloven’) 
 Extension of the application to other 
sectors (e.g. for immovable property) 
Yes Section 13(1) 
Section 13(2) 
The requirement 
of price indications 
apply to electronic 
commerce to the 
extent it is possible 
to place an order 
The rules apply to 
services as well 
More detailed rules are found 
in a number of Orders issued 
in accordance with Section 
13(8) of the Danish marketing 
practices act. The most 
important are: 
-‘Bekendtgørelse om oplysning 
om salgspris og enhedspris for 
forbrugsvare’ (BEK nr 866 af 
18/09/2000) 
- Bekendtgørelse om 
mærkning eller skiltning samt 
annoncering med kortvarige 
generelle prisnedsættelser for 
varer (BEK nr 10002 af 
16/03/1988). 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Section 13(1) Article 3(1) does 
not apply to sales 
by auction and 
sales of works of 
art and antiques 
(cf. Article 3(2).  
According to BEK 
10002 it is possible 
to announce price 
reduction for a 
shorter period (2 
weeks) by use of 
signage 
  Extension of price indications in 
advertising in Article 1(4) 
 Section 13(3) Includes oral 
references to price 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
306
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
The Danish marketing 
practices act 
(‘markedsføringsloven’) 
 Generally speaking, the Danish 
marketing practices act provides a 
common framework for traders’ 
marketing activities, including 
provisions on misleading and 
aggressive practices in order to 
protect the interests of consumers, 
businesses, and society. Hence, the 
regulation of B2B goes beyond the 
MCAD. 
The rules on comparative advertising 
do not go beyond the Directive.  
   
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Act No. 1257 of 20 December 
2000  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – DENMARK 
Issue/ Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your country 
separately (as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law Directives (the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No, it is a single 
procedure  
 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Individual 
consumers 
- Other  
[the plaintiff must 
have a sufficient 
interest in the case] 
The ID is implemented in Act 
no. 1257 of 20 December 
2000. It grants designated 
(foreign) authorities and 
organisation the right to to 
use the normal Danish 
procedure for injunctions. 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure  
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   
of some/all cost related to the procedure please 
explain the characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to 
cover areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex 
I of the Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- No, scope of the 
Directive not 
extended 
 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the 
comments column regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No 
 
 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
- Yes 
 
All traders must be identified. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the 
injunction procedures? (not including the consultation 
stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
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Does the national legislation provide for measures 
ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Ordinary rules on preliminary 
injunctions apply 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the 
injunction order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should 
they be paid 
Violation of an 
injunction may 
trigger penalty of a 
fine or imprisonment 
up to 4 months 
 
Fines are paid to the state. 
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective statement? 
- No  
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure 
for sanctions for the infringement? 
- No See below concerning 
damages 
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a 
result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
-Yes Act No. 1257 of 20 December 
2000 section3(1). 
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified 
entity or the public purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No/Yes A (private plaintiff’s) claim for 
damages can be brought 
before the court in the same 
case if the conditions for 
joinder according to general 
rules of civil procedure are 
met.  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No/Yes See comment above on 
preceding question 
Can individual consumers base their individual claims 
for damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
- No This would require new 
individual cases or a class 
action. 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond 
the injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders 
extended to the future infringements and/or same or 
similar illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- Yes An identical illegal practice 
would be considered a failure 
to comply with the injunction. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
Note: Data not available. 
It has not been possible to retrieve statistical data to meaningfully complete this table. 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).14  
14 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved 
for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
DKK 500 
[approx. 
EUR 67] 
DKK 6000 
[approx. 
EUR 806] 
 2 hours  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
  
Complaint 
fee 
DKK 275 
[approx. 
EUR 37] 
1 hour 
The procedure before 
the Package Travel 
Complaint Board can 
easily be carried out 
without a lawyer. The 
complaint fee is 
returned if the 
claimant is 
successful. 
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
It has not been possible to retrieve statistical data to meaningfully complete this table. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Finanstilsynet) 
Business association 16 June 2016 
ECC Denmark (Forbruger Europa) European Consumer Centre  16 June 2016 
Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) National regulatory 
authority 
(telecommunication) 
16 June 2016 
Danish Consumer Ombudsman 
(Forbrugerombudsmanden)  
National consumer 
enforcement authority 
17 June 2016 
Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority (Konkurrence- og 
Forbrugerstyrelsen) 
Ministry 23 June 2016 
The Confederation of Danish Enterprise 
(Dansk Erhverv) 
Business association 24 June 2016 
Danish Consumer Council 
(Forbrugerrådet) 
Consumer organisation 28 June 2016 
Creativity and Communication 
(Kreativitet & Kommunikation) 
Business association 
(advertising industry) 
29 June 2016 
Ministry of Justice (Justitsministeriet) Ministry 1 July 2016 
Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) National regulatory 
authority (energy) 
No interview was conducted 
as they had no comments to 
the questionnaire. 
 
Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Møgelvang-Hansen et al 2011 Markedsføringsretten 
Andersen & Madsen 2012 Aftaler og mellemmænd 
Multiple Online Karnovs lovsamling 
Heide-Jørgensen 2012 Lærebog I konkurrence- og markedsføringsret 
Trzaskowski 2016 Lawful Distortion of Consumers’ Economic Behaviour – Collateral 
Damage Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, European 
Business Law Review, 2016, pp. 25-49 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report ESTONIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Unfair commercial practices is a topic that has not gained much academic interest in 
Estonia. Until the implementation of the UCPD there was no special legislation on 
fighting unfair commercial practices and it was an area that was not given much 
attention to in practice. There was a norm on misleading information in the 
Competition Act of 2001 (§ 51) – a tort law norm by nature - but in practice it was not 
relied upon by traders. The Consumer Protection Act of 2004 also stipulated in § 12 
that unfair commercial practices, including misleading advertising are prohibited. 
However, the public enforcement of this provision remained an exception rather than 
the rule. Even an official of a regulator emphasised that they have mostly invested in 
information campaigns for consumers on unfair commercial practices and less in real 
supervision, as there is considerable shortage of both financial and personnel 
resources. 
The competent supervision bodies in Estonia are the Consumer Protection Board and, 
since 2015, also the Financial Supervision Authority who share the competence with 
the Consumer Protection Board for the finance sector under § 65 (5) of the Consumer 
Protection Act. There are no other sectoral regulators in Estonia as far as unfair 
commercial practices and advertising are concerned. 
According to the stakeholders, use of unfair commercial practices happens quite often 
in Estonia but there is not much case law due to the limited resources. This, in turn, 
does not enable to make far-reaching conclusions on the effectiveness of the principle-
based approach under the UCPD. A regulator’s official suggested, however, that the 
approach is justified: the black list of the Directive makes it easier for all parties to 
understand which practices are always deemed unfair and therefore those cases 
almost never end in court. Thus, the black list has been fostering transparency and 
legal certainty.  
Resorting to the general clause is much more uncertain in practice and leads often to 
disputes, also in court. Furthermore, it can be argued that in some cases, the Estonian 
Consumer Protection Board has not applied the general clause correctly, as it has 
issued precepts without analysing whether the particular practice has materially 
distorted or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of an average 
consumer. For example, in one case the Estonian Consumer Protection Board issued a 
precept1 because a creditor had indicated the APRC to be 761 % that was 0.61 % 
lower than was actually the case.2 One might wonder whether such a small difference 
really is able to influence the credit-taking decision of an average consumer. This is, 
however, an enforcement problem of a particular regulator and not a problem of the 
principle-based approach of the UCPD. 
 
1  A precept is an administrative act which imposes on a person an obligation to perform a required act or 
refrain from a prohibited act. If the addressee fails to perform the obligation imposed by a precept a 
penalty payment may be issued. 
2  Precept of the Consumer Protection Board, 04.06.2015, no 6-25/14-004945-009. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Both a government official as well as a consumer association assessed the black list of 
unfair commercial practices of the Directive as effective and positive. They 
emphasized that traders are usually avoiding the blacklisted commercial practices and 
the list makes it easier for consumers to recognize unfair practices, thus raising the 
consumer protection standard. It also makes the enforcement easier for the regulators 
as it is avoiding arguing over whether a particular practice should be considered unfair 
or not and thus, the black list also fosters legal certainty and clarity. As for practical 
examples, a consumer association referred to cases where traders have sent memorial 
coins marketed as ‘free’ but later on the consumer was still required to pay. Another 
example concerned ‘free’ mobile phone ringtones advertised to minors. 
A representative of a consumer association brought out the following cases of black-
listed unfair commercial practices that has been occurring in their practice and that 
have been settled in the favour of the consumer: 
• Including in marketing material an invoice or similar document seeking 
payment that gives the consumer the impression that the consumer has 
already ordered the marketed product when this is not the case. Mainly used in 
case of distance sales, different packages including books or food supplements, 
etc. sent to consumers;  
• Falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for 
purposes relating to the trader’s trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely 
representing oneself as a consumer. This is most common in the sale of 
second-hand cars; 
• Undertaking to provide after-sales service to consumers with whom the trader 
has communicated prior to a transaction in a language, which is not an official 
language of the Member State where the trader is located and then making 
such service available only in another language without clearly disclosing this 
to the consumer before the consumer is committed to the transaction. This is 
common in cross-border cases when the trader’s website targeted to 
consumers is displayed in different languages, but the complaints are accepted 
only in the language of the trader; 
• Pyramid schemes. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The Estonian legislator has not made use of Article 3(9) UCPD. In academic writing, 
this topic has not been discussed either. No unfair commercial practices were cited by 
Estonian respondents in the area of immovable property. As for financial services, 
there have been cases with incorrect information on APRC in consumer credit 
contracts. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
None of the respondents was able to report any such problems on the energy market. 
There have been no investigations or case law on this issue. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
A government official admitted that it is not possible to evaluate the practical benefits 
for the consumers. A representative of a regulator, however, pointed out that there is 
a lot of ambiguity concerning the notion of ‘average consumer’. For example, there is 
currently an administrative procedure pending against an Estonian mobile phone 
operator who is claiming that the regulator is not able to show who is an ‘average 
consumer’ of their services. The regulator had relied on the statistics concerning what 
services an average mobile service client is using and what price he or she is ready to 
pay for that. However, the respondents were not able to point out any case law where 
the court had dealt with the notion of an ‘average consumer’.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
There is no court case law on the notion of ‘vulnerable consumer’ in Estonia but in the 
enforcement practice of the Consumer Protection Board, there have been several 
disputes on who should be regarded as vulnerable consumer. One example of a new 
category of vulnerable consumers stems from the recent enforcement practice and 
concerns an e-driving school case about young, just-graduated people who were 
inexperienced in concluding contracts. Their vulnerability was, inter alia, shown by the 
fact that it was their parent and not themselves who turned to the Consumer 
Protection Board for legal help. In other cases, it was the poor economic situation as 
well as low educational background of the consumer that was the basis of the 
vulnerability: e.g. cases of usurious instant loans.3  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
In general, interviewed stakeholders considered self- and co-regulation good 
measures to overcome the burdensome and often unnecessary over-regulation in 
various spheres of economic activities. By subjecting themselves to self-imposed 
rules, market participants have the opportunity to rule out the use of unfair 
commercial practices and give consumers a clear signal, which market participants act 
ethically towards the consumers. Some of the positive examples that come to mind 
are the agreement not to sell alcohol to inebriated consumers by Estonian retail 
chains. To a certain extent, some acknowledgements also carry this function, e.g. the 
certification of trustworthiness given by the Estonian E-Commerce Association that 
gives the consumers a guarantee of the reliability of the business.  
The problem with self-regulation and sector-wide certifications is that the customers 
may not be aware of such actions and thus are not considering this in their behaviour. 
Secondly, several stakeholders pointed out that self-regulation is until now not very 
widely practiced in Estonia and is rather a new concept for most of the market players. 
The most prominent example of self-regulation in Estonia are the Guidelines on Good 
Commercial Practices put together by the Estonian Traders’ Association in 2007. As for 
its effectiveness, the stakeholders expressed different opinions: whereas an official of 
the regulator was rather sceptical, a representative of a traders’ association 
considered it definitely useful in practice. Neither of them was able to provide specific 
3 On the probleem of usurious instant loans in Estonia and its devastating social impact, see K. Sein, 
Protection of Consumers in Consumer-Credit Contracts: Expectations and Reality in Estonia. Juridica 
International 2013, pp 32-36. 
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examples to back their claims, however. Based on the above, it can be concluded that 
co-regulation is definitely a right step forward but it is not able to substitute the 
traditional public enforcement. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
A representative of a business association as well as an official of a regulator found 
that considering the rapid growth of e-commerce and sharing economy, developments 
in these and related areas should be accounted for when reviewing the list. They were 
not able to provide a more specific suggestion, however. 
Other stakeholders did not report of any necessity to extend or modify the black list. A 
regulator stressed that the current black list is justified and working effectively 
because it is clear and thus eliminating many disputes. Therefore, in their enforcement 
practice disputes mostly arise if an administrative procedure was initiated based on 
the general clause. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
The respondents have not reported of any such measures or best practices. An official 
of a regulator was of the opinion that the legal rules concerning unfair commercial 
practices do not contain any major flaws or shortcomings; it is the (domestic) 
enforcement regulation that could be improved. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
The PID is implemented in the Consumer Protection Act and in a government 
regulation ‘Requirements for indicating the prices of services and goods’. As for the 
awareness of consumers, all respondents were of the opinion that Estonian consumers 
are well-informed of the unit selling price. According to the Eurobarometer data, 45 % 
of Estonian consumers looked at the unit price often, 27 % sometimes and 11 % 
seldom. The consumers mainly consider unit price when buying food products. A 
regulator stressed that the awareness in Estonia is so high (also due to several 
information campaigns) that regulators even do not need for an extensive surveillance 
anymore. The traders have accepted the obligation and it seems that it has also 
become part of competitive factors: if a trader does not show the unit price then 
consumers might start preferring a competitor.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Currently the unit price is based on ‘1 litre’ or ‘1 kg’ and the respondents were of the 
opinion that both traders and consumers have got used to it. Therefore, they see no 
need for a change (introducing e.g. a number of washloads parameter) right now. 
They consider most important that the price for comparable products remains 
comparable and it is not so important which unit should be taken as a basis.  
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 • The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not relevant for Estonia. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses  
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD is implemented in the Advertising Act. For Estonia, the problem is not that 
the Directive’s scope is limited to the notion of ‘advertising’, but rather the fact that 
advertising is defined somewhat ambiguously and possibly even not conforming to the 
MCAD in the Estonian law (§ 2 (1) of the Advertising Act). Whereas § 2 (a) of the 
MCAD defines advertising as ‘making of a representation in any form’, § 2 (1) of the 
Estonian Advertising Act defines advertising as ‘information which is made public in 
any generally perceived form’. This has created problems in the enforcement process 
as non-complying traders argue that e.g. offers sent directly to a particular consumer 
do not constitute advertising and, hence, do not fall under the rules on misleading and 
comparative advertising. This problem has been reported both by a government 
official as well as by a regulator. However, this is a transposition problem and not a 
problem concerning the Directive itself. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Most respondents were not able to evaluate the effectiveness of that. An official of a 
regulator evaluated the strategy concerning misleading advertising as effective but 
also referred that it has been controversial in practice what constitutes ‘advertising’ 
and what ‘invitation to buy’. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Estonian legislator has not set forth any rules that go beyond the MCDA. There are 
also no other rules protecting B2B transactions. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
The respondents were not able to evaluate the effects of the full harmonisation 
provisions on comparative advertising. There is also no literature to be found on this 
particular issue. 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
317
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Most of the respondents were not able to evaluate that. An official of a regulator 
considered the comparative advertising rules to be effective for all marketing 
channels. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
A representative of a regulator considered the rules effective enough. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Estonian regulators have had good experiences with cooperating with traders. For 
example, Estonian traders are eager to use the opportunity to consult the regulator 
before publishing their advertisements. Similar and very beneficial cooperation exists 
with several advertising and marketing companies and media portals.  
In addition, the Consumer Protection Board has published a number of detailed 
guidelines for advertising specific products/services for the traders. One of the 
regulators also reported a self-regulation practice where a trader who submitted a 
complaint about another competitor to the regulator copied this e-mail also to the 
competitor being complained about. This enabled the competitor who had violated the 
advertising rules to comply with the complaint immediately if they so wished. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Business associations representing Estonian entrepreneurs reported that Estonian 
businesses have not encountered such problems due to the UCPD.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
As Estonian entrepreneurs report no problems due to UCPD one can assume that the 
black list has served its purpose on fostering free movement of goods and services. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Stakeholders and regulators have not reported such problems. However, those 
problems might arise, e.g. in respect to consumer financial services offered cross-
border. 
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
There are no negative experiences in Estonia in this respect.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Stakeholders and regulators have not reported of such barriers. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The respondents were not able to evaluate that. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Stakeholders and regulators have not reported such barriers. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The respondents were of the opinion that bigger traders are certainly aware of the 
information requirements and implement them but smaller (and possibly also middle-
sized) ones probably do not. It was reported that the more detailed information 
obligation requirements of the CRD play a far greater role in practice. As for the 
consumers, a representative of a consumer association found that parallel information 
requirements do not create confusion for the consumers and is rather informative. 
Based on the evidence and opinions expressed, one can conclude that many traders in 
Estonia do not give enough attention to the information requirements or are even 
knowingly ignoring them. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The respondents did not report on any costs arising for public authorities/businesses 
due to multiple information requirements in different directives. While they admitted 
that there are indeed different information requirements arising from different 
directives they did not bring out any specific overlaps or real practical problems.  
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1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The respondents, especially an official of a regulator, did not see any necessity for 
such extension or revision. This issue has not been reported as a problem and it has 
not received any attention in the legal literature, even not for the domestic trade. This 
might be because the same practical result can be reached under §§ 14 and 115 of 
the Law of Obligations Act. Those provisions set forth the option of a damages claim 
for breaching pre-contractual information obligations, including an obligation to ‘inform 
the other party of all circumstances with regard to which the other party has, based 
on the purpose of the contract, an identifiable essential interest.’4 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
The respondents saw no problems about keeping separate legal regimes for B2B and 
B2C transactions in the area of commercial practices. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
There was no enthusiasm for the latter option among the respondents. For them, the 
protection in B2B transactions should, as a rule, cover only the pre-contractual stage 
and generally not be extended to unfair commercial practices during and after the 
transactions. A representative of a traders’ association, however, believes that some 
certain types of unfair practices which are borderline fraudulent in their nature and 
have a cross-border effect, should be addressed on an European level, such as 
misleading invoices (European Business Number, fraudulent invoices regarding IP-
rights) and other types of scams (e.g. creating an organisation with similar symbols to 
an official institution and deceiving companies into participating in seminars, selling 
them materials etc.). The last problem is very common among Estonian businesses as 
well, and counter-measures to this type of operations should definitely be taken.  
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
The business associations did not report a need for such black list for B2B marketing 
area. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
There is no need to develop contractual consequences linked to the breaches of MCAD. 
The contract law rules on mistake and fraud, as well as on transactions violating good 
morals, are already providing necessary protection in individual cases. 
 
4 See further on that P. Varul et al, Võlaõigusseaduse üldosa. Kommenteeritud väljaanne, Juura 2006, pp 
58-62. 
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• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
On 14 February 2013, the Estonian Government adopted the Estonian position on the 
EU Commission’s Communication on unfair commercial practices in B2B transactions. 
Estonia supports revision of the MCAD in order to refine the scope of the Directive, 
provide for a definition of unfair commercial practice and create a list of unfair 
practices. Further, it supported provision of a legal basis for cross-border enforcement 
measures as well as creating a cooperation scheme for enforcement entities of the 
Member States.  
Whereas the Government of Estonia supports further action on the EU level, a 
representative of a traders’ association stressed the opposite. The representative 
found that although there are cases in which such measures could theoretically help 
with creating a fairer internal market that is also in the best interests of Estonian 
businesses, strict regulation for B2B transactions on a European level is not of utmost 
importance. This is due to the risk that such regulation could bring about too many 
unfounded complaints and legal arguments.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
In Estonian law there is an explicit provision in the Consumer Protection Act (§ 13 (2)) 
stating that violation of the prohibition on the use of unfair commercial practices does 
not result, in itself, in the nullity of the transaction. The literature suggests, however, 
that the nullity of a contract cannot be ruled out as under certain circumstances it can 
also follow from § 86 of the General Part of Civil Code Act that foresees the nullity of 
transactions violating good morals (bona mores).5 In addition, such contracts may, 
under certain circumstances be avoided due to fraud or mistake (§§ 92-95 of the 
General Part of Civil Code Act). Avoidance is executed by a notice to the other party, 
i.e. extra-judicially. In those cases, also a negative damages claim is available under § 
101 of the General Part of Civil Code Act. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
There is no case law available on that issue. There is case law on nullity of contracts 
because of immoral behaviour/usury6 but not connected to unfair commercial 
practices. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Neither the government officials nor the consumer associations see a need for 
developing contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
A regulator pointed out that there might be a need for that as currently declaring 
certain commercial practice to be unfair has no direct legal consequence for the 
consumer. Such necessity does not seem to be real, however, as in serious cases 
nullity of the contract can be reached by § 86 of the General Part of Civil Code Act that 
foresees the nullity of transactions violating good morals (bona mores). For most of 
the cases, there are already enough remedies available under Estonian law. 
5 M. Kingisepp. Tarbijakaitseõigus Euroopa Liidus ja Eestis. Läte, 2011, p 156. 
6 See on that, K. Sein, Protection of Consumers in Consumer-Credit Contracts: Expectations and Reality in 
Estonia. Juridica International 2013, pp 32-36. 
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However, representative of a consumer association pointed out that in practice 
consumers who have entered into contract due to the misleading or aggressive 
practises have no legal possibility to claim damages out of court, even if it has been 
confirmed by the competent authority that the trader has used unfair commercial 
practices and has therefore been sanctioned. According to this representative, this 
means that consumer complaints cannot be solved efficiently out of court.  
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The overall impression gained from the interviews is that the principle-based approach 
of the UCTD (and the Estonian transposing norms) are working effectively. The fact 
that the Directive is rather general and abstract calls for more detailed regulation at 
the national level. It was submitted that Estonia has achieved quite a well-balanced 
result here with a more detailed (but directive-conforming) rules, including a list of 
terms that are to be considered unfair in consumer contracts. 
The general principles underlying the UCTD are reasonable and justified. The real 
problem in Estonia is not the normative framework but rather the limited supervision 
resources.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
It is difficult to evaluate the practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms 
annexed to the Directive as the Estonian legislator has decided to set forth a binding 
and very detailed list of terms (altogether 34 terms) that are to be considered unfair 
in consumer contracts. The list in Estonian law is considerably longer than the one in 
the Annex of the UCTD and therefore practical experiences exist only in relation to the 
domestic list. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
It is hard to define whether the Estonian solution is the one of a black and/or grey list 
of unfair terms. Estonian law (§ 42 (3) of the Law of Obligations Act) provides for a list 
of standard contract terms considered unfair and thus void in all circumstances (for 
consumer contracts). This seems to suggest that Estonia has adopted the so-called 
black list. However, many terms of this list involve notions as ‘unreasonably high’, 
‘unreasonably long’ etc. and are thus rather ‘grey’ in nature as they require evaluation 
by the court. Thus, one can conclude that the Estonian law contains both a black and a 
grey list of unfair terms. This list contains 34 items and several of them cannot be 
found in the annex of the UCTD. For example, according to § 42 (3) item 11 a term 
prescribing that, in the event of a breach of the contract by the party supplying the 
term, the other party may exercise the party’s legal remedies against the party 
supplying the term only if the other party has previously filed a claim against a third 
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party with a court, is unfair. Other examples of unfair terms: term providing the party 
supplying the term with the right to require security of unreasonably high value (item 
22); prescribing the obligation of the other party to accept goods or services which 
were not ordered in addition to the goods and services agreed upon (item 23). In 
addition, the Estonian Law of Obligations Act contains a general clause in § 42 (1), 
transposing art. 3 (1) of the UCTD.    
The respondents found such a combination of a black/grey list and a general clause to 
be working well enough. In practice, it is easier to declare a term unfair based on the 
list; it is more complicated to argue it only under the general clause. In addition, the 
list provides good guidelines for the entrepreneurs of what the allowed/not allowed 
clauses are and thus facilitates legal certainty and predictability. The general clause, in 
turn, provides a good safety net for cases that cannot be dealt with under the list. The 
Estonian Supreme Court has used both the black/grey list as well as the general 
clause in its case law.7  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Under Estonian law, a court decision is only binding to the parties of the particular 
case so a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term does not extend 
to all contracts of the trader concerned, not to speak to the contracts of other traders 
containing similar term. However, § 457 (7) of the Estonian Code of Civil Procedure 
stipulates that if a person applying a standard term violates a court judgment whereby 
termination of the application of the standard term is required, the standard term is 
deemed to be invalid if the other contracting party relies on the court judgment.  
Furthermore, a court decision, especially a Supreme Court decision declaring a 
particular standard term unfair certainly has a strong impact on how the rules of unfair 
terms should be interpreted. Traders tend to consider such Supreme Court decisions 
rather quickly as they have a high interpretative value in the Estonian legal practice. A 
representative of a regulator also stressed that after a certain clause has been 
declared unfair and thus void by the Supreme Court it is very much easier for them to 
induce other traders to stop using a similar term.8 This does not apply to the 
insurance sector, however: they tend to continue using terms even after they have 
been declared unfair or not transparent by the Supreme Court. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The transparency requirements under art. 4 (2) and 5 of UCTD are reasonable and 
justified. However, Estonian law contains somewhat more detailed rules on 
transparency than the Directive does. Namely, § 37 (3) of the Law of Obligations Act 
stipulates that standard terms the contents, wording or presentation of which are so 
uncommon or unintelligible that the other party cannot, based on the principle of 
7 See for example P. Kalamees, K. Lilleholt, Early Termination of Consumer Contracts for the Leasing of Cars 
under Estonian and Norwegian Laws, European Review of Private Law (4) 2014, p 553-554 and K. Sein, 
K. Lilleholt, Enforcement of Security Rights in Residential Immovable Property and Consumer Protection: 
An Assessment of Estonian and Norwegian Law, Oslo Law Review (1) 2015, pp 31-32. 
8 This tendency has also been reported in the literature, see K. Sein, K. Lilleholt, Enforcement of Security 
Rights in Residential Immovable Property and Consumer Protection: An Assessment of Estonian and 
Norwegian Law, Oslo Law Review (1) 2015, pp 31-32. 
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reasonableness, have expected them to be included in the contract or which the party 
cannot understand without considerable effort are not deemed to be part of the 
contract. Thus Estonian law deals with transparency issues under the incorporation 
test and not as a part of unfairness test. The legal consequences are, at least under 
Estonian law, the same: an unclear/non-transparent clause is not binding for the 
consumer.9  
A government official expressed the opinion that Estonia’s more detailed domestic 
regulation puts the consumer to a slightly better position than the Directive does and 
thus enables a somewhat higher consumer protection standard. Officials of a regulator 
also stressed that transparency of standard terms is in many cases a central problem 
in practice. In case law, the transparency test has been used several times to declare 
certain terms of insurance contracts to be non-binding to the consumer.10 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Estonia has not extended the application of the UCTD to individually negotiated terms 
or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-matter. However, the 
rules on unfair terms also apply to individual employment contracts.11 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The sanction ‘term not binding to the consumer’ is effective and reasonable in 
practice. Under Estonian law, when a clause is declared unfair, the consequence is that 
the clause becomes null and void with effects ex tunc and legal provisions concerning 
the type of contract concerned are applied in lieu of such terms (§ 41 of the Law of 
Obligations Act).12 A reduction of an unfair term to the acceptable level is expressly 
prohibited in § 39 (2) of the Law of Obligations Act and the rule is accepted in the 
court practice as well.13 
The Estonian courts usually follow the obligation to invoke unfairness ex officio; 
however, the rule seems to be that the Supreme Court leads the way and after its 
decision to declare a particular term unfair also courts of lower instance follow the 
pattern in similar cases. There is no explicit provision in the Estonian law on the ex 
officio assessing obligation but the Supreme Court has stressed it in its continuous 
9 K. Saare, K. Sein, Transparenzgebot der AGB-Klauseln in den Verbraucherverträgen, Juridica International 
(1) 2012, pp 64-65.  
10 See e.g. the decisions of the Estonian Supreme Court no 3-2-1-112-14, available at 
http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&indeks=0,2,10246,10624,10629&tekst=RK/3-2-1-112-14 and no 3-2-
1-76-07, available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&indeks=0,2,10246,10624,10629&tekst=RK/3-2-
1-76-07 
11 See the decision of the Estonian Supreme Court no 3-2-1-39-11, available at 
http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&indeks=0,2,10246,10624,10625&tekst=RK/3-2-1-39-11 
12 An exception is foreseen for cases of dividable terms via the „blue pencil test“, see P. Varul et al, 
Võlaõigusseseaduse üldosa. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. Juura 2006, p 141. 
13 See the decision of the Estonian Supreme Court no 3-2-1-123-12, available  
http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-123-12 
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case law14 and the principle seems to be well-anchored in the Estonian legal practice. 
A government representative considered it the most reasonable and consumer-friendly 
result compared to other possible solutions where consumer should be active 
themselves. However, the official claimed that Estonia will not oppose if the 
Commission wants to lay down this principle expressis verbis in the legal act.  
There is no real administrative remedy in this area under Estonian law. The Consumer 
Protection Board is entitled to file a claim at the civil court and demand that the 
application of unfair standard terms be terminated (§ 65 (3) of the Consumer 
Protection Act). However, the Consumer Protection Board has no power to rule on 
legal consequences of an unfair term (damages, restitution). There has been 
theoretical discussion within a regulatory body as to  whether using unfair terms can 
be viewed as an unfair commercial practice with the result that the regulator is able to 
use administrative remedies (issue precepts under § 64 (1) of the Consumer 
Protection Act) to stop the use of unfair terms. However, there has been no case law 
yet. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The respondents were hesitant on that question. While they generally agreed that 
graphical presentation would improve transparency and readability of the terms, at 
the same time doubts were expressed whether it would be possible to use graphical 
presentation for all standard terms (irrespective of the products or services offered). 
Another concern expressed by a government official is that it would probably be very 
complicated to regulate graphical presentation of standard terms as in different 
sectors and different business models presentation of standard terms may be very 
different both in terms of form and content. 
There are no best practices or lessons learned in Estonia that could be relevant for 
other Member States. 
As a way forward, a government official suggested to lay down a binding list of non-
negotiated terms that would always be considered unfair. Such list could be based on 
the common ground found in the grey/black lists of the Member States. However, 
such list cannot be comprehensive and needs to be complemented by a general 
clause. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
The respondents have not reported of such cases and there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that such disparities influence the decisions of consumers and traders to 
engage in cross-border transactions. Based on the interviews and the lack of empirical 
14 See on that K. Saare, K. Sein, Amtsermittlungspflicht der nationalen Gerichte bei der Kontrolle von 
missbräuchlichen Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen, Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (1) 
2013, pp 19-20; P. Varul et al, Võlaõigusseadus I. Üldosa. Kommenteeritud väljaanne, Juura 2006, p 
126. 
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evidence, it can be concluded that differences in transposing and/or applying the 
general fairness clause of UCTD have not caused real problems to the Estonian traders 
or consumers. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
The respondents have not reported such cases, see above. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Not relevant as Estonia has not extended the scope of application of the UCTD. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
A business association answered that certain measures could definitely help benefit 
SMEs that sometimes have no other options than to succumb to the rules foreseen by 
the other contracting party. In particular, there have been problems connected to the 
supply chains of food products as bigger supermarkets and other retailers block 
smaller producers out. However, in Estonia, most businesses are SMEs and making a 
distinction based on the size of the company may not be the most effective measure, 
at least in Estonia.  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Estonia has extended the applicability of the rules on unfairness control also to B2B 
relations. Under § 44 of the Law of Obligations Act if a standard term is used in a 
contract where the other party to the contract is a person who entered into the 
contract for the purposes of the economic or professional activities of the person, the 
term is presumed to be unfair. In practice, however, establishing the unfairness of a 
standard term in B2B contracts is an exception rather than the rule. It is probably the 
reason why the applicability of unfair terms rules has not been contested in the 
Estonian legal literature. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
According to the business association, the scope should definitely not cover the 
question of price, which should remain a question that parties can decide upon. The 
same applies to the main subject-matter of the contract. The importance of party 
autonomy in those matters is also stressed in the literature.15 
 
15 P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseaduse üldosa. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. Juura, 2006, pp 139, 152. 
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• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
A business association found that in cross-border contracts the clauses on applicable 
law and jurisdiction are often established by the so-called stronger party and do not 
leave the other (usually smaller) business many options to challenge the terms of the 
contract or go to court against the other party in case of a breach. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
No such need has been reported by the respondents. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
There have been no indications in Estonia to suggest that this would be the case. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
There have been no indications in Estonia to suggest that this would be the case. On 
the contrary, it seems highly unlikely that extending unfairness control would have 
any influence on innovation as in this area other aspects such as contract price is 
much more important for the market players. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
The benefits of extending the scope to b2b transactions would not exceed the negative 
consequences of such an extension, according to stakeholders. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?  
Estonia has two different injunctions procedures: administrative procedure (issuing 
precepts16 and in case of non-compliance, applying a penalty payment) and court 
procedure (in civil court). A government official as well as a regulator, assessed the 
administrative procedure to be considerably more effective (faster and cheaper) than 
the civil court procedure. Since 2015, the maximum amount of penalty payments 
(now EUR 9600) has been considerably higher than before (EUR 640): this has, on the 
one hand, a higher preventive effect but on the other hand, it also induces traders to 
contest the penalty payments in court. The court procedure has been used only once 
(for stopping the use of an unfair term in a mobile operator’s standard terms); the 
proceedings up to the Supreme Court lasted ca. 1.5 years. 
16 A precept is an administrative act which imposes on a person an obligation to perform a required act or 
refrain from a prohibited act. If the addressee fails to perform the obligation imposed by a precept a 
penalty payment may be issued. 
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The cross-border system, on the contrary, does not function very well according to the 
assessment of the respondents. The Estonian Consumer Protection Board has not 
initiated any proceedings abroad nor have foreign consumer associations/regulators 
initiated proceedings in Estonia. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Both a government official as well as a regulator considered an administrative 
injunction order (issuing a precept) to be the most effective (including cost-effective) 
measure. If the trader does not comply with the precept voluntarily, then the 
Consumer Protection Board can apply penalty payment. However, issuing a precept 
was not considered the most effective measure when it comes to short-time violations 
(e.g. short advertising or sale campaigns). In those cases misdemeanour procedure 
should, in their view, be used instead.  
A government official found that it would be most effective for the consumers if the 
traders could be forced by the regulator to compensate the consumer right away; this 
is currently the case concerning the compensation under the Flight Passenger Rights 
Regulation. Namely, the Estonian Consumer Protection Board is entitled to issue a 
precept and force the trader via this administrative measure to compensate for the 
cancelled or delayed flight. It should be noted, however, that this is a real exception 
and as a rule, the consumers must turn to court or the Consumer Complaints 
Committee to claim damages.  
There is currently no system of collective redress in Estonia. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes, under § 64 of the Consumer Protection Act the Consumer Protection Board is 
entitled to apply the injunction procedure to all violations of collective consumer 
interests. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
The Estonian Consumer Protection Board has not initiated an injunction procedure in 
other Member States.  
A representative of a regulator reported several problems in case of cross-border 
cases starting from finding the right addressee and ending with the actual cross-
border enforcement.  
Costs of the proceedings were indicated as one of the major obstacles to a wider use 
of injunctions. Because of the ‘loser pays’ principle in the Estonian law there is a risk 
of paying the fees and costs of the opposing party. Due to the cost risks linked to 
litigation, regulators only launch injunctive actions when they are sure to win. The 
consumer associations in Estonia are entitled to launch injunctions but in reality have 
never done so because of shortage of resources. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
The respondents did not indicate any additional legislation to which the scope of the 
ID should be extended. Although in Estonia, injunctions can be used in case of any 
violations of collective consumer interests, there have been no practical cases outside 
the scope of the ID to suggest that this pattern should be followed throughout the EU. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
The respondents were not able to evaluate it as they have not had any cross-border 
enforcement experiences. It must be kept in mind that so far the Estonian Consumer 
Protection Board has only initiated one action to ban unfair terms. This is due to 
limited resources and it would require even more resources and know-how to act 
cross-border. Therefore it may be concluded that the legal and financial obstacles are 
too high for the Estonian regulator to seek injunctions in the courts of another Member 
State. The same is true for foreign consumer protection bodies: they have not filed a 
single claim in the Estonian courts. On the other hand, information exchange between 
regulators of different Member States on an informal level is used quite often. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
There is no separate procedure in Estonia; the injunction procedures (both civil court 
procedures and an administrative procedure, i.e. right to issue precepts) are general, 
i.e. applicable for all kinds of violations of collective consumer interests. Both of them 
are regulated in the Consumer Protection Act; the administrative procedure also 
underlies provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Issuing a precept is part of 
administrative procedure and it can be used also in cases of other violations of 
collective consumer interests.  
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In practice, the Consumer Protection Board is not using the civil court procedure 
(more precisely, it has done that in one case only17). The reason for not using the civil 
court procedure is the risk of losing the case with the result of the obligation to pay for 
the other parties’ costs. The civil court procedure follows according to the provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Estonian law does not provide for separate procedures. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
There are no official statistics on the costs for consumers and the stakeholders were 
reluctant to offer an estimate of such costs. In Estonia, the consumers turn to courts 
relatively seldom; the reason for that is probably both the court fees as well as the 
psychological hurdle to start a court case. Turning to the Consumer Complaints 
Committee that works at the Consumer Protection Board, this is used much more 
often and it is free for the consumers so that the consumer rights under the directives 
should be protected well enough. The Consumer Protection Board is also entitled to 
represent several consumers (or a group of consumers) in court: this helps to reduce 
the legal costs for consumers. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
The stakeholders were not able to provide statistical data or particular examples for 
that question. However, the general feeling was that the directives have constrained 
unfair market practices and thus fostered fair competition between the traders. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
The respondents were not able to provide detained answers or statistical data for that. 
Some traders have complained that following all consumer protection rules is time and 
money consuming but there is no official data to back that claim. 
 
17 The so-called Elisa case, see the decision of the Estonian Supreme Court no 3-2-1-135-15, 24.11.2015. 
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• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
It is not possible to quantify those costs. Administrative procedure (issuing a precept) 
is deemed to be cost-effective for the Consumer Protection Board as there are not too 
high costs involved. Civil court procedure is much more costly and risky (obligation to 
compensate for the other parties’ costs if losing the case), both for individual 
consumers as well as for the Consumer Protection Board. Therefore there has only 
been one court case launched by the Consumer Protection Board this far. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
No. The respondents agreed that using the administrative procedure is cheaper and 
more effective for consumers, regulators and possibly even for the traders than using 
the civil court procedure.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
The respondents made no such suggestions. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied 
in practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
The regulators are aware of the regulations but there is no data concerning the 
awareness of consumers and traders. The respondents were not able to evaluate that 
exactly but the general understanding was that both consumers and traders are quite 
well informed of the UCPD as there have been many information campaigns of the 
Estonian Consumer Protection Board on that. The awareness of UCTD is probably 
substantively lower as the case law on unfair terms is yet developing and is not as 
extensive as in some other Member States. As already reported above, there has been 
only one court case on injunctions related to unfair terms and that concerned a 
regulated sector (mobile phone operator). There have been very few administrative 
cases enforcing the UCPD in regulated sectors so it is difficult to provide a concise 
answer. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The main supervisory and enforcement authority is the Consumer Protection Board 
who is responsible for enforcing the UCPD/UCTD also in the regulated sectors. The 
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only exception is financial sector where the Financial Supervision Board has co-
supervision competence under § 65 (5) of the Consumer Protection Act. However, this 
co-supervision competence was introduced only in 2015 so there is very little practical 
experience yet. In practice, the leading partner/supervisor has always been the 
Consumer Protection Board.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Overlaps certainly do exist but the respondents have not reported on any practical 
problems due to that. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
There is certain overlap between horizontal and sector-specific regulations but the 
practical problems have concerned only the question as to which regulator has 
supervisory competence. A case has been reported where the Consumer Protection 
Board issued a precept to a credit institution but the credit institution argued that the 
supervisory power lies solely within the Financial Supervision Board and not within the 
Consumer Protection Board.  
There is no quantitative data available on the costs due to the complimentary 
application of dual regulations in the regulated areas. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The respondents have not reported such a need for clarification. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
There seem to be no practical reasons to extend the scope of those directives to C2B 
transactions. In Estonia, since March 2016, unfair commercial practices rules also 
apply to C2B transactions but there have been no cases to report on. The unfair terms 
rules also apply to C2B contracts as § 35 of the Law of Obligations Act does not 
require that the trader acts as a seller or service provider, but again, there are no 
specific cases to report. Other than that, consumers are able to rely on general 
contract law rules, including rules concerning avoidance of transactions due to fraud 
and mistake. 
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The respondents evaluated the concepts of ‘consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ 
appropriate and fit for purpose. The notion of ‘vulnerable consumer’ is somewhat more 
complicated. A government representative reported that in the Estonian enforcement 
practice the main criteria for defining vulnerability has been age. Minors as well as 
elderly people have been considered vulnerable in certain cases. Minors for example in 
certain advertising or unfair commercial practices cases, elderly people for example in 
deciding whether charging for paper bills is unfair or not or whether they should 
consult the trader’s internet web page in addition to the information sent them on 
paper.18  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The respondents could not report of any specific provisions that should be introduced 
in other directives. It seems that the UCPD is working well and allows adequate 
protection of vulnerable consumers in Estonia. The real problem for Estonia is not the 
regulation but rather the enforcement side (not enough resources for effective 
enforcement of the rules). 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The respondents agreed that transposing those directives into Estonian law and 
implementing them has certainly improved the level of consumer protection in Estonia. 
Before the transposition of those directives, there was no such specific consumer 
protection law in force in Estonia. It is general understanding that accession to the 
European Union and the resulting transposition of consumer law directives has 
increased the consumer protection standard in Estonia to a level much higher than 
previously in force. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Implementing the PID into Estonian law has definitely improved considerably the 
awareness of Estonian consumers about the unit price. Low-income consumers are 
especially attentive of unit prices.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Yes, that is the case. For example, comparative advertising was not even regulated in 
Estonia before 2001.  
18 Decision of Harju County Court no 3-13-965. 
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 • Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Those directives have fostered (cross-border) competition and increased consumers’ 
trust in traders. The Estonian consumers are increasingly buying goods from other 
Member States (via e-shops and when travelling). In e-commerce, geo-blocking and 
not the use of unfair commercial practices remains the biggest problem for Estonian 
consumers.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
It is hard to evaluate on a directive-by directive basis. Overall, the standard of 
consumer protection is rising in Estonia, the competition between traders, including 
cross-border trading is becoming more intense and less unfair. All this has also 
increased consumers’ trust. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Estonia  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Law of Obligations Act 
(Võlaõigusseadus, 
11.03.2016, 2) 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes § 42 (3) of the Law of 
Obligations Act 
The list in this 
provision 
contains both 
“black” and 
“grey” terms 
  'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
Yes § 42 (3) of the Law of 
Obligations Act 
The list in this 
provision 
contains both 
“black” and 
“grey” terms 
  Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
No   
  Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
Consumer Protection Act 
(Tarbijakaitseseadus, RT I 
11.03.2016, 8) 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
No §§ 13-18 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
 
  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
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commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No   
Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
  Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
No   
Consumer Protection Act 
(Tarbijakaitseseadus, RT I 
11.03.2016, 8) 
 
Requirements for 
indicating the prices of 
goods and services 
(Regulation) 
(Kauba ja teenuse hinna 
avaldamise nõuded, RT I 
11.02.2016, 17) 
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations Yes § 7-8 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
 
§ 5 (1) of the Regulation 
“Requirements for 
indicating the prices of 
goods and services” 
No need to 
indicate the 
unit price for 
goods sold in 
auction and 
sales of works 
of art and 
antiques, 
products 
supplied in the 
course of the 
provision of a 
service; also in 
case of certain 
other product 
categories 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Advertising Act 
(Reklaamiseadus, RT I  
11.03.2016, 7) 
   § 4 of the Advertising Act  
    § 5 of the Advertising Act  
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Consumer Protection Act 
(Tarbijakaitseseadus, RT I 
11.03.2016, 8) 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Estonia  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No 
 
 
There is a possibility of administrative 
procedure under § 64 of the Consumer 
Protection Act (issuing a precept and if the 
trader is not complying with it, then 
applying a penalty payment) as well as a 
court procedure. Both procedures go 
beyond the ID as they are available for all 
forms of violations of collective consumer 
interests. 
As court procedure has been used only once 
(in an unfair terms case) then practical 
problems concerning the coherence 
between the procedures have not yet 
emerged. There have been discussions 
within the Consumer Protection Board 
whether using an unfair term could 
constitute an unfair commercial practice 
entitling the Consumer Protection Board to 
issue a precept (and possibly penalty 
payment) but there is no case law yet. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Both forms of 
procedure 
Both an administrative procedure (issuing a 
precept) as well as court procedure are 
foreseen in case of activities harmful to the 
collective interests of the consumers (§ 64 
(1) of the Consumer Protection Act) 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption  of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
 
Certain deviations made by the court 
possible 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
areas of consumer 
law that are not 
part of Annex I of 
the Directive 
 
The Consumer Protection Board may 
require termination of or refraining from 
activities harmful to the collective interests 
of consumers and for that purpose either 
issue a precept or file a claim at the court (§ 
64 (1) of the Consumer Protection Act) 
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Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding type of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure 
- Yes Yes, according to § 45 (2) of the Law of 
Obligations Act a non-profit association 
whose objectives as specified in the articles 
of association thereof include protection of 
the rights of undertakings or persons 
engaged in professional activities is entitled 
to file a court claim to terminate the use of 
unfair term(s). 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including 
the consultation stage under Art. 5 of the 
ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- No  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- No, no sanction No specific sanction but the court may 
order a fine for non-compliance 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
The conclusion of a court judgment 
whereby the person recommending 
application of a standard term is obliged to 
terminate recommending and to withdraw 
the recommendation of the term shall, in 
addition, set out the requirement to 
communicate the court judgment in the 
same manner as the recommendation was 
communicated. The court may require that 
the user of the standard terms 
communicate the court judgment in the 
manner determined by the court or may 
determine an additional manner for 
communication of the judgment (§ 443 (2) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure). 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
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Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No Generally no, but as an exception the 
Consumer Protection Board may issue a 
precept (an administrative injunction) to 
pay a compensation under Flight 
Passenger’s Rights Regulation to a 
consumer (603 (2) of the Aviation Act) 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- No  
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices (of 
other traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
Consumer 
Complaints 
Committee 
Statistics 
538 cases 98% 1.6% 0.3% No data No data 
Total of 
percentages 
should add 
up to 100% 
There are no court statistics available on consumer cases. 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).19  
19 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure EUR 400 
Up to 5 hours of 
lawyer’s work; 
ca EUR 400-500 
No 2-3 hours  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
No fees 
Up to 5 hours of 
lawyer’s work; 
ca EUR 400-500  
No 2-3 hours  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There is no official statistics on that issue. Until now, there has been only one 
collective injunction proceeding where the Consumer Protection Board has filed a claim 
at the court to stop the use of unfair terms by an Estonian mobile operator. There are 
not many unfairness cases at the Consumer Disputes Committee and consumers in 
the court proceedings do not often invoke the unfairness of a standard term either. 
However, in recent years courts have been more and more willing to invoke unfairness 
of a contract term ex officio. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Eesti Kaubandus-Tööstuskoda Business association 17 June 2016 
Tarbijakaitseamet National consumer 
enforcement authority 
16 June 2016 
Finantsinspektsioon National regulatory authority 29 June 2016 
Justiitsministeerium Ministry 16 June 2016 
Euroopa Liidu tarbija nõustamiskeskus European Consumer Centre 26 July 2016 
Tarbijate Koostöökoda Consumer organisation 16 June 2016 
Majandus-ja 
Kommunikatsiooniministeerium 
Ministry 20 June 2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
M. Kingisepp 2011 Tarbijakaitseõigus. 
P. Varul, I. Kull, V. Kõve, M 
Käerdi  
2006 Võlaõigusseadus I. Üldosa. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. 
K. Sein, P. Kalamees 2014 Early Termination of Consumer Contracts for the Leasing of Cars 
under Estonian and Norwegian Laws 
K.Sein, K. Lilleholt 2015 Enforcement of Security Rights in Residential Immovable Property 
and Consumer Protection: An Assessment of Estonian and 
Norwegian Law 
K.Saare, K. Sein 2013 Amtsermittlungspflicht der nationalen Gerichte bei der Kontrolle 
von missbräuchlichen Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen 
K. Saare, K. Sein 2012 Transparenzgebot der AGB-Klauseln in den Verbraucherverträgen. 
T. Silem 2015 Muudatused tarbijakrediidi reklaami regulatsioonis.  
K. Sein 2014 Consumer Credit Contracts in Estonia – Expectations and Reality 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report FINLAND 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Finnish consumer law based on the Nordic tradition has its origins in the Consumer 
Protection Act (hereinafter CPA)1 from 1978. Compliance with the CPA is primarily 
supervised and enforced by the Consumer Ombudsman (kuluttaja-asiamies), 
Consumer Disputes Board (kuluttajariitalautakunta) and the Competition and 
Consumer Authority (Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto). The CPA is built on general clauses 
regulating unfair commercial practices in Ch. 2 and unfair contract terms in Ch. 3. The 
Consumer Ombudsman’s dual authority to negotiate industry contract terms and issue 
preliminary injunctions and bring cases to the Market Court (markkinaoikeus) on 
behalf of consumers suffering from a trader’s unfair commercial practices, has secured 
a high level of consumer protection in practice.2  
While based on the CPA, the interpretation of general clauses is otherwise aligned with 
general principles of contract law, as well as general principles of law based on the 
Contracts Act.3 Interpretation is also aligned with Market Court case law upholding 
honest practices (hyvä tapa) through the established concept of ‘honest commercial 
practice’ (hyvän tavan vastaisuus)4 in B2B as well as B2C relationships. This is 
essential, since the CPA and the Unfair Business Practices Act5 may be simultaneously 
applicable to a case before the Market Court.6  
The general concepts of private law also apply to C2B and C2C transactions in the Sale 
of Goods Act7 or sector-specific legislation (e.g. real estate transactions). Private 
persons may bring suit in general court. The Supreme Court has recently favoured 
inquiry under general contract law, rules of procedure or sector-specific legislation, 
rather than adjusting contract terms or conducting a reasonableness inquiry 
referencing the relationship between the parties or consumer protection grounds.8  
1 Kuluttajansuojalaki 20.1.1978/38. 
2 Tuomas Majuri, Finland-Legislative Techniques at 73 in University Bielefeld / European Commission, 2007, 
EC Consumer Law Compendium - Comparative Analysis http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/ 
safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf (Hereinafter Majuri 2007) 
3 L varallisoikeudellisista oikeustoista 1929/228. 
4 The Finnish concept does not define ‘honest’ or ‘honest commercial practices’; it only defines what are not 
honest commercial practices. 
5 L sopimattomasta menettelystä elinkeinotoiminnassa 22.12.1978/1061. 
6 Government Bill HE 32/2008 at 2.1.   
7 Kauppalaki 27.3.1987/355. 
8 KKO 2015:60, where the court concluded that a contract term that stipulated the interest accrued on the 
debt did not specifically address penalty interest in excess of the maximum interest chargeable under 
Section 4:1 of Interest Act. The interest amounted to 118 % of the principal debt. However, the standard 
contract terms applicable were interpreted against the drafter due to vagueness of the terms (general 
contract law). The court rejected that the C2B relationship would have decisive legal relevance for the 
outcome. In KKO 2014:30 a tenant had reached agreement with the landlord (C to C) to terminate a 3-
year apartment rental agreement after one year, due to 5 months of unpaid rent. The termination 
agreement was signed on the tenant’s initiative and included terms for immediate pre-termination of the 
fixed term lease, repayment of outstanding rents and a compensation fee of 3500 euros payable to the 
landlord. The original rental agreement had two personal guarantors. The landlord sought enforcement 
both against the tenant and the guarantors for outstanding rents and the compensation fee. The Supreme 
Court rejected adjustment of the termination agreement for the tenant, upholding contractual freedom 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
344
The Consumer Ombudsman has successfully secured negotiated contract terms also in 
industries regulated by sector-specific regulation. The success of the soft law approach 
naturally results in less case law.9 The Consumer Ombudsman therefore prioritizes 
cases that may be generalized across industry sectors and may bring the case to the 
Market Court to obtain a precedent, even if a particular trader has changed or 
abandoned the practice.10 
The principle-based approach of the UCPD fits well with the established framework for 
Finnish consumer protection. The UCPD did not change substantive law nor the 
established practice by the Consumer Ombudsman and Market Court, but made some 
changes to the statutory text in Ch. 2.11 The UCPD requirement of extending the 
prohibition from pre-contractual marketing to unfair business practices during the 
customer-relationship was included in Ch.2:1.1. The Consumer Ombudsman had 
previously intervened on behalf of consumers under Ch. 3 CPA, when negotiating 
industry contract terms.12 The UCPD concept of honest practices in national law was 
deliberately extended to protect more than the consumer’s financial interest. In line 
with national law, consumers are also protected against commercial practices that 
offend public values and dignity.13 The Council of Ethics in Advertising14 established by 
the Finnish Chamber of Commerce also similarly applies the concept of honest 
practices, which further strengthens the effectiveness of consumer protection in 
practice.15 The principle-based approach as applied to consumer protection in Finland, 
thus effectively captures activity outside the scope of the CPA.16 
Government officials found that the principle-based approach fits well with the national 
legal tradition of consumer protection, which is based on general clauses. One 
remarked that principle-based regulation is the only way to keep legislation up-to-
date. The UCPD did not effect a great change in national legislation, with the exception 
of the inclusion of a specific black list. The Consumer Ombudsman17 found the UCPD 
central to Finnish consumer law and it has functioned predominately well. In practice 
and the binding force of contract (general contract law) between private persons. The Act on Personal 
Guarantees required the consent of the guarantor, when substantial changes were made to the rental 
agreement for the guarantee to remain in effect. Thus, the Supreme Court found that the guarantors were 
responsible for the unpaid rent under the original lease, but not party to the termination agreement, and 
thus not liable for the compensation fee of 3500 euros. The court rejected claims of adjustment and the 
reasoning emphasized that equal parties are held to their contracts (general contract law).  
9 The Market Court is a specialised court that has subject matter jurisdiction of public procurement (561/934 
in 2015), intellectual property rights (342/934 in 2015) and unfair competition law cases (19/934 in 
2015). General competition law and cases brought by the relevant authority under the Financial Services 
Act (1/934 in 2015), Electricity Market Act (7/934 in 2015), Natural Gas Market Act are also included, but 
cases are few and far between (10/934 in 2015). The Supreme Court (korkein oikeus) serves as the court 
of appeal in cases relating to consumer protection or unfair commercial practices. Two cases were brought 
and decided by the Consumer Ombudsman under the CPA Ch. 3 & 4 and none were brought or decided 
regarding unfair contract terms (CPA Ch. 2). These numbers confirm that the authority under the CPA 
effectively induces enterprises to comply with soft law mechanisms used by the Consumer Ombudsman or 
the Consumer Disputes Board. Statistics available on the Market Court website: 
http://www.markkinaoikeus.fi/fi/index/markkinaoikeus/tilastojajakasittelyajat.html 
10 Anja Peltonen, Kuluttajaoikeus – kansallista vai kansainvälistä Kuluttajansuojalain 2 ja 3 lukujen sääntely 
ja ratkaisukäytäntö, Kilpailu- ja kuluttajaviraston julkaisut 20.5.2014 at 2, available at 
http://www.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/artikkelit/peltonen_anja_kuluttajaoikeus__-
kansallista_vai_kansainvalista.pdf. Last accessed 30.11.2016. (hereinafter Peltonen 2014) 
11 HE 32/2008 at 1.1. See also Majuri (2007) at 72-75 
12 HE 32/2008 at 2.1. 
13 Recital 7 of UCPD. HE 32/2008 at 1.1 and 2.1. Peltonen (2014) at 4. 
14 Mainnonnan eettinen neuvosto. 
15 Peltonen (2014) at 4. Majaniemi at 45. 
16 Peltonen (2014) at 1 and Majuri (2007) at 73. 
17 The Consumer Ombudsman issued a public statement on the effectiveness and functioning of EU 
consumer legislation (7 Directives) with specific comments for directives 93/13/EEC, 99/44/EC, 
2005/29/EC, 98/6/EC and 2011/83/EU, KKV/857/03.03/2016, 5.9.2016 available at 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/JulkaisuMetatieto/Documents/EDK-2016-AK-69477.pdf 
(hereinafter Statement by Consumer Ombudsman). 
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problems with effectiveness relate to lack of direct sanctions for clear infringements, 
compensation for breach of marketing requirements and of the black list.18   
Consumer associations found that there were no extraordinary problems in 
implementing the principle-based approach. Preference for a minimum harmonisation 
directive was expressed, but regardless of the principle-based approach, the UCPD has 
not been considered too broad or vague in practice. Consumer associations found that 
the Finnish national approach despite high level of consumer protection aims at 
producing broad consumer legislation. Consumer rights have not been weakened by 
the UCPD. Business associations confirmed that the principle-based approach has not 
materialized as less requirements in business experience (i.e., that it has not resulted 
in a lower level of protection). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The black list as an instrument of consumer protection was novel to Finnish law. 
Sections 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 20 and 28 were already categorically considered 
unfair in the established case law of the Market Court and others would likely be 
captured by the general clause.19 The required list was implemented by ministerial 
decree.20  
Only some government officials mentioned the procedural benefit of the black list. The 
Consumer Ombudsman also mentioned the benefit of not having to perform case-
specific assessment.21 
Stakeholders across the board mainly expressed concerns with the black list. The fear 
of stagnation and loss of flexibility was expressed by government officials. There was 
also concern expressed by consumer associations and consumer authorities for the list 
sending the wrong signal to businesses, thinking that activity outside the black list 
would be legal, although there is established case law indicating that additional unfair 
commercial practices are covered under the general clause. However, business 
associations found that there could be some ‘educational value’ in concretising clearly 
unlawful practices. The concrete examples also clearly benefit consumers.  
Government officials emphasized the unsuitability of closed lists. Likewise, the list 
includes irrelevant practices. While the list could be updated, an excessively long black 
list could render the general clause redundant. All interviewees expressed a clear 
preference for the general clause, since it responds well to ever-changing, borderline 
commercial practices. The Consumer Ombudsman emphasized the practical 
importance of regulation targeting grey practices for effective enforcement, since 
there may be varying interpretations and use of the black list in different member 
states.22  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Government officials found sector-specific regulation preferable to minimum 
harmonisation. Relying solely on general regulation is unsuitable, especially for the 
financial sector. While preferring minimum to complete harmonisation, consumer 
associations had not experienced any practical benefits for consumers. Consumer 
authorities confirmed lack of practical relevance of the UCPD Ch. 2 in Finland. 
18 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 3. 
19 HE 32/2008 at 2.1. 
20 Valtioneuvoston asetus kuluttajien kannalta sopimattomasta menettelystä markkinoinnissa ja 
asiakassuhteissa 19.1. 2008/601. 
21 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 4. 
22 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 1 and 3-4. 
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 • The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The UCPD did not bring any change in this regard, since marketing was regulated in 
the CPA prior to the Directive. Government officials confirm that enforcement in the 
energy sector relies on the Electricity Market Act (sähkömarkkinalaki) and Act on 
Unfair Contract Terms (Laki kohtuuttomista kaupan ehdoista). Business associations 
had not found evidence of practical relevance.    
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The Finnish consumer legislation is based on a consumer concept that protects the 
weaker party from unfair commercial practices in marketing. In the Finnish and Nordic 
tradition the consumer is thought to be a non-professional that glances at marketing 
rather than carefully considering it as a basis for a rational decision.23 The consumer 
concept, thus, is not based on the ideal ‘homo economicus’; rather, the concept is 
influenced by behavioural economics.24 The Finnish legislator finds that the concept of 
the ‘average consumer’ in CJEU case law, which is understood to be ‘reasonably well-
informed, reasonably observant and circumspect taking into account social, cultural 
and linguistic factors’, is in line with the Finnish ‘consumer’ concept.25 National law 
continues to refer to the traditional concept of ‘consumer’ to avoid confusion.26 It was 
noted that the CJEU case law leaves room for national courts to assess the level of 
attentiveness a consumer pays in different contexts.27 The meaning of the Finnish 
‘consumer’ concept is well-established and consistently applied in interpretation of the 
CPA and sector-specific legislation.28 The Market Court has referred to the average 
consumer as a rational actor, when denying the Consumer Ombudsman’s request for 
an injunction against an advertiser of a lottery. The Market Court argued that a 
rational consumer cannot expect a guaranteed win in a lottery, if they purchase every 
day products.29  
The stakeholders across the board expressed concerns with the concept of the 
‘average consumer’. Government officials recognised that the concept refers to an 
overly optimistic image of the consumer, especially relating to the ability to digest 
information and make rational decisions. Consumer authorities and associations 
expressed preference for a concept based on behavioural economics studies that 
would more accurately reflect the way consumers make decisions. Business and 
consumer associations found that the concept is applied in practice. Several 
government officials called for clarification of the concept, as well as consistent 
application also outside the UCPD. 
The Consumer Ombudsman emphasized that emotions, intuition and distorted 
behavioural models affect all consumers’ – not only vulnerable consumers’ – decisions. 
Hence, it is not enough that model behaviour is considered for pre-contractual 
23 HE 8/1977. Supreme Court KKO 2006:6. 
24 Peltonen (2014) at 6-7. 
25 Supreme Court KKO 2011:65 adopts this approach. 
26 HE 32/2008 at 13. 
27 HE 32/2008 at 13 and Peltonen (2014) at 6-7.  
28 HE 32/2008 at 13. 
29 MAO 55/2014 at 13, 19, 24 and 33. 
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information obligations, but scientific results should apply across the board in 
legislation and application of consumer protection law.30 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
New categories of vulnerable consumers have not been included based on the UCPD. 
However, national law already recognised that a consumer can be vulnerable or weak 
in certain situations without having to make categorisations based on poverty or debt. 
A decision by the Consumer Ombudsman relates to an electricity provider 
automatically requiring a EUR 500 security deposit from all consumers that have any 
mark in the credit register (maksuhäiriömerkintä) without assessing the consumer’s 
actual ability to pay for the service.31 Finnish law recognises that contract performance 
may be adjusted based on a social obstacle to performance (sosiaalinen suorituseste).  
The stakeholders confirmed the state of the law.  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
According to government officials self/co-regulation works depending on business 
commitment. Consumer protection law could not rely solely on self-regulation. 
Government officials referred to quasi-regulation being introduced solely to avoid 
government interference. As a general note government officials noted several 
positive aspects with self/co-regulation to compliment mandatory legislation, when the 
industry is committed. The government mentioned good experiences with the Finnish 
Direct Marketing Association (Suomen Asiakkuusmarkkinointiliitto) regarding 
guidelines for tele-marketing. The established position of the Consumer Ombudsman, 
Consumer Disputes Board and the Consumer & Competition Authority create a fruitful 
climate for both co-regulation and industry self-regulation in Finland. Soft law 
mechanisms are predominately used to uphold a high level of consumer protection in 
practice.32   
All stakeholders, including consumer associations found industry self-regulation useful 
for the purposes of weeding out unfair commercial practices at grass-root level. 
Associations mentioned the Realtors Union’s Ethical Board (kiinteistövälittäjien liiton 
eettinen lautakunta) and the Board of Business Practice (Liiketapalautakunta) as 
functioning, effective and cheap enforcement. 
The Energy Authority does not work with industry in assessing contract terms, since it 
lies within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Ombudsman. Finnish Energy 
(Energiateollisuus ry) actively produces guidelines and recommendations, which the 
industry actors follow reasonably well. There are a few exceptions from time to time. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
As mentioned above, Finnish interviewees were not keen on the black list. For 
government officials the problem lies with a closed list, since speculation naturally 
30 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 3. 
31 KKV/661/14.08.01.05/2016. 
32 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 1. Majuri (2007) at 72. 
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follows regarding why some harmful behaviours are mentioned and others are not. 
Authorities suggest a systematic review of the list. Now the list includes mostly 
marketing items, and it could be considered whether business practices during the 
customer relationship should be included. The Consumer Ombudsman makes similar 
suggestions, however, shows more scepticism to the functioning of the black list as an 
enforcement tool. Special measures should be taken so as not to extend the list too 
much, and thereby endanger the practical functioning of the general clause.33  
Business associations do not express any specific concerns, however they note the 
value of introducing a systematic reviewing mechanism. Consumer associations are 
against closed lists, as they benefit neither business nor consumers. A list of examples 
of illegal practices could be useful for traders, since it increases foreseeability for 
business.  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Business associations found that Finnish consumer protection works well. Consumer 
associations found that the tools are efficient and effective, however, the lack of 
awareness of the rules is the main problem. Businesses are not aware of their 
obligations and consumers are not aware of their rights. Raising awareness of 
consumer protection continues to be a challenge. Authorities mentioned that 
collaboration between member states’ authorities is established. 
The Energy Authority reports that consumer protection is effective in the energy sector 
and there is no need for revisions. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
As a general note from all stakeholders the PID works well relating to consumer 
goods, and problems are sector-specific. Government officials express concern about 
the outdated directive and calls for prioritizing review. Finnish legislation extends the 
requirements to services, and a variety of sector-specific legislation is in force. It is 
recognised that this jungle of requirements presents a real problem for businesses in 
terms of knowing the applicable law. Business associations mentioned internet travel 
services in particular, where listed hotel or airfare prices are increased, with extra 
costs being added during confirmation or payment with a credit card. In Finland there 
are good guidelines for businesses also relating to price indication of services, 
guidelines which function well and which Finnish business comply with. Consumer 
associations mention some (small) problems with price indication of goods in smaller 
stores. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The Ministry of Employment and Trade notes that review of the national regulation 
was discussed in 2014. The stakeholders could not reach consensus on the need for 
33 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 4. 
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review of existing rules. It was concluded that the relevant authorities could not issue 
guidelines. Businesses were however allowed to introduce additional information for 
the purposes of performance comparison relating to number of washloads, as long as 
the information required by the national regulation was met (price per kg or per 
litre).34 
The positions have not changed. Consumer authorities find that it is possible to include 
additional information, as long as it is comparable. Consumer associations agree, 
however they raise the concern of confusing consumers with too many markings, 
which in turn leads to consumers ignoring the markings. Consumer associations 
emphasized that the problem is not the lack of clear rules, but rather that businesses 
are not following them. Business associations took the opposite view. It may be true 
that a clear comparable indicator may be hard to find, but the current situation is 
unnecessarily complicated from the business perspective.  
The Consumer Ombudsman agrees that the existing requirements on the EU-level 
(stemming from different directives) make supervision and compliance difficult. The 
rules apply depending on the marketed product, type of sale and priority of rules. The 
rules can be randomly targeting or have huge gaps. The existing rules are completely 
non-functioning as a whole and should be revised with great priority. There should be 
a simple and business-neutral standard for price indication.35  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Finland has not enacted specific rules that apply to SMEs.36 The Consumer 
Ombudsman specifically advocated against introducing special rules according to 
business size.37 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD was implemented through the Unfair Commercial Practices Act. The rules 
on comparative advertising were removed from the CPA and the jurisdiction of the 
Consumer Ombudsman. Instead, traders affected by comparative advertising can 
bring suit directly against another trader in the Market Court.38 This development was 
welcome since traders are more likely affected by comparative advertising than 
consumers. The Unfair Commercial Practices Act operates primarily on its general 
clause that prohibits activity ‘against good commercial practice’. Thus, redress is not 
limited to advertising or marketing, or the scope of the MCAD.39   
Business associations did not report problems with effectiveness that should be 
addressed. 
34 TEM Muistio 22.10.2016 Pesuaineiden hinnan ilmoittaminen markkinoinnissa. 
35 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 4. 
36 Commission Communication on implementation of the Price Indication Directive 1998/6/EC, COM(2006) 
325 final at 9. 
37 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 4. 
38 HE 32/2008 at 14. 
39 HE 32/2008 at 15. 
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 • The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Business associations did not report problems with effectiveness that should be 
addressed.  
 
•  The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The concept of ‘against good commercial practices’ is constantly developed in the case 
law of the Market Court, and non-binding recommendations by the Commercial 
Practice Board, The Council of Ethics in Commercial Advertising, and the Consumer 
Disputes Board. Business associations had not discovered problems with effectiveness 
that should be addressed. 
 
•  The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Business associations found the rules to be functioning well. 
 
•  Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Business associations found the rules to be functioning well. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Business associations did not mention proposals for measures. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Business associations did not have concrete evidence to offer. On a general level, it 
would seem that harmonisation would remove problems relating to disparities. 
However, since businesses are also subject to different national regulation, Finnish 
businesses (that comply with national law) are at a disadvantage, because consumer 
protection is higher in Finland. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
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No specific experience reported. The Consumer Ombudsman points to divergent 
interpretations and legal uncertainty in Member States as the most harmful effect of 
black lists.40 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experience reported. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experience reported. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experience reported. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
Business associations did not have experience of comparative advertising between 
companies active in different Member States. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The mechanism for cross-border complaints has been in place for 20 years, which 
means that there is no need for a new mechanism. Business associations recall 
approximately 3 cases with Finnish business, of which 2 are relatively recent. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The Finnish legislator did not complement information requirements or set language 
requirements. It was clear that the Consumer Ombudsman already possessed means 
through Ch. 3 CPA to intercede against unfair commercial practices before and during 
40 Statement of the Consumer Ombudsman at 1. 
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the customer relationship. No requirement of sending a confirmation was 
implemented, since it was considered to actually weaken the position of the consumer 
in telemarketing. Instead, the Consumer Ombudsman would intensify enforcement in 
telemarketing.41 
Government officials found that traders are reasonably aware of information 
requirements relating to advertising. Business associations did not find problems with 
traders in Finland. Consumer associations reported lack of awareness based on their 
experience. Small business’ problems with compliance relate to lack of resources. The 
Energy Authority could not assess awareness of the EU Directive. Established traders 
are well aware of the functionally similar provision in the Electricity Market Act. 
Traders are primarily aware of and implement the sector-specific requirements, which 
mirror those of the UCPD.   
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
There should be special consideration of overlaps between directives in the upcoming 
review. There is significant overlap between the Services Directive and the E-
Commerce Directive for more than advertising requirements. 
Business associations reported that overlaps and conflicting requirements are harmful. 
Likewise, the benefits of consumer protection are lost when information requirements 
are too specific, because the consumer cannot or will not bother digesting all the given 
information. Businesses nonetheless face the extra cost. This is a particular problem 
for Finnish businesses that meticulously investigate and comply with all rules to be on 
the safe-side. This cost is reflected in consumer prices. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The Finnish system is based on a strong divide between consumer protection law and 
general contract law. In theory and in practice B2B relationships are considered equal. 
The exception of adjusting contracts in B2B relationships is rarely invoked and seldom 
applied. An extension of the UCPD to B2B relationships is not necessary, since the 
leading concept of honest commercial practices is already significantly aligned, 
regardless of the divide between B2C and B2B relationships. The change would have 
fundamental negative consequences for the coherence of Finnish contract law without 
any foreseeable necessity or obvious benefit for cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Business associations were in favour of keeping separate regimes. Consumer 
protection laws protect the weaker party, while the freedom of contract should reign 
supreme in B2B transactions. Complicating B2B transactions with more regulation 
would not yield positive results. There is already enough regulation (SopMenL, 
41 HE 157/2013 at 3.2.1. 
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OikToimL and Kilpailulaki), but scarce case law. Contracts are rarely adjusted based 
on unreasonableness in practice. This is an indicator of a functioning market. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Business associations reported that there are no problems with existing regulation. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Business associations reported that there are no problems with existing regulation. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
If at all appropriate, it could at most include information exchange between the 
relevant authorities in different Member States.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Business associations reported that there are no problems with existing regulation. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
Business associations reported that there are no problems with existing regulation. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Government officials reported that there are strict consequences for breach of 
information requirements in Insurance Contracts Law (vakuutussopimuslaki). 
Consumer authorities noted that there are no such consequences in the existing CPA, 
but it would be advisable to consider contractual consequences at EU level. Business 
associations reported that there is no need for contractual consequences. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Contractual consequences are not available under the CPA. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
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The Consumer Ombudsman calls for contractual consequences and a right to 
compensation.42 Business associations reported that there is no need for contractual 
consequences. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach has worked well in Finland according to government 
officials, since it has not caused conflict with the general principles of contract law nor 
the general principles of Finnish law. The flexible approach is welcomed, and should 
remain so in the future as well. Consumer associations do not find that the UCTD 
reflects principle-based regulation, most likely because it could be considered less 
principle-based than Finnish law. 
The Consumer Ombudsman found that the Directive has worked well, and should 
favour a principle-based approach in the future as well. The general clauses should 
apply to all types of consumer contracts equally. Industry-based regulation on unfair 
contract terms should not be allowed. The statement should be read in the Finnish 
context of the Consumer Ombudsman’s essential insight in representing consumers’ 
rights under CPA Chapter 3. Industry self-regulation is not ideal in assessing 
unfairness of terms from the perspective of consumers. However, regulation should 
leave room for industry-specific (co/self) regulation of contract terms, meaning that it 
is most efficient if the industry produces standard contract terms. EU regulation should 
continue to allow national discretion to align consumer protection with existing 
principles of contract law and general principles of law to maintain consistency in 
application.43 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
Government officials remarked that a list of unfair contract terms is not the most 
transparent way to address a layman audience. Consumer associations found that 
established case law on the matter renders the list redundant.  
The Consumer Ombudsman favours a principle-based approach together with an 
indicative list of unfair terms as most effective in practice. The list could be 
supplemented based on CJEU case law.44  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
42 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 3. 
43 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 2. 
44 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 2. 
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Black or grey lists (understood as presumptively illegal terms that can be rebutted)45 
do not exist in Finnish legislation. Government officials mentioned that clearly illegal 
behaviour and established case law to the same effect is often mentioned in 
preparatory works, which is a highly regarded source of law in Finland.46 Grey lists are 
not customary in contract law due to the preference for general clauses, soft law 
mechanisms and industry self/co-regulation with the Consumer Ombudsman over in 
casu-fact finding. From the Finnish point of view, regulatory lists increase litigation 
since they raise the question of whether specific conduct (question of fact) falls within 
or outside the behaviour listed. The Finnish system allows the Consumer Ombudsman 
to assess new commercial behaviour (CPA Ch. 2) or contract terms (CPA Ch. 3) in 
light of established interpretation of statutory text in preparatory works, case law and 
doctrine (question of law).  
As mentioned before, the Finnish stakeholders as a rule are not keen on lists. The 
stakeholders also expressed hope that industry-specific lists would not be allowed, nor 
that there would be industry-specific exceptions. The Consumer Ombudsman stated a 
preference against black lists, despite the positive effect of increased legal certainty. 
The lack of flexibility, as well as increased in casu-review of whether a term falls 
within the black list or not, effectively drains resources from more effective consumer 
protection. If the emphasis on black lists is increased there is a risk of less effective 
enforcement against new or borderline practices and an increased threshold for use of 
the general clause (if need to prioritize cases due to limited resources).47 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
By law the decisions brought to the Market Court by the Consumer Ombudsman have, 
if applicable, a collective effect. Consumer authorities report that all cases in which the 
Consumer Ombudsman actions (request, decision, preliminary injunction) have a 
collective effect in practice. Business associations confirm the practical effect of highly-
publicized cases (once appeals are exhausted), like a recent case relating to whether a 
company providing a basic service can bill the consumer for paper invoices.48 The 
Consumer Ombudsman’s dual role of supervisor of industry-specific contract terms, 
and sanctioning authority, enhances the collective effect. 
In practice, many consumer cases are effectively addressed in the Consumer Disputes 
Board (kuluttajariitalautakunta), although it, when appropriate, issues non-binding 
recommendations to traders to compensate the consumer. Many cases relate to 
compensation for travel services. The Consumer Authority publishes a black list for 
traders that do not follow the recommendation of the Consumer Disputes Board. 
45 An indicative list in Finland is coupled with a general clause, which captures borderline behaviour. A ‘grey’ 
list without a general clause would decrease discretion of the Consumer Ombudsman to interpret law, and 
increase litigation-like processing against the Consumer Ombudsman. At present, the Consumer 
Ombudsman interferes with unfair contract terms either in pre-negotiations (before use in consumer 
contracts) or by query to the business (if notified by consumer complaint of term). Most business change 
terms when notified, since the Consumer Ombudsman has the power to bring the case to the Market 
Court and in fear of media exposure for decisions relating to use of unfair contract terms. 
46 HE 32/2008 vp lists examples of unfair commercial practices in advertising to children at 13. 
47 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 2. 
48 Kotimaan Energia, KKV/509/14/14.08.01.05/2016, 23.8.2016. This case seeks clarification to KKO 
2016:49. 
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 • The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
According to government officials the transparency requirement is necessary, and 
applied in practice. Sometimes it is applied in conjunction with other rules, or stands 
alone as a basis for a decision. Cases are intermittent. The transparency requirement 
was also included in the recent Information Society Code.49 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Yes, consumer protection is enhanced. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Previously, individual consumers have had the right to raise this argument, and courts 
have generally not done so. A recent Supreme Court50 case has placed an obligation 
on authorities to raise the argument ex officio. The consumer authority reports that 
the effect remains to be seen in practice. Consumer associations note that these types 
of cases are very rarely taken to court. Business associations confirm that the 
consumer must raise the argument. However, all stakeholders agree that the services 
of the Consumer Ombudsman and the Consumer Disputes Board constitute the 
primary avenue to protect the interests of consumers. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Consumer authorities recognize that there is need for improvement. The problem, 
especially acute in digital contracts, remains that consumers do not read contracts. 
Business associations confirm that graphical presentation can help at times in the 
digital environment. However, graphical presentations can be interpreted differently, 
which does not address the underlying problem (focus the consumer’s attention to 
relevant terms at the right time, i.e. at the conclusion of contract). Consumer 
associations do not see added value in a fixed graphical or other presentation model. 
Instead, national discretion to develop suitable models should be preferred. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
49 HE 67/2016. Tietoyhteiskuntakaari 7.11.2014/917. 
50 KKO 2015:60 and KKO 2015:76 (District Ct. should have dismissed the case ex officio). 
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• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
Business associations did not report disparities. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Business associations found it possible that lists would create obstacles to cross-
border trade. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No assessment available. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Business associations did not report such a need. The Consumer Ombudsman has 
stated a strong preference against making distinctions based on the size of business.51 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Business associations did not state a preference here, but as mentioned above it is 
clear from the context of the interview that the separate regimes are preferred.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Business associations preferred a flexible approach, since one-size does not fit all. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Business associations preferred a flexible approach, since one-size does not fit all. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
51 Statement by Consumer Ombudsman at 1. 
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Business associations did not report such a need. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Business associations preferred a flexible approach, since one-size does not fit all. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Business associations did not assess effects. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Business associations did not evaluate benefits and consequences. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?52  
 
Finnish consumer law based on the Nordic tradition has its origins in the Consumer 
Protection Act (hereinafter CPA)53 from 1978. Compliance with the CPA is primarily 
supervised and enforced by the Consumer Ombudsman (kuluttaja-asiamies), 
Consumer Disputes Board (kuluttajariitalautakunta) and the Competition and 
Consumer Authority (Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto). The CPA is built on general clauses 
regulating unfair commercial practices in Ch. 2 and unfair contract terms in Ch. 3. The 
Consumer Ombudsman’s dual authority to negotiate industry contract terms and issue 
preliminary injunctions and bring cases to the Market Court (markkinaoikeus) on 
behalf of consumers suffering from a trader’s unfair commercial practices has secured 
a high level of consumer protection in practice.54  
Only courts may issue injunctions under the Finnish Code of Civil Procedure. The 
Consumer Ombudsman may issue a preliminary injunction against an enterprise that 
violates the CPA. The Consumer Ombudsman also may bring suit in Market Court on 
behalf of consumers. The Market Court has sole jurisdiction on issuing final injunctions 
and payment of fines for violation of the injunction. Businesses may violate the CPA, 
but generally discontinue use of contested terms or practices when notified. The 
Consumer Ombudsman may not seek other sanctions on behalf of consumers 
(damages). Punitive damages are not available under Finnish law.55  
52  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
53 Kuluttajansuojalaki 20.1.1978/38. 
54 Tuomas Majuri, Finland-Legislative Techniques at 73 in University Bielefeld / European Commission, 2007, 
EC Consumer Law Compendium - Comparative Analysis http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/ 
safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf (Hereinafter Majuri 2007) 
55 Recently Nokia Tyres was caught having consistently cheated in tyre tests, where the tested tyres did not 
equal those sold. Tyres were naturally sold to both businesses and private persons. A law firm advertised 
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The availability of injunctions is generally regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure and 
tailored in sector-specific legislation. Finnish consumer protection is built on soft law 
instruments, voluntary compliance and cases rarely go to court. The Consumer 
Disputes Board handles the bulk of consumer complaints and effectively induces 
businesses to comply with non-binding rulings favouring compensation. The 
Competition and Consumer Authority publishes a black list of traders that have not 
complied with the Consumer Disputes Board’s recommendation. 
The strong protection of consumers in Finland is embedded in the legal culture. Small 
claims may be subject to summary procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure and 
judgment may issue, even if the consumer does not respond to the claim 
(yksipuolinen tuomio). Recently the Supreme Court held that a judge must ex officio 
raise the issue to protect a consumer by denying relief, when enforcement of an 
excessive claim is sought.56   
 
Government officials reported that the ID did not change the law in Finland. 
Injunctions were available long before the ID was introduced. The cross-border 
injunctions procedure has not been applied one way or the other. Government officials 
estimate the reason to be that the procedure is burdensome in relation to the harm to 
the consumer. Consumer harm rarely reaches that threshold. The desired result can 
easily be achieved through cross-border cooperation between authorities (Reg. 
2006/2004). This conclusion is in line with the earlier findings of the Commission.57 
Consumer associations reported that ID did not affect their operations at all in 
practice. The Energy Authority confirms that the procedure is not applied in the energy 
sector. Under national law the Energy Authority may seek sanctions in the Market 
Court. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The Consumer Ombudsman may issue injunctions relating to all offering, selling and 
marketing of consumer goods, services or other benefits under the CPA and special 
sector-specific legislation, where the Ombudsman has sole or shared jurisdiction. In 
issues relating to financial services or marketing of securities the Ombudsman must 
hear the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority before issuing a final or temporary 
injunction.58 The relevant court (Market Court or District Courts) may issue 
for buyers to contact them in order to pursue negotiations for compensation collectively. While a law suit 
is technically possible (joint complaint) relief is limited to actual damages. There is little incentive to 
settle the case, for consumers to carry litigation costs, or for the law firms to continue representation. 
The parties have not reached settlement. 
56 KKO 2015:60. 
57 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Concerning the application of Directive 
2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interest, COM (2012)635 final at 3.  
58 Sections 10 and 11 Act on the Competition and Consumer Authority 30.11.2012/661; final injunction in 
uncontested matters on clear points of law (Section 10.2). 
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preliminary or permanent injunctions under Chapter 7 Section 3 Code of Judicial 
Procedure (1.1.1734/4). 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. There is a preference 
for cooperation between qualified entities in Finland and in the other EU country, 
where each qualified entity brings an injunction action in its own jurisdiction. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. There is a preference 
for cooperation between qualified entities in Finland and in the other EU country, 
where each qualified entity brings an injunction action in its own jurisdiction. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. There is a preference 
for cooperation between qualified entities in Finland and in the other EU country, 
where each qualified entity brings an injunction action in its own jurisdiction. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
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regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The availability of injunctions is generally regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure and 
tailored in sector-specific legislation. Finnish consumer protection is built on soft law 
instruments, voluntary compliance and cases rarely go to court. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Not applicable to Finland. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
Consumer authorities reported that consumers benefit from lower prices due to 
increased legal certainty. They emphasized that protection of the weaker party should 
never be reduced to a question of cost. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Consumer authorities predicted benefits to traders from clear rules relating to e.g. 
liability for defective products (virhevastuu). Increased legal certainty reduces costs to 
traders. Business associations reported that existing consumer protection laws are 
necessary and benefit traders one way or the other. Consumer associations reported 
that consumer protection benefits honest traders. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Business associations reported that there are always compliance costs. Consumer 
associations rejected the notion that costs for running a lawful business would be 
considered a cost for traders. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above (Finnish authorities do 
not view protection of the weaker party as a cost, but as a government obligation). 
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• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
Business associations reported that national supplementary regulation is not cost-
effective. Implementation of harmonised provisions is not problematic, but for 
instance opening up the honest practices clause59, which has not been applied in 
practice. Consumer associations reported that there are no indications of 
implementation that is not cost-effective. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
Consumer associations did not find the question relevant for Finland. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
According to the Energy Authority it is not likely that consumers nor businesses relate 
requirements of consumer protection especially to a named directive, since 
implementation has coincided with reform of national regulation. According to a 
government official, businesses, especially established actors, are well aware of the 
requirements of the Electricity Market Act in the energy sector. New businesses, 
especially foreign enterprises are less aware of the requirements. Most unfair practices 
in the energy sector relate to tele-marketing and consumers’ awareness of the 
requirements of the Electricity Market Act is relatively weak.  
Consumer awareness is on the rise through some recent highly publicized case 
involving Caruna Ltd., the owner of electricity transmission network in Finland. After 
purchasing the network from the government in 2014, Caruna informed their clients of 
a rise in the basic electricity transmission fee by 22-27%. Caruna claimed raised costs 
due to necessary investments in the network. The Consumer Ombudsman intervened 
and reached a settlement with Caruna, to reduce the raise by 25 % in 2016, refrain 
from raises in 2017, and keep future raises within 10-15% stretched over a longer 
period of time, and calculated on the consumer’s earlier fee, including VAT.60 Suur-
Savon Sähkö’s practice of automatically requiring a 500 euro deposit prior to entering 
to a contract with a person that has any mark in the credit register was unreasonable, 
since they provided a basic utility service.61 
Consumer financial services are regulated separately in the CPA. The Consumer 
Ombudsman frequently uses the power to negotiate industry contract terms for 
consumer services in the financial sector under Ch. 3 CPA.62 Traders are generally 
59 Likely referring to maintaining claims, when the consumer’s financial interest is not affected. 
60 Caruna Oy, KKV/207/14.08.01.05/2016, 18.2.2016. 
61 Suur-Savon Sähkö Oy KKV&661/14.08.01.05/2016, 15.9.2016. 
62 Peltonen at 13. 
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aware of their obligations under law and consumer rights. Consumers are likely 
unaware of their rights. Standards contracts relating to passenger transports and 
package deals are supervised by the Consumer Ombudsman. The Consumer Disputes 
Board provides a form for consumer complaints, which consumers frequently use to 
claim compensation.63  
The Consumer Ombudsman has also targeted traders in different sectors that do not 
offer paper bills or a free non-digital means to acquire billing information. One case 
involving a mobile phone company was reversed by the Supreme Court, since the 
company offered the billing information via text message for free.64 Another case is 
set for court involving an energy company that charges a fee for paper bills.65 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The Consumer Ombudsman has general jurisdiction relating to all consumer protection 
issues, and coordinates consumer protection with sector-specific authorities or 
regional /municipal authorities. For example, the Consumer Ombudsman and Finnish 
Transport Safety Agency Trafi share supervising duties relating to passenger 
transports. The Consumer Ombudsman shares jurisdiction with Finnish Financial 
Authority (Finanssivalvonta), which in practice shifts consumer matters to the 
Consumer Ombudsman. The Energy Authority shares jurisdiction with the Consumer 
Ombudsman, however, they approach regulation from different perspectives. The 
Consumer Ombudsman is responsible for supervision of the CPA. There is no formal or 
systematic cooperation between the public authorities, but there is a framework for 
executive assistance and cooperation. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Consumer authorities reported that the legal framework is neither clear nor coherent 
at present. One problem relates to sector-specific rules surpassing and complementing 
the horizontal consumer provisions (instead of falling within the general framework). 
Particular problems relate to the general marketing rules and information 
requirements. It was advanced that reasonableness regulation should be placed in 
horizontal regulation and sector-specific regulation should only serve to specify 
horizontal regulation. 
The Energy Authority did not report inconsistencies. There is overlap between the CPA 
and the Electricity Market Act, with the latter providing more specific rules.  
  
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
63 Forms are available in Finnish and Swedish. Instructions to fill in the form in English. 
http://kuluttajariita.fi/fi/index/valituksenteko/valituslomakkeet.html 
64 KKO 2016:49. 
65 Kotimaan Energia, KKV/509/14/14.08.01.05/2016, 23.8.2016. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
364
See above. Consumer authorities stated that the broad jurisdiction of consumer 
authorities in Finland simplifies supervision and creates synergies in the regulated 
sectors. As a rule the costs are higher the more scattered regulation and supervision 
duties are.66 
The Energy Authority mainly implements the Electricity Market Act. The Consumer 
Authorities may apply the CPA simultaneously with the Electricity Market Act. If there 
are benefits from the overlaps they would fall within the Consumer Authorities 
purview. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Government officials requested more cooperation and communication between DG 
working groups in charge of different regulation. Sometimes it seems that essential 
expertise is lacking on cross-cutting or inter-sectional issues. Consumer authorities 
expressed a strong preference for clarification.  
The Energy Authority was satisfied with the current framework, since the Electricity 
Market Act serves its purpose. There is no need to extend EU-level regulation. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Government officials noted that there may be isolated incidents, which could be 
reviewed. Yet, it is a marginal issue. Consumer authorities indicated that review could 
be timely, since the traditional role of the consumer is currently changing. Business 
associations expressed a need for review, if it is professional activity. Application has 
not been necessary in isolated incidents in the past. If regulation is reviewed or 
developed in this regard it should take the form of guidelines. Consumer associations 
did not find a need for development in this regard, since national legislation (Sale of 
Goods Act) provides rules for this eventuality. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Government officials referred to answers above that the regulators’ view of the 
consumer is too optimistic. Consumer authorities also advocated for a move away 
from an ideal consumer towards a more realistic view of consumer behaviour. The 
concepts should also be consistent in content and application across sectors. According 
to consumer associations the concept of vulnerable consumers is too broad, and does 
not account for differences between e.g. children, the elderly and the visually 
impaired. 
66 Majuri (2007) at 75. 
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In the energy sector the national concept of ‘consumer’ is consistently applied. The 
concepts of ‘average consumer’ or ‘vulnerable consumer’ are not applied in the context 
of the Electricity Market Act. It should be noted that the Consumer Ombudsman has 
joint jurisdiction with the Energy Authority to apply the CPA and Electricity Market Act 
in the energy sector. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Business associations reported that there is no evidence that existing rules would not 
offer adequate protection. Consumer associations reported that existing rules do not 
offer adequate protection. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Government officials found that the directives did not improve the situation in Finland, 
but clarified some issues. Consumer authorities agreed that the black list has codified 
some issues that were previously relying on general clause (and case law). As a whole 
there was nothing new, since consumer protection was high in Finland. Business 
associations confirm that not much effect can be seen, since consumer protection is 
high in Finland. Consumer associations report added value. 
The Energy Authority attributed the added value to the Electricity Market Directive, 
although recognized that there is likely overlap between the directives. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Consumer authorities are very critical of the ‘regulatory jungle’ relating to price 
indication. Overlaps and wide gaps (esp. services) render the regulation unworkable in 
practice. Business associations see some benefits, but report added 
misunderstandings and confusion among traders. Consumer associations report that 
the implementation of PID has weakened the position of consumers in practice. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
There is a steady stream of cases to the Market Court relating to comparative 
advertising, where affected traders can seek direct redress based on general harm to 
consumers.67 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
67 KKO 2011:88 where Unilever, Valio’s primary competitor, was not specifically mentioned in comparative 
advertising, but could seek an injunction. 
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Government officials report that there is no evidence of a change and that the role of 
regulation is exaggerated in this regard. Consumer authorities share the view that 
differences in consumer protection is exaggerated. Differences in consumer protection 
levels is rarely the most significant issue affecting traders’ willingness or ability to 
trade in Finland. 
Business associations did not find it difficult to find information about consumer 
protection requirements in different member states. However, understanding the 
differences in culture and implementation require the most resources to master. These 
differences present an obstacle to many traders. Consumer associations on the other 
hand found that it is unlikely that the main differences would be removed by 
regulation. They found the language and culture the biggest obstacle to trade in 
Finland, not legislation.  
As a clarification it could be added that the size of the potential market in relation to 
e.g. language costs are essential non-regulatory factors affecting traders’ willingness 
to trade in Finland. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
Business associations reported that guidelines may be somewhat helpful. The Energy 
Authority reported that the high level of consumer protection in the energy sector is 
unlikely a result of these directives. However, there are no significant problems or 
conflicts to note. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – FINLAND 
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Laki kuluttajansuojalain 
muuttamisesta / Lag om 
ändring av 
konsumentskyddslagen 
(1211/2013) 30/12/2013  
Virallinen julkaisu: 
Suomen Saadoskokoelma 
(SK); Virallisen lehden 
numero: 1211/2013; 
Julkaisupäivämäärä: 2013-
12-31 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
No Kuluttajansuojalaki 2 ja 3 
luku 
 
  'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
No   
Sähkömarkkinalaki 
9.8.2013/588  
Changing of 
contract terms 
allowed in 
special 
circumstances
93 § 
Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
Yes Yes, national law has 
broadened the scope of 
the unfairness assessment 
to individually negotiated 
contractual terms 
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  Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
Yes Yes, national law has 
broadened the scope of 
the unfairness assessment 
to the adequacy of the 
price or remuneration. 
 
Laki sähkömarkkinalain 88 
§:n muuttamisesta / Lag 
om ändring av 88 § i 
elmarknadslagen 
(1212/2013) 30/12/2013  
Virallinen julkaisu: 
Suomen Saadoskokoelma 
(SK); Virallisen lehden 
numero: 1212/2013; 
Julkaisupäivämäärä: 2013-
12-31 
 Confirmation requirement not adopted, except 
in energy contracts. 
Yes and No HE 157/2013 at 3.2.1. 
Sähkömarkkinalaki 88 § 
 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
30.12.2013/1211   Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
No Kuluttajansuojalaki 2 luku 
ja Laki sopimattomasta 
menettelystä 
elinkeinotoiminnassa 2 
luku. 
 
27.8.2010/746  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
29.8.2008/561  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No   
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Asetus kulutushyödykkeen 
hinnan ilmoittamisesta 
markkinoinnissa, 
30.12.1999/1359 repealed 
 Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
No Kuluttajansuojalaki 2 luku. 
Regulation on Price 
Indications in Marketing of 
Consumer Goods has been 
repealed and replaced by 
Valtioneuvoston asetus 
kulutushyödykkeen hinnan 
ilmoittamisesta 
markkinoinnissa 
553/2013. 
 
Valtioneuvoston asetus 
kulutushyödykkeen hinnan 
ilmoittamisesta 
markkinoinnissa 
553/2013. 
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations No   
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Laki sopimattomasta 
menettelystä 
Lelinkeinotoiminnassa 
(1978/1061)  
muuttamisesta 
29.8.2008/562 
     
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Laki rajat ylittävästä 
kieltomenettelystä 
21.12.2000/1189 1  
     
Laki kuluttajansuojalain 
muuttamisesta 
27.8.2010/746 
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Laki muussa kuin 
viranomaisessa 
tapahtuvassa 
kuluttajariitojen 
ratkaisemisesta 
30.12.2015/1696 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – FINLAND  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your country 
separately (as a separate procedure or/and in a separate 
legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive or/and by the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
The ID did not change the law in 
Finland, since injunctions were 
already available under the CPA 
and sector-specific legislation 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction? - Designated 
public bodies 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure  
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   
of some/all cost related to the procedure please explain 
the characteristic of such exemption in the comments 
column. 
-The qualified 
entities are 
exempted from 
costs  
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to 
cover areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex I 
of the Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
consumer law in 
general 
 
 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the 
comments column regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
- No But the Consumer Ombudsman 
can bring parallel cases 
simultaneously. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the 
injunction procedures? (not including the consultation 
stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
 
The Consumer Ombudsman can 
issue decisions and preliminary 
injunctions. 
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
It was considered to slow down 
the process to include a 
requirement of consultation. 
Consultations are encouraged. 
Does the national legislation provide for measures 
ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
- Yes 
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Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the 
injunction order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should 
they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day 
of non-
compliance 
 
 
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective statement? 
- Yes All decisions are published on 
the websites of the Competition 
& Consumer Authority 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure for 
sanctions for the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a 
result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified 
entity or the public purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
Established traders comply. 
Many times cases are brought 
against companies that are out 
of business or unreachable for 
enforcement, which renders the 
question moot in practice. 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond 
the injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders extended 
to the future infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- Yes 
 
Injunction on pain of fine 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2016 
Decisions 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
26 cases 0 %  11 % 7% 82 % 100 % 
All cases are 
based on 
national 
legislation 
2015 
Decisions 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
21 cases 5 % 0% 14% 81% 100% 
All cases are 
based on 
national 
legislation 
2014 
Decisions 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
19 cases 0 % 16% 11% 73% 100% 
All cases are 
based on 
national 
legislation 
2012-
2016 
Injunctions 
by 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
8 cases 0% 0% 25% 75% 100% 
All cases are 
based on 
national 
legislation 
2013-
2016 
Consumer 
cases in 
Market 
Court 
17 cases 0 % 47% 5 % 48% 100% 
All cases are 
based on 
national 
legislation 
Note: Since the directives are implemented in the Consumer Protection Act, it is not possible to acquire the requested 
statistics. Many cases are also simultaneously advancing several claims. Most directives did not affect a change in 
existing national law. The case has been marked as generally falling within the theme of the directive, although it may 
not have actually applied a provision stemming from the directive. Cases from the Consumer Disputes Board have been 
omitted, since they tend to concern compensation for defective products/services, which is not within the scope of this 
study. The Board does not assess commercial practices, which is within the jurisdiction of the Consumer Ombudsman.  
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).68  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
Civil case 
District court 
EUR 500 + 
Appeals court 
EUR 500 
EUR 2000 – 
3000 unlikely to 
qualify for legal 
aid 
Witnesses, 
travel cost to 
hearing, loser 
pays rule on 
attorney fees 
Preparation 
time not 
possible to  
assess, likely 
requiring a 
lawyer. 
Court 
procedure & 
decision: 
6 months  to 
1 year 
Time estimates 
are difficult 
since civil cases 
are usually 
complicated. 
This case would 
not go to D. Ct. 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
Consumer 
Disputes Board 
(defect in 
service or good)  
EUR 0 
EUR 0 
There is a 2-
page form 
designed for 
travel 
complaints 
available on the 
website. Lawyer 
not required. 
Written 
procedure 
Preparation 
time  1 day 
Decision in 2 - 
3 months 
 
Notes: The unfairness of standard contract terms is raised ex officio, or via a complaint to the Consumer Ombudsman, 
who decides whether to pursue the case on behalf of consumers against the trader (request, negotiations, decision, 
preliminary injunction, Market Court).  
 
68 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Rarely, if ever, since the Consumer Ombudsman pre-negotiates standard contract 
terms with industry. The Consumer Ombudsman has made 6 decisions relating to 
unfair contract terms; vagueness of term (1), consumer carry repair costs of trade-in-
phone (1); changing terms (1); requirement of security deposit (1) and payment for 
paper bills (2). One was appealed to the Market Court (MAO 170/03), and one 
reversed by the Supreme Court (KKO 2016:49). 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Finland Chamber of Commerce Business association 7.9.2016 
Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services 
Business association 5.9.2016 
Competition and Consumer Authority National consumer enforcement 
authority 
6.9.2016 
Energy Authority National regulatory authority 7.9.2016 
Financial Supervisory Authority National regulatory authority 10.8.2016 
Ministry of Justice Ministry 5.9.2016 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment 
Ministry 23.10.2016 
ECC Finland European Consumer Centre 26.8.2016 
Finnish Consumer Association Consumer organisation 6.9.2016 
Consumer Ombudsman Consumer Authority Public statement issued on 
5.9.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
COM (2006) 325 
final 
2006 Communication of the Commission on the implementation of the Price 
Indication Directive 1998/6/EC. 
COM (2008) 756 
final 
2008 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 
98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for 
the protection of consumers' interest 
COM (2012)635 
final 
2012 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interest 
HE 32/2008 vp 2008 Ehdotus  hallituksen  esitykseksi  Eduskunnalle  laiksi   
kuluttajansuojalain 2 luvun muuttamisesta ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi 
HE 157/2013 vp 2013 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laeiksi kuluttajansuojalain ja 
sähkömarkkinalain 88 §:n muuttamisesta 
HE 67/2016 vp 2016 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laeiksi tietoyhteiskuntakaaren 
muuttamisesta ja väliaikaisesta muuttamisesta sekä eräitä tuoteryhmiä 
koskevista ilmoitetuista laitoksista annetun lain muuttamisesta 
KKV/857/03.03/2
016 
2016 EU:n kuluttajalainsäädännön toimivuutta koskeva julkinen kuuleminen, 
5.9.2016. 
Tuorila, Helena- 
Määttä, Kalle – 
Peltonen, Anja 
2016 Kuluttajahuijaukset, Kilpailu- ja kuluttajaviraston selvityksiä 1/2016. 
http://www.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/selvitykset/2016/kkv-
selvityksia-1-2016-kuluttajahuijaukset.pdf 
 
Majaniemi, Sirpa 2007 Kuluttajamarkkinoinnin käsikirja 
Majuri, Tuomas 2007 Finland- Legislative Techniques in University Bielefeld / European 
Commission, 2007, EC Consumer Law Compendium - Comparative Analysis 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/comp_a
nalysis_en.pdf 
Peltonen, Anja 2014 Kuluttajaoikeus- kansallista vai kansainvälistä Kuluttajansuojalian 2 ja 3 
lukujen sääntely ja ratkaisukäytäntö, Kilpailu- ja kuluttajaviraston julkaisut, 
20.5.2014. http://www.kkv.fi/ratkaisut-ja-julkaisut/julkaisut/artikkelit/ 
 
TEM/TMO/KTL/Sa
ri Alho 
2016 Muistio pesuaineiden hinnan ilmoittamisesta markkinoinnissa, 22.10.2016. 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report FRANCE  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Stakeholders stress the benefits of a well-balanced, ‘future-proof’ and flexible general 
clause but also point at the legal uncertainty it causes. The UCPD does not contain any 
positive obligations. General clauses are at odds with French legal tradition since they 
leave much room for the judiciary to appreciate the circumstances of the case in view 
of their broadly worded definitions and, by doing so, to interpret the clauses at the 
expense of the legislator.1 What is more, general clauses do not sit well with a judicial 
system which is known for the length and the complexity of its procedures. As a 
matter of fact, there are many contradictory decisions at all levels of the judiciary. A 
decision of a Court of Appeal deeming a radio advertisement misleading has recently 
been overturned by the Cour de Cassation for not having taken the ‘limitations of the 
communication medium’ into account.2 
Consumer associations are rather negative about the effectiveness of the open-
textured clauses of the Directive in combination with the maximum harmonisation 
clause, which does not allow for specific bans on commercial practices other than the 
ones on the black list.3  
The general nature of the clauses has no deterrent effect and makes actions by 
enforcement bodies less convincing: the openness of the clauses encourages traders 
to enter time-consuming discussions on the fairness of a practice and the outcome of 
the action is highly uncertain given the level of legal uncertainty. This discourages 
enforcement bodies from taking action on the basis of the general clause. 
The exhaustive nature of the black list and the full harmonisation goal of the UCPD 
have led to the removal of often used clear-cut national bans on certain commercial 
practices. The commercial practices formerly prohibited by French law (sales with 
gifts, commercial lottery and sweepstake advertising, tied sales) must now be 
reviewed under the general clauses laid down in Art. L. 121-1 ff. Code de la 
consommation (hereafter: C.conso.)4 before being condemned. In practice, such 
practices are sometimes deemed fair, which means that the French consumer is less 
protected than before the Directive was enacted. The Cour de Cassation has referred 
preliminary questions to the CJEU about the fairness of a tied offer consisting of the 
sale of a computer equipped with pre-installed software, in order to secure greater 
clarity and to increase legal certainty. Taking into consideration the ruling of the CJEU, 
which hinted at the commercial practice being unlikely to materially distort the 
1 Not all the stakeholders knew about the Guidance document of the Commission (which is not available in 
French). 
2 Supreme Court, 1 September 2015, n° 14-85.791, MARIONNAUD PARFUMERIES c/ unknown. 
3 One stakeholder regretted in that respect that the legislative part on commercial practices in the Code de 
la consommation no longer applies to C2C relationships. 
4 The Code de la consommation has been amended on the 1st of July 2016. The articles referred to in the 
report are the new articles. 
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average consumer's behavior, the Cour de Cassation recently confirmed that the 
combined offer of sale of a computer with a pre-installed software is a fair practice.5  
On the other hand, trade associations consider that ending the ban on specific 
practices, even if it creates legal uncertainty, could potentially benefit the consumer. 
Following a Court Order,6 the legal definition of the reference price that is used in 
price reduction announcements has recently been amended. The new definition is 
considered to be less rigid, and allows for a differentiation between products and a 
more truthful comparison between prices (e.g. seasonal products). Consumers might 
be better off if the reference price is indeed more realistic, which is of course 
something the announcer must account for. The effective enforcement of the fairness 
of the price comparison (old-new) is however a problem. 
What is more, the effectiveness of the general clause is jeopardized by the lack of an 
autonomous sanctioning mechanism under French law. Claimants must fall back on 
the sub-clauses or the black list. The articulation of (the criteria of) the general clause 
and the sub-clauses of art. 6-8 UCPD, is unclear to legal scholars and practitioners 
who find it difficult to comprehend the interaction between the general clause and the 
sub-clauses, in view of the jurisprudence of the CJEU.7 Can a practice be deemed 
unfair without being misleading or aggressive and inversely, can a practice be deemed 
misleading without being unfair, i.e. in breach of the requirements of professional 
diligence? 
At the individual level, the principle-based approach is considered by the stakeholders 
to not be very effective for it creates problems of proof and results in lengthy and 
expensive procedures. The clauses and corresponding sanctions are not geared 
towards the solution of individual B2C conflicts. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The black list offers some legal certainty (although it still contains some open-textured 
formulations prone to interpretational divergences) but has very seldom been applied. 
It does not compensate for the legal uncertainty created by the principle-based 
approach. 
Many stakeholders have criticised its exhaustive nature and its incapacity to quickly 
respond to new (types of) practices. Another criticism pertains to the level of detail 
and narrowness of the definitions of the practices on the list. A practice must exactly 
match a very detailed definition in order to be tackled on the basis of the list. This 
was, for example, not the case in the only court procedure based on the black list that 
could be retrieved from the national database Legifrance.fr.8 The practices on the list 
are so precisely defined that they do not occur very often. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The exemption of art. 3(9) UCPD has been widely used in France to the satisfaction of 
enforcement authorities. The weight such contracts can bear on a consumer budget, 
and their complexity, amply justify a more protective approach. 
5 Supreme Court 17 June 2015, n° 14-11.437, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:C100451; ECLI:EU:C:2016:633, Case 
C-310/15, (Deroo-Blanquart), 7 September 2016; Supreme Court, 14 December 2016, n° 14-11.437 
ECLI:FR:CCASS:2016:C101414. The legality of selling bundled software has been challenged and has 
given rise to a considerable amount of disputes in France over the last few years. 
6 ECLI:EU:C:2015:560, Case C-13/15, (Cdiscount), Order 8 September 2015. 
7 Picod, nr. 123; Calais-Auloy and Temple, nr. 93. 
8 Cass. Com., 26 February 2013, n°  12-12203. 
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The maximum harmonisation nature of the Directive is criticised by consumer 
organisations. National bans on unfair practices which offer more legal certainty and 
protection than the UCPD are welcomed by most stakeholders. There are benefits in 
terms of proof at the individual level but, more importantly, actions instigated by 
national supervisory authorities and consumer associations are easier and more 
effective when grounded on clear-cut bans. As indicated above, general clauses are 
considered to have caused legal insecurity. In this respect, the extensive 
interpretation of a ‘commercial practice’ by the European Commission (Guidance) and 
the CJEU was fiercely criticised by one stakeholder: the wider the definition, the 
narrower the scope of national legislative and enforcement actions. 
However, as was indicated before, too narrowly defined rules also have their 
shortcomings. The Act ‘Sapin 2’9 introduced at the end of 2016 a provision (article L. 
222-16-1) which outlaws aggressive advertising practices with regard to financial 
services such as Forex and binary options which are deemed dangerous for the 
consumer. This very precisely formulated provision has been fiercely criticised and is 
expected to be ineffective: the targeted rogue financial services providers, who are 
mainly situated in Cyprus, do not expressly use the forbidden terms in their ads.10 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
There is uncertainty as to what constitutes a green claim. This definition problem has 
been discussed by different stakeholders11 and has led to an official guidance 
document.12 In 2015, the French Directorate-General for Competition, Consumer 
Affairs and Prevention of Fraud (DGCCRF) has led extensive investigations into 
misleading ‘generalising’ environmental claims.13  
The DGCCRF has also investigated unfair selling tactics by solar and other energy 
efficiency companies.14 More specifically, the doorstep selling tactics of photovoltaic 
panels companies have been deemed aggressive and misleading.  
The fact that labels, such as the French RGE (‘Reconnu Garant de l’Environnement’) 
label, do not warrant the fairness of the commercial practices of its holders, has been 
openly criticised.15 
In a few cases, environmental claims in the energy market have been challenged by 
environmental and consumer rights associations. The UCPD has for example 
successfully been applied in the Monsanto-case: the company was fined for misleading 
the public about the environmental impact of its flagship herbicide Roundup.16 
9 Loi n° 2016-1691 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie 
économique, et la loi organique n° 2016-1690 relative à la compétence du Défenseur des droits pour 
l'orientation et la protection des lanceurs d'alerte. 
10 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/05/25/loi-sapin-2-l-interdiction-des-publicites-sur-
internetpour-certains-produits-financiers-a-risques-d-une-totale-inefficacite_4926422_3232.html 
11 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/directions_services/cnc/avis/2010/151210rapport_allegations_ 
   environnementales.pdf 
12 http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/guide_allegations_ok.pdf 
13 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/enquete-sur-allegations-environnementales-globalisantes 
14 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/energies-nouvelles-renouvelables 
15 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/dgccrf/presse/communique/2015/ 
   CP-EnR151119.pdf 
16 Cass. Crim. 6 October 2009, n° 08-87757. 
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When challenging a green claim, it appears very difficult to substantiate the breach of 
the misleading clause. One stakeholder has indicated a problem of proof since a lot of 
the information given in the pre-contractual stage is provided orally. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The concept of the average consumer has been transposed into art. L. 121-1 C.conso. 
The most notorious advantage of this abstract concept is that a practice can be 
deemed unfair even if the interests of consumers have not actually been harmed. 
The interpretation of the concept by French courts appears to be quite random. 
Although the Guidance document of the European Commission mentions that ‘the 
median consumer’s vulnerability pattern is similar to the EU-wide pattern’,17 
stakeholders provided contrasting responses to the question whether the concept is 
applied rigidly. Some stakeholders indicate that the concept is applied in a flexible, 
rather protective way18 whereas other stakeholders (mainly consumer organisations) 
consider the application to be rather strict.19  
Enforcement bodies have admitted to avoid taking a demanding consumer image as a 
starting point of their investigations. 
A recent decision of the Cour de Cassation might help get rid of the disparities: it 
considered the average consumer to be a highly objective concept, which does not 
take into account the subjective knowledge of the consumer in the case at hand.20  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The vulnerable consumer concept has been transposed in art. L. 121-1(3) C.conso. 
There is a smooth transition between the consumer concepts under French law since 
courts tend to always take into account the target group of a commercial practice. The 
reference consumer depends on the object and content of the practice in question. 
The vulnerability of the consumer who is being targeted adds to the unfairness of 
some types of inertia- or doorstep-selling. 
In individual cases, the abuse of weakness-provision is more often used. The ‘abus de 
faiblesse’ laid down in art. L. 121-8 and L. 121-10 C.conso. relies on a concrete 
appreciation of the weakness of the consumer. This provision also plays a role in 
collective actions.21 Consumer associations sometimes choose to act on both grounds. 
In the financial sector, the national supervisory and regulatory authorities Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF) and Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel (ACP) have initiated 
talks on the position of the vulnerable consumer, more specifically the aging 
consumer. They focus on the implications of this concept for the positive information 
duties of the sector-specific legislation (such as the duty of care of banks). The co-
regulatory Charte de l'inclusion bancaire et de prévention du surendettement, aims at 
protecting vulnerable consumers. 
17 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/ucp_guidance_en.pdf, p. 45 (footnote 111). 
18 Cf. http://www.influencia.net/fr/actualites/in,observatoireinfluencia,publicitepratiquescommercialesde 
   loyalesnotionconsommateurmoyen,3525.html (29 May 2013). 
19 E.g. CA Paris, 25e ch. A, 16 November 2007, Contrats, conc. consom. 2008, comm. 55. 
20 Cass. Civ. 1ere, 22 January 2014, n°  12-20982. 
21 Cass. Crim., 18 March 2008, n°  07-82792. 
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There is, strictly speaking, no categorisation taking place in French case-law (which is 
based on a case-by-case approach) but some stakeholders nonetheless have identified 
new ‘categories’ of vulnerable consumers, such as a category of consumers with lesser 
means, and a category of isolated (i.e. lonely) consumers.  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
There are few self- and co-regulatory initiatives focusing on commercial practices in 
France. The reason is that French legal culture – the reliance on rather strict rules and 
well-defined (positive) obligations – traditionally hinders such initiatives. Professionals 
are not spurred to take action by the lack of a solid legislative framework. Moreover, 
considerations of competition prevent traders from establishing codes. Finally, there is 
no approval scheme by the DGCCRF. 
Current attempts to reach common positions or to devise some kind of charter have 
not been very successful according to business associations. Self-regulatory initiatives 
are generally more about the valorisation of good practices than the devising of new 
(more protective) rules. 
The most successful auto-regulatory actions pertaining to commercial practices have 
been led by the French advertising self-regulatory organization (ARPP), which has 
devised numerous standards such as the digital Advertising and Marketing 
Communications Code.22 One stakeholder pointed out that misleading practices and 
omissions occur despite the recommendations of the ARPP. Continuously evolving e-
practices are difficult to keep up with. 
Some co-regulation takes place within the framework of the Conseil National de la 
Consommation (CNC), a large platform where consumer and trade associations in 
different fields meet with government representatives. Within this framework, the 
co-regulatory Comité consultatif du secteur financier (CCSF) issues declarations and 
positions which can be translated into professional norms. In the field of telecom, 
there have been a few co-regulatory initiatives (Federation Française des Telecoms in 
cooperation with the government) with regard to general terms of contract (GTC) 
(SIM-locking, termination of the contract, etc.).23 
 
The financial sector presents some examples of self-regulation in the field of 
commercial practices. First there are codes of conduct which have been officially 
approved by the Ministry of Economic affairs.24 Second, there are codes which have 
been approved by the ACP.25 Both approval systems have only had limited success, 
according to stakeholders. 
 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
22 Calais-Auloy and Temple, nr. 91, see for example: http://www.arpp-
pub.org/IMG/pdf/Digital_Advertising_and_Marketing_Communications_Code.pdf 
23 http://pubminefi.diffusion.finances.gouv.fr/pub/document/18/9344.pdf 
24 Cf. la charte de l'inclusion bancaire et de prévention du surendettement. 
25 Décision n° 2013-C-34 du 24 juin 2013 : approbation d’un code de bonne conduite relatif à l’information 
sur le relevé de compte du total mensuel des frais bancaires et du montant de l’autorisation de découvert 
à la demande de la Fédération bancaire française and Décision n° 2013-C-35 du 24 juin 2013 : 
approbation d’un code de bonne conduite relatif à la présentation des plaquettes tarifaires des banques 
suivant un sommaire-type et un extrait standard des tarifs à la demande de la Fédération bancaire 
française. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
383
There is a lot of criticism of the exhaustive nature of the list from the perspective of 
consumer protection. This criticism is inextricably linked to the criticism on the full 
harmonisation nature of the Directive. 
Several stakeholders have expressed the need to extend the list and/or to get rid of 
its exhaustive nature. According to one stakeholder, the modification mechanism 
should be kept very simple and should not give way to lengthy negotiations. The 
modification of the black list should according to some stakeholders not take place at 
the European level but be left to the MS since problems with commercial practices 
often are very much localised. For example, the regulation of sales is a predominantly 
French and Belgian issue. Some stakeholders would like to bring back the bans that 
were forced out of the Code de la consommation. The rapid digitalisation of the 
economy also strengthens the case for a modification of the list. A practice that could 
make it to the list according to one stakeholder is the practice consisting of hiding 
information on a website and making the information only accessible after several 
click-throughs. 
One stakeholder – a public agency – has even suggested removing the list since no 
mechanism will ever be able to keep pace with actual developments. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
France has a public authority that is specialised in informing the consumer and 
consumer associations: the INC.26 
The (new) sanctioning mechanism tied to the sub-clauses of the UCPD under French 
law is considered very effective.27 The recently enacted group action (art. L. 623-1 
C.conso.), is also quoted as a useful addition to the arsenal of enforcement 
possibilities. 
Some legal experts and stakeholders consider the enforcement system to be too far-
reaching for it enables the DGCCRF to impose administrative fine of its own motion 
(without a court order).28 
One consumer association suggested that the disgorgement of illegal profits should be 
made possible. 
Another consumer association noticed that the use of harassment, coercion and undue 
influence often appears difficult to prove and that this problem of proof should be 
tackled more effectively. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
All stakeholders consider that French consumers are effectively informed about the 
unit selling price and that traders are generally well-aware of their information duties 
and willing to abide by them. No major problems were mentioned as far as mandatory 
26 http://www.conso.net/sites/default/files/pdf/INC_in_english.pdf 
27 N. Sauphanor-Brouillaud, ‘Les sanctions des règles protectrices des consommateurs dans la loi relative à 
la consommation’, Revue des contrats 2014/3, p. 471. 
28 See also : C. Minet, ‘Loi Hamon : Le mieux est-il l’ennemi du bien ?’, Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires 
2014/93. 
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unit price indications are concerned. Regular and thorough inspections have been 
carried out by the DGCCRF in the recent years of economic downfall. 
Prior to the PID, extensive and very detailed price indication regulation already existed 
in France. The PID has not been literally transposed.29 France has enacted a long 
positive list of both food and non-food products to which the obligation to indicate the 
(measurement) unit price is applicable. 
Moreover the obligation to indicate the price under the PID is coupled to the more 
specific information requirements laid down in the CRD (art. L. 112-3 and L. 112-4 
C.conso.). Different rules work hand-in-hand as far as price indications are concerned. 
Problems related to price indications can also be addressed by the UCPD (price 
comparison, BOGOF).30   
From the data provided by the DGCCRF it seems that consumers regularly complain 
about price information. One stakeholder indicated that the quality of the information 
pertaining to delivery costs sometimes constitute a problem. Another stakeholder 
pointed at problems with sales by lot. 
The sanctions attached to the breach of all information duties regarding unit selling 
prices have recently been reinforced (art. L. 131-5 C.conso.). 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Under French law, there is an obligation to indicate the price per unit of measurement 
for a number of listed non-food products such as detergents.  
Art. 4 of the loi Hamon31 has introduced, on an experimental basis, a double price 
setting: during three years, from Jan 1st 2015 until Dec 31st 2017, sellers can opt to 
display both the unit price and the utility price for certain products. The introduction of 
the concept of the utility price can be explained by the transition from an economy of 
ownership to one of service functionality. This initiative has however been criticised for 
being very difficult to implement (what defines a product’s utility and can this be 
measured in advance? What does the concept of ‘économie de fonctionnalité’ 
entail?).32 The initiative has had only very limited success, according to stakeholders. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
France has not made use of the derogation right under art. 6 PID. However, breaches 
of the PID rules by non-self-service retail outlets with a sales area not exceeding 120 
m2, have been considered with a certain degree of forbearance, in line with legislation 
prior to the PID. Such outlets, where customers have to be advised and assisted by 
the seller, are relatively rare.   
No complaints have been registered and, according to one stakeholder, this policy of 
tolerance and acquiescence should be continued as far as small local and mobile 
29 Consumer Law Compendium, p. 569, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/comp_analysis_en.pdf 
30 Cass. Crim. 15 May 2012, n°  11-84125 (UFC/Entreparticuliers.com). 
31 Loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation 
32 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/cnc/avis/2015/Rapport_sur_le_double_ 
affiche_des_prix_de_vente_et_d_usage_des_biens_de_consommation.pdf; 
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/cnc/avis/2015/Avis_relatif_au_double_afficha
ge_des_prix_de_vente_et_d_usage_des_biens_de_consommation.pdf 
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shops, mainly in rural areas, are concerned. The obligations resulting from the PID 
entail too much of a burden for those shops. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The scope of protection under the MCAD has been extended under French law. The 
misleading practices of art. 6 UCPD and the black list of misleading practices from the 
UCPD (art. L. 121-2 and L. 121-4 C.conso.) are directly applicable to B2B transactions 
(see art. L. 121-5 C.conso.).33 These provisions, and the accompanying sanctions and 
enforcement mechanism ‘transpose’ the relevant MCAD provisions. The extension of 
the scope beyond the notion of ‘advertising’ is considered to provide better protection 
for businesses. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach to misleading advertising under the MCAD has been 
merged with the similar approach to misleading practices under the UCPD. There is no 
separate article dealing with misleading advertising in B2B-transactions in French law. 
The principle-based approach to misleading practices of art. L. 121-2 C.conso. is 
viewed as quite effective. It was already into place long before the enactment of 
Directive 1984/450/EEC. In contrast to the general fairness-clause of art. 5 UCPD, 
French courts are very familiar with the misleading-clause and the concept of the 
average consumer who is traditionally defined as a ‘bon père de famille’.  
An interesting development is the use of the misleading clause to combat human 
rights violations. Samsung world has been summoned to appear before a French court 
by Sherpa, a human rights defence group, and by trade union INDECOSA-CGT.34 
Samsung is accused of misleading the consumer about structural human rights 
violations. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
National rules go beyond the MCDA. For instance, the misleading action provision and 
the black list of misleading practices of the UCPD applies to B2B-transactions (art. L. 
121-2 and L. 121-4 C.conso.). They are considered to provide better protection for 
businesses since they are not restricted to advertising. The list has obviously 
advantages in terms of the burden of proof. This however can hardly be seen as ‘gold 
plating’ since the ‘new’ rules on misleading practices have not changed much to the 
existing situation: the rules in place on misleading advertising were already quite 
protective35 and encompassed a  wide range of commercial communications.36 As for 
33 The provision transposing the misleading omission clause does not apply to B2B-transactions (art. L. 121-
3 C.conso.). 
34 http://www.humaniteinenglish.com/spip.php?article2947 
35 See Piédelièvre, nr. 151 
36 Cass.crim., 19 February 2008, n° 07-83.858; Cass.crim., 11 December 2007, n° 07-82.903; CA Pau, 28 
April 2005, JurisData n° 2005-270849 
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the black list, it has not had any noticeable impact yet. What is more, by merging the 
MCAD and UCPD clauses, the French legislator has not left much room for diverging 
applications of the misleading clause depending on the B2B of B2C nature of an 
advertisement. Although the minimum harmonisation MCAD provisions could, in 
theory, be interpreted more extensively and hence offer more protection than the full 
harmonisation UCPD rules, such a differentiation seems very unlikely. The ‘old’ 
misleading clause did not distinguish between B2C and B2B relations and courts are 
not used to make this distinction. Last but not least, the misleading omission clause 
(art. 7 UCPD) does not apply to B2B relationships. Given the very subtle difference 
between misleading actions and omissions, I cannot but wonder whether the 
protection of businesses against passive deception (the submission of incomplete 
information) might even have been reduced. Misleading omissions used to be covered 
by the ‘old’ misleading clause applicable to B2B-relations.37 
Furthermore, traders can also invoke art. 1382 Code civil (unfair competition) to claim 
damages. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
The criteria laid down in art. L. 122-1 C.conso. (the provision on comparative 
advertising) are not clear, according to one trade association, such as, for instance, 
the size/characteristics of the ‘competitors’ whose products are being compared: can a 
supermarket be compared with a hypermarket? 
The full harmonisation clause is to some extent being circumvented by the 
introduction of contractual dispositions which fall outside the scope of the MCAD. The 
loi Hamon has enacted pre-contractual information duties pertaining to the online 
price comparison websites: art. L. 111-6 C.conso. 
Art. L. 122-4 C.conso. forbids comparative advertising on packaging, travel tickets, 
means of payment or admission tickets. This prohibition is justified by the fact that 
such mediums are difficult to control. There is some doubt as to whether this rule is 
allowed by the Directive.38 The same goes for art. L. 122-3 C.conso. which only allows 
comparisons between products that have the same ‘appellation d’origine contrôlée’.39 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
The rules pertaining to comparative advertising are transposed in art. L. 122-1 – L. 
122-7 and L. 132-25 C.conso (if the comparative ad is deemed illicit, the sanctions 
attached to the misleading practices apply). Their application has increased since the 
use of comparative advertising has increased in recent years. 
The rules of the MCAD were deemed unable to deal with modern types of online 
comparative practices. Traders asked for the introduction of specific rules like the ones 
laid down in art. L. 111-5 ff C.conso by the loi Hamon in 2014. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
the rules are effective. The rules have however never been applied in a cross-border 
setting. 
37 Cass. crim., 28 sept. 1994, n° 92-84.302, Bull. crim., n° 308. 
38 Piédelièvre, nr. 138. 
39 Piédelièvre, nr. 141. ECLI:EU:C:2007:230, C-381/05 (De Landtsheer Emmanuel), para. 70. 
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A comparison between cross-border trade figures was deemed illicit in 1991.40 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
According to stakeholders, the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for 
businesses could be enhanced if the full harmonisation clause relating to comparative 
advertising was removed. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
There are differences in the way the concept of the average consumer is being 
interpreted and applied but the interviewed trade associations do not think these 
differences in the interpretation of general clauses have had any impact on cross-
border trade. The UCPD has not had any noticeable effect on cross-border trade since 
it is only a small part of the EU legislation relevant to traders and not the most 
relevant part. Moreover this legislation is considered very abstract and vague. 
Clear-cut obligations as to the safety and conformity of products at both national and 
European level have a much larger impact on the decision to ‘cross the border’. In that 
respect, brands such as IKEA or HEMA that have integrated chains of production have 
easier access to the internal market.  
Cross-border trade is, according to one stakeholder, also seriously affected by ‘gold 
plating’, i.e. the implementation of additional (positive) duties at the time of the 
transposition of European directives (such as the obligation to inform the buyer about 
the availability of spare parts, which was introduced in the loi Hamon transposing the 
CRD).  
Trade associations are proponents of European Regulations, of maximum 
harmonisation and of explicit, well-defined rules which they consider to be very 
effective in stimulating cross-border trade. If straightforward maximum rules cannot 
be agreed upon, they give preference to maximum rules which are less precise (like 
the ones in the UCPD). The possibility to fine-tune the interpretation of those rules at 
the European level is then indispensable according to one trade association. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
No noticeable effects were mentioned during the interviews. The list is very detailed 
and the listed practices represent only a very small part of the large array of 
commercial practices. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
40 TGI Paris, 23 septembre 1991, Gaz. Pal. 1991, 2, pan.  jurispr. 576 (Renault/Volkswagen). According to 
the advertisement, Renault sold twice as many cars in Germany as Volkswagen sold in France. The figures 
mentioned in the ad were accurate, but the ad hinted at the fact that they resulted from the inferior 
quality of Volkswagen cars. The court ruled that the ad did not meet the objectivity requirement. 
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cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No noticeable effects were mentioned during the interviews. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Cf. the findings concerning the UCPD. 
Art L. 122-1 ff C.conso. transposes the dispositions relating to comparative 
advertising. No noticeable effects were mentioned. Cross-border comparative 
advertising (between brands or shops in two different MS) is very uncommon. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Those provisions have been merged with the maximum provisions of the UCPD and do 
not exist separately. No noticeable effects were mentioned. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
Cross-border comparative advertising (between brands or shops in two different MS) 
is sparse. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
this is not the case.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Art. L. 121-3 C.conso. transposes art. 7(4) UCPD. The information requirements of the 
CRD are laid down in art. L. 111-1, L. 112-1 ff (price) C.conso.  
The level of awareness of the information requirements is satisfactory according to 
consumer associations. The requirements are generally well implemented, even 
though there are some exceptions. Small traders appear to have more difficulties 
implementing new obligations. Members of trade associations are more aware of the 
requirements than non-members, according to different stakeholders. 
There are limits to the overlap between the CRD and UCPD and sometimes the 
claimant has no choice but to found his claim on the more detailed duties of the CRD. 
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Art. L. 111-1(6) C.conso. regarding the information about the access to ADR is not 
covered by art. 7(4) UCPD. This information requirement is not always complied with, 
according to one stakeholder. Besides, art. 5 CRD, which is based on minimum 
harmonization, has led to additional information requirements (whose breach does not 
amount to a misleading omission in the sense of art. 7(4) UCPD). 
The choice to apply the provisions from the CRD or the UCPD provisions (misleading 
omission) depends on the seriousness of the infraction, on the size of the trader and 
the extent of the practice and of the damage caused. The latter provisions require an 
impairment of the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision. The breach of 
positive obligations from the CRD is much easier to prove and many stakeholders 
prefer to fall back on the CRD (and on sectoral legislation or the E-commerce 
directive). The UCPD is then used to further back up the claim. 
What is more, the breach of the UCPD rules is sanctioned differently. The sanctions 
tied to the UCPD are much stricter (a UCPD constitutes a criminal offense41) than 
those attached to the CRD. 
Different stakeholders have questioned the utility of information obligations. They tend 
to protect the trader and not so much the consumer-who cannot deal with the 
information overload. Furthermore, a lot of mandatory information is incorporated in 
the GTC, which is problematic from a viewpoint of transparency. Consumers do not 
read the fine print, according to stakeholders. 
There is criticism from trade associations of the French tendency to ‘gold plate’, by 
adding new obligations to the already long list of European information duties: they 
point for example at the recently enacted obligation to inform customers about the 
availability of spare parts. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
One stakeholder criticised the particularly ineffective interplay (and possible 
contradiction) between the E-Commerce Directive and the open-textured UCPD. The 
E-Commerce Directive seems not fit to address recent developments regarding 
platforms.42 The UCPD obliges such platforms to provide clear information. Hosting 
sites however do not bear any responsibility under the E-Commerce Directive and the 
UCPD does not offer a clear and concrete lead to create such responsibilities. The 
UCPD is considered too vague to deal with particular e-practices. To fill in the void, 
pre-contractual positive information obligations applicable to platforms, have been laid 
down in art. L. 111-7 C.conso. by the national legislator. 
No overlaps or extra costs were mentioned during the interviews. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The framework covering B2B unfair commercial practices entails an effective 
combination of hard and soft law at both European (cf. the principles of good practices 
41 See for example: Supreme Court, 13 January 2016,  n° 14-84072,  EUROCHALLENGES FRANCe c/ 
unknown 
42 Cf. the recent Guidance document of the Commission, p. 127. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
390
in the food supply chain)43 and national level (cf. the Commission d'examen des 
pratiques commerciales, cf. art. 440-1 Code de commerce).44 The Code de la 
consommation for instance provides a certain level of protection: as was mentioned 
before, the provision pertaining to misleading practices (art. 6 UCPD) and the black 
list of misleading practices from the UCPD also apply to B2B relationships. Title IV, 
Book IV of the Code de commerce headed 'Transparency, restrictive competition 
practices and other prohibited practices’, also contains many provisions such as art. L. 
441-7 or art. L. 442-6(I), which provide a high level of protection to traders against 
different abusive commercial practices (cf. section 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of this report). The 
protection laid down in Title IV has been strengthened in recent years.45 
According to stakeholders, there is no need to extend the application scope of the 
provisions on aggressive practices, although one stakeholder noted that small 
businesses may suffer from specific commercial practices (such as ‘acquisition’ fraud 
with bogus invoices). Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted 
for this country report, it is concluded that there are enough rules warranting fair B2B 
relationships and there is no need to extend B2C protection rules to B2B transactions. 
The coverage of B2B practices is already very comprehensive and there is no need for 
additional rules from European origin. One stakeholder even questioned the need for 
the high amount of B2B protection rules pointing at MS where no such rules exist. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
All trade associations rejected the idea of an alignment and advocated a strict 
separation between the two legal regimes. The B2B relationship is, as opposed to the 
B2C relationship, not fundamentally imbalanced. B2C rules are not adapted to B2B 
transactions46 and B2B relationships should be covered by their own set of rules (such 
as is the case now with the MCAD and the Code de commerce).  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that businesses are well enough protected under French law at all 
stages of the contract by the Code de la consommation (art. L. 121-2 and L. 121-4 
C.conso.) and the Code de commerce.  
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
One trade association referred to the list established by the supply chain initiative.47 If 
the protection is to be extended to B2B transactions at the European level, the 
stakeholder expressed their preference for a list of clear-cut bans. Another stakeholder 
43 Supply chain initiative, http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-
vertical-relationships-food-supply-chain 
44 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/retail/docs/140711-study-utp-legal-framework_en.pdf 
45 The rigidity of the protective provisions introduced by the loi Hamon has been criticised and more flexible 
provisions were introduced in 2015 by the loi Macron. 
46 The concept of the “bon père de famille” cannot for example be applied to a trader. 
47 http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/sites/default/files/b2b_principles_of_good_practice_in_the_ 
   food _supply_chain.pdf 
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however warned for the risk of reverse reasoning with black lists (‘if it is not 
forbidden, it is allowed’). 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
A preventive mechanism at the European level with more accurate notifications and 
information sharing is being preferred. One stakeholder mentioned the Technical 
Regulations Information System (TRIS). The introduction of a similar system could 
prevent creating barriers in the internal market before they materialize. Member 
States notify their legislative projects regarding commercial practices to the 
Commission which analyses these projects in the light of EU legislation. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that businesses, the existing possibilities to claim damages under 
French civil law are seen to be sufficient and there is no need to tie new contractual 
remedies to the breaches of the MCAD. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
According to one stakeholder, the rules on comparative advertising need to be clarified 
and updated. The French legislator already took some steps in adapting the rules to 
new developments such as the digitalisation of the economy by adopting specific rules 
as far as comparative websites are concerned (art. L.111-5 Code de la 
consommation). 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
If an aggressive commercial practice leads to the conclusion of a contract, this 
contract is deemed null and void (art. L. 132-10 C.conso.).  
Although contracts concluded under the influence of misleading practices are not 
expressly sanctioned in the Code de la consommation, it has been argued that such 
contracts can be deemed null and void as well in view of art. 6 of the Civil code (the 
misleading practice constitutes a breach of the ‘ordre public de protection’).48 
Be that as it may, unfair commercial practices are likely to lead to a vitiated consent, 
in which case, the contract is voidable (duress, undue influence, deceit or emotional 
distress).49 It is up to the consumer to prove the vitiated consent. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
48 Calais-Auloy and Temple, no. 108. 
49 G. Chantepie, La détermination de sanctions effectives, proportionnées et dissuasives des pratiques 
commerciales déloyales, in E. Terryn & D. Voinot (eds), Droit européen des pratiques commerciales 
déloyales: Evolution et perspectives (2012), p. 86 ff. 
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The nullity of the contract concluded under the influence of an aggressive practice is 
seldom invoked by consumers. The ‘abus de faiblesse’ – a national disposition that 
also leads to nullity – is more often used. 
In the Doublô-case in which the Caisse d’Epargne has been accused of misleading 
advertisement50, the validity of the contracts concluded under the influence of the 
practice was not challenged. There were no contractual consequences. Consumers 
could however seek damages, since a misleading practice can be considered faulty.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Contractual consequences are not always needed. Depending on the practice, a 
consumer may rather claim for compensation than annul the contract. Most 
stakeholders favour the possibility to seek compensation, even in case of trifle losses. 
Different stakeholders – even consumer organisations – are a bit reluctant as to 
introducing a contractual remedy in case of a breach of the general fairness- or the 
misleading clause.  
Such a sanction is only acceptable provided the decision to contract was actually 
materially impaired by the unfair or misleading practice. The question is whether all 
the information mentioned in the UCPD always has the same actual (causal) impact on 
the decision to conclude or renew a contract. Even if the information is considered 
material by the UCPD, it does not mean it actually influences the consumer’s 
decisions. 
A second ‘condition’ would be that a consumer does not use her contractual remedies 
in a manner which is incompatible with principles of civil law such as the principle of 
good faith. Recently, the abuse of consumer contractual rights has been reprimanded 
by the Cour de Cassation. It ruled that consumer can only cancel a life insurance 
contract on the basis of a breach of an information duty (art. L. 132-5-2 Code des 
assurances) provided he or she acts in good faith.51 
One stakeholder suggested to award punitive damages to the consumer. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
This approach is deemed quite effective by all stakeholders in view of the amount of 
case-law. Stakeholders stress the importance of the minimum harmonisation nature of 
the clause and commend its flexibility. It enables courts to tackle new terms and to 
take into consideration the concrete circumstances of the case. 
The fairness-clause is applied in a rather consistent and objective way and there is a 
lot of (both national and European) jurisprudence available.52 The general clause does 
50 http://doublo.monde.free.fr/ 
51 Cass. civ. 2, 19 May 2016, n° 1512.767, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2016:C200776. 
52 Pavillon 2011. 
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not contain any reference to the principle of good faith in order to warrant a more 
objective interpretation of the fairness-clause.53 
One stakeholder stressed that the intervention of a court is necessary to get rid of 
terms that are unfair under the general clause and that ADR bodies (‘médiateurs’) do 
not apply the law (i.e. the general clause seems not fit for ADR). This goes at the 
expense of its effectiveness. 
Trade federations such as the Medef have actively informed their members about the 
legislation on UCT.54 Most compliance problems now occur in the field of digital 
services with new actors which are often operating from abroad (social media, internet 
providers, streaming services). 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list is not considered to be very effective.55 It only gives some examples 
of unfair terms and leaves the burden of proof on the consumer. The indicative list, 
which was attached as an Annex to the Code de la consommation, has had only little 
impact on the application of the general clause in the period before the introduction of 
the domestic grey and black lists. These lists however are to a large extent based on 
the European list (10 black terms and 8 grey terms also figure on the European list).  
The terms listed in the similarly indicative recommendations by the Commission des 
clauses abusives (CCA) have had more impact in practical cases.56 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
Yes, the national lists represent a considerable advantage for consumer protection 
compared to the purely indicative list of the Directive. 
In 2010, the Code de la consommation was amended to allow the creation by decree 
of a black list of contract terms which are unfair and automatically ineffective 
(‘deemed not written’) and a grey list of clauses that are presumed to be unfair, 
imposing a burden on a business to prove otherwise.57 The black and  grey lists are 
referred to in art. L. 212-1(4) and art. L. 212-1(5) respectively, and laid down in art. 
R. 212-1 and R. 212-2 C.conso, respectively. Some clauses are forbidden by the Code 
civil (e.g. the arbitration clause).58 
The lists are relatively easy to enforce, both in individual and in collective (injunctive) 
procedures. Especially the black list confers significant protection upon the consumer 
and provides a high level of legal security to traders. One stakeholder argued in favour 
of a further extension of the black list. 
The DGCCRF can order a trader to stop using black clauses without requiring a court 
decision. This injunction can be published. The DGCCRF can also impose an 
53 Picod, nr. 314. 
54 http://www.medef.com/medef-corporate/publications/fiche-
detaillee/categorie/2009/back/106/article/eviter-les-clauses-abusives-dans-les-contrats-de-
consommation.html 
55 Piédelièvre, nr. 459 a). 
56 Piédelièvre, nr. 463. 
57 Decree n° 2009-302 of 18 March 2009. 
58 Piédelièvre, nr. 471-472. 
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administrative fine on traders who make use of a clause which is black-listed (art. L. 
241-2 C.conso.). 
One stakeholder commended the combination of the lists and the general clause. 
Another stakeholder pointed at the qualification problems that sometimes occur when 
a list is invoked. Discussions often arise as to the question whether the clause 
matches the definition on the list. This stakeholder pleaded for clear definitions. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Under French law, the qualified entities (the DGCCRF and consumer associations) are 
entitled to request before the French jurisdictions the deletion of an unlawful or 
abusive clause included by the seller in any contract or type of contract (intended to 
be) offered to consumers. 
A qualified entity may also request a declaration that such clauses are deemed 
unwritten in any identical contracts used by sellers with other consumers and to order 
the seller to inform consumers at its own expenses and by any appropriate means 
(art. L. 524-1(2) and (3), L. 621-2(2), L. 621-8(2) C.conso.). This article implements 
the erga omnes effect of art. 7 UCTD (cf. the Invitel-ruling of the CJEU). 
It is too early to indicate the impact of the new articles. Traders have not yet 
complained about the erga omnes effect. 
One stakeholder has questioned the effectiveness of this provision, for the erga omnes 
effect only affects identical – and not similar – contracts. A strict interpretation of this 
requirement could be easy to circumvent. 
This stakeholder also pointed at the fact that the possibility to tackle terms in 
contracts which are no longer utilised (‘pas en cours d’execution’) created by the loi 
Hamon,59 has been repelled on July 1st 2016. Lawsuits against unfair terms are 
useless when the disputed contract term is no longer proposed by the trader to the 
consumers (and this is regularly the case). 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The contractual transparency requirements are seen as indispensable, meaningful and 
quite effective despite the lack of a clear-cut sanction applicable in collective actions. 
The transparency and visibility of GTC is as big a problem as their unfairness. One 
stakeholder stressed the importance of the use of the French language. 
These requirements have been transposed into art. L. 211-1(1) C.conso. In case of a 
breach of the requirements, the contra proferentem rule applies in an individual B2C-
dispute (art. L. 211-1(2) C.conso.).60 A term in breach of the transparency 
requirement is not per se unfair. One stakeholder regrets the lack of a nullity sanction. 
However, intransparant and misleading terms happen to be found unfair when they 
59 Raymond, nr. 499. 
60 Cass. Civ. 1re 22 May 2008, no. 05-21822, Bull. civ.  N° 145. 
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also cause a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer (but to be nullified 
they must be reviewed against the fairness clause).61 
The breach of the transparency requirement is often invoked in combination with art. 
L. 212-1(3) so as to tackle terms relating to the main subject-matter of the contract 
which do not meet the transparency requirement. The Tribunal de grande instance de 
Nîmes recently referred preliminary questions to the CJEU about the transparency of 
core terms.62    
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
France has extended the application of the Directive (art. L 212-1 C.conso.) to 
individually negotiated terms. 
This extension is very important according to different stakeholders since it prevents 
discussions on the negotiated status of contract clauses and lightens the burden of 
proof placed on the consumer. The term ‘non-negotiated’ can be interpreted in 
different ways and a rigid reading of this requirement is detrimental to consumers. As 
a matter of fact, consumers are not capable of negotiating GTC. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
According to L. 241-1 C.conso., an unfair term is deemed ‘not written’. Consumers are 
generally ignorant of the protection conferred upon them by the legislation on unfair 
terms. Collective enforcement by public authorities and associations (cf. the next 
section on injunctions), and the ex officio application are therefore indispensable. 
The ex officio application of the fairness test is laid down in art. R. 632-1 C.conso. The 
first version of the article (2008) only spoke of a competence but later versions of the 
article (2014 and 2016) stress the compulsory nature of the ex officio application of 
the UCTD. The CJEU case-law has to a large extent helped shape the applicable law. A 
national court is now (in line with the Pannon-judgment) required to examine, of its 
own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal 
and factual elements necessary for that task. 
The Cour de Cassation (the first civil chamber) has (after a long period of 
‘resistance’63) explicitly acknowledged the competence of national courts to apply the 
test of their own motion.64 In practice, many lower courts65 however do not have the 
time, the knowledge or the means to review contract terms of their own motion. Many 
61 Pavillon 2011, nr. 233. CA Paris 15 June 2001; TGI Niort 9 January 2006. 
62 ECLI:EU:C:2015:262, Case C‑96/14 (Van Hove). The proceedings concerned an allegedly unfair 
contractual term in an insurance contract that includes the definition of ‘total incapacity for work’ for the 
purposes of that company’s cover of repayments on mortgage loans taken out by Mr Van Hove. 
63 First the Cour has taken the stance that consumer protection rules (‘ordre public de protection’) may not 
be applied ex officio by French courts but only following a plea raised by the consumer. Then it has taken 
the stance that the consumer has to invoke and to prove the facts on the basis of which the court can 
apply the rule of its own motion (whereas according to the Pannon-ruling a court must proceed to review a 
term if it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task). 
64 Cass. Civ. 1re, 30 mai 2012, n° 11-12242. 
65 There are a few exceptions though, such as the ‘specialised’ courts in Paris and Grenoble. 
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stakeholders have pointed at the lack of legal training of the magistrates in the field of 
European consumer law. Again, the introduction of these legal provisions is too recent 
to assess their effect. 
Administrative remedies are only open to the DGCCRF (that collects consumer 
complaints). 
The sanction is not fit for the purpose of alternative – amicable – dispute settlement 
(ADR).  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Regarding improvement measures, one stakeholder requested more European 
initiatives concerning pan-European GTC (car rentals). Another suggested the drafting 
of a European list of unfair terms based on the case-law of the MS. 
More legal training of magistrates could help increase the effectiveness of the UCTD. 
According to stakeholders, graphical presentation would improve the readability but 
not necessarily the comprehension by consumers of the very complex GTC since a 
graphical presentation in itself would not be sufficient.  There would always be a need 
for an additional text to grasp the full meaning of the terms. 
Regarding best practices, most stakeholders are very positive about the national grey 
and black lists of unfair terms.  
French professionals and courts seek guidance in the very detailed recommendations 
of the Commission des clauses abusives (CCA), a public ad hoc authority attached to 
the Minister in charge of Consumer Affairs that consists of a member of the national 
legal service, two legal or administrative magistrates or members of the Council of 
State, two entities qualified in contract law or technique, four professionals’ 
representatives and four consumers’ representatives. The CCA recommendations can 
be looked upon as a successful example of mixed public-private guidance. 
One stakeholder pointed at the very formal information requirements in the Code des 
assurances which oblige the trader to place a ‘key information box’ at the top of the 
contract (art. A 132-8 and L. 132-5-2 Code des assurances).  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
A comparative law study conducted by the present author a few years ago revealed 
noticeable differences in the way the different MS interpret the general clause.66 The 
stakeholders confirmed those findings. The ‘no show’ clause that was seen as fair by a 
66 Pavillon 2011. 
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Belgian court67 in the coordinated procedure against air carriers had for instance been 
deemed unfair by Austrian, German and Spanish courts68.  
Diverging interpretations have a negative direct impact on cross-border trade in the 
sense that it adds to the high level of legal uncertainty that is created by general 
clauses, minimum harmonisation and the lack of harmonisation of contract law at the 
European level. From the point of view of consumer associations it makes the scarce 
and costly actions aimed at protecting the ‘cross-border consumer’ more risky. 
However, many stakeholders – consumer organisations and enforcement authorities – 
have indicated that they attach much value to minimum harmonisation and to national 
protective measures such as the lists.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
There are no indications that the lists represent a barrier to cross-border trade.  
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
There are no indications that the extension of the application of the UCTD to 
negotiated terms represents a barrier to cross-border trade. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
The rules on UCT laid down in the Code de la consommation apply the ‘non-
professionnel’, a legal entity acting for purposes which are outside his commercial 
activity (cf. art. L. 212-2 C.conso.).69 In other circumstances, the rules on unfair 
contract terms of the Code de la consommation do not apply to B2B transactions.  
However, Book IV title IV of the Code de commerce contains many provisions aiming 
at securing well-balanced and fair trade relationships, irrespective of the size of the 
business. The provisions tackle power asymmetries, which often result from the 
structure of the market (e.g. suppliers to mass market retail chains are generally in a 
position of weakness, regardless their size).  
More specifically, art. L. 442-6(I)(2°) Code de commerce (which was introduced in 
2008) entails a control on unfair terms in B2B-contracts (including terms defining the 
contract’s object and the balance between price and performance). A court can hold a 
term unfair (and void) if it causes a significance imbalance in the rights and 
obligations of the parties, provided that one party has subjected (or at least attempted 
to subject) the other party to this term. 
67 Cess. Pr. Com. Namur 10 mars 2010 - TA c. Brussels Airlines para. 8. 
68 BEUC, Unfair terms in air transport contracts, Letter sent to Mr. Tony Tyler, Chief Executive Officer/IATA 
(Ref. L2013_016/MGO/UPA/rs – 05/02/2013), p. 2-3. 
69 Recent case-law of the Cour de Cassation (Cass. Civ. 1re, 23 June 2011, n° 10-30645 and Cass. Civ. 1re, 
1 June 2016, n° 15-13236 ASSOCIATION SOCIETE PROTECTRICE DES ANIMAUX c/ unknown) has shown 
that this category is very broad. This broadness goes at the expense of the effectiveness of the UCTD 
since consumers may not invoke those rules against a large category of GTC-users. 
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What is more, the current revision of the Code civil (law of obligations)70 entails the 
introduction of a fairness-test applicable to all not individually negotiated standard 
agreement forms (excluded the terms pertaining to the subject-matter of the contract 
and the adequacy of the price). The newly drafted fairness-test of art. 1171 Code civil 
is based on the concept of the significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations. It does not refer to the principle of good faith. 
It is very likely that art. L. 212-1 C.conso. constitutes a lex specialis in case of a B2C-
transaction but this must be confirmed. Indeed, the ex officio application of art. 1171 
Code civil seems problematic since the legislator has opted for ‘relative’ nullity at the 
aggrieved party’s request. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
As opposed to the B2C relationship, the B2B relationship is not fundamentally 
imbalanced. And even if the relationship is imbalanced, this imbalance is not 
necessarily detrimental: each party can benefit from a business deal.  
According to one stakeholder, a system of protection based on the significant 
imbalance seems appropriate for standard B2B agreements or in case a trader acts for 
purposes which are outside his commercial activity. As was explained before, such a 
system is already (being put) in place and there is no need for new rules.  
The existence of three fairness-tests (including the European test) next to each other 
in French law is nonetheless considered a threat to legal certainty by some 
stakeholders. 
The legal certainty of the contractual fairness provision laid down in the Code de 
commerce has been challenged before the French Constitutional Court. This Court 
however stressed the similarity between the imbalance-test of art. L. 212-1 C.conso. 
and art. L. 442-6(I)(2°) Code de commerce, and held that the former provision abided 
by the constitutional requirement of legal certainty.71 
In any case, the extension of the scope of the UCTD should not have any impact on 
the current state of the law nor should it lessen the level of protection afforded to 
traders. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
The scope of the new article of the Code civil – its restriction to standard agreement 
forms – seems appropriate, although discussions could arise with regard to the non-
negotiated nature of a clause.  
One stakeholder suggested that in concrete cases, depending on the specificities of 
the B2B relation, the possibility to forbid negotiated terms could be useful, for instance 
if a trader is forced to “negotiate”, i.e. to accept a contract term. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
70 Ordonnance du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve 
des obligations. 
71 Conseil constitutionnel 13 January 2011 décision n° 2010-85 QPC, paras 3 – 4 and see Petites Affiches 13 
April 2011, no. 73, p 17. 
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Art. L. 442-6(II) Code de commerce lists a few contract terms which are deemed void 
in a B2B transaction. Case law also offers many examples of unfair terms in B2B 
contracts.72 
Otherwise, all stakeholders consider that the applicability of the general clause to B2B 
contracts largely suffices. 
Furthermore, it can be expected that the civil courts will flesh out the general clause of 
the civil code with the lists from the Code de la consommation. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
One stakeholder questioned the value-added benefit of such an obligation. Problems in 
the B2B relationship do generally not pertain to a lack of transparency or 
misunderstanding but to the impossibility to negotiate and the intrinsic imbalance of 
the terms of contract. 
Most stakeholders are reluctant as far as the introduction of new protective measures 
for businesses are concerned (including the consulted trade associations). 
French law already contains many formal requirements mandating the transparency of 
B2B contracts.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
There are no indications that an extension of the minimum UCTD would benefit cross-
border trade or create a level-playing field (differences in the level of protection will 
remain). 
According to all stakeholders, if the UCTD is to be extended, the directive should stick 
to its minimum harmonisation goal, in order to avoid a reduction of the level of 
protection in place. It should also specifically take into account the specificities of B2B 
transactions, in order to prevent a negative impact on commercial relationships. B2C  
and B2B relationships are fundamentally different in nature. One stakeholder 
reiterated its opposition to the extension of consumer rules to B2B relationships, which 
need their own set of rules. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
There are no indications that an extension of the UCTD would affect market 
opportunities. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Stakeholders rather hold on to the national legislation on B2B contract terms. 
Extending the scope of the minimum UCTD has no value-added whatsoever. 
 
72 E.g. asymmetric provisions on terms of payment, on price revision, on unilateral termination of a contract 
without notification or compensation. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?73  
The injunctions procedure has been embedded in an already developed system of 
injunctions against unfair terms and is not limited to cross-border infractions.74 The ID 
has been transposed by adding a (first) paragraph to the existing disposition in the 
Code de la consommation (the former art. L. 421-6 C.conso).  
In the amended Code de la consommation, the ‘European’ injunction procedure and 
the injunction procedure specifically aimed at unfair terms have been laid down in two 
different articles of law (art. L. 421-6 has been divided into art. L. 621-7 and art. L. 
621-8 C.conso.). 
The use of the injunction procedure in France is widespread and very effective in the 
fight against unfair terms. The injunction procedure based on the ID has in practice 
mainly been used to tackle unfair terms.75 The length of the procedure has been 
criticized: it takes years to obtain to decision that can be enforced. 
The DGCCRF can also bring an action seeking an injunction against both domestic and 
traders from other MS. The latter procedure is however based on Regulation 
2006/2004 (art. L. 524-1 and L. 524-2 C.conso.). The mechanism of mutual 
assistance established by the CPC Regulation has been preferred to cross-border 
procedures. 
The DGCCRF itself is also competent to order the cessation of, and to fine the 
infringement of specific consumer rules.76 These autonomous injunction competences 
are relatively new (2014) and their effectiveness cannot yet be measured. The first 
signs are promising. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The DGCCRF, as opposed to consumer organisations, does not need to be represented 
by a lawyer (‘dispense de ministère d’avocat’, art. R. 525-3 C.conso.), which reduces 
the costs of a (public) injunction action. The representation costs consumer 
organisations have to bear are considered to be contra productive: these costs can run 
high and are not completely covered by an awarding of costs (art. 700 Code de 
procédure civile). 
A regular injunction procedure is seen as lengthy, complex and expensive. 
73  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by art. 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
74 The injunction procedure in the Code de la consommation has seen the light of day with the enactment of 
the Loi n° 88-14 du 5 janvier 1988 relative aux actions en justice des associations agréées de 
consommateurs et à l'information des consommateurs. 
75 Raymond, nr. 974. 
76 The rules transposing the UCPD are however not part of these rules and concerning the UCTD, only art. L. 
241-2 C.conso. regarding the black list of unfair terms entails an administrative fine. 
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A summary procedure exists (‘référé’) in case an urgent court decision is needed (Art. 
484-492 Code de procédure civile). This procedure lasts approximately two months 
but does not lead to a final decision (but to a ‘ordonnance provisoire’). This procedure 
is sometimes being used in case of a misleading practice.  
The obligation to inform consumers by all appropriate means about the unfairness of 
contract terms (Art. L. 621-8(2) C.conso.) is considered a very effective ‘sanction’ 
(see para. 1.2.1). Traders fear negative publicity. For the same reason, art. L. 621-
11(1) C.conso. (the publication of an injunction order in a newspaper or on a 
website77) is viewed as a particularly (even the most) effective measure: traders 
especially fear the obligation to publish the decision on their own website. 
Art. L. 524-2, L. 621-2(1) and L. 621-8(1) C.conso. contain a sanction for non-
compliance with the injunction order (the ‘astreinte’ or penalty payment). This 
sanction increases the effectiveness of the injunction order.  
The non-compliance with the injunction order may also lead to the imposition of very 
severe sanctions (see for example art. L. 132-9 C.conso. regarding misleading 
practices: the non-compliance with a court order is punishable by a prison term of two 
years and a fine of EUR 300 000). 
Pecuniary sanctions are deemed ineffective by some stakeholders: even though fines 
have been raised in the loi Hamon, breaching the law still remains profitable for some 
(bigger) traders. 
The Cour de Cassation has tied the injunction to an obligation to pay damages if the 
general interest has been breached.78 These damages are not proportionate to the 
prejudice caused according to a stakeholder and they have no deterrent effect. 
The French legislator has not transposed art. 5. In practice, a prior consultation often 
takes place in proceedings regarding unfair terms but when there is a blatant breach 
of consumer law; consultation does not make any sense according to one stakeholder. 
The injunction order in itself is deemed effective (especially when coupled to a penalty 
payment and the obligation to publish it on a website). Its effects are mainly 
noticeable in the fight against unfair terms. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The ‘European’ injunction procedure (which is open to European qualified entities) is 
laid down in art. L. 621-7 C.conso. This procedure is expressly confined to acts which 
are illicit in view of the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction 
Directive.79 There is no requirement that this illicitness constitutes a criminal offense. 
The provision explicitly refers to the list in the Annex. This raises the problem of the 
identifiability of those pieces of legislation since it is not always clear which provisions 
in French law transpose European Directives.  
Interestingly, art. L. 621-8 C.conso. refers to both illicit and unfair clauses. The 
difference between these concepts is not clear (since an unfair term can be deemed 
illicit as well).  
There is also an injunction procedure which is attached to a civil action to protect 
collective consumer interests in case of a collective prejudice. This action is only 
accessible for national entities. According to art. L. 621-2 C.conso., all the acts 
(‘agissements illicites’) and clauses (‘clauses illicites’) which are illicit on the basis of 
French law can be the object of this ‘national’ injunction procedure (such as an ‘abus 
77 Cass. Civ. 1re 3 June 2015, n°  14-13193 (UFC/SFR). 
78 Cass. Civ. 1ère, 5 October 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°  260, Picod, nr. 633. 
79 Raymond, nr. 975. 
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de faiblesse’ or a clause which is in breach of a legislative or reglementary provision). 
National associations thus have at their disposal different procedures and often invoke 
both provisions. 
The injunction procedure reserved for the DGCCRF covers all acts and clauses which 
are deemed illicit on the basis of all national and European rules with regard to which 
the DGCCRF is competent (art. L. 511-5-L. 511-7 C.conso.). 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
The obstacles to the effective use at the national level that were mentioned by the 
interviewees pertain to: 
• The openness of clauses (and related problems in terms of proof); 
• The length of the procedure; 
• The costs of the procedure (legal assistance). 
The obstacles to the effective use at the EU level that were mentioned by the 
interviewees pertain to: 
• The costs of the procedure (legal assistance, translation, travel costs); 
• Language problems (national entities want to be able to proceed in their own 
language); 
• The applicable law/the choice of law (maximum harmonisation does not 
prevent diverging interpretations); 
• Differences in procedural laws/complexity of the procedure/potential problems 
with the enforcement/execution of the ruling.80 
Since 2012, the autonomous administrative injunctive competences of the DGCCRF at 
the national level have been enlarged. 
No other measures were taken to reduce the above-mentioned obstacles. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
The limited scope of art. L. 621-7 C.conso. has been severely criticised by different 
stakeholders.  
According to consumer associations, the European procedure should be extended to all 
the directives which have an impact on the position of the consumer, including for 
example Intellectual Property- and Privacy-directives (so as to combat commercial 
practices and unfair clauses in social media-agreements).81 The list is seen as an 
80 The complexity of a cross-border action is well-illustrated by the joint action by the Centre Européen de la 
Consommation and the Union féminine civique et sociale, association française de défense des 
consommateurs against the german Commerzbank : http://www.cec-zev.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/cec-
zev/PDF/documentation/etudes/Etude_action_de_groupe.pdf 
81 http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2014/03/25/donnees-personnelles-l-ufc-assigne-twitter-
facebook-et-google-pour-clauses-abusives_4389172_651865.html 
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undesirable restriction. The legal provisions and the relation between the different 
actions under French and European law should be clarified. 
According to a national supervisory and regulatory authority, the coverage of the ID 
should be extended in line with the coverage of Regulation 2006/2004. This regulation 
is currently being revised and an extension of its scope to a large number of directives 
and regulations has been announced.82 The stakeholder in question strongly supported 
the idea that the coverage of both pieces of EU legislation should be aligned.  
The ID should not be extended to the protection of collective business’ interests. The 
extension of the scope of injunction procedures should, according to all stakeholders, 
be left to national MS to decide on. 
The recently enacted class action procedure was quoted as an example of a good 
practice (art. L. 623-2 ff C.conso.). 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Domestic injunctions are widespread, but the procedure has not yet been used by 
French qualified entities to address infringements originating in another EU country, 
either in France or in the trader’s jurisdiction (ad a) and b)). UFC has once brought a 
procedure before a Swiss court, but without success.83  
As far as c) is concerned, there has been some transnational cooperation between 
qualified entities. A coordinated ‘cross-border’ action was initiated in May 2009 by a 
consortium made of France’s UFC-Que Choisir, Portugal’s DECO and Belgium’s Test-
Achats. The action concerned airlines’ general conditions of carriage and was brought 
before a Belgian court. Some terms were regarded as unfair and three airlines were 
compelled to stop using these terms. This well-coordinated cross-border action does 
however not formally qualify as cross-border litigation under the ID. 
Ad c) also pertains to the cooperation network provided for by Regulation 2006/2004. 
As was indicated before, the DGCCRF favours this type of cross-border enforcement. 
No cross-border injunction procedure has ever been instigated by the DGCCRF for the 
reasons mentioned above (costs, complexity, uncertainty etc.). 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
See the above-mentioned. N/A. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
82 Including for instance the Services directive 2006/123/CE; Regulation No 1107/2006 concerning the 
rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air; Regulation No 
1371/2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations and Directive 2014/92/EU on the comparability of 
fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic 
features. 
83 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/documents/study_on_injunctions_directive_final_report-
18_12_2011_en.pdf, p. 69. 
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practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Different stakeholders praised the CPC network. 
One stakeholder complained about the lack of coordination between the ID and 
Regulation 2006/2004. The ID should follow the idea laid down in the regulation that a 
procedure instigated by a competent authority/legal entity within the jurisdiction 
where the trader is established is most effective. It was suggested that there is also 
some unhealthy competition going on between the two pieces of legislation. Some MS 
favour the ID and some MS prefer acting upon mutual assistance requests addressed 
to them through the CPC Network. A sole instrument would be more effective. This 
stakeholder commended the plans to increase the role of the EC in the new CPC 
Regulation.84 
Further measures that could enhance the level of consumer protection at EU level and 
the cross-border use of the procedure relate to a better definition of the procedural 
rules applicable to injunction procedures in different MS.85 In one MS the competent 
court shall be the court where the defendant is established, whereas in another MS it 
shall be the court where the claimant resides. 
A better coordination at EU level of the (preventive) controls on the commercialisation 
of financial products by free services providers was suggested by the AMF (pointing at 
the binary options scam). 
No best practices were mentioned during the interviews. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure laid down in art. L. 621-7 C.conso. and in art. L. 524-1 ff 
C.conso. (DGCCRF) pertain to all those directives and make no distinction as to the 
(European) source of the illicitness. 
The domestic civil action of art. L. 621-1 ff. C.conso. also constitutes a legal basis to 
enforce the consumer law directives. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
There are a few differences between the national and the ‘European’ procedure: the 
non-French entities on the Commission list have only access to the latter procedure. 
National qualified entities have access to both the domestic and the ‘European’ 
procedure. 
84 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/docs/cpc-revision-proposal_en.pdf 
85 Cf. ECLI:EU:C:2013:800, Case C‑413/12 (Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y 
León). 
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The ‘European’ procedure is restricted to the rules transposing the listed directives 
(and does not pertain to domestic consumer law). 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
French consumers were already well protected under existing national laws against 
UCT and UCP. Nowadays, the consumer is better protected by the minimum rules 
stemming from the UCTD than by the maximum rules on UCP.  
The general clauses are praised for their large scope and for their flexibility which 
allows enforcers and consumer associations to tackle many types of terms and 
practices, especially when traders try to circumvent clear-cut rules. General clauses 
act as a ‘safety net’. 
The Directives (especially the clear-cut rules such as the misleading omission or the 
black list of unfair terms) are also particularly effective in preventing the use of unfair 
practices and terms. Their effectiveness is guaranteed by the strict sanctions and far-
reaching injunctive powers of the DGCCRF.  
The benefits of these Directives are limited not so much by the costs for consumers in 
exercising their rights under them (there are many procedures available which are 
easily accessible in terms of costs)86 but more by their lack of knowledge of these 
rights. Some stakeholders stressed the need to inform consumers more effectively 
about their rights. The vagueness and the abstractness of the rules however make 
them difficult to grasp. 
According to a consumer association the directives have not had any repercussions on 
the prices and (potential) costs were not passed on to the consumer. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
There might be benefits for bigger companies insofar as the number of bans has 
decreased under the influence of the UCPD. A trade association however pointed at 
the fact that good practices were not lost and that the level of consumer protection did 
not drastically drop. Rogue traders were already banned from the domestic market by 
the old rules. 
The effect of the UCPD is not clear since many new (positive) rules have seen the light 
of day since 2005 (the CRD and loi Hamon). Many stakeholders have criticised the 
(hasty87) legislative changes that have occurred in recent years. They aspire to a 
period of legislative stability or to a simplification/reduction of the rules. Trade 
86 One stakeholder stressed the importance of the recently introduced class action. 
87 One stakeholder pointed at the introduction of rules on planned obsolescence and the extension of the 
legal guarantee. Both are currently being discussed at the European level. 
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associations argue in favour of maximum harmonisation since it does not allow for 
additional national legislation and increases the consistency of the rules. 
There is unfortunately no quantitative evidence available. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
More regulation, especially formal rules, entails more costs. However, one stakeholder 
noted that traders are only required to provide information they already possess. This 
was called into question by a business association that indicated that some sellers 
depend on their suppliers/distributors to obtain mandatory information (and 
sometimes information is lost). 
Traders are generally willing to adapt to new rules and to bear the costs associated 
with their implementation.  
The level of legal uncertainty stemming from the use of general clauses (mainly the 
UCPD), however, is considered to be problematic. The benefits of a more liberal 
approach seem to be mainly88 accessible to those companies which can afford legal 
advice and are member of trade associations. Different stakeholders doubt the 
benefits of a level playing field for small and medium businesses, which encounter 
problems dealing with the legal uncertainty. One stakeholder pointed at the costs of 
the diverging (and changing) interpretations of general clauses at the national and 
European level. 
The ID appears to have had no impact at all in France since an effective domestic 
procedure was already in place. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
The legal certainty that was lost with the disappearance of positive bans under French 
law in the field of commercial practices has increased the costs of investigations for 
public authorities: more evidence is needed and the discussions arising with traders 
prolong those investigations. Means are lacking to effectively enforce general clauses. 
One stakeholder specifically pointed at the problematic lack of means of national 
enforcement authorities. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
The UCPD has not been implemented in a cost-effective manner. The implementation 
process has been a long and uncertain one and was only recently89 completed, after 
several bans on commercial practices had to be removed from the Code de la 
consommation. There is a lot of uncertainty as regards the correct transposition and 
interpretation of this full harmonisation directive. 
The implementation of the other directives under scrutiny has been cost-effective 
(there are no indications for the contrary). 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
88 One respondent mentioned that even larger businesses are seeking for legal advice. 
89 Abrogation de l’arrêté du 31 décembre 2008 relatif aux annonces de réduction de prix à l'égard du 
consommateur 
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The costs of implementation of minimum directives are lower and these directives 
allow for a higher level of consumer protection. So there is no contradiction as far as 
minimum harmonisation is concerned. 
As far as full harmonisation is concerned, stakeholders have criticised the extensive 
and continuously expanding interpretation of the UCPD by the European Commission 
(Guidance) and the CJEU and pointed at the lack of clarity of the general clauses. The 
costs of implementation could be reduced by the introduction of better-defined 
positively formulated rules that do not give (too much) way to diverging 
interpretations. 
One trade association has given a detailed account of the costly changes incurred by 
the very detailed European Commission Guidance document (which for instance 
suggests that the marketplace can be considered a ‘trader’).90 
A consumer association indicated that more should be done to reduce the costs of 
injunction actions for consumer associations, by facilitating access to public files and 
records of the DGCCRF and by alleviating their burden of proof. In this respect, it 
suggested that the CE Marking should be better controlled at the European level (like 
the NF marking). Reliable marking brings benefits in terms of evidence. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied 
in practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
Businesses in the regulated sectors are aware of the applicability of the general 
requirements concerning contract terms and commercial practices. These 
requirements are unfortunately not always complied with as shows enforcement 
practice. 
The UCTD is regularly applied by the DGCCRF and courts as a legal basis to tackle 
unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated sectors, notably in the areas of 
electronic communications91, energy92 and consumer financial services93. 
In the same way, the UCPD is used as a legal basis to combat unfair commercial 
practices in the regulated sectors. In the energy sector, the photovoltaic panels scam 
has been tackled by means of the dispositions transposing the UCPD. In the financial 
90 Guidance document, p. 127. 
91 https://www.quechoisir.org/action-ufc-que-choisir-sfr-lourdement-condamne-pour-de-nombreuses-
clauses-abusives-n14023/; 
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/dgccrf/presse/communique/2015/cp-
demarchage-agressif-telephonie-24-09-2015.pdf; http://www.leparisien.fr/economie/free-somme-par-la-
justice-de-supprimer-plusieurs-clauses-abusives-29-03-2016-5670029.php 
92 Recommandation n° 2014-01 relative aux contrats proposés par les fournisseurs de gaz et d'électricité ; 
http://lci.tf1.fr/economie/consommation/electricite-gaz-31-clauses-abusives-dans-les-contrats-
8560541.html, UFC Que choisir has instigated different injonction procedures against energy companies 
EDF-GDF, Energie Direct and Eni ; http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/contrats-fourniture-delectricite-
et-gaz-naturel 
93 Cass. Civ. 1ere 23 January 2013, n° 10-21177 and 10-22815. Recommandation n°05-02 relative aux 
conventions de compte de dépôt (BOCCRF 20/09/2005). 
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sector, the DGCCRF has tackled unfair (doorstep-selling) practices of insurance 
companies, more specifically the breach of information duties and aggressive 
practices.94 
The level of awareness among consumers is low. The INC has the official task of 
informing consumers about their rights under both directives regardless of the sector. 
Recently the INC has warned the ‘financial consumer’ about misleading advertising for 
forex and binary trading options.95  
The dissemination of information also takes place at the sectoral level: the ARCEP 
(French Telecommunications Regulatory Authority) for example informs consumers 
about their rights (including their rights under both directives) by means of a website: 
telecom-infoconso.fr. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors?]  
A distinction must be made between the rules transposing the general directives into 
the Code de la consommation, the rules transposing sector-specific directives into the 
Code de la consommation and the rules transposing sector-specific directives into 
sectoral legislation. 
The DGCCRF has exclusive supervisory and enforcement competences with regard to 
the rules transposing the general directives and the sector-specific directives into the 
Code de la consommation, irrespective of the sector.96 The DGCCRF has a clear 
overview of the interplay of general and sectoral legislation laid down in the Code de 
la consommation. Specialised sectoral units within the authority assess sectoral 
problems themselves. 
Sectoral authorities have no competences regarding the enforcement of the Code de la 
consommation, not even the sectoral rules.97  
The ARCEP has no regulatory or enforcement powers whatsoever concerning the two 
Directives under scrutiny. Its competences are limited to the Code des Postes et des 
Télécommunications which does not refer to the Code de la consommation. Consumer 
rules relating to electronic communications have been transposed into the Code de la 
consommation and are enforced by the DGCRRF (art. L. 224-26 ff and art. L. 224-43 
ff.  C.conso). ARCEP and DGCCRF maintain narrow (though informal) contact with 
each other when the latter authority carries out investigations within the sector or 
prepares regulatory texts. They exchange public information. They also cooperate 
within the CNC (Conseil national de la consommation) when it discusses telecom 
issues. ARCEP finally deals with consumer complaints (without being formally obliged 
to do so) and redirects consumer towards consumer associations, the DGCCRF or ADR. 
Beside the DGCCRF, two sectoral authorities are indirectly responsible for the 
enforcement of the rules transposing the general and sector-specific directives in the 
field of financial services in the Code de la consommation. The AMF is in charge of 
monitoring financial markets. Its competences are similar to those of the ACP which 
monitors the activity of banks and insurance companies. According to art. 612-1(II)(3) 
Code monétaire et financier, it ‘shall verify the adequacy of the means and procedures 
that said entities implement in order to comply with Book I of the Consumer Code 
94 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/demarchage-et-vente-a-distance-dassurances 
95 http://www.conso.net/content/forex-attention-danger 
96 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/Consommation/Consommation-par-secteur.  
97 The Commission de Regulation de l’Energie has for instance indicated that is not competent as regards 
the UCPD and UCTD and could not answer the questions. 
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(old)’, (which contains the rules transposing the UCPD and UCTD). Both authorities do 
not control directly the abidance by the rules transposing those directives. They only 
have direct competences as far as sectoral regulation is concerned (art. 612-1(I)(2) 
Code monétaire et financier) and do not enforce the UCPD and UCTD rules directly. 
The ACP issues recommendations concerning good commercial practices which should 
be taken into account by financial services providers (art. L. 612-29-1 Code monétaire 
et financier). These recommendations constitute soft law98 but refer to hard law, 
including the UCPD and the UCTD.99 
AMF and ACP work closely together. Both authorities control, investigate and sanction 
the conduct of financial service providers. They cooperate in a ‘pôle commun’ in order 
to fine-tune their interpretation of general clauses such as the misleading clause and 
issue statements together.  
Coordination with the DGCCRF occurs in case of a blatant disregard of general 
consumer rules and when there is a need to exchange information. The cooperation 
with the DGCCRF is not formalised. It takes place on a regular basis but does not go 
further than ad hoc contacts on concrete cases (Forex/binary options) and joint 
guidelines.100 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
There is no sectoral equivalent for the UCTD.  
In the field of consumer credit, lenders must abide by a great variety of formal 
requirements. The breach of these requirements constitutes a formal ‘irregularity’ and 
leads to the loss of the right to interest. For years, courts were not entitled to apply 
this sanction ex officio but used the fairness-test to bypass this prohibition, deeming a 
term deviating from a model contract unfair. This circuitous route is no longer needed 
since all the remedies and sanctions laid down the Code de la consommation may be 
raised ex officio.101  
In the field of commercial practices, rules tend to overlap each other. One stakeholder 
spoke of a ‘mille-feuille’ of provisions. When compared with the breach of sectoral 
rules, the breach of the UCPD rules is seen as more difficult to prove. The breach of 
sectoral rules does not fall within the scope of tort law. 
In the financial sector, overlap exists between the general misleading clause of the 
UCPD and art. L. 533-12(1) Code monétaire et financier which states that ‘all the 
information, including communications of a promotional nature, that is sent to clients, 
including potential clients, by an investment service provider, shall have a content 
which is accurate, clear and not misleading’.102 There is also overlap between art. L. 
132-27 Code des assurances and the misleading clause (more specifically art. 7(2) 
UCPD). 
Sectoral regulation, which is based on both European and national legislation, is very 
fragmented and complex. Most rules have a limited scope of application. Furthermore, 
98 Conseil d’Etat 20 June 2016, N° 384297, ECLI:FR:CECHR:2016:384297.20160620 
99 Cf. Recommandation sur la commercialisation des contrats d’assurance vie liés au financement en 
prévision d’obsèques 2011-R-04 du 15 juin 2011 which refers twice to recommendations of the CCA. 
100 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/arnaques-financieres-en-ligne-lamf-parquet-paris-dgccrf-et-lacpr-
se-mobilisent 
101 The Cour de Cassation took the stance that the sanction attached to the unfairness-test did not apply to 
formal irregularities which are sanctioned by the loss of the right to interests and condemned this 
circuitous route: Cass. Civ. 1ère 23 November 2004, n° 03-11411, Bull. civ. 2004 I, no. 287 
102 Cf. art. 314-10 à 314-17 règlement général de l’AMF. 
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the many legislative amendments of the last years have had a negative impact on the 
coherence of the rules;103 see for instance the rules regarding the doorstep-selling of 
financial and insurance products (art. L. 222-1 – 222-18 C.conso., art. L. 341-1 ff 
Code monétaire et financier, art. 112-9 Code des assurances, art. L. 222-18 Code de 
la mutualité which reproduces the old provisions of the Code de la consommation). 
The question arises whether all types of products are being covered by a protective 
rule.  
In general, general rules (including national rules such as the ‘abus de faiblesse’) and 
sector-specific rules do not interfere and complete each other quite well. Sectoral rules 
from European and domestic origin are generally more precise and contain positive 
obligations. Such rules are preferred above general clauses by both enforcers and 
traders. Based on the interviews, traders largely abide by the sector-specific rules. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
As far as commercial practices are concerned, enforcement bodies have different 
options at their disposal. The complementary application offers some flexibility. 
However, the benefits of the complementarity are somehow limited in view of the 
restricted competences of sectoral authorities. 
The ACP stressed that it cannot apply the UCPD and UCTD directly. The fact that the 
above-mentioned art. L. 132-27 Code des assurances only applies to life insurance 
contracts is therefore seen as a problem since the ACP cannot directly fall back on the 
misleading clause of the UCPD if the information given in for instance a car insurance 
contract is considered misleading. The ACP also mentioned art. 17(1) Directive 
2016/97 on insurance distribution. This article, which is formulated positively, provides 
the authority with the competence to tackle unfair practices in the insurance sector 
(even if it is not competent to act upon art. 5 UCPD). 
Enforcement bodies prefer to apply the sector-specific rules which are geared towards 
the peculiar practices of the sector. They are more detailed and constitute a solid basis 
of action. 
No quantitative information is available concerning the costs due to the 
complementary application with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
As long as there is no conflicting overlap there is no need for clarification. 
Contradictions between the general and the sectoral rules are scarce. Sometimes 
sectoral rules provide more protection to the consumer than the general rules. 
Sectoral rules are given precedence over general rules (lex specialis) by enforcement 
bodies and traders in a sector focus primarily on sectoral legislation. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
103 Sectoral legislation on commercial practices in the financial sector is currently being extended to  
    address new types of e-practices and dangerous practices (cf. the loi Sapin II).  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
411
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Most stakeholders indicate that in many C2B transactions the consumer is in a weaker 
position than the professional party, irrespective of the consumer being the seller. If 
such an imbalance is the case, it is according to most stakeholders very desirable and 
also very likely that consumer law (including the UCTD and UCPD) will apply.  
As a matter of fact, specific legal dispositions have recently been enacted regarding 
the sale of precious metal by the consumer (art. L. 224-96 ff, L. 242-34 ff and R. 224-
4 C.conso.).104 
The regulation of the C2C relationship within the sharing economy is considered a 
more pressing issue. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The concepts of ‘consumer’, ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ as 
currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant jurisprudence are 
considered to be valid and fit for purpose. They provide some much needed flexibility 
without jeopardising the harmonisation goals of the directives. More guidance would 
be much appreciated though, since the interpretation of these concepts still diverges 
at both the national and the European level.105 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The fact that the ‘abus de faiblesse’ provision has been maintained in the Code de la 
consommation might indicate that there is need for a more adequate tool to protect 
vulnerable consumers in concrete circumstances. The unfairness-test of the UCPD is 
considered to be too abstract in that respect. 
Based on the experiences in France, there is no need to introduce specific provisions 
protecting the vulnerable consumer in the UCTD. In the financial sector, regulation 
(including self-regulation) contains different provisions which aim at protecting the 
vulnerable consumer.106 
When it comes to the transparency and the content of general terms of contract, all 
consumers are vulnerable. Consumers do not read GTC. It is doubtful whether the 
application of ‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ 
consumer concept by the CJEU107 in the context of the UCTD is valid and fit for 
purpose. 
 
104 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/dgccrf/documentation/fiches_pratiques/ 
    fiches/rachat-d-or-metaux-precieux.pdf 
105 B. Duivenvoorde, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Springer 
2015. 
106 Cf. la Charte sur l’inclusion bancaire et de prévention de surendettement. 
107 ECLI:EU:C:2014:282, Case C-26/13, (Kásler és Káslerné Rábai), 30 April 2014, para. 74. 
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1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Concerning the UCPD, the level of protection of consumers against UCP has slightly 
decreased with the disappearance of several bans on commercial practices and the 
high level of legal uncertainty created by the general clause. Some previously 
forbidden practices are no longer controlled by the DGCCRF. The black list is not 
perceived as an effective tool and does not match the ‘needs’ of enforcement 
authorities. 
Regarding the UCTD, the answer to this question is more ambivalent: legislation 
regarding unfair terms (and the injunction procedure) was already in place but the 
further extension of this legislation (the coming about of the lists) and the case-law of 
the CJEU (regarding the ex officio application) have increased the level of consumer 
protection during the years. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
No, detailed information requirements regarding prices per measurement units already 
existed in France (since 1987). Nothing has changed after the PID has been 
transposed into French law. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Comparative advertising was already strictly regulated under French law (until 1992 it 
was even forbidden) but this regulation was considered to be too strict and to 
disregard the benefits of comparative advertising. The implementation of the MCAD 
has stimulated competition without jeopardising the protection of businesses.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
It has become easier for French businesses to directly trade cross-border to final 
consumers located in other EU countries in recent years, thanks to the internet, the 
single currency, harmonised conformity and safety rules. 
For consumers, it has become easier to purchase cross-border thanks again to the 
internet, the single currency and maybe a better knowledge of English. The tackling of 
geo-blocking will further facilitate cross-border trade provided that websites adapt to 
local culture and language.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
As far as the consumer is concerned improvements are not related to the mentioned 
directives. Most stakeholders doubt whether consumers take their legal rights into 
consideration when they make the decision to purchase something abroad. Consumers 
for instance are generally considered to not read GTC. 
As far as traders are concerned, it is at least very doubtful whether these Directives 
have played a facilitating role. Their concepts are considered too vague and too 
abstract. Clear-cut and concrete rules such as the harmonisation of the delivery and 
the withdrawal period have had some impact, for they pertain to concrete aspects of 
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the selling process. Such univocal rules provide legal certainty (and capture the 
attention of consumers). 
According to the stakeholders, key considerations for both traders and consumers 
when crossing the border are: 
• Language issues (translation costs); 
• Distance and travel costs; 
• Adaptation (of the products) to the local culture and taste. 
Traders also take into consideration the amount and the level of complexity of clear-
cut European and domestic regulation, such as: 
• Domestic information duties (think of the obligation to provide information on 
the availability of spare parts in France, which discourages foreign traders to 
access the French market according to one stakeholder); 
• Domestic product conformity and safety rules (certificates, labels). 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – France  
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
Art.  L. 212-1 C.conso. (general 
clause)108 
Art. L. 241-1 – L. 241-2 C.conso. 
(sanctions) 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Art. R. 212-1, R. 212-3 et 
R. 212-4 C.conso. 
Art. R. 212-3 et R. 
212-4 relate to the 
exceptions. 
Art. R. 212-1 – R. 212-2 
C.conso. (list) 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
Yes Art. R. 241-2, R. 241-3 et 
R. 241-4 C.conso. 
Idem. 
Art. L. 211-1 C.conso. 
(transparency requirement) 
 Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
Yes Art. L. 212-1 (6) C.conso.  
Art. L. 621-7 and L. 621-8 
C.conso. (injunction procedure) 
 Extensions of the application of Directive to 
the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No Art. L. 212-1 (3) C.conso.  
Directive 2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in 
Art. L. 121-1 C.conso. (general 
clause) 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes See Annex 3 Study on the 
application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in 
the EU 
 
108 Loi n° 95-96 du 1er février 1995 concernant les clauses abusives et la présentation des contrats et régissant diverses activités d'ordre économique et commercial. 
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the internal market Art. L. 121-2 – L. 121-5 C.conso. 
(misleading practices) 
L. 132-1 – L. 132-9 C.conso. 
(sanctions) 
 Provisions regarding immovable going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes See Annex 3 Study on the 
application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in 
the EU – French report 
 
Art. L. 121-6 – L. 121-7 C.conso. 
(aggressive practices) 
L. 132-10 – L. 132-12 C.conso. 
(sanctions) 
 Application of UCPD to B2B transactions Yes Art. L. 121.2 C.conso. 
(misleading practices) and 
L. 121-4 C.conso.(black 
list misleading practices) 
Only partially: art. 
L. 121-5 C.conso. 
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection in 
the indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to consumers 
Arrêté du 3 décembre 1987 
relatif à l’information du 
consommateur sur les prix 
 Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
 
Yes L. 112-2 C.conso. Extension to  
service providers. 
(France did not 
make use of Art. 
3(1)) 
Arrêté du 16 novembre 1999 
relatif à la publicité, à l’égard 
du consommateur, des prix de 
vente à l’unité de mesure de 
certains produits préemballés 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations: 
- Art. 5(2) allowing MS in the case of non-
food products, to establish a list of the 
products or product categories to which the 
obligation to indicate the unit price shall 
remain applicable. 
- Art. 4(1) allowing MS to provide that the 
maximum number of prices to be indicated 
be limited: identical products sold at the 
same price and displayed together can bear 
a single indication of the selling and unit 
prices 
Yes  
- Annexe to Arrêté du 16 
novembre 1999 
 
- Art. 6 Arrêté du 3 
décembre 1987 
 
Art. L. 112-1 - L. 112-2 C.conso.      
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Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading 
and comparative 
advertising 
Art. L. 121-2 C.conso       
Art. L. 122-1 – L. 122-7 and L. 
135-25 C.conso. 
     
Directive 2009/22/EC 
on injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' interests 
Ordonnance no 2001-741 du 
23 août 2001 
     
Art. L. 621-7 and L. 621-8 
C.conso. 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – France  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No, single 
procedure  
 
Art. L. 621-7 in combination with art. 
L. 621-8 C.conso. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
 
The competence of the DGCCRF to 
bring an action seeking an injunction 
is based on Regulation 2006/2004, 
not on the ID. 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in the 
comments column for which infringements 
the court or administrative procedure is 
foreseen 
- Both forms of 
procedure 
An action seeking an injunction on 
the basis of the ID can be brought 
before a civil court (art. L. 621-7 
C.conso.). 
The national injunction procedure 
tied to civil actions carried out in the 
collective interest of consumers (a 
prejudice is required: L. 621-1 
C.conso.) can be brought before a 
civil or a criminal court. Art. L. 621-2 
C.conso. does not stem from the 
Directive and goes back to 1988. 
The DGCCRF has administrative 
injunctive powers. 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
Art. 700 Code de procédure civile 
(«condamnation aux dépens»). 
Not all the costs will however be 
covered. 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
areas of consumer 
law that are not 
part of Annex I of 
the Directive 
 
The national injunction procedure 
tied to civil actions carried out in the 
collective interest of consumers 
pertains to practices and clauses 
which are illicit under national law. It 
is not restricted to Annex I of the 
Directive. This type of civil action is 
however restricted to national109 
organisations. 
109 http://www.conso.net/content/les-associations-de-consommateurs 
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Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure 
- Yes 
 
Indirectly, the procedure pertains to 
the C.conso. (including those 
provisions which apply to B2B such 
as the misleading practices). 
The injunctive powers of the DGCCRF 
also concern Title IV of the Code de 
commerce (re the fairness of B2B 
transactions): art. L. 465-1 Code de 
commerce. 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
 
- No 
 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including the 
consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
 
- No 
 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in the 
comments column. 
- Yes 
 
There is a general procedure 
(‘référé’) for when an urgent 
decision from a judge is needed; this 
can be used by a consumer 
association in order to stop an 
infringement. 
Approx. two months. 
Art. 484-492 Code de procédure civil. 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day of 
non-compliance 
 
To the public purse (‘astreintes’) 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
L. 621-11 C.conso. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are paid 
to the public purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes 
 
It is actually the other way around in 
art. L. 621-2 C.conso. an injunction 
procedure can be brought within an 
action for damages. 
The damages are paid to the 
qualified entity. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
419
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
- No Not within the procedure but a 
separate action de groupe can be 
started. 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- No  
Can the qualified entity claim other measures 
beyond the injunction, e.g. evidence of 
compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices (of 
other traders)? 
- Yes 
 
The erga-omnes effect of injunctions 
against unfair terms is laid down in 
art. L. 524-1(2) and (3), L. 621-2(2), 
L. 621-8(2) C.conso. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available = 
2015)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(no. of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of… Comment 
UCPD UCTD PID* other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
sectoral) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
Statistics 
of the 
DGCCRF 
5800 
investi-
gations 
28.1%  
2802 
5% 
495 
30.3
% 
3022 
12.2% 
1208 
24.4% 
2433 
100% 
9960 
Note: This data was provided by the DGCCRF (national enforcement body) and is based on the investigations (“enquêtes 
et contrôles”, which often apply different Directives) it carried out in 2015 after complaints from consumers. *Including 
legal guarantees Sales Directive, information duties pertaining to the price from the CRD. 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).110  
110 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 0 
E-
procedure111 
(via internet): 
EUR 39.90- 
89.90 
n/a n/a 
Impossible to estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, literacy, 
perseverance and 
experience of 
consumer. No time 
needed in case court 
tests term of its own 
motion in the course of 
a procedure. ( the 
procedure itself lasts 
approximately one 
month) 
The consumer 
may have to 
bring in a 
bailiff 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0 n/a n/a 
Impossible to estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, literacy, 
perseverance and 
experience of 
consumer. (the 
procedure itself lasts 
90 days) 
 
Notes: Lower court procedure: Juge de proximité (is going to be integrated into the tribunaux d’instance on January 1st 
2017); ADR: Médiateur de la consummation. In both procedures it is possible to be assisted by a lawyer, however few 
consumers choose to do so.  
 
111 https://www.demanderjustice.com/ 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
No reliable data available. It is very unlikely that ADR procedures are being used to 
invoke the unfairness and thereby the non-binding character of GTC, since ADR bodies 
(‘médiateurs’) do not apply the law. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
EEC-France European Consumer Centre 20/6/2016 
Association Consommation, 
Logement, Cadre de Vie (CLCV) 
National consumer organisation 
 
 
22/6/2016 
Autorité des Marchés financiers 
(AMF) 
National supervisory and 
regulatory authority 
24/6/2016 
Fédération du Commerce et de la 
Distribution (FCD) 
2 interviews 
Business association 
 
 
27/6/2016 
 
15/7/2016 
Union Française des 
Consommateurs - Que Choisir 
(UFC) 
National consumer organisation 29/6/2016 
Institut national de la 
Consommation 
(INC)/Commission des clauses 
abusives (CCA) 
National authority 4/7/2016 
Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel 
(ACP) 
 
National supervisory and 
regulatory authority 
6/7/2016 
Direction générale de la 
concurrence, de la 
consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes (DGCCRF) 
2 interviews 
National supervisory and 
regulatory authority 
11/7/2016 
 
 
 
Written answers received on 
19/7/2016 
Autorité de régulation des 
communications électroniques et 
des postes  (ARCEP) 
National supervisory and 
regulatory authority 
12/7/2016 
Fédération des industries 
électriques, électroniques et de 
communication (FIEEC) 
Business association 18/7/2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
J. Calais-Auloy & H. 
Temple 
2015 Droit de la consommation 
Y.  Picod 2015 Droit de la consommation 
G. Raymond 2014 Droit de la consommation 
C. Pavillon 2011 Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht: de 
oneerlijkheidsnorm in vergelijkend perspectief 
N. Sauphanor-Brouillaud  
 
2014 ‘Les sanctions des règles protectrices des consommateurs dans la loi 
relative à la consommation’, Revue des contrats 2014/3, p. 471. 
 C. Minet 2014 ‘Loi Hamon : Le mieux est-il l’ennemi du bien ?’, Revue Lamy Droit 
des Affaires 2014/93. 
S. Piédelièvre 2014 Droit de la consommation 
E. Terryn & D. Voinot 
(eds) 
2012 Droit européen des pratiques commerciales déloyales: Evolution et 
perspectives 
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1.  Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report GERMANY  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The German law on unfair competition has a long history, as the first Act against 
unfair competition dates back to 1896.1 The second code against unfair competition – 
dating from 1909 – remained in force until 2004.2 It was characterised by a broad 
general clause, whose application led to a considerable amount of case law and 
consequently established categories of unfair commercial practices.3 This general 
clause is one of the main reasons for the UWG having maintained its structure for 
nearly a hundred years. In practice, this approach was well recognized since it allows 
a great flexibility when adapting to new developments.4 It has proven to be an 
essential tool to properly adjudicate new unfair commercial practices. Thus the 
principle-based approach was and still is assessed as effectively preserving fair 
competition. Despite the existence of established case law, the German legislature 
decided to pass a new Act against unfair competition in 2004, in which the established 
case law was codified while maintaining a general clause.5 Hence, it is fair to state 
that the principle-based approach has been part of the German law against unfair 
competition since its beginnings. The UCPD did cause some deviation from this 
principle, especially since the latest amendment of the German Act against Unfair 
Competition in December 2015, which became necessary due to critique from part of 
the European Commission with regard to the implementation of the UCPD.6 Due to the 
fact that the principle-based approach was always a significant part of German Unfair 
Competition law, stakeholders did not report any problems with it.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Most of the unfair commercial practices listed in in the black list were already 
prohibited in German unfair competition law before the transposition of the UCPD. 
Therefore, the actual effect of the UCPD blacklist should be assessed as negligible,7 a 
view also supported by most stakeholders.8 It should be added however, that there 
1 Act against Unfair Competition (“Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb”, UWG), Imperial Law 
Gazette (RGBl.) I 1986, p. 145. 
2 Imperial Law Gazette (RGBl.) I 1909, p. 499, as to its importance see Köhler, “Einleitung UWG”, 
rec 2.3 seqq. in: Köhler/Bornkamm (2016). 
3 Cf. for further references regarding the application of the general clause in Germany prior to the UCPD, 
Beater (2011), p. 376 seqq. 
4 Cf. e.g. Peukert “§ 3 UWG”, rec. 23 in: Großkommentar UWG (2014); Sosnitza “§ 3 UWG”, rec. 1, 13 in: 
Münchener Kommentar (2014); Wirtz “§ 3 UWG”, rec. 30 in: Götting/Nordemann (2016). 
5 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2004, p. 1414, most recently amended by Art. 4 of the Act of 17.02.2016, 
Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, p. 233, 235. 
6 Ohly GRUR 2016, 3, 4. 
7 Scherer WRP 2011, 393, 400. 
8 According to the “Wettbewerbszentrale” – one of the stakeholders – only 2% of their cases dealt with the 
“black list”; cf. also Wettbewerbszentrale (2015), Jahresbericht (Annual Report) 2015, p. 103. 
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has been a slightly negative assessment of the black list in legal literature,9 as the 
commercial practices address very specific situations, which might not be relevant in 
all Member States – again a view which was supported by stakeholders. For example 
one stakeholder – a consumer organization – complained that it is in practice hardly 
ever possible to proceed against bait-and-switch offers under the black list (Sec. 3 
para. 3 with No. 5 Annex I UWG), since the provision does not prohibit as such an 
inadequate supply, but rather the misleading and insufficient advertisement. Thus 
phrases, as ‘while stock lasts’, are enough to legitimate bait-and-switch offers, which 
is why this kind of unfair commercial practices is emerging in practice. 
Only one stakeholder pointed out that the black list led to an increase in legal 
certainty. Also in the daily practice of stakeholders, the black list plays only a minor 
role.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
It seems that there are no statutes in Germany imposing more restrictive regulations 
with regard to financial services or immovable property (i.e. more restrictive than the 
UCPD).10 Further, it should be noted that especially in the field of financial services the 
EU legislature introduced provisions that supercede the UCPD as leges speciales under 
Art. 3 para. 4 UCPD.11 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The German law regarding misleading environmental claims has not profoundly 
changed due to the Directive. Environmental advertising has always been scrutinised 
by German courts. However, due to the need to adapt to the European model of the 
average consumer (cf. below), German law had to accept changes. The prior German 
model of the average consumer was more protective. Hence, environmental 
advertising was only allowed under strict limitations.12 To date, the law only allows 
environmental advertising under limited circumstances due to the complexity of 
environmental correlations and the mostly limited knowledge of customers on the one 
hand, and the strong emotional component of such advertisement on the other 
hand.13 In general, claims about food being ‘organic’ as an absolute measurement are 
allowed only under strict scrutiny, whereas more comparative advertising (‘more’ 
organic) are more likely to be regarded as fair.14 Advertising regarding the support of 
environmental goals (e.g. the protection of parts of rainforest with a certain 
percentage of the price asked for the advertised product) is admissible as long as a 
company fulfils the promises made in the advertisement.15 Environmental claims 
always need to be correct and relevant in the context; this relevance is especially 
9  Cf. Beater (2011), p. 264 (considered black list as containment (”Fremdkörper“) in the UWG);  
Fritzsche/Peifer, “§ 3 UWG” rec. 693 in: Großkommentar UWG (2013); Scherer WRP 2011, 392; 
Schöttle WRP 2009, 673. 
10  Cf. legislators’ explanation to the statute implementing the UCDP into the German UWG, Bundestag-
Drucksache. 16/10145, p. 14); however, there are some, at least implicit, regulations in this area, such 
as Sec. 39 para. I Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act) that impose restrictions on using the term “bank”, cf. 
in this regard Fischer “Sec. 39 KWG”, rec. 3 in: Boos/Fischer/Schulte-Mattler (2012). 
11  Cf. for a comprehensive analysis Rott (2011), p. 136 seqq. 
12  Roller ZUR 2014, 211, 212 ff. 
13  Sosnitza “§ 5 UWG”, rec. 301 in: Ohly/Sosnitza (2016). 
14  Sosnitza “§ 5 UWG”, rec. 302 in: Ohly/Sosnitza (2016). 
15  Cf. BGH 26.10.2006, Az. I ZR 97/04 (Regenwaldprojekt II); cf. also Roller ZUR 2014, 211, 214 seq. 
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important if an environmental label is used.16  
Closely related to misleading practice regarding environmental claims are practices in 
the energy market. For example, generally known information does not need to be 
given to consumers, e.g. that green power does not derive directly from renewable 
resources.17 However, claims like ‘hair drying against nuclear power’ or ‘ironing for 
health’ have been treated by courts as misleading commercial practices, based on the 
reasoning that the claims suggest that the companies in question are not delivering 
nuclear electricity, although they actually do.18  
One stakeholder reported that it has to deal with numerous cases in the area of 
environmental claims and also cases in the area of energy.19 It stressed that the 
current legal system in Germany is fit to deal with such claims. This view was backed 
by other stakeholders. Only one other stakeholder expressed the opinion that 
sometimes environmental claims are too vague in order to be regarded as unfair 
under the UWG.20  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
Historically, German law had always provided for a high level of consumer protection. 
The consumer model applied was based on an uncritical and superficial consumer. A 
misleading rate of 10-15% was deemed sufficient in order to regard a commercial 
practice as misleading.21 This interpretation had to change due to the CJEU’s definition 
of the average consumer as ‘reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect’.22 Hence, EU law focuses on informing the consumer, presuming the 
consumer will comprehend the given information and act accordingly.23 German courts 
are thus obliged to apply the concept of the ‘average consumer’ and stakeholders did 
not report any problems with this concept. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The concept of the vulnerable consumer has been codified in Sec. 3 para. 4 cl. 1 UWG. 
The categories are identical to Art. 5 para. 3 UCPD. However, these categories had 
already been established in the jurisprudence of German courts before the UCPD. 
German law interprets Art. 5 para. 3 UCPD rather narrowly: The advertisement must 
be targeting this group specifically, based on the logic that otherwise all mass 
advertising would be illegal.24 So far, no additional groups of vulnerable consumers 
16 Sosnitza “§ 5 UWG”, rec. 301 in: Ohly/Sosnitza (2016). 
17 OLG Karlsruhe 10.12.2008, Az. 6 U 140/08, GRUR-RR 2009, 144, 146 (100% Ökostrom);  
Sosnitza “§ 5 UWG”, rec. 307 in: Ohly/Sosnitza (2016). 
18 LG Hamburg 10.11.1999, Az. 315 O 773/99, ZUR 2000, 338 (although this dates from 1999, it seems 
unlikely that the court would have decided otherwise under the current law); cf. also Roller ZUR 2014, 
211, 213 seq. 
19 For example see http://www.vzbv.de/pressemitteilung/vzbv-mahnt-care-energy-management-ab, which 
dealt with an incorrect online energy fee calculator. 
20 However, legal literature does not support this view, cf. Birk GRUR 2011, 198, 202 with further references 
and also Augenhofer (2015) in: Kobel/Kellezi/Killpatrick (eds.), p. 514. 
21 Beater (2011), p. 425; Emmerich (2016), p. 191 seq. 
22 ECLI:EU:C:1998:369 (Gut Springheide). 
23 Lettl GRUR 2004, 449, 453; cf. also Weatherill (2013), p. 101. 
24 Köhler “§ 3 UWG”, rec. 5.18 seqq. in: Köhler/Bornkamm (2016); Gerecke NJW 2015, 3185; 
Alexander WRP 2014, 1010-1016. 
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have been recognised by German courts, nor did stakeholders see a need for such 
additional consumer groups. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Self-regulation does not play an important role in Germany.25 Rather, it is regarded 
critically: It is said it can be (mis)used to influence the judicial review of unfair 
commercial practices. In addition, codes of self-regulation might be considered as 
problematic under antitrust law.26 If self-regulation is mentioned in a misleading way 
in a commercial practice, it is deemed unfair under Sec. 5 UWG.27 The most influential 
self-regulation organisation in Germany is the ‘Wettbewerbszentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs’ – a private organisation that according to its statutes 
promotes the enforcement of unfair competition law by pursuing unfair commercial 
practices.28 Further examples of self-regulation include the German Werberat, FSM 
(Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia e.V.), FSF (Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen 
e.V.), FSK (Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft e.V.), Selbstregulierung in der 
Informationswirtschaft e.V. and the Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex.29 
However, self-regulation through these later named bodies is limited to, for example, 
the protection of youth or the prevention of disrespectful or indecent advertising in the 
case of the Werberat.30  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
There is some general mistrust of the black list in German literature because it is 
feared that a black list implies that all commercial practices not included in the list are 
legal.31 In general, the list seems to be problematic with regard to certain terms used 
which need to be interpreted (e.g. the term ‘child’).32 Moreover, the gravity of the 
behaviour listed in the black lists differs quite considerably.33 With regard to some 
examples enumerated in the black list, the German translation of the Directive is 
regarded as flawed (e.g. No. 8 does not include after-sales services in the German 
translation), with the result that German law needs to rely on Sec. 5a paras. 1, 2, 3 
No. 4 UWG.34  
Stakeholders were against adding more unfair commercial practices to the black list. 
In the event that the European Commission opts for adding more commercial practices 
to the list, stakeholders wish to enact a mechanism allowing quick changes of the list. 
 
25 Cf. therefore and for a more comprehensive analysis of self-regulation in Europe after the UCPD 
Augenhofer (2010), p. 19. 
26 Sosnitza “§ 3 UWG“, rec. 62 in: Münchener Kommentar UWG (2014). 
27 Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann (2010), p. 96. 
28 It is considered as a “business organisation” under Sec. 8 para. 3 no. 2 UWG and therefore has standing 
in court in competition law procedures. For further information see 
<https://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/institution/profil/auftrag/> (accessed on the 21.08.2016). 
29 Cf. Hoeren BB 2008, 1182, 1187. 
30 Cf. also Augenhofer (2010), p. 19 seqq. 
31 Cf. Scherer NJW 2009, 324, 325. 
32 Schöttle WRP 2009, 673 ff. 
33 Hoeren BB 2008, 1182, 1187. 
34 Scherer NJW 2009, 324, 327. 
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• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Stakeholders did not report any need to change the UCPD, nor do German court 
decisions or literature support such conclusions. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
Consumers in Germany are usually aware of the unit selling price and effectively 
informed about it. Since the statute regulating nominal quantities for pre-packed 
products (Sec. 1 Act on Quantities of Prepacked Goods35)) has been abandoned (due 
to liberalisation of prepacking under Directive 2007/45/EC),36 some discussion has 
taken place with regard to the size of the letters stating the unit selling price.37 
Stakeholders reported that a standardisation committee is currently working on a DIN-
Norm indicating proper sizes for different products and different versions of 
advertising. 
The PID is transposed into German law in Art. 2 of the Act on Price Indication,38 which 
also contains provisions on price indications beyond the PID’s scope. Price indication 
rules are enforced by general unfair competition law. They are commonly considered 
as market behaviour rules (‘Marktverhaltensregel’) under Sec. 3a UWG.39 Further it is 
generally acknowledged that infringements of price indication rules may also 
constitute a misleading commercial practice in terms of Sec. 5 para. 1 cl. 2 No. 1 UWG 
or Sec. 5a para. 2, 3 No. 3 UWG (misleading omissions).40 Lastly, the infringement of 
the PAngV’s provisions may constitute an administrative offence in the event of 
intentional or negligent infringement under Sec. 10 PAnGV. This also includes a 
violation of the indication of the unit selling price (Sec. 10 para. 1 no. 7 PAngV). Price 
indication rules and general unfair competition law exist in a complementary and not 
mutually exclusive relationship. Additionally, commercial practices outside the scope of 
the German PAngV and the PID and related to the indication of a price (so-called 
‘Preisschlagwörter’), might be considered misleading under Sec. 5 and Sec. 5a UWG.41  
German courts tend to emphasise the necessity of the price per unit measure, as it 
makes products comparable and hence enhances the capability of consumers to make 
a rational decision. This approach can be seen in the jurisprudence of the High Court 
of Justice as well as several Higher Regional Courts.42 In a very recent decision the 
High Court of Justice further emphasised this approach: The ruling holds that traders 
on digital platforms can be held liable for infringing price indication rules as a principal 
offender, even if they do not have a decisive influence on the final arrangement of the 
35 “Fertigpackungsverordnung”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I,1994, p. 451, recently amended by Art. 2 Act 
of 15.02.2016, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2015, p. 201. 
36 Cf. Jacobi WRP 2010, 1217. 
37 Cf. BGH 07.03.2013, Az. I ZR 30/12, GRUR 2013, 850. 
38 “Preisangabenverordnung (PAngV)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2002, p. 4197, recently amended by 
Act of 11.03.2016, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2016, p. 396. 
39 Cf. Weidert/Völker “§ 2 PAnGV“, rec. 18 in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013). 
40 Weidert, “§ 5 UWG“, rec. 23 in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013). 
41 Nordemann “§ 5 UWG“, rec. 2.63 in: Götting/Nordemann (2016); Schünemann “Einleitung UWG“,  
rec. 25 seq. in: Großkommentar UWG (2014). 
42 Cf. BGH 31.10.2013, Az. I ZR 139/12, GRUR 2014, 576 rec. 20 (2 Flaschen GRATIS); BGH 07.04.2011, 
Az. I ZR 34/09, GRUR 2011, 742 (Leistungspaket im Preisvergleich); OLG Köln 22.02.2002,  
Az. 6 U 152/01, GRUR-RR 2002, 304, 305 (Sprudelwasserpreis); OLG Koblenz 25.04.2006,  
Az. 4 U 1219/05, GRUR-RR 2007, 23 (Grundpreisangabe). 
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offer.43 This judgment might strengthen price clarity also in the digital platform 
economy. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
German law already knows this kind of price indication for products such as household 
detergent, pursuant to Sec. 2 para. 4 cl. 1 PAngV, which allows deviation from 
Sec. 2 para. 3 PAngV and indication of the price in relation to a ‘common usage’. The 
intention of the German legislature was therefore that the utility of these products 
varies broadly and the relation to a weight does not provide consumers with 
comprehendible information.44 This view was also supported by one stakeholder. 
Other stakeholders expressed concern that measurement units provide a very 
unreliable tool of information as, for instance, the number of washloads for detergents 
depends on various factors like the type and program of the washing machine, the 
hardness of the water and the degree of stains on the clothes to be washed. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
The German legislature implemented the derogation for small businesses (Article 6 
PID) in Sec. 9 para. 4 No. 3 PAngV. The German legislature, deviating from the 
wording of the Directive, used the terms ‘small direct salesman’ and ‘small retailer’. 
These terms have been subject to some discussion in literature.45 The intention of the 
German legislature was to protect mom-and-pop-stores as well as direct sales at 
farms.46 In order to restrict the scope of this exception and avoid any quantitative 
criteria (as suggested by Art. 6 PID), legislators introduced the criterion of a 
‘distribution by attendance’ (‘Warenausgabe überwiegend im Wege der Bedienung’). 
This criterion is not persuasive since also mom-and-pop-stores are commonly self-
service markets and thus are not protected by this exception.47 
However, stakeholders did not report any problems with this derogation in practice, 
despite the fact that it is used by small businesses. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
As noted above, Germany has a long history of regulating unfair competition law and 
its goal was, originally, to protect competitors. Hence, the MCDA did not lead to any 
additional protection in B2B relations, with the exception that comparative advertising 
was restricted before 1997. Therefore, there is no problem under German law with the 
43 BGH 03.04.2016, Az. I ZR 110/15. 
44 Gelberg “§ 2 PAngV“, rec. 20 in: Landmann/Rohmer (2016); Weidert/Völker “§ 2 PAnGV“, rec. 18 in: 
Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013); Völker “§ 2 PAngV“, rec. 52 in: Völker (2002). 
45 Sosnitza “§ 9 PAngV“, rec. 16 in: Zipfel/Rathke (2015); Völker “§ 9 PAnGV“ rec. 48 in: Völker (2002). 
46 Cf. Bundestags-Drucksache No.180/00, p. 32. 
47 Cf. also Weidert/Völker “§ 9 PAnGV“, rec. 26 in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013). 
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scope of the MCAD. Stakeholders did not express a wish to change the scope of the 
MCAD in the future. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach complies with the German tradition of a ‘general clause’, 
as described above. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Taking into account the minimum harmonisation approach of the MCAD, it is 
acknowledged that the transposing rule (Sec. 5 UWG) has to be interpreted differently 
regarding the advertisement’s addressee. As regards consumers, the interpretation 
needs to align with Art. 5 UCPD, whereas for businesses Art. 2 lit. b, Art. 3 and Art. 8 
para. 1 MCAD are decisive for the interpretation.48 In contrast to the UCPD itself, Sec. 
5 para. 2 UWG, which transposes Art. 6 para. 2 lit. a UCPD, applies to B2B-relations 
as well under German law. As the requirements of Art. 6 para. 2 lit. a UCPD are 
stricter than those of the MCAD, this leads to a higher level of protection of companies 
in German law compared to the MCAD.49  
In the view of the interviewed stakeholders there is no need to change the minimum 
harmonisation approach of the MCAD. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Before the transposition of Directive 97/55/EC, comparative advertising was generally 
prohibited in Germany and the BGH only allowed comparative advertising under very 
narrow circumstances.50 Therefore, an enhancement of market transparency was 
expected with the transposition.51 However, in practice comparative advertising is still 
barely used in Germany, and hence stakeholders hardly ever have to deal with 
comparative advertising.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Neither stakeholders nor academic authors have reported cases in which ‘modern 
types of marketing’ should be considered as unfair, but are not covered by the MCAD 
or the respective German provisions.52 One stakeholder mentioned that in its view, 
websites comparing, for example, product prices, should be excluded from the rules 
governing comparative advertising, as a third party (i.e. the website) is involved.  
 
48 Köhler GRUR 2013, 761, 765.  
49 Bornkamm “§ 5 UWG” rec. 2.23 seq. in: Köhler/Bornkamm (2016). 
50 Cf. Augenhofer (2005) 20 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 2005, 110. 
51 Beater (2011) p. 325; Scherer WRP 2001, 89. 
52 For academic views on the implementation of the MCAD with regard to comparative advertising cf. e.g. 
Alexander (2016), p. 325; Plaß NJW 2000, 3161; Sack WRP 2001, 327. 
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• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
In Germany, comparative and misleading advertisement is traditionally enforced by 
competitors and business associations.53 However, some commentators argue that 
different enforcement systems in Member States prevent the development of a 
harmonised enforcement framework.54 One stakeholder – which is not a ‘qualified 
entity’ under the ID but allowed to bring injunctions under German law – reported 
problems when jurisdiction lies outside Germany. Two other stakeholders mentioned 
‘directory scams’ (‘Adressbuchschwindel’) and that with regard to this kind of unfair 
commercial practice criminal law is relevant, which does not fall under the competence 
of the EU. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
From an academic standpoint the MCAD and UCPD need to be aligned. It is hard to 
understand why misleading commercial practices in B2C relations and advertising in  
B2B relations are governed by a whole set of different rules; and why misleading 
advertising is minimally harmonised while the UCPD and B2B comparative advertising 
involve full harmonisation. However, in practice the law of unfair competition works 
very well, due to its long history in Germany, and the fact that German rules for B2B 
and B2C relations are more aligned than under European law.55  
Stakeholders did not report any need for changes of the current system. One 
stakeholder suggested that the German enforcement system should become a model 
for all European countries. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Stakeholders did not report examples dealing with a disparate understanding of the 
principles. Most stakeholders noted that factors outside law – e.g. language problems, 
costs for postage services – are also affecting cross-border trade. Some stakeholders 
wish that the guidelines for the UCPD published by the European Commission were 
available in German, and most stakeholders expressed a need to reduce (or at least 
harmonise) the information duties under the different directives.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Stakeholders did not report any effect of the black list on the free movement of goods 
and services. 
 
53 Cf. Sec. 8-14 UWG and Köhler, “Einleitung UWG”, rec. 2.41 in: Köhler/Bornkamm (2016). 
54 Glöckner “Einleitung B”, rec. 466 in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013). 
55 van Eek/Czernik GRUR Int. 2016, 539, 546; for the experiences and implications of the UCPD’s application 
to businesses cf. Hoeren WRP 2009, 789, 794. 
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• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Stakeholders did not report any cases thereof. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
It is referred to the answer given above with regard to the UCPD (1.1.4, question 
one). 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Stakeholders did not indicate any relevant cases. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
In the view of the stakeholders, this is the case. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
In the view of stakeholders – given the fact that in the framework of the UCPD, 
consumers do not have legal standing anyway – the lack of a cross-border 
enforcement mechanism does not constitute a barrier to cross-border trade.  
Some stakeholders liked the idea of an informal exchange between enforcement 
agencies in order to foster cross-border enforcement.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Stakeholders asserted that traders are quite aware of these information requirements. 
However, stakeholders regard the information requirements in European consumer 
law as overwhelming. It has also been noted that the information requirements under 
the different directives should be coordinated properly. The view of stakeholders is in 
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line with legal literature that suggests the current mass of information requirements 
are not providing sustainable consumer protection.56 
Overlaps pertaining to the Services Directive and the E-commerce Directive exist 
especially with regard to Art. 5 E-commerce Directive und Art. 22 para. 1 Services 
Directive. In the view of one stakeholder, Art. 7 para. 4 UCPD should remain in force 
despite all the information requirements set out in the CRD, as the information 
requirements under the UCPD play a role in the early stages of a pre-contractual 
relationship. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
From a theoretical perspective, a harmonised law in every Member State might 
promote cross-border trade. However, stakeholders were quite concerned about the 
notion that the European Commission plans to further harmonise this area. They 
explicitly said that – in their view – there is no need to harmonise Unfair Commercial 
Practices Law with regard to B2B transactions. Consequently, the need for a ‘black list’ 
was denied, as was also the need for either enforcement cooperation mechanisms or 
the adoption of new rules concerning comparative advertisement. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
German contract law offers a range of interfaces with the law of unfair commercial 
practices,57 although there is no general principle that an unfair commercial practice 
56 Cf. Link “§ 5 UWG”, rec. 36 in: Juris Praxiskommentar UWG (2013). 
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(irrespective of whether pre-contractual or occurring during the conduct of the 
contract) constitutes either a breach of contractual duties or automatically triggers the 
avoidance of the contract or damages.  
German law used to provide a provision that enabled purchasers to rescind the 
contract, if this contract was concluded under the influence of misleading 
advertisement and this advertisement was essential for the conclusion. This right was 
codified in Sec. 13a UWG and was in effect from 01.01.1987 until 02.07.2004.58 The 
legislature’s explanatory notes accompanying the 2004 amendment of the UWG 
emphasised that this provision did not have any effect in practice and therefore should 
be abolished.59 The legislature insofar complied with the demands in German legal 
literature where this right to rescind was similarly considered redundant.60 
1. Unlawfulness and unconscionability (‘Gesetzes- und Sittenwidrigkeit’) 
Sec. 134 German Civil Code61 declares as void any contract which violates a statutory 
provision. This rule appears to be fitting for infringements of unfair competition law. 
However, Sec. 134 BGB requires that the content of a contract be a violation of 
statutory provisions and not only the circumstances under which the contract was 
concluded. It is regularly the case that the content of a contract concluded subsequent 
to unfair commercial practices does not infringe statutory provisions.62 However 
contracts that intend to infringe unfair competition law might be void due to 
unlawfulness.63 
In addition, contracts concluded under the influence of unfair commercial practices are 
not generally considered as unconscionable under Sec. 138 BGB. Again, the provision 
intends to prohibit contracts with unconscionable content, but not contracts that are 
concluded under circumstances that are considered as ‘unfair’.64 This view, which was 
also repeatedly supported by the Courts, is based on the structural system of the BGB. 
In respect of the guiding principle of private autonomy, contracts should only be 
automatically void under very narrow circumstances. As far as contract conclusion is 
concerned, the governing provisions are Sec. 119 and Sec. 123 BGB, which only cause 
voidance if one party rescinds.65 
Nevertheless the German High Court of Justice did find contracts to be void in 
particular cases. This is especially the case where the unfair commercial practice spills 
over into the concluded contract or the contract does not comply with general 
principles of the legal system.66 This was concluded, for instance, in the establishment 
of a promotional pyramid scheme (‘Schneeballsysteme’)67 or behaving unconscionably 
in addition to intentional deception over the payout of winnings.68 
2. Warranty Rights (‘Gewährleistungsrecht’) 
57 Cf. Alexander WRP 2012, 515. 
58 Cf. Act against Unfair Competition of 03.07.2004, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2004, 1414. 
59 Bundestags-Drucksache No. 15/1487, p. 14. 
60 See for a summary Alexander (2002), p. 280. 
61 “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 2002 I, p. 42, recently amended by Art. 3 
Act of 24.05.2016, Federal Law Gazette I 2016, p. 1190. 
62 Arnold “§ 134 BGB”, rec. 69 in: Erman (2014); Seibl/Sack “§ 134 BGB”, rec. 304 in: Staudinger (2011); 
Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 173; Köhler JZ 2010, 767, 769, Sack GRUR 2004, 625, 626. 
63 Sack GRUR 2004, 625, 626. 
64 This is the strongly prevailing opinion in German law, cf. only Köhler “§ 3 UWG”, rec. 10.5 in: 
Köhler/Bornkamm (2016). 
65 BGH 25.01.1990, Az. I ZR 19/87, NJW 1991, 287; BGH 14.05.1998, Az. I ZR 10/96, GRUR 1998, 945, 
946 (Co-Verlagsvereinbarung); see also Armbrüster “§ 138 BGB”, rec. 1 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB 
(2015); Seibl/Sack “§ 134 BGB”, rec. 5 in: Staudinger (2011). 
66 BGH 14.05.1998, Az. I ZR 10/96, GRUR 1998, 945, 946 (Co-Verlagsvereinbarung). 
67 BGH 22.04.1997, Az. XI ZR 191/96, WRP 1997, 783, 784 (Sittenwidriges Schneeballsystem). 
68 BGH 29.06.2005, Az. VIII ZR 299/04, NJW 2005, 2991; in this judgment the BGH was slightly more open 
towards the idea that an infringement of the UWG leads to voidance of the contract in terms of Sec. 138 
BGB; however, other decisions do not indicate such a change yet, cf. also Nasall NJW 2006, 127. 
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Furthermore, pre-contractual commercial practices may play a role in determining 
whether a good is fit for purpose pursuant to § 434 BGB. Advertising will in particular 
be considered in determining whether a good satisfies the intended fit for purpose 
requirement found under Sec. 434 para. 1 cl. 2 (which transposes Art. 3 Sales 
Directive). In case of non-conformity, this triggers warranty rights according to 
Sec. 437 BGB, which include the right to demand repair or replacement 
(‘Nachbesserung’ or ‘Nachlieferung’) in the first place, and further to reduce the price 
or to revoke the contract if the defect is not merely minor.69 Nevertheless the 
circumstances of every single case need to be examined in order to determine 
whether a misleading advertisement or any other misleading commercial practice may 
exist. 
3. Law of Mistake (‘Irrtumsrecht’) 
Sec. 119 BGB enables a contractual party to avoid the contract if it was mistaken 
about the declarations content or had no intention whatsoever of making a declaration 
with this content. Thus Sec. 119 para. 1 BGB offers two possibilities: Either there was 
a mistake in declaration (‘Erklärungsirrtum’, Sec. 119 para. 1 cl. 1 BGB), e.g. a typing 
error (writing ‘100’ instead of ‘10’ in an order) or misspeaking, or there was a mistake 
regarding the meaning of the declaration (‘Inhaltsirrtum’, Sec. 119 para. 1 cl. 2 BGB). 
So at a first glance, this appears to fit perfectly with situations of misleading 
commercial practices. However, it is acknowledged in German legal literature that 
Sec. 119 para. 1 BGB does not apply to the decision-making process of the party itself 
but rather to a divergence between declaration and intent. So Sec. 119 para. 1 does 
not include errors regarding the parties’ motives, the price or the value of a good. 
Though there have been attempts to apply Sec. 119 para. 1 BGB also to errors 
concerning the conformity of goods, this has not yet prevailed.70 Nevertheless, 
Sec. 119 para. 2 BGB states that errors with regard to ‘essential characteristics’ 
(‘verkehrswesentliche Eigenschaften’) are able to constitute a mistake in terms of 
Sec. 119 para. 1 BGB. Though it is highly disputed which characteristics are ‘essential’ 
in terms of Sec. 119 para. 2 BGB,71 it is acknowledged that a misleading 
advertisement may establish such an essential characteristic. Therefore, it has been 
suggested to consider the catalogue of necessary information in Art. 7 para. 4 UCPD 
(Sec. 5a para. 3 UWG) as essential characteristics in terms of Sec. 119 II BGB.72 
However, the scope in terms of a contractual remedy for breaching unfair commercial 
practices law, remains narrow.73  
Sec. 123 BGB gives a party the right to rescind a contract if the party was 
intentionally deceived or put under duress. Generally, a misleading commercial 
practice is able to constitute deception under Sec. 123 para. 1 BGB.74 But as deception 
in terms of Sec. 123 para. 1 BGB requires intent, it does not grant a sound protection 
against, for example, negligently misleading advertisements or other misleading 
commercials.75 Some scholars argue that Sec. 123 para. 1 BGB should be applicable 
analogously in situations of negligence.76 The same applies to duress under 
§ 123 para. 1 BGB. Although it is basically possible that an aggressive commercial 
69 Cf. for a comprehensive study of this topic Augenhofer (2002); further also Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 
174; Sack GRUR 2004, 625, 627. 
70 Singer “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 47 in: Staudinger (2012). 
71 Cf. Arnold “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 36 in: Erman (2014). 
72 Cf. Alexander (2016) in: Augenhofer/Alexander (eds.), p. 159. 
73 Armbrüster “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 1 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2015); Arnold “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 22 in: 
Erman (2014); Hefermehl “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 51 in: Soergl (1999); Mansel “§ 119 BGB”, rec. 1 in: 
Jauernig (2015); Brox/Walker (2014) rec. 407; for a slightly higher importance due to a more extensive 
interpretation Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 173 and Sack GRUR 2004, 625, 626. 
74 Cf. Armbrüster “§ 123 BGB” rec. 93” in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2015). 
75 Weiler WRP 2003, 423, 426. 
76 Cf. Canaris AcP 2000, 273; Weiler WRP 2003, 423, 427; critically Fleischer (2001), p. 432; 
Schwarze (2001), p. 310. 
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practice constitutes ‘duress’ in terms of Sec. 123 para. 1 BGB, the requirements of 
those two rules are not identical. 
4. The principle of culpa in contrahendo (pre-contractual liability) 
In addition, it is discussed whether the principles of pre-contractual liability (‘culpa in 
contrahendo’, Sec. 241 para. 2, 311 para. 2 BGB) are applicable to pre-contractual 
unfair commercial practices.77 The details of such application are highly disputed 
among German legal scholars, since this legal institute needs to be harmonised with 
Sec. 123 BGB and Secs. 434, 437 BGB. However, there are good arguments to apply 
Secs. 241 II, 311 II BGB in cases of intentional or negligent unfair commercial 
practices.78  
Overall, German law tries to draw a clear line between contract law and unfair 
competition law as according to both the prevailing view in German legal literature and 
the High Court of Justice, unfair competition law protects collective interests of 
consumers or more generally purchasers on a fair competition, but not the interests of 
an individual consumer. This view was also supported by the stakeholders interviewed 
for this study. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
In German law the questions dealt with in the UCTD are regulated in Sec. 305 et seq. 
of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB). It has to be noted that 
Germany has a long history of regulating standard contract terms, first in a single act, 
the so-called AGBG (Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen, Act Regarding the Regulation of the Law Governing Standard 
Contract Terms)79 which was enacted in 1976, whose provisions were incorporated 
into the BGB with the so-called ‘Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz’ in 2001. The 
AGBG was seen by some authors as highly influential for the UCTD, even though the 
UCTD is significantly less far reaching (cf. below with regard to the black/grey list). 
Hence, it did not require much to implement the UCTD into German law.80 Most 
notably, previous to the transposition of the Directive, German unfair contract terms 
law did not cover B2C contract terms which were intended only for non-recurrent use 
on one occasion. Equally, the Directive now makes it necessary to take into account 
concurrent circumstances surrounding the entering of the contract when applying Sec. 
307 BGB (the general clause) to B2C contracts.81 
The general view in German literature, as well as among stakeholders, is that the 
overall effectiveness of the UCTD – and its German equivalent – is quite positive also 
due to the fact that Germany has long history of a principle-based approach. However, 
it has been noted in literature that the German unfair contract terms law´s impact in 
preventing unfair terms varies from industry to industry and appears to be more 
77 Cf. for a comprehensive summary Alexander (2002), p. 134 seqq. 
78 Alexander (2002) p. 140 and 145; Augenhofer WRP 2006, 169, 175; Köhler GRUR 2003, 265, 268; 
Leistner (2007) p. 1073; Sack GRUR 2004, 625, 630. 
79 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 1976 I, p. 3317. 
80 Cf. Ulmer/Habersack, “Einl”, rec. 92 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
81 Schwerdtfeger DStR 1997, 499. 
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substantial with regard to larger corporations having their own legal departments.82 
Yet the relative success appears to be owed only to a very limited extent to the 
implementation of the Directive.83 It was also noted by one of the stakeholders that a 
principle-based approach to unfair standard terms is the only possible approach in lieu 
of a (partly) harmonised European private law and a consequently different national 
understanding of the (un)fairness of terms. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The terms on the indicative list overlap to a certain extent with the terms on the 
black/grey list in Sec. 308/Sec. 309 BGB. This affects the use of the indicative list in 
practice. The indicative list can firstly be relevant in connection with the application of 
Sec. 308 and Sec. 309 BGB (black/grey list) by the courts, in cases where there is 
some interpretative leeway under German Law as to whether the particular clause is 
actually void or not. Furthermore, for terms covered by the indicative list but not by 
Sec. 308 or Sec. 309 BGB, the list is used in the context of the general clause  
(Sec. 307 para. 1 BGB). In both cases the indicative list is said to create a rebuttable 
presumption or at least an indication that the particular term is unfair.84 If, however, a 
term is undoubtedly void under Sec. 308 or Sec. 309 BGB, the indicative list is 
irrelevant for interpretation, as both articles then constitute more stringent provisions 
within the meaning of Art. 8 UCTD.85 As well, with regard to practical problems it 
seems that to a certain extent, the vague nature of the term ‘indicative’ has led to 
some uncertainty as to how to apply the list in a particular context.86 However, none 
of the stakeholders experienced any problems with the indicative list of the UCTD in 
practice, as Sec. 308 and 309 BGB in combination with the general clause  
(Sec. 307 BGB) provide for an efficient legal framework. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
There exists a black/grey list in Sec. 308 and Sec. 309 BGB which is applicable to all 
B2C transactions, but in general not to B2B transactions pursuant to Sec. 310 para. 
1 BGB (however, Secs. 308 and 309 might serve as an indication for the unfairness of 
terms in B2B contracts87). The clauses in Sec. 309 BGB are invalid without any room 
for evaluation (though some of the terms used in the clauses might need 
interpretation themselves), whereas under Sec. 308 BGB it depends on the judgment 
of the court whether the term in question is valid or not.88 Additionally, both Sec. 308 
and Sec. 309 BGB are used in connection with the general clause in Sec. 307 para. 1 
BGB to assess whether terms similar to the terms on the lists, but not covered by 
82 Basedow “vor § 305”, rec. 15 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2016); Ulmer/Habersack  
“Einl”, rec. 80 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Graf von Westphalen NJW 2013, 961, 966. 
83 Ulmer/Schäfer “§ 310”, rec. 48 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Graf von Westphalen NJW 2013, 961, 
966. 
84  Fuchs “vor § 307”, rec. 23 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Schmidt “308 Nr. 1”, rec. 5 in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Wurmnest “§ 308”, rec. 12 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2016); 
particulars disputed. 
85  Wurmnest “§ 308”, rec. 12 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2016). 
86  See the overview by Pfeiffer “Art. 3”, rec. 75 seq. in: Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer (2013). 
87  Ulmer/Schäfer “§ 310”, rec. 27 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). In addition, Sec. 308 No. 1a and 
No. 1b BGB, which were introduced in 2014 in order to transpose Directive 2011/7/EU into German Law, 
are also applicable in the context of B2B contracts, cf. Sec. 310 para. 1 BGB. 
88  Fuchs “vor § 307”, rec. 7 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
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them, are unfair or not.89 It appears that the use of a black/grey list has the 
advantage of helping practitioners and the courts to decide more easily whether a 
particular term is unfair or not, and that it thus provides for legal certainty. However, 
the majority of court decisions concern cases where the general clause was applied, as 
the term in question was not covered by the black/grey list.90 It is debatable whether 
fewer cases concerning the black/grey list came up because of the steering effect of 
the list or simply because the list is rather fragmentary.91  
In the view of one stakeholder, the German BGB does not contain a grey list and a 
black list but rather two black lists, as is it only up to the judge to decide whether a 
term is unfair or not without having leeway with regard to the legal consequences. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Under German Law, court decisions – no matter whether brought to court by an 
individual party, following an injunction under Sec. 1 Injunctions Act,92 or brought by 
an organisation with standing under Sec. 3 UKlaG – have effect primarily inter partes 
(Sec. 325 para. 1 ZPO93 (Zivilprozessordnung, Civil Procedure Code).94 If, however, 
the user continues to use the unfair term despite an injunction having been granted, it 
is possible for other contracting parties to invoke the decision of the court from the 
previous injunction proceedings against the user in subsequent proceedings. This 
leads to the result that the term in question has to be regarded as non-binding (Sec. 
11 UKlaG). There is some disagreement between academic scholars whether the 
provision is sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Art. 7 para. 1 of the UCTD in the 
light of the CJEU decision in ‘Invitel’,95 as the customer has to invoke the decision 
first. It seems that so far neither of the two positions has gained the upper hand.96 In 
any event, Sec. 11 UKlaG has been of little practical relevance so far.97  
Generally, both the injunctions procedure (Sec. 1 seqq. UKlaG) as well as claims by 
individuals are said to have quite a positive impact on reducing the use of unfair terms 
in practice,98 although not all expectations with regard to the injunction procedure 
89  Cf. Ulmer/Habersack “Einl”, rec. 71 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
90  Pfeiffer “Einl.”, rec. 43 in: Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer (2013). 
91  Pfeiffer “Einl.”, rec. 43 in: Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer (2013); Ulmer/Habersack “Einl”, rec. 71 in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
92 “Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG)”, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 2002 I, p. 3422, 4346, recently 
amended by Art. 3 Act of 11.04.2016 (Federal Law Gazette I 2016, p. 720). 
93 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 2005 I, p. 3202, recently amended by Art. 2 Act of 05.07.2016  
(Federal Law Gazette I 2016, p. 1578). 
94 See also Witt “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 6, in Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
95 ECLI:EU:C:2012:242 (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt). 
96 In favour of accordance with EU law: Köhler, “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 1 in: Köhler/Bornkamm (2016); 
Schlosser “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 4 in: Staudinger (2013); Witt “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 2a in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Lindacher EWiR 2012, 677, 678; against accordance with EU Law: 
Micklitz “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 2. in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013); Stadler (2015) in: Meller-
Hannich/Haertlein et. al. (eds.), p. 481, 495; Halfmeier, (2015) p. 168. 
97 Micklitz “§ 11 UKlaG”, rec. 2. in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
98 Pfeiffer “Einl.”, rec. 46 in: Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer (2013); Ulmer/Habersack “Einl.”, rec. 72 seq., 84 in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
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have been fulfilled so far.99 In this regard, especially consumer organisations call for 
the introduction of group actions as an additional measure. They argue that it is 
impossible under current German Law to help a large group of consumers who each 
suffered only minor damages because of the same unfair contract term, as individual 
proceedings are too costly and time-consuming.100 On the other hand, industry 
interest groups such as the BDI (‘Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie’) consider 
the current system sufficient and argue that group actions create the danger of abuse 
at the expense of businesses.101 The Ministry for Justice and Consumer Protection said 
that it is considering the introduction of group actions or model proceedings as an 
option, but so far no concrete proposal has been published.102  
As an alternative to the introduction of group actions, scholars have been discussing 
whether – in addition to injunctions under Sec. 1 UKlaG – consumer interest groups 
could bring forward a claim for remedial action (‘Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch’) under  
Sec. 8 UWG.103 However, a prerequisite for this would be that the use of unfair 
contract terms always (or at least under certain circumstances) also constitutes an 
illegal commercial practice, which is highly contested in academia and by the 
judiciary.104 Ultimately, clarification on claims to remedial action under  
Sec. 8 UWG following the use of unfair contract terms can only be provided by a 
decision of the High Court of Justice (BGH). 
Aside from the discussions around group actions, claims to remedial action and the 
application of Sec. 11 UKlaG, it appears that there are no other attempts to extend the 
effect of court decisions to parties outside the scope of Sec. 325 ZPO.  
Stakeholders have not reported any particular problems with regard to the current 
legal situation in Germany. Rather, it was noted that court decisions de facto also 
protect other consumers, even if they are – de iure – only binding inter partes. One 
stakeholder pointed out that in cease and desist letters (‘Unterlassungserklärungen’), 
businesses have to commit to refraining from using an unfair term against all 
customers.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Prior to the adoption of the Directive, the transparency requirement was not codified 
in German Unfair Contract Terms Law but was accepted and applied by the courts at 
least since the late 1980s.105 In reaction to the CJEU decision Commission v. 
Netherlands,106 the contractual transparency requirement was then codified in  
Sec. 307 para. 1, cl. 2. BGB in 2001.107 In addition to Sec. 307 para. 1 cl. 2 BGB,  
Sec. 305 para. 2 BGB, Sec. 305c para. 1 and para. 2 BGB, also to a certain extent 
deal with questions regarding the transparency of contract terms, yet these provisions 
are primarily relevant for the question as to whether standard contract terms become 
part of the contract at all – a question which is not dealt with in the UCTD. While no 
material change of the law was intended when the transparency requirement was 
99 Ulmer/Habersack “Einl.”, rec. 86 in Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Witt “Vorb. v. § 1 UKlaG”, rec. 8 in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
100 vzbv (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband), „Positionspapier, Lücken im kollektiven Rechtsschutz endlich 
schließen“ (2015), available at http://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/kollektiver_ 
rechtsschutz-poitionspapier-vzbv-2015.pdf; see also Halfmeier (2015) p. 34 seq.  
101 http://bdi.eu/artikel/news/missbrauchsgefahr-durch-sammelklagen-verhindern/. 
102 https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/2015/09282015_StBillen_vzbv.html. 
103 For an overview on the discussion with further references see Bunte ZIP 2016, 956. 
104 Against a claim for remedial action because of unfair contract terms under Sec. 8 UWG:  
OLG Stuttgart 07.08.2015, Az. U 107/14, ZIP 2016, 927 seq.; Bunte ZIP 2016, 956 seq.; in favour of a 
claim for remedial action because of unfair contract terms under Sec. 8 UWG: LG Leipzig 10.12.2015,  
Az. 05 O 1239/15, VuR 2016, 109 seq.; Reich VuR 2014, 247, 248; Rott VuR 2016, 112 seq. 
105 BGH 17.01.1989, Az. XI ZR 54/88, BGHZ 106, 259; BGH 24.11.1988, Az. III ZR 188/87, BGHZ 106, 42. 
106 ECLI:EU:C:2001:257 (Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of the Netherlands). 
107 Cf. Fuchs “§ 307”, rec. 323 seq. in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
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codified in Sec. 307 para. 1 cl. 2 BGB,108 some scholars argue that the codification is 
of importance as it underlines that the transparency requirement applies equally to all 
types of contracts.109 In general, it appears that the transparency requirement plays 
quite an important role for courts in reviewing standard contract terms. In practice, 
courts seem to apply the transparency requirement strictly with regard to price 
transparency in particular, especially in relation to terms that allow one party to adjust 
the originally agreed price or add extra fees under unclear circumstances or with 
completely unpredictable results.110 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
In Germany, the Directive applies neither to individually negotiated terms nor to terms 
on the adequacy of the price or the main subject matter of the contract (see Sec. 307 
para. 3 cl. 1 BGB, Sec. 305 para. 1 BGB, Sec. 310 para. 2 BGB). Problems with price 
adequacy and problems with regard to the main subject matter of the contract are 
rather questions of general civil law, cf. sec. 134, 138 BGB. However, terms regarding 
the price or the performance can be invalid if they are not transparent 
(Sec. 307 para. 3 cl. 2 BGB read in conjunction with paras. 1 cl. 1 and 2 BGB).111 Cf. 
also the answer to the previous question. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Neither the stakeholders’ responses nor court decisions or literature report any 
problems with regard to the legal consequence envisaged by the UCTD. There are no 
administrative remedies under German law for consumers in this area, and the 
German court system provides for a quite active role for judges in all areas of civil law. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Stakeholders did not report any need for a change to the UCTD. In a newspaper 
article, the current German Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection, Heiko Maas, 
argued that pictograms could make otherwise lengthy and (for laymen) 
incomprehensible standard contract terms more accessible, which could improve 
consumer protection (in particular data protection) in the context of online shopping 
and social networking.112 However, considering the amount of content in typical 
standard terms, this seems only viable with regard to the most important clauses of 
each contract. Moreover, defining the most important clauses would also not seem an 
108 Fuchs “§ 307”, rec. 324 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
109 Thüsing “Transparenzgebot”, rec. 1 in: Graf von Westphalen/Thüsing (2016) with further references. 
110 Fuchs “§ 307”, rec. 336 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016); Pfeiffer, “§ 307”, rec. 236 in: 
Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer (2013). 
111 Fuchs “vor § 307”, rec. 40 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
112 Heiko Maas, Die Gefahr steckt im Detail, Frankfurter Rundschau, 09.10.2015 available at http://www.fr-
online.de/freiheit/gastbeitrag-die-gefahr-steckt-im-detail,31839204,32123826.html. 
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easy task, as each consumer may consider different clauses to be important or not 
depending on the circumstance of the particular sale or the consumer’s particular 
background and needs. Another idea for improving the accessibility and 
comprehensibility of standard contract terms concerns the use of software for ‘text 
and pattern analysis’ of online standard terms to show, for instance, hidden costs and 
to deal with the problem that consumers usually do not bother to read standard terms 
when agreeing to a contract.113 However, this approach works only with clear and 
simple terms that do not require ‘legal assessment’, and of course such software 
cannot provide legal advice either.114 Stakeholders, however, expressed serious 
doubts whether a graphical presentation model could work in practice, as information 
contained in standard contract terms is far too complex to be displayed graphically. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the working group for consumer contract law at the 
German Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection discussed whether it would be 
advisable to introduce ‘seals’ certifying fair standard contract terms. The group 
concluded, however, that the current regime is sufficient and that it would be very 
hard to review standard contract terms countrywide and in a timely fashion.115  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
Some scholars argue that the general problem is that the CJEU is – with the exception 
of its very early ruling ‘Freiburger Kommunalbauten’116 – refraining from declaring 
terms invalid in a particular case. Instead the court is leaving the ultimate decision 
whether a particular term is unfair or not to the national court. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to develop uniform European standards for unfair terms.117 Other scholars 
criticise the fact that a Directive was used as the tool to harmonise the law of the 
Member States, but in rather broad terms and with sometimes not ideal means of 
transposition, and that this has all led to quite different standards in various Member 
States. Instead, the use of a Regulation could have prevented differing standards by 
creating a unified law of unfair contract terms.118 Contrary to the position highlighting 
the lack of uniform standards, others argue that it would be impossible to establish 
such standards at the current stage of European contract law in any event.119 The 
latter view was also expressed by one of the stakeholders. In any event, despite the 
slightly different wording Sec. 307 para. 1 BGB and Art. 3 para. 1 of the Directive are 
113 Boos VuR 2014, 47 seq. 
114 Boos VuR 2014, 47, 48 seq. The method as well does not guarantee that the result will always be fully 
correct or exhaustive, ibid. 53. 
115 Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe Verbrauchervertragsrecht beim Bundesministerium für Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz (2016), p. 20 available at http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/ 
DE/StudienUntersuchungenFachbuecher/Verbrauchervertragsrecht_Abschlussbericht_AG.html. 
116 ECLI:EU:C:2004:209 (Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter 
and Ulrike Hofstetter).  
117 See e.g. Basedow “vor § 305”, rec. 43-47 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2016);  
Graf v. Westphalen NJW 2013, 961, 966. 
118 Zaccaria ZEuP 2016, 159, 166. 
119 Schlosser “vor § 305”, rec. 14 in: Staudinger (2013). 
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considered to be largely congruent.120 Generally, the stakeholders interviewed did not 
report any particular problems caused by the current approach either.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
So far no evidence was found nor were problems reported by stakeholders. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
So far no evidence was found. Some argue, however, that extension of unfair contract 
terms law to B2B contracts is a disadvantage for Germany as a trading place.121 
However, one has to keep in mind that the law of unfair contract terms was initially 
developed to protect parties in B2B relations and that hence the regulation of this area 
of law in B2B contracts has a long history in Germany. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
As pointed out previously, Germany already reviews standard contract terms in B2B 
relations and hence no need was reported to further strengthen supervision in order to 
protect SMEs or micro enterprises. Sec. 307 BGB – which is based on good faith – 
does not cause any particular problems with regard to B2B relations. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Stakeholders advocated against such a widening of the scope of B2B protection. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Stakeholders did not respond to this question. However, whether a term in a B2B 
relationship is unfair or not is more difficult to determine than in B2C relationships 
because neither one of the parties is in a weaker bargaining position per se. This is 
why it is inevitable that the individual situation of the contracting parties will be taken 
into account in each case. 
 
120 Coester “§ 308”, rec. 105 seq. in: Staudinger (2013); Fuchs “§ 307”, rec. 397 in: 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016). 
121 E.g. Müller BB 2013, 1355, see also below. 
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• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Such a rule already exists under Sec. 307 para. 1 BGB. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No evidence available. However, stakeholders state that other than legal barriers also 
influence a company’s decision whether or not to engage in cross-border trade.  
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No evidence available.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
No evidence available.  
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?122  
The Injunctions Directive is transposed into German law partly by the UKlaG and partly 
by the UWG. However, it should be noted that prior to the transposition of the 
Directive, injunction procedures were already possible under the so-called AGBG 
(Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, Act 
Regarding the Regulation of the Law Governing Standard Contract Terms) and the 
UWG, and that the existing rules were only moderately modified during the 
transposition process.123 The UKlaG and the UWG allow qualified entities (consumer 
organisations), certain business associations and the Chambers of Industry, 
Commerce and Trade to initiate injunction procedures.124 Consumer organisations 
must be registered by the Federal Office of Administration (‘Bundesverwaltungsamt’) 
or the European Commission.125 Public authorities as well as individual consumers 
have no locus standi.126 The proceedings under the UKlaG concern infringements of 
the rules on standard contract terms and various other consumer protection laws.127 
122 Consumers' detriment should be understood as the consumers' financial loss that was caused or that 
could have been caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
123 Witt “Vorb. v. § 1 UKlaG”, rec. 1, 6 in: Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen (2016);  
Köhler (2012), in: Augenhofer (ed.), p. 63 seq. The rules previously covered in the AGBG were moved 
completely to the UKlaG. 
124 Cf. Sec. 3 UKlaG and Sec. 8 para. 3 UWG.  
125 For more details on this requirement: Köhler/Feddersen “§ 8 UWG”, rec. 3.54 seqq. in: 
Köhler/Bornkamm (2016); Bergmann/Goldmann “8 UWG”, rec. 367 seqq., in: Harte-
Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig (2013); Greger NJW 2000, 2457, 2459 seq. 
126 See Micklitz “Vorbemerkung zu den §§ 1ff.“, rec. 19 in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
127 Cf. Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 UKlaG. With regard to the other consumer laws covered see the answer below to 
the question in respect of Annex I of the Injunction Directive. 
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The proceedings under the UWG concern commercial practices which are prohibited 
pursuant to Secs. 3 und 7 UWG. However, while court decisions following a claim 
under Sec. 1 UKlaG have an effect only with regard to future misbehaviour, Sec. 2 
UKlaG and Sec. 8 UWG also allow for a claim to remedial action 
(‘Beseitigungsanspruch’).128 
Stakeholders consider the UKlaG and the UWG provisions on injunction proceedings as 
very useful in practice. Both have been very successful so far with regard to reducing 
the number of infringements of consumer protection rules. However, since injunction 
procedures had already existed prior to the Injunction Directive, the particular impact 
of the Directive is difficult to determine. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Generally, stakeholders considered all of these measures as very helpful. In particular, 
corrective statements and interim injunctions (‘Einstweilige Verfügungen’)129 were said 
to be very effective. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes, Sec. 2 UKlaG allows for an injunction procedure in the event of a violation of any 
consumer protection law (‘Verbraucherschutzgesetz’), meaning any provision whose 
main purpose is the protection of consumers.130 Sec. 2 para. 2 UKlaG contains various 
examples of such laws, including those transposing the Directives listed in Annex I of 
the Injunction Directive.131 Not covered by the Annex, but listed in  
Sec. 2 para. 2 UKlaG as further examples, are in particular laws regarding consumer 
data protection (Sec. 2 para. 2 No. 11) and laws regarding the unauthorised offering 
of legal advice (Sec. 2 para. 2 No. 8). 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Some German scholars have assessed the role of consumer organisations in injunction 
proceedings positively.132 However, the scope of the term ‘qualified entities’ is rather 
limited, which makes the injunction procedure less effective.133 In particular, the 
requirements for consumer organisations as set out in Sec. 4 para. 2 UKlaG have been 
perceived as too strict.134 This is even more the case since these entities have the 
greatest interest in bringing forward consumer protection cases.135 Moreover, there is 
no genuine procedural law regarding infringement.136 Sec. 5 UKlaG merely refers to 
the general German procedural law (ZPO). Another shortcoming is the lack of 
128 See in this regard also below 1.3.3. and above 1.2.1. 
129 Cf. Sec. 5 UKlaG read in conjunction with Sec. 935, 940 ZPO. 
130 Walker “§ 2 UKlaG”, rec. 3 in: Walker (2016). 
131 With the exception of No. 5 of the annex of Directive 2009/22/EC, which is covered by Sec. 1 UKlaG, and 
No. 11 of the annex, which is covered by Sec. 8 UWG. 
132 Köhler (2012), in: Augenhofer (ed.), p. 64. 
133 See Micklitz “Vorbemerkung zu den §§ 1ff.“, rec. 18 seq. in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
134 See Micklitz “Vorbemerkung zu den §§ 1ff.“, rec. 18 in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
135 See Micklitz “Vorbemerkung zu den §§ 1ff.“, rec. 18 in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
136 See Micklitz “Vorbemerkung zu den §§ 1ff.“, rec. 21 in: Münchener Kommentar ZPO (2013). 
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transparency due to the absence of an electronic register of injunction procedures137 – 
a statement which was supported by one of the interviewed stakeholders. Generally, 
stakeholders assess the current state of the law as quite positive, besides the general 
problem of how to finance injunctions brought by consumer organisations.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Generally, stakeholders are very content with the scope of the Injunctions Directive 
and have not expressed any wish to extend the coverage, e.g. to B2B relationships. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
In Germany, injunction actions against traders from other EU countries are governed 
by Sec. 4a UKlaG. This provision allows proceedings by qualified entities against 
traders from other EU Member States who do not comply with consumer law. The 
provision does not deal with the applicable law. The applicable law is determined in 
accordance with general EU law principles (Art. 2 para. 2 of the Regulation 
2006/2004138, Regulation 44/2001139 and the Rome I and II Regulations140). However, 
scholars have assessed the success of transnational injunctions as rather poor.141 The 
main reason is that they are not used frequently.142 Moreover, the legal differences 
among Member States are often perceived as an obstacle to the Internal Market.143  
Stakeholders also reported various problems with transnational injunctions. These 
problems concern, inter alia, the delivery of documents, language barriers, bad 
translations and the issue of who to mandate with representation. Furthermore, it is 
problematic that from country to country there are varying expectations on the results 
137 Halfmeier (2015), p. 165 seq. 
138 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
139 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  
140 Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations and Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of  
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. 
141 See e.g. Stadler VuR 2010, 83, 84.  
142 See e.g. Stadler VuR 2010, 83, 84. 
143 Doralt/Nietner AcP 2015, 855. 
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of the application of the substantive law. In addition, public authorities in other 
countries are sometimes reluctant to apply foreign law. Stakeholders also suggested 
that these issues could be tackled during the process of the revision of Regulation 
2006/2004 regarding the cooperation between EU countries for consumer protection.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Sec. 8 UWG serves as transposition of both the Injunction Directive and of Art. 11 of 
the UCPD. Secs. 1, 3 seq. UKlaG serve as transposition both of the Injunction 
Directive and of Art. 7 of the UCTD. Secs. 2, 3 seq. UKlaG serve as a transposition of 
both the Injunction Directive and Art. 23 of the Consumer Rights Directive. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Firstly, Sec. 8 UWG and Sec. 3 UKlaG are different with regard to standing, as claims 
under the UWG can also be brought by competitors. Secondly, under Sec. 3 para. 2 
No. 1 UKlaG, consumer organisations cannot bring forward claims with regard to 
unfair contract terms (Sec. 1 UKlaG) when these terms concern a B2B relationship. 
Conversely, there are no restrictions on consumer organisations with regard to the 
UWG. Thirdly, Sec. 8 para. 4 UWG prohibits a claim for an injunction if its enforcement 
would be improper, while  Sec. 2 para. 3 UKlaG, which previously contained a 
provision similar to  Sec. 8 para. 4 UWG, was revoked in 2016. Finally, Sec. 8 UWG 
and Sec. 2 UKlaG constitute a claim for remedial action 
(‘Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch’), whereas it is contested in cases regarding unfair 
contract terms whether or not the claimant can bring a claim for remedial action.144  
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
With regard to substantive law, consumers are rather well protected in the mentioned 
area. This is, however, not true with regard to procedural rights: In Germany, 
infringements of both UCTD and UCPD are enforced by individuals or private 
organisations before civil law courts. It is well observed that consumers may have a 
rational disinterest in exercising their rights. This is firstly due to the fact that a court 
144 See for an overview on the issue with further references Bunte ZIP 2016, 956 seq. 
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procedure triggers costs while the outcome of the process is uncertain. For example, 
where a consumer’s claim is dismissed by the court, he has to bear his costs of the 
court proceeding as well as those of the opposing party (Sec. 91 ZPO). There exist 
some measures to counter this problem: For instance, parties before a local court 
(which is competent for claims up to EUR 5000 pursuant to Sec. 23 para. 1 GVG) are 
not compelled to be represented by a lawyer (Sec. 78 para. 1 ZPO). In order not to 
undermine their chances to win the case without legal assistance, the court is obliged 
to give reasonable hints to parties and prevent them, for example, from failing to 
comply with formal requirements (Sec. 139 ZPO).145 Further there is a special court 
procedure for small claims up to EUR 600 under Sec. 495a ZPO, which also has the 
effect of creating reduced costs. For those persons in special financial need, there is 
the possibility to apply for state aid (‘Prozesskostenhilfe’, Sec. 114 seqq. ZPO). One 
has also to note the new ADR-procedure in this regard.146 However, it is too early to 
know whether or not it will contribute to an efficient enforcement of consumer law. 
Further the notion of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer, mentioned above, 
to introduce collective claims in the Civil Procedure Act is noteworthy.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
In general, any form of harmonisation has benefits for traders because it leads to 
(some) legal certainty. This makes it easier for traders to trade across borders, saving 
legal costs, avoiding changes of practice etc. However, this only applies if traders can 
rely on a certain level of harmonisation, i.e. that there is actually legal certainty and 
not a profoundly different interpretation among the courts or an (undue) interrelation 
of the harmonised consumer rules with the foreign legal system in question. However, 
it has to be noted that other factors – outside the law – have an important impact on 
cross-border trade as well, e.g. language barriers.  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Stakeholders were mostly concerned by the compliance costs caused by the multitude 
of information obligations.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Generally the German enforcement system is focused – with regard to UCPD and 
UCTD – on private enforcement, rather than public enforcement. However public costs 
occur if public enforcement is understood in a broader sense, including e.g. costs for 
consumer information or consumer education. Due to Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004, 
the Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz) is the central link for the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC), which triggers at least 
administrative costs to a certain extend. Other costs in this context were not 
mentioned by the relevant stakeholders. Apart from these costs, it should be 
considered that the German government spends money on the education of 
145 Kocher (2012) in: Tamm/Tonner, p. 1347 with further references and a discussion of the highly 
controversial issue regarding the degree to which the court is obliged to compensate a party’s lack of 
proficiency in conducting court procedures. 
146 Act on the Transposition of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive and the Online Dispute Resolution 
Regulation in Consumer Matters, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I, p. 254, transposing  
Directive 2013/11/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013. 
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consumers and is the main financier of consumer organisations (e.g. the 
‘Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband’).147 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
There are no indications that the transposition of the concerned Directive is cost-
inefficient. Further, stakeholders did not provide any ideas on how to reduce costs 
while maintaining the level of protection. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The UCPD and UCTD – or more correctly the national laws implementing the Directives 
– are applied by German civil courts, while the application of sector specific rules 
might fall in the competence of special authorities. Courts as well as authorities are 
well aware of the different sector specific provisions. There exists not a formal but an 
informal cooperation. The greatest overlap between the different rules exists with 
regard to information requirements. It does not seem that a major change is required. 
However, information duties under the different Directives should be aligned in the 
view of stakeholders.  
147 For example the “Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband” received for the Financial Year 2014/2015 
approximately EUR 9.5 Mio. by the Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, excluding further project-
specific grants. 
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 1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
As mentioned before, stakeholders are opposed to expanding the scope of the UCTD 
as well as the UCPD. As far as C2B relations are concerned, current rules already 
provide some protection: If – a jeweller, for instance – uses unfair trading terms on 
the supply-side against consumers, the UCTD and the transposing law applies, since 
the scope is not limited to terms for ‘purchases’. Moreover, it is hardly supposable that 
a consumer would choose to use contract terms pursuant to Sec. 310 para. 1 clause 1 
BGB, since the purpose of such contract terms (avoiding costs by using the template 
of terms for many transactions) does not fit usual consumer behaviour. The same 
pertains to the UCPD: A consumer usually does not ‘advertise’, nor does he conduct 
commercial practices in terms of the UCPD or the MCAD. In order to stick with the 
mentioned example: A jeweller that advertises a willingness to pay a fair market price 
for items such as gold-jewellery is already subject to the UWG and to the UCPD. What 
is a minor issue in legal literature is the question whether private persons should be 
held liable for ‘testimonials’ that are considered as unfair commercial practices.148 
However, this does not pertain to the specific role of a private person as a consumer. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The concept is considered to be valid and is applied by courts and recognised among 
authorities and government bodies. Insofar, it is referred to the answers given above 
under 1.1.1, questions five and six. Especially regarding financial services, German 
courts do not apply a different concept of ‘consumer’.149 The rules laid down in the 
Directive appear to be adequate and there is – according to stakeholder feedback – no 
need for further amendments. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
See answers given under 1.1 and 1.2. Since the provisions governing these areas 
already existed in German law previously, it is not possible to assess whether there 
has been an improvement.  
148 Cf. with further references Henning-Bodewig GRUR 2013, 26 
149 Cf. Rott (2011), p. 136. 
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 • Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Requirements to indicate unit prices have been introduced in German law by the PID 
and have therefore contributed in promoting price clarity for consumers.150  However 
price indication rules did also exist before the implementation of the PID in German 
law and especially in context with the provision on nominal quantities of pre-packed 
goods provided a high level of consumer protection. Insofar, it is again difficult to say 
whether there has been an improvement that is only due to the implementation of the 
PID.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
See answers given under 1.1.3. The protection of businesses has always been the 
main focus of German unfair competition law, which leads to the assumption that the 
MCAD did not bring any substantial improvements, but rather a decrease since 
comparative advertisement is admissible to a broader extent. While comparative 
advertisement may promote a rational consumer decision, it deteriorates business 
protection. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Principally yes. However, all stakeholders noted that the decision by both consumers 
and businesses as to whether they will engage in cross-border transactions is also 
influenced by factors outside the legal environment.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
All the areas covered in the directives were already regulated in Germany prior to the 
enactment of the directives. Hence the directives did not lead to significant 
improvement, as discussed above. 
 
150 Sosnitza “Einführung PAnGV“, rec. 7 in: Ohly/Sosnitza (2016). 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Germany  
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts 2001, 29.11.2001, 
BGBl. 2001,  
p. 3138, Art. 1 
Before Directive 93/13/EEC there 
was the AGB-Gesetz (Unfair 
Contract Terms Act) from 1977. It 
was slightly modified with the 
“Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-
Gesetzes und der 
Insolvenzordnung“ (19.07.1996, 
BGBl 1996 I p. 1013) to implement 
the Directive.  
'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Sec. 309 BGB  
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts 2001, 29.11.2001, 
BGBl. 2001,  
p. 3138, Art. 1 
 'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
Yes Sec. 308 BGB  
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts 2001, 29.11.2001, 
BGBl. 2001, 
p. 3138, Art. 1 
 Extensions of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
No - Sec. 305 para. 1 and 
305 b BGB state that 
individually 
negotiated terms are 
not subject to review. 
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Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts 2001, 29.11.2001, 
BGBl. 2001,  
p. 3138, Art. 1 
 Extensions of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No Sec. 307 para. 3 BGB It has been argued 
though that 
Sec. 307 para. 3 is 
slightly narrower 
than Art 4 para 2 of 
the Directive.151  
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts 2001, 29.11.2001, 
BGBl. 2001,  
p. 3138, Art. 1 
 Application of certain 
unfair contract terms 
provisions to b2b 
relationships 
Yes Sec. 310 para. 1 BGB   
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Gesetzes gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, 02.12.2015, BGBl. 
2015, p. 2158 (UWG Novelle 2015) 
The first attempt to implement 
the Directive was with the Erstes 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes 
gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, 22.12.2008, BGBl. 
2008, p. 2949 (UWG Novelle 2008) 
Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Gesetzes gegen unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, 02.12.2015, BGBl. 
2015, p. 2158 
 Provisions regarding 
immovable property going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Gesetzes gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, 22.12.2008, BGBl. 
2008, p.2949 (UWG Novelle 2008) 
 Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
Yes The UWG is 
generally applicable 
to B2B transactions, 
since there is no 
specific provision 
that limits the scope 
to B2C transactions. 
Exceptions are Sec. 3 
para. 3 UWG with 
the Annex (Black 
List), Sec. 5a para. 3 
UWG.  
151 Basedow, “§ 305 BGB“ rec. 19 in: Münchener Kommentar BGB (2016). 
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Verordnung zur Änderung der 
Preisangaben- und der 
Fertigpackungsverordnung 
28.07.2000; BGBl. I 2000, p. 1238 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
Yes   
Verordnung zur Änderung der 
Preisangaben- und der 
Fertigpackungsverordnung 
28.07.2000; BGBl. I 2000, p. 1238 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Sec. 9 para. 4 PAngV 
regulates the 
derogation set out 
in Art. 6 PID 
 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Gesetz über den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb vom 03.07.2004,  
BGBl. 2004 I, p. 1414 
 Misleading commercial 
practices 
 Sec. 5 UWG 
transposes Art. 3 
MCAD 
 
Gesetz über den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb vom 03.07.2004,  
BGBl. 2004 I, p. 1414 
 Comparative advertisement  Sec. 6 UWG 
transposes Art. 5 
MCAD 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Gesetz zur Änderung des EG-
Verbraucherschutzdurch- 
setzungsgesetzes und zur 
Änderung des 
Unterlassungsklagen-gesetz, 
06.02.2012, BGBl. 2012 I, p.146  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – GERMANY  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen 
by the Injunctions Directive regulated in 
your country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal 
acts 
 
The general procedural rules are set out in the 
Civil Procedure Act (“Zivilprozessordnung”, ZPO). 
Additional provisions for the Injunction procedure 
are found in Sec. 5-12a UKlaG. As leges speciales 
they supersede the general rules of the ZPO. 
However, pursuant to Sec. 5 UKlaG, the ZPO is 
applied complementarily for everything that is 
not particularly regulated by the UKlaG. As far as 
injunctions against unfair commercial practices 
are concerned, Secs. 8-10 UWG contain the 
relevant provisions. 
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- business 
organisations 
Pursuant to Sec. 3 para. No 2 UKlaG also entitled 
are: Associations with legal personality for the 
promotion of commercial interests, insofar as 
their membership includes a considerable number 
of businesses marketing goods or commercial 
services of the same or a similar type on the same 
market, insofar as their staffing, material and 
financial resources enable them actually to 
perform the interest promotion functions laid 
down in their statutes. 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
- Court 
procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations) 
are entitled to an exemption of some/all 
cost related to the procedure please 
explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
- The costs are in 
general borne by 
the losing party 
 
 
This is the general rule in German civil procedure 
(Sec. 91 ZPO), which is applicable under Sec. 5 
UKlaG. There is no exception for qualified entities. 
However, qualified entities which are expected to 
cope without a lawyer in average cases can only 
receive a lump sum fee if they win. This is, for 
example, currently set at 230 EUR for the 
Wettbewerbszentrale. Please note that qualified 
entities are to certain extent funded by the 
federal government and are therefore able to 
bear the risk of losing in court. 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer 
law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
Yes. 
 
According to Sec. 2 para. 2 No. 11 UKlaG, the 
scope is extended to infringements of Directive 
95/46/EG. Please note that from the German 
perspective all listed elements under Sec. 2 para. 
2 UKlaG are considered as consumer law.  
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Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
Yes, partly with 
regard to the 
UCPD 
The UKlaG aims at protecting consumers. 
However, since businesses might use the same 
(unfair) terms which are – under Sec. 310 para. 1 
BGB – in some cases also considered unfair in 
contracts with a business, they also benefit from 
the procedure. 
However, pursuant to Sec. 8 para. 3 No. 2 UWG 
every competitor is entitled to seek an injunction 
of unfair commercial practices. But please note 
that this provision was already part of the UWG 
prior to the Injunction Directive. 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their 
associations 
Yes. 
 
This is the general rule in German civil procedure 
(Secs. 59, 60 and – by analogy – 260 ZPO), which 
is applicable pursuant to Sec. 5 UKlaG.  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
Yes. 
 
This procedure is not explicitly set out in UKlaG, 
but is rather a result of Sec. 93 ZPO. If the 
defendant does immediately acknowledge the 
claim (“sofortiges Anerkenntnis”), the claimant 
has to bear the costs, regardless whether the 
claim was substantial or not, if the defendant has 
not given cause for the action brought. That is 
why the claimant usually seeks the defendant to 
sign a cease and desist declaration 
(“Unterlassungserklärung”) before he brings the 
claim to court. 
Moreover, there can be a conciliation hearing, 
but that is in general not obligatory (exceptions 
are due to § 15a EGZPO). 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
- Yes, 
requirement for 
party seeking 
injunction to 
consult with the 
defendant 
See comment above. 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
 Yes. 
 
Yes, the burden of proof is facilitated with regard 
to preliminary injunctions pursuant to Sec. 5 
UKlaG and Sec. 12 para. 2 UWG. Under the 
general provisions regarding preliminary 
injunctions in Sec. 935 et seq., the claimant has to 
credibly show that he has a claim and that – 
without the preliminary injunction – the 
enforcement of the claim might be endangered 
(time limit). However, due to Sec. 5 UKlaG and 
Sec. 12 para. 2 UWG there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the claim is urgent. There are 
no restrictions regarding the subject matter. 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be 
paid 
- Yes, contractual 
penalty clause 
 
 
Under German law it is usually deemed necessary 
that the infringer sign a cease and desist 
declaration with a penalty clause due to the 
otherwise existing risk of repetition. This is paid to 
the claimant. Moreover, the claimant can ask for 
a fine (paid to the national budget) if the infringer 
violates this injunction, Sec. 890 para. 2 ZPO. 
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Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
This is governed by Sec. 7 UKlaG or alternatively 
Sec. 12 para. 3 UWG. If the claimant succeeds, he 
can apply for the publication of the judgment in 
the “Bundesanzeiger” at the defendant’s expense 
or at his own expense in any other medium. 
However, the decision is left to the discretion of 
the court, which also rules on the details of the 
publication.  
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
No. The UKlaG does not include any claims for 
sanctions; these result only from a cease and 
desist declaration with a penalty clause and 
cannot be claimed in advance. The same applies 
to the UWG. An exception is provided by the fines 
prescribed by Sec. 890 ZPO (see above). 
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public purse 
or to other beneficiary be brought within 
the injunction procedure? 
Yes. 
 
An action for restitution of profits to the public 
purse can only be brought in cases of the 
infringements of unfair competition law. The right 
is codified in Sec. 10 UWG. But only business 
organisations, regulatory bodies and qualified 
entities (Sec. 10 para. 1 with Sec. 8 para. 3 Nos. 2-
4 UWG) are entitled to make such a claim. 
Pursuant to Sec. 260 ZPO, claims might be 
combined if they pertain to the same defendant, 
the same court is competent and the subject 
matter is the same (“kumulative Klagehäufung”). 
Insofar, both actions could be brought before 
court together in order to save costs. But please 
mind that this is not a specific feature of the 
injunction procedure but is rather possible under 
general civil procedure rules. 
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No. There is no action for damages because damages 
can only be claimed by competitors under Sec. 9 
UWG. 
Can an action for damages or redress to 
be paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No. However, an action for skimming of profits can be 
brought under Sec. 10 para. 1 UWG with the 
limitation that payment is made to the national 
budget. Other than that, the consumers 
themselves have to claim damages under the 
general rules of the German Civil Code. 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies 
on the injunctions order?  
Yes. 
 
Yes, with regard to the validity of the provision: 
Pursuant to Art. 11 UKlaG, the provision in 
question is void if the individual consumer 
objects. That also applies to contracts that were 
concluded before the injunction order. 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
No.  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
Yes. Actually, a judgment in a civil law case binds only 
the parties themselves (“inter partes”). However 
Sec. 11 UKlaG deviates from this general rule 
stating that a trader cannot rely on a trading 
term that has been held unfair previously. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
Note: Data is not available in this regard.  
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).152  
152 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved 
for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 438* EUR 925** EUR 925*** 
Information 
is not 
available 
The costs mainly depend 
on the following two 
variables: 
- value of the matter in 
dispute 
(“Streitgegenstand”) 
- losing or winning 
In the example set out 
below, the matter in 
dispute is valued at 
EUR 5000, which causes 
the district court 
(“Amtsgericht”) to be 
competent at first instance 
(Sec. 23 para. 1 GVG). 
However, court fees and 
fees for legal assistance are 
the same, regardless 
whether the district court 
or Regional Court 
(“Landgericht”) is 
competent at first instance. 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0 EUR 0 EUR 30 
Information 
is not 
available 
Pursuant to Sec. 23 I and 
Sec. 31 para. 3 Act on 
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Consumer 
Matters, in general no fees 
arise for consumers, unless 
the consumer’s claim 
appears to be abusive. 
Legal assistance is not 
compelled. 
Notes: * Court fees and attorney fees are regulated by the Act on Fees for Legal Assistance 
(Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz, RVG)153 ; **Attorney fees may vary slightly since it is possible to impose additional 
fees for special conduct; further it should be noted that in this instance representation by a lawyer is not compelled 
under Sec. 78 Sec. 1 ZPO; ***In the event the suit is dismissed, the claimant has to bear the other party’s attorney fees 
pursuant to Sec. 91 para. 1 ZPO. 
 
153 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2004, p. 718, 788, recently amended by Art. 5 Act of 24.5.2016, Federal 
Law Gazette (BGBl.) I 2016, p. 1190 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
460
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Stakeholders were not able to provide substantive data. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
BMWi (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy)  
Ministry 06.07.2016 
Vzbv (Federation of German Consumer 
Organisations) 
Consumer organisation 11.07.2016 
BMJV 
(Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection) 
Ministry 14.07.2016 
BMJV 
(Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection) 
Ministry 28.07.2016 
BEVH 
(German E-Commerce and Distance Selling 
Trade Association) 
Business organisation 29.07.2016 
Wettbewerbszentrale 
(Centre for Protection against Unfair 
Competition) 
Self-regulatory institution for the 
enforcement 
of the Act against Unfair Competition 
09.08.2016 
DIHK 
(Association of German Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry) 
German central organisation for 79 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
09.08.2016 
Söp 
(German Conciliation Body for Public 
Transport) 
Consumer organisation/Arbitration agency 09.08.2016 
Bundesnetzagentur 
(Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway) 
National regulatory authority 10.08.2016 
BaFin 
(Federal Financial  
Supervisory Authority) 
National regulatory authority 10.08.2016  
Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (Federal Aviation Office) National regulatory authority - 
Bankenfachverband 
(Organisation for credit banks) 
Business Organisation - 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Alexander 2010 “Die ‘Schwarze Liste’ der UGP-Richtlinie und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland und Österreich”, GRUR Int. (Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz 
und Urheberrecht International), p. 1025. 
Alexander 2016 “Wettbewerbsrecht”, Cologne.  
Alexander 2012 “Vertragsrecht und Lauterkeitsrecht unter dem Einfluss der 
Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken“ WRP 
(Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), p. 515. 
Alexander 2014 “Fachliche Sorgfalt und Gewinnspielwerbung gegenüber Kindern” 
WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), p. 1010. 
Alexander 2016 “Lauterkeitsrecht, Vertragsrecht, Verbraucherschutzrecht: Zur 
systematischen Einordnung des UWG unter dem Einfluss der UGP-
RL“ in: Alexander/Augenhofer, 10 Jahre UGP-Richtlinie, Tübingen, 
p. 145. 
Alexander 2002 “Vertrag und unlauterer Wettbewerb”, Berlin. 
Augenhofer 2006 “Individualrechtliche Ansprüche des Verbrauchers bei unlauterem 
Wettbewerbsverhalten des Unternehmers“ WRP (Wettbewerb in 
Recht und Praxis) p. 169. 
Augenhofer 2002 “Gewährleistung und Werbung. Das neue Gewährleistungsrecht für 
Werbeaussagen”, Vienna. 
Augenhofer 2005 “Comparative Advertisement in Europe: The Preliminary Ruling in 
Pippig vs. Hartlauer and Open Questions after 1997 Directive” Tul. 
Eur. & Civ. L.F. (Tulane European and Civil Law Forum), p. 110. 
Augenhofer 2010 “State of play of the implementation of the provisions on 
advertising in the unfair commercial practices legislation” (Study for 
the Policy Department A of the European Parliament), Brussels. 
Augenhofer  2015 "German Report" in: Kobel/Kellezi/Killpatrick (eds.): Antitrust in 
Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Competition to 
Corporate Social Responsibilities, Berlin, p. 507. 
Beater 2011 “Unlauterer Wettbewerb”, Tübingen. 
Birk 2011 “Wann enthält eine Werbung ein ‚Angebot’?“ GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 198. 
Boos 2014 “Nutzungsunterstützung durch automatisierte Auswertung 
einzelner standardisierter Vertragsbedingungen”, VuR (Verbraucher 
und Recht), p. 47. 
Boos/Fischer/Schulte-
Mattler (eds.) 
2012 “Kommentar zumKreditwesengesetz”, 4th edition, Munich. 
Brox/Walker 2014 “Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches”, 38th edition, 
Munich. 
Buck-Heeb/Dieckmann 2010 “Selbstregulierung im Privatrecht”, Tübingen. 
Bunte 2016 “Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch nach dem UWG bei unzulässigen AGB-
Klauseln?”, ZIP (Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht), p. 956. 
Canaris 2000 “Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts – Tendenzen zu seiner 
Materialisierung AcP (Archiv für die civilistische Praxis), p. 273. 
Doralt/Nietner 2015 “Verbrauchervertragsrecht und Rechtswahl”, AcP (Archiv für die 
civilistische Praxis), p. 855. 
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Emmerich 2016 “Unlauterer Wettbewerb”, 10th edition, Munich. 
Erman 2014 “Handkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch”, 14th edition, 
Cologne. 
Fleischer  2001 “Informationsasymmetrie im Vertragsrecht”, Munich. 
Gerecke 2015 “Werbung gegenüber Kindern und Jugendlichen” NJW (Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift), p. 3185.  
Götting/Nordemann 
(eds.) 
2016 “UWG Handkommentar“, 3rd edition, Baden-Baden. 
Graf von Westphalen 2013 “Verbraucherschutz nach zwei Jahrzehnten Klauselrichtlinie”, NJW 
(Neue Juristische Wochenschrift), p. 961. 
Graf von 
Westphalen/Thüsing 
(eds.) 
2016 “Vertragsrecht und AGB-Klauselwerke”, 38th edition, Munich. 
Greger 2000 “Neue Regeln für die Verbandsklage im Verbraucherschutz- und 
Wettbewerbsrecht”, NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift), 
p. 2457. 
Großkommentar UWG  2014 “Großkommentar UWG“, 2nd edition, Berlin. 
Halfmeier 2015 “50 Jahre Verbandsklage, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen Kollektiver 
Rechtsschutz-instrumente: Bilanz und Handlungsbedarf, Gutachten 
im Auftrag des Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.”, Berlin. 
Harte-
Bavendamm/Henning-
Bodewig 
2013 “Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), Kommentar”, 
3rd edition, Munich 
Henning-Bodewig 2013 “Haften Privatpersonen nach dem UWG?” GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 26. 
Hoeren 2008 “Das neue UWG – der Regierungsentwurf im Überblick”, BB 
(Betriebs-Berater), p. 1182. 
Hoeren 2009 “Das neue UWG und dessen Auswirkungen auf den B2B-Bereich”, 
WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), p. 789. 
Jacobi 2010 “Die optische Vergrößerung der Grundpreisangabe – Notwendigkeit 
und Umsetzung“, WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis) p. 1217. 
Jauernig 2015 “Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch”, 16th edition, Munich. 
Juris Praxiskommentar  2013 “Juris Praxiskommentar UWG”, 3rd edition, Saarbrücken. 
Kocher 2012 “Individualklagen: Besonderheiten in Verbrauchersachen” in: 
Tamm/Tonner, Beratungshandbuch Verbraucherrecht, Baden-
Baden. 
Köhler 2010 “Wettbewerbsverstoß und Vertragsnichtigkeit” JZ (Juristenzeitung), 
p. 767. 
Köhler 2013 “Irreführende vergleichende Werbung” GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 761. 
Köhler 2012 “Klagebefugnis der Verbraucherverbände de lege lata und de lege 
ferenda” in: Augenhofer (ed.), Verbraucherrecht im Umbruch, 
Tübingen, p. 63. 
Köhler  2003 “UWG-Reform und Verbraucherschutz“, GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 265. 
Köhler/Bornkamm (eds.) 2016 “Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb”, 34th 
edition, Munich. 
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Landmann/Rohmer (eds.) 2016 “Gewerbeordnung und ergänzende Vorschriften: Loseblatt-
Kommentar“, 72nd edition, Munich. 
Leistner 2007 “Richtiger Vertrag und lauterer Wettbewerb“, Tübingen. 
Lettl 2004 “Der Schutz der Verbraucher nach der UWG-Reform”, GRUR 
(Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht), p. 449. 
Lindacher 2012 “Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urt. v. 26.04.2012 – Rs C-472/10”, EWiR 
(Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht), p. 677. 
Möstl 2014 “Wandel des Verbraucherleitbilds? Eine Positionsbestimmung aus 
lebensmittelrechtlicher Perspektive”, WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht 
und Praxis), p. 906. 
Müller 2013 “Die AGB-Kontrolle im unternehmerischen Geschäftsverkehr – 
Standortnachteil für das deutsche Recht”, BB (Betriebsberater), 
p. 1355. 
Münchener Kommentar 
BGB 
2015 “Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 1”, 
7th edition, Munich. 
Münchener Kommentar 
BGB 
2016 “Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 2, 
Schuldrecht – Allgemeiner Teil”, 7th edition, Munich. 
Münchener Kommentar 
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Münchener Kommentar 
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4th edition, Munich. 
Namysłowska 2010 “Trifft die Schwarze Liste der unlauteren Geschäftspraktiken ins 
Schwarze? Bewertung im Lichte der EuGH-Rechtsprechung”, GRUR 
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Ohly/Sosnitza (eds.) 2016 “Kommtentar zum Gesetz gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb”, 
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Plaß 2000 “Die gesetzliche Neuregelung der vergleichenden Werbung“, NJW 
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Reich 2014 “Zur Möglichkeit und Durchsetzung eines sog. 
Folgenbeseitigungsanspruchs im UWG und im AGB-Recht – das 
Flexstrom-Urteil des KG v. 27.03.2013 und die Folgen für 
unberechtigt geforderte Energiepreis-“anpassungen“ durch die 
Versorger”, VuR (Verbraucher und Recht), p. 247. 
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Auskunfts- und Rückzahlungspflicht der Bank bei rechtswidrigen 
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application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices 
in the EU. 
Sack 2001 “Vergleichende Werbung nach der UWG-Novelle” WRP 
(Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), p. 327. 
Sack 2004 “Folgeverträge unlauteren Wettbewerbs“ GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 625. 
Scherer 2009 “’Case law’ in Gesetzesform – Die ‘Schwarze Liste’ als neuer UWG-
Anhang”, NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift), p. 324. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
465
Scherer 2011 “Was bringt die ‘Schwarze Liste’ tatsächlich? Bestandsaufnahme 
und Konsequenzen”, WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), 
p. 393. 
Scherer  2001 “Partielle Verschlechterung der Verbrauchersituation durch die 
europäische Rechtsvereinheitlichung bei vergleichender Werbung“, 
WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis), p. 89. 
Schöttle 2009 “Die Schwarze Liste – Übersicht über die neuen Spe- zialtatbestände 
des Anhangs zu § 3 Abs. 3 UWG” WRP (Wettbewerb in Recht und 
Praxis), p. 673. 
Schwarze 2001 “Vorvertragliche Verständigungspflichten”, Tübingen. 
Schwerdtfeger 1997 “Änderungen des AGB-Gesetzes durch Umsetzung der Verbraucher-
vertragsrichtlinie”, DStR (Das deutsche Steuerrecht), p. 499. 
Soergl 1999 “Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Band 2: Allgemeiner 
Teil 2. §§ 104 - 240 BGB”, 13th edition, Stuttgart. 
Stadler 2015 “Beseitigungsklagen durch Verbände im AGB-Recht”, in: Meller-
Hannich/Haertlein et al. (eds.), Rechtslage – Rechtserkenntnis –
Rechtsdurchsetzung, Festschrift für Eberhard Schilken zum 
70. Geburtstag, Munich. 
Stadler  2010 “Von den Tücken der grenzüberschreitenden Verbands-
Unterlassungsklage”, VuR (Verbraucher und Recht) p. 83. 
Staudinger 2012 “J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, §§ 90-124; 130-133, 
UKlaG (Allgemeiner Teil 3)”, Berlin. 
Staudinger 2011 “J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, §§ 134-138; Anh zu § 138, 
ProstG (Allgemeiner Teil 4a)”, Berlin. 
Staudinger 2013 "J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, §§ 305-310, UKlaG (Recht 
der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen)", Berlin. 
Streinz 2014 “Verbraucherleitbild – Existenz? Wandel? Differenzierungen?” in 
Möstl (ed.): Verbraucherinformation im Wandel, Bayreuth. 
Tilmann 1997 “Richtlinie vergleichende Werbung” GRUR (Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht), p. 790. 
Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen 
(eds.) 
2016 “AGB-Recht, Kommentar zu den §§ 305-310 BGB und zum 
Unterlassungs-klagengesetz”, 12th edition, Cologne. 
van Eek/Czernik 2016 “Dutch and German application of the UCP Directive on competing 
businesses“, GRUR Int. (Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht International), p. 3161 
Völker 2002 “Preisangabenrecht, Recht der Preisangaben und der 
Preiswerbung“, 2nd edition., Munich. 
Walker 2016 “Unterlassungsklagengesetz, Kommentar”, Baden-Baden 
Weatherill 2013 “EU Consumer Law and Policy”, Cheltenham. 
Weiler 2003 “Ein lauterkeitsrechtliches Vertragslösungsrecht des 
Verbrauchers?“ WRP 2003, 423, 426. 
Wenke 1998 “Die vergleichende Werbung in Deutschland nach der Richtlinie 
97/55/EG und der BGH-Entscheidung ‘Testpreis-Angebot’”, WRP 
(Wettbewerb in Recht und Preaxis), p. 811. 
Wettbewerbszentrale 2015 “Jahresbericht 2015”, Berlin. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
466
Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer 
(eds.) 
2013 “AGB-Recht, Kommentar”, 6th edition, Munich. 
Zaccaria 2016 “Anmerkungen zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 93/13/EWG über 
missbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen in Europa”, ZEuP 
(Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht), p. 159. 
Zipfel/Rathke 2015 “Lebensmittelrecht, Loseblatt-Kommentar“, 162nd edition, Munich. 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
467
1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report GREECE  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
UCPD has been transposed into Greek law by N 3587/2007 which amended N 
2251/1994. N 3587/2007 brought significant changes to 2251/1994 which is the main 
piece of Greek consumer legislation. N. 2251/1994 incorporates the majority of EU 
consumer law Directive in its text under different parts and headings. The UCPD has 
been transposed almost verbatim. The way EU consumer law Directives have been 
transposed in Greek law has been critiqued also in the literature, as no effort is made 
to codify the legislation or organise it in a systematic way and the transposition of the 
UCPD has not been an exception to that rule.1  
Prior to the transposition of the UCPD, there was no Greek law regulating unfair 
commercial practices with the broad scope of the UCPD, while there were rules on 
advertising on 2251/1994 which transposed previous EU Directives, specifically 
Directive 84/450/EU on misleading advertising, Directive 97/55/EU for comparative 
advertising and Directive 89/552.  
The UCPD broadened the scope of application by catching a broad range of practices 
taking place before, during and after a transactional decision. Also, it introduced 
provisions on aggressive commercial practices for the first time in Greek consumer 
law. However, it reduced the scope of application because it introduced a narrower 
concept of the consumer. This caused a level of concern, as the general definition of 
consumer in Greek law is very broad. A consumer is:2  
‘every natural or legal person or unions of entities without a legal personality 
who constitute the target group of products or services offered in the market 
and who use products or services being their end user. A consumer is also: 
aa) every target group of promotional activities, bb) every physical or legal 
entity who gives a guarantee in favour of the consumer on condition that they 
do not act in the context of their professional or business activity.’ 
There were fears that e.g. professionals would not be able to benefit from the 
protection of consumer law leaving what was considered to be a gap in 
protection, as they may still be in a position of grave imbalance of power vis-à-
vis the trader.3 
A representative of the Ministry stated that they receive a low number of complaints 
relating to unfair commercial practices. However, that can only be an approximate 
estimate, as no statistical evidence is held for the complaints received. This could 
point to either an effective application of the law, meaning unfair practices are not a 
major problem in the market, or to the exact opposite. It is difficult to draw 
conclusions. Similarly, the statistics presented by the Greek Consumer Ombudsman 
that is responsible for ADR, unfair practices form a small number of their case load at 
6.1% in their 2015 report.  
1  Deloyka-Igglesi, Δικαιο του Καταναλωτή Ενωσιακό και Ελληνικό, [2014] Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 26-27 
2  N.2251/94, art.1 par.4(a) 
3 Aleksandridou, “Ο τροποποιημένος νόμος για την προστασία του καταναλωτή από την σκοπιά ενός 
εμπορικολόγου” [2007], 55 NoB 7, 1493, 1497 
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The effectiveness of the UCPD can be demonstrated also by a brief comparison to the 
attitudes towards the UCTD. Stakeholders were a lot more comfortable and confident 
in discussing the application of the UCTD, which may be attributed to the fact that the 
UCTD has been applied for longer and there is already a robust body of case law on its 
application. Contrary to that, not many cases concerning unfair practices have 
appeared in court as can be drawn from interviews with consumer organisation 
representatives. There is no available data on how many cases are brought to court 
either as representative actions or as actions of individual consumers. 
Representatives of consumer organisations have pointed out that judges in Greece are 
not very accustomed to dealing with cases relating to unfair practices or even 
consumer law in general. This has the effect that abstract terms used in the Directive 
may be interpreted in a manner consistent with the civil law. Therein lies the danger 
of a stricter interpretation of the terms, making it more difficult for an action to be 
accepted. 
The representatives of the Consumer Ombudsman favoured the principle-based 
approach of the UCPD, as it allows the flexibility for the inclusion of cases that were 
not originally considered by the legislator. Business associations were in general 
warier of the principle-based approach that might allow gold-plating, yet they did not 
have specific problems to report that stemmed from the Directive. A representative of 
a consumer organisation criticised the broad concepts employed in the general clause 
of art.5 and particularly the concept of ‘material distortion of economic behaviour’ 
included in the Directive, as it is difficult to define what amounts to material distortion.  
While problems with unfair practices continue to exist that was not attributed to the 
legal framework itself by the interviewees, which was deemed satisfactory in general, 
but to the enforcement of the law. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The black list has been incorporated in N. 2251/94 not as a unified list, as it is in 
Annex I of the UCPD, but as two separate articles, art.9στ for misleading practices, 
and art.9 η for aggressive practices.  
Consumer organisations as well as authorities recognised the benefits of the existence 
of the black list. It simplifies the application of the law and there is no need to go 
through the hurdle of proving the effect of the practice on the average consumer. 
Business associations were also positive to the existence of the black list which was 
seen as a vehicle to ensure legal certainty, which is in general desirable for 
businesses. 
In the literature there have been criticisms of the black list, as it still requires the use 
of abstract legal terms e.g. ‘reasonable grounds’ in point 5 of Annex I, which 
undermine the goal of achieving legal certainty.4 
The main benefit of the blacklist as stated by many interviewees is the fact that they 
do not have to go through additional hurdles to prove that a practice is unfair. 
However, the Ministry has on occasion used multiple legal bases when administering 
fines that could be based solely on the black list. It appears that using a 
supplementary legal basis is seen as a way of fortifying the administrative decision 
against scrutiny in a court, something that may be undermining the purpose of the 
black list, which is eliminating the hurdles in proving a practice is unfair. The same 
practice of using multiple legal bases where the blacklist would have sufficed can also 
be seen in court decisions.5 
4  Marinos, ‘Από το ελληνικό στο κοινοτικό δίκαιο του αθέμιτου ανταγωνισμού-προβλήματα εφαρμογής της 
μαύρης λίστας της οδηγίας 2005/29 για τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές’, [2011] ΔΕΕ, 877,881 
5 See Decision no. 4196/2013 ΔιοικΕφΑθ where not only point 3 of Annex I was invoked but also art.6 UCPD 
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The Consumer Ombudsman also considers that the black list aids the understanding of 
consumers of unfair practices. Consumers may not be aware of the structure of the 
legislation of unfair practices, however when informed on a specific practice, e.g. via a 
campaign, there is a positive and immediate response, at least from the consumers 
sophisticated enough to engage with e.g. a social media campaign. 
With regard to the application of the black list in specific cases, the following examples 
were mentioned by the Ministry: 
Employing art.9στ (δ) of N.2251/94 (point 4 of Annex I UCPD) to catch cases of 
companies making non verifiable claims about their products such as energy saving 
devices (see also below on environmental claims); art.9στ (κστ) of N.2251/94 (point 
17 of Annex I UCPD) for products such as ‘energy bracelets’ claiming to cure 
rheumatisms and ozone devices proclaiming the benefits of drinking water with ozone 
to cure illnesses. 
The Greek market has been flooded with cheaply made products often making 
unverifiable claims that now take up a lot of TV air time, which they would not be able 
to afford in pre-crisis times and are often sponsored by celebrities making it easier for 
consumers to be misled. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The Greek legislator did not make use of the minimum harmonisation clauses for 
financial services and immovable property when transposing the UCPD. Stakeholders 
view the minimum harmonisation clauses as positive, given the particularities of these 
two sectors. However, no stakeholder had any experience with immovable property 
which traditionally falls outside the scope of Greek consumer law. In transactions in 
the sector of immovable property, consumers are not considered to require the 
heightened protection granted by consumer law, as they enter these transactions after 
careful weighing. 
Financial services form a large part of the workload of consumer organisations and 
authorities alike and there is a multitude of legislation for consumers of financial 
services. However, the focus is on the over indebted consumers rather than unfair 
practices, where the standard of the UCPD applies. 
Representatives of consumer associations have also reiterated their preference for 
minimum harmonisation and its benefits for consumers. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
This does not appear to be a major problem. The stakeholders interviewed expressed 
the opinion that Greek consumers may be less interested in products labelling 
themselves as green and more focused on prices or costs effectiveness. The financial 
crisis has also had a role to play in consumers focus on price rather than other 
characteristics of products. For example, consumer organisation representatives 
mentioned they dealt with cases of misleading claims of devices claiming to 
significantly reduce energy consumption. The assessment of the consumer 
organisation was that consumers were more interested in reducing their electricity bills 
rather than the environmentally friendly aspect of the product. There were some 
incidents mentioned that can be divided into two broad categories.  
In relation to the energy market, the market is in the process of being opened up to 
competition with about 90% of the market being held by the formerly public DEH. 
However, there have been incidents with misleading advertising relating to claims of 
producing ‘green energy’. Consumers requested more information from the regulator 
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as they were unfamiliar with the term ‘green energy’ and what it meant for them. 
Regulator was able to deal with the practices effectively, as it was clear any such 
advertising would be misleading. It is technically impossible to receive any green 
energy certification in Greece at the moment as all providers receive energy from a 
common ‘pot’ and it is impossible to distinguish where the energy came from. 
The second category relates to misleading claims from telemarketing products. As 
mentioned above, the Greek market in the last years has seen a large increase in the 
advertising of poor quality, low price products, mostly marketed via the use of 
telemarketing. These products were either devices that claimed to assist in reducing 
energy bills or for example gadgets that claimed to be environmentally friendly 
replacements to laundry detergents.  
The problems identified in relation to these products were related also to product 
safety rules. There were difficulties on behalf of regulators in proving the claims made 
to be misleading, as it required an ad hoc committee for the testing of the product to 
be formed. Article 9στ (δ) of N.2251/94 was used to catch such environmental claims 
as there is no specific practice in the black list on misleading environmental claims. 
The use of the blacklist for these issues led to them being quickly resolved, sometimes 
within 6 months. 
Finally, consumer organisation representatives pointed out some issues in the fuel 
market where some companies were making claims of selling bio-diesel fuel which 
were difficult to verify as the criteria for labelling a fuel as bio-diesel were not 
transparent. 
In general, this is not a significant problem and does not generate a large number of 
consumer complaints. However, this could be attributed to what appears to be a low 
interest on ‘green’ products and services on behalf of Greek consumers.   
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The average consumer is a concept that both authorities and courts seem to be 
relatively unfamiliar with. One of the reasons for that, according to stakeholders, could 
be the fact that there are limited cases relating to unfair practices, especially in 
comparison to e.g. unfair contract terms.  
There is a need to contrast the average consumer to the general definition of 
consumer employed in Greek consumer law. N.2251/94 employs a very general 
definition of consumer.6 This broad definition of consumer has generated a number of 
issues highlighted in the literature as it is broad enough to grant the heightened 
protection of consumer to everyone, even large companies. There has been a 
coordinated effort in the case law and in the literature to limit and qualify this general 
concept mostly via the use of AK281 on abuse of right.7 In comparison to that, the 
‘average consumer’ is viewed in the literature as a relatively problem-free stricto 
sensu consumer. 
The concept of the average consumer does not appear to be applied in a rigid manner. 
Often it may be co-related to the level of expertise and knowledge the average 
consumers is expected to exhibit in relation to the product or service. For example, a 
representative of the Ministry mentioned that for the purpose of administering a fine 
they considered the average consumer would find a claim that a device can turn water 
into fuel misleading. A level of scientific knowledge higher than that of the average 
consumer would be required to be able to not fall prey to that practice. This reveals a 
6  N.2251/1994, art.1 par.4 (a) 
7  For a thorough review of the debate see Perakis ‘Article 1 N.2251/94’ in Aleksandridou (ed) Δίκαιο 
Προστασίας Καταναλωτη: Ελληνικό- Κοινοτικό, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008), 51-56 
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tendency to be more protective of the consumer, one that is also reflected in the 
general definition of consumer employed in Greek consumer law. 
However the law is not always favourable to consumers. Level of education is also an 
important criterion taken into account by the courts when assessing the standard of 
the consumer. In a case concerning charges for excessive mobile phone data usage, 
the court took into account the fact that the consumer was a computer engineer for 
assessing whether he had taken reasonable measures to avoid the charges. If a more 
sophisticated consumer could not avoid the charges, then the average mobile phone 
user could not have either.8 Consumer ombudsman and consumer organisations 
mentioned that in cases with Swiss franc loans where many of the affected consumers 
were doctors there was a reluctance to accept that they had been misled because of 
their high level of education. Also, in a case concerning advertising of medical 
equipment in a specialised journal, the Court found that the audience of this magazine 
had a high level of knowledge in this market and that they would not readily accept 
the claims made in an advertisement without further research.9  
Business associations also believed that there is a disparity between the Greek 
average consumer and the average consumer of e.g. a central European country in 
how well-informed they are and how active they are in seeking out information. They 
also pointed out the disparities between consumers based on age, i.e. that older 
consumers are a lot less informed than the younger ones. Greek consumers fail to live 
up to the high standard implied for the average consumer in rec.18 UCPD. The 
Ministry agrees that there is a great divide between young and older consumers 
making it more difficult to assess what the average consumer would be capable of. In 
this case age is also connected to technological illiteracy as one of the main reasons 
older consumers are considered to be worse off is because they are often not able to 
use new technologies effectively. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The UCPD sets out three criteria for vulnerability: age, mental or physical infirmity and 
credulity.10 Out of these, the criterion of age is the most widely employed in Greece. 
As mentioned also in the above question, interviewees expressed the view that elderly 
consumers often find themselves in a vulnerable position. That is often co-related with 
their lack of familiarity with modern technologies meaning they have difficulties in e.g. 
using the internet to find information or file a complaint with a trader. This could be 
owed also to the fact that these technological advancements, such as e-commerce 
have been less pervasive in Greece where it is only in the last years that there has 
been a significant rise, meaning elderly consumers may be unfamiliar with them. 
On the other side of the age spectrum, the protection of young consumers is also of 
great importance. So much so, that there is an article for the protection of the mental 
health of minors in 2251, one that extends also to their moral development.11 The 
criterion of ‘credulity’ is the most problematic one, as there is no clarity as to its 
meaning and when it should be applied. As a result it is not used and many 
interviewees pointed out that it is problematic as its meaning is not clear and may 
create confusion with related civil law concepts governing the rules on legal capacity. 
In the last years, in light of the financial crisis there have been many legislative 
initiatives for the protection of vulnerable consumers. The most notable is 
N.3869/2010 for over-indebted households, which has generated a great influx of 
cases both for courts, consumer associations, and relevant authorities. However it 
8 Decision no. 1488/2013, ΕιρΑθ 
9 Decision number 2130/2013 ΕφΑθ 
10  UCPD, art.5.3 
11  N.2251/94, art.7α 
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needs to be pointed out that this legislation is not related to the vulnerability of 
consumers to unfair practices. It uses income and social criteria. The financial crisis 
has created the rise of a vulnerable consumer whose vulnerability is caused by the 
impact of the financial crisis. 
Another example would be that of the ‘vulnerable customer’ in the electricity market 
where specific categories of vulnerable consumers, with very specific criteria are 
included in the law.12 These criteria range from income criteria for low-income 
consumers and the long-term unemployed, age for elderly consumers as well as 
disability. Another category of vulnerable consumer designed especially for the energy 
market is that of the inhabitant of a small island (one of less than 3.100 inhabitants) 
due to the special needs of the area in electricity.13 
Consumer organisations and regulators were positive towards these initiatives for 
vulnerable consumers, as they tend to offer concrete rights to consumers. In their 
view, consumers are informed about these provisions and make use of them. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
There have been many initiatives both of self- and co-regulation, both sectoral and co-
sectoral with various degrees of success. One example that has been mentioned by 
several interviewees as a successful one is that of SEE, the Council for Control of 
Communication. It is the council that enforces the code of advertisers, which is cross-
sectoral. The code is based on the ICC code of advertising and marketing 
communication practice. According to several interviewees, this code is working well 
and the council is active in enforcing the code and its decisions are complied with by 
the members.  
An example of a code that was not successful was that of the slimming 
institutes/beauty parlours, as reported by consumer associations. A few years ago, 
many of these institutes engaged in aggressive practices, targeting primarily women 
and making them sign contracts for several thousand euros. The code did little to help 
with these practices as the businesses would easily switch from members to non-
members of the code. Eventually legislative intervention was required to put an end to 
these practices. 
Co-regulation initiatives are also frequently used, usually initiated by independent 
authorities. For example, the telecommunications and post regulator EETT employs a 
code in telecommunications. This code was mentioned by a representative of the 
consumer ombudsman as one that was helpful in resolving the issues that had been 
created with unfair practices in the telecommunications industry at a time when the 
market was being opened to competition. Consumer organisations argued that there is 
a degree of hesitation on behalf of the banks in enforcing the co-regulatory code for 
banks for non-performing private loans, which results in reduced protection for 
consumers.14  
A consumer organisation representative pointed out that having too many sectoral 
codes does little to help consumers who may not be aware of their existence, or they 
may not be enforced so rigidly, preferring hard law over self-regulation initiatives. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
12 ΥΑ Αριθ. Δ5−ΗΛ/Β/Φ.1.21/οικ. 12112 Κατηγορίες, κριτήρια και διαδικασία ένταξης Πελα−τών στους 
Ευάλωτους Πελάτες ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας 
13 ΥΑ Αριθ. Δ5−ΗΛ/Β/Φ.1.21/οικ. 12112, art.2 (α), (γ), (στ), (η) 
14 N.4224/2013, art.1 par.2 
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there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
The majority of interviewees were positive about the idea of a mechanism for revising 
the blacklist, as new practices may emerge that require modification. However, when 
prompted only few could produce concrete examples of a practice they would like to 
see included in the black list. More specifically, a representative of the Ministry 
suggested that a practice that could be included would be that of making misleading 
claims about a product that blatantly go against current scientific knowledge and 
capabilities such as misleading claims that a device can turn water into fuel (there 
were cases featuring these kind of products). Another suggestion by representative of 
consumer organisation was including practices relating to promotional activities where 
there are problems relating to price transparency, e.g. 2-for-1 offers, claims of 20% 
cheaper etc.  
Representatives of authorities pointed to the importance of new challenges as a result 
of new technologies and the internet, such as online targeted ads and that as 
commercial practices become more globalised, any effort to combat them should be 
coordinated at the EU level. Business associations also expressed the view that e-
commerce has created issues that should be taken into account when revising the 
black list.  
In contrast, consumer organisations have stated their preference for minimum 
harmonisation and Member States being able to add and remove practices to the list. 
Furthermore, it was pointed out by consumer organisations that the modification of 
the black list should be done within a limited timeframe to allow for the practices to be 
up to date with the latest marketing techniques, rather than a process with a lengthy 
procedure that might mean some practices may already be obsolete by the time they 
are included in the list. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
A consumer association representative suggested that further guidance by the 
Commission is required for the application of the UCPD and especially the concept of 
the average consumer.15 Another suggestion was that of offering the possibility of 
claiming damages/compensation for violations of unfair practices on an EU level and 
clarifying how these damages would be proven and calculated.  
A further suggestion that would be welcomed by the Consumer Ombudsman as well as 
consumer associations, would be the use of a black list and white list for traders, 
where the list would be public and searchable and would act as a deterrent for traders 
and would allow consumers to be informed on whether traders are using unfair 
practices. 
No best practices were identified. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The general consensus amongst interviewees was that this is a Directive that is 
working well and is not causing particular problems. Few consumer complaints are 
15 A Commission Staff Working Document on Guidance for the application of the UCPD has been recently 
published. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/ucp_guidance_en.pdf (Accessed 
September 2016) 
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received over this issue. Any complaints may revolve around the issue of presentation 
of the price. Perhaps the price tag is not in an obvious place or perhaps the unit price 
is displayed in a much smaller font size making it difficult to spot. The general view 
was that consumers do make use of the unit price as it is their only way to effectively 
compare prices, however it is not easy to tell how many consumers are in fact 
informed about it. 
The interviewees were more concerned with other pricing techniques that create a 
problem in the market. Issues are caused by promotional material of super markets 
advertising their offers with claims such as ‘now 20% cheaper” without specifying how 
that is calculated. Another problem was caused by shops failing to display prices at 
their window or misrepresenting prices during sales. However, these issues relate to 
price transparency and misleading pricing and are caught by the UCPD rather than the 
PID. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Opinions were divided on the issue. Some of the interviewees believed that 
performance units would facilitate comparison for consumers. Others believed that a 
performance unit is subjective and to the extent that it is decided by the producer 
(e.g. in the detergent example the manufacturer would define how much product is 
needed for a wash load), it can create confusion. A representative of the Ministry also 
pointed out that a performance unit could create confusion in promotional activities 
e.g. when extra product is offered. A consumer organisation representative found the 
crucial point was that all traders used the same measurement unit, regardless of 
which one it is. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Greece is one of the countries that has made use of the derogations for small 
businesses from the requirement to indicate the unit price. This is something that 
according to the assessment of the interviewees is working well and is not causing 
particular problems. In Greece there are many very small businesses, such as mini-
markets that make use of the derogation. Representatives of consumer associations 
are not against this derogation as they recognise that the requirement to indicate unit 
price would create a high cost for many very small, family businesses. On the other 
hand, representative of a business association pointed out that with the use of new 
technologies it may become easier for small businesses to comply with the law at a 
smaller cost which may eliminate the need for derogation. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD has been transposed in Greek law in the following manner: the articles on 
comparative advertising are found in art.9 par.2-4 of N.2251/94. Misleading 
advertising is covered by art. 9δ and 9ε of N.2251/94. Different concepts of consumer 
are in place in N.2251/94. For article 9 the general definition applies which is: 
‘Consumer: every physical or legal entity or unions of entities without a legal 
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personality who constitute the target group of products or services offered in the 
market and who use products or services being their end user. A consumer is also: aa) 
every target group of promotional activities, bb) every physical or legal entity who 
gives a guarantee in favour of the consumer on condition that they do not act in the 
context of their professional or business activity.’ 
That is a very broad definition that appears to grant the status of consumer to almost 
everyone and definitely covers traders and professionals for the purposes of the 
MCAD. On the other hand, for art.9 δ and 9ε which transpose art.6 and 7 UCPD in 
Greek law, the more restrictive definition of consumer of the Directive applies which 
includes only the consumer as a natural person who is acting for purposes which are 
outside their trade, business, craft or profession.16 
The transposition of the Directive in Greek law has created a number of problems. 
Especially for misleading advertising it is not clear whether traders can directly invoke 
art.9δ και 9 ε in court for their protection. Representatives of the Ministry have stated 
that they do accept complaints from professionals on advertising. These could either 
be from small businesses or professionals that wish to be protected or from businesses 
who report consumer law violations viewing it more as a tool to stop competitors. 
They do accept these complaints and have on occasion taken action where there was a 
violation, yet would not want to see an increase in complaints from businesses as the 
scope of their service is already very broad. 
Business organisation representatives said that traders might and have in the past 
invoked N.2251/94 in court but mostly apply competition law or the general law of 
sales and obligations for misleading advertising. They consider that to be a lot easier 
and faster for administration of justice, since via the use of private law they can get 
an injunction more easily in order to stop the practice. Businesses may apply 
N.2251/94 by analogy and not directly. One business organisation representative 
expressed the view that it is sufficient for the framework to be limited to advertising. 
The lack of clarity around whether businesses can in fact use these provisions has led 
to them not being widely used by businesses. There appears to be a low visibility of 
the provisions as being there for the protection of businesses given that they are 
included in the legislation for consumer protection. That problem is even more acute 
for misleading advertising. 
These problems in the transposition of the Directive have also been highlighted in the 
literature where it has been advocated that the provisions of the MCAD should have 
been transposed in N.146/1914 on unfair competition, instead of 2251/94 on 
consumer protection and article 9 of N.2251/94 abolished in light of the UCPD.17 
Given the issues highlighted above, the application of the MCAD cannot be said to 
have been effective. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Please refer to the answer above. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
16 See Ν.2251/94 art.9 α (α)  
17 Apostolopoulos, ‘Αθέμιτη συγκριτική διαφήμιση χωρίς καν σύγκριση; Επιταγη φιλελευθεροποίησης της 
συγκριτικής διαφήμισης υπό το πρίσμα του κοινοτικού δικαίου’, [2006] ΣΤ ΧρΙΔ, 29,30; Vasilopoulos, 
‘Συγκριτική διαφήμιση και αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές’ in Douvlis and Mpolos (eds) Δίκαιο Προστασίας 
Καταναλωτών, (Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2008), 633 
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Misleading advertising is also covered by the law of unfair competition on art.1, 3 of 
N.146/1914. Furthermore, the code of advertisers as enforced by SEE also covers 
misleading advertising with detailed provisions that go beyond what is prescribed in 
the MCAD. As the code does not distinguish amongst addressees of the advertisement 
it can also be applied in B2B relations. There is no extension of the UCPD in B2B 
transactions, which is also causing the issue with misleading advertising highlighted 
above. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Prior to the introduction of the Directive, comparative advertising was forbidden in 
Greek law. Greek courts were cautious about allowing comparative advertising in 
exceptional circumstances.18 The introduction of full harmonisation provisions on 
comparative advertising has brought a significant shift in that attitude as comparative 
advertising is now allowed provided it conforms with certain conditions and full 
harmonisation means the courts cannot enforce stricter standards that would limit 
comparative advertising further. However, in the context of the code of advertisers, 
there has been the critique that they adhere to a stricter standard for comparative 
advertising than that of the MCAD, meaning they limit this type of advertising 
further.19 Greek law also regulates comparative tests/trials which are considered a key 
aspect of comparative advertising which is not covered by the Directive.20 The same is 
true for art.9.2 (δ) of N.2251/94 which regulates derogatory statements and personal 
comparisons.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Representatives of a business association have stated that comparative advertising is 
not frequently employed in Greece and therefore no particular issues have been 
identified in this field. They attributed this to the characteristics of the Greek market 
which is comprised mainly of small and very small businesses who are unlikely to 
engage in comparative advertising. Similarly, the Ministry has informed us that there 
has been only one case of comparative advertising where a fine has been 
administered. Comparative advertising does not appear to cause any particular 
problems, yet that may stand to change in the future as marketing practices develop. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Please refer to answer in first bullet point. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No specific measures were identified. 
 
18 Apostolopoulos, ‘Αθέμιτη συγκριτική διαφήμιση χωρίς καν σύγκριση; Επιταγη φιλελευθεροποίησης της 
συγκριτικής διαφήμισης υπό το πρίσμα του κοινοτικού δικαίου’, [2006] ΣΤ ΧρΙΔ, 29, 31 
19 See Greek Code of Advertisement, art.11; Apostolopoulos, ‘Αθέμιτη συγκριτική διαφήμιση χωρίς καν 
σύγκριση; Επιταγη φιλελευθεροποίησης της συγκριτικής διαφήμισης υπό το πρίσμα του κοινοτικού 
δικαίου’, [2006] ΣΤ ΧρΙΔ, 29,32 
20 N.2251/94, art.9, par.4 
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1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
It is important to mention that Greek businesses do not engage in cross-border trade 
as much as perhaps other Member States. This is something that has been highlighted 
in interviews with business associations and can also be seen in external reports.21 
There are many factors contributing to that, some of which relate to the structure of 
the Greek market, made up primarily of small family businesses, the impact of the 
financial crisis, and isolating the role of the legal framework is an arduous task. 
Therefore, any remarks made on cross-border trade are of limited use. This is true for 
all parts of the questionnaire relating to cross-border trade. 
Business associations did not report specific problems to in relation to cross-border 
trade. A business association representative considered that there may be issues with 
services, especially for older consumers, given the language barrier. It was mentioned 
that Greek businesses currently engage in cross-border trade primarily through e-
commerce. E-commerce traders had to adjust to legislation, yet there were no 
particular difficulties reported or cases where a foreign authority had to intervene. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Please refer to answer above. 
 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Business associations had little, if any, experience with employing the MCAD, let alone 
in cross-border transactions. They highlighted that participation of Greek businesses in 
cross-border trade is limited, something which is supported also by the external 
evidence presented above. Yet, as a business association representative pointed out, if 
there were any issues with cross-border advertising they would be more inclined to 
turn to competition law rather than consumer law to resolve any problems. 
A cross-border cooperation mechanism between national authorities was considered a 
good step. That being said business associations did not have specific experience 
coming from their members of problems arising in practice that would benefit. 
 
21 See for example the OECD Economic Survey for Greece (March 2016) available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/GRC%202016%20Overview%20EN.pdf (Accessed September 2016) 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
478
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Please refer to answer above. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Traders provide some of the information required by art. 7(4) UCPD, namely the ones 
included in 7(4)(a), (b) and (c) UCPD. It is extremely rare, if ever, that a trader 
provides the information included in 7(4) (d) and (e) on complaints procedure and 
information on the right to withdrawal or cancellation. If that information is provided 
then it would be in the form of small print briefly appearing during an advertisement. 
Interviewees from government authorities and business associations believed that it is 
not the role of advertising to provide such detailed information such as right to 
withdrawal so early on, but rather its role is to attract the consumer. 
Consumer associations were in favour of keeping both the information requirements 
under UCPD and CRD as they cover distinct stages and if one were abolished then the 
level of protection for consumers would drop. Representatives of the Ministry and the 
Consumer Ombudsman were in favour of abolishing the informational requirements 
under art.7 (4) to the degree there is overlap, so as to simplify both legislation and its 
enforcement. The same view, favouring abolishment was expressed also by business 
associations. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
No added information. Please refer to answer above. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
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• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
It has also been argued that a way to extend the scope of the UCPD to B2B 
transactions would be to remove the criterion of ‘professional diligence’ in the general 
clause and leave only that of ‘material distortion of the economic behaviour’ not only 
of the consumer but of any actor in the market, including businesses.22 
A business association representative was positive to the idea as that would 
strengthen protection for businesses and would increase their legal artillery against 
other businesses. Another business association disagreed with the idea of expanding 
the UCPD or the MCAD as B2B transactions were in their view better regulated by 
private law and having a uniform regime would fail to take into account the differences 
between business and consumers e.g. they considered businesses to be a lot better 
informed than consumers, even small businesses. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
In the literature it has been argued that an alignment of B2B and B2C regimes would 
be beneficial also for ensuring fair competition within businesses.23 The argument is 
that having a practice be judged under different criteria and different legislation 
depending on whether the claim is brought by a consumer or a business creates legal 
uncertainty. Having a legislative intervention to align the two regimes would mean 
relieving judges of that task.  
The Ministry was in theory not opposed to an extension of protection for B2B relations 
yet what would be highly undesirable for them would be to be responsible for the 
enforcement of both types of transactions as that would be a huge burden for them 
and would ultimately mean enforcement standards would suffer. 
Please refer also to the answer above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Nothing further to add. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
In the literature it has been argued that the black list of the UCPD could be applied to 
B2B relations by analogy. In that case, with the current regime, it would be no more 
than an indication of unfairness.24 However, that can be an indication that the idea of 
a blacklist in B2B relations will not be viewed unfavourably. 
A representative of a business association was positive to the idea of such a black list, 
provided there would be adequate consultation in order to identify which practices 
should be included. 
 
22 Mpechri- Kehagioglou, ‘Η οδηγία 2005/29 για τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές: Ο νομικός μηχανισμός 
λειτουργίας της και οι δυσλειτουργίες του κατά την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας’, [2012] ΕΕμπΔ 17, 34 
23 Kalampouka-Giannopoulou, ‘Νομολογιακά δεδομένα περί αθέμιτων εμπορικών πρακτικών’, [2014] 5 ΔΕΕ 
479, 490-491 
24 Marinos, ‘Από το ελληνικό στο κοινοτικό δίκαιο του αθέμιτου ανταγωνισμού-προβλήματα εφαρμογής της 
μαύρης λίστας της οδηγίας 2005/29 για τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές’, [2011] ΔΕΕ, 877, 883 
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• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Business associations’ representatives were not positive to the idea of a single 
enforcement authority on a European level which they believed might be more 
bureaucratic but would be open to the idea of cross-border cooperation of authorities. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Nothing further to add. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No such need was identified by the interviewees yet as analysed above the rules of 
MCAD in Greece are employed more for the benefit of consumers rather than traders. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
There are no such provisions currently in place. Consumers would have to rely on the 
general clauses of the law of obligations, particularly art.281, 288 of the Civil Code. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
No specific examples to report. There is not a lot of case law on unfair practices. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Consumer organisations expressed the view that linking the use of unfair commercial 
practices to contractual consequences would result in a higher level of protection for 
consumers and could potentially act as a deterrent for businesses. If this were to be 
out in force, a reversal of the burden of proof would also make it easier for consumers 
to seek protection in court. 
Business associations on the other hand feared that contractual consequences could 
create a wave of claims made against businesses that could often be unfounded. 
Given that consumers do not easily decide to take action against a company, it is 
doubtful whether such a surge in legal action would indeed occur, even if the UCPD 
would have such contractual consequences. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
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In Greece unfair terms in consumer contracts were first regulated with art.22-26 of Ν. 
1961/1991. UCTD was transposed a short while later with the current N.2251/94.The 
general perception is that the UCTD is working quite well. The general clause in 
particular, allows consumer associations, which are the ones mainly dealing with unfair 
terms when filing class actions, to pursue cases based on a broad range of unfair 
terms. There has also been a robust body of case law that has developed on unfair 
terms, mostly in the sectors of financial services and telecoms.25 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The list of unfair terms, which in Greece is a black list, is viewed as one that specifies 
the general clause. The case law has developed three guiding principles for the terms 
included in the list: a) the principle of transparency, b) the principle of prohibiting the 
trader to define the obligations in an absolute manner and c) the principle of 
prohibiting traders from getting consumers to give up their legal rights against the 
trader without good reason. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
There is a black list in place.26 The black list does increase the level of protection and 
makes it easier to enforce the law, according to the assessment of the interviewees. 
The advantages of a blacklist are appreciated also in the case law for offering a safe 
direction to judges and increasing legal certainty.27 However, a representative of a 
consumer organisation pointed out that because of the frequent use of the black list, 
courts may be less receptive to a term that does not neatly fall within one of the terms 
listed in the black list. That being said according to the case law it is possible to bring 
an action using both the general clause as well as the black list.28 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Individual consumer actions are not extended to other cases. In collective actions 
(injunctions) filed by consumer associations, the situation is different. According to 
art.10 par.20 of N.2251/94 the irrevocable decision on a collective action is applicable 
against everyone, even if they were not parties to the trial. This provision has been 
heavily criticised in the literature and the prevailing view is that it should be 
25 For analysis of the recent case law see Dellios, Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2nd ed Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 
2013), 457-569 
26 N.2251/94, art.7 par.2 
27 See for example, ΕφΑθ 5101/2011, ΝοΒ 2011, 2139; ΕφΑθ 2386/2006, ΧρΙΔ 2007, 613 as quoted in 
Dellios Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2nd ed Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2013), 294, note 823 
28 Dellios, Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2nd ed Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2013), 295 
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interpreted restrictively so as not to contravene with the general rules on the Greek 
law on res judicata. This means that individual consumers can invoke the injunction 
order for the violation e.g. an unfair term, but it is ultimately not binding for the court. 
However, it is possible to extend the res judicata principle to all traders via the 
mechanism of art.10 par.21 of N.2251/94. According to that provision, the Minister of 
Development, invoking reasons of public welfare may issue a decision (which is a law 
of the state), extending the res judicata of an irrevocable injunction order to all 
traders. 
The extension of the effect of the decision is a powerful tool for ensuring compliance of 
traders and for protecting consumers and it is very effective in the majority of cases. 
However, there were reported incidents when the traders would include a term found 
to be unfair with minor changes. This meant there was a need for another collective 
action against the ‘new’ term. Business associations did not identify any particular 
negative effects as a result of this extension of res judicata. That could be explained 
by the fact there have not been so many Ministerial Decisions extending the res 
judicata.  
The Consumer Ombudsman stated that even in ADR procedures, when referring to 
related court decisions, especially when they are irrevocable, it facilitates their work 
significantly in achieving the cooperation and compliance of the trader. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Opinions of interviewees on the issue were divided with consumer associations on the 
one hand claiming that traders are often not well-informed on contractual 
transparency requirements, leading to a range of violations of the UCTD, and business 
associations on the other hand, claiming that at least medium and large enterprises 
are well-informed of their obligations. This however may be contrasted to the fact that 
it is large enterprises such as banks that generate the vast amount of case law on 
unfair terms. This case law on banking terms could also be attributed to the fact that 
these are high value contracts that consumer organisations and consumers are more 
likely to pursue in court.  
It was pointed out by representatives of the Consumer Ombudsman that especially the 
businesses engaging in e-commerce (which represent a relatively small but increasing 
segment of businesses) are more pro-active about conforming to their legal 
requirements in this area (e.g. what should be included in their terms and conditions 
and how their website should be structured) 
The principle of transparency is at the core of unfair contract terms law in Greece and 
Greek case law has on several occasions elaborated on how that principle is to be 
interpreted and applied. In fact, a representative of a consumer association suggested 
that elevating the status of the principle of transparency in EU law would facilitate the 
application of the law in the Member States, especially in the field of financial services. 
It has also been added in the law that presenting the terms in Greek is a mandatory 
requirement even for terms of international transactions that are applied in the Greek 
market.29 Case law has also included unexpected or surprise terms as terms that 
contravene the principle of transparency, as predictability of terms is considered to be 
an element of transparency.30 This covers for example, terms that define how the 
price and other additional expenses for the consumer are being calculated. 
The principle of transparency as a guiding principle in the law seems to be working 
quite efficiently. It is featured often in the black list of practices where many terms are 
to be considered unfair as contravening the principle of transparency, creating what 
29 N.2251/94, art.2 par.2 
30 See ΟλΣτΕ 1210/2010, ΕλλΔνη 2010, 1148, 1158 as quoted in Dellios Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2nd ed 
Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2013), 213, note 532 
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the theory has named as a quasi-presumption of unfairness for intransparent contract 
terms.31 Contractual transparency is one of the most quoted and applied forms of 
reasoning for finding a contract term to be unfair. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
No such extension has been made. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The term not being binding is an effective sanction, according to stakeholders, 
however consumer associations highlighted that there are also other issues that may 
arise. It is not only about rendering a term not binding, but also about what replaces 
the unfair term. Courts replace the term by interpreting the contract according to the 
principles of good faith, as per the general principles of civil law. While one 
representative of a consumer association stated that this interpretation of the contract 
works well in correcting the previous imbalance of power, another expressed the 
concern that sometimes the new terms are not too far removed from the unfair ones. 
In relation to national courts taking on an active role, the consensus among 
stakeholders was that that is not the case. National courts wait for an action to be 
filed. A few exceptions to that general rule were mentioned. Where there is a criminal 
law dimension to the violation, public prosecutors did pursue cases ex officio. In 
addition to that, in some cases the judges took initiative in invoking unfairness ex 
officio when an action was brought that was not well-founded. 
The possibility of further guidance by the CJEU, using the mechanism of reference for 
preliminary ruling, was viewed in a positive light by stakeholders, especially by 
consumer organisations. That being said, there is as mentioned above a developed 
body of case law on unfair terms, unlike e.g. unfair practices. 
Other avenues open to consumers besides resorting to the court system would be 
either to use the ADR procedure provided by the Consumer Ombudsman or to file a 
complaint to the General Secretariat for Consumer Protection. However, such a 
complaint can only result in a fine for the company. In general, the General 
Secretariat is cautious about enforcing the UCTD, a task that they consider is best 
handled by the courts. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A measure that was identified as positive by several interviewees was the power 
granted to the Minister of Development to publish a decision that turns the irrevocable 
court decision on a collective action by a consumer association into law, thus making it 
binding for all traders and essentially adding it to the blacklist of unfair terms.32 
31 Dellios Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2nd ed Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2013), 212 
32 N.2251/94, art.10 par.21 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
484
Another suggestion was that of extending the scope of protection to professionals, 
going beyond the stricto sensu consumer usually employed in EU Directives, as the 
Greek legislator has done by adopting a broader definition of consumer. 
The idea of a graphical representation model got mixed responses. Some interviewees 
expressed their concern that a graphical presentation model could mean that 
consumers would not take the terms seriously or that the graphics might create 
further ambiguity of the terms as they may be interpreted differently by individual 
consumers as aesthetics come into play. Other consumer associations were open to 
the idea of such a model but prioritised the presentation of the terms in a clear, 
concise manner with language that is easy to understand. One regulator 
representative was positive to the idea of graphical representation for helping 
consumers understand more technical concepts and terms they now have difficulty 
comprehending and business association representatives believed such a model could 
aid consumers’ understanding of the terms. 
 
1.2.2.  Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal 
Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
A business association representative considered the UCTD to be effective in 
combating the ambiguities that may be created by unfair terms especially in the e-
commerce market which is the sector most active in cross-border trade which as 
stated also above is limited in Greece. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
To the extent that there may be disparities between the lists, business associations 
considered that could pose a barrier to cross-border trade. However, there was no 
practical experience with any issues arising in that context. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Nothing further to add. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Business association representatives think there is a need to protect especially SME’s 
and micro enterprises. As mentioned, these types of businesses make up the majority 
of the Greek market. A representative of a business association was positive about 
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introducing the measures listed below as a way to enhance competition between 
businesses. 
In Greek law, there is already a level of protection for SMEs from unfair contract 
terms. For unfair terms, the general definition of the consumer of art.1 par.4 (α) of 
N.2251/94 applies which includes legal persons and defines the consumer as the end 
user without requiring that they act outside their trade or profession. The definition 
has been criticised as overly broad in the literature and there has been a debate over 
the mechanism to be employed on narrowing the concept. Yet, even those in favour of 
a narrower concept recognise that small businesses and professionals may often need 
the protection granted to consumers as there is a significant inequality of bargaining 
power and often these categories have no specialised knowledge to assist them.33 For 
example, in a case in the court of first instance where investment products were sold 
to a professional, a doctor, the Court acknowledged that the fact that even though he 
was a professional he had no specialised knowledge in the area of investment products 
and found the term to be unfair.34 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Please refer to answer above. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
A business association representative expressed doubts as to whether there would be 
benefits at all. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Nothing further to add. 
 
33 See Perakis, ‘Article 1 N.2251/94’ in Aleksandridou (ed) Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτη: Ελληνικό- 
Κοινοτικό, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008), 50; Deloyka-Igglesi, Δικαιο του Καταναλωτή Ενωσιακό και 
Ελληνικό, (Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2014), 34 
34 Decision no. 35/2015 ΠρωτΛαρ 
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• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Nothing further to add. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?35  
The injunction procedure in Greece is a representative action for the protection of the 
collective interests of consumers by consumer associations. Ιt is viewed as an effective 
tool for acknowledging violations and since this is a collective action one that is far 
more effective than claims made by individual consumers.36 
The injunction procedure has enabled consumer associations to be quite active in this 
respect and have been successful in many injunctions. The data provided by an 
consumer association that has been the most active in injunctions show that they 
have filed a total of 57 collective actions during their years of operation, with 50 of 
them, the vast majority, having been successful. 
However, there are not many consumer associations in Greece that have the 
resources and expertise to pursue injunction orders. In fact, that task is reserved for 
only a couple of consumer associations who have notable action to show in this field. 
The smaller regional consumer associations face many barriers and it is clear they do 
not have the financial and human resources to pursue an injunction order. 
Consumer associations have pointed out the problems in the enforcement of consumer 
law and how in their view collective actions are a powerful tool, notwithstanding the 
problems faced in their use. Government authorities had little to comment on the 
injunction procedure as it is not something they deal with. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
1) The cost of the procedure is considered to be a high one, one that many consumer 
associations struggle to cover since they are funded by their members. That is the 
case especially when the damage to the consumer is of low monetary value. 
2) With regard to the summary procedure, injunctions are included within the 
voluntary jurisdiction procedure of the Civil Procedure Code.37 That is considered quite 
efficient as it is easier to get a date for a court hearing and the judgements are issued 
a lot faster than the ordinary procedure. A representative of a consumer association 
estimated it would take approximately 6 months for the first hearing and about 3-5 
years for the decision to be made irrevocable. In Greece administration of justice is 
slow and cumbersome and this timeframe is considered efficient. 
35  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
36 Deloyka-Igglesi, Δικαιο του Καταναλωτή Ενωσιακό και Ελληνικό, [2014] Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 321 
37 N.2251/94, art.10, par.20 
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3) With regard to publication of the decision and publication of a corrective statement: 
There are no specific measures in place for the publication of the decision and the 
general rules apply. As for the corrective statement, consumer association 
representatives mentioned that even though they request such a statement to be 
made, the court rarely grants that request. 
4) With regard to sanctions for non-compliance of the trader. This could be a 
potentially powerful tool to ensure compliance as it is possible to request the 
temporary enforcement of the injunction order.38 If granted, and the trader does not 
conform there is the threat of a penalty of up to 100.000€ and up imprisonment up to 
1 year.39 However, according to consumer organisations courts are very hesitant to 
grant temporary enforcement and therefore these measures are not applied in 
practice. 
5) With regard to prior consultation, no specific measures have been enacted. One 
consumer association said they do attempt to consult with the trader before filing an 
action on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, another consumer association 
representative claimed that it there is little reason to introduce prior consultation as 
that would only cause further delays to the process. It is important to note that in 
Greek legal culture the mechanism of prior consultation is not widespread and is often 
treated with a level of suspicion by lawyers. 
6) With regard to the effects of the judgement, according to art.10 par. 20 N.2251/94 
it is extended to all even if they were not parties to the trial. The provision has been 
subject to critique as it appears to be in conflict with the general rules on res judicata 
which should only apply for those that were parties to the trial.40 The dominant view is 
that the provision should be interpreted correctively to mean that third parties can 
invoke the favourable res judicata in a different trial but the court is not obliged to 
follow it.41 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The scope has been extended and the list is only indicative.42 Any consumer law 
provision can provide a basis for an injunction and certainly it is extended to all 
articles of N.2251/94, which is the main piece of consumer protection legislation. What 
is also interesting is that the Greek law has extended the possible requests beyond 
that of cessation or prohibition of an infringement. More specifically the other 
possibilities allowed under Greek law are the following: 1) pecuniary compensation 
due to moral damages, 2) preliminary injunction to secure the demand either to 
cessation or compensation and 3) The recognition of the right to rectify the loss 
incurred by consumers due to the illegal behaviour.43 
An interesting recent case that points to the judges being more receptive to the 
extension of the Injunction procedure is the following: Consumer associations were 
able to file an injunction under art.10 par.16 of N.2251/94 to request that consumers 
would not be obliged to pay a tax included in their electricity bill (issued by DEI the 
formerly state-owned provider controlling 90-95% of the market).44 Art.2 of 
N.2251/94 has also been extended to terms of public companies by the case law.45 
38 N.2251/94, art.10 par.20 
39 ΚΠολΔ, art.947 
40 Art.20Σ in conjunction with art.106 ΚΠολΔ 
41 Apalagaki, ‘Αρθρο 10 Ν 2251/1994’ in Aleksandridou (ed), Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτή Ελληνικό- 
Κοινοτικό, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008), 574-576 
42 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16(α) 
43 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (β), (γ), (δ) 
44 1101/2012 ΠολΠρΑθ Τμήμα Εκουσίας Δικαιοδοσίας, 293/2014 ΑΠ 
45 See ΑΠ 7/2011, ΧρΙΔ 2012 45 
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 • Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
There have been no changes since 2012 and no action has been taken to remove 
obstacles. 
However, the following obstacles were pointed out by consumer associations in the 
interviews: 
• The six-month deadline to file the injunction, which is quite limiting.46 Consumer 
associations may not always have the resources to closely monitor the market so 
as to be aware of the violations and be prepared to file the injunction within the 
space of six months. 
• High cost of procedure. It was suggested that if injunctions are to be supported 
and facilitated as an enforcement mechanism then an effort should be made to 
reduce the costs for consumer associations. For example, court fees could be 
reduced or abolished. Another cost is that for expert witnesses to give their 
opinion, which could be reduced or partially covered by the state. 
• In the cases where the injunction is requested together with pecuniary 
compensation due to moral damages, part of such damages is awarded to the 
state for the education and protection of the consumer. Consumer associations 
would like a higher percentage of the compensation awarded to them to enable 
them to cover their expenses and act as an incentive to pursue collective action. 
However, reservations to this approach have been expressed in the literature as it 
is undesirable that collective action becomes a vehicle for consumer associations 
to make a profit out of.47 
Another potential obstacle for injunctions is the fact that consumer associations may 
be penalised if found to have filed an action for pecuniary compensation due to moral 
damage which was unfounded. If an action for pecuniary compensation is rejected as 
unfounded, the trader can file an action for compensation or damages against the 
consumer association.48 If the consumer association repeatedly has actions for 
compensation rejected, it may be dissolved.49 The fear of such penalties could act as a 
deterrent for consumer associations to file for collective action. While it is 
understandable for the legislator to wish to discourage unfounded actions, the penalty 
of dissolving the association has been criticised as disproportionate.50 
All of the obstacles highlighted relate to two main categories. One is the problem of 
consumer associations lacking funding and the other is the Greek civil procedure rules 
applied. The fact that no special measures are taken to facilitate injunctions on a civil 
procedure level, other than their inclusion in the special voluntary jurisdiction process 
creates barriers for collective actions. 
 
46 N.2251/94, art.10 par.18 
47 Papanikolaou, “Σκέψεις πάνω στον νέο νόμο (ν. 3587/2007) για την προστασία των καταναλωτών”, 
[2008] ΕλλΔνη 660, 668 
48 N.2251/94, art.10 par.23 
49 N.2251/94, art.10 par.29 
50 Apalagaki, “Αρθρο 10 Ν 2251/1994” in Aleksandridou (ed), Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτή Ελληνικό- 
Κοινοτικό, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008), 578 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
489
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
There is not an urgent need to extend the coverage of the ID in Greece as it is already 
possible to bring an injunction for any violation of consumer legislation.51 
 A suggestion made by a consumer association representative would be to extend the 
scope of the ID also to the newest Directives on financial services, such as the 
Mortgage Credit Directive. The financial services sector, primarily banking and 
insurance have generated a large number of injunctions in Greece. The sector 
continues to be a cause of concern with recent collective actions taken against banks 
for unfair terms and unfair practices in Swiss franc loans. Consumer associations 
welcome the EU Directives on financial services for ensuring a higher level of 
protection for consumers and would like to be able to bring injunctions on the basis of 
that legislation. 
The extension of the ID for collective interests of businesses was viewed favourably by 
consumer associations, as one that would bring also competition law under the scope 
of the ID. A business association representative was also positive to the idea of the ID 
being extended to collective business’ interests, especially in the area of unfair 
practices. Another business association expressed fears the Injunction Procedure 
might be ill-suited for the protection of the interests of businesses and may end up 
making enforcement less efficient. 
Consumer associations were far more concerned with actions for damages rather than 
injunctions. They see this as key in their role of ensuring redress for consumers and 
for collective action to be able to have a deterrent effect. They would welcome the 
introduction on an EU level, of an action for damages or compensation. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
There is no experience in injunctions being used to address cross-border violations. 
The consumer associations interviewed represented the largest ones in Greece and the 
only ones that have been active in pursuing collective actions. However, they face 
significant obstacles that prevent them from exercising any of the options listed 
above. Consumer associations face a lack of funds and personnel that make the 
exercise of such actions prohibitive. Please note that N.2251/94 regulates consumer 
associations and their funding sources.52 Most consumer associations are funded 
through the subscriptions of their members and do not have the resources for such 
cross-border actions. 
The list of qualified entities compiled by Greece includes regional consumer 
associations that are in no position to take on such action on a national level, let alone 
for a cross-border violation. Qualified entities also include regional chambers of 
commerce as well as chambers of tradesmen. From the interviews and out of the 
51 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16α 
52 N.2251/94, art.10 par.6 
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information available it appears that these chambers have never exercised their right 
to file an injunction. 
Consumer associations welcomed the right to exercise the above options, as qualifying 
entities. However, at the moment there is no motivation for them to pursue such 
action as they would hardly be able to recuperate their expenses, if not incur debt. In 
order to encourage qualified entities to make use of the options available the following 
options would be helpful: either funding consumer associations to file such actions, 
and/or allowing them to recuperate their expenses through damages awarded to 
them. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
See the answer above. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
See the answer above. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The Injunctions Directive has been incorporated in art.10 of N.2251/94. It is 
incorporated in a single piece of legislation (N.2251/94) for all Directives mentioned 
above. Article 9θ of N.2251/94, sets out the possible sanctions, yet that is part of the 
same piece of legislation. There is no equivalent article on sanctions for the UCTD. 
Art.10 of N.2251/94 envisions a representative action where certain consumer 
organisations can protect the collective interests of consumers in court. Injunctions 
are brought as part of the voluntary jurisdiction of the Civil Procedure Code.53 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
As mentioned above, these procedures are regulated in a single legal act, namely 
N.2251/94 and in a single procedure, namely the voluntary jurisdiction of the Greek 
Civil Procedure Code. The collective action of art.10 par 16 of N.2251/94 can request 
not only an injunction but also for pecuniary compensation for moral damages, 
temporary injunction as well as the acknowledgement of the right of consumers to 
restore the damages they incurred from the illegal behaviour of the trader.54 It should 
53 ΚΠολΔ, art. 739-866 
54 N.2251/94, art.10 par. 16 (β), (γ), (δ) 
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be noted that only injunction and pecuniary compensation for moral damages are 
exercised under the voluntary jurisdiction procedure. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
It is difficult to define, let alone quantify the benefits for consumers.  
Representatives of the Ministry believe the legislative framework is sufficient and has 
reaped benefits for consumers. According to the Consumer Ombudsman there have 
been benefits for consumers in the field of redress more so than in deterrence of bad 
behaviour by traders. There is no cost for consumers to access ADR.  
The same is true for the helpline of the General Secretariat for Consumers. However, 
in that helpline consumers cannot get redress as they can only report a violation and 
the Ministry can decide whether or not it is required to take action in the form of 
administering fines against the trader. They are however able to receive advice.  
Sectoral regulators such as the EETT for telecommunications and post and RAE for 
energy have their own complaints procedure which is also free of charge. However, if 
the consumer goes to court to enforce their rights the cost is quite high and there is 
little incentive to do so. 
The more sophisticated consumers, usually younger ones, are better informed about 
their rights and make better use of internal complaints procedures of traders. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
The general view expressed by authorities was that the Directives has been helpful in 
encouraging fair competition amongst traders. The same view was expressed by 
business associations’ representatives stating that to the extent that the Directives 
help boost competition and establish a level playing field there are benefits for traders 
and consumers. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
A representative of the business association stated that they do not have such data 
available, as that would require them to conduct research specifically on the topic. 
Another representative mentioned they had not received any complaints from their 
members relating to a high cost of compliance. Compliance is viewed as a normal cost 
of doing business. 
Representatives of the Ministry pointed out that they believe the cost for traders to be 
quite low as they can easily access all the information they need through their 
website. Also, the Ministry often receives questions from traders on compliance and 
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they offer this guidance free of charge. It was also pointed out by the Ministry that 
recently traders unions have started to be more active in helping out their members to 
comply with consumer legislation. For example, a union may offer guidance on the 
type of information that need to be provided in a website or model contract terms free 
for their members to use. Such initiatives are welcome and mean that even small 
enterprises that do not have the same resources to devote to compliance as large 
businesses can conform to the law in a cost-effective manner. Assessing to what 
extent traders do indeed comply or make use of these alternatives is difficult. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
There is no such information available. The General Secretariat for Consumer 
Protection is chronically underfunded and has limited resources, something that can 
obviously have an impact on the efficiency of the service. The independent authorities, 
which include the sectoral regulators such as RAE for energy and EETT for 
telecommunications and post produce annual reports on their activities which includes 
their budgets and operating costs.55 However, these reports do not answer the 
question of enforcement costs for these authorities, especially when they also have a 
range of non-consumer-related activities. 
The data provided by the Consumer Ombudsman in their Annual Report are 
particularly interesting, given that this is an independent authority dealing exclusively 
with consumer issues, even if it is only in the context of ADR. According to the 
evidence included in their report 699.100€ have been returned to consumers as a 
result of their actions and showing they do in fact operate in a cost efficient manner.56 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
It is difficult to make any assessment on cost-effectiveness. There are some issues 
with the way the Directives have been implemented that have been highlighted above, 
e.g. in the case of the MCAD, yet the interviewees did not make specific remarks on 
cost-effectiveness. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
It was suggested that existing legislation could be further simplified and codified. This 
was a suggestion coming both from business associations as well as consumer 
associations and authorities. The same criticism has been made in the literature on 
how a more systematic approach needs to be taken when transposing EU Directives.57 
Of course any codification would also have a cost, but the simplification of the 
legislation could bring benefits that outweigh potential costs and would be beneficial 
for consumers, traders and authorities. 
A process for reviewing N.2251/94 is currently in place. Greece, as part of its 
commitments deriving from the third economic adjustment programme, has to align 
its legislation with the OECD toolkit. As part of that alignment and for the promotion of 
e-commerce a review of N.2251/94 is under way. One of the recommendations of the 
OECD is the simplification of consumer legislation and the introduction of a single 
55  See for example the RAE 2014 Annual Report section 9.2.2 available online at 
http://www.rae.gr/site/file/system/docs/ActionReports/2014 and the EETT 2015 Annual Report section 
1.5.4 available online at 
http://www.eett.gr/opencms/export/sites/default/EETT/library_videos/Proceedings/PDFs/2015.pdf 
(Accessed September 2016) 
56  See Consumer Ombudsman 2015 Annual Report, p.73 available online at 
http://www.synigoroskatanaloti.gr/docs/StK-Annual-Report-2015.pdf (Accessed September 2016) 
57 Deloyka-Igglesi, Δικαιο του Καταναλωτή Ενωσιακό και Ελληνικό, [2014] Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα, 26-27 
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definition for consumer and producer. As indicated before this is not the case under 
the current framework. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
UCPD and UCTD are being applied in the sectors in question. National sectoral 
authorities first seek to apply sectoral legislation as the lex specialis and then if there 
are gaps they will turn to the horizontal legislation as lex generalis. As mentioned 
above many sectoral regulators also enforce their own code of conduct on the 
businesses they supervise which may go beyond what is prescribed in the Directives. 
As for the courts, the two Directives are very frequently and successfully applied in the 
context of these sectors. As mentioned above, the vast majority of the Greek case law 
on unfair contract terms comes from the field of financial services and secondly from 
electronic communications. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions for all these 
different sectors grouped together as they differ significantly. For example, the energy 
market in Greece is still monopolistic meaning that few issues arise as there is e.g. 
very little advertising. Other markets such as financial services are a lot more mature. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?] 
There are different authorities responsible. The General Secretariat for Consumer 
Protection, part of the Ministry of Development is the authority with the most general 
responsibilities as they enforce the whole spectrum of consumer law. Representatives 
of the Ministry stated that the fact that the scope of their responsibilities is so broad it 
means they are often overwhelmed. 
The regulated sectors mentioned above have their own regulatory authorities usually 
in the form of independent authorities. In electronic communications it is EETT, in 
passenger transport the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Networks and the 
RAS for railways, for energy sector it is RAE and for financial services the Bank of 
Greece has some responsibilities on consumer issues.  
There is informal cooperation between the different authorities, usually in the form of 
one of the sectoral authorities liaising with the General Secretariat of the Consumer 
Ombudsman (another independent authority) and vice versa. However, there is no 
institutionalised cooperation between them. The authorities consulted expressed the 
view that cooperation is generally functioning well, in spite of the lack of 
institutionalised framework. There are limits to what each regulator considers to be in 
their responsibilities but to the degree there is overlap between the Secretariat 
General and the sectoral regulators, these limits are based on informal cooperation. 
For example, representatives from the Ministry stated that they have not had incidents 
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where they referred a case to a different authority and it was sent back to them. 
Conversely, representatives from consumer authorities stated that often this referral 
from authority to authority can be time-consuming and frustrating for consumers. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Representatives of a sectoral regulator stated that they do not face particular 
problems arising from the complementary application. They viewed the horizontal 
legislation as a safety net that (even though not used very frequently) was useful to 
catch cases not included in sectoral legislation and should remain in place.  
Consumer association representatives pointed out that the different concepts 
employed by sectoral and horizontal legislation e.g. on the terms consumer and trader 
may create confusion when it comes to applying the law.  
There was an incident of potential conflict between sectoral and horizontal legislation 
in the field of telecommunications that was mentioned. EETT would allow the unilateral 
modification of contract terms when a certain form of notification was adhered to. 
While this is not directly in conflict with the black list of unfair contract terms58 it 
created a problem in practice as the Ministry wanted to stop the practice of unilateral 
modification which was compliant with the EETT standards. The same issue arose also 
with the Consumer Ombudsman and EETT. 
There has also been a trend in the case law where decisions on fines administered by 
the General Secretariat were rejected in the court which decided that they should have 
been administered by the sectoral regulator, EETT as this was in the 
telecommunications sector. The justification was that were there is sectoral legislation 
in place that should be the basis instead of N.2251/94. This is not yet an established 
trend in the case law and it remains to be seen how it will develop. 
These examples show that there is a need for the clarification of the interplay between 
horizontal and sector-specific legislation that would allow for a more efficient 
application. This was also the view of the Ministry and consumer organisations 
provided that it does not result in a lower level of protection for consumers. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
Please refer to the answer above. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Please refer to the answer above. 
 
58 See N.2251/94, art.2 par.7 (e) 
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1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
As it is not specified how the extension would work, two scenarios have to be 
examined: first the extension of the Directives above to C2B transactions to the 
benefit of the trader, and second, to the benefit of the consumer. The first scenario 
was found to be highly undesirable by the interviewees, as the trader, even in C2B 
relations is still the stronger party, who is in no need of a heightened level of 
protection. 
For consumers, there was a far more positive reaction in extending the application. It 
was recognised that there is currently a gap in protection for C2B transactions. For 
example, a consumer in a C2B transaction would have no access to ADR. Some 
interviewees from the Ministry and consumer organisations argued that some 
instances of C2B relations such as the sale of gold could already be brought under the 
scope of consumer law via analogy.  
It should be noted that at some point around 2010-2011 there was a huge increase of 
such shops that resulted in an increase in consumer complaints. The wave of 
complaints stopped around 2012, not due to any action taken but rather because 
consumer interest in the service dropped. Besides this surge of complaints and issues 
around sale of gold, there have been few other issues concerning C2B relations. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
As mentioned above, different concepts of the consumer apply in the context of 
N.2251/94 where the Greek legislator applies abroad concept of the consumer where 
not forced to do otherwise due to EU Directives. The existence of many different 
concepts of the consumer in different Directives was criticised by the interviewees as 
inefficient and in the literature.59 A consumer representative suggested a horizontal 
piece of EU legislation that would set out all the main terms and framework that would 
then be applied in all sectors.  
The average consumer concept has not been yet been clarified in the case law in an 
efficient manner due to the relatively few cases on unfair practices and appears to not 
be employed by regulators either. In the literature, there has not been a great deal of 
commentary on the average consumer, at least not that goes beyond a critique of it 
being an unrealistic standard that probably does not correspond to ‘actual consumer’ 
behaviour.60 
The vulnerable consumer is not so frequently featured in EU Directives with the 
notable exception of the UCPD. Requirements such as that the vulnerability must be 
foreseeable to the trader, make the application of the vulnerable consumer standard 
more difficult. The limited criteria for vulnerability, notably the exclusion of any 
income or social criteria, were also pointed out as being important omissions. 
 
59 Aleksandridou, ‘Ο τροποποιημένος νόμος για την προστασία του καταναλωτή από την σκοπιά ενός 
εμπορικολόγου’ [2007], 55 NoB 7, 1493, 1498 
60 Delouka-Igglesi, Δίκαιο του καταναλωτή ενωσιακό και ελληνικό, (Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2014), 295 
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• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
See also above for vulnerable consumers. Interviewees did not mention any particular 
group of vulnerable consumers they were not able to help. Yet, the majority of the 
problems relating to vulnerable consumers related to financial services for which 
Greece was able to take measures to protect consumers. Perhaps introducing the 
concept of the vulnerable consumer, with socio-economic criteria in the Directives on 
financial services, such as the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit 
Directive would be a step forward in increasing the level of protection. 
In relation to the UCTD, some stakeholders were negative about introducing a 
‘vulnerable consumer’ concept in the UCTD. Consumer associations representatives 
held that there would in fact be a decrease in the level of protection as judges would 
then hold a higher standard for the ‘average consumer’. Please note that the average 
consumer concept is not applicable in the UCTD in Greece. Consumer ombudsman 
representatives argued that whether a term is unfair or not should be judged against a 
more objective standard of fairness, regardless of the consumer in question. Both 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable consumers should be protected from unfair terms. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Yes, all interviewees unanimously agreed that the two directives did significantly 
improve the level of protection for consumers, regardless of whatever problems there 
are with the Directives as pointed out above. As is pointed out also in the literature, 
Greek consumer law largely owes its existence to EU law and is made up almost 
entirely of EU directives.61 If the two Directives had not been introduced, consumers 
would only have the protection of private law. 
Prior to the introduction of the UCPD, unfair practices in Greece were caught by article 
9 of 2251/94 for misleading and unfair advertising.62 However, that article was limited 
to advertising and did not have the broad scope of the UCPD in relation to unfair 
practices. 
Prior to the introduction of the UCTD, unfair contract terms were regulated by 
N.1961/91, art. 22-26. That law was quickly replaced by the current N.2251/94, which 
also transposed UCTD in art.2. The short-lived N.1961/91 meant that the current rich 
Greek case law and literature on unfair contract terms were built on the basis of the 
UCTD. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Yes, as there was no legislation previously in Greece regarding unit prices. The 
consensus amongst the interviewees was that this is a piece of legislation that is 
working well and can be characterised as a success. There is no empirical evidence of 
how much consumers have been making use of the unit price information. However, 
the controls conducted by the relevant authorities reveal that there is a high level of 
compliance.  
 
61 Aleksandridou, Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτή, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008), 8 
62 Delouka-Igglesi, Δίκαιο του καταναλωτή ενωσιακό και ελληνικό, (Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2014), 250 
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• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
As explained above, there have been issues with how the MCAD has been transposed 
in Greek law, even when the broad concept of consumer adopted in Greek consumer 
law is taken into account. This is a Directive that has had little impact on the 
protection of businesses, which are in theory able to benefit from the protection of 
consumer law, where the general definition of consumer in Greek law applies. The 
transposition of the MCAD has created uncertainty as to its field of application and 
whether businesses can benefit from it and it does not seem to be of little use. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
There has been an increase in the last years in consumers making cross-border 
purchases, especially as e-commerce has become more pervasive and widely used, at 
least with the younger segment of consumer population (even though it remains at 
levels far lower than in other EU Member States). Whether there has been a similar 
effect for businesses is difficult to assess. It is important to note the effect that capital 
controls imposed in Greece in 2015 have had on consumption habits. Capital controls 
make it difficult if not impossible for consumers to make online purchases and limit 
their offline purchases as well. Similarly, businesses have also been severely impacted 
as they may face problems with payments and their reputation has suffered a blow. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
It is difficult to assess to what extent the current situation can be attributed to the 
mentioned directives as there a range of factors are influencing it. The existence of a 
harmonised legislative framework is positive and contributes to the confidence of 
consumers in cross-border transactions. However, it is difficult to assess the extent of 
the influence of the legal framework. 
For businesses, there are certain characteristics of the Greek market that influence 
cross-border trade. Greece is a relatively isolated south-eastern state with few large 
businesses and even large Greek businesses are not very active in cross-border trade. 
These factors along with the effects of the financial crisis may account for the relative 
lack of cross-border trade of Greek businesses, with the legal framework being one 
amongst many factors and perhaps not the decisive one. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – GREECE  
Directive Transposition 
legislation 
(National law, 
Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in consumer 
contracts 
N.2251/1994, art.2 
 
 
 'Black list' of terms considered 
unfair in all circumstances 
Yes N.2251/94 
Article 2.7 
 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
No   
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually negotiated 
terms  
No   
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main subject-
matter 
No   
Directive 2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal 
market 
N.2251/94, art.9α – 9θ  
 
 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Provisions regarding immovable 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
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 Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection in the 
indication of the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
ΚΥΑ Ζ1-404  
 
 Extension of the application to 
other sectors (e.g. for immovable 
property) 
No   
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Article 3.3 (a) 
and  (b), 5, 6  
KYA Z1-404 
The derogation of art.3.2 PID for products 
supplied in the course of the provision of a 
service and sales by auction and sales of 
works of art and antiques has been used. 
(See art.3.3 (a) and (b) KYA Z1-404). 
The waiver of art.5 PID has been used.  
Art.5 KYA Z1-404 includes table I and table 
II of non-food products and foodstuff 
respectively that are exempt from the 
obligation to indicate the unit price of 
products. 
The derogation of art. 6 PID for small 
businesses has been used in art.6 KYA Z1-
404. 
Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising 
Ν.2251/94, art.9        
N.2251/94, art.9δ, 9ε      
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' 
interests 
N.2251/94, art.10 
par.30 
     
N.2251/94, art.10 
par.16, ββ), εε), θθ) 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Greece  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- No, single 
procedure in a 
single legal act 63 
 
The collective action of art.10 par 16 of 
N.2251/94 can request not only an injunction 
but also for pecuniary compensation for 
moral damages, temporary injunction as well 
as the acknowledgement of the right of 
consumers to restore the damages they 
incurred from the illegal behaviour of the 
trader.  It should be noted that only 
injunction and pecuniary compensation for 
moral damages are exercised under the 
voluntary jurisdiction procedure. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations64 
Consumer associations that have at least 500 
active members and are enrolled in the 
consumer organisation register for at least a 
year. 
It is possible for two or more consumer 
associations of less than 500 active members 
to bring an action jointly, provided that the 
number of their combined members is 500.65 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in the 
comments column for which infringements 
the court or administrative procedure is 
foreseen 
- Court 
procedure66 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as 
a rule borne by 
the losing party67 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to 
cover consumer 
law in general68 
 
The list provided in art.10.16(α) is purely 
indicative, yet it includes also violations of 
Directive 2013/11/EU in case ιι and Reg. 
524/2013 in case κκ 
63 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.16 
64 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.16 
65 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.17 
66 N.2251/94, art.10 par.19 
67 ΚΠολΔ, art.176 
68 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16(α) 
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Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
- Yes 
 
Injunction action can be brought against 
suppliers’ unions69 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including 
the consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No If yes, please provide details 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in the 
comments column. 
- Yes The procedure used for the injunctions is that 
of voluntary jurisdiction, which is considered 
a lot shorter.70 The same provision states 
that the trial date should be set at the 
earliest day possible, however it is doubtful 
that can ensure a shorter process. 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, other 
sanction  
It is possible to request the temporary 
enforcement of the injunction order.71 If 
granted, and the trader does not conform 
there is the threat of a penalty of up to 
100.000€ and up imprisonment up to 1 
year.72 The penalty would be paid to the 
plaintiff, the consumer organisation. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- No73 Law only states that suitable publication of 
the decision or corrective statement can be 
order with no further qualifications 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- Yes and no The request for pecuniary compensation for 
moral damages that can be brought within 
the injunction procedure is a type of 
sanction.74 
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are paid 
to the public purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
-No 
 
 
69 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (α) 
70 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par. 20 
71 N.2251/94, art.10 par.20 
72 ΚΠολΔ, art.947 
73 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (α) 
74 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (β) 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
502
Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes 
 
It is possible for the consumer organisation 
to ask for pecuniary compensation for moral 
damages.75 This compensation is provided 
only once for the same violation. It is 
distributed in the following manner: a) 
thirty-five per cent (35%) to the plaintiff 
consumers union, b) thirty-five per cent 
(35%) to consumers unions of second degree 
and c) thirty per cent (30%) to the State 
Budget.76 
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes77 
 
If there is an irrevocable judgement that 
recognises the right to damages, individual 
consumers can follow the following process: 
Notify their claim for damages to the trader 
in writing with supporting evidence. Should 
the trader not respond to the notification 
after 30 days, consumer can request a court 
order for payment.78 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- Yes 
 
For defective products, the qualified entity 
can request their seizure, withdrawal or 
destruction.79 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices (of 
other traders)? 
- Yes and no80 
 
Art.10 par. 20 of 2251/93 states that ‘the 
legal consequences of the decision arising 
from this decision are valid for everyone, 
even if they have not been litigant parties.’ It 
is accepted that this provision should be 
interpreted contractively so as not to conflict 
with the Greek law on res judicata. This 
means that individual consumers can invoke 
the injunction order for the violation e.g. an 
unfair term but it is ultimately not binding for 
the court. 
However, it is possible to extend the res 
judicata to all traders via the mechanism of 
N.2251/94, art.10 par.21. According to that 
provision, the Minister of Development, 
invoking reasons of public welfare may issue 
a decision (which is a law of the state), 
extending the res judicata of an irrevocable 
injunction order to all traders. 
75 N.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (β) 
76 N.2251/94, art.10 par.22 
77 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.20 
78 Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.20 
79 N Ν.2251/94, art.10 par.16 (α) 
80 N.2251/94, art.10 par.20, par.21 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
Admini-
strative 
fine 
decision 
34 
decisions 42% 15% 0% 45 % 33%  
There is no data available on court cases, as the only data collected on court cases refers to the total number of cases 
per degree of jurisdiction with no reference to the type of case or to the legal basis. Information is however available 
for administrative fine decisions. Note that percentages do not add up to a 100% as many of these fines were 
administered using several different legal bases and grouping together several violations of the same trader. If the 
decisions made solely on e.g. the UCPD would be presented, then there would be a distortion of how much the 
provisions are being employed. 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).81  
81 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 48.96 Representation 
by lawyer is not 
mandatory 
when using the 
small claims 
procedure. If 
used: 
EUR 105.76 
minimum for 
court 
appearance 
fees (taxes 
included) 
 
Legal research: 
EUR 80/hour 
minimum +24% 
VAT 
EUR 45 + 24% 
VAT = 
EUR 55.80 
minimum for 
serving the 
decision to 
the trader. 
The cost goes 
up according 
to how many 
kilometres 
away the seat 
of the trader 
is from the 
centre of the 
city where 
the action 
was filed. 
(here 
calculated for 
Athens)  
 
EUR 60-70  
(for copies, 
stamps for 
the special 
construction 
of Courts and 
Prisons etc) 
N/A  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0.00 No 
representation 
by lawyers 
 Time spent by 
consumer e.g. 
collecting 
evidence or 
attending 
settlement 
meeting 
cannot be 
calculated. 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There is no data available for court cases. 
As for ADR procedures, the Consumer Ombudsman, though it provides extensive 
statistics it does not include unfair contract terms in them. It does deal with unfair 
terms, as it can be seen in the following cases quoted in their Annual Report for 2015: 
Unfair terms on expenses in bank loans,82 unfair terms in insurance contracts that 
reversed burden of proof and only left a very short deadline for the consumer to 
exercise their right,83 unfair terms in gym/slimming institute contracts relating on the 
right to cancel,84 unfair terms relating to concert cancellations,85 unfair terms in 
contract for transport of pupils to kindergarten,86 unfair terms on unilateral 
modification of terms in the telecommunications sector.87 
However, the Consumer Ombudsman can only issue recommendations towards 
traders and does not have the power to enforce the non-binding character of the term. 
 
 
82 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, available online at 
http://www.synigoroskatanaloti.gr/docs/StK-Annual-Report-2015.pdf (Accessed September 2016) p.87 
83 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, p.91 
84 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, p.103 
85 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, p.132 
86 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, p.142 
87 Consumer Ombudsman Annual Report 2015, p.148 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder 
type 
Date 
EKPOIZO Consumer 
organisation 
21.07.2016 
28.07.2016 
KEPKA Consumer 
organisation 
22.07.2016 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
European 
Consumer Centre 
25.07.2016 
RAE National 
regulatory 
authority 
26.07.2016 
SEV Business 
association 
27.07.2016 
General Secretariat 
for Consumer 
Protection 
Ministry 28.07.2016 
29.07.2016 
INKA Consumer 
organisation 
29.07.2016 
ESEE Business 
association 
04.08.2016 
ESR National 
regulatory 
authority 
29.08.2016 
An ESR Representative submitted written remarks on the 
questionnaire which were supplemented by phone 
communication. ESR has limited authority on the application 
of the Directives, focusing only on covert advertising in TV and 
radio 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Aleksandridou 2007 Aleksandridou, “Ο τροποποιημένος νόμος για την προστασία του 
καταναλωτή από την σκοπιά ενός εμπορικολόγου” [2007], 55 NoB 7, 1493, 
1497 
Aleksandridou 2008 Aleksandridou, Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτή Ελληνικό- Κοινοτικό, 
(Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008) 
Apalagaki 2008 Apalagaki, “Αρθρο 10 Ν 2251/1994” in Aleksandridou (ed), Δίκαιο 
Προστασίας Καταναλωτή, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008)  
Apostolopoulos 2006 Apostolopoulos, ‘Αθέμιτη συγκριτική διαφήμιση χωρίς καν σύγκριση; 
Επιταγή φιλελευθεροποίησης της συγκριτικής διαφήμισης υπό το πρίσμα 
του κοινοτικού δικαίου’, [2006] ΣΤ ΧρΙΔ, 29 
Dellios 2013 Dellios, Γενικοί  Όροι Συναλλαγών, (2
nd ed Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα 2013) 
Deloyka-Igglesi 2014 Deloyka-Igglesi, Δικαιο του Καταναλωτή Ενωσιακό και Ελληνικό, (Εκδόσεις 
Σάκκουλα 2014) 
Kalampouka-
Giannopoulou 
2014 Kalampouka-Giannopoulou, ‘Νομολογιακά δεδομένα περί αθέμιτων 
εμπορικών πρακτικών’, [2014] 5 ΔΕΕ 479 
Marinos 2011 Marinos, ‘Από το ελληνικό στο κοινοτικό δίκαιο του αθέμιτου 
ανταγωνισμού-προβλήματα εφαρμογής της μαύρης λίστας της οδηγίας 
2005/29 για τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές’, [2011] ΔΕΕ 877 
Mpechri-
Kehagioglou 
2012 Mpechri-Kehagioglou, ‘Η οδηγία 2005/29 για τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές 
πρακτικές: Ο νομικός μηχανισμός λειτουργίας της και οι δυσλειτουργίες 
του κατά την εφαρμογή της οδηγίας’, [2012] ΕΕμπΔ 17 
Papanikolaou 2008 Papanikolaou, “Σκέψεις πάνω στον νέο νόμο (ν. 3587/2007) για την 
προστασία των καταναλωτών”, [2008] ΕλλΔνη 660 
Perakis 2008 Perakis ‘Article 1 N.2251/94’ in Aleksandridou (ed) Δίκαιο Προστασίας 
Καταναλωτη: Ελληνικό- Κοινοτικό, (Νομική Βιβλιοθήκη 2008) 
Vasilopoulos 2008 Vasilopoulos, ‘Συγκριτική διαφήμιση και αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές’ in 
Douvlis and Mpolos (eds) Δίκαιο Προστασίας Καταναλωτών, (Εκδόσεις 
Σάκκουλα 2008) 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report HUNGARY  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD is implemented into Act XLVII of 2008.1. Article 5 paragraph 1 is 
implemented into Section 3 paragraph 1, and Article 5 paragraph 2 in Section 3 
paragraph 2. The enforcement of Act XLVII of 2008 is the responsibility of public 
authorities, consumer protection associations and consumers. Enforcement of the act 
is primarily administrative. Section 10 gives a leading role in enforcement to the 
National Consumer Protection Authority (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság), also 
empowering the Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal) and the Hungarian 
National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank).  
Under Section 15, public enforcement however does not take away consumers’ rights 
to take private court actions. 
Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2 containing the principle based approach seem to work 
well in practice. 
According to stakeholders, the principle based approach works well in practice. Public 
authorities asserted that this approach is useful in embracing commercial practices 
that are not named on the black list (going as far as considering unnecessary the 
revision of the black list). The principle based approach is flexible and able to embrace 
new and emerging practices. A stakeholder highlighted that the general prohibition is 
easy to remember and it is generally known to large businesses. There was even an 
opinion that the legislator should focus on adopting general clauses instead of mass-
producing specific rules, the number of which became unmanageable. Stakeholders 
did not raise any problems in interpreting the content of general clauses. 
The general acceptance of the principle based approach can be explained by its 
historical roots. The use of general clauses in the area of unfair commercial practices 
has a long history. The predecessors of Act XLVII of 2008 contained general clauses 
prohibiting commercial practices capable of misleading consumers. The general 
legislative technique was in line with the UCPD’s; a general prohibition was followed by 
specific prohibitions.2  
Although the principle based approach is a generally welcomed approach, it is rarely 
applied in the practice of the public authorities. For example, around 70% of decisions 
of the Consumer Protection Authority involve misleading or aggressive commercial 
practices (Articles 6 and 7); 25% black list (Annex I) and only 5% Article 5.  Indeed, 
although a considerable number of court decisions involve Section 3, it has been 
mainly used in conjunction with specific prohibitions of misleading commercial 
practices in Sections 6 and 7 (implementing Articles 6 and 7 of the UCPD). Practice 
seems to be more comfortable with the general prohibition in section 3 paragraphs 1 
1  2008. évi XLVII. törvény a fogyasztókkal szembeni tisztességtelen kereskedelmi gyakorlat tilalmáról. 
2  Section 1 of Act V of 1923 on unfair competition, contained a general clause on the prohibition of 
conducting business in an unfair manner or against good morals. See the Act at: 
http://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7545; Section 11 paragraph 1 contained a general prohibition 
on misleading commercial practices. Section 11 paragraph 2 contained named misleading commercial 
practices. See Act LXXXVI of 1990 on prohibition of unfair market conduct at 
http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=99000086.TV (repealed by Act LVII of 1996). See for 
detailed overview: József Sárai, Gábor Szoboszlay (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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(implementing Article 5 paragraph 1), only a few judgments involved Section 3 
paragraph 2 (implementing Article 5 paragraph 2 of the UCPD).3 Typically courts are 
giving a ‘factual’ meaning to general clauses i.e. connecting the facts of the case to 
the applicable provision of the law, without drawing general conclusions, without 
establishing principles. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Annex I of the UCPD is implemented into an Annex attached to Act XLVII of 2008. 
A representative of a business highlighted that although the practices were considered 
to be unethical before the implementation of the UCPD, incorporating these into a 
statute and empowering public authorities for their enforcement made their 
application easier. It raised the level of consumer protection, and brought benefits for 
businesses by providing a level playing field.  
Stakeholders were of the opinion that businesses do try to avoid practices that are on 
the black list. Even if they use some of the practices, stakeholders agreed that the 
black list is very easy to apply in practice. As stated above, in the practice of (at least 
some) authorities in enforcing the provisions of the UCPD, the black list plays a 
dominant role.  
The relevant authorities reported that the most common black listed practices are 
those in points 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17, 20, 26, 28 and 31 of the UCPD Annex I.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Article 3 paragraph 9 is implemented by Section 1 paragraph 4 of Act XLVII of 2008, 
allowing for more stringent sector specific information rules.  
Sector specific rules in the area of financial services provide for more stringent 
regulation than the UCPD provides. For example, Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on credit 
institutions and financial undertakings4 provides for an obligation on financial firms in 
terms of the provision of pre-contractual information, publication and supply of 
standard terms and conditions, and periodic information during the duration of the 
contract. Act CLXII of 2009 on consumer credit5 implementing Directive 2008/48 on 
consumer credit also includes more stringent information provisions than the UCPD. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
It is difficult to estimate the effectiveness and practical benefits of the UCPD in 
tackling misleading environmental claims/practices. So far there has been one 
example of successful application of the UCPD to tackle misleading environmental 
claims. The Competition Authority has decided that a commercial communication 
falsely stating that a certain type of fuel is capable of saving as much as 1 litre per 
fuel tank and that using a certain type of fuel definitely decreases fuel consumption, is 
an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Section 3 paragraph 1 of Act 
XLVII of 2008.6 
3 Conclusions are based on available case law in the database of court decisions Döntvénytár/Új Jogtár as 
available closing with 15 October 2016. 
4 2013. évi CCXXXVII. törvény a hitelintézetekről és a pénzügyi vállakozásokról. 
5 2009. évi CLXII. törvény a fogyasztónak nyújtott hitelről.  
6 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-104/2012. 
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Stakeholders generally highlighted that consumer complaints involving environmental 
claims are very rare, due to the lack of environmental sensitivity of consumers. It has 
been emphasized by a government official that no complaint has been filed to any of 
the competent public authorities following the well-known Volkswagen scandal. In 
general, therefore environmental matters do not influence consumer decision making. 
Environmental claims are only capable of influencing consumer decision making by 
being connected to price claims, given that Hungarian consumers are price sensitive.  
Stakeholders also noted that given the emergence of advertisements with 
environmental appeals, the importance of unfair commercial practices in policing 
environmental claims may increase in the future. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
In implementing Article 5 paragraph 2 of the UCPD, Section 4 paragraph 1 of Act 
XLVII of 2008 went beyond the wording of the UCPD. Taking into account Recital 18 of 
the UCPD and the case-law of the CJEU,7 Section 4 paragraph 1 omitted any reference 
to the notion of ‘average consumer.’ Instead, it defined the standard of a consumer 
behaviour to which the commercial practice should be adjusted.8 It explains that a 
fairness of a commercial practice should be estimated based on the behaviour of a 
consumer that is reasonably informed, and has been reasonably observant and 
circumspect in relation to the particular commercial practice, and taking into account 
the linguistic, cultural and social aspects of a product. According to the Metropolitan 
Court of Appeal, without referring to the notion of an average consumer, the provision 
determines the characteristics of such a consumer. The average consumer standard is 
determined by an average person, a person ‘from the street’, an average shopper and 
does not refer to people at the very ends of the spectrum such as those that are 
extremely knowledgeable or mentally disadvantaged.9 Thus without using the notion 
of ‘average consumer’ Section 4 paragraph 1 refers to such a consumer.10 Similarly, 
according to the Competition Authority, the average consumer is someone who is not 
at either of the two ends of the spectrum. The law is not aimed at protecting 
consumers who are uninformed, or entirely unobservant, or those consumers that are 
unable to read and write, or that abuse their rights; nor can the average consumer 
standard be applied to those consumers that have expert knowledge or those that are 
business partners.11 
Stakeholders noted that there are no problems in interpreting the concept of average 
consumer, problems rather occur in deciding on when a consumer is reasonably 
informed, observant and circumspect. At the start of the application of this statute, 
businesses placed high expectations towards average consumers, expecting them to 
read and carefully scrutinize the content of every communication, but courts and 
public authorities developed a more protective approach towards consumers.  
The concept of an average consumer is primarily shaped by the practice of the 
Competition Authority.12 According to the Competition Authority a reasonably informed 
consumer is not expected to check the validity or truthfulness of information in 
commercial communication. A reasonably behaving consumer trusts the content of a 
7  Explanatory notes on Section 4 paragraph 1, available in Új Jogtár. 
8  Gellén (see literature review at the end of the document). 
9  Fővárosi Ítélőtábla, decision no. 2.Kf.27.171/2012/4. 
10 József Zavodnjik, Commentary on Section 4 paragraph 1 (see literature review at the end of the 
document). 
11 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-102/2014. 
12 Court decisions normally confirm the Competition Authority’s rulings. 
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commercial communication,13 including advertisements,14 and takes into account the 
ordinary meaning of words.15  A reasonably observant consumer cannot be expected 
to investigate the accuracy of the content of a message. On the contrary, according to 
the Competition Authority the function of advertisements is to remedy information 
asymmetries between consumers and businesses in cost effective manner and to 
enable the consumer to accept the information provided by the business, regardless of 
the form of communication.16 The Metropolitan Court of Appeal agrees with this 
approach, finding that a reasonable consumer is not suspicious and tends to trust that 
the received information is valid and accurate. A reasonably acting consumer is not 
obliged to research the accuracy of the content of the message, unless the sender of 
the message draws his or her attention to that, or there is strong reference to such an 
obligation in the text of the message.17 
As a general rule, a reasonably observant and circumspect consumer is not a rational 
decision maker.18 The complex process of consumer decision making is influenced by 
many factors including emotions and therefore it cannot be a purely rational process.19 
In shaping their marketing practices businesses do play on both consumer rationality 
and emotions.20 In addition, consumers usually behave in a ‘situation based’ manner, 
i.e. depending on the product, market or commercial communication; the same 
consumer may act differently in different situations.21  However, even a rational 
consumer can be misled.22 
The Competition Authority emphasized the consumer-centered approach in applying 
the test. The content of the commercial communication, product labelling and their 
marketing should be looked at with the eyes of consumers, the business’ intention and 
interpretation of the communication is irrelevant.23 
If a commercial communication is directed towards a group of consumers, under 
Section 4 paragraph 1 the fairness of a commercial practice will be measured in regard 
to an average member of that group. The Competition Authority confirmed that even 
above average informed consumers can be misled by commercial communications, if 
they are unable to supplement or modify the information received.24 This group is in a 
better position to evaluate the information communicated and therefore a higher than 
average standard applies to it. The Competition Authority also defined groups, for 
example, potentially pregnant women, women consciously trying to get pregnant. The 
characteristics of this state of (pre)pregnancy is that the process of decision making is 
fast as women wish to know whether or not they are pregnant as soon as possible. 
The group is heterogenic, consisting of women of different age, material status, 
pregnancy related intentions, biological risks, etc. However, this group of women has 
the same pregnancy test related information background as the rest of the population, 
without having socialized knowledge on these tests.25 Therefore, the same standards 
are applicable as to the average consumer. 
13 For example decisions of the Competition Authoriy no.: VJ-7/2015, VJ -89/2014, VJ-51/2014, VJ-
49/2014, VJ-33/2014, VJ-28/2014, VJ -17/2014, VJ-8/2014, VJ-75/2013. 
14 For example decisions of the Competition Authroiry no: VJ-45/2014, VJ-41/2014, VJ-35/2014,  also VJ-
6/2004. Note that the Competition Authority worked with the standard of an average consumer even 
before the implementation of the UCPD and therefore its earlier points of views remain relevant. 
15 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj-8/2011. 
16 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-84/2009. 
17 Fővárosi Ítélőtábla, decision no. 2.Kf.27.171/2012/4. The Kúria has confimed this stanpoint in decisions 
no. Kfv.II.37.191/2013/8,and Kfv.VIII.37.083/2014/8. See also Kfv.III.37.404/2014/5 
18 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ -154/2009 and VJ-3/2010. 
19 Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 2.Kf.27.231/2011/9  (VJ-154/2009) 
20 József Zavodnjik, Fogyasztók és kísérletek (see literature review at the end of the document)  
21 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-54/2011.  
22 Metropolitan Court (Fővárosi Bíróság), decision no. 2K.35.796/201/6 (Vj-45/2010).  
23 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-72/2003. 
24 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-12/2009. 
25 Competition Authroity, decision no. VJ-81/2011, VJ-41/2012; confimed by Metropolitan Court (Fővárosi 
Törvenyszék) in decision no. 2.Kf.650.207/2013/6. 
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According to the president of the Competition Authority the concept of average 
consumer is capable to evolve and adjust to circumstances. The characteristics of an 
average consumer are market dependent and may be different in different markets 
(for example in case of a classical investment product or a more specific investment 
product). A particular consumer credit group may become more knowledgeable about 
the typical characteristics of certain products, and these changes influence the picture 
of an average consumer. For example, in VJ-78/2012 the Competition Authority has 
decided that in a loyalty contract for a mobile phone the essential conditions for 
providing the loyalty statement are known to consumers, in particular due to the 
provider’s extensive information campaign in this aspect. It follows that the absence of 
information in advertisements on the necessity of providing loyalty statements or on 
the loyalty character of contracts is not considered to be an unfair commercial 
practice, given that it did not induce consumers into transactional decisions they would 
have not made otherwise.26  
The concept of average consumer and the general prohibition of an unfair commercial 
practice have been used to cover legal gaps. For example, in case of the so called 
‘Hungarian product’ (‘Magyar termék’) the Competition Authority has observed the 
fairness of a commercial practice from the perspective of the average consumer. The 
Competition Authority has noticed that consumers’ perception of a Hungarian product 
goes beyond product characteristics. It includes aspects that go into societal values 
and benefits such as using Hungarian labour and Hungarian materials in the process of 
production, etc. Based on a survey measuring consumer perceptions of the 
characteristics of Hungarian products, the Competition Authority has created an image 
of the average consumer on this market and measured the businesses’ commercial 
communication against that image.27  
Based on the above evidence it can be concluded that concept of the average 
consumer is not applied rigidly.  The Competition Authority has a key role in shaping 
the content of Section 4 paragraph 1. The content of a reasonably well informed, 
observant and circumspect consumer standard is developed on a case by case basis, 
adjusting the concept to a particular life situation (a stakeholder asserted that a sort 
of ‘situation based approach’ is dominant in the practice of the Competition Authority). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Article 5 paragraph 3 of the UCPD is implemented in Section 4 paragraph 2 of Act 
XLVII of 2008, adopting the phrase ‘mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity’. 
Overall, stakeholders noted that these rules are satisfactory in providing a high level 
of consumer protection as they leave room for taking into account individual life 
circumstances.28  
The Competition Authority has generally noted that vulnerability is a sort of situation 
of need that may occur for example because a consumer is unhealthy, unbalanced, 
does not have the necessary material resources, experience or knowledge in the given 
field or a consumer that has (subjectively or objectively) no choice.29  
Vulnerability towards marketing messages can be relative and partial. A highly 
educated ill person can be susceptible to healing messages; an entirely healthy and 
rational consumer that avoids gambling can be vulnerable due to his or her material 
situation to messages marketing financial products that appear favourable; a gambler 
may be susceptible to messages inducing gambling.30 
26 Miklós Juhász, p. 92 (see literature review at the end of the document).  
27 Ibid. See also Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-17/2011, VJ-21/2011, VJ-88/2010. 
28 See also Klára Gellén. 
29 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ -102/2014. 
30 Ibid. 
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Expectations in relation to an average consumer are equally applicable to vulnerable 
consumers. A vulnerable consumer cannot be expected to check or doubt the validity 
or truthfulness of information in commercial communication, or to investigate the 
accuracy of a content of a message.31  
The Competition Authority has recognized ill consumers as a special group of 
vulnerable consumers. Consumers suffering from serious illness are more vulnerable 
than average consumers to commercial communication advertising products with 
healing effects to their illness. These consumers often interpret the communication in 
a way to support their hope for healing. The decision making process of ill consumers 
is distorted by their lack of information and experience with the product. Thus 
commercial communication on the effects of healing products must be clear, precise, 
without leaving room for diverging interpretation.32 
In terms of financial services and products, the Competition Authority does not 
recognize the users of financial services and products, poor or indebted consumers as 
a special, vulnerable group. However, it does take into account the susceptibility of 
these consumers to marketing communications.33 Cases involving financial services 
and products mostly arose in regard to consumer credit groups (as explained below). 
The commercial communication of consumer credit groups usually targeted financially 
vulnerable consumers, those that had bed credit rating or were indebted. In one case 
that involved the omission of material information by a credit institution the 
Competition Authority considered that consumers with bad credit rating were 
particularly susceptible to a specific offer.34 Recognizing this however, the Competition 
Authority has estimated the fairness of a communication by taking the average 
consumer as a benchmark,35 adjusting therefore the standard of average consumer to 
the special situation of financial services and products. Although consumers of 
financial services are considered to be average consumers, it cannot be expected from 
an average consumer to have expert knowledge in the field. Also, a lower level of 
awareness, information about a service or a product is acceptable compared to 
average consumers consuming other products, given the special relationship of trust 
between the financial firm and a consumer.36  
In approaching vulnerability, the authorities start from the concept of an average 
consumer, and if a commercial practice involves a vulnerable consumer, this factor is 
taken into account in determining the appropriate sanction, i.e. a commercial practice 
becomes sanctionable because it is being addressed to a vulnerable person or the 
sanction becomes higher. Some stakeholders were of the opinion that vulnerability is 
not approached properly, signalling a need for further developing the categories of 
vulnerability. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Self-regulation in the form of codes of conduct are common, however, stakeholders 
emphasized that that their usefulness is limited in the over-regulated environment. 
Codes of conduct only make sense if they can provide added value to primary and 
secondary law, i.e. if they are able to provide additional protection for consumers. 
However, in practice codes of conduct usually repeat and explain the primary and 
secondary law that is in force. 
31 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj-17/2015. 
32 Competition Authority, decision no. VJ-99/102, VJ-83/2013. 
33 Competition Authority, e.g. decision no Vj-5/2011/63 and 5/2011/73.  
34 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj-5/2011/73. 
35 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj- 5/2011/63, Vj-5/2011/73. 
36 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj- 58/28/2009; Krisztina Grimm, Izabella Szoboszlai, p. 17 (see 
literature review at the end of the document). 
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There is also little information on the effectiveness of these codes given that their 
breach would be primarily sanctioned within an internal disciplinary procedure. 
According to a representative of businesses, codes of conducts adopted by businesses 
fail to protect consumers due to cultural factors. In Hungary, businesses strive to 
achieve short term gains if necessary even by resorting to unethical behaviour, 
whereas their counterparts in some other Member States care more about their 
reputation and long term sustainability. This societal problem cannot be solved by 
ethical codes, but would require an institutional overhaul, with increasing the role of 
consumer protection organizations in disciplining business behaviour. Nevertheless, it 
has also been said that Hungarian business entities increasingly realize the long term 
benefits of ethical behaviour. Businesses intending to stay longer on the market 
respect the rules, and are ‘customer friendly’.37 In particular, large businesses do care 
about their reputation as they realize reputational damage is difficult to repair (but 
around 99% of businesses in Hungary are small or medium sized).  
There are successful examples of self-regulation by associations of businesses. Self-
regulation has been used in the past to cover legal gaps. Many of these rules have 
been later incorporated into primary and/or secondary law. The most well-known 
example is the Code of Conduct on Principles of Fair Conduct of Financial 
Organizations Engaged in Retail Lending adopted in 201038 by the Association of 
Hungarian Banks.39 It was a temporary solution that has later influenced legislative 
changes aiming to induce ethical lending practices, and increase consumer confidence. 
Initially, part of the Code was copied into Government Decree 275/2010 on the 
Conditions of Unilateral Modification of Interest Rate Defined in the Contract40; later 
larger parts of it influenced the Act LXXVIII of 2014.41 The revised code (as of 2015) is 
comprised of those provisions that have not become part of primary or secondary law. 
A breach of the code is actionable as an unfair commercial practice, and can be 
sanctioned by the supervisor under Section 6 paragraph 2 subparagraph b of Act 
XLVII of 2008. The sanctioning power has been used in practice. For example, 
according to a stakeholder, a firm was fined because it failed to respect the provisions 
of the Code that mandated firms to offer repayment options for customers in payment 
difficulties. According to a stakeholder the primary advantage of the Code was 
however not a possibility of sanction but foreseeing good practices that have gradually 
built into the behaviour of financial firms. 
Apart from adopting codes of conduct, business associations have other ways to 
prevent unethical behaviour. A government official highlighted the important work of 
the Hungarian Marketing Society (Magyar Reklámszövetség), which acts as a filter for 
eliminating unethical advertisements from the market. Businesses frequently turn to 
the society, asking their opinion on compliance of a particular advertisement with the 
society’s ethical code. This practice is capable of eliminating unethical advertisements 
before they reach consumers. 
The ethical behaviour of businesses is motivated by the Consumer Protection 
Authority’s Certification System of Consumer Friendly Business (Fogyasztóbarát 
Vállakozás Tanusitási Rendszer). The system aims to publicize businesses that place 
customer satisfaction and confidence at the heart of their operation. Businesses that 
are awarded the certificate made efforts to address customer satisfaction in various 
innovative ways, beyond simply complying with primary and secondary law. The 
certificate is awarded in several categories, such as customer friendly customer 
services, or socially responsible business. Certificates are awarded following an 
application and based on detailed rules of procedure developed by the Authority. 
37 Krisztina Grimm, Izabella Szoboszlai, p. 24. 
38 Magatartási Kódex a lakosság részére hitelt nyújtó pénzügyi szervezetek ügyfelekkel szembeni 
tisztességes magatartásáról. 
39 See the text of the current Code at http://www.bankszovetseg.hu/hasznos-informaciok/aktualizalt-
magatartasi-kodex. 
40 275/2010. (XII. 15.) Korm. Rendelet a szerződésekben előírt kamat egyoldalú módosításának feltételeiről. 
41 2014. évi LXXVII törvény az egyes fogyasztói kölcsönszerződések devizanemének módosulásával és a 
kamatszabályokkal kapcsolatos kérdések rendezéséről. 
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Certificates are issued for the period of 2-3 years and can be withdrawn should the 
circumstances change in satisfying the applicable criteria.42 The list of consumer 
friendly businesses is published on the Authorities website.43 Having a look at the list 
however one may wonder about the success of the system. The certificate is currently 
held by 11 businesses, and some holding the certificate from 2014. This may suggest 
that there are not many business entities that focus on consumer satisfaction and 
confidence or the system of certification is simply unknown in business circles.  
The other, perhaps more effective way of inducing ethical behaviour is by the use of 
online customer reviews. According to a representative of a consumer protection 
organization traders take these reviews seriously. Thus ethical behaviour is becoming 
increasingly important with the popularization of online trade (i.e. so called web 
shops) in Hungary, and the increased use of price comparison websites such as 
olcsobbat.hu or argep.hu. 
The National Media and Infocommunications Authority operates a Media and 
Infocommunications Ombudsman that is in charge of observing ethical behaviour of 
market participants. The Ombudsman acts upon consumer complaints, and ends its 
investigations with recommendations. According to a government official, these are 
respected by those entities that joined the scheme. The latest recommendation 
includes the Ombudsman’s reaction onto a number of complaints about loyalty 
contracts, and relates to taking into account ethical issues in the concussion of loyalty 
contracts and in complaint handling related to these contracts.44 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Stakeholders agreed that the black list requires occasional updates. A general 
suggestion is to keep the list updated in the light of emerging developments in e-
commerce transactions.  
Stakeholders suggested the expansion of the black list to include new commercial 
practices commonly appearing in Hungary and the amendment of the list to reflect 
emerging developments. 
The black list could be used to ban the creation of consumer credit groups (fogyasztói 
csoport). Consumer credit groups are created and operated for pulling together 
resources to purchase a fairly expensive product, for example, a car. Consumers, 
members of a group are obliged to pay monthly contributions in fixed instalments. 
Members are called for general meeting when one member, selected randomly, gets 
an opportunity to purchase the desired product. Based on the Hungarian experience, 
businesses that organize and operate consumer credit groups specially target 
vulnerable consumers, consumers with a bad credit rating. Using marketing 
techniques, they create a false impression about the provision of credit whereas in 
reality the consumers’ chance of getting the product is entirely dependent on luck. 
Frequently consumers end up waiting years to be selected, regularly paying monthly 
fixed instalments getting even deeper into financial despair. In addition, consumers 
are obliged to pay monthly instalments until the product is fully paid off, even after 
the product has been purchased. From 1 January 2014, the creation of consumer 
credit groups is subject to a general ban in Hungary (Section 16/B paragraph 1 of Act 
CLV of 1997 on Consumer Protection).45 The operation of groups created prior this 
42 See the rules at: http://www.nfh.hu/node/7844 
43 See http://www.nfh.hu/fogyasztobarat-vallalkozasok 
44 See the latest recommendation at: 
http://mediaeshirkozlesibiztos.hu/dokumentum/170121/meltanyossagi_ajanlas_media_es_hirkozlesi_bizt
os.pdf 
45 1997. évi CLV törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről. 
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date is subject to detailed rules now laid down in Gov. Decree 530/2013 on Consumer 
Groups.46 
Sales promotions (termékbemutatók) or some aspects of them could be banned. While 
the implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive (implemented into Government 
Decree 45/2014)47 provided some level of protection for consumers for contracts 
concluded off premises, these rules do not provide sufficient safeguards against 
detriment caused by sales promotions. One problem in Hungary was that these rules 
applied for sale promotions held off premises, but once promotions were held regularly 
at a location, e.gevery Saturday, these premises were considered business and the 
new rules became inapplicable. To remedy this, Hungary introduced more stringent 
rules specially targeting sales promotions, effective from December 2015.48 For 
example, holding any sales promotions is subject to advanced notice, giving thereby 
an opportunity for the relevant public authority to be present and control the 
information provided to consumers. However, these new rules did not address every 
issue. A stakeholder highlighted that sales promotions targeting ill consumers create a 
visual environment suggesting that a medical health check is taking place whereas the 
examination is not performed by a doctor of medicine and therefore the health check 
cannot be medical.  
The black list could also be used to ban the change of the terms and conditions of 
promotional sales while the duration of the promotion. This ban could follow the 
decision of the Competition Authority that has considered such a change to be an 
unfair commercial practice, when a company changed the terms and conditions of 
collecting and exchanging promotional stamps.49Another problem in Hungary is 
disproportionately high charges. A commercial practice imposing disproportionately 
high charges compared to the service provided should be black listed.  
Businesses are commonly trying to increase their sales volume by creating a false 
impression that the product is on sale, indicating the price difference (the new and the 
old price) or the percentage of discount, whereas in reality the product was never 
placed on the market at a higher price, even more so, sometimes the product was 
previously sold at a lower than the ‘sales price’.50 The black list could be used to ban 
these false sales promotions.In terms of the amendment, a public authority suggested 
to modify point 21 of Annex I by deleting reference to ‘marketing material’ as this 
reference unnecessarily restricts the application of this ban. Another stakeholder 
suggested Point 20 of Annex I should be amended to reflect the modern trend of 
‘paying’ for the service with personal data. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
The effectiveness of the UCPD in providing a high level of protection (according to the 
interviewed stakeholders) could be improved by:  
46 530/2013. (XII. 30.) Korm. Rendelet a fogyasztói csoportokról.  Prior to adopting these rules the 
Competition Authority has commission research and conducted an information campaign on consumer 
credit groups, see http://www.nedoljonbe.hu/ne_doljon_be/kutatasi-eredmenyek. It has also delivered 
several decisions involving these groups, see for example: Vj- 71/2011. 
47 45/2014. (II. 26). Korm. Rendelet a fogyasztó és a vállalkozó közötti szerződések részletes szabályairól. 
48 See the rules at: http://www.nfh.hu/node/65 
49 Competition Authority, decision no Vj-64/2015/41. 
50 For example, the Kúria case considered that stating the product is on promotional sale whereas it is soled 
for its original price (that id double the false promotional price) is a misleading commercial practice. to be 
an unfair commercial practice. Kúria, decision no. Kfv.II.37.684/2013/2 (also reported in KGD no. 
2015.98). 
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• Strengthening the enforcement i.e. by raising the capacity of consumer protection 
organizations and increasing the usage of public interest actions for addressing 
mass disputes; 
• Minimizing the overlaps between the UCPD and the sector specific regulation;  
• Attributing a more active role to consumer protection organizations in monitoring 
non-compliance with the law, by following, analysing and summarizing the most 
frequently occurring black listed practices (having an effect of informing 
consumers and disciplining businesses); 
• Tackling promotional sales. Consumers are lured into buying promotional products 
ending up with very expensive products in the end (for example, mobile phones 
that cost HUF 1 or 0 [less than EUR 0.01]).51 This problem could be tackled by 
informing consumers on the full price of the product by including the full price at 
least into the contract, but preferably also before the contract is concluded (by 
analogy to indicating the APR in financial services transactions). 
There are several practices that could be useful for other Member States: 
• The practice of using mystery shopping. Mystery or sample shopping has proved 
very useful in the practice of Hungarian public authorities.52 According to a 
representative of a sector specific authority, mystery shopping is the only way to 
prove that consumers have been misinformed, i.e. that oral information amounts 
to an unfair commercial practice. This power enables the authorities to eliminate 
unfair commercial practices more effectively. It not only enables them to spot 
irregularities in commercial communications but also to obtain necessary evidence 
for the subsequent process. For example, in protecting consumers at sales 
promotions government officials have recorded the information provided during 
the promotion and used this as solid evidence in the later process. This is a 
valuable tool given the mentioned evidentiary problems with commercial 
practices. The practice of mystery shopping has now increased businesses’ 
compliance with the rules and increased their pro-active initiative. They now 
preventively turn to enforcement authorities seeking their opinion about the 
conformity of their commercial communication (i.e. information) with the 
applicable rules; 
• The practice of providing informal opinions on legal matters. Some public 
authorities can give informal opinions on whether certain actions or information 
comply with the primary and secondary law. The opinion is free of charge and is 
purely of interpretative, or advisory nature, i.e. it cannot be used as evidence in 
administrative or judicial process; 
• Seeking undertakings instead of imposing formal sanctions, concluding ‘public 
contracts’ (hatósági szerződés). Several authorities, such as the Competition 
Authority and the Media and Infocommunications Authority are empowered to 
seek undertakings from businesses instead of imposing formal sanctions, i.e. 
fines. With this agreement, the business undertakes a commitment to change its 
practice, with the authority specifying the practices that need to be changed. The 
authorities consider this as an efficient tool for changing business practices long 
term, in sustainable manner; 
• The practice of operating a Consumer protection rapporteur (Fogyasztóvédelmi 
referens). This role is mandatory from 2013 for large businesses based on Section 
17/D of Act CLV of 1997. The rapporteur is an expert in the field of operation of 
the company and is additionally educated on consumer protection matters.53 Its 
51 See also Vj-90/2008 where the Competition Authority considered the advertising of a ‘free bank account’ 
a misleading commercial practice given that it was conditions upon the minimum use of 6 months and the 
maintenance of an extremely large balance (HUF 3 000 000 [approx. EUR 9 687]) or a monthly income of 
minimum HUF 150 000 [EUR 484]. 
52 Mystery shopping is a widely used enforcement tool of public authorities. It is even amongst the tools of 
the Hungarian National Bank. 
53 Explanatory notes on Section 17/D of Act CLV of 1997 in Új Jogtár. 
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role is to make sure the company is up to date with the regulatory developments, 
transfers this knowledge onto other employees and to be a point of contact with 
public authorities, ADR bodies and others having a consumer protection 
competence. The stakeholders considered this new role useful for positively 
shaping business practices; 
• Stakeholders welcomed the Competition Authority’s flexible approach to the 
notion of an average consumer – the sort of ‘situation based’ approach described 
above.  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
The PID is implemented into Section 14 of Act CLV of 1997 and in Decree 4/2009 on 
detailed rules on the indication of prices and unit prices of products, and fees for 
services.54 
According to stakeholders, the PID works well in practice and consumers are 
effectively informed about unit selling prices (although a stakeholder notes that 
consumers frequently ignore the unit selling price). 
Occasionally, there are problems such as the size of unit selling price indication that is 
difficult to see, or failure to indicate the unit selling price all together. ‘Borderline 
products’ (such as toilet paper) are problematic where businesses fail to realize the 
need for indicating the unit selling price. In practice there was also an issue about the 
indicaton of unit selling prices whith products containing a gift i.e. the volume of the 
product was increased by a certain amount that was gifted. For example, in case of 
coffee the gifted units increased the overall weight of the product, and in the case of 
dishwasher capsules, the number of available units within the package. According to 
Kúria, in such situations the unit selling price is to be calculated by reference to the 
entire package (including the gifted part) as only such calculation will enable 
consumers to compare prices.554/2009 Decree is currently under revision: efforts are 
being taken to equalize the size of the letters indicating the size of eggs and their unit 
price.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Stakeholders agreed that indicating the unit price per performance measurement is 
not necessary. Some considered this as a matter of free competition between the 
businesses. Others highlighted the area of ‘borderline products’, problematic products 
from the aspect of unit price, for which it would be difficult to join the unit price with 
its performance measurement such as toilet paper.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
54 4/2009. (I. 30.) NFGM-SZMM együttes rendelet a termékek eladási ára és egységára, továbbá a 
szolgáltatások díja feltüntetésének részletes szabályairól. 
55 Kúria, Decision no Kfv. VI. 37.052/2011/7( also reported as principled court decision – elvi bírósági 
döntés (EBH) no 2012. K.16): 
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This derogation is not applicable for Hungary. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD is implemented into Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair market 
conduct and restriction of competition56 that is enforced by the Competition Authority. 
The scope of protection provided is broader than misleading and comparative 
advertising. Act LVII of 1996 also contains rules unfair commercial practices more 
generally, rules similar to Act XLVII of 2008 implementing the UCPD. The Hungarian 
implementation of MCAD applies to ‘business practice’ more generally, that is 
according to a stakeholder, based on the term ’commercial practice’ in the UCPD. This 
allows investigation of a wider range of issues than advertising, and this broader 
mandate works well in practice.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
According to a stakeholder, the principle based approach works well in practice given 
that it allows the authority to tackle a broad range and different kinds of commercial 
practices. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
As mentioned above, the MCAD has been implemented in a way to allow the 
investigation of a broader range of issues than advertisements. Act LVII of 1996 
applies to any ‘business practice’ following the term ‘commercial practice’ in the UCPD. 
Therefore, although the application of the UCPD has not been extended to B2B 
transactions, the provisions of Act LVII of 1996 have been inspired by the UCPD. 
Section 8 paragraph 1 contains a general prohibition of misleading business partners. 
Paragraphs 2 specifies what amounts to a misleading ‘business practice’ referring to 
both misleading actions and omissions in a very similar fashion to Sections 6 and 7 of 
Act XLVII of 2008 implementing Articles 6 and 7 of the UCPD. 
In addition, as will be explained below, Section 10/A paragraph 2 of act LVII of 1996 
contains a reference to the ‘average business’ similar to Section 4 paragraph 1 of Act 
XLVII of 2008 (implementing of the average consumer concept from the UCPD).  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
According to a stakeholder, the framework is effective as it also covers modern types 
of advertisements. However, it could be reconsidered whether there is a need for the 
definition of ‘misleading advertising’ and the criteria for determining misleading 
advertising in MCAD when such behaviours are already covered by the UCPD. 
 
56 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról. 
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• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
According to a stakeholder, comparative advertising rules provide an effective 
framework for modern types of marketing. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Stakeholders agreed that the current rules on enforcement are effective, in particular 
because they did not negatively affect cross-border transactions. It is suggested 
though that there is a need for strengthening cross-border cooperation between 
enforcement authorities. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Stakeholders asserted that businesses would be better protected by a differentiated 
approach within the businesses community, providing a higher level of protection for 
small and medium sized businesses (a thorough research would be needed to draw 
exact lines). This could be done by bringing closer the rules on advertising in MCAD to 
unfair commercial practices in the UCPD to protect vulnerable businesses.  
A stakeholder also suggested the example of Hungary could be followed by extending 
the scope of MCAD beyond advertisements. 
Stakeholders also mentioned that cooperative between enforcement authorities the EU 
should be strengthened. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Based on the interviews it can be concluded that Hungarian businesses have negligible 
experience with the internal market. 
Relevant stakeholders asserted that Hungarian businesses go very rarely abroad. Due 
to their low capitalization, language, and other barriers, they have little access to 
foreign markets. Those that go abroad primarily target the German market. The more 
developed consumer protection culture coupled with strong enforcement have 
‘disciplined’ Hungarian businesses, forcing them to change their business strategies, 
operational models, or even to withdraw from the German market. This assessment 
however relates to traditional, offline trade whereby Hungarian companies establish 
their daughter business in the other Member State, conducting domestic trade in the 
host state.  
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There is an increasing number of online shops, because of transportation costs most of 
them target domestic buyers, and for the time being, do not market their products 
and services EU wide. Stakeholders had no knowledge of any problems. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Hungarian businesses have very little experience with the internal market (as 
explained above). Similar to the UCTD, the effectiveness of MCAD in eliminating 
obstacles to the internal market cannot be estimated. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to stakeholders, large businesses that advertise frequently and follow the 
legal developments carefully are aware of these rules. There are frequent problems 
with online or web-shops (operated by small and medium sized businesses). According 
to a government official, the Consumer Protection Authority in 80% of cases finds that 
there has been an infringement of information provisions and in 54% of cases the 
infringement is addressed upon the Authority’s finding. In order to faciliate 
compliance, the Consumer Protection Authority has developed a Exemplary online 
shop (Mintawebáruház).57 This shop serves to inform and educate consumers and 
businesses by showing the key consumer protection rules. The sample shop looks like 
a real online shop, without an actual possibility to make a purchase 
A sectoral authority highlighted that in regard to information provision they primarily 
control the compliance with (the many) sector specific rules and the requirements of 
UCPD are less relevant for their practice.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Public authorities did not mention any additional costs. Businesses with effective 
management in place transfer compliance costs onto consumer (as explained below). 
57 See the Exemplary online shop at: http://mintawebaruhaz.nfh.hu/hu/  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
522
 1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
As mentioned above, Hungary already applies the equivalent of some consumer 
protection rules in a B2B context.  Act LVII of 1996 contains (implementing the MCAD) 
very similar rules to those in Act XLVII of 2008 (implementing the UCPD). Section 8 
paragraph 1 contains a general prohibition of misleading business partners in 
economic competition. Paragraphs 2 specifies what amounts to a misleading ‘business 
practice’ referring to both misleading actions and omissions in a very similar fashion to 
Sections 6 and 7 of Act XLVII of 2008 implementing Articles 6 and 7 of the UCPD. 
According to a stakeholder, the general clause allows for the prohibition of aggressive 
business or commercial practice, whereas misleading commercial practices are 
regulated in more detail. 
Section 10/A paragraph 2 of act LVII of 1996 contains a reference to the ‘average 
business’ that is similar to Section 4 paragraph 1 of Act XLVII of 2008 (implementing 
of the average consumer concept from the UCPD).  This section provides that in 
evaluating a business practice the standard of a reasonably well informed, observant 
and circumspect business should be taken into account. In comparing the standard of 
an ‘average consumer’ and an ‘average business’, the Competition Authority expects a 
higher degree of awareness and circumspection from businesses then from 
consumers.58 The level of expectation however depends on the market in which the 
infringement has occurred. The highest level of awareness is expected from the 
business in regard to a business practice on the market on which it usually operates. 
In deciding on whether the business practice is misleading, the Competition Authority 
also takes into account the size of the business (a lower level of awareness is required 
from small and medium sized businesses then large businesses; but the threshold of 
expectation is higher than towards consumers), its resources available for obtaining 
information and the power relationship between the businesses in the given 
transaction. 
Comparing the rules applicable to B2B (implementing the MCAD) and to B2C 
(implementing the UCPD), it can be noted that there are no black listed practices 
available for B2B transactions and no reversal of burden of proof infront of the 
Competition Authority. 
There is no available evidence about the effect of these rules on cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Although many of the rules in Act LVII of 1996 are similar to the rules of the UCPD, 
representatives of businesses are generally against of the extension of consumer 
protection rules to the B2B context. They have highlighted that different rules should 
be applicable in B2B and B2C contexts, with the former giving primacy to free 
competition. Small and medium sized businesses could be protected by helping them 
in enforcing their rights. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
58 Competition Authority, decision no. Vj-30/2003. 
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aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
According to a stakeholder, the current rules are applicable both before and after the 
contract has been concluded. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
According to stakeholders, the black list could be useful even without differentiating 
between businesses of different size. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Stakeholders were not convinced about extending the operation of the Regulation 
2006/2004, but did not come up with alternatives. This may be due to their lack of 
experience with cross-border disputes. So far for example the Competition Authority 
has been approached only once through Regulation 2006/2004. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
According to stakeholders, there could be a need to develop contractual consequences 
for misleading and comparative advertising. However, this would require systemic 
changes in Hungary. ‘Core’ contractual matters, such as contractual consequences are 
regulated in the Civil Code59 and can only be enforced by courts, whereas the MCAD is 
currently enforced by the Competition Authority. A sharp distinction is made between 
administrative and civil protection of consumers. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
Stakeholders had no suggestions on whether there is a need to adapt the rules on 
comparative advertising. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Contractual consequences are available for unfair commercial practice in Hungary. 
Although unfair commercial practices are primarily enforced by public authorities, 
commercial practices may also be subject to private law actions.  
First, under Section 15 paragraph 1 of Act XLVII of 2008, public enforcement does not 
take away consumers’ right to take private court actions. Therefore, an injured 
consumer can commence a court action against the business that has resorted to an 
unfair commercial practice. Contractual consequences are available under the general 
rules of the Civil Code. 
Second, unfair commercial practices may be subject to collective court actions. 
Compensation or specific performance is available in public interest actions (as 
explained below). 
59 Ferenc Szilágyi (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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The Civil Code foresees a general duty of cooperation and information between the 
contractual parties, under Section 6:62. Parties are obliged to mutually cooperate and 
this includes informing each other about circumstances that are important for their 
relationship, during negotiations, at the time of contract conclusion, during the 
duration of the contract and after ending the contract.60 The breach of this obligation 
is sanctionable under the general rules of contract (provided the contract has been 
concluded), or general rules of tort (provided the contract has not been concluded, i.e. 
breach of information obligations during negotiations). This principle based approach 
is supplemented by sector specific rules on information provisions. 
An illegal contract, or a contract that breaches mandatory provisions of law, is void 
under Section 6:95 of the Civil Code (tilos szerződés). Given that information 
provisions are normally mandatory, any breach of these would trigger the operation of 
Section 6:95 
Contracts concluded due to misrepresentation (megtévesztés) or duress (jogellenes 
fenyegetés) are avoidable under Section 6:91 of the Civil Code. 
Immoral contracts (jóerkölcsbe ütköző szerződés, Section 6:96 of the Civil Code) and 
usury contracts (uzsorás szerződés, Section 6:97 of the Civil Code) are void, while 
contracts with manifest disadvantage (feltűnő értékaránytalanság, Section 6:98 of the 
Civil Code) are avoidable. 
An administrative process cannot end with contractual consequences, as explained.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
No case law is available, as individual claims are almost non-existent, and collective 
actions ending with damages compensation or specific performance are very rare. 
Enforcement decisions of administrative authorities cannot attribute contractual 
consequences to unfair commercial practices. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices.  
As mentioned above, contractual consequences are already available in Hungary for 
unfair commercial practices. 
Stakeholders asserted that developing contractual consequences raised a range of 
procedural issues, the most important of which is the evidentiary problem. It is very 
difficult to prove oral information. Recognizing this, Section 15 of Act XLVII of 2008 
transferred the burden of proof onto the business that used the commercial 
communication in question. Nevertheless, individual claims are almost non-existent in 
practice.  
Collective actions commenced by consumer organizations are also rare. To these 
organizations the general rules on the burden of proof apply, and they have no 
resources to collect consumer complaints to be able to prove that a commercial 
practice has taken place. 
It seems therefore that public authorities are the best placed to overcome the 
evidentiary burden. Apart from having resources to collect individual consumer 
complaints, public authorities also perform mystery shopping. This includes attending 
for example a sales promotion and recording the information that has been provided 
to consumers. However, upon establishing that an infringement has occurred, public 
authorities are only able to commence collective actions. Contractual consequences 
could not be attributed to administrative processes conducted by public authorities, 
i.e. damages compensation or specific performance would not be available, due to 
60 Mutual information provision is only one form of mutual cooperation. Commentary on Section 6:62 in 
Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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systemic divisions of public and private enforcement. The award of contractual 
consequences is in the exclusive competence of courts in Hungary. 
A stakeholder suggested that consumers would benefit from contractual consequences 
in administrative processes. They could use the possibility to rescind or modify the 
contract that has been concluded as a result of an unfair commercial practice. This 
would however raise a range of practical problems. For example, it would be difficult 
to determine which consumers were affected by a particular commercial 
communication, and it would be challenging to rescind the contract when it has 
already been performed, or to return what has been received in due performance of 
the contract when it is not possible to do so. In such cases consumers could be 
awarded damages as compensation, however, these are not available in 
administrative actions. The problem is in a systemic division of public and private 
enforcement, as mentioned above. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Before answering the questions, it should be noted that the majority of the 
interviewed stakeholders had limited experience in applying the unfair contract terms 
rules, as the enforcement of the UCTD is in the exclusive competence of courts in 
Hungary. Their experience extends to commencing and conducting court actions for 
the protection of collective interests of consumers.61 In addition, the practice of courts 
has been largely shaped by the recent, foreign currency loans crisis. Finally, the report 
now discusses the provisions of the Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code of Hungary62 that 
overtook the regulation of unfair contract terms from Act VI of 1959 on the Civil Code 
of Hungary63 with minor changes, and therefore the earlier case-law remains 
relevant.64 
The interviews with stakeholders and the literature suggest that the principles based 
approach works well in practice. 
A stakeholder has particularly noted that in the aftermath of the Hungarian foreign 
currency denominated loans crisis, the principles of civil law, including the principles of 
good faith and significant imbalance are better respected by financial firms than 
before. Previously, economic competition and the absence of societal focus on these 
principles have placed them in the background of firms’ operation.  
The principle based approach in defining contractual rights and obligations has a 
tradition in Hungary. Section 4 paragraph 1 of Act IV of 1959 contained a general 
obligation of good faith and mutual cooperation in performance of contracts (this duty 
is now in Section 1:3 of Act V of 2013). In fact, the principle based approach is 
dominant throughout the Civil Code.65 
61 For example, the National Bank of Hungary and the Consumer Protecton Authority have powers to 
scrutinise unfair terms, this operation will necessarily involve the application of the unfair contract terms 
rules of the Civil Code. However, they are unable to bring final judgments on the fairness of the rules. 
Should the authorities suspect the systemic use of an unfair term, they can only commence a collective 
court action, or use this power to negotiate with businesses to change their terms, as explained below. 
62 2013. évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről. 
63 1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről.  
64 See also Commentary on Section 6:102 in Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end 
of the document). 
65 Introduction in Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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In regard to the above provision, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has succinctly 
summarized the attitude towards general clauses. It has considered general clauses 
necessary and useful because they are able to solve the tension between the static 
nature of the law in force and the changing nature of life situations that it intends to 
regulate. It went as far as considering general clauses more suitable for legal certainty 
than creating a closed list of situations intended to be regulated.66 
General clauses remain important in over-regulated areas of financial services and 
products, given that these only cover the most important rights of consumers and, in 
the aftermath of the mortgage loans crisis, addressed those terms that were the most 
problematic; they are however unable to effectively regulate every possible 
contractual term that would infringe consumers’ interests.67  
Article 3 paragraph 1 is implemented into Section 6:102 paragraph 1. Although the 
importance of general clauses is universally accepted, there seem to be 
inconsistencies in interpreting the relationship of the two general clauses within the 
test of fairness. Historically, legal theory and practice agreed that the requirement of 
good faith and significant imbalance is one, objective criteria, the lack of good faith 
being determined by significant imbalance.68 This means that from the more possible 
interpretations of the UCTD, the most common approach in Hungary isthe option 
where good faith is not an independent criterion within the test of fairness; but good 
faith and significant imbalance are one, integrated criteria. Consequently, significant 
imbalance will also automatically trigger the violation of good faith, or in other words, 
it is sufficient to show the term causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations for it to be considered unfair.69 More recently however, under the influence 
of the CJEU in C-415/11 the Metropolitan Court of Appeal considerd significant 
imbalance and good faith to be separate criterias.70 The implications of this approach 
are that both good faith and significant imbalance have to be proved separately, and 
this adds an extra elemnt of uncertainty in the application of this complex test.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
In Hungary, the indicative list is implemented as a black (Section 6:104, paragraph 1 
of the Civil Code) and a grey list (Section 6:104, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code). Both 
66 Hungarian Constitutional Court, decision no. 801/B/2002, points 3.1. and 3.2. See also decision no. 
55/2001.  
67 Tamás Babai-Belánszky, p. 7 (see literature review at the end of the document) 
68 Judit Fazekas, Development of Hungarian Consumer Protection Law p. 339 (see literature review at the 
end of the document). Municipal Court of Szeged (Szegedi Városi Bíróság), decision no. P. 23 
454/1999/25. See also Szeged Court of Appeal (Szegedi Ítélőtábla, decision no. Gf.I.30.552/2011/3. 
(also reported in BDT no. 2013. 2945.) 
69 The Kúria went as far as to entirely disregard the requirement of good faith in interpreting the test of 
fairness. It considered a term unfair should it cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ obligations to 
the detriment of the consumer. Opinion 2/2012 of the Civil Chamber on the Unfairness of unilateral 
contract modification clauses used by financial firms in consumer credit contracts, point 6 (2/2012 (XII. 
10.) PK vélemény a fogyasztói kölcsönszerződésben pénzügyi intézmény által alkalmazott általános 
szerződési feltételekben szereplő egyoldalú szerződésmódosítási jog tisztességtelenségéről).  
70 According to the Metropolitan Court of Appeal a clause that deviates from the default rules of law to the 
detriment of the consumer causes significant imbalance. In determining whether a clause is contrary to 
good faith it must be looked at whether the business could have reasonably expected from the consumer 
to accept the term if individual negotiations took place. Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), 
decision no. 5.Pf.22.061/2013/4. (also reported in BDT no. 2013. 2945.) 
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types of terms are null and void. The difference between them is that grey listed terms 
are presumed to be unfair giving a chance to a business to prove the opposite, 
whereas black listed terms are considered to be unfair per se.71  
According to stakeholders, the list works well in practice. The black list is more 
frequently applied than the grey list. The black list is easy to apply and is more 
effective in protecting consumers then the grey list, where business have a chance 
and were sometimes successful in the past in rebutting the presumption attached to 
the grey list. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
The effect of court decisions establishing the unfairness of a term has been extended 
to all contracts of a business concerned. The court can scrutinize the fairness of a 
contract term in three distinct situations. First, when the term has been previously 
used. Under Section 6:105 paragraph 2, the court is able to annul the term with a 
(quasi) erga omnes effect, reaching every contract (except those that have already 
been performed) concluded by a particular business (failing to reach contracts using 
the same term drafted by other business entities). Secondly, based on Section 6:105 
paragraph 3, an action may also be taken against a business that has drafted and 
published the particular term but not yet used in practice. The court will issue an order 
to stop the business from using the term in the future. Finally, under Section 6:105 
paragraph 4, an action may also be taken against the business that did not draft or 
use an unfair contract term, but made a public recommendation for its usage, for 
example, when the term has been drafted by professional chambers or 
organizations.72 In this case the court will stop the business entity from using the 
particular term in the future. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
In implementing Article 5 of the UCTD, Hungary went beyond the requirements of the 
UCTD. Section 6:103 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an ambiguity of a 
(standard term or individually not negotiated) term in consumer contracts is a 
sufficient basis for establishing the unfairness of the term. Given that under Section 
6:103 paragraph 3 an unfair term is null and void, a term may be null and void for 
being only non-transparent. 
Current rules in interpreting transparency provisions are shaped by the ruling of the 
CJEU in C-26/13 and the Decision 2/2014 of Kúria that ‘implemented’ that ruling. In 
deciding on whether a contract term transferring the currency risk onto consumers 
was clear and understandable, it must be assessed whether an average consumer 
would have inferred this risk from the content of the contract, and from advertising 
and information provided during the process of contract conclusion. The provision of 
information mandated by sector specific rules and the signing of a declaration that 
revealed the risk, will satisfy the above criteria, until the opposite is proven. The 
burden of proof that the information has been provided is on the financial firm. It may 
happen however that despite the clarity of contract terms, the information received 
71 Commentary to Section 6:104 in Commentary to the Civil Code. 
72 Commentary on the relevant section of the old Civil Code in Complex Jogtár (database ceased to exist). 
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during the process of contract conclusion has mislead a consumer into (falsely) 
believing that the currency risk is not realistic, it is unlikely to happen or that the 
amount of transferrable risk is capped. These circumstances give rise to the unfairness 
of a term in question. However, the burden of proof is on a consumer to show that the 
term of the contract transferring the currency risk onto him or her was not clear and 
understandable due to unsuited information.73 As discussed above, proving oral 
information is very difficult, this condition therefore seems to be harsh on consumers, 
and may jeopardize the overall effectiveness of these rules. 
In an earlier decision, the Kúria has guided lower courts in applying the rules on 
transparency. The Kúria has created an image of an average consumer. An average 
consumer is not an expert in the field in which the contract is concluded, and normally 
fails to understand the use of professional terminology and mathematical formulas. 
The use of specific terms such as EURIBOR is nevertheless not unfair in itself. It is 
imperative however that these terms appear in a transparent structure. Form 
contracts often direct consumers to terms that are in separate documents e.g. special 
standard terms and conditions, or even advertisements; and for an average consumer 
it becomes impossible to ‘track down’ the applicable terms and conditions for its 
contractual relationship with the financial firm. In such cases, a term in question will 
not be transparent. It is also required that terms are presented in a readable sized 
print and simple style.74 
In addition to this protection, the Kúria also expects a certain standard of behaviour 
from the average consumer. It can be expected from consumers to inform themselves 
prior to the conclusion of the contract taking into account the character, the value and 
the associated risks to the transaction. An average consumer must carefully scrutinize 
the applicable standard terms and conditions, and seek additional explanations for the 
terms that are not clear. If necessary, a consumer can ask for additional time to read 
the contract and obtain an opinion of a lawyer.75 Again, here it seems that the court 
places too much burden on consumers, expecting them to read complex contracts 
whereas this is not in line with reality. 
Indeed, a representative of a consumer protection organization highlighted courts are 
not well ‘tuned into’ consumer disputes. They start from the traditional freedom of 
contract approachpresuming that contracts have been read and understood. Public 
authorities seem to have a similar approach. A representative of a public authority 
highlighted that it works with the concept of an average consumer, and it is assumed, 
an average consumer has read the content of standard terms and conditions before 
concluding an individual contract with a provider, that are based on standard terms 
and conditions. This fiction applies even if everyone knows consumers fail to read 
standard terms and conditions. 
A representative of a public authority asserted that although authorities work with the 
concept of average consumer, in reality there are more categories of consumers that 
require a different level and quantity of information. A basic need of one category is 
too much or too complex information for the other category. A one size fits all solution 
will not make information provision effective. In the practice of a public authority, 
consumers could be divided onto: 1) disinterested consumers (representing around 
50-60% of the consumer population) that care about the price only. This category 
should be subject to a high level of protection that could be achieved by preventive 
control of standard terms and conditions i.e. the scrutiny of standard terms before 
they would be used; 2) informed consumers (around 35%) that are interested in 
obtaining detailed information to compare offers and make an informed decision; 3) 
expert consumers (around 2-3%) that know more about some (technical) features of 
a product or service than the provider of a service itself. These consumers are 
73 Kúria, Decision no 2/2014 for the unification of civil law (Polgrái Jogegységi Határozat), point 3. 
74 Kúria, Opinion no 2/2012, point 6 (see above the full title); see also Appellate Court of Szeged (Szegedi 
Ítélőtábla), decision no. Pf. II. 20 486/2012 (reported in BDT no. 2013. 2889). 
75 Ibid. 
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interested to be informed but need a different kind of information than the above 
category.  
There is no evidence that a term has been declared unfair only because it was not 
transparent. There is however evidence that courts (and the parties) fail to refer to 
transparency requirements as a reason for nullity. According to the Metropolitan Court 
of Appeal breaching an obligation to inform mandated by sector specific rules will 
result in a breach of contact based on those sector specific rules, or the information 
relates to an essential circumstance of the contract conclusion or element of the 
contract will make the contract voidable under the general rules of the Civil Code, and 
will not make the contract null and void. Here the court failed to see that the absence 
of information may trigger the operation of transparency rules of unfair contract terms 
and the special regime of nullity of contract terms/contracts.76  
Drawing a general conclusion from what has been said above, there seem to be many 
obstacles that can hinder the effectiveness of transparency rules in Hungary.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Hungary did not extend the test of fairness to price or main subject matter terms as 
per Article 4 paragraph 2 of the UCTD (in Section 6:102 paragraph 3 of the Civil 
Code). As to the individual negotiated terms exemption, this also was followed in 
Hungary. So, the test of fairness (as will be explained below) is applicable to standard 
terms in both B2C and B2B context (Section 6:102 of the Civil Code). Although the 
applicability of the test of fairness is extended in consumer contracts beyond standard 
terms, it only reaches terms that were not individually negotiated (and does not go as 
far as individually negotiated terms) in Section 6:103 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Under Section 6:103 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code an unfair contract term in a 
consumer contract is null and void. This is a special rule for consumer contracts, as 
opposed to the general rule for B2B contracts that the use of unfair terms makes the 
contract voidable (Section 6:102 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code).  
According to the Metropolitan Court of Appeal an unfair term is not binding. This is a 
special consequence of nullity based on EU law. Consumers become free from any 
obligation conferred upon them by an unfair term, the obligation becomes non-
existent, null because of its content.77 However, it is likely that declaring the term 
non-existent will not always or at least not entirely satisfy consumer needs. 
Consumers should also be able to rely on the general rules on consequences of nullity. 
Under the general rules the consequences of nullity are, upon the parties’ request, 
restitution in integrum (Section 6:112 of the Civil Code) or validation of the contract 
(Section 6:111 of the Civil Code). Courts will not determine the consequences of their 
own motion, but the parties must be precise in putting forward their request, for 
example, they have to specify the amount of money they wish to be repaid. However, 
courts are not bound by the parties’ requests and may order a different 
76 Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 6. Pf. 20 353/2013/4 (reported in BDT no. 
2014.3097). 
77 Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 5. Pf. 21 456/2013/5 (reported in BDT no. 
2014.3058). 
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consequence.78 In the absence of a parties’ request, courts will order damages 
compensation based on the rules of unjust enrichment.79  
According to the general rules, an unfair term is void from the moment of its supposed 
conclusion, i.e. ex tunc (Section 6:88 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). In theory no 
court process is necessary for establishing the consequences of nullity (Section 6:88 
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). However, in practice, if the business disputes the 
fairness of a term, courts have to make justice between the parties.  
An unfair term will be removed from the contract whereas the rest continues in 
operation. In consumer contracts, an unfair clause will bring down the entire contract 
only if performance is impossible without the clause in question (Section 6:114 
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code).  
According to the general rules on nullity, courts observe nullity ex officio (Section 6:88 
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code). In 2005 the Kúria (then the Supreme Court) issued an 
opinion that clarified the relationship of ex officio ruling with the traditional, civil 
procedure rules that place procedural (and substantive) initiatives in the parties’ 
hands.80 In 2010 the Kúria has issued a new opinion further clarifying procedural 
issues in ex officio ruling. According to this opinion, courts are obliged to inform the 
parties that they have noticed a reason for nullity, instructing the parties to provide 
the necessary evidence and giving the parties an opportunity to express their views on 
these. The Kúria has specially clarified that ex officio ruling is only possible based on 
the evidence provided by the parties; courts cannot collect evidence ex officio due to 
Section 164 paragraph 2 of Act III of 195281 on civil procedure.82 Should the first 
instance court fail to rule on nullity ex officio, the obligation will transfer onto the 
second instance court; however, second instance courts are only obliged to proceed on 
their own motion if the information supplied in the first instance procedure is sufficient 
to determine the existence of nullity without a doubt, or if other procedural rules allow 
for the evaluation of the new facts or evidence that emerged following the first 
instance process.83 It can therefore be seen that the lack of available information may 
present an obstacle for courts to scrutinize the fairness of terms on their own motion. 
This may be used by courts to justify their lack of initiative in scrutinizing fairness.  
Indeed, the ‘first generation’ case law on consumer loans denominated in foreign 
currency mostly relied on ‘traditional’ contract law principles of usury, immorality, 
mistake, etc., failing to invoke the fairness of contract terms by both parties (and their 
lawyers) and the courts.84 Before 2012, there was only one case where the court 
scrutinized the fairness of the terms of the contract ex officio (out of 53 relevant 
cases).85 Subsequently however there are successful ex officio rulings. In BDT 
2014.3097 for example, the Metropolitan Court of Appeal scrutinized the fairness of 
those terms that the parties failed to notice, finding a basis for this obligation in Article 
6 paragraph 1 of the UCTD and in CJEU’s ruling in C-397/11. It seems however that 
good examples such as the above are rare. According to stakeholders, courts normally 
refuse to rule on fairness of contract terms on their own motion, contemplating that 
the reason for this refusal may be because the Civil Code does not specially attribute 
this obligation to unfair contract terms. As mentioned above, the Civil Code only 
provides that an unfair term is null and void, without specially referring to the ex 
officio obligation of a court to scrutinize this nullity, this obligation is placed elsewhere 
78 Kúria, Opinion no. 2/2010, point 2 (see full title above). 
79 See on the new system of remedies introduced by the new Civil Code in György Wellman (see literature 
review at the end of the document). 
80 Kúria, Opinion no 1/2005 on the ex officio procedure to be followed in ruling on the reasons for 
nullity (1/2005. (VI.15.) PK vélemény a semmisségi ok hivatalbóli észlelése kapcsán követendő 
eljárásról). 
81 Kúria, Opinion no. 1/2010 on consequences of nullity (1/2010. (VI.28.) PK vélemény az érvenytelenség 
jogkövetkezményeiről), point 4. 
82 1952. évi III. tőrvény a polgári perrendtartásról . 
83 Ibid. 
84 Mónika Józon, Country report for Hungary, p. 89-90 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
85 The Kúria’s Case-Law Assessement Group, p. 7 (see literature review at the end of the document).  
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in the Civil Code. In addition, unfair terms in consumer contracts end in the so called 
‘relative nullity’, i.e. nullity than can only be invoked in the interest of consumers 
(Section 6:103 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code). As with general nullity, this ‘type’ 
should also be observed ex officio by courts,86 however, the word ‘invoked’ might be 
also interpreted as needing to have at least some activity of a party in alerting the 
court.87 Although it can be seen that there is an obvious need for a statutory mandate 
for courts to rule on the fairness of the terms of the contract ex officio, this 
opportunity has been missed by the drafters of the new Civil Code.88 
Generally, an unfair term is removed from the contract and cannot be replaced. 
However, there are also opinions that following the ruling of CJEU in C-26/13 courts 
are able to replace the unfair term with default rules of a law.89 Interpreting the 
CJEU’s particular ruling, the Kúria in its 2/2014 Decision has not mentioned this 
possibility. At another opportunity however the Kúria has not ruled out the possibility 
for courts to modify the terms of individual contracts following an unfair term and 
changed circumstances, and applying the general rules of contract modification by 
courts under Section 6:192 of the Civil Code.90 
As already mentioned, enforcement of the UCTD is only in the hands of courts, and 
therefore an administrative remedy is not available for consumers. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
In Hungary there are no special, formal requirements as to the readability of standard 
terms (statutory protection only extends to substantive matters).91 According to the 
stakeholders, the very small print is abolished, and although letters could be larger 
this will not induce consumers to read contracts. Stakeholders highlighted the general 
problem that consumers do not read their contracts, this partially being due to the 
length and complexity of contracts. As a solution, a stakeholder suggested terms 
applicable for a particular transactional relationship should be extracted from the 
generally applicable standard terms and conditions or they should be specially 
highlighted and/or explained to the consumer in question (this could be one of the 
tasks of a consumer protection rapporteur, as explained above).  
A stakeholder highlighted the practical usefulness of comparative tables, web-sites 
that compare the key features of a contract (going beyond comparing the price only).  
Stakeholders noted the good practice of administrative control of the fairness of 
standard terms and conditions. Based on its power to commence public interest court 
actions under Section 6:105 of the Civil Code, the Hungarian National Bank has 
recently reviewed the fairness of standard terms and conditions of contracts for 
86 In Hungary, null contracts (érvénytelen szerződések) are divided onto void (semmis) and voidable 
(megtámadható) contracts, void contracts are further divided onto absolutely void (semmis) and 
relatively void contracts (relatív semmisség). Relatively void contracts are similar to voidable contracts 
because voidity can be invoked only in the interest of one contractual party, but they are a special case of 
void contracts, as voidity is observed ex officio without limitation period.  
87 Commentary on Section 6:103 in Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end of the 
document). 
88 This approach is in line with the general approach taken in drafting the appropriate sections on unfair 
contract terms of the new Civil Code that largely overtook the solutions from the 1959 Civil Code, failing 
to take into account the lessons learned from the case-law of the CJEU and from the case-law of domestic 
courts. See 1Józon Mónika, Hungary, p. 167 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
89 Commnetary on Section 6:104 in Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end of the 
document). Also Katalin Szeghő, p. 9 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
90 Kúria, Decision no. 6/2013 for the unification of civil law (6/2013. számú Polgrái Jogegységi Határozat), 
point 7. 
91 Hungary did not act upon EU recommendations in regard to the size of the print. 
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vehicle financing, and recommended the necessary changes, affecting around 150 000 
contracts.92 
The foreign currency denominated loans crisis has showed the importance of 
regulating the effect of changed circumstances onto the validity of contract terms. The 
majority of disputes arose in regard to loans indexed in foreign currency, where 
following changes on money markets, consumers’ monthly instalments have changed 
significantly from what they have anticipated at the time of contract conclusion. The 
relevant provisions from the Annex of the UCTD have been implemented into Section 
6:104 paragraph 2 subparagraph d) making a unilateral modification without a valid 
reason unfair, and making a unilateral modification with a valid reason unfair provided 
a consumer is not granted a right of withdrawal. In addition, sector specific rules 
mandate that the contract contains an objective ‘list of reasons’ (‘ok lista’) for 
modification, as a pre-condition for unilateral contract modification.93 Given the 
complexity of the rules and the importance of the question in addressing consumer 
detriment, the Kúria has developed guiding principles for deciding on the fairness of 
these terms. Clauses modifying the interest, fees and charges are unfair if they fail to 
adhere to one following principles:1) their content is not clear and understandable for 
the consumer (the principle of clear and understandable language); 2) the conditions 
for modification are not objective, the business can influence their occurrence (the 
principle of objectivity); 3) a consumer could not foresee the conditions and the extent 
of modification (the principle of foreseeability); 4) a consumer is not guaranteed the 
right of withdrawal following the modification (the principle of withdrawability); 5) 
they take away the possibility  to modify the terms of the contract in favour of a 
consumer (the principle of symmetry); 6) the ‘list of reasons’ for modification is 
missing or is not exhaustive94 (the principle of exhaustive determination); 7) the 
conditions on the list are not relevant as they entirely or partially fail to influence the 
interest, fees and charges (the principle of reality and proportionality). 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems? Please provide examples, if relevant] 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
As mentioned above, Hungarian businesses have very little experience with operating 
on the internal market, it is impossible therefore to estimate the effect of the above 
rules on cross-border trade.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
92 Tamás Babai-Belánszky 
93 Kúria, Opinion no. 2/2012, point 6 (see full title above). 
94 The list must be exhaustive and contain only objective reasons, but the financial firm maintains a 
discretion to determining the precise content of the list. 
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• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Stakeholders asserted that a need to provide a higher degree of protection to SMEs 
with regard to unfair contract terms exists. Given that around 99% of businesses are 
SMEs in Hungary, a differentiated approach that would provide more stringent 
protection to micro-enterprises would also be desirable. A stakeholder noted however 
that extending consumer protection rules may not be the most desirable solution 
given that B2B transactions are about different products that raise different problems 
than B2C transactions. Stakeholders agreed that there is no need to extend the rules 
onto large businesses where free competition should prevail. Despite these points of 
view, Hungary extended the application of the UCTD onto standard terms in B2B 
transactions, without differentiating between the size of businesses, as explained 
below. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Key provisions of the UCTD are implemented without differentiating between B2B and 
B2C transactions.95 Section 6:102 of the Civil Code regulates unfair standard contract 
terms. Paragraph 1 implements the general test of fairness in Article 3 paragraph 1 of 
the UCTD. Section 2 implements Article 4 paragraph 1. Section 3 implements Article 4 
paragraph 2. Section 4 implements Article 1 paragraph 2. 
The rules on unfair contract terms are extended to B2B transactions without 
differentiating between the size of businesses in the level of protection provided 
(although as shown above this would have been desirable).  
Although the key rules are extended to B2B contracts, the standard of protection is 
somewhat lower than in B2C contracts. The regulation of unfair terms in B2B contacts 
is limited to standard terms, and is not extended to individually not negotiated terms, 
the extension of which is only applicable for consumer contracts. While unfair terms in 
B2C contracts are null and void, unfair terms in B2B contracts are avoidable (Section 
6:102 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code). The black and grey lists are only applicable to 
B2C contracts (see below). 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
The black and grey lists in Section 6:104 of the Civil Code are only applicable for B2C 
contracts. Business representatives had no suggestions on specific terms that would 
deserve to be black or grey listed in B2B contracts. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
According to a stakeholder the rules are likely to encourage SMEs for cross-border 
trade. 
95 Commentary on Section 6:102 in Commentary on the Civil Code (see literature review at the end of the 
document). 
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• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
As said above, despite the opinion of stakeholders that the unfair contract terms rules 
should not be extended onto transactions between large businesses, the current rules 
in the Civil Code does not differentiate between the sizes of businesses and is equally 
applicable to all B2B transactions. However, this extension does not seem to have 
shown any negative practical consequence so far. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?  
Before answering the questions, it is worth noting that it is difficult to estimate the 
exact reach of the ID in reducing consumer detriment. The ID is implemented as part 
of a wider regulation of collective court actions and administrative enforcement, to an 
extent that for example Section 38 of the CPA has 8 paragraphs out of which Sections 
6 to 8 implement the ID. These provisions are not ‘free standing’. They provide for 
example for the publication of judgments, building on the previous sections that define 
the procedure.  It is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementing 
provisions alone because of the inseparable link between those and the broader 
context of the procedures in which they operate. The report therefore evaluates the 
wider context in which these provisions operate. However, the wider context itself is 
complex given that there are two types of collective court actions (see below); and 
that the ID has been implemented as being part of both court and administrative 
processes. In addition, injunctions (as part of court and administrative processes) are 
foreseen by several acts that do not seem to implement the ID. Given that in the eyes 
of stakeholders no difference is made between the origin of the rules, the report refers 
to all injunctions procedures relevant for the Directives under scrutiny. 
Injunctions as court processes are not very effective in providing a high level of 
consumer protection, as hardly any cases go to court. Consumer organizations on 
average commence 4-5 disputes per year, and the number is even lower for public 
authorities. Stakeholders noted that the effect of these actions is not noticeable on the 
reduction in the number of disputes. Consumers themselves contribute to the low 
effectiveness of injunctions on the reduction of consumer detriment by refraining to 
enforce their rights. In the well-known ‘yellow cheque’ case,96 according to a 
stakeholder, only around 5% of consumers claimed compensation from the company.  
Injunctions are more effective as preventive tools. Public authorities resolve most 
cases by negotiation, with the threat of the injunction in the background. Based on 
Section 45/B of Act CLV of 1997 the Consumer Protection Authority frequently controls 
the fairness of standard terms and conditions but it resolves around 90% of disputes 
by negotiation (around 15-20 per year), and takes only 1-2 per year to court. It is 
successful even with large businesses, such as Wizz Air, where the company agreed to 
make changes in its standard terms and conditions and conditions governing its 
96 In this case a mobile phone company unfairly charged consumers in various ways including by imposing a 
special charge on payments done in post offices by yellow cheques – the so called yellow cheque case. 
The company imposed a charge although the method of payment in question did not actually cost 
anything for the company neither did it provide a separate service for the charge. Metropolitan Court of 
Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 14. Gf. 40.605/2013/7. 
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complaints procedure.97 The Hungarian National Bank had a similar positive 
experience with the financial firms changing their standard terms and conditions 
following its notice in vehicle financing contracts (as explained above). Consumer 
protection organizations also experienced the positive response from businesses. 
Online shops have modified their standard terms and conditions following the 
commencement of injunctions procedures. They have negotiated with the organization 
after they have received the claim, and modified their terms before the end of the 
process.  
Injunctions within administrative processes are more effective then court actions in 
preventing consumer detriment. Public authorities are empowered to issue cease and 
desist orders (based on e.g. Section 88 paragraph 1 of the Act CXXXIX of 2013, 
Section 47 paragraphs 1 subparagraphs a) and b) of Act CLV of 1997, Section 76 
paragraph 1 subparagraph f) and g) of Act LVII of 1996, and Section 16/D of Act CVII 
of 2001 on electronic commercial services, and on some issues connected to 
information society services).98 Stakeholders agreed, the success of these actions is 
largely due to the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by public authorities. Namely, 
the success of sanctions imposed in a court action depends on consumers. Depending 
on the type of action (as will be discussed below), in order to get compensation, 
consumers either have to turn to the business in question or commence a separate 
court enforcement action. Given that Hungarian consumers are normally passive and 
rarely claim compensation, even large court actions may not affect the businesses 
balance sheet. Sanctions targeting the reputation of the business are less effective, 
given that Hungarian businesses care less about their reputation than their 
counterparts in some other Member States (as discussed above). Apart from publicity, 
public authorities have a power to impose (large) fines. In the practice of the 
authorities, injunctions orders are usually imposed together with fines, and these are 
effective in shaping future behaviour. In addition, according to a representative of a 
consumer protection organization, it is easier for these organizations to proceed 
infront of administrative authorities, the process is simpler and cheaper than infront of 
the court.  
Court actions may follow administrative actions (in case of public interest 
enforcement, a type of court action for the protection of collective interests of 
consumers as will be explained below). However, the Kúria has noted that court 
actions are only justified if they are to serve a preventive role. If a business has 
already complied with the administrative decision and the infringement has not 
harmed a large number of consumers under Section 39 paragraph 1 of Act CLV of 
1997, the administrative sanction is sufficient. The public interest element is not 
fulfilled and the court action is not justified.99 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Measures regarding the cost of procedure, i.e. relief from court fees for consumer 
protection organizations; the erga omnes effect of judgments; the possibility to order 
damages compensation or specific performance in a court process. The possibility to 
join fines with injunctions orders in an administrative process. 
 
97 See press release on agreement reached with Wizz Air at: http://www.nfh.hu/node/13640 
98 2001. évi CVII. törvény az elektronikus kereskedelmi szolgálltatások, valamint az információs     
társadalommal összefüggő szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiről. 
99 Kúria (then Supreme Court), decision no. Pfv. VIII. 21.007/2008 (reported in BH no. 2009.246). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
536
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Court actions can be used for the protection of consumers in various situations and 
the legal base are set very broadly, including a ‘catch all’ provision enabling the public 
prosecutor and consumer protection organizations to commence actions in regard to 
any matter that falls under the competence of courts: 
• Public interest actions can be submitted against the use of unfair contract terms 
based on Section 6:105 the Civil Code;  
• Public interest enforcement can be commenced following anti-competitive 
agreements and practices that harmed consumers based on Section 92 of the Act 
LVII of 1996; 
• Based on Section 45/A paragraphs 1 to 3 in connection with Section 81 paragraph 
1 of Act CLV of 1997 public interest enforcement can be commenced following the 
administrative decision of the Consumer Protection Authority establishing the 
infringement of a wide range of consumer protection rules, i.e. distribution and 
the provision of services; protection of children and minor consumers; consumer 
credit groups; in relation to the operation of complaint handling, customers 
services or consumer protection rapporteur; the business entities information 
obligation related to the consumers’ right to resolve their disputes infront of 
Consumer Arbitration Boards, and the business entities obligation to participate in 
the ADR process upon the initiation of the consumer (so called obligation to 
cooperate with the consumer – együttműködési kötelezettség); unfair commercial 
practices; marketing of goods; quality, composition and packaging of goods; 
measurement of goods on sale or intended for sale, government or other 
regulated price; guarantee and warranty rights; equal treatment in marketing 
goods or services; information of consumers. Public interest actions can be 
commenced in regard to any subject matter that falls under the competence of 
the courts, based on Section 39 paragraph 1 of Act CLV of 1997; 
• For unfair contract terms, commercial practices and any other infringement of 
consumer’s rights connected to financial services and products based on Section 
164 of the Act CXXXIX of 2013. 
In the absence of a ‘catch all’ provision, the legal basis for commencing administrative 
processes are limited to the competence of the public authorities in question (the 
Consumer Protection Authority, the Competition Authority, the National Bank of 
Hungary as explained above, and the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority for infringements in the area of media and electronic communications). 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Court actions foreseen by Act CLV of 1997 have been significantly reformed in 2012 
with Act LV of 2012,100 which introduced the differentiation between the two types of 
court actions. The aim of the reform was to increase the usage of court actions by 
aligning the provisions of the Act CLV of 1997 with other acts allowing for court 
actions. This meant clarifying the powers of the court in terms of determining the 
content of the final award, easing the burden of proof and making enforcement of the 
judgment easier.101 Although this made the legal rules clearer, according to all 
stakeholders, the effect on the increase of claims is not visible. 
Injunction procedures as court procedures are subject to a number of obstacles:  
Consumer protection organizations highlighted the following obstacles:  
100 Act LV of 2012 on amendments to Act CLV of 1997 on the protection of consumers (2012. évi LV. 
törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről szóló 1997. évi CLV. törvény módosításáról). 
101 Explanatory notes on Section 39 Act CLV of 1997 in Új Jogtár. 
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• Obstacles created by the absence of funding. Consumer protection organizations 
struggle with funding. Although they are exempted from paying court fees (under 
Section 5 paragraph 1 subparagraph b of Act XCIII of 1990 on Fees), lawyer’s 
fees have to be covered and legal representation is mandatory. Disputes can last 
up to 3-4 years and generate such an expense that can force the organization into 
bankruptcy (under Section 78 paragraph 1 of Act III of 1952 the loser bear the 
costs of the parties). The more expensive (and expert) the lawyer is that 
represents the business entity, the more of a deterrent it is for consumer 
organizations to proceed (a representative of a consumer protection organization 
gave an example of withdrawal of claim upon the contemplation of the expertise 
and expenses of the business’ lawyer). The majority of consumer organizations 
are funded by the state on yearly basis. The funding is constantly decreasing and 
there is no targeted funding available for financing court actions; 
• Obstacles created by the lack of expertise. The problem of covering lawyers’ fees 
could be overcome by employing qualified lawyers able to represent the 
organization in a court action, however, consumer protection organizations lack 
sufficient resources to make working in the organizations attractive for experts; 
• Obstacles created by attitude. Representatives of government highlighted 
although the funding of organizations is constantly decreasing, consumer 
protection organizations should take steps to become self-sufficient instead of 
waiting for government funding. It should also be noted that a representative of a 
consumer protection organization stated that collective court actions are not 
necessary when there is an administrative decision on which consumers can rely 
on, as ‘consumers will know what to do’; 
• Obstacles in informing/mobilizing consumers. Collective court actions are in part 
unsuccessful in reducing consumer detriment because consumers are not 
informed of their right to claim compensation. In the absence of sufficient media 
attention, and given the apparent ineffectiveness of publication of judgments, 
consumer protection organizations should conduct information campaigns to 
communicate the results of court actions, however, they lack sufficient funding. 
 
Public authorities face the following obstacles: 
• Problem with competence. The National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
lacks competence to file court actions for the protection of consumers’ collective 
interests. The National Consumer Protection Authority lacks competence for the 
protection of consumers’ contractual interests and finds it sometimes challenging 
to draw an often artificial line between an unfair commercial practice and an unfair 
contract term; 
• Problem with informing/mobilizing consumers. Following a successful court action, 
stakeholders do not have the necessary tools to find and mobilize affected 
consumers, to organize information campaigns on how consumers can claim 
compensation; 
• Procedural obstacles. Stakeholders highlighted the difficulty in providing evidence 
that an unfair commercial practice has taken place or in identifying the circle of 
affected consumers (for public interest enforcement), or the amount of damages 
suffered (for public interest enforcement); 
• Problems created by institutional uncertainty. Representatives of public authorities 
highlighted that constant reorganization within the Consumer Protection Authority 
makes cooperation more difficult; 
• Problems created by capacity. A government official noted that the Consumer 
Protection Authority had previously a department for collective court enforcement 
that is now abolished. 
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It should be noted that the Act III of 1952 is currently under revision.102 Measures will 
be introduced to enhance the effectiveness of collective court dispute resolution, by 
laying down framework rules for public interest actions and introducing group actions. 
Group actions will enable the joinder of claims based on the consent of claimants 
(using the opt-in model) rather than public interest.103 At the moment, there is no 
reference to collective court actions in this act. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Stakeholders agreed that the Annex should be updated, suggesting that it could be 
aligned with the annex attached to Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation, or by periodically asking Member States for their experience in using the 
ID. 
In Hungary, collective court actions are extended for the protection of business 
interest. Section 6:106 of the Civil Code empowers organizations representing the 
interests of businesses to commence public interest actions for the protection of 
collective interests of their members. There is little information however on the 
practical usefulness of this provision. Stakeholders could not recall that is has ever 
been used during the 2 years of its existence. According to a business representative 
this is because commercial chambers are not prepared to take up such complex 
disputes, as they do not have the necessary legal expertise and experience. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country? 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Stakeholders could not come up with an example. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Stakeholders asserted that cross-border injunctions seem very unlikely in practice. 
This aim could be achieved by raising the capacity of consumer protection 
organizations, i.e. targeted funding of collective court actions and relieving consumer 
protection organizations from mandatory legal representation. 
A representative of a business suggested that in return for increased funding, the 
government should define the tasks of consumer protection organizations and monitor 
their efficiency in achieving these. An EU level recommendation is also plausible, 
102 T-11900 törvényjavaslat a polgári perrendtartásról. 
103 Wopera Zsuzsa (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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specifying the role of consumer protection organizations in achieving the goals of EU 
consumer protection policy.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
There is no special act that implements the ID. Its provisions are scattered in several 
legal acts that contain separate sections on injunctions procedures e.g. Sections 37-38 
of the Act CLV of 1997; Section 164 of the Act CXXXIX of 2013, Section 92 of Act LVII 
of 1996. Injunctions procedures against the use of unfair contract terms is regulated 
separately, it is placed in Section 6:105 of the Civil Code. This provision however does 
not implement the ID (see Section 8:6 of the Civil Code). Injunctions against unfair 
contract terms are therefore not separated from the enforcement procedure envisaged 
by Article 7 of the UCTD. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The distinctive feature of injunctions as a court process is that there are two types of 
court actions in Hungary. One could be translated as public interest action (közérdekű 
kereset) and the other as public interest enforcement (közérdekű igényérvényesítés). 
The difference between the two is that the latter can only be commenced if there is a 
prior administrative decision that has established the infringement. 
Public interest actions are regulated by Section 6:105 of the Civil Code and Section 39 
of Act CLV of 1997104. The Civil Code empowers the court to scrutinize the fairness of 
a contract term in three distinct situations (as explained above), and these processes 
are pure injunctions, their result being the cessation of current use and desisting from 
future use of the unfair term. They end with a declaratory judgment, and any 
damages claim would have to be realized in a subsequent and separate court process. 
Public interest actions are somewhat different under Section 39 of Act CLV of 1997. 
These actions can be commenced against business an infringement that has harmed a 
large, identifiable group of consumers, whose personal identity is not known, or that 
has caused significant disadvantage, provided the matter falls under the courts’ 
competence (paragraph 1). The process ends with a declaratory judgment establishing 
the infringement (without ordering to stop the infringement). In this case consumers 
would have to realize their damages claim in a separate process, only needing to 
prove the causal link between the infringement and their damages. In addition, the 
process can also end with a cease and desist order alone or with a case order 
accompanied with a restitution order, which is an order to restore the situation to the 
way it was prior to the infringement (paragraph 3). Alternatively, under Section 38 
paragraph 3 the process may also include a claim for damages or specific performance 
provided the amount of damages or the content of the performance can be clearly 
determined at the time of submission in general terms, i.e. without having regard to 
individual circumstances of every consumer.  
104 Section 164 paragraph 9 of Act CXXXIX of 2013 also makes reference to public interest actions in the 
Civil Code. 
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The other type of collective actions is public interest enforcement, possible under 
Section 38 of Act CLV of 1997, Section 164 Act CXXXIX of 2013 and Section 92 Act 
LVII of 1996. These actions are conditioned upon the prior administrative process that 
has established the infringement, and a large number of consumers being affected by 
the infringement the circle of which can be determined at the time of submitting the 
claim. One option is to ask for a declaratory judgment that determines an 
infringement has occurred (without ordering to stop the infringement). The court will 
then identify the group of consumers affected by the judgment. Any injured consumer 
within the group may submit a separate claim for damages, only needing to prove the 
causal link between the infringement and damage and the amount of damages 
suffered. In addition to asking for an injunction, enforcement authorities can also seek 
damages or specific performance of the outstanding contractual obligation, provided 
the amount of damages or the content of specific performance is determinable 
(Section 164 paragraphs 3-4 Act CXXXIX of 2013, Section 38 paragraph 3 of Act CLV 
of 1997, Section 92 paragraph 4 of Act LVII of 1996). Businesses must voluntarily 
comply with the award of damages or specific performance in the absence of which 
affected consumers may ask the court to enforce the judgment.105 
There are no special measures foreseen to secure the coherence of the regime. 
Coherence is only ensured by, on the one hand, the division of competences between 
the administrative authorities, qualified entities, and by the subject matter on the 
other hand. Unfair contract terms are only actionable based on the Civil Code; any 
infringements of consumer rights connected to financial services are within the 
competence of the National Bank (including unfair contract terms); anything 
connected to infringing the rules on fair competition are within the competence of the 
Competition Authority, infringements in the area of media and electronic 
communications within the competence of the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority (only administrative actions) and anything else is in the competence of the 
Consumer Protection Authority. Although competences are nicely divided between 
public authorities and qualified entities (there are also well-working MoUs between 
them as shown above), and according to the stakeholders there are no problems in 
practice, a clash of competences is possible given that the list of qualified entities is 
much broader than public authorities. In addition to these, based on Section 6:105 of 
the Civil Code, court actions can also be conducted by the public prosecutor, the 
minister, or the head of any autonomous government authority, government office or 
central office, the head of the Budapest and county government offices, and 
professional chambers and organizations. Court actions are apparently foreseen as a 
task of consumer protection organizations, as these are empowered to commence 
court actions by all relevant acts expect for Act LVII of 1996. In theory therefore 
collective actions could be commenced at the same time by more enforcement 
authorities, however, in practice this is unlikely to happen given the scarcity of these 
actions.  
Injunctions procedures go beyond the ID in two ways. Section 6:105 of the Civil Code 
attributes a quasi erga omnes effect to judgments on unfair terms, the annulment of 
the unfair terms reaches every contract between a particular business and its clients 
(except those that have already been performed). In actions other than those 
regarding unfair terms, the court will determine the circle of consumers that is 
affected by the judgment (Section 164 paragraphs 3-4 Act CXXXIX of 2013, Section 
38 paragraph 3 of Act CLV of 1997, Section 92 paragraph 4 of Act LVII of 1996). 
Second, the court can directly remedy consumers in both types of collective actions 
whether through ordering specific performance or compensation.  
 
105 Explanatory notes on Section 39 Act CLV of 1997 in Új Jogtár. 
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1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
Administrative procedures 
Costs for consumers in exercising their rights in front of public authorities in enforcing 
the UCPD does not in general limit their benefits given that administrative procedures 
are free of charge or trigger minimal costs. 
Costs of procedures are regulated by Act XCIII of 1990 on Fees.106 As a general rule, 
first instance administrative process costs HUF 3000 [approx. EUR 10]. The cost of the 
second instance process depends on the value of the claim, but it triggers the 
minimum cost of HUF 5000 [approx. EUR 16] (Section 29 paragraph 1). By way of an 
exception, first instance procedures infront of the Consumer Protection Authority are 
free of charge (Section 33 Paragraph 35) and so is the process infront of the National 
Bank (Section 33 Paragraph 34). However, the costs of any legal representation are to 
be covered by a consumer. Cost waivers and legal aid are available under the general 
rules (explained below). 
The first instance process infront of the Competition Authority starts ex officio upon a 
consumer complaint or notification, and is free of charge for the consumer (Section 
62/B paragraph 2 of Act LVII of 1996). However, should the consumer be unsatisfied 
with the outcome of the process, the second instance process is conducted in front of 
a court, where the court fees (explained below) are applicable.  
Court process 
The costs of commencing individual court processes for enforcing their rights under 
the UCPD and the UCTD may deter consumers from taking actions.  
There are no specialized court fees or tariffs for consumer disputes; the general rules 
under Act XCIII of 1990 apply. The fee of a court process is 6% of the value of the 
claim, however it is a minimum HUF 15 000 [approx. EUR 48] or maximum 
HUF 1 500 000 [approx. EUR 4 843]. Very small value claims will therefore trigger the 
minimum amount of HUF 15 000 [approx. EUR 48] that may go (well) beyond the 
value of the claim.  
In addition to these, parties may also engage lawyers, although lawyers’ fees are 
often disproportionality high compared to the value of the dispute.107 A representative 
of a consumer protection organization noted that lawyers rarely specialize in consumer 
law, and those that do may be reluctant to accept small value cases (it is therefore 
challenging to find the lawyer in the first place). 
The general rule is that the costs of a court procedure are born by the losing party in 
the procedure (Section 78 of Act III of 1952), equally applies in consumer disputes. 
Consumers in hardship are eligible for cost waivers and for legal aid also under the 
general rules.  
106 1990. évi XCIII. törvény az illetékekről. 
107 There are no pre-set tariffs for lawyers’ fees, the final amount of which is subject to mutual agreement. 
Lawyers may charge a lump sum of first consultation fee, charge and hourly rate, charge by hearings or 
in percentage from the value of the dispute. The recommendation of the Lawyers Association for the 
hourly rate is between HUF 15 000 to 30 000 [approx. EUR 48 – 97], 
http://www.irinkov.hu/hu/koltsegek.html. First consultation fees may be as high as HUF 40 000 [approx. 
EUR 130] http://www.ugyvedipraxis.hu/ugyvedi-munkadij, fees for disputes for the annulment of 
contracts is 10% from the value of disputes that includes representations at 2 hearings, any subsequent 
hearings cost HUF 30 000 [approx. EUR 97]. See for more: http://www.ugyvedek.net/ugyvedi-dijszabas 
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Cost waivers are available in relation to fees, costs of expert witness, lawyers’ fees, 
etc. Relief may be full or partial, however, full waiver is granted exceptionally, only if 
the consumer would be unable to participate in the court process with a partial waiver 
(Section 84 Act III of 1952). Legal aid is regulated by Act LXXX of 2003 on Legal 
Aid.108 This Act lays down the conditions of obtaining legal aid connected to the 
conduct of civil procedure and to drafting documents and the provision of legal advice 
(activities outside the legal proceeding). Legal aid is available, inter alia, for: covering 
lawyers’ fees (Section 11); drafting submissions and drafting other documents and for 
the provision of legal advice related to settling the dispute out of court; advice or 
drafting documents in an administrative procedure; advice on the most suitable 
procedure for the enforcement of rights an obtaining redress (including administrative, 
court and out-of-court procedures) (Section 3 paragraph 1).  
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In enforcing their rights under the UCTD consumers may also turn to ADR bodies. 
Consumer Arbitration Boards (Békéltető Testület) are ADR bodies of general 
competence that handle all disputes except for those arising out of financial services 
contracts that is in the competence of the Financial Arbitration Board (Penzügyi 
Békéltető Testület).109 Turning to these bodies is free of charge, however, given that 
the cost of the process are born by the losing party in the dispute (Section 33 
paragraph 3 of Act CLV of 1997, Section 114 paragraph 4 of Act CXXXIX of 2013) and 
that consumers may have to support their claim with expert opinion, the cost may go 
well beyond the value of the claim.110 This may therefore deter consumers from tuning 
to ADR bodies. 
Related to all forums for enforcement, stakeholders highlighted that apart from fees 
consumers may also have costs that are non-recoverable such as costs associated 
with travel and time spent. Another representative also noted that any costs above 
HUF 4000 – 5000 [approx. EUR 13 – 16] would deter consumers from enforcing their 
rights. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Although without doubt the rules have improved business practices and contract 
terms, the rules are not as effective as they could be given the enforcement 
framework in which they operate, especially the absence of effective enforcement 
through injunctions as court actions (as explained above).  
Although there are incentives in place for inducing compliance with the rules, such as 
the Consumer Protection Authorities Certification System of Honest Businesses (as 
explained above), dishonest behaviours are still present, especially among small and 
medium sized companies. This may be due to business mentality in Hungary that 
focus on short term gains instead of long term sustainability (as explained above). A 
representative of businesses noted that consumer friendly or honest businesses are in 
competitive disadvantage compared to those that does not comply with all the rules. 
The level playing field is thus distorted by dishonest behaviour. 
 
108 2003. évi LXXX. törvény a jogi segítségnyújtásról. 
109 Consumer Arbitration Boards are independent bodies operated by chambers of commerce and industry, 
i.e. the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 19 regional chambers of commerce and 
industry, and are regulated by Act CLV of 1997. There is only one Financial Arbitration Board that is 
attached to the Hungarian National Bank and is regulated by Act CXXXIX of 2013. 
110 Andrea Fejős, p. 463 (see literature review at the end of the document).  
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• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Stakeholders could not come up with specific figures. Business representatives 
generally noted that consumer protection or compliance with many rules is expensive, 
but with effective management in place, businesses are able to calculate these costs 
into the final price of products and services and transfer them onto consumers. As 
long as the rules does not infringe competition they are not against the interest of 
business (in this regard however, it has been noted that consumer friendly businesses 
are in competitive disadvantage compared to those that does not comply with all the 
rules). 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Stakeholders noted that obviously the enforcement of consumer protection rules 
triggers expenses such as the cost of labour and other associated cost for example, 
per diem, travel expenses, expense of buying items in performing mystery shopping, 
however these vary and it is difficult to come up with any figures.   
The amount spent on public enforcement is determined on yearly basis by the relevant 
statute on budget (költségvetési törvény). Under the general rule in Section 7 of Act 
CXL of 2004 on general rules of administrative procedures and services,111 an 
administrative process infront of a public authority must adhere to the general 
principle of cost effectiveness, i.e. it must be organized in a way to complete the 
process as soon as possible burdening the authority and the consumer with minimal 
expenses. In 2015 the Parliament adopted a package of measures aiming to reduce 
bureaucracy. Following the general principle that public authorities must be reasonable 
in spending public money, and the governments’ policy of shielding citizens from 
unnecessary expenses, a number of procedures have been simplified and their costs 
have been reduced.112 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
There are no indications that the directives are not implemented in a cost-effective 
manner in Hungary.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
According to a representative of a consumer protection organization, consumers 
should be freed from paying court fees when enforcing their rights under the UCPD 
and the UCTD. A representative of businesses noted the administrative burdens should 
be lowered. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
111 2004. évi CXL törvény a közigazgatási hatósági eljárás és szolgáltatás általános szabályairól. 
112 The so called ‘bürokráciacsükkentő csomag’ that included a set of measures aiming to reform public 
administration. The key legal basis has been provided by Act CLXXXVI of 2015 on amendments related to 
the decrease of bureaucracy (2015. évi CLXXXVI. tőrvény a közigazgatási bürokráciacsökkentéssel 
összefüggő törvénymódosításokról) that has foreseen amendments to 110 legal acts. 
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• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
In enforcing the UCPD, according to relevant stakeholders, public authorities are 
aware of the origins of national rules and sometimes refer to the UCPD. In enforcing 
the rules of Act XLVII of 2008 courts also make references to the UCPD, however, it is 
impossible to draw a general conclusion on the frequency of these references. 113 
In enforcing the UCTD courts do apply the UCTD. In fact, the matter of unfair contract 
terms is, as explained by the Kúria, considered to be a matter of EU Law. The 
interpretation of these rules is in the hands of the CJEU rather than national courts.114  
Given the recent foreign currency denominated loans crisis in Hungary, the key 
judgments involving ruling on the fairness of contract terms are about the terms of 
consumer credit contracts (i.e. regulated sector of financial services). The same 
approach is however likely in any other sector, given the courts general attitude that 
unfair terms are a matter of EU law. 
Stakeholders noted that consumers and small and medium sized businesses have a 
general knowledge of the relevant national rules, while more detailed knowledge is 
typical for large businesses and consumer protection organizations. Apart from the 
latter, it is unlikely that the other players are aware of the origins of the rules. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
According to Section 10 of Act XLVII of 2008 the enforcement of the UCPD is divided 
between three public authorities. The Consumer Protection Authority is the primary 
enforcement authority115 competent for everything except for commercial practices 
capable of infringing competition that are in the competence of the Competition 
Authority and commercial practices connected to financial services that are entrusted 
to the Hungarian National Bank.  
Based on Section 12 of Act XLVII of 2008 the relevant authorities are obliged to 
cooperate. The cooperation is to facilitate a uniform application of substantive and 
procedural rules and to avoid collision in competences. To develop their relationship, 
the authorities have signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2015.116 The 
authorities have now developed a mechanism for the exchange of their decisions and 
court judgments delivered based on these, and for the exchange of consumer 
complaints. The authorities also operate an ‘alert system’ though which they are able 
to notify each other on the occurrence of unfair commercial practice and the 
commencement and completion of the administrative process. According to 
stakeholders, this cooperation works well in practice. 
113 For example, in ruling on its competence the Kúria has referred to the preamble of the UCPD in its 
decision no. Kfv.III.37.869/2014/5. 
114 Kúria, Decision no. 6/2013 for the unification of civil law (6/2013. számú Polgrái Jogegységi Határozat). 
115 The Consumer Protection Authority takes a coordinating role in cooperation with other authorities, 
transferring relevant information and representing the interests of county government offices (first 
instance authorities). 
116 See the Memorandum of Understanding at: 
http://www.nfh.hu/sites/default/files/GVH_MNB_NFH_20150206.pdf 
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Enforcement of the UCTD is vested in courts who apply the regular rules of civil 
procedure. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
According to stakeholders, the general and specific rules work well in practice. 
Authorities would in the first instance refer to sector specific rules, and if these are not 
available, to general rules. Sometimes the sector specific rules are applied together 
with general rules, using general rules as a ‘safety net’. For example, one authority 
considered that a commercial practice of ‘hiding’ important information in the small 
print at a place that is likely to stay unnoticed by consumers, is an unfair practice 
despite formally complying with the specific rules that mandated the information in 
question. Therefore, although there are overlaps between the rules, a stakeholder 
highlighted, overlaps are not necessarily disadvantageous for consumers. 
The relationship of the general and specific has also been developed by courts in 
interpreting the relationship between the 1959 Civil Code (now repealed by the new 
civil code) and the Act CXII of 1996 (now repealed by Act CCXXXVII of 2013). The 
Supreme Court (now Kúria) has specially acknowledged that in financial services 
contracts Act CXII of 1996 gets primacy over general rules on fairness in the Civil 
Code.117 However, one court has departed from this general rule giving primacy to 
substance over form. The Metropolitan Court of Appeal has given primacy to the 
general rules on fairness. According to this court, a contract term will be unfair if 
contrary to the requirements of good faith causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations (the test of fairness under the Civil Code) even if it 
complies with the rules on mandatory content of credit contracts in the sector specific 
law.118 In this judgement therefore the court gave primacy to substantive fairness 
over formal compliance with the rules. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
The benefit of complementary application of the UCTD and the UCPD with sector 
specific rules stem from the existence of a safety net in form of general clauses. On 
the one hand, these are flexible, able to embrace new situations whereas sector 
specific rules are usually more rigid. On the other hand, general clauses can be 
invoked to establish infringements when businesses formally comply with sector 
specific rules but amount to an unfair contract term or unfair commercial practice 
under the general rules. For example, stakeholders mentioned the currently topical 
advertising of discounted deals that are not addressed by sector specific rules but can 
be tackled by reference to general clauses. Stakeholders noted that this 
complementary application, as any other task does carry certain costs which is 
impossible to quantify. 
Stakeholders also considered useful the complementary application of the UCTD and 
the UCPD. This is because it is often difficult to differentiate between practices and 
terms, as the same set of facts may result in a contract term and a commercial 
practice. If for example a contract term is fair, the conclusion of the contract may be a 
result of an unfair commercial practice. 
 
117 Kúria (then Supreme Court), decision no. Gfv.IX-30.221/2011 (reported in BH no. 2012.41). 
118 Metropolitan Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), decision no. 5. Pf. 21 456/2013/5 (reported in BDT 
no. 2014.3058). 
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• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
A stakeholder noted that there may be a need to clarify the interplay of general 
clauses in the UCTD and UCPD on the one hand and sector specific rules on the other. 
These cause problems and require special cooperation between the authorities. 
In regard to the interplay between the UCTD and the UCPD, a stakeholder noted that 
it should be clarified which rules should be applied for assessing the fairness of 
contract terms communicated pre-contractually. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Stakeholders asserted, the issue is not very relevant in practice. The business does 
not suffer from information deficit and remain dominant in determining the conditions 
of sale. However, if the issue does arise, the general rules in the Civil Code provide 
sufficient protection for businesses.  
In addition, given that in practice consumers-sellers could continue to be protected by 
the UCPD, a formal extension is not necessary.119 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Based on the above evidence it can be concluded that the concepts of ‘average 
consumer’ and ‘vulnerable consumer’ are fit for purpose. They are sufficiently wide 
concepts to be able to respond to emerging practical trends and life situations. 
As for the concept of a ‘consumer,’ stakeholder opinions seem to conflict. On the one 
hand, representatives of businesses have repeatedly emphasized the need for lower 
level of intervention in B2B transactions and the unsuitability of consumer protection 
rules for protecting businesses. On the other hand, there was the opinion that the 
notion of consumers should be extended onto businesses, that the previous approach 
in defining consumers should be reinstated. Namely, at the beginning of the process of 
implementing the EU consumer acquis, Hungary has extended the notion of 
consumers onto businesses. The Civil Code implementing the UCTD, for example 
defined a consumer as any person who is a party to a contract concluded for reasons 
other than economic or professional activities, emphasizing therefore the character of 
a transaction, as opposed to the character of the parties. Any natural or legal person 
could have been considered a consumer in a particular transaction.120   
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
119 In Vj-122/2014, the Competition Authority has fined pawn shops for misleading statements in 
advertisements, considering depositors as consumers and applied the UCPD for estimating the fairness of 
messages. 
120 See Judit Fazekas, Fogyasztóvédelmi jog, p. 75-79 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
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experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
According to stakeholders, the existing rules are good as they are in providing a high 
level of consumer protection. 
In practice, courts have worked with the concept of an average consumer (even 
though such concept is not included into the UCTD) even before the CJEU’s judgement 
in C-26/13. However, as explained above, the standard of the average consumer has 
been set quite high. Courts and public authorities expected from average consumers 
to read and understand their contracts, which is not in line with reality. For this 
reason, it would be useful to insert the average consumer concept into the UCTD and 
to define the concept in a more protective manner. One option would be to follow the 
CJEU’s guidance in C-26/13 and subsequent case-law that set relatively low 
expectations to average consumers, recognizing that average consumers normally do 
not read their contracts and that some terms are simply not understandable for 
average consumers. Another option would be to introduce the concept of an average 
consumer and to create a vulnerable category of consumers for complex contracts 
such as contracts for financial services. 
 
1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms has improved as a result of the UCTD and the UCPD. Stakeholders agreed that 
Hungarian law alone would not achieve the present level of protection. 
Representatives of public authorities highlighted that business practices have changed 
considerably since the implementation of these directives, these changes are difficult 
to quantify, but the improvements are visible in their practice. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Stakeholders agreed that the information in regard to unit prices has improved since 
the implementation of the PID. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
According to a stakeholder, overall, the protection of businesses has increased. It 
should be noted however that the national implementation (as explained above) has a 
much broader scope of application than the MCAD. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Stakeholders noted that although the rules have levelled the playing field throughout 
the EU in terms of the legal framework and expectations; other barriers for cross-
border trade remained. For example, language, level of consumer awareness of the 
rules, different outcomes of enforcement procedures, etc. 
As for consumers, stakeholders noted that harmonized rules are capable to raise 
consumer confidence. However, the success of the rules depends on their enforcement 
that needs further improvement. 
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 • To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
The implementation of the mentioned directives plays an important role in the 
improvements, although it is difficult to determine the extent of this influence. 
UCPD: Prior to implementing the UCPD, unfair commercial practices have been 
regulated by Act LVII of 1996. Section 8 paragraph 1 contained a general prohibition 
of misleading consumers, whereas paragraph 2 contained certain misleading actions 
and omissions (albeit not as detailed as Act XLVII of 2008 today). The standard of an 
average consumer has been shaped in practice of the Competition Authority. The more 
detailed prohibitions, the explicit inclusion of aggressive practices, the black list and a 
special reference to the standard of the average consumer are improvements 
compared to the previous regime.121 
UCTD: The first version of Act IV of 1959 did not contain any provisions on unfair 
contract terms. Act IV of 1977 on amendments to the Civil Code, inserted Section 209 
on standard terms providing for a possibility to annul standard terms that gave one-
sided, unjustified advantage to the legal person.122 Prior to implementing the UCTD 
the Hungarian legal system was therefore not familiar with the notion of unfair 
contract terms. Although there is an opinion that despite making the test of fairness 
clearer and more precise, the implementation of the UCTD in practice brought the 
same results as the above 1977 test,123 the situation is not that simple. The black and 
grey lists of terms are a result of the UCTD. The 1977 Act introduced the possibility of 
public interest actions or actio populis, these were however not as far reaching as 
public interest actions in the Civil Code today.124  
PID: Before implementing the PID, there were no similar rules to the PID in regard to 
indicating unit prices. This act is therefore certainly beneficial for consumers. 
ID: Given the complexity of the implementation of the ID (as explained above), it is 
difficult to say to what extent it has raised the level of consumer protection.  
The improved rules and their enforcement have raised the level domestic consumer 
protection given that cross-border transactions remain rare. 
121 See on the history: Attila Békés, p. 21-16 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
122 Fazekas, Európai Uniós irányelv, p. 664 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
123 Attila Menyhárd, p. 350 (see literature review at the end of the document). 
124 See on the history Fazekas, Fogyasztóvédelmi jog, p. 142-145 (see literature review at the end of the 
document). 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – HUNGARY  
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
Act V of 2013 on Civil Code (2013. évi V. 
törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről) 
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Section 
6:104 
paragraph 
1 
 
Sections 6:102-6:105  'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
Yes Section 
6:104 
paragraph 
2 
 
  Extensions of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
No   
  Extensions of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
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  Unfairness due to lack of 
transparency 
Yes  Section 
6:103 
paragraph 
2 
 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Act XLVII of 2008 on the prohibition of 
unfair business to consumer commercial 
practices (2008. évi XLVII. Törvény a 
fogyasztókkal szembeni tisztességtelen 
kereskedelmi gyakorlat tilalmáról) 
Apart from Act XLVII of 
2008 the UCPD may have 
triggered the amendment 
of other related acts 
Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Section 1 
paragraph 
4  
 
Sector specific rules are 
restricted onto more stringent 
regulation of information 
provision. 
  Provisions regarding 
immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Section 1 
paragraph 
4 
Sector specific rules are 
restricted to more stringent 
regulation of information 
provision. 
  Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Act CLV of 1997 on consumer protection 
(1997. évi CLV. törvény a 
fogyasztóvédelemről)  
Section 2 subparagraphs m) and n), 
Section 14 paragraphs 1-3, 5 and 6, 
Section 56/A paragraph 5 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
Yes   The rules are applicable to 
products, i.e. movable property 
(except money, securities and 
other financial instruments), 
and natural energy usable as a 
product (Section 2 paragraph f) 
of Act CLV of 1997) 
Decree 4/2009 on detailed rules on the 
indication of prices and unit prices of 
products, and fees for services 
(4/2009. (I. 30.) NFGM-SZMM együttes 
rendelet a termékek eladási ára és 
egységára, továbbá a szolgáltatások díja 
feltüntetésének részletes szabályairól) 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Section 14 
paragraph 
2 
The rules on price indication are 
not applicable for products sold 
at auction, provided the 
starting bid is determined in the 
auction documents. 
    Section 3 
paragraph 
2 
 
The unit price shall not be 
indicated when the product is: 
a) under 50g, 50 ml or 5 
cm, 
b) Sold from an 
automated machine, 
c) Sold in bulk, 
d) Is gift wrapped 
e) A foodstuff sold in a 
package for 
preparation of a 
particular meal. 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of 
unfair market conduct and restriction of 
competition (1996. évi LVII. törvény a 
tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a 
versenykorlátozás tilalmáról)   
   Section 8 Applies to ‘business practice’ 
that allows an investigation of 
a wider range of issues than 
advertising. 
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advertising Section 6/A, Section 8, Section 10, 
Section 10/A paragraph 1, Section 10/B, 
Section 10/C, Section 64/B paragraph 2, 
Section 72/A paragraph 1 subparagraph 
a), Section 76 paragraph 1 subparagraph 
j), Section 86 paragraph 1, Section 87/A, 
Section 88 paragraph 13, Section 88/A 
paragraph 2. 
   Section 
10/A 
paragraph 
2  
 
Reference to the ‘average 
business’ standard. 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Act CLV of 1997 on consumer protection 
(1997. évi CLV. törvény a 
fogyasztóvédelemről)  
Section 38 paragraphs 6 and 8, Section 
39 paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 46 
paragraph 2 subparagraph b), Section 47 
paragraph 1 subparagraphs a) and b), 
Section 49 paragraph 1, Section 51 
paragraphs 2-4. 
This list may not be 
complete. Apart from 
these acts, the ID might 
have been implemented in 
other acts as well. Many 
national implementing 
measures125 earlier 
reported are not valid any 
more. 
 
    
Act CXXXIX of 2013 on Hungarian 
National Bank (2013. évi CXXXIX. 
törvény a Magyar Nemzeti Bankról), 
Section 82 paragraph 1 
Note also that injunction 
procedures are also 
provided without 
implementing the ID in 
Section 6:105 of the Civil 
Code, Section 92 of Act 
LVII of 1996, and Section 
88 and 164 of Act CXXXIX 
of 2013. 
    
125See the list at:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=celex:32009L0022 
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Act CVII of 2001 on electronic 
commercial services, and on some 
issues connected to information society 
services (2001. évi CVII. törvény az 
elektronikus kereskedelmi 
szolgálltatások, valamint az információs 
társadalommal összefüggő 
szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiről) 
Section 16/C paragraph 2, Section 16/D 
paragraph 4, Section 16/E paragraph 1 
and 2. 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – HUNGARY126 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures foreseen 
by other EU Consumer Law Directives (the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
or/and by the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
Injunctions procedures are regulated in 
various acts separately from the acts 
implementing the UCPD and the CRD.   
 
Note that the enforcement procedure of 
unfair contract terms is regulated in the Civil 
Code together with other provisions 
implementing the UCTD.  
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking 
an injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Individual 
consumers 
 
Note that Section 6:105 of the Civil Code 
empowers a number of enforcement agents 
to commence injunctions procedures, i.e. the 
public prosecutor; the minister, or the head of 
any autonomous government authority, 
government office or central office; the head 
of the Budapest and county government 
offices and professional chambers and 
organizations (but the Civil Code does not 
implement the ID). 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Both forms of 
procedure 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure, please explain 
the characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
-The qualified 
entities are 
exempted from 
costs  
- Some 
administrative 
procedures in 
front of public 
authorities are 
free of charge. 
Consumer protection organizations are 
exempted from the costs of court procedure 
under Section 5 paragraph 1 subparagraph b) 
of Act XCIII of 1990 on Fees. 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
consumer law in 
general 
The scope of application is very wide, 
including all disputes suitable for court 
procedure (based on Section 39 paragraph 1 
of Act CLV of 1997). 
126 This fact sheet is completed based on the solutions provided in acts/sections that implement the ID. A 
separate note is made of injunctions procedures that does not implement the ID, only where relevant. 
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Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No Generally, no, but under Section 6:106 of the 
Civil Code business associations may file a 
claim for the protection of collective interest 
of its members against the use of unfair 
standard terms (note that this provision does 
not implement the ID). 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage 
in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under Art. 
5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- No  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen, please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- No, no sanction  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes Under Section 38 paragraph 6 of Act CLV of 
1997 the court may order the publication of a 
statement, upon the claimants’ request. The 
court will decide on the content of the 
statement and the method of publication. 
Publication is in particular possible in a daily 
newspaper with country-wide distribution 
and on the Internet. 
Section 16/E of Act CVIII of 2001 contains 
detailed rules on the publication of an 
administrative decision. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- Yes It is possible to claim damages and specific 
performance in collective court actions under 
Section 38 paragraph 3 and Section 39 
paragraph 3 of Act CLV of 1997. 
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No Note that fines imposed based on Act CVIII of 
2001 are payable to the account of the Media 
and Infocommunications Authority (Section 
16/D paragraph 3 Act CVIII of 2001). 
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
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Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes 
 
Under Section 38 paragraph 3 and Section 39 
paragraph 3 of Act CLV of 1997. 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
Under Section 38 paragraph 3 of Act CLV of 
1997, if a court process ends with a 
declaratory judgment, any injured consumer 
within the group identified by the court may 
submit a separate claim for damages, only 
needing to prove the causal link between the 
infringement and damage and the amount of 
damages suffered. 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- Yes 
 
Qualified entities may claim damages or 
specific performance under Section 38 
paragraph 3 and Section 39 paragraph 3 of 
Act CLV of 1997. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(numb-
er of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
n.a.         
 
There is no reliable data available on the total number of B2C disputes or on B2C 
disputes involving the directives under scrutiny. For example, one authority could only 
provide data for appellate disputes. Another authority indicated that their records are 
not broken down by the directives under scrutiny. 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).127  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved 
for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
6% from the 
value of the 
claim, that is, 
EUR 300 
(around 
HUF 92 000) 
Depending on 
how the charges 
are calculated:  
HUF 200 000 
(based on 10 
hours of work),  
lump sum initial 
consultation fee 
e.g. HUF 40 000 
[approx. 
EUR 130] 
EUR 500 or 
around 
HUF 155 000, 
10% from the 
value of the 
claim 
 5 hours Note that 
lawyers’ fees are 
approximate, 
fees are 
ultimately subject 
to mutual 
agreement 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
Free of charge 
infont of a 
Consumer 
Arbitration 
Board 
The same rates 
as above. It is 
estimated that 
the work would 
take 5 hours. 
 2-3 hours  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
127 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There is no available annual statistics on the number of these particular disputes 
infont of courts. As mentioned above, the ‘first generation’ of the disputes involving 
foreign currency loans rarely invoked the fairness of contract terms. This might have 
changed later, as the Government’s first package of measures aimed at helping these 
debtors affected 11 000 pending cases,128 where many or at least some disputes are 
likely to have involved the matter of the fairness of contract terms. The lawyers’ 
awareness of the possibility to invoke the fairness of contract terms is likely to have 
gradually changed, and invoking the fairness of contract terms became more frequent. 
There is no exact data available, unfortunately. 
There is no statistical data available on the number of these disputes infront of ADR 
bodies. The issue is not included into the reports of the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry summarizing the activities of all 20 Consumer Arbitration 
Boards,129 and into the annual reports of Financial Arbitration Boards.130 
 
 
 
128 Barnabás Ferencz, p. 38 (see literature review below) 
129 http://www.mkik.hu/hu/ 
130 https://www.mnb.hu/bekeltetes/bemutatkozas/eves-jelenteseink 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
National Trade Association (Nemzeti Kereskedelmi 
Szövetség) 
Business association 13.07.2016. 
Hungarian Chamber of Trade and Industry (Magyar 
Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara) 
Business association 07.07.2016. 
National Consumer Protection Authority (Nemzeti 
Fogyasztóvédemi Hatóság) 
National consumer 
enforcement authority 
13.07.2016. 
National Media and Infocommunications Authority 
(Nemzeti Média és Hírközlési Hatóság) 
National regulatory 
authority 
08.07.2016. 
 
Hungarian National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) National regulatory 
authority 
12.07.2016. 
and in writing 
Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal) National regulatory 
authority 
13.07.2016.  
and in writing 
Ministry of National Development (Nemzeti Fejlesztési 
Minisztérium) 
Ministry  17.08.2016. 
 
Ministry of Justice (Igazságügyi Minisztérium) Ministry 12.07.2016. 
European Consumer Center European Consumer Centre 13.07.2016 
National Consumer Protection Association (Országos 
Fogyasztóvédelmi Egyesület) 
Consumer organisation  13.07.2016. 
 
National Federation of Consumer Protection 
Associatations (Fogyasztóvédelmi Egyesületek Országos 
Szövetsége) 
Consumer organisation 13.07.2016. 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source Year Title of publication 
Klára Gellén 2016 
(forth-
coming) 
A reklámokkal megcélzott fogyasztó megítélése a Gazdasági 
Versenyhivatal gyakorlatában (In: Sajtószabadság és médiajog a 21.sz. 
elején. Vol. 3, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, 429-446). 
Lajos Vékás, Péter 
Gárdos (eds.) 
2014 Commentary on the Civil Code - Kommentár a Polgári Törvénykönyvhöz 
(Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, E-book - no page numbers available). 
József 
Zavodnjik 
2013 Nagykommentár a tisztességtelen kereskedelmi gyakorlatról szóló 
törvényhez (Wolters Kluwer, Budapest, E-book -no page numbers 
available) 
Ferenc Szilágyi 2014 Implementation of the Consumer Rights Directive: Hungary (Vol. 3 Issue 
1 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law) 
Andrea Fejős 2008 Consumer Protection in Sales Transactions in Hungary (Vol. Issue 4 Acta 
Juridica Hungarica) 
Judit Fazekas 1995 Judit A fogyasztói szerződések tisztességtelen szerződési feltételeit 
szabályozó új Európai Uniós irányelv és a magyar jog (Vol.  47 Issue 11 
Magyar Jog). 
József Zavodnjik 2014 Fogyasztók és kisérletek (Vol. 10 Issue 2 Versenytükör) 
Miklós Juhász 
 
 
2015 The role of consumer protection in the enforcement practice of the 
Hungarian Competition Authority - A fogyasztóvédelem szerepe a 
Gazdaségi Versenyhivatal tevékenységében (Vol. 11 Special edition 
Versenytükör) 
Krisztina Grimm, 
Izabella Szoboszlai 
2016 Communication and commercial practices regarding financial matters – 
in the light of the enforcement practices of the Hungarian Competition 
Authority -Pézügyekkel kapcsolatos téjákoztatások, kereskedelmi 
gyakorlatok a Gazdaság Versenyhivatal tükrében (Vol. 12, Special issue 
no. 3 Versenytükor) 
Tamás Babai-
Belánszky 
2016 Unfair general contract terms in the field of vehicle financing -
Tisztességtelen általános szerződési feltételek a gépjármű finanszírozás 
körében (Vol. 12, Special issue no. 3 Versenytükör) 
Judit Fazekas 2007 Development of Hungarian Consumer Protection Law (In: The 
Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005, András Jakab, 
Péter Takáts, Allan F. Tatham (eds.), 331-348). 
Attila Menyhárd 2007 Consumer Protection and Private Law (In: The Transformation of the 
Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005, András jakab, Péter Takáts, Allan F. 
Tatham (eds.), 349-352) 
Katalin Szeghő 2015 ‘Devizaperek’ egy bíró szemével (Gazdaság és Jog, 2015/12) 
Barnabás Ferencz 2015 Koneferencia, Az Új polgári perrendtartás – a közérdekű keresetindítás 
kérdései (Európai jog, 2015/5) 
József Sárai, Gábor 
Szoboszlay 
2012 The Development of the Hungarian Competition Law – from the Outset 
(1991) until 2007 (In: Evolution of Competition Laws and their 
Enforcement, Pradeep S Mehta (ed.), Routledge, 43-72) 
György Wellmann 2014 A szerződés érvénytelenségének szabályozása az új Polgári 
Törvénykönyvben (Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2014 február) 
Wopera Zsuzsa 2016 Célegyenesben az új polgári perrendtartási kódex előkészítése 
(Ügyvédvilág 2016/1) 
Attila Békés 2008 A fogyasztókkal szembeni tisztességtelen kereskedelmi gyakorlat 
tilalmáról elemzés, Parlamenti beszámoló, Budapest, at 
http://www.parlament.hu/biz38/mb/dokumentum/tisztlen_ker.pdf 
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NA NA Explanatory notes to different acts, Új jogtár online database, Wolters 
Kluwer, at http://uj.jogtar.hu/az-uj-jogtarrol 
NA NA Commentary on 1959 Civil Code, Complex Jogtár-online database 
(database no longer available) 
Judit Fazekas 2007 Fogyasztóvédelmi Jog (Complex, Budapest). 
Mónika Józon  2014 ’Hungary’ In: I. Domurath, H-W. Micklitz (eds.) The Over-indebtedness 
of European Consumers – a View from Six Countries, EUI Working Paper 
Law 2014/10 at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32451/LAW%20WP%202
014_DOM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
Mónika Józon 2015 Country Report for Hungary, In: Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion, 
Hans-W. Micklitz, Irina Domurath (eds.), Ashgate, 85-98. 
The Kúria’s Case-Law 
Assessem-ent Group 
2012 A fogyasztói kölcsönszerződésben pénzügyi intézmény által alkalmazott 
általános szerződési feltételekben szereplő egyoldalú 
szerződésmódosítás tisztességtelensége megítélése tárgykörében 
felállított joggykorlat-elemző csoport összefoglaló véleménye, at 
http://www.kuria-
birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/joggyakorlat_osszefoglalo_velem
eny.pdf 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report IRELAND  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
According to an experienced policymaker located within the responsible Ministry for 
Consumer Protection, the UCPD comprises detailed rules (the blacklist), a principles-
based approach (the general prohibition of unfair commercial practices) and a mix of 
the two (the prohibitions on misleading and aggressive commercial practices). In the 
view of the Ministry, this combination makes for an effective instrument. To date, 
however, most if not all of the enforcement actions taken in Ireland have been under 
the more specific rules in the blacklist or the prohibition of particular types of 
misleading practice. While the general prohibitions offers a potentially useful option for 
addressing new and emerging practices, its utility has yet to be established in 
practice. 
An experienced legal practitioner with a strong academic background in consumer law 
said that the principle-based approach is to be preferred, being more flexible. The 
view was expressed that it can be ‘more troublesome’ to give concrete legal advice. 
Irish courts are not comfortable giving views on 'principles' issues such as the 
unfairness test in UCPD. The blacklist adds a degree of clarity. 
Irish law has had a long history of deploying principles-based legislative measures to 
counteract the use of misleading commercial practices with the landmark legislation 
dating back to the Merchandise Marks Act 1887. This legislation, the subject of a 
significant number of amendments over the years, dates back to Victorian times when 
the United Kingdom Parliament had jurisdiction over Ireland, the Irish State being 
established in 1922. The Merchandise Marks Acts regulated commercial practices 
through the Criminal Law. In 1978 the legislation was updated by way of the 
Consumer Information Act 1987. Section 6 makes it a criminal offence to make false 
or reckless statements for purposes related to a trade, business or profession vis-à-vis 
services, accommodation or facilities. Section 7 relates to offers to supply goods, 
services or accommodation which contain a false or misleading indication of price, 
previous availability, a recommended price or installation charges. Section 8 
proscribes the publication of false or misleading advertisements. Infraction of sections 
6, 7 and 8 are criminal offences. Other regulatory measures prior to the UCPD involve 
the Civil law. Implied terms as to goods meeting a description, being of merchantable 
quality and fit for purpose again date back to Victorian legislation in the form of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893. The 1983 legislation was reviewed in the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act 1980 (SOGSA). Most noteworthy is the fact that disclaimers 
and limitation clauses, after 1980 in consumer contracts, are void insofar as they seek 
to limit the effect of statutory implied terms.  
Irish law, coming as it does from the common law tradition, does not contain a 
mechanism permitting public administrations to impose administrative sanctions: 
there are no administrative bodies that can impose penalties outside court procedures 
although this dichotomy is breaking down. Consumer bodies with a statutory basis 
must act within the confines of their legislative mandate: Office of the Director of 
Consumer Affairs, replaced by the National Consumer Agency, and merged in 2014 to 
form the consumer protection arm of the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission.  
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Self-regulation, in historical terms, has not been a significant part of the consumer 
protection landscape, while there have been a number of trade associations and they 
have often been important as lobbyists, the most significant body to promote self-
regulation as a consumer dispute resolution body is the Advertising Standards 
Authority for Ireland (ASAI). The ASAI is an independent and self-regulatory body set 
up and financed by the advertising industry. ASAI has produced a Code of Standards 
for Advertising and Marketing Communications in Ireland, currently in a 7th edition. 
Section 3 sets out a set of general rules that must be observed by advertisers in 
making marketing communications. The Code is a central part of a complaints 
procedure and review mechanism. Donnelly and White, in Consumer Law Rights and 
Regulation (i.e. Donnelly and White), comment that, apart from ASAI, the most 
significant self-regulation trade bodies include the Direct Sellers Association of Ireland, 
the Irish Parking Association and the Irish Cellular Industry Association. The last 
mentioned body has an important Code of Practice which establishes standards that 
mobile phone operators must meet (ICIA Code of Practice 2014).  
It is arguable that in recent years a plethora of Irish trade sectors have implemented 
self-regulation strategies of this kind which take Irish law much further than the 
minimum requirements that gave effect to the Misleading Advertising Directive - see 
the Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988 (S.I. No. 134 of 1988).  
The Background to the adoption into Irish Law of Directive 2005/29/EC is sketched by 
Donnelly and White who point out that the Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 1931 may 
have contained criminal penalties for misleading or false trade descriptions, but, as 
these Acts only applied to goods, the law was ‘extremely 'form-based' and hence 
inflexible’, as well as being ‘complex, confusing and often reactionary’.  
Directive 2005/29 was transposed into Irish law by Part 3 of the Consumer Protection 
Act 2007, coming into operation on May 1, 2007. The impact of the transposition on 
earlier statute law was to repeal pre-existing but incompatible legislation such as the 
Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 1931. A number of transitional arrangements relating 
to price information were made (see section 93(1)). Donnelly and White provide a 
thorough review of the transposition difficulties such as the boundary between 
business to consumer transactions and problems of hidden traders and the fact that 
Ireland is in a minority position in relation to possible extension of the Directive to 
Consumer to Business transactions. Ireland has expressed a view favouring the 
extension of UCPD to Consumer to Business Transactions but the European 
Commission supports the view, as expressed by a majority of Member States, which 
favours limiting UCPD to Business to Consumer Transactions. The general clause in 
Article 5 of the Directive 2005/29/EC is transposed into Irish law in Section 41 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 2007. While Donnelly and White comment that there are 
some drafting adjustments made in Section 41, there is no suggestion that these 
changes do anything other than clarify how the general clause in Article 5 is intended 
to operate.  
Most commentators consider UCPD to have been transposed correctly. In contrast to 
the work of the Irish drafters of the Consumer Protection Act 2007, Part 3, there is 
widespread criticism of the way in which one Irish High Court judge has approached 
the interpretation of what constitutes a commercial practice under the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007. In McCambridge Ltd. v. Joseph Brennan Bakeries (2012) a 
dispute over the use of copycat packaging in relation to similar bread products 
packaged in similar but not identical packaging was held not to warrant an injunction 
under the 2007 Act - a common law passing off claim was however successful - 
because the judge considered that design of packaging not to be a commercial 
practice. This decision is widely thought to be wrong; several commentators have 
argued that use of a competitor’s packaging should be viewed as a commercial 
practice by the user.1 
1  Donnelly and White, Consumer Law Rights and Regulation, para.9.20 and Johnson and Gibson, (2015) 
131 LQR 476 at 484.  
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Finally, in regard to the remedies available under Part 3 of the Consumer Protection 
Act 2007, persons convicted (first offence) relating to certain misleading commercial 
practices or aggressive or prohibited commercial practices may be fined up to 
EUR 4 000 or sentenced to imprisonment for six months or both (summary 
conviction). On conviction following proceedings upon indictment (first offence) 
persons may be fined up to EUR 60 000 or imprisoned for up to 18 months. For 
subsequent convictions higher fines and longer sentences of imprisonment may result. 
Civil remedies, like criminal sanctions, are largely in the hands of the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission. These consist of prohibition orders, undertakings to 
be given and meeting compliance notices.  
The most striking example of the interplay between UCPD provisions, as transposed 
(specifically the fixed penalty notice provision in section 85 of the Consumer Protection 
Act 2007) took place during September 2016. The telecommunications regulator, 
ComReg, used the fixed penalty notice mechanism against Virgin Media for breaches 
of the requirement to make contracts available to customers in durable form, as 
required by the Consumer Rights Directive, as transposed by S.I. No. 484 of 2013. 
Virgin Media accepted the fixed penalty notice assessment of EUR 255 000 in respect 
of over 26,000 Virgin Media customers. While UCPD envisages civil remedies, the 
Section 85 mechanism is a criminal penalty predicated on a finding by an authorised 
officer that one of a range of criminal offences has been committed.  
Consumers may also exercise civil law remedies in contract and consumer legislation, 
Section 74 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 affords a damages remedy to a 
consumer who is aggrieved by an unfair, misleading or aggressive consumer practice.2  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The blacklist is transposed into Irish law in sections 55(1) and 55(3) of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007. Donnelly and White3 point to some subtle differences that make 
the provisions relating to pyramid selling - a particular problem in Ireland - more 
effective than literal adherence to the Directive itself would achieve. According to a 
senior administrator in an enforcement agency, having a blacklist of commercial 
practices which are per se unfair is useful for consumers. Having such a set of rules 
compliments the principle based approach. The enforcement body actively monitors 
'business opportunities' that may in fact be disguised pyramid promotional schemes. 
Consumers have made contact with us when they suspect that features of a business 
model that they are considering engaging with displays the hallmarks of a pyramid 
promotional scheme. The Consumer Protection Act 2007 gives particular prominence 
to combatting this blacklist practice.  
An experienced administrator/policymaker in the relevant Ministry said that the 
Minister has an open mind about additions to the list. The Minister has not given the 
matter detailed consideration, but possible additions might include items on car 
'clocking' (adjusting vehicle mileage readings downwards) as well as items dealing 
with digital content practices such as providing false or misleading information about 
interoperability. The Minister is prepared to consider mechanisms for adding to the 
UCPD blacklist short of a revision of the Directive.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
There are significant benefits for consumers in financial services in respect of the 
derogation effected in Article 3(9) of the Directive. According to Donnelly and White, 
these derogations allow Member States to increase levels of consumer protection,4 
2 See Untoy v. GEC Capital (2015, HC). 
3 Consumer Law Rights and Regulation para. 9-63.  
4 Consumer Law Rights and Regulation para. 9-26.  
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being minimum harmonisation measures. There has been little or no discussion of how 
the Article 3(9) derogation in respect of immovable property has impacted, although 
there are examples of enhanced consumer protection in the form of the ‘soft law’ 
provisions in the Central Bank Consumer Protection Code of 2012 (e.g. on vulnerable 
consumers) and in relation to the purchaser of immovable property. Consumer 
protection for the purchasers of new dwellings is a contentious issue as it appears to 
be one area where consumer protection has failed Irish consumers. Buyers of homes 
that have been damaged by using pyrite infected material have found it difficult to get 
private law remedies, leading the Government to devise and fund a statutory pyrite 
remediation programme in 2013 as a remedy of last resort. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
Environmental Protection is a statutory function that has been delegated to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA elsewhere in this Report), as a result of the 
Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992. Under Section 19(1) of the Competition 
and Consumer Protection Agency Act 2014 the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Agency (CCPA) has entered into a ‘Co-operation Agreement’ with the EPA to facilitate 
co-operation on matters affecting consumers and other issues of synergy. There is 
nothing in the literature to suggest that the UCPD has been applied in the context of 
environmental claims. A similar co-operation agreement is in place between the CCPA 
and the Commission for Energy Regulation (hereafter ComReg). A legal practitioner 
with a strong academic background in consumer law noted no examples in Ireland 
where there has been any enforcement action taken regarding misleading 
environmental claims. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
Irish transposing legislation takes the ‘average consumer’ test as found in Directive 
2005/29/EC and transposes it literally. The Irish Act also directs that where the 
targeted group of consumers forms a defined category (e.g. children interested in 
sports) the commercial practice is to be assessed by reference to an average 
consumer in that group rather than consumers generally.  
One experienced administrator involved in the judicial enforcement area told the 
interviewer that what constitutes the 'average consumer' in an Irish context is 
something that the national courts have had little difficulty in determining. 
Enforcement actions that have been taken have ultimately relied on the idea of the 
average, circumspect and reasonably well informed consumer as the benchmark 
against which the impugned practice is tested. In contrast, a legal practitioner was of 
the view that different judges have taken differing approaches, and expressed the 
opinion that the CJEU only offers abstract, not practical guidance.   
In contrast, Donnelly and White comment that ‘the average consumer benchmark, as 
mediated by a judge, may not reflect the fact that some consumers may be especially 
vulnerable’.5  
 
5 See also Reilly, (2005) 12 C.L.P. 125. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts recognised new categories of vulnerable consumers 
not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
There is a degree of dissatisfaction in Ireland with the marginal role afforded to 
vulnerable consumers. The Law Reform Commission, in a Report on Vulnerable Adults 
and the Law (2006) LRC 83 - pages 14 to 16, drew attention to the ‘mental or physical 
infirmity, age or credulity’ aspects of Article 5.3 and expressed the view that ‘a 
potential difficulty could give arise here in determining the particular characteristics of 
an ‘average member’ of a group, but it is hoped that this definition will not reduce the 
protection available to vulnerable adults’. Some similar comments were made during 
debates on the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015.  
The Central Bank Consumer Protection Code 2012 sets out a definition of vulnerable 
consumer that has attracted a broad level of support: A ‘vulnerable consumer’ is a 
natural person who: 
‘(a) has the capacity to make his or her own decisions but who, because of 
individual circumstances, may require assistance to do so (for example, 
hearing-impaired or visually impaired persons); and/or 
(b) has limited capacity to make his or her own decisions and who requires 
assistance to do so (for example, persons with intellectual disabilities or 
mental health problems).’ 
There is also a definition of a vulnerable consumer in relation to statutory 
disconnection powers and their use by the energy industry to be found in S.I. No. 463 
of 2011. The definition is not directly income based, stressing either high levels of 
dependency on electricity or gas for medical devices or vulnerability due to age or 
medical condition, for instance. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
In Ireland one example of self and co-regulation is afforded by the Irish Cellular 
Industry Association (ICIA) Code of Practice. The four Irish mobile telephone operators 
have produced a Code of Practice that addresses the provision of all mobile services in 
the Irish market – voice, text, multi-media, mobile internet access and video 
telephone services. The Code deals with provision of parental controls for minors, 
offensive person to person communications, spam, access and illegal content, 
premium rate services and legislative compliance and enforcement. The Code is like 
most codes of this kind, weak on enforcement and sanctions. It is an example of a co-
regulation code as it involves the interaction of the Data Protection and 
Communications regulators.  
The most effective Code is the ASAI Code in respect of Advertising. According to an 
enforcement administrator, the best example of a self/co-regulation model that is 
directly applicable to the UCPD is run by the Advertising Standards Authority of 
Ireland (ASAI). It is industry funded and has a code of practice broadly in line with the 
requirements under the UCPD. There is a facility for consumers to make a complaint in 
relation to infringing advertising. The ASAI investigate such complaints and arrive at a 
decision. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
In this context, an enforcement administrator stated that most of the blacklisted 
practices investigated relate to pyramid schemes. Enforcement agencies since 2005 
have had little experience in investigating most of the 31 blacklisted practices, leading 
the agencies to doubt how prevalent these practices are.  
Because any additions to the list can only be brought about by a revision of the 
Directive, changing would appear to be quite a burdensome process. A facility should 
be available to respond to new developments but at this juncture the Department said 
it would not propose any changes. According to another practitioner, a straightforward 
mechanism by which the blacklist could be added to should be developed as new 
practices emerge, although no view as to how this could be done was expressed. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
There is a reluctance in Ireland to prosecute and seek financial compensation in 
damages, with a mediated settlement and enforcement and other notices being a 
preferred solution. Certainly the levels of fine and the fact that first offenders are 
treated less harshly than multiple and serial offenders, should be noted. One 
enforcement administrator praised the UCPD, but suggests higher criminal penalties 
might be helpful. According to this administrator, the UCPD is a cornerstone of 
Ireland's consumer protection regime. This has been achieved through a number of 
channels including enforcement actions, advocacy efforts and an increased general 
awareness amongst consumers, traders and legal professionals as to rights and 
obligations that the UCPD has introduced into Irish law. There is however a weakness 
that relates to the level of fine that may be imposed on a trader for breaches of the 
UCPD. Currently, following a summary conviction for a breach of the UCPD, a trader 
can be fined up to EUR 4 000. To some traders such a fine may be considered a 'cost 
of doing business' and is therefore of little deterrent value. On the other hand the 
offences are 'strict liability' offences reflecting their regulatory nature and are hybrid 
offences which can be disposed of summarily or on indictment.  
A policymaker in the relevant consumer protection Ministry suggested that additional 
resources for awareness and enforcement would improve the effectiveness of the 
UCPD. The same view was expressed by the Irish ECC.  
The view expressed by consumer organisations was that while self-regulation as a 
means of supporting judicial and administrative enforcement mechanisms is 
important, some self-regulation mechanisms are weak and that sanctions may not be 
dissuasive. Consumer redress and the various ADR and European Small Claims 
Procedure initiatives have not been effective in Ireland.6 There is felt to be an 
integration deficit for remedies. 
 
6 See Chapter 10 of Donnelly and White. 
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1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
The Price Indication Directive (98/6/EC) was transposed into Irish law by the European 
Communities (Requirements to Indicate Product Prices) Regulation 2002 (S.I. No. 639 
of 2002). Information about the impact of the Directive, in tangible terms, is difficult 
to locate and access. Under the Regulations the contravention of the Regulations 
constituted a criminal offence, to be prosecuted in the Circuit Court by (currently) the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission.  
According to an administrator in the judicial enforcement area, the CCPC and its 
predecessor, the NCA, have actively enforced European Communities (Requirements 
to Indicate Product Prices) Regulations 2002. The Regulations introduce obligations 
concerning the display of unit prices which are also defined therein. The agencies have 
found that there is a very good level of compliance in relation to these regulations and 
consumers are being effectively informed.  
A policymaker in the relevant consumer protection Ministry expressed the opinion that 
there is a high level of awareness of, and compliance with, the unit selling price 
provisions of the PID. Consumer awareness of price displays in Ireland is high, 
possibly because of national pricing legislation dating back to 1958. Whether 
consumers can distinguish between earlier 1958 national legislation provisions, the 
PID legislation and UCPD provisions may be a more interesting question.7  
In the interview with one Business Organisation, that organisation said its members 
were compliant and that compliance levels are managed through regular inspection 
and monitoring by the organisation, as well as checks by the statutory agency. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
A policymaker in the relevant consumer protection Ministry pointed to the difficulties 
raised in this question saying the Ministry would be prepared to consider alternative 
measurement units on a case-by-case basis, but said it was not easy to think of 
alternatives that could be applied as readily and uniformly as those based on weight or 
volume. Another practitioner in the judicial enforcement area suggested that the view 
to be adopted was dependent on certainty of results. Numbers of washloads might not 
be effective as it is hard to imagine it as a consistent indicator of performance. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not applicable to Ireland.  
 
7  Donnelly and White make a reference to the PID transposition order that supports this view: Paragraph 2 
- 84, footnote 298. 
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses  
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
A policymaker in the relevant consumer protection Ministry argued that, on the one 
hand, the replacement of Art. 3 MCAD by, for example, the more comprehensive 
provisions on misleading commercial practices at Articles 6-7 UCPD merits 
consideration; however, on the other hand, it appears to be the case, pending a full 
impact analysis at least, that the misleading practices affecting businesses involve a 
relatively small number of practices of mass-marketing frauds or scams such as 
misleading business directories and misleading payment forms. There may be a case 
for focusing any legislative proposal on the specific practices that are a cause of 
detriment rather than undertaking a large-scale extension of the scope of the present 
Directive. There are significant reservations in the Ministry about any legislative 
proposal that, in respect of goods and services purchased by traders for business 
purposes, proceeded on the assumption that traders needed the same level of 
protection as consumers. The case for protections for small businesses in particular 
against abuses that have been convincingly shown to be a serious source of detriment, 
should be assessed on its merits. It remains the case that traders are better placed 
than consumers to defend themselves against misleading communications about 
goods and services purchased on an ongoing basis for business purposes.  
Two court cases about the misleading advertising provisions of the MCAD have raised 
a question about the scope of these provisions and their transposition in Ireland. In 
line with the interpretation in the Commission Communication of 2012 (Com (2012) 
762 final) the Ministry believes that the Directive's misleading advertising provisions 
apply to misleading advertising in B2B transactions, while its comparative advertising 
provisions have both a B2B and a B2C dimension. The Directive defines 'misleading 
advertising' as 'any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives 
or is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and 
which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic behaviour or 
which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor'. The Irish 
Regulations (the European Communities (Misleading and Comparative Marketing 
Communications) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 774/2007) state that a marketing 
communication is misleading if – in any way (including its presentation) it deceives or 
is likely to deceive in relation to any matter set out in paragraph (4) the trader to 
whom it is addressed or whom it reaches, and  
(i) by reason of its deceptive nature, it is likely to affect the trader's economic 
behaviour; or 
(ii) for any reason specified in this paragraph, it injures or is likely to injure a 
competitor (our emphasis). 
The matter at issue accordingly is whether the substitution of 'trader' for 'persons' in 
the transposition of the definition of 'misleading advertising' in the Irish Regulations 
has resulted in the incorrect implementation of the Directive. In the view of Cregan J. 
in Aldi Stores (Ireland) Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores, (2009), the definition in the Directive 
was drafted more broadly than the provision in the Regulations in that it 'could include 
a consumer'. In an earlier case, Tesco Ireland Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores, however, Laffoy 
J. took a different interpretation and agreed with counsel for the plaintiff that the 
reference to 'trader' in Regulation 3(2) should be a reference to consumer. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
As pointed out above, Irish case law has yet to resolve issues of overall effectiveness 
which is inextricably linked with the scope of MCAD.  
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Common law passing off actions continue to be relied upon rather than MCAD 
provisions or even UCPD actions, often as a result of legislative uncertainty or judicial 
error - see McCambridge v. Joseph Brennan Bakeries (2012).  
An administrator in a relevant Ministry points out that Irish rules in relation to 
advertising by medical practitioners, dentists and solicitors, administered by 
professional bodies, appear to function effectively.  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
A senior policymaker in the relevant Ministry indicated that there were a number of 
cases in which traders in the retail sector have invoked the MCAD in response to 
claims of misleading comparative advertising about the price and other aspects of 
goods. Most recently, Aldi Stores (Ireland) Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores (2015), gave rise to 
a lengthy judgement and is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The 
comparative advertising rules in the MCAD do not appear to the Ministry to be in need 
of substantial overhaul, but the policymaker indicated that any proposals for change 
would be examined on their merits.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
There are no other specific comments to be made on this question.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
A policymaker in the relevant Ministry commented that there is no pattern of public 
enforcement of the MCAD in Ireland. Regulation 5 of the European Communities 
(Misleading and Comparative Marketing Communications) Regulations 2007 provides 
that a trader or other person may, upon giving notice to the trader against whom the 
order is sought, apply to the Circuit Court or the High Court for an order prohibiting 
that trader from engaging, or continuing to engage in, a misleading marketing 
communication or a prohibited comparative marketing communication. The Regulation 
also contains provisions on the procedure for making such an application and on the 
conduct of court proceedings. The Ministry does not have any evidence suggesting 
that the problem of misleading B2B advertising in Ireland is of a scale or severity that 
requires the establishment of a public enforcement mechanism. The advantage of a 
public enforcement mechanism for traders, particularly small traders, is clearly that it 
may relieve them of the cost and other burdens associated with the pursuit of private 
actions. The corresponding disadvantage is that it would transfer this cost and burden 
to public authorities in circumstances in which budgetary constraints make it difficult 
for public authorities to undertake their existing functions, let alone assume additional 
functions. The extension of public enforcement to misleading B2B advertising also has 
implications for the well-established principle in some Member States that businesses 
should look after their own interests in commercial dealings and not look to the State 
to do it for them. It may also lead to demands for an extension of public enforcement 
to other aspects of B2B relations. There is insufficient information to give an informed 
response to the question about the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing an effective 
enforcement framework for cross-border transactions. 
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• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No comments other than those above. A policymaker in a relevant Ministry indicated 
that awareness of rules in other jurisdictions, including Member States, was not such 
as to allow the question about best practice to be answered on an informed basis, 
suggesting that issues of awareness arising within the Member States, at a 
policymaking level, may itself be something that needs attention.  
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
As stated above, there has been little or no use made of the general clause, as 
transposed into Irish law in Section 41 CPA 2007. Section 43 has however been 
recently applied in a consumer finance transaction - Untoy v. GEC Capital (2015) in 
relation to misleading commercial practices. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
No comments other than the above.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
There are no tangible instances relating to the two derogations other than as stated 
above. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
As stated above, there is little or no evidence or data that allows this to be answered 
effectively.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
As stated above, there is not sufficient knowledge, data or expertise to provide a 
specific answer. 
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• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
As stated above, there is not sufficient knowledge, data or expertise to provide a 
specific answer. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
As stated above, there is not sufficient knowledge, data or expertise to provide a 
specific answer. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to a policymaker in the relevant consumer protection Ministry, the concept 
of 'invitation to purchase' was new to Irish law and remains one of the more 
problematical elements of the UCPD. It has been difficult, first, to determine where 
this concept fits in with the well-established (and reasonably well understood) 
concepts of 'offer' and 'invitation to treat'. There is a lack of clarity and certainty about 
the main elements of the definition ('characteristics of the product and the price', 'in a 
way appropriate to the means of the commercial communication used', and 'thereby 
enables the consumer to make a purchase'.) It is far from clear what information the 
trader is required to provide in respect of the 'characteristics of the product'. Article 
6(1)(b) of the Directive lists 18 separate items in its specification of the 'main 
characteristics' of the product. Should information about the characteristics (main and 
non-main) of the product involve even more items? It is far from clear similarly what 
level and type of information satisfies the criterion that it 'thereby enables the 
consumer to make a purchase’.  
This view was endorsed by another interviewee who said that traditional contract 
information concepts were helpful approximations but that the invitation to purchase 
has become much more prevalent with the advent of the digital age and the huge 
increase in online purchasing. Art 7(4) has introduced information requirements 
specifically for invitations to purchase. There may be a level of uncertainty as to 
whether the information required to be provided to consumers is that information that 
relates solely to the transaction or whether it should be interpreted broadly so as to 
capture those factors which although not concerned directly with the transaction might 
influence the consumer's decision to transact.  
Litigation is seeking to explore these enforcement issues in the Irish courts. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
A policymaker in the relevant consumer Ministry expressed sympathy for the plight of 
traders on this issue, saying that while the individual directives may have some 
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rationale or justification, there is little doubt but that many traders view them as an 
excessively complex and confusing set of overlapping rules.  
There is a need, many of the interviewees said, for a review of the multiplicity of 
information requirements in force under different pieces of European Union legislation 
(UCPD, Price Indications Directive, Services Directive, e-Commerce Directive, 
Consumer Rights Directive, etc.). Such a review should have regard to the 
commitment in the EU Small Business Act to reduce and simplify the regulatory 
burden on SMEs. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
In Irish law there is a wider definition of 'consumer' that is applicable in respect of the 
jurisdiction of the Financial Services Ombudsman to investigate consumer complaints. 
The same definition of a 'consumer' is operative in respect of the application of the 
Central Bank Consumer Protection Code on respect of the application of the Code to 
investors (i.e. persons who finance investments by commercial borrowing). A 
consumer is: 
(a) a person or group of persons, but not an incorporated body, with an annual 
turnover in excess of EUR 3 million in the previous financial year; or 
(b) incorporated bodies having an annual turnover of EUR 3 million in the 
previous financial year.  
Scholarly writing has not raised the question whether the UCPD should be extended or 
revised so as to apply to B2B transactions, much less the cross-border implications of 
such changes.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
There are no studies in Ireland that address this and material is absent from academic 
sources. There is however a provisional comment from the relevant Ministry that 
suggests a willingness to review the alignment issue: 
‘Aligning the legal regimes for B2B and B2C transactions in the area of 
commercial practices, the provisions on misleading advertising in the 
Regulations that give effect to the MCAD in Ireland are, subject to the 
necessary modifications, modelled on Article 6 of the UCPD, rather than on 
Article 3 of the MCAD, particularly in respect of the list of product or trader 
attributes that can be the subject of misleading advertising. This is an 
alignment that merits consideration in our view.’ 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
There are no studies in Ireland that address this and material is absent from academic 
sources. Ministry comments suggest that this issue merits consideration. One business 
organisation, reflecting on the Groceries Order (S.I. No. 35 of 2016) (which introduces 
a dispute resolution mechanism for B2B disputes over groceries) warned about the 
unintended consequences of legislating for narrow disputes when loose definitions may 
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well have the effect of facilitating litigation amongst retailers who were not intended to 
be caught. S.I. No. 35 of 2016 was intended to deal with grocery supply contracts but 
some disputes involving large pharmacy outlets and supermarkets may now be 
engaged by the S.I. because pharmacies and supermarkets often sell groceries. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
A policymaker in the relevant Ministry said that any Irish view on this would depend in 
large part on the content of any such blacklist. Ireland would have no objection per se 
to the inclusion of blacklist provisions in a revised MCAD but in view of the fact that 
misleading B2B practices of a serious nature appear to be relatively few in number, 
any such blacklist should reflect this fact. The interviewee indicated that a MCAD 
blacklist that came close to the thirty one items on the UCPD blacklist would be 
considered sceptically.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
The view of a senior policymaker in the relevant Ministry is that Ireland has reserved 
its position on any such issue. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
The view of a senior policymaker in the relevant Ministry was that the Regulations that 
give effect to the MCAD in Ireland provide that in making an order on foot of an 
application under the Regulations, the Court may impose terms or conditions that it 
considers appropriate. The interviewee said there was willingness to consider a right of 
action in B2B cases similar to that which applies in B2C cases under section 74 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 2007.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
A senior policymaker in the relevant Ministry said that Ireland would consider 
proposals for such adaptations ‘on their merits’. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Section 74 of CPA 2007 provides that consumers are to have a right of action for 
damages in respect of unfair, misleading or aggressive practices that fall outside 
meeting a commitment in a code of practice or the operation of a pyramid scheme. 
There is no case law. Section 74 is examined in Donnelly and White, para. 9-81. While 
there are public policy principles at common law, it is difficult to see these as being 
applicable. Even a breach of the Central Bank Consumer Code 2012 is not actionable 
in damages, nor does non-compliance make transactions unenforceable by the 
financial services provider (e.g. a bank or other lender). 
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• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Yes. One case in which an insurance product buyer recovered damages: Untoy v. GEC 
Capital (2015, HC).  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The range of enforcement mechanisms that are extra contractual suggests that 
Ireland does not wish to add a range of contractual options that are remedies vis-à-vis 
UCPD non-compliance. Principles such as caveat emptor are still strong in consumer 
sales law and case law in contract and tort, as well as some contract and tort law 
practices are addressed by statutory implied terms, e.g. a limitation clause seeking to 
limit or exclude liability for a non-fraudulent, pre-contractual misrepresentation must 
pass a statutory fair and reasonable test (SOGSA 1980, section 46). 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Before considering this question it is necessary to point out that in traditional Irish 
consumer sales law the starting point is the principle of caveat emptor – Sale of Goods 
and Supply of Services Act 1980. The implied terms as to goods meeting their 
description, merchantability and fitness for purpose are exceptions. The main effect of 
the 1980 Act is to make a trader’s contractual attempts to exclude or limit liability 
void. In the case of contracts for services there are some statutory implied terms. 
(e.g. service provider has the skill necessary to render the service) but in a B2C 
service contract these terms can be excluded if fair and reasonable: 1980 Act, section 
39 and 40. Thus, the philosophy behind the UCTD, rooted as it is in German law, is 
quite difficult to accommodate within Irish common law and statute law framework. 
There are a number of interpretative decisions from the Irish Courts that support a 
good faith perspective e.g. Carroll v. An Post National Lottery (1996) when terms are 
onerous or unusual but Irish law does not confine this to consumer contracts – as a 
limited doctrine it can also operate in B2B transactions – James Elliott Construction v. 
Irish Asphalt (2011) (High Court decision). The law in Ireland on unconscionable 
bargains is both centuries old and rich in terms of legal tradition but it is not applied in 
sales law transactions. Unconscionable bargain protection is confined to property 
transactions in the main, when one party is weak and at a disadvantage to the other 
party, the contract terms and surrounding circumstances indicate unfairness and the 
weaker party has acted without independent advice. When the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive was initially transposed by Statutory Instrument (S.I. No. 26 of 1995), 
Donnelly and White comment on the lack of imagination displayed by successive Irish 
legislators to use the potential inherent in UCTD: 
‘Like most early consumer protection directives, Directive 93/13 was 
transposed into Irish law with the most minimal domestic engagement and 
the UTCC Regulations do not expand the scale of consumer protection 
beyond that of Directive 93/13. The UTCC regulations have not been 
revisited in any depth since their original transposition although the civil 
enforcement remedies available have been expanded. There has also been 
minimal judicial engagement with the UTCC Regulations, with only one 
reported judgement to date (2014).’ 
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Of the cases mentioned by Donnelly and White in Consumer Law Rights and 
Regulation, the reported case concerned an arbitration clause and the issue was 
whether arbitration was the consumer’s sole remedy. Other cases have been engaged 
with the question whether the goods/services were provided to a consumer in the 
strict sense (e.g. loans for property investments). The most important case involved 
standard terms in a building contract – Re Application under Article 8(1) (December 5, 
2001), discussed by Dorgan [2002] Law Society Gazette 12 to 17. This case is a ‘one 
off’ in the sense that court-sanctioned blacklisting of terms has not subsequently 
featured in Irish litigation.  
The principle-based approach has been considered by the Irish Law Reform 
Commission in its 2011 Consultation Paper on Reform of Irish Insurance Law. 
Attention was drawn to the ‘core’ provision and uncertainty over its scope and 
application. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
Transposition of the indicative list has been literal in form. There have been no 
reported cases in which the list has been discussed by an Irish Court. However, in the 
case of the Irish regulatory body that is responsible for judicial enforcement, the 
impact of the general clause and indicative list, when combined, has been said to be 
complementary. Relying solely on the indicative list, it was said, would not be enough 
because, during negotiations, traders have pointed to the absence of the practice in 
question on the indicative list. The enforcement agency states that the indicative list 
can operate as a reference point against which terms can be compared; the grey list 
carries a strong persuasive effect. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists, key aspects 
to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it make a difference to 
have such a list?] 
Not applicable to Ireland.  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: Have the effects of court decisions establishing the unfairness of an 
unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned or to the 
contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this work in 
practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects of court 
decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
The only Irish written decision is a record of an extempore decision handed down by 
the Irish High Court on December 5, 2002 and contained in an article by Patrick 
Dorgan in [2002] Law Society Gazette 12. Under Regulation 8(1) of S.I. No. 27 of 
1995 the Enforcement Agency (now CCPC): 
‘may apply to the High Court for, and may, at the discretion of the 
Court, be granted, an order prohibiting the use or, as may be 
appropriate, the continued use of any term in contracts concluded by 
sellers or suppliers adjudged by the court to be an unfair term’ (See 
now S.I. No. 160 of 2013.) 
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It should be noted that the application is an administrative matter: a consumer cannot 
use it: 
• it must be made by the Statutory Regulator; 
• the application need not be based upon a specific dispute; 
• the order does not address any specific contract or contractual relationship; 
• the order is given at the discretion of the court; 
• the order sought, if granted, is prohibitory of terms used by sellers or suppliers; 
• the order speaks to future use – ‘continued use’.  
The order actually given by the High Court judge applied to 15 terms and variants 
thereon: the order prohibited ‘any term that is intended to, or does in fact, have like 
effect’. Amongst these 15 clauses were: 
• entire agreement clauses; 
• clauses excluding liability for death or personal injury; 
• penalty clauses; 
• unilateral termination clause for the supplier; 
• one way extension of fixed term contracts. 
See the list at [2002] Law Society Gazette, page 16.  
Therefore, in response to this question, it is evident that Irish law does enable the 
regulatory body to obtain court orders that may regulate contractual terms across a 
sector with appropriate safeguards being in place via a court hearing and the exercise 
of a judicial discretion. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The Directive has been literally transposed. Little or no Irish jurisprudence has been 
produced to date. As the jurisprudence of the ECJ/CJEU reveals, there are drafting 
ambiguities in the Directive that must be addressed by the courts within the EU. The 
view of the current enforcement regulator, in summing up Irish practical experience 
over the last decade is to explain that the practice is not to go to court but to open a 
dialogue with the trader concerned and discuss the fairness or otherwise of a 
particular term. Rather than using UCT Regulations there is use made of an 
undertakings procedure under the Consumer Protection Act 2007 (i.e. UCPD) that has 
been more successful. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Not applicable to Ireland.  
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Irish law transposes Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 but no case law exists on this vis-
à-vis whether the contract will continue in existence.  
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There are no Irish cases on the interpretation of the ‘core terms’ exemption. Academic 
commentary on ‘core terms’ is critical of the lack of clarity on this point and the failure 
of the Irish Government to revise Irish law in the light of CJEU decisions such as the 
Kasler case C-26/13. See Donnelly and White.8  
The National Consumer Agency, predecessor of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (CCPC) set out a number of important points of practice in its 
Unfair Contract Terms Guidance Document, Identifying and Avoiding the Use of Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts (June 2014).  
Enforcing the Directive involves a network of mechanisms. Under the 1995 
Regulations the powers were vested in the Office of the Director of Consumer Affairs 
although in 2000 the regulations were amended to cover other consumer bodies that 
met a statutory test.  
Co-operation agreements between the successor body (NCA and now the CCPC) and 
the Central Bank give the Central Bank and CCPC concurrent functions in relation to 
enforcement powers in relation to consumer financial services. In the energy sector 
the Commission for Energy Regulation has a consumer protection division which 
investigates consumer complaints over matters such as misleading advertising.  
Enforcement preferences, as stated above, revolve around reaching agreements to 
amend unfair contract terms under formal agreements facilitated by the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007, section 73. In this way both the UCTD and the UCPD provide 
complimentary enforcement mechanisms that avoid the need for (expensive) 
litigation.  
The energy regulatory body stated the sanctions are effective.  
In relation to telecommunications, the pattern set in Ireland (which relates to 
enforcement by negotiation and settlement) has recently been added to the use of 
fixed penalty notice provisions. The Regulator, ComReg has used UCPD powers in a 
Press Release. It was said: 
‘Virgin Media Ireland Limited (‘Virgin Media’) is to pay the Commission for 
Communications Regulation (ComReg) a EUR 255 000 penalty after an 
investigation found that Virgin failed to provide 26,046 of its customers 
with a contract in a durable form. This is in contravention of the Consumer 
Information Regulations 2013.  
ComReg has imposed this penalty in the form of Fixed Payment Notices 
(‘FPNs’) under Section 85 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007. Virgin 
Media has accepted that it breached the Consumer Information Regulations 
2013 and has committed to pay the penalty in full.  
ComReg investigated Virgin Media as a result of complaints from Virgin 
customers who said they did not receive contracts from the company in 
durable form. This made it difficult for the affected Virgin Media customers 
to recognise and see exactly what they were being charged for by the 
company.  
This is the first time that ComReg has imposed FPNs. ComReg has the 
power to issue FPNs under the Consumer Protection Act 2007 for breaches 
of the Consumer Information Regulations 2013. The Consumer Information 
Regulations 2013 give consumers certain protections where contracts are 
concluded online, by telesales etc. or otherwise by means of what is known 
as a ‘distance contract’.’ 
 
8 Consumer Law Rights and Regulation para 5-88.  
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
According to consumer protection organisations and advocates, while the UCTD has 
been effective in providing guidelines and reference points in assessing unfair terms, it 
has a need for expanded application. Individual consumers can rely on the Directive in 
court cases but in practice, costs of proceedings are prohibitive for most cases other 
than small claims jurisdiction. No statistics exist on UCTD cases here. Academic 
commentary supports recent proposals to build upon a provision in the Arbitration Act 
2010 that designates a contract that requires a trader and consumer in an arbitration 
to pay their own costs an unfair term under the Regulations.  
Ireland has established a policy whereby when these provisions are reviewed in 
Parliament, a court should have to consider the unfairness of a term regardless of 
whether this has been pleaded in the case. It has also been recommended to apply 
the UCTD to negotiated terms. The biggest improvement the Ministry had advanced is 
that it should be expressly provided that terms should be legible, clearly presented 
and readily accessible. ‘Core’ terms should only excluded from assessment if 
prominent and transparent, that is, brought to the attention of the consumer in such a 
way as to lead to the conclusion that the consumer be aware of the term. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
There is no evidence that vis-à-vis the United Kingdom the general fairness clause has 
any impact on cross border trade. From experience with consumers, geoblocking 
practices and currency factors are more important differentials. Retail Ireland has 
recently highlighted that online sales effected via Amazon are 30% higher than a year 
ago and that the fall in the value of sterling following the UK referendum on leaving 
the European Union on 23 June 2016 has exacerbated a trend under which some 70% 
of online sales are effected by Irish buyers with companies located outside the 
jurisdiction of Ireland.9 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Donnelly and White have this to say about the impact that Irish minimal transposition 
may have in this context: 
‘Ireland was unusual among EU Member States in choosing to transpose 
Directive 93/13 without any expansion of the scope of protection afforded 
to consumers in respect of unfair terms. As a result, Irish consumers are 
less well protected in respect of unfair terms than consumers in most other 
Member States. While a lax regime is clearly problematical for Irish 
consumers, it may also increasingly serve as an impediment to Irish 
9 Irish Times November 29, 2016 “Online Shoppers migrate to UK Websites”,  
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businesses seeking to compete in the cross border market. As discussed 
above, Directive 2011/83 now requires Commission publication, inter alia, 
on a designated website of measures taken by Member States that extend 
consumer protection beyond the terms of Directive 93/13. While it is not 
clear how many consumers will actually use such a website, the publication 
of this information will undoubtedly have a trickle-down effect through 
other forms of media. Thus, a reputation for limited consumer protection 
from unfair terms could render Irish businesses less competitive. For this 
reason, there is a strong case for a thoroughgoing review of Irish consumer 
protection in respect of unfair terms. […] 
Secondly, the ‘core terms’ exemption, as it stands, leaves the most 
significant aspects of consumer contracts outside of the scope of consumer 
protection, very often without the consumer’s awareness that a particular 
term is part of the core terms of the contract […] if the ‘core terms’ 
exemption is to be maintained, the issue of ‘hidden’ core terms must be 
addressed more effectively than is the case at present. […] 
Finally, the lack of formal legal standing for the indicative list needs to be 
addressed. There is a risk that designating terms as automatically unfair 
will have an undesirable impact on the market; therefore, while there may 
be a case for some blacklisting, any moves in this direction should be 
approached with care. There is a stronger case for introducing a formal 
presumption of unfairness where a term is in accordance with the terms 
mentioned in the list. As well as introducing greater clarity in respect of 
judicial assessment, this would also enhance the enforcement capabilities 
of authorised bodies and provide consumers with a more definitive 
indication of what is, and is not, legally acceptable.’10 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Consumer awareness that some jurisdictions might, in a formal sense, provide a 
degree of consumer protection that only meets a minimal standard in terms of not 
applying to individually negotiated terms, or core terms examination (as in Ireland) 
may provide a barrier to cross-border trade. Arguably this should be a matter for each 
jurisdiction to address any substantive law shortcomings. Also see quotation from 
Donnelly and White in connection with the last question.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
This is little demonstrable enthusiasm for the expansion of UCTD provisions into B2B 
contracts. While some contractual disputes in respect of insurance and other financial 
services contracts between SMEs with a turnover of EUR 3 million and financial 
services companies come under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank and Financial 
Services Ombudsman, this has not permeated into a general demand for expansion. 
Ireland, unlike many other Member States, does not have any general provisions to 
regulate unfair B2B terms. The relevant Ministry sees any such development as a 
fundamental shift in the way in which commercial transactions are regulated in 
Ireland. There has been one recent development in respect of the supply of food and 
10 Consumer Law Rights and Regulation paras, 5-152 to 5-155.    
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drink to supermarkets in the form of grocery goods contracts, with term transparency 
and unfair term implications but this is exceptional as a piece of Irish legislation and 
academic commentators think that suppliers will be slow to use S.I. No. 35 of 2016 (a 
UCPD piece of legislation in the sense that the legislative basis rests on a permissive 
provision in the 2007 legislation). The negative consequences for freedom of contract 
outweigh any benefits that may arise. On the other hand, one of the business 
organisations in the course of an interview said that the CCPC and the previous entity, 
the NCA, was reluctant to get involved in examining B2B disputes even where the 
complainant is a micro business or SME and the ‘offender’ is a multinational. Few 
SMEs have the scale or resources to initiate private proceedings and in the absence of 
CCPC action the matter is left unresolved, even though consumers suffer when the 
larger entity imposes unfair terms on the micro business or SME. Another business 
organisation tentatively suggested that enforcement and costs are of critical 
importance. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Irish law in general does not require good faith in negotiation. Good faith during 
performance may be inferred so a statutory good faith requirement would be opposed 
by Irish commercial entities if it were to be a mandatory rule of law. Costs of litigation 
and commercial uncertainty that would result are not acceptable consequences of Irish 
business.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
See answers to this question above in this section. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
See answers to this question above in this section. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
See answers to this question above in this section. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
See answers to this question above in this section. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
See answers to this question above in this section. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
See answers to this question above in this section.  
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment? 
In relation to the UCTD the statutory enforcement agency, the Office of the Director of 
Consumer Affairs (later the National Consumer Agency, now the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) was the only body that could seek statutory 
enforcement remedies. In 2000 the Irish regulations on UCTD were amended to allow 
any other ‘consumer organisation’ to constitute an ‘authorised body’ for enforcement 
purposes (S.I. No. 307 of 2000). In 2013 there were changes made by S.I. No. 160 of 
2013 which extended the status of an authorised body to the Central Bank for the 
purposes of financial services enforcement. In 2011 the Central Bank and the National 
Consumer Agency (predecessor to the CCPC) signed a cooperation agreement under 
Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007. Where there are concurrent functions 
this cooperation agreement procedure allows one body (in this instance the (now) 
CCPC) to forbear from exercising its enforcement functions under the UCTD 
enforcement regulations in respect of a financial service provided by a regulated 
financial service provider unless the CCPC and the Bank agree ‘within a reasonable 
timeframe that the Bank has chosen not to exercise such functions’: See Donnelly and 
White, paragraph 5 – 141.  
It follows that the three enforcement bodies in Ireland (the CCPC, any consumer 
organisation and the Central Bank) enjoy enforcement powers under UCTD. These 
authorised bodies can apply to the Circuit Court or High Court for a declaration that 
any term drawn up for use between consumers and sellers, and that the Court has a 
discretion to grant an order prohibiting the use of such a term or a term having similar 
effect. This provision is not much used.11 Enforcement provisions under the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007, transposing the UCPD include prohibition orders and compliance 
notices under Sections 71 and 75 of the 2007 Act (available as civil reliefs) from the 
Circuit Court or High Court. Thus, under the UCTD and UCPD, before the ID was 
transposed, injunction type reliefs were in place. In practice, there is no real use of 
the ID in Ireland at all. The relevant Ministry in relation to contracts involving the 
retail sector, reported that some traders in the retail sector had sought injunctions and 
other court orders under the comparative advertising parts of the Directive on 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising.  
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
As the ID replicates existing provisions at national level, there is no data on this. 
Donnelly and White state that the ID ‘remains an alternative tool for enforcement of 
consumer law’. But the statutory enforcement agency itself in the interview indicated 
that it has never had to invoke the procedures set out in the current transposing 
measure. An experienced practitioner with a strong academic background in consumer 
law credited the drafters of the 2007 Consumer Protection legislation with the lack of 
visibility that the ID has in Ireland. The 2007 legislation has a comprehensive 
remedies system in terms of mandatory orders being available and the view was 
11 See Dorgan [2002] Law Society Gazette 12 for one instance 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
584
expressed that few practitioners knew of S.I. No. 555/2010 as a separate remedy. 
Lack of use was attributed to the expense of obtaining an injunction, particularly 
where multiple jurisdictions were concerned. Businesses rather than consumers 
express more interest in the ID when rivals ‘tarnish’ a brand (e.g. by web advertising 
practices that are likely to confuse consumers). 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes. Directive 2011/83/EC has been added. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Donnelly and White address the effectiveness issue but do not do so by reference to 
Irish materials. They refer to Commission Report COM (2012) 635 final. In the 
interviews two interviewees indicated that the mutual assistance/cooperation 
provisions under which the enforcement agencies communicated with each other over 
cross border complaints/investigations was more cost effective than seeking 
injunctions on a cross-border basis. As the enforcement agencies in Ireland do not use 
the ID there cannot be any data on obstacles to use in Ireland. However, the relevant 
Ministry, without any empirical evidence to support this view, suggested the main 
obstacle is likely to be the cost of legal proceedings.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
There is not much point in extending the scope of a Directive that seems to be little 
used other than on a mutual cooperation level. In an interview the relevant Ministry 
said that there would be no support for proposals to extend protection to collective 
business interests. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
It has never been used in Ireland. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
It has never been used in Ireland. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
The ID procedure has never been used in Ireland so there are no national measures 
that inform the issue of improvements that may be made to the injunction procedure.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
As set out above, the ID was transposed separately by way of a distinct statutory 
instrument, S.I. No. 449 of 2001 transposed Directive 98/27/EC and S.I. No. 555 of 
2010 transposed the Consolidated Directive, Directive 2009/22/EC. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The separate enforcement mechanisms under, on the one hand, the UCTD and the 
UCPD transposition measures, and the ID transposing measures, are broadly similar in 
a formal and structural sense. Both involve enforcement by seeking Court orders by 
way of Circuit Court applications (although the High Court may also take injunction in 
regard to the UCTD and UCPD provisions). The coherence that exists as between the 
application of these two broadly parallel streams of regulation can be said to be 
cultural in a sense. The traditional approach to enforcement since 1978 has been to 
seek to mediate and educate traders into following best practice guidelines and ensure 
that traders agree to follow compliance agreements secured by the enforcement body. 
Instances of egregious conduct are normally addressed via criminal prosecutions by 
the enforcement body. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
In terms of the views of consumer rights and enforcement stakeholders the UCTD was 
seen as a ‘ground breaking’ measure that strikes a balance between a consumer 
having to negotiate contract terms and being bound by standard terms over which the 
consumer would have no chance of negotiating improvements. One enforcement 
professional said that the possibility of a consumer reopening a contract improves 
consumer confidence but it also forces the trader to think beyond the immediate 
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transaction. The same enforcement professional said that the same can be said of the 
UCPD, requiring the trader to abandon a caveat emptor philosophy and exercise 
professional diligence standards in relation to consumers. The academic opinion of 
Donnelly and White explore the economic dimensions of providing effective consumer 
redress. At paragraph 10 – 09 of Consumer Rights and Regulation they write: 
‘Effective consumer redress plays a crucial role in growing the consumer 
market and making this market operate more efficiently. Effective 
consumer redress contributes to heightened consumer confidence and 
improved market discipline. If consumers believe they have effective 
redress they will be more prepared to enter the market in question, thus 
facilitating growth in the market and more effective competition.’ 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Academic opinion from Donnelly and White points to the significance of market 
discipline for traders. They write (op. cit.) that market discipline is enhanced because 
traders will desist from certain practices when the costs of anti-consumer practices 
exceed the benefits for them: this is a self-regulatory mechanism. This however 
depends on the trader acting rationally and the enforcement measures being effective. 
As an enforcement professional pointed out, a trader should not be economically 
disadvantaged by complying with the law while other traders do not. Policing is 
however entirely reliant on adequate resources being available to ensure compliance 
and take enforcement action when necessary. In some ways criminal law measures 
are the best form of enforcement mechanism, as several interviewees said. The high 
profile created by the September 2016 Fixed Penalty notice agreement between 
ComReg and Virgin Media (EUR 255 000 fine) creates a real sense of ‘compliance as 
culture’ and strengthens CCPC and other regulators in their education of consumers 
mission. A business organisation commented that honest traders were often restricted 
by the unwillingness of consumer enforcement agencies to engage in B2B disputes, 
remarking that new laws are of little value unless there are enforcement mechanisms, 
and that SMEs and individual traders do not have the capacity to take prosecutions or 
undertake enforcement actions directly. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
One enforcement professional gave the view that there was no excessive burden on 
traders in the context of securing compliance with the Directives. Costs of court 
proceedings, while very high in Ireland, must be seen in the context of a culture of 
negotiation and mediation with traders by regulators, with criminal law charges being 
reserved for extreme cases. At the transaction cost level, it was said that the same 
level of effort will be needed to draft a compliant standard form contract as it will be 
for a non-compliant contract. Once a contract is drafted in a compliant manner, it is 
unlikely to require further remedial work and attract consumer and regulatory 
disapproval or sanction. The existence of the general clause in the UCPD repairs a 
defect in the general law prior to 2007 in Ireland and even if this is an additional cost, 
procuring professional diligence from traders is a cost worth bearing. Fees in 
employing legal advice when a trader is seeking to trade in a multiplicity of 
jurisdictions can be an issue but many see this as an opportunity cost that is worth 
bearing. The relevant Ministry expressed the view that trader costs should be seen as 
an essential cost of doing business.  
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• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
An enforcement professional said it was difficult to assess the costs involved as each 
case turns on its own facts. Criminal prosecutions can result in the award of court 
costs if the prosecution is successful but these do not provide reimbursement of 
investigation costs. The same is true of civil proceedings, rare though they are in 
Ireland. In both these contexts, civil and criminal proceedings, it was said that the 
attitude of the trader will be a significant determinant on the level of effort and the 
commensurate costs that an enforcement agency will be prepared to expend. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
An enforcement professional as well as an interviewee in the relevant Ministry 
answered ‘No’ to this question. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
It is difficult to see how this could be done without damaging the level of consumer 
protection. In Ireland civil legal aid for consumer disputes does not exist in reality. In 
any event, the question assumes that courts see the law in EU terms. As one 
interviewee put it, court costs will not really differ where a consumer relies on national 
sales law and (transposed) directives and costs will not be easy to apportion to 
directives, national rules, and directive-based national rules. Budgets are under strain 
across the Irish State sector.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
There are no official statistics that would inform questions concerning the levels of 
awareness of consumers or traders in respect of the relationship between sector 
specific consumer protection legislation on the one hand, and UCPD and UCTD on the 
other. In the Energy Sector, the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) is chiefly 
responsible for the protection of energy customers who interact with licensed energy 
suppliers for the supply of gas and electricity. CER has general consumer protection 
functions but the CCPC is the enforcement body. CER has functions in regard to 
consumer protection measures, specifically as a body that is required to approve 
energy suppliers’ codes of practice. Consumer law compliance obligations are set out 
in Electricity and Gas Supply Licence Conditions and the Suppliers Handbook. CER has 
also implemented specific requirements in respect of marketing and advertising by 
suppliers. These are found in a Code of Practice on Marketing and Advertising which is 
contained in the Suppliers Handbook. These documents are available from the CER 
website. A similar structure and relationship exists in respect of telecommunications 
regulation as between CCPC and the Commission for Communications Regulation. The 
Cooperation Agreements are formal and regulated agreements under Section 19(10) 
of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014. Some studies completed in 
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2014 by CER in relation to consumer awareness are available on the CER website. 
Other sectoral prescribed bodies that must under statute interact with the CCPC, inter 
alia, in relation to decisions by prescribed bodies affecting consumers include the 
relevant prescribed bodies for broadcasting, financial services, aviation, data 
protection, environmental protection, the Central Bank, Financial Services 
Ombudsman, food safety, health insurance and transport.  
It is open to conjecture whether the prescribed bodies are as aware of the sector 
specific and horizontal directives although the prescribed bodies themselves appear to 
insist that suppliers must meet all legal standards if they are to meet licensing 
conditions.  
The relevant enforcement agency indicated in an interview that general awareness by 
sectoral prescribed bodies has been improving but that periodic refreshment of the 
messages was needed. Prosecution efforts are based on the UCPD so they are well 
known. One interviewee pointed out that terminology can be a barrier. Most directives 
address ‘consumers’ but in the transport sector the directives address ‘passengers’. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Ireland the enforcement body that is charged with enforcement is the CCPC. While 
in the area of financial services the Central Bank is the enforcement body, recent 
legislative changes render enforcement and other functions concurrently vested in the 
Central Bank and the CCPC (2010). A 2011 Cooperation Agreement was provided for 
under what is now section 19(1) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 
2014. See Donnelly and White Consumer Law Rights and Regulation, paragraph 2 – 57 
for a list of the prescribed bodies that must consult with the CCPC. It is evident 
therefore that prescribed bodies, as such, are not enforcement agencies but they do 
serve as bodies that can refer matters to CCPC once a consumer has exhausted any 
grievances he or she may have with licensed suppliers/contractors in the relevant 
sector.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Sector specific prescribed bodies work in conjunction with the CCPC under the 
statutory framework of cooperation agreements. As pointed out above, the Central 
Bank and CCPC hold dual powers for financial services. 
Nothing further can be added to that explained above and the enforcement body, in 
the interview, simply expressed the view that these mechanisms work quite well. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
Several interviewees believed that the dichotomy had tangible benefits insofar as 
sectoral bodies very quickly developed specialist knowledge of the kinds of undesirable 
practices that developed in specific sectors. Because these practices often took place 
within the context of industries which required participant traders to comply with 
general laws as a precondition to trading/renewal of licences, it was thought that the 
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threat of commercial sanctions like removal of a licence could often bring undesirable 
practices to an end, following discussion between the prescribed body and the trader. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Because the relationship between the sector-specific regulatory bodies and the CCPC 
has been fixed by statute – section 19(1) of the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Act 2014 is the current basis – there appears to be no need for further clarification. 
The only case where there is a lack of clarity, according to Donnelly and White, relates 
to the relationship between the Central Bank and the CCPC. The authors seek to argue 
that the concurrent jurisdiction of both bodies in certain areas requires monitoring so 
as to ‘ensure that consumer protection in the financial services context is delivered in 
a maximally effective way’.12 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The Irish enforcement agency believes that there is a case to be made to extend the 
two unfair terms and practices directive to consumer to business transactions. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Most enforcement and prescribed bodies are of the view that the definitions of 
consumer and vulnerable consumer are generally clear and beneficial. Attention has 
been drawn above to the way in which legislation transposing the UCPD has 
broadened out the vulnerable consumer definition.  
In the context of the energy sector, the definition of a vulnerable consumer has been 
expanded in S.I. No. 463 of 2013 which refers to a consumer’s vulnerability to 
disconnection from energy supplies: These regulations provide, in addition to UCTD 
and UCPD rules: 
‘‘vulnerable customer’ means a household customer who is – 
(a) critically dependent on electricity powered equipment, which shall 
include but is not limited to life protecting devices, assistive technologies to 
support independent living and medical equipment, or 
(b) particularly vulnerable to disconnection during winter months for 
reasons of advanced age or physical, sensory, intellectual or mental 
health.’ 
Additional protections are in place in relation to advertising practices and vulnerable 
consumers. 
 
12 Consumer Law Rights and Regulation para 2-102. 
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• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The consumer enforcement body states that this issue has not been raised or 
discussed in Ireland. There are no Irish experiences that inform any such debate on 
expanding the unfair terms legislation into sector specific directives. One interviewee 
asked what the point would be, as Directive 93/13 applies anyway.  
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The overall assessment of the protection of consumers, the information provided to 
consumers, and the positive nature of EU action cannot be in doubt. All interviewees 
said EU action had improved the consumer protection landscape. The enforcement 
agency interviewee in particular said that in the last nine years of his time in his job 
the importance of the community acquis provisions and the increasingly sophisticated 
awareness of Irish consumers was a remarkable development. Acting in conjunction 
with national regulators and particularly through websites, self-help and complaints by 
consumers demonstrated considerable developments in terms of consumer 
assertiveness. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Pricing mechanisms were part of the landscape in Ireland since 1958 and under 
Groceries Orders, part of national law, but PID had improved the levels of compliance 
and consumer awareness. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Most interviewees did not express a view although one of them thought this was a 
difficult issue to quantify, particularly in the case of misleading advertising provisions. 
Enforcement and complaints here can involve trade mark issues as well as common 
law passing-off complaints. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Most interviewees were of the view that though a range of impediments to cross-
border selling remain, these are less marked than in the past and there are a number 
of proposals under the Digital Single Market Strategy to reduce them further. Cross-
border purchases by Irish consumers have increased steadily in recent years and this 
would suggest that it has become easier for consumers to buy goods, digital content 
or services from traders in other Member States. 
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• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
That is difficult to say. The increased level of harmonisation brought about by the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directives may have lessened some of the regulatory 
impediments to cross-border trade, while the increased protections provided by these 
Directives may have helped make consumers more confident in purchasing from 
traders in other Member States. Geoblocking, especially of digital content, is still a big 
issue. 
 
 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
592
Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – IRELAND  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
European Communities 
(Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts) Regulations 1995 
(S.I. No. 27 of 1995) (UCTR)  
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
No   
  'Grey list' of terms which may 
be considered unfair 
Yes UCTR, Reg 3(7) at 
Schedule 3 
 
  Extensions of the application 
of Directive to individually 
negotiated terms  
No   
  Extensions of the application 
of Directive terms on the 
adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
No   
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Consumer Protection Act 
2007 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Provisions regarding 
immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Consumer 
Protection Act 
2007, S.2(1) 
(definition of 
‘goods’) 
 
  Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection 
in the indication of 
the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
European Communities 
(Requirements to Indicate 
Product Prices) Regulations 
2002 (S.I. No. 639 of 2002) 
(2002 Regulations) 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes 2002 Regulations, 
Regulation 3 
Products supplied under provision of a service 
and auctions sales and sales of works of art and 
antiques 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
European Communities 
(Misleading and 
Comparative Marketing 
Communications) 
Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 
774 of 2007) 
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Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' interests 
European Communities 
(Court Orders for the 
Protection of Consumer 
Interests) Regulations 2010 
(S.I. No. 555 of 2010 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – IRELAND  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your country 
separately (as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the enforcement 
procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
or/and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
or/and by the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
Drafted in compliance with Directive 
2009/22/EC. Application is made by 
qualified entities to the Circuit 
Court.  
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
 Qualified entities are defined in the 
Directive for Member States other 
than Ireland. In Ireland The 
Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission is the only 
body that can use the Directive as 
an enforcement mechanism.  
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column 
for which infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an 
exemption  of some/all cost related to the 
procedure please explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
 S.I. No. 555 of 2010 specifies that 
‘nothing in the regulations affects 
the Court’s power to make an order 
for costs’. However, as these 
Regulations have never been 
invoked in an Irish court, there is no 
answer possible to this question.  
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to 
cover areas of consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- No, scope of the 
Directive not 
extended 
 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the 
comments column regarding type of business' 
interests covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly 
against several traders from the same economic 
sector or their associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the 
injunction procedures? (not including the 
consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement 
for party seeking 
injunction to 
consult with the 
defendant 
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Does the national legislation provide for measures 
ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments 
column. 
- Yes 
 
Qualified entity must make 
reasonable efforts to consult with 
the infringer and request cessation 
of infringement. After 
commencement of consultation, the 
qualified entity may make the 
application to the Circuit Court.  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the 
injunction order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen 
please specify in the comments column to who 
exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day 
of non-compliance 
 
The amount is to be specified in the 
Court Order and the payment is 
made to the Irish Exchequer (Central 
Fund). If payment is not made, the 
competent Minister may recover 
sum due as a simple contract debt.  
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
The Circuit Court makes provision 
for publicity when making the order.  
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained 
as a result of infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified 
entity or the public purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to 
the consumers concerned be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their individual 
claims for damages/remedies on the injunctions 
order?  
- No  
Can the qualified entity claim other measures 
beyond the injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance 
with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders 
extended to the future infringements and/or same 
or similar illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comment 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. 
CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
n.a n.a        
Note: No data exists in relation to this question. 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).13  
13 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure n.a     
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
n.a     
Notes: There are no precedents from Irish case law that can provide an approximate answer to the hypothetical 
example. There are no reported cases that could provide a benchmark. 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
No information is available upon which any answer could be made which would be 
even an approximate guide to the levels of use of court or arbitration mechanisms in 
assessing unfairness.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
599
C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission 
National Consumer Enforcement 
Authority 
September 6, October 19, 
2016 
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation 
Ministry September 12 and October 
10, 2016 
Commission for Energy Regulation National Regulatory Authority September 14 and 27, 2016 
4 ECC Ireland European Consumer Centre September 27, 2016 
Bar Library Member Consumer Rights Advocate October 21, 2016 
RGDATA Business Association November 9, 2016 
IBEC/Retail Ireland Business Association November 9, 2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Bird 2008 Consumer Protection Act 2007 
Barry and Others 2016 Blackstone’s Guide to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
Clark 2016 Contract Law in Ireland 
Davidson 2010 The Law of Electronic Commerce 
Donnelly & White 2014 Consumer Law: Rights and Regulation 
Donnelly & White 2013 Irish Consumer Law: Asserting a Domestic Agenda DULJ 1-34 
Donnelly & White 2008 The Effectiveness of Information-Based Consumer Protection Yearbook of 
Consumer Law 
Haigh 2001 Contract Law in an E-Commerce Age 
Heffron 2015 Energy Law 
Law Reform 
Commission 
2006 Report on Vulnerable Adults 
Lawson 2013 Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms 
Reilly 2005 The UCPD and the Average Consumer (10) (5) CLP 
Reilly 2009 
 
Trader Enforcement of Consumer Law DULJ 100 
Sales Law Review 
Group 
2011 Report on the Legislation Governing the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services 
White 2012 Commercial Law 
White 2015 Selling Online 22(2) CLP 31 and (22)3 CLP 63 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report ITALY 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD was implemented by legislative decree No. 146 of 2 August 2007, which 
introduced the current Art. 18-27-quater of the Italian ‘Consumer Code’. The 
legislative decree No. 221 of 23 October 2010 inserted then in the list of the 
‘Fundamental Rights of the Consumers’ contained in Art. 2 of the Consumer Code, the 
‘Right to commercial practices that are in conformity with the principles of good faith, 
fairness and loyalty’. Art. 7, Para 2 of law decree No. 1 of 24 January 2012 converted, 
with modifications, by law No. 27 of 24 March 2012 on ‘Urgent provisions for 
competition, infrastructure development and competitiveness’ introduced Art. 18, Para 
1, lit. d-bis of the Consumer Code, which inserted the definition of ‘micro enterprises’ 
in the general set of definitions laid down in Art. 18 of the Consumer Code (which 
implements Art. 1 and 2 of the UCPD)1 and partially extended to the relationships 
business-to-microenterprises the scope of application of the implementing provisions 
of the UCPD by modifying Art. 19, Para 1 of the Consumer Code (which implements 
Art. 3 UCPD).2  
Art. 36 of the law decree No. 201/2011, which was converted with modifications by 
law No. 214 of 22 December 2011 on the ‘Conversion to law, with modifications, of 
law decree No. 201 of 6 December 2011 on urgent measures for the growth, equity 
and consolidation of public finances’ introduced then Para 3-bis of Art. 21 of the 
Consumer Code (which contains also the implementing provisions of Art. 6 UCPD), 
which specifically concerns unfair commercial practices laid down by banks, credit 
institutions or financial agencies and has been further modified by Art. 28, Para 3, of 
law decree No. 1 of 24 January 2012 converted, with modifications by law No. 27 of 
24 March 2012 on ‘Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development and 
competitiveness’.3 Furthermore law Decree No. 179 of 18 October 2012, which was 
converted with modifications by law No. 221 of 17 December 2012 later, introduced a 
new Para 4-bis into Art. 21 of the Consumer Code, which deals with the problems 
1 Art. 18, Para 1., lit. d-bis, Consumer Code: ‘d-bis) ‘micro-enterprises’: entities, companies or associations 
that, regardless of their legal form, engage in an economic activity, even as an individual or family, that 
employs fewer than ten persons and generates an annual revenue or total annual balance sheet not in 
excess of two million Euros, pursuant to section 2, paragraph 3 of the annex to recommendation 
2003/361/EC of the Commission, dated 6 May 2003’. 
2 Art. 19, Para 1, Consumer Code: ‘This Title shall apply to unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product as well as any unfair 
commercial practices between professionals and micro-enterprises. The protection of micro-enterprises 
from deceitful advertising and unlawful comparative advertising is explicitly guaranteed by legislative 
decree n. 145 of 2 August 2007’. In this regard see G. De Cristofaro, Unfair Business-to-Microenterprise 
Commercial Practices: The Italian Solution in the European Context – The Extended Scope of Application 
of UCP Directive’s Implementing Provisions, in Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2015, p. 
20 ff.; D. Valentino, Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. La tutela del consumatore e delle microimprese nelle 
pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Rivista di Diritto civile, 2013, p. 1157 ff. 
3 Art. 21, Para 3-bis, Consumer Code: ‘It is considered to be an unfair commercial practice when a bank, 
credit institution or financial agency makes the stipulation of a loan contract conditional on the stipulation 
of an insurance policy supplied by the same bank, institution or intermediary or to open an account with 
the same bank, institution or intermediary. 
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arising from the costs-surcharge for the finalisation of an electronic transaction with a 
supplier of goods or services.4  
As specifically concerns misleading omissions, Art 22 of law No. 99 of 23 July 2009 
containing ‘Provisions for the development and internationalisation of firms, and 
regarding Energy’ introduced Art. 22-bis of the Consumer Code, which specifically 
deals with deceptive advertising of prices charged by maritime companies.5 
Art. 27 of the Consumer Code regulates the enforcement measures that can be taken 
by the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato against businesses which 
infringe the prohibition of unfair commercial practices.6 The businesses can challenge 
the decisions (Provvedimenti) of the AGCM before the Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale (TAR) Lazio-Roma,7 whose judgements can be challenged before the 
Consiglio di Stato (the highest administrative court in Italy).8  
If the trader infringes the prohibition of unfair commercial practices, consumer 
associations are entitled to pursue an injunction for the protection of their collective 
interests according to Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer Code (which implement 
directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests9) and 
the individual consumer is entitled to the ‘Azione di classe’ (a kind of class-action) 
regulated by Art. 140-bis of the Consumer Code.10 
Art. 19, Para 3 of the Consumer Code (which implements Art. 3, Para 4 UCPD) further 
provides that ‘In the event of conflict, the provisions of Community directives or other 
Community legislation, and the national provisions transposing them to govern specific 
aspects of unfair commercial practices shall prevail over the provisions of this Title and 
shall apply to these specific aspects’.11 In order to clarify the meaning of this provision 
4 Art. 21, Para 4-bis, Consumer Code: ‘It is considered to be an unfair commercial practice to require costs 
surcharge for the finalization of an electronic transaction with a supplier of goods or services’. 
5 Art. 22-bis, Consumer Code: ‘Advertising regarding prices charged by maritime companies operating from 
Italy either directly or under code-sharing agreements is deemed deceptive when it advertises the cost of 
the ticket purchased from the maritime company separately from additional charges, port taxes and from 
any other charges borne by the consumer, the maritime company being obliged to advertise a single price 
which includes all of these items’. 
6 The decisions of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato are available at: 
http://www.agcm.it/consumatore--delibere/consumatore-provvedimenti.html. See A. Ciatti, Art. 27 
Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al Diritto dei consumatori, 
2nd ed., Padua 2013, p. 226 ff. 
7 The decisions of the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale Lazio-Roma are available at: 
https://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/cdsavvocati/faces/provvedimentiRic.jsp?_afrLoop=5268480246385225&_afrWindowMod
e=0&_adf.ctrl-state=cy8xrd8mw_14. 
8 The decisions of the Consiglio di Stato are available at: https://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/cdsavvocati/faces/provvedimentiRic.jsp?_afrLoop=5268594620163736&_afrWindowMod
e=0&_adf.ctrl-state=cy8xrd8mw_49. 
9 The text of both provisions is available at http://www.normattiva.it/ricerca/semplice. 
10 The text of the provision is available at http://www.normattiva.it/ricerca/semplice. 
11 For the discussion in this concern see e.g. L. Arnaudo, Concorrenza tra Autorità indipendenti. Noterelle 
bizzarre intorno a un parere del Consiglio di Stato, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2010, p. 916 ff.; T. 
Broggiato, Pratiche commerciali scorrette: dalla direttiva europea alla normativa nazionale di 
recepimento, in Bancaria, 2010, fasc. n. 4.; B. Carducci Agostini, Criteri di raccordo tra la disciplina 
generale a tutela del consumatore e la normativa di settore assicurativa, in Diritto ed economia 
dell’assicurazione, 2009, p. 49 ff.; G. Carriero - P. De Ioanna - A. Frignani - F. Nanni - M. Prosperetti, 
Pratiche commerciali scorrette ed assicurazioni, in Diritto ed economia dell’assicurazione, 2010, p. 727 ff.; 
M. Clarich, Le competenze delle Autorità indipendenti in materia di pratiche commerciali scorrette, in 
Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2010, I, p. 688 ff.; G. Corvese, La pubblicità dei prodotti assicurativi: un 
tentativo di ricostruzione della disciplina, in Responsabilità civile e previdenza, 2010, p. 2130 ff.; M. 
Libertini, Clausola generale e disposizioni particolari nella disciplina delle pratiche commerciali scorrette, 
in Contratto e impresa, 2009, p. 73 ff.; M. Libertini, Le prime pronunce dei giudici amministrativi in 
materia di pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Giur. comm., 2009, II, p. 880 ff.; V. Meli, L’applicazione 
della disciplina delle pratiche commerciali scorrette nel ‘macrosettore credito e assicurazioni’, in Banca, 
Borsa e Titoli di credito, 2010, I, p. 334 ff.; V. Meli, Le pratiche commerciali scorrette nella relazione 
banca-cliente, in A.A.V.V., Nuove regole per le relazioni tra banche e clienti. Oltre la trasparenza?, Torino 
2010, p. 104 ff.; G. Meo, Consumatori, mercato finanziario e impresa: pratiche scorrette e ordine 
giuridico del mercato, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2010, I, p. 720 ff.  
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and the relationship between the implementing provisions of the UCPD and the 
sectoral legislation, the Italian legislator recently modified Art. 27 of the Consumer 
Code in way of the implementation of Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights by 
means of the insertion of a new paragraph (Para 1-bis),12 which provides that ‘even in 
regulated sectors pursuant to Art. 19, para 3, the power to intervene with respect to 
conducts of traders  involved in unfair commercial practices, without prejudice to 
current regulations, shall lie exclusively with the Competition Authority [Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato] which acts on the basis of the powers 
granted  by this Section after  getting the opinion of the competent Regulation 
Authority. This without prejudice to the competence of the Regulation Authorities to 
exercise their powers in the event of infringement of the regulations non 
constituting unfair commercial practices. The Authorities may regulate 
through memorandums of understanding the enforcement and procedural issues of 
their mutual cooperation, pursuant to the respective competences’.13 
Within the described context, the principle-based approach under the UCPD has been 
widely welcomed in Italy as it allows the necessary flexibility in order to cope with the 
changing aspects of the market and market practices and at the same time it avoids 
the risk of obsolescence of the UCPD and its implementing provisions. This aspect has 
been emphasised especially by national stakeholders, which underlined that the 
principle-based approach offers space to enforcement authorities to adapt the concept 
to the new needs. Some reports also underlined that this approach gives to traders 
more space for innovation and is therefore a positive element for the market. On the 
contrary, some national stakeholders fear that this approach could have negative 
effects especially as concerns the risk of divergent interpretation on among the 
different member States.   
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Relevant benefits arise from the provisions of the black list, first of all the legal 
certainty for both consumers and businesses. Nevertheless there are also 
disadvantages connected to the black list, as it reduces the degree of flexibility. In this 
regard, in particular the enforcement authorities highlighted some contradictions 
relating to the black list, as some of its provisions are formulated in a way which 
requires an evaluation of the fairness/unfairness of the term, which is not compatible 
with the nature of the black list: see e.g. the formulations contained in the No. 7 
(‘falsely stating’), 17 (‘falsely claiming’), 18 (‘inaccurate information’), 22 (‘falsely 
claiming’) and 23 (‘creating the false impression’) of the Annex I of the UCPD. In 
particular, it has been underlined that the provisions of the black list which require an 
assessment in concreto of the unfairness of the behaviour of the traders are not 
compatible with the nature of the black list. Consumer organisations point out that 
from the black list arise relevant benefits for consumers, as in particular concerns 
predictability and clarity.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
In implementing UCPD, Italy has not made use of the option, offered by Art. 9, par. 3 
of the UCPD, to introduce special rules imposing more restrictive and prescriptive 
requirements in the field of financial services and immovable property. There is also 
no case law concerning this aspect. Some consumer associations sharply criticised the 
UCPD approach in this regard, by emphasising the connected risk to lower the level of 
12 The modification was laid down by Art. 1, Para 6 of Legislative Decree No. 21 of 21 February 2014: 
‘Implementation of the directive 2011/83/UE of consumer rights, amending directives 93/13/CEE and 
1999/44/CE and repealing directives 85/577/CEE e 97/7/CE’. See Consiglio di Stato, ad. plen., 9 February 
2016,  No. 3, in Foro Amministrativo, 2016, p. 274. 
13 For issues relating to intertemporal law see Consiglio di Stato, ad. plen., 9 February 2016, No. 3, in 
Giurisprudenza italiana, 2016, p. 1206 (case note C.E. Gallo). 
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consumer protection relating to sectors in which there is a relevant need of consumer 
protection (e.g. relating to investment services).  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The UCPD has been applied also for tackling both misleading environmental claims and 
for addressing misleading practices in the energy market. In this concern, there has 
been a conflict of competence between the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato and other sectoral authorities. Such conflict has been solved by the Italian 
legislator in way of implementation of Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights: in 
that context the Italian legislator has clarified that even relating to commercial 
practices in the mentioned sectors, when a behaviour integrates an unfair commercial 
practice, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato has the competence to 
decide on the case. Indeed, the new Art. 27, Para 1-bis of the Consumer Code (as 
amended by Art. 1, Para 6 of legislative decree No. 21 of 21 February 2014 
‘Implementation of the Directive 2011/83/UE of consumer rights, amending Directives 
93/13/EEC and 1999/44/EC and repealing Directives 85/577/EEC e 97/7/EC’) provides 
that: ‘Even in regulated sectors pursuant to Art. 19, Para 3 [of the Consumer Code],14 
the power to intervene with respect to conducts of  traders  involved in unfair 
commercial practices, without prejudice to current regulations, shall lie exclusively 
with the Competition Authority  which acts on the basis of the powers granted  by this 
Section after  getting the opinion of the competent Regulation Authority. This without 
prejudice to the competence of the Regulation Authorities to exercise their powers in 
the event of infringement of the regulations non constituting unfair commercial 
practices. The Authorities may regulate through memorandums of understanding the 
enforcement and procedural issues of their mutual cooperation, pursuant to the 
respective competences’. 
As in particular concerns the application of the UCPD in tackling misleading 
environmental claims and/or in addressing misleading practices in the energy market, 
some stakeholders underlined that in these sectors it is particularly difficult for the 
consumer to verify the misleading nature of the commercial practice, and that such a 
situation usually means that consumers are unaware as to the misleading nature of 
the practice. This happens especially when consumers trust in a specific brand, which 
is renowned for being trustworthy, as e.g. happened in the so called ‘Volkswagen-
case’.15 Considering the described situation, some stakeholders propose to introduce a 
mechanism in order to monitor the claims before their diffusion and to provide in 
advance automatic penalties for the cases in which those claims are false. In the 
opinion of some consumer associations, the UCPD has not reached in this sector a 
satisfying level of protection. Considering the growing diffusion of those claims, the 
same associations underlined the need that a reshaped version of the UCPD contains a 
part specifically dedicated to this topic.  
 
14 Art. 19, Para 3, Consumer Code: ‘In the event of conflict, the provisions of Community directives or other 
Community legislation, and the national provisions transposing them to govern specific aspects of unfair 
commercial practices shall prevail over the provisions of this Title and shall apply to these specific 
aspects’. 
15 See the decision of the AGCM 4 August 2016, PS 10211, Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. and Volkswagen 
AG, in www.agcm.it. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
In the opinion of the enforcement authorities, the concept of ‘average consumer’ 
works well in practice. The concept has not been applied rigidly, but rather flexibly. On 
the contrary, some consumer associations underline that the notion of average 
consumer is too widely formulated and does not comply with the reality of consumers 
behaviour: in this context, it has been highlighted the risk that consumers with lower 
skills than the average consumer remains without adequate protection. Other 
consumer associations suggest maintenance of the concept of average consumer and 
creation of additional specific categories of consumers.16 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The enforcement authority has not created ad hoc categories concerning the notion of 
‘vulnerable consumer’. Some of the interviewed consumer associations propose 
introducing specific provisions to protect consumers in situations of poverty and/or 
over-indebtedness (in all cases in which such circumstances can influence the 
commercial decision of the consumer).  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The interviewed stakeholders reported the positive contribution given by self- and co-
regulation in combating unfair commercial practices. In any case they underlined that 
such regulations, in order to be really effective, need to provide: i) precise information 
duties determined jointly by business and consumers associations, ii) precise 
consequences for the cases of not compliance; iii) an authority which is competent for 
assessing the cases of not compliance with the rules stated in the self-regulatory 
codes of conduct.17 In this context, positive effects have been experienced in Italy 
throughout the activity of the ‘Giurì dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria’,18 which is 
competent for ensuring the observance and the application of the the ‘Codice di 
Autodisciplina della Comunicazione Commerciale’,19 which aims to ensure that 
marketing communication is carried out as a service to the public, with special 
consideration given to its influence on consumers.  
 
• In a forward-looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
On the one hand, according to the opinion of the interviewed enforcement authorities, 
there is no need to extend the black list of the UCPD, as they underline that the 
16 See in this regard G. De Cristofaro, Art. 20 Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria 
(eds.), Commentario breve al Diritto dei consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua 2013, p. 160 ff. 
17 See in this regard P. Fabbio, I codici di condotta nella disciplina delle pratiche commerciali sleali, 
‘Giurisprudenza commerciale’, 2008, p. 706 ff. 
18 See Istituto dell’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria, http://www.iap.it/. 
19 For an English version of the ‘Codice di Autodisciplina della Comunicazione Commerciale’ (62nd edition 
effective December 20th, 2016), see http://www.iap.it/about/the-code/?lang=en&lang=en. 
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principle based approach is the real added value of the UCPD: according to the 
enforcement authorities, the black list should be rather amended and reshaped, as 
some of its provisions are formulated in a way, which requires an evaluation of the 
fairness/unfairness of the term, which is not compatible with the nature of the black 
list: see e.g. the formulations contained in the No. 7 (‘falsely stating’), No. 17 (‘falsely 
claiming’), No. 18 (‘inaccurate information’), No. 22 (‘falsely claiming’) and No. 23 
(‘creating the false impression’) of the Annex I of the UCPD. The provisions of the 
black list which require an assessment in concreto of the unfairness of the behaviour 
seem not to be compatible with the nature of the black list. On the other hand, the 
interviewed consumer associations are in favour of an extension of the black list of the 
UCPD, by including new cases which are experienced in the practical application of the 
implementing provisions of the aforementioned Directive.  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
The enforcement of the UCPD in Italy is already particularly effective due to the fast 
and efficient activity of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. In this 
regard, stakeholders underline that a further improvement of the effectiveness of the 
implementing provisions of the UCPD has been experienced since 2012, when the 
highest limit of the administrative fine for unfair commercial practices has been 
increased up to EUR 5 000 000.00,20 a limit which has been reached inter alia in a 
recent judgement published on 4 August 2016 concerning the so called ‘Volkswagen-
case’.21  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID was implemented by the legislative decree No. 84 of 25 February 2000,22 
which was later repealed by Art. 146, Para 1, lit. m, Consumer Code, as the 
implementing provisions of the PID have been transferred into Art. 13-17 of the 
Consumer Code.23  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
there is little case law on this issue. In this regard it is not clear whether this 
circumstance arises from a very high level of compliance in this sector or rather from a 
lack of interest or of information of the consumers.  
 
20 See Art. 27, Para 9, Consumer Code: ‘9. In its measure prohibiting the unfair commercial practice, the 
Authority shall also impose an administrative fine of between EUR 5 000.00 and EUR 5 000 000.00, to 
take account of the seriousness and the duration of the infringement […]’. 
21 See in this regard the decision of the AGCM 4 August 2016, PS 10211, Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. 
and Volkswagen AG, in www.agcm.it, in which the Authority sanctioned Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. 
and Volkswagen AG with an administrative fine of EUR 5 000 000.00. 
22 For the English text of legislative decree No. 84 of 25 Feburary 2000, see 
http://www.normattiva.it/ricerca/semplice;jsessionid=LgJdTWeG3mv2lxd4n64EeA__.na1-prd-norm. 
Concerning the previous legislation on this topic: A. Ciatti, L’obbligo di indicare il prezzo di vendita e il 
prezzo per unità di misura dei prodotti offerti dai commercianti ai consumatori, in Contratto e 
impresa/Europa, 1998, p. 1124 ff. 
23 In this regard see F. Toschi Vespasiani, Art. 13-17 Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. 
Zaccaria (eds.), Commentario breve al Diritto dei consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua 2013, p. 110 ff..  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
607
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The stakeholders consulted consider this not to be a problematic issue. In particular, 
they are not in favour of an increase of the information duties as they see in this 
possible increase a concrete risk of information overload. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD was implemented by the legislative decree No. 145 of 2 August 2007,24 
which contains also provisions (Art. 1, 5, 6 and 7 of the legislative decree No. 
145/2007) introduced by the Italian legislator in addition to those which were 
necessary in order to implement the MCAD: Art. 1, 5, 6 and 7 of the legislative decree 
No. 145/2007 apply generally to any kind of advertising (the notion of ‘advertising’ is 
contained in Art. 2, lit. a of the legislative decree No. 145/2007).25 
Concerning the enforcement in particular, Art. 8 of the legislative decree No. 
145/2007 regulates the measures that can be taken by the Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato against businesses which infringe the rules laid down in the 
legislative decree.26 The businesses can challenge the decisions (Provvedimenti) of the 
AGCM before the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) Lazio-Roma,27 whose 
judgements can be challenged before the Consiglio di Stato (the highest 
administrative court in Italy).28  
The interviewed stakeholders highlighted that MCAD ensures a satisfactory level of 
protection for businesses but, considering its scope of application, it causes a 
disequilibrium between the levels of protection provided for the two sectors of 
Business-to-Business and of Business-to-Consumer. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Also in the context of misleading advertising, the interviewed stakeholders did not 
assess particular application problems. Even the behaviours, which do not fall squarely 
within the notion of ‘advertising’ have been easily included in the scope of application 
of Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising and of its implementing 
provisions. 
 
24 The English version of the legislative decree No. 145 of 2 August 2007 is available at: 
http://www.agcm.it/en/consumer-protection/consumer-protection-legislation/1726-legislative-decree-no-
145-of-2-august-2007.html. 
25 See e.g. G. De Cristofaro, La disciplina ‘generale’ della pubblicità contenuta nel d.lgs. 2 agosto 2007, n. 
145, in G. De Cristofaro (ed.), Pratiche commerciali scorrette e codice del consumo, Turin 2008, p. 487 ff. 
26 The decisions of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato are available at: 
http://www.agcm.it/consumatore--delibere/consumatore-provvedimenti.html. 
27 The decisions of the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale Lazio-Roma are available at: 
https://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/cdsavvocati/faces/provvedimentiRic.jsp?_afrLoop=5268480246385225&_afrWindowMod
e=0&_adf.ctrl-state=cy8xrd8mw_14. 
28 The decisions of the Consiglio di Stato are available at: https://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/cdsavvocati/faces/provvedimentiRic.jsp?_afrLoop=5268594620163736&_afrWindowMod
e=0&_adf.ctrl-state=cy8xrd8mw_49. 
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
In Italy there are several national rules, which go beyond the MCAD. In particular, Art. 
1, para 2 and Art. 5-7 have been autonomously shaped and adopted by the Italian 
legislator, in addition to those contained in the MCAD. The first rule which goes 
beyond the MCDA is contained in Art. 1, para 2 of the legislative decree No. 145 of 
2007, which provides that: ‘Advertisements must be transparent, truthful and 
accurate’.  
The second rule which goes beyond the MCDA is contained in Art. 5 of the legislative 
decree No. 145 of 2007, which provides that: ‘1. Advertisements must be clearly 
recognisable as such. Press advertisements must be distinguishable from other forms 
of public notices, and use graphical forms that are easily perceptible. 2. The terms 
‘guarantee’, ‘guaranteed’ and similar expressions may only be used if they are 
accompanied with specific details of the substance of the guarantees and the 
formalities relating to the guarantee offered. When the advertisement is too short to 
publish these details in full, the summary reference to the substance and the 
procedures for claiming against the guarantee must explicitly refer to a text which the 
consumer can easily obtain, setting out all the details. 3. All forms of subliminal 
advertising are prohibited’.  
The third rule which goes beyond the MCAD is contained in Art. 6 of the legislative 
decree No. 145 of 2007, which concerns advertising of products that are dangerous to 
health and safety and provides that: ‘1. Any advertisement is deemed to be 
misleading when it fails to indicate that a product advertised is likely to threaten the 
health or safety of the public in such a way that the public may be led to neglect the 
normal rules of prudence and vigilance’.  
The fourth rule which goes beyond the MCAD is contained in Art. 7 of the legislative 
decree No. 145 of 2007, which concerns advertising addressed to children and 
adolescents and provides that: ‘1. Any advertisement is deemed to be misleading 
when, being likely to be seen by children and adolescents, it exploits their natural 
credulity or lack of experience or which, by using children and adolescents in the 
advertisements, without prejudice to the provisions of section 10 of Law No 112 of 3 
May 2004, exploits the natural sentiments of adults towards children. 2. Any 
advertisement is deemed to be misleading when, being likely to be seen by children 
and adolescents, it may, even indirectly, place their safety in jeopardy’. In this 
concern, stakeholders have underlined that it is quite difficult to imagine cases of 
advertising which can be dangerous to health and safety of a business (Art. 6 of the 
legislative decree No. 145 of 2007).  
The interviewed stakeholders have highlighted in this concern that it is difficult to fit 
the provision of Art. 7 of the legislative decree No. 145 of 2007 into the B2B sector. 
The reason of the presence of such provisions is that they were already contained in 
the Art. 5 and 6 of the legislative decree No. 74 of 25 January 1992, which 
implemented in Italy Directive 1984/450/EEC on misleading advertising. Based on the 
available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, it is concluded 
that the effects of the provisions on misleading advertising have to be considered 
positively. In particular, in the view of Italian stakeholders, the MCAD marked an 
important step forward. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
According to the opinion of Italian stakeholders, the detailed and restrictive rules on 
comparative advertising produced the effect of de facto eliminating this kind of 
advertising. 
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• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
See above. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
In this regard Italian stakeholders highlighted several criticisms. In particular, several 
problems  arise from the fact that the EC Regulation 2006/2004 concerns only the 
business-to-consumer relationships and is therefore not applicable to situations which 
fall within the scope of application of the MCAD: the problems here concern both the 
investigation activity and the execution of the decisions. Furthermore, Italian 
enforcement authorities underline that they receive several compliants in this regard 
but that they are not able to react adequately, because of the lack of adequate 
instruments concerning the cross-border cooperation. 
Therefore, Italian stakeholders consider it to be of crucial importance to extend the 
scope of application of the EC Regulation 2006/2004 at least to the business-to-micro-
enterprises relationships and at best to all B2B disputes. This is considered to be even 
more important in light of the proposal of the European Commission for a new 
regulation on Geoblocking.29 
Taking the opportunity of the new strategy for the creation of a Digital Single 
Market,30 it would be therefore of particular importance to lay down common rules, 
which ensure that national authorities are able to provide effective cross-border 
enforcement. Otherwise, national authorities will not be able to enforce their decisions 
in other countries. Due to this lack of harmonised provisions, the enforcement in the 
B2B sector is therefore as of today really difficult and problematic. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Please see 1.1.6. below. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that national differences in the application/implementation of the UCPD 
play a detrimental role for businesses, as they are required to adapt their commercial 
behaviour to different national legislations. This causes a lack of confidence of the 
businesses in marketing abroad. At the end this causes also an increase of costs and 
therefore leads to higher prices for consumers. In certain markets there is no real 
cross-border competition at the retail level. 
29 Proposal of the European Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of 
residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC. 
30 Cf. A. De Franceschi (ed.), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market: The Implications of the 
Digital Revolution, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, 2016. 
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 • The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
The uniform black list of commercial practices annexed to the UCPD is deemed to have 
positive effects, as it allows businesses to identify the limits for their best practices 
and therefore contributes to enhancing their confidence in marketing abroad. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
According to the opinion of Italian stakeholders, the detailed and restrictive rules on 
comparative advertising produced the effect of de facto eliminating this kind of 
advertising. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanisms in B2B relations 
constitutes a relevant barrier to cross-border trade. Several problems arise from the 
fact that the EC Regulation 2006/2004 concerns only business-to-consumer 
relationships and is therefore not applicable to situations which fall within the scope of 
application of the MCAD: this situation causes problems concerning both the 
investigation activity and the execution of decisions. It would be therefore of crucial 
importance to extend the scope of application of the EC Regulation 2006/2004 also at 
least to the B2Micro-enterprises relationships and at best to all B2B disputes. 
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1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements seems to be 
quite high, as they have also to pay reputation damages if they fail to comply with 
these requirements. Several interviewees underline that the information requirements 
contained in Art. 7, Para 4 UCPD would need a more precise coordination with the 
comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements of the CRD. In particular, the 
overlappings between the information duties under several directives creates 
confusion not only among consumers and businesses, but also among the 
enforcement authorities, which are entitled to apply these provisions.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The interviewees reported many problems of overlap between Art. 7, Para 4 UCPD and 
the E-Commerce Directive (in particular with its Art. 5) as well as with the CRD (in 
particular with its Art. 6). It has been indeed pointed out that there is a too high 
amount of information duties and there is a need of compliance with all subsystems 
which are abstractly applicable to the concrete commercial behaviour. 
Several consumer organisations reported problematic overlaps between the 
information duties contained in Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Directive 
2006/123/EC on services in the internal market and Directive 2000/31/EC on 
electronic commerce. In particular, Art. 6, Para 8 CRD highlights that the information 
requirements laid down in that Directive ‘are in addition to information requirements 
contained in Directive 2006/123/EC and Directive 2000/31/EC and do not prevent 
Member States from imposing additional information requirements in accordance with 
those Directives. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, if a provision of Directive 
2006/123/EC or Directive 2000/31/EC on the content and the manner in which the 
information is to be provided conflicts with a provision of this Directive, the provision 
of this Directive shall prevail’. Furthermore, recital 12 CRD adds that ‘Member States 
should retain the possibility to impose additional information requirements applicable 
to service providers established in their territory’. This broad space left to the 
discretionality of national legislators can create relevant problems in the cross-border 
trade and is in evident contrast with the targeted full harmonisation.31  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
31 See A. De Franceschi, Informationspflichten und formale Anforderungen im Europäischen E-Commerce, in 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz- und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, 2013, p. 866 f. 
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Art. 7, para 2 of law decree 1/2012 converted, with modifications, by law No. 27 of 24 
March 2012 on ‘Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development and 
competitiveness’ introduced in the set of definitions contained in Art. 18, Para 1, of the 
Italian Consumer Code (implementing Art. 2 UCPD) the definition of ‘micro-
enterprises’ (according to Art. 18, para 1, lit. d-bis, Consumer Code ‘micro-
enterprises’ are ‘entities, companies or associations that, regardless of their legal 
form, engage in an economic activity, even as an individual or family, that employs 
fewer than ten persons and generates an annual revenue or total annual balance 
sheet not in excess of two million Euros, pursuant to section 2, paragraph 3 of the 
annex to recommendation n. 2003/361/EC of the Commission, dated 6 May 2003;’). 
Furthermore, Art. 7, Para 2 of law decree No. 1/2012 converted, with modifications, 
by law No. 27 of 24 March 2012 on ‘Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure 
development and competitiveness’ modified also Art. 19, Para 1 of the Italian 
Consumer Code – which implements Art. 3 UCPD –, introducing the following 
formulation: ‘1. This Title shall apply to unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices before, during and after a commercial transaction in relation to a product as 
well as any unfair commercial practices between professionals and micro-enterprises. 
The protection of micro-enterprises from deceitful advertising and unlawful 
comparative advertising is explicitly ensured by legislative decree No. 145 of 2 August 
2007 [which contains the implementing provisions of Directive 2006/114/EC]’. 
Italian enforcement authorities have warmly welcomed this extension of the scope of 
application. Also business organisations and scholars have fundamentally welcomed 
this extension of the scope of application to the relationships between businesses and 
micro-enterprises.32  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Based on the opinion of stakeholders and literature, it seems to be appropriate to 
extend, in all European Member States, the scope of application of the implementing 
provisions of the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices to the relationships 
Business-to-Microenterprises. On the contrary, such an extension would be more 
problematic in other sectors, taking e.g. into consideration the circumstance that the 
UCPD takes as one of the parameters the notion of ‘average consumer’. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Italian stakeholders and enforcement authorities consider it useful to extend the scope 
of protection in B2B transactions in order to cover also unfair commercial practices 
during and after the transaction. At the present stage, the protection from misleading 
advertising in the B2B sector covers only the advertising in the pre-contractual stage. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
As already mentioned above, concerning the black-list of practices in the business-to-
consumer marketing area according to the UCPD, it has to be pointed out that the 
32 See e.g. G. De Cristofaro, Unfair Business-to-Microenterprise Commercial Practices: The Italian Solution 
in the European Context – The Extended Scope of Application of UCP Directive’s Implementing Provisions, 
in Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2015, p. 20 ff.; D. Valentino, Timeo Danaos et dona 
ferentes. La tutela del consumatore e delle microimprese nelle pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Rivista 
di Diritto civile, 2013, p. 1157 ff. 
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introduction of black-list provisions causes a certain degree of rigidity, which may 
have negative effects on the system. Furthermore, the introduction of such a list in 
the B2B sector would be welcomed by the enforcement authorities only in the case in 
which all black-list provisions introduced in this way would not require an assessment 
of the concrete unfairness of the behaviour of the concerned parties.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Italian stakeholders consider it essential to create a cross-border enforcement 
instrument similar to the EC Regulation 2006/2004 also in the B2B sector. For this 
purpose it would be essential to avoid a duplication of the parallel system to that of EC 
Regulation 2006/2004, but rather to extend the scope of application of EC Regulation 
2006/2004 also to the B2B sector. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Enforcement authorities have serious doubts concerning the opportunity to regulate at 
the European level contractual consequences linked to the breaches of the Misleading 
and Comparative Advertising Directive, as European member States have different 
categories concerning contract law remedies and therefore a harmonisation would be 
particularly difficult to be accepted by the member States. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
The Italian implementing provisions of the UCPD do not expressly provide any specific 
contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices. Nevertheless, provisions on 
the vices of will contained in the Italian Civil Code (Art. 1427-1440) and the 
consequent remedy of the  annulment of the contract for fraud, duress or mistake 
(Art. 1441-1446) are commonly accepted to apply in this context33. In particular, Art. 
19, Para 1, lit. a of the Consumer Code, which reproduces (without any relevant 
changes) Art. 3, Para 2 of Directive 2005/29/EC expressly provides that Title III, Part 
II of the Consumer Code (concerning unfair commercial practices) ‘is without prejudice 
to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the formation, validity, or effect of a 
contract’. In this concern, the Italian literature has underlined that by means of the 
aforementioned provision the legislator aimed at clarifying that the implementing 
provisions of the UCPD do not exclude the application of the usual contract law 
remedies provided for by the Italian Civil Code. Therefore, in the cases in which a 
contract is void, voidable or not binding on the consumer the remedies are those listed 
33 See e.g. G. De Cristofaro, Unfair Commercial Practices and Italian Private Law, in Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law, 2015, p. 251 ff.; G. De Cristofaro, Pratiche commerciali scorrette, in 
Enciclopedia del Diritto. Annali vol. V, Milan 2012, p. 1113 ff.; M.R. Maugeri, Violazione della disciplina 
sulle pratiche commerciali scorrette e rimedi contrattuali, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, Padua 2010, p. 
1677; C. Camardi, Pratiche commerciali scorrette e invalidità, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, Padua 
2010, p. 367 ff.; S. Delle Monache, Pratiche commerciali scorrette, obblighi di informazione, dolo 
contrattuale, in Annuario del contratto, 2009, p. 109 ff. 
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in Art. 1418, 1425 and 1427 of the Civil Code.34 It has been in particular underlined 
that unfair commercial practices should be considered among the elements which are 
to be taken into account in the interpretation of a contract. Furthermore, unfair 
commercial practices connected with the conclusion of a contract are to be qualified as 
‘circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of the contract’, which, according 
to Art. 34, Para 1 of the Consumer Code (which implements Art. 4 UCTD), are relevant 
for the assessment of the unfair nature of the contractual terms35 and to decide 
whether these terms are drafted in plain and intelligible language, in order to comply 
with the principle laid down in Art. 35 of the Consumer Code (which implements Art. 5 
UCTD). Furthermore, it has been observed that, relating to proceedings brought for 
the avoidance of a B2C contract for threat or fraud, the rules laid down in the articles 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Consumer Code (which implement Art. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 
the Annex I of the UCPD) can, as concerns the B2C relationships, contribute to 
reshape the concepts of ‘deception’, ‘misrepresentation’ and ‘threat’ laid down in the 
Italian Civil Code.36 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
In this regard there are no available data. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The enforcement authorities consider not necessary for the legislator to provide 
specific contract law consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
On the contrary some consumer associations proposed to lay down specific contract 
law remedies, which give the possibility to terminate the contract without recurring to 
the civil jurisdiction. Furthermore, some authors consider it necessary to lay down a 
harmonised solution at EU level concerning contractual and/or non-contractual 
remedies.37 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCTD was implemented by law No. 52 of 6 February 1996. The implementing 
provisions were inserted in Art. 1469-bis to 1469-sexies of the Italian Civil Code.38 
Those provisions have been later repealed on the occasion of the release of the Italian 
34 G. De Cristofaro, Unfair Commercial Practices and Italian Private Law, in Journal of European Consumer 
and Market Law, 2015, p. 255. 
35 See in this regard also ECJ Case C-453/10 Perenicova and Perenic v SOS financ spol s r o [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:144. 
36 G. De Cristofaro, Unfair Commercial Practices and Italian Private Law, in Journal of European Consumer 
and Market Law, 2015, p. 255. 
37 G. De Cristofaro, Die zivilrechtlichen Folgen des Verstoßes gegen das Verbot unlauterer 
Geschäftspraktiken: eine vergleichende Analyse der Lösungen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten, in Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz- und Urheberrecht - Internationaler Teil, 2010, p. 1017. 
38 See e.g. C.M. Bianca, F.D. Busnelli et alii (eds.), Commentario al capo XIV-bis del codice civile: dei 
contratti del consumatore, in Le nuove leggi civili commentate, 1997, p. 751 ff.; G. Cian, Il nuovo capo 
XIV-bis (titolo II, libro IV) del codice civile, sulla disciplina dei contratti con i consumatori, in Studium 
Iuris, 1996, p. 411 ff.; E. Minervini, Tutela del consumatore e clausole vessatorie, Naples 1999. 
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Consumer Code39 and transferred into Art. 33 to 37 of the Italian Consumer Code.40 
As an element of significative originality, the Italian legislator introduced (into Art. 
1469-quinquies of the Civil Code, and later) into Art. 36 Para 2 a black list of contract 
terms, which ‘shall be null, even if they have been individually negotiated, where they 
have the purpose or effect of: a) excluding or exempting liability of the professional in 
the event of the death of the consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from 
an act or omission of that professional; b) excluding or exempting the actions of the 
consumer vis-à-vis the professional or another party in the event of total or partial 
non-performance or inadequate performance by the professional; c) providing for an 
extension of the consumer’s acceptance to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract’. 
As particularly concerns enforcement, Art. 5, law decree No. 1 of 24 January 2012 
(converted into law with slight amendments by law No. 27 of 24 March 2012 on 
‘Urgent provisions for competition, infrastructure development and competitiveness’) 
introduced Art. 37-bis of the Consumer Code, which lays down the rules for the 
‘Administrative protection against unfair terms’.41  
Based on the available evidence and on the interviews conducted for this country 
report, it can be concluded that the general clause has proved to be able to adapt 
consistently to the developments of society and concrete behaviours of businesses and 
it has therefore been welcomed by judges, as well as by business and consumer 
associations.42 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the Directive was initially (by law No. 52 
of 6 February 1996) transposed in Art. 1469-bis of the Civil Code and is now contained 
(since Legislative decree No. 206 of 6 September 2005: see the previous bullet) into 
Art. 33, Para 2, Consumer Code. Such indicative list has been implemented as a ‘grey-
list’ of unfair contract terms (Art. 33, Para 2, Consumer Code provides indeed that: ‘2. 
Terms are presumed unfair, unless proved otherwise, where they have the object or 
effect of...’). According to the enforcement authorities, this solution provides for a 
39 Legislative decree No. 206 of 6 September 2005: the updated version of the legislative decree is available 
at http://www.normattiva.it/ricerca/semplice. 
40 An English version of those provisions is available at http://www.agcm.it/en/consumer-
protection/consumer-protection-legislation/1725-legislative-decree-no-206-of-6-september-2005-
consumer-code.html. 
41 Art. 37-bis of the Consumer Code: ‘1. The Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, having heard 
the representative national-level professional associations and the interested chambers of commerce or 
their unions, ex officio or in response to complaints, and for the sole purpose of the subsequent 
paragraphs, declares the unfair nature of terms that are included in contracts between professionals and 
consumers through the acceptance of general contract conditions or the signing of forms, models or 
templates. The provisions envisaged by section 14, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of law n. 287 of 10 October 
1990 apply in accordance with the procedures noted in the regulation referred to in paragraph 5. In cases 
of non-compliance with orders by the Authority pursuant to section 14, paragraph 2 of law n. 287 of 10 
October 1990, the Authority may apply pecuniary administrative sanctions ranging from EUR 2 000 to 
EUR 20 000. If the information or documentation that is untruthful, the Authority may apply pecuniary 
administrative sanctions ranging from EUR 4 000 to EUR 40 000. 
2. An extract of the measure establishing the unfair nature of the term shall also be distributed via 
publication in a special section of the Authority's institutional website, on the website of operators who 
adopt terms deemed to be unfair and by any other means deemed opportune in relation to furnish 
consumers with due notice by and at the expense of the operator. In cases of non-compliance with the 
provisions of the present paragraph, the Authority may apply pecuniary administrative sanctions ranging 
from EUR 5 000 to EUR 50 000. any case […].’ 
42 See S. Troiano, Art. 33 Codice del Consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria (eds.), Commentario 
breve al Diritto dei consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua, 2013, p. 252 ff.; E. Navarretta, Art. 1469-bis Codice 
civile, in C.M. Bianca, F.D. Busnelli et alii (eds.), Commentario al Capo XIV bis del codice civile: dei 
contratti del consumatore, in Le nuove leggi civili commentate, 1997, p. 864; A. Barenghi, Art. 33 Codice 
del consumo, in V. Cuffaro (ed.), Codice del consumo, Milan, 2015, p. 280. 
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good functioning and does not create relevant problems. According to the opinion of 
the consumer associations, the mix of principle-based approach of the Directive and 
‘grey-list’ of unfair terms ensures a good balance between legal certainty and 
flexibility. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
According to the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders, the black list of unfair 
contract terms entails the risk of creating a too high degree of rigidity in the 
framework of the unfairness-check. In particular, some stakeholders underlined that 
the introduction of a black list causes a limitation of competition and therefore can 
have negative effects on the market. Therefore any introduction of black list provisions 
in a future refit of the Directive 1993/13/EEC should be subject to a stringent 
proportionality test, in order to make sure that any restriction of market freedom has 
a positive net effect in terms of consumer welfare. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In the Italian system, the effects of a decision of a court concerning the unfairness of 
a term is limited to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the 
consumer. As a consequence, the effects of a court decision cannot be automatically 
extended to other contracts. Especially in the cases in which the decision concerning 
the unfairness of the term was released by the Supreme Court, this increases the 
probability that the same term will be considered unfair in a later judgement as well. 
Furthermore it has to be underlined that, since the introduction of the ‘administrative 
protection against unfair terms’ through Art. 37-bis of the Consumer Code (see 
above), the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, having heard the 
representative national-level professional associations and the interested chambers of 
commerce or their unions, ex officio or in response to complaints, and for the sole 
purpose of the subsequent paragraphs of Art. 37-bis of the Consumer Code, can 
declare the unfair nature of terms that are included in contracts between professionals 
and consumers through the acceptance of general contract conditions or the signing of 
forms, models or templates. In cases of non-compliance with orders by the Authority 
pursuant to section 14, paragraph 2 of law No. 287 of 10 October 1990, the Authority 
may apply pecuniary administrative sanctions ranging from EUR 2 000 to EUR 20 000. 
If the information or documentation is untruthful, the Authority may apply pecuniary 
administrative sanctions ranging from EUR 4 000 to EUR 40 000. 
In particular, Art. 37-bis, Para 3 of the Consumer Code provides that the enterprises 
in question may ask in advance the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato 
to determine whether the terms they intend to use in commercial relations with 
consumers would be considered unfair. The Authority should take a decision on this 
consultation within one hundred and twenty days of when the request is received, 
unless the information that was provided turns out to be seriously inaccurate, 
incomplete or untruthful. Terms that are found not to be unfair as a result of the 
consultation are immune to further assessment by the Authority. The afore mentioned 
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provision highlights in this regard that the professionals’ accountability to consumers 
remains unchanged in any case. It is worth to be underlined that Art. 37-bis, Para 4 of 
the Consumer Code expressly safeguards the ability of civil courts to assess the 
fairness of contractual terms and to rule on damages.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The UCTD does not expressly provide a sanction for the violation of the contractual 
transparency requirements under the Directive. Italian stakeholders underline that this 
situation leads to a lack of clarity, as it remains doubtful which consequences should 
arise from the violation of such requirements.43 In this concern it has been highlighted 
that the violation of the contractual transparency requirements could give rise to a 
pre-contractual responsibility.44 Furthermore, Italian courts assessed the unfairness45 
and the consequent voidness46 of the non-transparent term. According to Italian 
literature, the non-observance of the duty of transparency can be a basis for an 
injunction according to Art. 37 of the Consumer Code (which contains the 
implementation provision of Art. 7 UCTD).47 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
The Italian legislator has not put in place this extension of the scope of application of 
the UCTD.  
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
According to the interviewed stakeholders, the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for 
unfair contract terms (term is not binding) has a high level of effectiveness, in 
particular because Italian courts take up the active role imposed by the European 
Court of Justice, by invoking ex officio the unfairness.48 In Art. 37-bis of the Consumer 
Code (see above), the Italian legislator provided furthermore an administrative 
remedy in this area. In any case, the scope of application of the afore mentioned 
provision has not been extended to the B2B or B2Microenterprises sector. 
 
43 See in this regard, e.g. S. Pagliantini, Trasparenza contrattuale, in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Annali V, Milan 
2012, p. 1280 ff.; E. Minervini, La trasparenza contrattuale, in I Contratti 2011, p. 97 ff. 
44 So A.M. Azzaro and P. Sirena, Il giudizio di vessatorietà delle clausole, in E. Gabrielli and E. Minervini 
(eds.), I contratti dei consumatori, in P. Rescigno and E. Gabrielli, Trattato dei contratti, in E. Gabrielli 
and E. Minervini, I contratti dei consumatori, I, Turin 2005, p. 152; A. Barenghi, I contratti per adesione e 
le clausole vessatorie, in Lipari (ed.), Trattato di diritto privato europeo, Padua 2003, III, p. 346. 
45 Tribunale di Roma, 3 March 2005, in Guida al Diritto 2005, No. 30, p. 62 ff.; Tribunale di Bergamo, 10 
May 2005, in I contratti, 2006, p. 592. 
46 Tribunale di Vigevano, 6 June 2003, in Studium Iuris, 2004, p. 115 f. 
47 Tribunale di Roma, 21 February 2000, in Foro italiano 2000, I, 2046 ff.; Court of Appeal of Rome, 24 
September 2002, in Foro italiano, 2003, I, p. 332 ff. 
48 For a detailed and in-depth analysis of the most relevant issues in this regard, see S. Pagliantini (ed.), Le 
forme della nullità, Turin 2009. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Based on the interviews conducted for this country report, the answer is negative. In 
this concern, stakeholders have underlined the circumstance that, in any case, the 
average consumer does not really read the general terms and conditions. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
As has been underlined by the interviewed stakeholders, national differences in the 
application/implementation of the directives have a detrimental impact on businesses, 
as they are committed to adapt their commercial behaviour to different national 
legislations. This causes less confidence of the businesses in marketing abroad. This 
causes also an increase of costs and therefore leads to higher prices for consumers. In 
certain markets there is no real cross-border competition at the retail level. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
The uniform indicative list of commercial practices annexed to the UCTD is deemed to 
have positive effects, as it allows businesses to identify the limits for their best 
practices and therefore contributes to enhance their confidence in marketing abroad. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
According to the relevant stakeholders, in Italy there is a particular argument for the 
extension at least to the Business-to-Microenterprises sector of the provisions of the 
UCTD, as the weakness of the contractual position of small and medium businesses 
often shows similarities to the weakness of the contractual position of consumers. 
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• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
According to the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders, if the legislator decides to 
extend the scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms, one could consider 
the possibility to extend the protection to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
The decisive question in this concern is whether the protection ensured by the UCTD 
should be extended also to the B2B sector. Once this decision has been taken, it 
seems to be rational to apply the transparency requirements equally to B2B 
transactions. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it has to be concluded that such an extension would have a positive effect on 
innovation by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it has to be concluded that the benefits of extending the scope of application of the 
provisions of the UCTD to business-to-business transactions would exceed the 
negative consequences of such an extension. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?49  
The Italian implementing provisions of Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interests are laid down in Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer 
Code. Before the implementation of the ID, the Italian legislator already regulated the 
injunction procedure in Art. 1469-sexies of the Civil Code (the implementing provision 
of Art. 7 UCTD). On the occasion of the entry into force of the Consumer Code, Art. 
1469-sexies of the Civil Code was repealed and its contents were transferred into Art. 
37 of the Consumer Code. In the Italian legal system there is therefore now a ‘bipolar’ 
system of collective protection of the consumers’ interests: i) Art. 37 of the Consumer 
Code regulates the injunction procedure for the particular case of violation of the 
consumers’ collective interests (the case in which the trader inserts unfair terms in the 
general contract terms);50 ii) Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer Code contain the rules 
of the so called ‘general injunction procedure’: the injunction procedure for the cases 
of violation of the collective interests of consumers protected by the rules of the 
Consumer Code.51 
In the absence of statistical data it is not possible to provide a precise assessment 
concerning the effects of the use of the injunction procedure in Italy in terms of 
contributing to the reduction in the number of infringements of consumer protection 
rules and reduction in consumers' detriment. However, the interviewed stakeholders 
underlined that while the collective injunction procedure is highly effective at national 
level, there is a lack of effectiveness at cross-border level. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The interviewed stakeholders underline the effectiveness of the publication of 
decisions in newspapers. In this regard, they highlight in particular the circumstance 
that it is most important that at least one of the mentioned newspapers has a 
circulation at national level. 
 
49  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1, Para 2 of the Injunctions Directive. 
50 See e.g. M. Libertini, Prime riflessioni sull’azione inibitoria dell’uso di clausole vessatorie, in Contratto e 
Impresa/Europa, 1996, p. 567 ff.; E. Minervini, Contratti dei consumatori e tutela collettiva nel codice del 
consumo, in Contratto e impresa, 2006, p. 635 ss.; R. Donzelli, La tutela giurisdizionale degli interessi 
collettivi, Naples 2008. 
51 See e.g. E. Vullo, Art. 139-140 Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria (eds.), Padua 
2013, p. 926 ff.; S. Benucci, Le azioni inibitorie e l’accesso alla giustizia, in G. Vettori (ed.), Il contratto 
dei consumatori, dei turisti, dei clienti, degli investitori e delle imprese deboli. Oltre il consumatore, 
Padua, 2009, p. 1441 ff. 
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• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes. In the implementing provisions of the Injunction Directive the Italian legislator 
does not refer to the list of directives mentioned in the Annex I to the Injunction 
Directive. Art. 139 of the Consumer Code has indeed a broad scope of application and 
refers more generally to the ‘collective interests of consumers and users’. In 
particular, Art. 139 of the Consumer Code provides that the consumers’ and users’ 
associations listed in Art. 137 of the Consumer Code are entitled to take an action, 
according to Art. 140 of the Consumer Code (which implements Art. 2 ID) for the 
protection of the consumers’ and users’ collective interests. Furthermore, Art. 139 of 
the Consumer Code states that, in addition to what is disposed in the general 
provision of Art. 2 of the Consumer Code52, the mentioned associations are entitled to 
take an action in the case of violation of the collective interests of the consumers 
listed in the subjects regulated by the Consumer Code and in the following acts: i) law 
No. 233 of 6 August 1990 and subsequent modifications, including those contained in 
the general act on radio and television (legislative decree No. 177 of 31 July 2005 and 
law No. 122 of 30 April 1998); ii) legislative decree No. 541 of December 1992 
concerning the advertising of medicinal products for human use; iii) legislative decree 
No. 59 of 26 March 2010, which implemented the Directive 2006/123/EC on services 
in the internal market; iv) regulation 2013/524/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes. It has therefore to be 
underlined that collective interests for whose violation the mentioned associations are 
entitled to take an action are not only those listed in the general provision of Art. 2 of 
the Consumer Code, but also those listed in different law provisions which are recalled 
by the Consumer Code (as e.g. legislative decree No. 385 of 1 September 1993, which 
is a general act containing the rules concerning Banks and Credit (especially Art. 121-
127); legislative decree No. 114 of 31 March 1998 on the regulation of commerce; 
legislative decree No. 300 of 16 December 2004, which implemented Directive 
2003/33/EC on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products; legislative decree 
No. 58 of 24 February 1998, which is a general act containing the rules concerning 
investment services and activities.53  
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Consumer associations argue that the slowness of the procedures before the civil 
courts is the major obstacle to the effective use of the injunction procedure. As 
concerns the Italian system, despite the recent reforms of the civil procedure, there is 
no evidence of relevant improvements of the described situation. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country, it 
seems to be more adequate not to restrict the scope of application of the ID to 
particular rights or directives. It would be rather more equilibrated to cover all 
52 The text of Art. 2 of the Consumer Code is available at http://www.normattiva.it/ricerca/semplice. 
53 See in this regard E. Vullo, Art 139 Consumer Code, in G. De Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria (eds.), 
Commentario breve al Diritto dei consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua 2013, p. 929 ff. 
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legislative measures which are mentioned in the annex to the regulation 
2006/2004/EC on the administrative cooperation for the protection of consumer 
interests. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country, the 
obstacles faced by consumer associations in trying to access foreign civil courts, 
dissuades them from starting an injunction procedure for addressing infringements 
originating in another EU country. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
As mentioned under the previous bullet, consumer associations underline that financial 
obstacles for bringing claims to foreign courts are insurmountable, mainly because of 
the related costs. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Concerning this point, consumer associations underline that in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the injunctions procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country, they would need an adequate financial support, as the main 
obstacle for bringing claims to foreign courts are mainly of financial nature. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer Code entitle the consumer associations listed in Art. 
137 of the Consumer Code the power to ask a court to putting an end to abusive 
conducts which harm consumers’ interests. In any case, relating to the implementing 
provisions of the mentioned directives, there is provision for an additional protection 
system, which gives to the consumers’ associations the power to ask the 
administrative authority for an injunction (in particular: Art. 27 Consumer Code 
concerning the violation of the implementing provisions of the UCPD;  Art. 37 bis 
Consumer Code concerning the violation of the implementing provisions of the UCTD; 
Art. 66 Consumer Code concerning the violation of the implementing provisions of 
CRD).  
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• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Please refer to earlier answers.  
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
According to enforcement authorities and consumer associations it is particularly 
difficult to assess the benefits for consumers arising from the protection provided by 
European directives. Italian stakeholders underlined that such protection benefits 
consumers. On the one hand, the procedure before the Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato is fast, effective and free of charge to consumers. On the 
other hand, the procedure before the national courts is relatively slow and expensive 
for consumers: this significantly impairs the effectiveness of the consumer protection. 
The circumstance that the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato is 
particularly fast and efficient in applying the implementing provisions of the UCPD has 
caused a high effectivity of the concerning rules.  
The interviewed consumer associations underlined on the one hand that the mix of 
general clauses and black lists is to be particularly welcomed, as it allows a good 
degree of flexibility in order to protect the consumers’ interests. On the other hand, 
the same consumer associations underline that the high costs and length of 
judgements before the national courts impair in a significant way the effectivity of 
such provisions. Consumer associations further underline that also ADR do not meet 
the expectations as concerns their functioning. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
The quick and effective enforcement activity – especially that carried out by the 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato concerning unfair commercial 
practices – ensures relevant direct benefits for consumers and indirect benefits for fair 
handling businesses. As specifically concerns the implementing provisions of the 
UCPD, the extension of the scope of application from the B2C to the 
B2Microenterprises relationships, should enhance the benefits for traders. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country, it is 
difficult to quantify the costs for traders in order to comply with consumer law 
legislation. In any case, stakeholders underlined the circumstance that a too high 
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amount of information duties and in particular their fragmentation and overlappings 
(see above, 1.1.5.) cause higher costs for businesses without really enhancing the 
level of consumer protection. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
There are no sufficient elements in order to answer this question as neither the 
interviewed stakeholders nor other institutions have conducted studies concerning the 
costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules. As specifically concerns the 
enforcement of the implementing provisions of the UCPD, the circumstance that the 
administrative fine for unfair commercial practices has been increased in 2012 up to a 
limit of EUR 5 000 000.0054 (a limit which has been reached inter alia in a recent 
judgement published on 4 August 2016 concerning the so called ‘Volkswagen-case’)55 
could help not only to enhance the level of compliance by the traders and the level of 
consumer protection but also to cover the costs involved in the public enforcement of 
these rules (see above 1.1.1.). 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
The interviewed stakeholders stated that European directives are implemented in Italy 
in a cost-effective manner. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it does not seem to be realistic to reduce the costs for implementing and enforcing the 
rules of the directives covered by this study without lowering the level of protection for 
consumers. On the contrary, as the proceedings before the civil courts are particularly 
slow, it would be particularly reasonable, as concerns Italy, to increase the costs for 
implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives. Consumer associations further 
underline the need to invest more in order to enhance the awareness of consumers 
concerning their rights and duties. They hope to experience soon a significant increase 
of the effectiveness of the ADR procedure. 
 
54 See Art. 27, Para 9, Consumer Code: ‘9. In its measure prohibiting the unfair commercial practice, the 
Authority shall also impose an administrative fine of between EUR 5 000.00 and EUR 5 000 000.00, to 
take account of the seriousness and the duration of the infringement […]’. 
55 See in this regard the decision of the AGCM 4 August 2016, PS 10211, Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. 
and Volkswagen AG, in www.agcm.it, in which the Authority sanctioned Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. 
and Volkswagen AG with an administrative fine of EUR 5 000 000.00. 
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1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
With specific regard to the banking sector, the Bank of Italy highlighted that 
businesses and the specific public enforcement bodies are aware of the requirements 
of the UCPD and the UCTD and of the interactions among those directives and the 
sector-specific legislation.  
As regards consumers, they are aware of the existence of consumer protection rules 
and tend to submit their complaints to those Authorities that they suppose are better 
placed to deal with them (i.e. the Bank of Italy and/or the Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato).  
In particular, unfair contract terms can also be reviewed by the judicial authority as 
well as by the Italian financial Ombudsman (Arbitro Bancario Finanziario) set up in 
2009 according to the Italian Consolidate Law on Banking (legislative decree No. 385 
of 1993)56. In the banking and financial sector, national law transposing the directives 
is widely used as a legal basis to combat unfair commercial practices and unfair 
standard terms. Italian legislation transposing the UCPD is commonly applied by the 
Italian competition authority in its proceedings on unfair commercial practices held by 
banks and other financial institutions; as already stated, compliance of the Italian 
legislation on unfair contract terms is ensured by the courts as well as by the Italian 
financial Ombudsman. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Italy, while the Authority in charge of the enforcement of the horizontal EU 
consumer law is the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, enforcement of 
sector specific rules usually lies under the responsibility of other authorities, each one 
responsible for its own specific sector. As regards the banking and financial industry, 
financial consumer protection is carried out by four financial market supervisory 
authorities: Bank of Italy, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), 
Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi di Pensione (COVIP) and Istituto per la Vigilanza 
sulle Assicurazioni (IVASS). The Bank of Italy is competent for Banking services 
(deposits, payment services, current accounts, loans). The IVASS is competent for 
Insurance related issues. The CONSOB is competent for securities, collective portfolio 
management activities and investment services. The COVIP is competent for private 
pension plans. The Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato is competent for 
Unfair commercial practices and for the further aspects related to the enforcement of 
56 The decisions of the Arbitro Bancario e Finanziario are available at 
https://www.arbitrobancariofinanziario.it/decisioni. 
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the CRD listed in Art. 66 of the Consumer Code.57 The division of functions is coupled 
by strong co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms.  
In order to reduce administrative and regulatory burdens for financial services 
providers to a minimum and to ensure the effectiveness of supervision over them, 
supervisors must coordinate their activity. For this purpose they are mandated to 
exchange all relevant information and establish co-operation frameworks through 
memorandums of understanding (which are made public). This framework allows to 
establish the arrangements which are more appropriate in order to deal with cross-
sectoral issues taking into consideration their specificities. Moreover, formal and 
informal meetings are held on a regular basis and some committees are established in 
order to improve the co-operation among different authorities. It is worth noting that 
regulators cannot invoke professional secrecy while dealing with each other. 
As regards the activity of banks and other financial institutions, co-operation between 
the Italian competition authority and the Bank of Italy has been formalised since 2011 
within a memorandums of understanding, in order to avoid possible overlaps in their 
respective activities. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
The interaction among horizontal EU consumer law (especially the UCPD) and the 
sector-specific rules has not been plain for a certain time. While the different sets of 
provisions were expected to ensure a very comprehensive protection of financial 
consumers, Italian administrative courts have called into question the applicability of 
the UCPD in those sectors (e.g. energy, media) for which specific rules are provided.  
In order to solve the aforementioned problems, in way of implementation of Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights the Italian legislator laid down Para 1-bis of Art. 27 of 
the Consumer Code, which clearly states that, also in those sectors for which specific 
consumer protection rules are provided, the Italian competition authority is in charge 
for the enforcement of the provisions that have transposed the UCPD into the Italian 
system; the same legislation specifies that all infringements of sectoral regulations 
different from unfair commercial practices remain within the remit of each specific 
authority. The new rules make clear that coordination between the Italian competition 
authority and the specific public enforcement body in each relevant sector must be 
achieved. To that end, the Italian competition authority, when ascertaining whether a 
firm operating in a sector that lies within the mandate of a specific public body has 
57 Art. 66 of the Consumer Code: ‘1. In order to ensure compliance with the provisions of Subchapters I to 
IV of this Chapter by operators, the provision of Sections 27, 139, 140, 140-bis, 141 and 144 of this Code 
shall apply. 2. The Competition Authority ex officio or upon application of an interested person or 
organisation shall ascertain breach of the provisions of Subchapters I to IV of this Chapter, shall inhibit its 
continuation and eliminate the effects. 3. On assessment and penalties for infringement Section 27, 
paragraphs (2) to (15) of this Code shall apply. 4. The Competition Authority shall have the role of 
competent authority pursuant to Section 3 letter c) of EC Regulation No. 2006/2004 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 27 October 2004 with respect to the issues referred to in Subchapters I to 
IV of this Chapter. 5. This is without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Courts. This is also 
without prejudice to  extra-judicial resolution of litigations on the consumer relationship, on matters 
involving Sections I to IV of this Chapter, at the appropriate bodies set up  by the chambers of 
commerce, pursuant to Section 2, paragraph (4) of Law No. 580 of 29 December 1993’. 
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held a commercial practice that is not compliant with the UCPD, is mandated to seek 
an opinion from the specific public body that has regulatory powers over that sector.58  
A Memorandum of Understanding currently sets out a co-operation scheme between 
the Italian competition authority and the Bank of Italy; as stated before, it includes 
the exchange of information, holding meetings on a regular basis, as well as the 
issuance of opinions by the Bank of Italy in the context of proceedings of the Italian 
competition authority on unfair commercial practices.59 
The interviewed stakeholders also underlined that there is an overlap between the 
different sets of information duties. 
This overlapping originates at EU level and let rise the need of a better coordination of 
the interaction of information duties laid down in different legislative instruments. 
Concerning e.g. the sector of the passenger air services, there is a complex interaction 
between EU Regulation 1008/2008 on passenger air services (ASR), Directive 
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights. On the one hand, the information duties contained in Art 23 ASR contribute to 
specify the content of the provisions concerning unfair (and, in particular, misleading) 
commercial practices. On the other hand, Art 3 para 2 CRD foresees that if any of the 
CRD’s provisions conflicts with a provision of another Union act governing specific 
sectors, the provision of that other Union act shall prevail and apply to those specific 
sectors. In particular, Art 3 para 3 lit k CRD clarifies that the sole provisions of the 
consumer rights directive which find application to contracts for passenger transport 
services are Art 8 para 2 as well as Art 19 and 22 CRD. In this concern it is in 
particular necessary to adequately coordinate Art 23 ASR with Art 8 para 2 and Art 22 
CRD as well as with Art 6 and 7 UCPD.60 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
The main benefit that arises from the complementary application of the UCPD and 
UCTD in the regulated sectors is that a certain minimum level of consumer protection 
is always granted. However, this comes at a cost, because coordination among the 
58 The modification was laid down by Art. 1, Para 6 of Legislative Decree No. 21 of 21 February 2014: 
‘Implementation of the directive 2011/83/EU of consumer rights, amending directives 93/13/EEC and 
1999/44/EC and repealing directives 85/577/EEC e 97/7/EC’. Art. 19, Para 3 of the Consumer Code 
(which implements Art. 3, Para 4 UCPD) further provides that ‘In the event of conflict, the provisions of 
Community directives or other Community legislation, and the national provisions transposing them to 
govern specific aspects of unfair commercial practices shall prevail over the provisions of this Title and 
shall apply to these specific aspects’. In order to clarify the meaning of this provision and the relationship 
between the implementing provisions of the UCPD and the sectoral legislation, the Italian legislator 
modified Art. 27 of the Consumer Code in way of the implementation of  directive 2011/83/EU on 
consumer rights throughout the insertion of a new paragraph (Para 1-bis), which provides that ‘even in 
regulated sectors pursuant to Section 19, paragraph (3), the power to intervene with respect to conducts 
of  traders  involved in unfair commercial practices, without prejudice to current regulations, shall lie 
exclusively with the Competition Authority [Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato]  which acts 
on the basis of the powers granted  by this Section after  getting the opinion of the competent Regulation 
Authority. This without prejudice to the competence of the Regulation Authorities  to exercise their 
powers in the event of  infringement  of the regulations non constituting  unfair commercial practices. The 
Authorities may regulate through  memorandums of understanding the enforcement and procedural 
issues of their mutual cooperation, pursuant to the respective competences’. 
59 The full text of the ‘Protocollo d’intesa tra la Banca d’Italia e l’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato in materia di tutela dei consumatori nel mercato bancario e finanziario’ is available at 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/accordi/protocollo-BI-AGCM-tut-cons-mbf.pdf.  
60 See in this concern CJEU 15.1.2015 Case 573/13 (Air Berlin v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen 
und Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e. V.) ECLI: EU:C:2015:11; see also 
Consiglio di Stato, 30 June 2011, No 3897, para 9.1, in http://www.neldiritto.it/appgiurisprudenza.asp? 
id=6565#.VWrLkNH9l3c, which qualified as misleading commercial practice the behavior of the trader 
who inferred the consumer’s consent by using default options (and, in particular, an ‘opt-in’ mechanism). 
For a comment see A. De Franceschi, Additional Payments and Final Price for Passenger Air Sevices: 
Interactions between Air Service Regulation and EU Directives, in Journal of European Consumer and 
Market Law, 2015, p. 107 ff. 
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horizontal EU consumer law and the provisions applicable in the field of financial 
consumer protection although theoretically clear may turn to be difficult to implement 
in concrete cases; it is also worth noting that coordination between the Italian 
competition authority and the Bank of Italy is necessary in order to avoid a bis in idem 
(i.e. more than one administrative proceeding being carried out with reference to the 
same commercial practice in cases when it might be relevant both under the UCPD 
provisions and the specific sector regulation). 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Several consumer organisations report problematic overlap between the information 
duties contained in Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Directive 2006/123/EC 
on services in the internal market and Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce. 
In particular, Art. 6, Para 8 CRD highlights that the information requirements laid 
down in that Directive ‘are in addition to information requirements contained in 
Directive 2006/123/EC and Directive 2000/31/EC and do not prevent Member States 
from imposing additional information requirements in accordance with those 
Directives. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, if a provision of Directive 
2006/123/EC or Directive 2000/31/EC on the content and the manner in which the 
information is to be provided conflicts with a provision of this Directive, the provision 
of this Directive shall prevail’. Furthermore, recital 12 CRD adds that ‘Member States 
should retain the possibility to impose additional information requirements applicable 
to service providers established in their territory’. This broad space left to the 
discretion of national legislators may create relevant problems in the cross-border 
trade and is in evident contrast with the targeted full harmonisation.61  
Furthermore, in the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders, and in particular of the 
Bank of Italy, there is some room for clarification in the interplay between the UCPD 
and other EU sector-specific rules in the field of banking services. The UCPD states 
that i) that in the case of conflict between the provisions of the Directive itself and 
other Community rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the 
latter shall prevail and apply to those specific aspects (art. 3(4) UCPD); ii) in relation 
to ‘financial services’, as defined in Directive 2002/65/EC, Member States may impose 
requirements which are more restrictive or prescriptive than the Directive itself (art. 
3(9) UCPD). In the field of financial consumer protection, it happens quite often that 
directives and regulations at the EU level state that they should apply without 
prejudice to the provisions of the UCPD (cf. e.g. Art. 4, Para 4 Directive 2008/48/EC 
on consumer credit; Recital No. 55 of the EU Directive 2015/2366 on payment 
services). As a matter of principle, the Bank of Italy considers that it could be very 
useful if EU directives and regulations involving financial consumer protection identify 
more clearly the provisions that regulate ‘specific aspects’ of unfair commercial 
practices and therefore should prevail over the corresponding provisions of the UCPD. 
In the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders such solution would imply a more 
effective and consistent approach in the enforcement of the EU-level provisions in the 
field of consumer protection. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
61 See A. De Franceschi, Informationspflichten und formale Anforderungen im Europäischen E-Commerce, in 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz- und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, 2013, p. 866 f. 
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Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
it is concluded that there is a general desire for the extension of the scope of 
application of the consumer law directives to consumer-to-businesses relations. 
Without such an extension, the enforcement authorities are indeed forced to 
particularly extensive interpretations in order to cope with the lack of protection for 
consumers. The classic example regards a non-professional who sells gold to a 
jewellery or a dedicated shop. In this regard, the actual provisions on consumer 
protection would not find application to such a case. Therefore competent authorities 
might be led to configure this contractual scheme as that of a service contract, in 
which framework the consumer pays for a service consisting in the assessment of the 
value of the goods proposed to the jewellery or the dedicated shop. Based on this 
evidence as well as on the previous evaluations, it would be therefore much more 
efficient to extend the scope of application of the consumer law directives (at least 
UCPD and UCTD) also to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
According to the interviewed stakeholders, the notions of ‘consumer’, ‘vulnerable 
consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ as currently defined by the EU legislation and 
interpreted by EU case law work fine in practice. In particular, the stakeholders 
manifested doubts concerning the opportunity to introduce new categories of 
‘vulnerable consumers’, as this would entail the risk to create certain rigidities in the 
system without at the same time enhancing the legal certainty. Furthermore, 
consumer protection organisations underline that the standard of the ‘average 
consumer’ risks to be too abstract and outdated, as the concrete experience shows 
that consumers are much more vulnerable than the average consumer. In particular, 
consumer protection organisations consider adequate to introduce specific protection 
for consumers which are vulnerable due to their economic conditions, as e.g. poverty 
and/or considerable indebtedness.  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The interviewed stakeholders underlined the opportunity to extend the protection, 
which is actually limited to consumers, also to microenterprises. Also consumer 
protection organisations underline the opportunity to extend to the business-to-
microenterprises relationships the protection against both unfair commercial practices 
and unfair contract terms. As mentioned above (1.4.3.), stakeholders consider that it 
would be therefore much more efficient to apply consumer law directives (at least 
UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Before the implementation of the UCTD, Italian law did not offer a substantive control 
of unfair terms. Therefore, by means of the implementation of the UCTD, Italian Law 
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experienced a ground-breaking change, which has been very welcomed by 
stakeholders and literature and which influenced also interpretation and legislation 
concerning unfair trade terms outside the business-to-consumers sector (see Art. 9 of 
law No. 192 of 1998 on subcontracting in manufacturing activities).62 The UCPD has 
been also welcomed in Italy, even if it has been criticised for not providing a precise 
set of consequences for the violation of the prohibition of unfair commercial 
practices.63 As proof of the mentioned positive assessment, the Italian legislator 
extended the scope of application of the implementing provisions of the UCPD from 
the business-to-consumer to the business-to-microenterprises sector (Art. 18, para 1, 
lit. d-bis and 19, Para 1 of the Consumer Code) and introduced several further 
provisions regulating specific cases of unfair commercial practices (see Art. 21, Para 3-
bis, Art. 21, Para 4-bis and Art. 22-bis of the Consumer Code: see above 1.1.1.). 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Concerning the implementation provisions of the PID there is extremely limited case 
law and in the opinion of the interviewed stakeholders it is not possible to say that the 
information of consumers regarding unit prices has improved since the implementation 
of the PID in national legislation. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Based on the available evidence and the interviews conducted for this country report, 
the MCAD did not really contribute in increasing the protection of businesses against 
unfair marketing in Italy. As underlined by the interviewed stakeholders, the real 
considerable improvement of the protection of businesses against unfair marketing 
has been rather a consequence of the implementation of Directive 1984/450/EEC on 
misleading advertising. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
The increase of the number of contracts concluded by electronic means has made it 
considerably easier for businesses to directly trade cross-border. This is also a 
consequence of the circumstance that the recent consumer protection legislation (and 
especially Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights) enhanced considerably the confidence of consumers 
in directly purchasing cross-border from traders located in other EU countries. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
Based on the interviews conducted for this country report, the directives which 
particularly contributed in enhancing the cross border trade and purchase in the EU 
are Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices and Directive 2011/83/EU on 
consumer rights. 
 
62 An English version of the mentioned provision is available at 
http://www.agcm.it/en/competition/competition-legislation/1970-law-no-192-of-18-june-1998-article-9-
abuse-of-economic-dependence-rules-on-subcontracting-in-manufacturing-activities.html. 
63 G. De Cristofaro, Die zivilrechtlichen Folgen des Verstoßes gegen das Verbot unlauterer 
Geschäftspraktiken: eine vergleichende Analyse der Lösungen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten, in Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz- und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, 2010, p. 1017. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Italy  
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
Art. 25, law No. 52 of 6 February 
1996, introducing Art. 1469-bis 
to 1469-sexies of the Civil Code  
 
 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Until legislative decree 
No. 205 of 6 September 
2005: 
Art. 1469-bis, Para 2 of 
the Civil Code 
Since legislative decree 
No. 205 of 6 September 
2005: 
Art. 36, Para 2, 
Consumer Code 
 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be considered unfair Yes Until legislative decree 
No. 205 of 6 September 
2005: 
Art. 1469-quinquies of 
the Civil Code 
Since legislative decree 
No. 205 of 6 September 
2005: 
Art. 33, Para 2, 
Consumer Code 
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 Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
No   
 Extensions of the application of Directive terms on 
the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter 
No   
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Law decree No. 1 of 24 January 
2012 converted, with 
modifications, by law No. 27 of 
24 March 2012 on ‘Urgent 
provisions for competition, 
infrastructure development and 
competitiveness’ 
 Provisions regarding financial services going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Application of UCPD to B2Microenterprises 
transactions 
Yes Consumer Code 
(legislative decree No. 
205 of 6 September 
2005) 
Art. 18, Para 1, lit. d-bis 
(definition of 
Microenterprises) 
and 
Art. 19, Para 1 
(extension of the scope 
of application of the 
UCPD) 
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Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection 
in the indication of 
the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
Until legislative decree No. 205 
of 6 September 2005: 
Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of legislative 
decree No. 84 of 25 February 
2000 
Since legislative decree No. 205 
of 6 September 2005: 
Art. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 of the 
Consumer Code (legislative 
decree No. 205 of 6 September 
2005) 
 Extension of the application to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
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Resolution of the Ministry of 
Economic Development, 
‘Chiarimenti su decreto 
legislativo 6 settembre 2005, n. 
206 – Pubblicità – Prezzo di 
vendita e prezzo per unità di 
misura 
No. 96410 of 19 June 2015 
 Derogations: 
The following products are excluded from the duty of 
indicating the unit price: 
a) Products which are sold without packaging; 
b) Products of different nature put in one single 
package; 
c) Products sold by means of vending 
machines; 
d) Products which are destinated to be mixed 
with one another in order to create another 
product; 
e) Pre-packaged product which are exempted 
from the duty of indication of the net 
quantity; 
f) Pre-cooked products; pre-prepaired 
products; products which contain elements 
which are separately packaged in one single 
package and that need an activity of the 
consumer in order to come to the final 
product; 
g) ‘Fantasy products’; 
h) Single-item ice creams; 
i) Non-food products which can be sold only 
per piece. 
Yes   
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Legislative decree No. 145 of 2 
August 2007  
 Provisions going beyond the MCAD: 
Art. 1, para 2, legislative decree No. 145 of 2 August 
2007: ‘Advertisements must be transparent, truthful 
and accurate’ 
Art. 5 legislative decree No. 145 of 2 August 2007:  
‘1. Advertisements must be clearly recognisable as 
such. Press advertisements must be distinguishable 
from other forms of public notices, and use graphical 
forms that are easily perceptible. 2. The terms 
‘guarantee’, ‘guaranteed’ and similar expressions may 
only be used if they are accompanied with specific 
details of the substance of the guarantees and the 
formalities relating to the guarantee offered. When 
the advertisement is too short to publish these details 
in full, the summary reference to the substance and 
the procedures for claiming against the guarantee 
must explicitly refer to a text which the consumer can 
easily obtain, setting out all the details. 3. All forms of 
subliminal advertising are prohibited’. 
Yes Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10 of  Legislative 
decree No. 145 of 2 
August 2007  
 
  Art. 6 of the legislative decree No. 145 of 2007: ‘1. 
Any advertisement is deemed to be misleading when 
it fails to indicate that a product advertised is likely to 
threaten the health or safety of the public in such a 
way that the public may be led to neglect the normal 
rules of prudence and vigilance’. 
Yes   
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
636
  Art. 7 of the legislative decree No. 145 of 2007: ‘1. 
Any advertisement is deemed to be misleading when, 
being likely to be seen by children and adolescents, it 
exploits their natural credulity or lack of experience or 
which, by using children and adolescents in the 
advertisements, without prejudice to the provisions 
of section 10 of Law No 112 of 3 May 2004, exploits 
the natural sentiments of adults towards children. 2. 
Any advertisement is deemed to be misleading when, 
being likely to be seen by children and adolescents, it 
may, even indirectly, place their safety in jeopardy’. 
Yes   
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' interests 
Art. 139 and 140 Consumer 
Code  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Italy 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen 
by the Injunctions Directive regulated in 
your country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in a 
single legal act 
 
 
Art. 139 and 140 of the Consumer Code 
entitle the consumer associations listed in 
Art. 137 of the Consumer Code the power 
to ask a court to putting an end to 
abusive conducts which harm consumers’ 
interests. In any case, relating to the 
implementing provisions of the 
mentioned directives, there is provided an 
additional protection system, which gives 
to the consumers’ associations the power 
to ask the administrative authority for an 
injunction (in particular: Art. 27 
Consumer Code concerning the violation 
of the implementing provisions of the 
UCPD; Art. 37 bis Consumer Code 
concerning the violation of the 
implementing provisions of the UCTD; 
Art. 66 Consumer Code concerning the 
violation of the implementing provisions 
of CRD).  
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations 
- Other 
Consumers’ associations pursuant to 
Article 137, associations representing 
professionals, and Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Crafts and 
Agriculture 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
(art. 37, 139 and 140  
Consumer Code) 
 
The procedures regulated by Art. 37, 139 
and 140 of the Consumer Code provide 
that the aforementioned subjects may 
bring proceedings against any 
professional or professional association 
that uses or recommends the use of 
contractual terms drawn up for general 
use, and may request the competent 
court to grant orders preventing the use 
of terms that have been found to be 
unfair. 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations 
are entitled to an exemption   of some/all 
cost related to the procedure please 
explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
- The costs are 
normally beared by 
the unsuccessful 
party 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application extended 
to cover consumer 
law in general 
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Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure? 
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- Yes 
 
According to Art. 37 of the Consumer 
Code, also associations representing 
professionals, and Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Crafts and 
Agriculture, may bring proceedings 
against any professional or professional 
association that uses or recommends the 
use of contractual terms drawn up for 
general use, and may request the 
competent court to grant orders 
preventing the use of terms that have 
been found unfair.  
According to this, the afore mentioned 
provision aims at protecting the fair 
competition between businesses. 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their 
associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage 
in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
 
Art. 140 Consumer Code provides that the 
injunction procedure can be started only 
after 15 days after sending by registered 
letter with acknowledgement of receipt a 
request to cease the unlawful behaviour. 
After the afore mentioned period of 15 
days, the consumer organisations can 
also start a procedure of conciliation 
before the competent chamber of 
commerce or start an ADR procedure.  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement 
for party seeking 
injunction to consult 
with the defendant 
and a qualified 
entity 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Art. 140, Para 8, Consumer Code provides 
that in urgent a summary procedure is 
ensured according to Articles 669-bis to 
669-quater of the Code of Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be 
paid 
- Yes, pecuniary 
sanction 
Art. 140, Para 7 Consumer Code provides 
for non-compliance with the injunction 
order a sanction of an amount between 
EUR 516 and EUR 1032 for each non 
fulfilment or day of delay. The 
aforementioned amounts have to be paid 
to the Italian State Budget. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
The decisions of the judges or of the 
admnistrative authority may be published 
on national newspapers. The decisions of 
the administrative authority may be 
published also on the institutional 
website of the authority.  
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Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
- Yes It is provided by Art. 140, Para 7 of the 
Consumer Code 
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public purse 
or to other beneficiary be brought within 
the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to 
be paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies 
on the injunctions order? 
- No They need to bring a civil action before an 
ordinary court 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- Yes 
 
 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
See comment Individual injunctions orders may have a 
role as precedents, even if in the Italian 
legal system the precedent is in itself not 
binding. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 2: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
 
n.a.         
Note: There are no data available in this regard.  
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).64  
There are no data available in this regard.  
 
64 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country.
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Table 3: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 264.00  
EUR 7 054.85: 
this is the average 
fee calculated 
according to the 
Decree of the 
Ministry of Justice 
No. 55 of 2014 and 
can be derogated 
in case of an 
agreement 
between the 
lawyer and the 
defended party.  
ca. 
EUR 250.00  
 
It is impossible 
to estimate: it 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance 
and experience 
of consumer. 
The 
proceedings 
are connoted 
by high costs 
and duration.  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
ADR:  
from EUR 0 to 
EUR 20 
 
‘Negoziazione 
assistita’: 
EUR 0 
 
Mediation: 
EUR 48.80 at 
the beginning.  
In case the 
procedure is 
concluded, the 
fee goes from 
EUR 238 to 
EUR 406.25  
The determination 
of the lawyer’s fee 
is determined by 
an agreement 
between the 
lawyer and the 
client.  
According to the 
Decree of the 
Ministry of Justice 
No. 55 of 2014, 
the average fee is 
EUR 4 647.74 
(EUR 1890.00 + 
further costs and 
value added tax: 
EUR 2757.74). 
Cost for 
notification:  
ca.  EUR 30  
 
It is impossible 
to estimate: it 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance 
and experience 
of consumer.   
 
Notes: due to the Italian financial crisis, the indicated fees are often considerably lowered . 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
In the absence of a register for ADR procedures and decisions it is not possible to give 
either statistics or even an estimation. The interviewed stakeholders had no further 
evidence available in this regard. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 4: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Assoelettrica Business association 
 
27 July 
2016 
Confcommercio Business association 15 July 
2016 
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e 
del Mercato (AGCM) 
National enforcement and 
regulatory authority 
1 August 
2016 
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle 
Comunicazioni 
(AGCOM) 
National enforcement and 
regulatory authority 
31 August 
2016 
Banca d’Italia National Regulatory Autority 1 August 
2016 
Ministero della Giustizia Responsible Ministry 28 July 
2016 
Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico Responsible Ministry 25 July 
2016 
European Consumer Centre Italy European Consumer Centre 20 July 
2016 
Federconsumatori National Consumer 
Organisation 
8 August 
2016 
11 August 
2016 
Adiconsum National Consumer 
Organisation 
20 July 
2016 
Altroconsumo National Consumer 
Organisation 
5 August 
2016 
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Table 5: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
G. Alpa (ed.) 2014 I contratti dei consumatori, Milan 
G. Alpa and G. Conte 
(eds.) 
2015 I contratti d’impresa, Milan 
G. Alpa e S. Patti 
(eds.) 
2003 Clausole vessatorie nei contratti del consumatore (art. 
1469bis-1469sexies), in Commentario Schlesinger, 
Milan 
L. Arnaudo  2010 Concorrenza tra Autorità indipendenti. Noterelle 
bizzarre intorno a un parere del Consiglio di Stato, in 
Giurisprudenza commerciale, p. 916 ff.  
A.M. Azzaro and P. 
Sirena 
2005 Il giudizio di vessatorietà delle clausole, in E. Gabrielli 
and E. Minervini (eds.), I contratti dei consumatori, in 
P. Rescigno and E. Gabrielli, Trattato dei contratti, in 
E. Gabrielli and E. Minervini, I contratti dei 
consumatori, I, Turin, p. 152 
A. Barenghi 2003 I contratti per adesione e le clausole vessatorie, in 
Lipari (ed.), Trattato di diritto privato europeo, Padua, 
III, p. 346 
A. Barenghi 2015 A. Barenghi, Art. 33 Codice del consumo, in V. Cuffaro 
(ed.), Codice del consumo, 4th ed., Milan, p. 280 
P. Barucci and C. 
Rabitti Bedogni (eds.) 
2010 20 anni di Antitrust, Turin 
A. Belelli, L. 
Mezzasoma and F. 
Rizzo 
2014 Le clausole vessatorie a vent’anni dalla direttiva CEE 
93/13, Naples 
S. Benucci 2013 Le azioni inibitorie e l’accesso alla giustizia, in G. 
Vettori (ed.), Il contratto dei consumatori, dei turisti, 
dei clienti, degli investitori e delle imprese deboli. 
Oltre il consumatore, Padua, p. 1441 ff. 
C.M. Bianca, F.D. 
Busnelli et alii (eds.) 
1997 Commentario al capo XIV-bis del codice civile: dei 
contratti del consumatore, in Le nuove leggi civili 
commentate, p. 751 ff. 
T. Broggiato  2010 Pratiche commerciali scorrette: dalla direttiva europea 
alla normativa nazionale di recepimento, in Bancaria, 
fasc. n. 4 
C. Camardi 2010 Pratiche commerciali scorrette e invalidità, in Studi in 
onore di Giorgio Cian, Padua, p. 367 ff. 
B. Carducci Agostini 2009 Criteri di raccordo tra la disciplina generale a tutela 
del consumatore e la normativa di settore 
assicurativa, in Diritto ed economia dell’assicurazione, 
p. 49 ff. 
G. Carriero, P. De 
Ioanna, A. Frignani, 
F. Nanni and M. 
Prosperetti 
2010 Pratiche commerciali scorrette ed assicurazioni, in 
Diritto ed economia dell’assicurazione, p. 727 ff. 
G. Cian 1996 Il nuovo capo XIV-bis (titolo II, libro IV) del codice 
civile, sulla disciplina dei contratti con i consumatori, 
in Studium Iuris, p. 411 ff. 
A. Ciatti 2013 Art. 27 Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and A. 
Zaccaria, Commentario breve al Diritto dei 
consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua, p. 226 ff. 
M. Clarich 2010 Le competenze delle Autorità indipendenti in materia 
di pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Giurisprudenza 
commerciale, I, p. 688 ff. 
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G. Corvese 2010 La pubblicità dei prodotti assicurativi: un tentativo di 
ricostruzione della disciplina, in Responsabilità civile e 
previdenza, p. 2130 ff. 
V. Cuffaro (ed.) 2015 Codice del consumo, 4th ed., Milan 
G. De Cristofaro 2008 La disciplina ‘generale’ della pubblicità contenuta nel 
d.lgs. 2 agosto 2007, n. 145, in G. De Cristofaro (ed.), 
Pratiche commerciali scorrette e codice del consumo, 
Turin, p. 487. 
G. De Cristofaro (ed.) 2008 Le pratiche commerciali scorrette nei rapporti fra 
professionisti e consumatori, in Le nuove leggi civili 
commentate, p. 1057 ff. 
G. De Cristofaro (ed.) 2008 Pratiche commerciali scorrette e codice del consumo, 
Turin 
G. De Cristofaro 2010 Die zivilrechtlichen Folgen des Verstoßes gegen das 
Verbot unlauterer Geschäftspraktiken: eine 
vergleichende Analyse der Lösungen der EU-
Mitgliedstaaten, in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz- und 
Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, p. 1017 ff. 
G. De Cristofaro 2012 Pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Enciclopedia del 
Diritto. Annali vol. V, Milan, p. 1113 ff. 
G. De Cristofaro - A. 
Zaccaria (eds.) 
2013 Commentario breve del diritto dei consumatori, 2nd 
ed., Padua 
G. De Cristofaro 2015 Unfair Business-to-Microenterprise Commercial 
Practices: The Italian Solution in the European 
Context – The Extended Scope of Application of UCP 
Directive’s Implementing Provisions, in Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law, p. 20 ff. 
G. De Cristofaro 2015 Unfair Commercial Practices and Italian Private Law, in 
Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, p. 
251 ff. 
A. De Franceschi 2013 Informationspflichten und formale Anforderungen im 
Europäischen E-Commerce, in Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz- und Urheberrecht – Internationaler Teil, 
p. 865 ff. 
A. De Franceschi 2015 Additional Payments and Final Price for Passenger Air 
Sevices: Interactions between Air Service Regulation 
and EU Directives, in Journal of European Consumer 
and Market Law, p. 107 ff. 
A. De Franceschi  2016 European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market: 
The Implications of the Digital Revolution, Cambridge 
– Antwerp – Portland 
S. Delle Monache 2009 Pratiche commerciali scorrette, obblighi di 
informazione, dolo contrattuale, in Annuario del 
contratto, p. 109 ff. 
R. Donzelli 2008 La tutela giurisdizionale degli interessi collettivi, 
Naples 
P. Fabbio 2008 I codici di condotta nella disciplina delle pratiche 
commerciali sleali, ‘Giurisprudenza commerciale’, p. 
706 ff. 
A. Genovese 2011 Il contrasto delle pratiche commerciali scorrette nel 
settore bancario, in Giurisprudenza commerciale, I. p. 
200 ff. 
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A. Genovese (ed.) 2008 I decreti legislativi sulle pratiche commerciali 
scorrette. Attuazione e impatto sistematico della 
direttiva 2005/29/CE 
A. Genovese 2008 La normativa sulle pratiche commerciali scorrette, in 
Giurisprudenza commerciale, I, p. 762 ff. 
A. Gentili 2010 Pratiche sleali e tutele legali: dal modello economico 
alla disciplina giuridica, in Rivista di diritto privato, p. 
37 ff. 
M. Libertini 1996 Prime riflessioni sull’azione inibitoria dell’uso di 
clausole vessatorie, in Contratto e Impresa/Europa, p. 
567 ff. 
M. Libertini 2009 Clausola generale e disposizioni particolari nella 
disciplina delle pratiche commerciali scorrette, in 
Contratto e impresa, p. 73 ff. 
M. Libertini 2009 Le prime pronunce dei giudici amministrativi in 
materia di pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Giur. 
comm., II, p. 880 ff. 
M.R. Maugeri 2010 Violazione della disciplina sulle pratiche commerciali 
scorrette e rimedi contrattuali, in Studi in onore di 
Giorgio Cian, Padua, p. 1677 ff. 
V. Meli 2011 L’applicazione della disciplina delle pratiche 
commerciali scorrette nel ‘macrosettore credito e 
assicurazioni’, in Banca, Borsa e Titoli di credito, I, p. 
334 ff. 
V. Meli 2011 Le pratiche commerciali scorrette nella relazione 
banca-cliente, in Nuove regole per le relazioni tra 
banche e clienti. Oltre la trasparenza?, Turin, p. 104 
ff. 
G. Meo 2010 Consumatori, mercato finanziario e impresa: pratiche 
scorrette e ordine giuridico del mercato, in 
Giurisprudenza commerciale, I, p. 720 ff.  
E. Minervini 1999 Tutela del consumatore e clausole vessatorie, Naples 
E. Minervini 2006 Contratti dei consumatori e tutela collettiva nel codice 
del consumo, in Contratto e impresa, p. 635 ff. 
E. Minervini 2011 La trasparenza contrattuale, in I Contratti, p. 97 ff. 
E. Minervini - L. Rossi 
Carleo (eds.) 
2009 Le modifiche al codice del consumo, Turin 
E. Navarretta 1997 Art. 1469-bis Codice civile, in C.M. Bianca, F.D. 
Busnelli et alii (eds.), Commentario al Capo XIV bis 
del codice civile: dei contratti del consumatore, in Le 
nuove leggi civili commentate, p. 864 
S. Pagliantini 2009 Le forme della nullità, Turin 
S. Pagliantini 2012 Trasparenza contrattuale, in Enciclopedia del Diritto, 
Annali V, Milan, p. 1280 ff. 
L. Rossi Carleo 2010 Consumatore, consumatore medio, investitore e 
cliente: frazionamento e sintesi nella disciplina delle 
pratiche commerciali scorrette, in Europa e diritto 
privato, p. 685 ff. 
F. Toschi Vespasiani 2013 Art. 13-17 Codice del consumo, in G. De Cristofaro 
and A. Zaccaria (eds.), Commentario breve al Diritto 
dei consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua, p. 110 ff.. 
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S. Troiano 2013 Art. 33 Codice del Consumo, in G. De Cristofaro and 
A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al Diritto dei 
consumatori, 2nd ed., Padua, p. 252 ff. 
G. Vettori (ed.) 2009 Codice del consumo. Aggiornamento. Pratiche 
commerciali scorrette e azione collettiva, Padua  
D. Valentino 2013 Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. La tutela del 
consumatore e delle microimprese nelle pratiche 
commerciali scorrette, in Rivista di Diritto civile, p. 
1157 ff. 
G. Vettori (ed.) 2013 Il contratto dei consumatori, dei turisti, dei clienti, 
degli investitori e delle imprese deboli. Oltre il 
consumatore, Padua 
E. Vullo 2013 E. Vullo, Art. 139-140 Codice del consumo, in G. De 
Cristofaro and A. Zaccaria (eds.), Padua, p. 926 ff. 
E. Zucconi Galli 
Fonseca 
2014 Tutela arbitrale e tecnica del processo: la clausola 
compromissoria nei contratti di consumo 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report LATVIA  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The stakeholders have underscored that the implementation of the UCPD in Latvia has 
been successful. The stakeholders have unanimously praised the principle-based 
approach under the UCPD. The reasoning behind this approach is focused on the 
inability of specific rules to regulate adequately each and every case. The principle-
based approach, on the other hand, gives administrative authorities and adjudicators 
the necessary freedom and flexibility to decide cases, paying due attention to all the 
relevant circumstances. The only disadvantage is that the principle-based approach 
may diminish legal certainty, but overall this disadvantage is outweighed by 
advantages related to the use of the principle-based approach.  
The practice of the Consumer Rights Protection Center (hereinafter – CRPC) illustrates 
application of the principle-based approach. The CRPC had established that once 
consumers make air ticket reservations, an airline company offered automatically 
activated check boxes for additional services or receipt of optional price supplements. 
The administrative case was initiated. In its decision the CRPC stated that the airline 
company had violated a well-known fair commercial practice and good faith principle 
and this significantly influenced the economic conduct of the average consumer.1 In 
the case at hand, the principle-based approach and the concept of ‘average consumer’ 
were successfully applied. 
The stakeholders have likewise noted that the European Commission’s Guidance 
document concerning the Directive2 facilitates more effective application of the 
implementing national legislation. Moreover, the CRPC has developed its own 
Guidelines, helping the traders to follow or to be aware of the fair commercial 
practices.3  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
According to the stakeholders, the black list facilitates identification of unfair 
commercial practices. This provides certainty to traders. Thus, while the stakeholders 
have supported the principle-based approach under the UCPD, they have equally 
supported the use of the black list.  
1 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K115-39 dated 23 October 2012. 
Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lieta_air_baltic_keksi_lemums_izraksts_23_10_12_2_.pdf (last 
seen on 30.07.2016). The decision was appealed before a court and the court affirmed the decision.  
2 DG Justice Guidance document concerning Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC 
and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. European Commission, DG Justice, 
June 2014; Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 
2005/29 EC on Unfair Commercial practices. SWD (2016) 163 final, 25 May 2016. 
3 For example, Guidelines on Implementing Fair Commercial Practices in Consumer Crediting, Guidelines on 
Implementing Fair Commercial Practices in Area of Electronic Communication, Guidelines on Implementing 
Fair Commercial Practices in Price Identification of Goods and Services etc. 
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 • The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The minimum harmonisation rules allow governments to construe an appropriate 
solution for specific problems arising in a particular Member State, which may be non-
existent or less prevalent in other Member States.  
The Latvian Government has adopted specific restrictions of consumer crediting.4 They 
also indicate the non-exhaustive list of advertising encouraging irresponsible 
borrowing.5 However, these rules are not adopted under the UCPD, but are 
implementing the Directive 2008/48/EC, dated 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for 
consumers.6 
There are no cases concerning immovable property.  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The CRPC has been actively involved in the supervision and monitoring of the opening 
of the electricity market from the point of view of consumer protection in Latvia as 
from 1 January 2015, thus the transposed rules of the UCPD were intensively applied. 
In addition, the CRPC has developed the Guidelines for traders. Moreover, the CRPC 
actively participated in consumer information activities on the opening of this market. 
The involvement of the CRPC ensured that application of the UCPD in the electricity 
market was very effective. The stakeholders have emphasized that currently there are 
no specific problems with application of the UCPD in this area.  
There is no practice concerning environmental claims in Latvia and at the moment the 
issue is not topical. However, the authorities are planning to focus on this area, 
making more detailed studies about the state of affairs therein. The CRPC is currently 
preparing national guidelines on unfair commercial practices in this area, while the 
Ministry of Agriculture has focused on the use of words ‘bio’, ‘eco’ and has developed 
the Guidelines on using these words in the labels of food supplements.7 The new rules 
limit the use of those words in the names of the companies. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
The stakeholders gave positive assessment of the concept ‘average consumer’. The 
concept creates the framework of reference for assessing economic behaviour of the 
consumer. The concept is actively used in practice. 
The latter statement is confirmed by the publicly available case-law of the CRPC. The 
concept of ‘average consumer’ is referred to in a majority of its cases. In its practices, 
4 Regulations on Consumer Crediting [Noteikumi par patērētāja kreditēšanu]. Regulations of Cabinet of 
Ministers No. 1219 adopted 28 December 2010. On application of these rules, see also the Consumer 
Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. 18-pk dated 30 June 2016. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemuma_izraksts4finance.pdf (last seen on 30.07.2016). 
5 Article 11, Regulations on Consumer Crediting [Noteikumi par patērētāja kreditēšanu]. Regulations of 
Cabinet of Ministers No. 1219 adopted 28 December 2010. 
6 B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, 
Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 264-265. 
7 Vadlīnijas par terminu „bioloģisks”, „ekoloģisks” un vārdu daļu „bio” un „eko” lietošanu uztura 
bagātinājuma marķējumā [Guidelines on Use of Terms „Biological”, „Ecological” and Parts of Words „bio” 
and „eco” in Labels of Food Supplements]. Guidelines of Ministry of Agriculture adopted 9 March 2016.  
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the CRPC often refers to Recital 18 of the UCPD and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – CJEU)8 to clarify the meaning of the 
concept. Notwithstanding these references, the practice of the CRPC, usually, does not 
explain how specific facts of the case were assessed in light of the concept of ‘average 
consumer’. As emphasized by a consumer organisation, the concept remains very 
uncertain. For this reason, it seems impossible make a general statement as to how 
the concept is applied in the Member State.  
There are two main problems with application of this concept. Firstly, the stakeholders 
observe that businesses often consider that consumers are more advanced than 
established through the practice of the CRPC. This may be, inter alia, due to 
sometimes not easily perceivable content of the concept of ‘average consumer’. In 
other words, for a layperson it may be difficult to grasp how the concept is applied in a 
particular case. Secondly, the stakeholders consider that it is often difficult to apply 
the concept of ‘average consumer’ in cases concerning groups of consumers, for 
example, persons of older age.  
The use of the concept allows authorities to render a flexible decision, specifying the 
content of the concept of ‘average consumer’ in a manner that is best suited for the 
specific case. This is an obvious advantage given to the authorities that are not bound 
by formalistic and overly specific rules, when evaluating the nature of the supposedly 
unfair practice. The disadvantage is that nuances of that evaluation often remain 
unknown to those who read the practice of the CRPC, since the precise limits of the 
concept are usually not uncovered.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
No new categories are introduced by law. However, the concept of ‘vulnerable 
consumers’ has been used in the practice of the CRPC, most notably in respect of 
persons with serious diseases.9 Likewise, children and young persons have been often 
described as ‘vulnerable consumers’ in the practice of the CRPC. However, the CRPC 
has also characterized unemployed persons (actively seeking employment) as 
‘vulnerable consumers’ since their income, on average, is below minimal income 
determined by the state.10   
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
According to the stakeholder, the co-regulation actions are employed in practice. The 
CRPC plays the central role in their employment. This institution, together with traders 
and other institutions, develops guidelines for fair commercial practices. These 
guidelines also address issues related to advertising. Two important examples are the 
8 E.g., CJEU case No. C-112/99 dated 25 October 2001, para. 52 ([…] the perception of an average 
individual who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. Account should be 
taken of the type of persons at whom the advertising is directed.”); CJEU case No. C-44/01 dated 8 April 
2003, para. 55; CJEU case No. C-356/04 dated 19 September 2006, para. 78; CJEU case No. C-381/05 
dated 19 April 2007, para. 23. 
9 E.g., Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-REUD-31 dated 13 August 2009. 
Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/bioaktivators.pdf (last seen on 
30.07.2016); Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-REUD-53 dated 10 
December 2009. Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/izraksts.pdf (last seen 
on 30.07.2016). 
10 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-KREUD-49 dated 16 September 2010. 
Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_nr-e03-kreud-
49_sia_baltic_euroex_izraksts.pdf (last seen on 30.07.2016). 
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2010 Guidelines on Preparation of Fair Loan Agreements11 and 2013 Guidelines on 
Implementing Fair Commercial Practices in Consumer Crediting.12 
These guidelines are not binding, but contain recommendations, explaining the 
requirements set by the law and provide examples of unfair commercial practices. 
These guidelines help traders make preventive assessments of their activities and 
avoid unfair commercial practices. Moreover, during the drafting stage, the CRPC 
receives useful information from traders, identifying problems in the market. However, 
some stakeholders have stated that it would have been better, if the CRPC were 
allowed to draft binding instruments.  
In addition, traders sometimes directly contact the CRPC to obtain its opinion on 
legality of their practices. For example, to verify whether content of a particular 
advertisement could cause non-compliance with consumer protection laws.  
The most important tool for self-regulation is the creation of Good Practice Codes. The 
traders may develop such a code - a voluntary agreement of the traders or a body of 
provisions - regulating the behaviour of such performers of commercial practices, who 
have undertaken to fulfil the commitments specified in the good practice code in one 
or several types of commercial practices, as well as in one or several fields of 
economic or professional activity. The CRPC, upon its own initiative or upon a request 
of professional associations of traders, evaluates content of such codes and provides a 
recommendatory opinion. Such codes are developed by traders in consumer credit and 
advertising markets. 
The stakeholders, however, note that the use of such codes does not always achieve 
its goal. The codes may simply reproduce requirements set out in laws, while being 
presented to consumers as encompassing good practices beyond those imposed by 
law, hence misleading consumers. Scholars also observe that only few industries use 
such codes and even when they exist they are not effective.13 Moreover, in some 
cases, industries create their own bodies for assessing compliance of businesses with 
such codes. In practice, these bodies sometimes fail to limit their assessment to such 
codes and, likewise, assess compliance with laws in force. This creates confusion 
within the industry and among consumers as such decisions may differ from the 
practice of the CRPC, rendering consumer law standards more ambiguous.14 However, 
there are also positive examples. In 2013, large associations of traders voluntary 
agreed to the memorandum ‘Fair Euro Enforce’. This memorandum did function in 
practice and helped smooth transition from the former national currency to the euro.    
The practice of the CRPC shows that often the CRPC must intervene first in order to 
provide an initial cause for establishment of self-regulatory instruments within the 
industry. For that reason, the CRPC monitors different areas of commerce in 
accordance with annually set priority areas. To give an example, in 2008 the CRPC, 
with assistance of phone operators, scanned 14 websites that were offering mobile 
content services (melodies of calls, pictures, games etc.). The CRPC concluded that 
the websites provided unclear or incomplete information about the services or prices, 
violating the fair commercial practice rules. In order to tackle the problem, the CRPC 
rendered individual decisions in these cases and also developed advice package for 
consumers. Only after the CRPC took these measures, mobile phone operators 
developed their own Code of Conduct, eliminating these practices. Overall, the 
stakeholders expressed scepticism about self-regulation measures.  
11 Vadlīnijas taisnīga patērētāja kreditēšanas līguma sastādīšanai. Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2010. 
Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/vadlinijas_taisniga_pateretaja_kreditesanas_liguma_sasta
disanai.pdf (last seen on 16.07.2016). 
12 Vadlīnijas godīgas komercprakses īstenošanai patērētāju kreditēšanas jomā. Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre, 03.09.2013, No.8. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/fin_vadlinijas_komercprakse.pdf (last seen on 
16.07.2016). 
13 B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, 
Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 250.  
14 Ibid., 250-251.  
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
The stakeholders have not signalled the existence of major difficulties with the black 
list of the UCPD. The existing list does not require changes. However, the list has to be 
adjusted to modern trends in commerce, i.e., developments of modern technologies, 
like e-commerce, digital tendencies and innovative marketing methods. The changes 
should be introduced through the standard procedure of amending directives.  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Firstly, as it was stated above, one improvement – amendments to the black list 
dealing with development of modern technologies. Secondly, the UCPD should have 
more elaborate regulation on new economic forms. For example, the sharing economy 
– peer-to-peer traveling/shopping/car sharing, price comparing webpages etc. and 
blogs popularizing the particular goods or services or using (often fake) endorsements 
of previous consumers.  
Another particular problem that should be addressed are the so called ‘rogue traders’, 
who offer goods or services to consumers, collect monies but then vanish from the 
market. Currently, there are no efficient tools against this practice. So far, the 
competent authorities have attempted initiating criminal proceedings against them, 
but with no success. It is also problematic to deal with a situation when a trader 
provides certain services for free and while the service is performed offers goods to 
the customer. In such a situation, the consumer may be forced to buy goods. 
Thirdly, just as with other Directives studied here, the stakeholders have underscored 
the need for more harmonization to ensure better cross-border cooperation. 
Successful cross-border cooperation is difficult if standards vary across Member 
States. Thus, in general full harmonization is preferable to minimum harmonization.  
Fourthly, sometimes there are problems with delimitation of competences among 
enforcing authorities. For example, the CRPC has established that the branch of an 
Estonian bank had distributed the advertisement inviting to conclude the crediting 
contract and the particular advertisement was recognized as unfair commercial 
practice thus the penalty was imposed on the mother bank as a supervising entity of 
the branch.15 In some cases even the criminal proceedings are initiated because the 
foreign branch continues the unfair commercial practice and does not comply with a 
CRPC decision.16 In more general terms, there is a need for harmonisation and 
clarification of issues arising during the enforcement of the UCPD. Notably, questions 
of penalties, allocation of enforcement authority, etc.   
Finally, the CRPC develops guidelines for the traders – that is the good practice that 
can be shared with other Member States. While these guidelines do not automatically 
reduce the number of infringements, they ensure more rapid resolution of disputes 
and promote legal certainty.  
 
15 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-F342-10 dated 2 July 2015. 
Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_par_administrativa_soda_uzliksanu_bigbank_izraksts.
pdf (last seen on 21.06.2016). 
16 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. 7-nk dated 27 August 2010. Available in 
Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_nr-7-nk_viasat_izraksts.pdf (last seen on 
21.06.2016). 
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1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
First, it shall be noted that the Cabinet of Ministers has adopted the Regulations 
No. 178 “Procedures for Indication of Prices of products and Services” prescribing the 
procedure by which selling price and price per unit of measurement for products and 
services offered to a consumer shall be indicated.17 Thus Latvia extended the 
application of the PID to services. Moreover, the Regulations provided for the 
procedure of dual display of prices of products and services during the period of 
Latvia’s accession to the Euro zone. 
The Regulations states that the price does not have to be indicated, inter alia, for a 
product which is utilised in providing a service and which is part of the service, in 
auctions and in marketing of works of art and antiques (Article 12). The price per 
certain unit of measurement does not have to be indicated at small points of sale 
where it is not possible to ensure the indication of the price per certain unit of 
measurement in the manner easily identifiable and clearly legible for a consumer 
(Article 12.1).  
According to the stakeholders, consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price in Latvia. Certain difficulties were foreseen when Latvia joined the euro-
zone in 1 January 2014. The law provided for special parallel price identification 
requirements as from 1 October 2013 – 30 June 2014. From 1 January until 30 June 
2014, the CRPC performed 15’768 inspections and in 4890 cases (31%) violations 
were ascertained but the discrepancies in parallel identification of the prices were 
cured in 87% cases. Consumers’ complaints were received in January 2014, including 
complains against carriers of the transport as it was not clear how the price for 
carriage has changed (change of tariffs) and it was considered as increase of price and 
violation of the law providing that conversation from the Latvian Lats to euro was to 
be conducted pursuant to rate set by the Council.18    
The CRPC has adopted the ‘Guidelines on Price Identification in Selling the Goods and 
Providing Services, Taking into Account Fair Commercial Practice’ in 2015. The 
guidelines are not an official interpretation of the relevant norms, however, they are 
recommendations by the CRPC based on the practice, complains and understanding of 
the norms.19  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Such an approach is not adopted in Latvia. Pursuant to the stakeholders, discussions 
about its introduction were initiated, but it was established that it would be an 
enormous burden for traders. 
 
17 See: Kārtība, kādā norādāmas preču un pakalpojumu cenas [Procedures for Indication of Prices of 
Products and Services]. Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No.178 adopted 18 May 1999. Available in 
English at http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/MK_Noteikumi/Cab._Reg._No._178_-
_Procedures_for_Displaying_Prices_of_Products_x_Services.doc (last seen on 21.06.2016). 
18 Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības centra 2014. gada pārskats [Report of the Consumers’ Rights Protection 
Centre of 2014]. Consumer Rights Protection Centre, p. 34. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/publiskais_parskats_2014.pdf (last seen on 21.06.2016). 
19 Vadlīnijas preču un pakalpojumu cenu norādīšanai, tostarp godīgas komercprakses īstenošanā. Consumer 
Rights Protection Centre, 1.10.2015, No. 21. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/nr_21.pdf (last seen on 21.06.2016). 
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• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
N/A 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
First of all, it is necessary to explain the current legal framework in Latvia. Misleading 
commercial practices, encompassing misleading advertising, is regulated by the Unfair 
Commercial Practice Prohibition Law.20 This law is implementing the UCPD. The 
Advertising Law deals with misleading and comparative advertisement in non-
consumer cases and implements the MCAD.  
Article 1 of the Advertising Law states that ‘[a]dvertising is any form or any mode of 
announcement or endeavor associated with economic or professional activity, intended 
to promote the popularity of or demand for goods or services (including immovable 
property, rights and obligations).’21 Thus, in essence (though not in precise wording), 
the definition of ‘advertising’ used in said law is identical to that of Article 2(a) of the 
MCAD.   
In general, the scope of the MCAD is rather broad and provides effective protection for 
traders. In practice two problems have been identified. Firstly, currently in Latvia, 
there is a discussion about drawing a line between political statements and 
advertisements. Recently, the Non-bank Creditor Association made statements 
criticizing the practice of the CRPC in relation to non-bank crediting. The statements 
were distributed through media via advertisements. The obvious objective of these 
statements was to protect non-bank financial institutions from more rigorous practices 
of the CRPC. In such cases, the problem is to distinguish between an economic or 
professional activity intended to promote goods or services and expression of opinion 
by businesses and their associations. This is, of course, a very specific problem, 
closely related to issues of constitutional legal order and is thus difficult to solve at the 
supranational level. 
The second problem is that monitoring and supervision of the area is difficult in 
practice. The competing traders use advertisements against each other and 
sometimes breaking ethical rules or using illegal forms of advertisement when replying 
to advertisement campaigns by other traders. Moreover, there are suspicions that 
complaints by traders against each other are overloading the supervising authorities.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The stakeholders have positively evaluated the principle-based approach, as it allows 
finding a reasonable solution for each particular case. The downside of the approach is 
a lower level of legal certainty. However, benefits of the approach outweigh this 
disadvantage.  
20 Negodīgas komercprakses aizlieguma likums [Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law]. Latvian Law 
adopted 22 November 2007 Available in English at 
http://vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Unfair_Commercial_Practice_Prohibition_Law.do
c (last seen on 17.07.2016). 
21 See Reklāmas likuma [Advertising Law]. Latvian Law adopted 20 December 1999. Available in English at 
http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Advertising_Law.pdf (last seen on 
21.06.2016). 
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 • The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Advertising Law almost verbatim reproduce Articles 3 and 4 of 
the MCAD when defining misleading and comparative advertisement.22 Hence, 
substantive scope of protection under the national law does not go beyond that of the 
Directive. It is, however, important to mention that there are other provisions giving 
protection to businesses in case of misleading advertising. For example, Article 23521 
of the Latvian Civil Law23 protects honour, respect and business reputation. In some 
cases, misleading advertising may be considered to cause damage to other market 
participants.  
The UCPD is not extended to B2B transactions. There are no other rules protecting 
B2B transactions. The majority of the stakeholders have observed that the current 
situation is adequate. However, the stakeholders dealing with competition law 
consider that while there is no hard data about the need for such extension, in 
principle, it would be considered a positive development.   
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
The stakeholders consider that full harmonisation provisions on comparative 
advertising effectively allow to tackle problems linked to comparative advertising. At 
the same time, the stakeholders have underscored the need for further guidelines on 
application of the MCAD.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
In principle, the answer is positive. However, it was stated above in respect of the 
UCPD, there may be some problems in regards to use of blogs or webpages with 
consumer (often fake) endorsements of products comparing them to competing 
products. As the stakeholders have noted, in respect to the UCPD, current legal 
instruments in the area of advertising are difficult to enforce in such cases. Possibly, a 
more elaborate regulation is needed for these types of comparative advertising. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
As with other Directives, the functioning of the MCAD in cross-border transactions is 
subject to successful cooperation among enforcement authorities in different Member 
States. So far, this cooperation is not without problems. For example, in some cases 
foreign traders are using methods of advertising in breach of Latvian law, but not of 
that in other Member States. In such cases, foreign authorities cannot impose any 
sanction, if requested so by Latvian authorities. This allows traders to evade any 
sanction whatsoever.  
The stakeholders note that to ensure better cooperation, full harmonization provisions 
must be preferred to minimum harmonization, even if limiting the marge of 
appreciation. Similarly, issues of territorial competence, penalties and matters of 
enforcement must be harmonized. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Latvijas Republikas Civillikums [Civil Law]. Latvian Law adopted on 28 January 1937. Available in English 
at http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/The_Civil_Law.doc (last seen on 
17.07.2016). 
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 • Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
For measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD see the previous 
answer. While the CRPC is elaborating guidelines for laws implementing consumer 
protection, similar guidelines may be useful for the MCAD.  
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law, implementing the UCPD, transposes 
its provisions almost verbatim. Moreover, the practice of the CRPC shows that it often 
refers both to the text of the law implementing in Latvia and the UCPD itself. Now, the 
problem is that principle-based approach provides a large margin of appreciation to 
Member State authorities. Even the practice of the CJEU does not solve the issue as it 
likewise operates with rather ambiguous notions. Had the CJEU acted otherwise, it 
would render the principle-based approach meaningless, substituting it by formalized 
rules. It is important to note that the practice of the CRPC and case-law of the 
Administrative Courts do not show that these institutions would refer to practice of 
foreign courts or institutions. Thus, disparities among Member States in application of 
the principle-based approach are inevitable.  
However, the stakeholders have not indicated that application of the principle-based 
approach would create particular problems. According to the stakeholders, usually, the 
minimum harmonization provisions or gaps in EU rules create disparities in the 
market. Theoretically, the principle-based approach may be prone to disparities, 
although there are no specific statistics or studies about the issue.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
The stakeholders have, in general, considered the black list to be an efficient tool, 
complementing the principle-based approach. The fact that the black list contains an 
exhaustive and precise list of unfair commercial practices should, in principle, aid free 
movement of goods and services as it provides more uniformity. As stated above, 
while the principle-based rules of the UCPD are also harmonizing the legal 
environment, their application may differ among Member States. The black list with it 
precise rules generates lesser disparities among Member States.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
The stakeholders have indicated that while in principle full harmonization is preferred 
by enforcement authorities, in respect of financial services minimum harmonization 
provides important advantages as the Latvian legislator was able to implement 
measures dealing with troublesome development in the market of non-bank crediting. 
However, currently a special regime for consumer crediting is established through 
implementation of the Directive 2008/48/EC, dated 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers. 
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As there is no practice on immovable property and this is not a topical issue in Latvia, 
there is also no significant effect on cross-border trade.  
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The stakeholders have not indicated that the principle-based approach would 
genuinely create disparities. However, it must be taken into account that Latvia is a 
small market and it may be difficult to spot certain problems due their scale. In future, 
if practice among Member States authorities varies, such disparities could affect cross-
border trade. However, in any case, the affect would most likely be negligible.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
The stakeholders have noted that the use of minimum harmonisation is creating 
barriers. It allows traders to escape from the application of more stringent rules.  
It is not known to what degree businesses exporting into Member States with higher 
requirements are suffering from varying regulations.   
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The full harmonization rules, in principle, are satisfactory and ensure equal treatment 
of the market participants.  
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
According to the stakeholders, this is not so much a problem of barriers to cross-
border trade, but rather a problem of evasion from enforcement by certain traders. 
This, however, may negatively affect cross-border trade indirectly, by distorting 
competition among traders in different Member States.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to the stakeholders, there is no research uncovering the level of awareness 
among traders. However, the everyday observations of the stakeholders enforcing 
consumer protection rights show that the level of awareness is comparatively low. The 
study of the practice of the CRPC also shows that disregard of requirements set out on 
Article 7(4) UCPD is not the main infringement of consumer law, but it is a recurrent 
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infringements.24 The practice of the CRPC shows that traders frequently do not 
indicate prices.25 In one case, a trader did not indicate precise prices in its internet 
advertisements, claiming that clients could find the price by clicking on additional 
links.26 Also traders have failed to indicate sufficient information about the payment, 
delivery, performance and other provisions of the contract.27 These cases show that 
the level of awareness is probably low.   
The usefulness of the information requirements in view of the more comprehensive 
pre-contractual information requirements of the CRD is not studied in Latvia and is not 
a topical issue.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The stakeholders have noted that no such overlap has been established. The practice 
of the CRPC shows that these instruments are occasionally applied. For example, in 
respect of E-commerce the concept of advertising the Law on Information Society 
Services (implementing the E-commerce Directive) and the Advertising Law 
(implementing the MCAD) complement each other.28 Complementary application of 
different laws make it complicated for businesses (especially, smaller ones) to 
navigate among different legal regimes.  
This implies two problems. First is related to implementation of the Directives. All 
three directives (the MCAD, Service and E-commerce Directive) are implemented via 
three different laws with multiple cross-references and provisions determining their 
mutual interplay. Implementation in a single law might simplify the situation, making 
the legal regime more transparent. Second is related to the Directives themselves. 
The fact that they contain complementary legal regimes makes it difficult to determine 
their scope.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
This problem has not been discussed in Latvian scholarship or among enforcement 
authorities. However, theoretically, there are both advantages and disadvantages to 
24 E.g., Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K204-4 dated 9 April 2015. 
Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_komercpr_k-204izraksts.pdf 
(last seen on 21.06.2016). 
25 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-L13-L34-14 dated 23 July 2015; 
Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_rigas_satiksme_23_07_2015_izraksts_majas_lapai_00
000003.pdf (last seen on 21.06.2016). Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. 11–
pk 4 April 2016. Available in Latvia at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/04_04_2016_sia_promotion_studio.pdf (last seen on 
21.06.2016). 
26 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. 11–pk dated 4 April 2016. Available in 
Latvia at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/04_04_2016_sia_promotion_studio.pdf (last seen on 
21.06.2016). 
27 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K20-5 dated 14 May 2015. 
Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_komercpr_k-20izraksts.pdf (last 
seen on 21.06.2016). 
28 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-P65-7 dated 2 March 2012. 
Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_nr-eo3-ptu-p65-7.pdf (last seen 
on 21.06.2016). 
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such extension. On the one hand, the extension would have helped to level the playing 
field among Member States in B2B transactions. On the other hand, it is not without 
its problems.  
B2B transactions are a broad category. Some of them may, in principle, require 
application of such rules. These would be transactions between smaller and larger 
businesses. The former may have level of competence and bargaining power similar to 
those of consumers. For example, Latvian tax law recognizes the so-called ‘patent tax 
payers’ regime. A patent tax payer is a natural person registered in the State Revenue 
Service, whose annual turnover does not exceed EUR 50 000, who does not employ 
other persons and does not provide services to other traders (for example, mushroom 
pickers). Patent tax payers are unprotected and for them such new legal regime may 
be helpful.  
The problem is to design objective criteria making it possible to identify those traders 
that need additional protection. These criteria should be harmonized and be efficient, 
notwithstanding very different national regulations of commercial forms.  
As there are no studies on the need for such extension in the market, it is impossible 
to make an unequivocal conclusion, whether such extension is needed.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
The B2C regime is based upon the premise that a consumer is a weaker and less 
competent party. The B2B regime cannot be based upon the same premise as all 
parties involved are businesses. For example, Article 5(5) of the UCPD provides that 
Annex I contains the list of those commercial practices which shall in all circumstances 
be regarded as unfair. It may be questioned whether all practices enumerated therein 
could be considered unfair in B2B transactions, where parties should normally have a 
higher level of competence than consumers. Similarly, the concept of the average 
consumer is probably not a good benchmark to assess B2B transactions. Thus, both 
regimes should remain distinguished.  
For the sake of uniformity both regimes could be based upon similar terminology and 
similar categories (unfair commercial practices, misleading actions/omission and 
aggressive commercial practices), but thresholds used within each category must 
differ for B2B transactions.   
Finally, since 1 January 2016 Latvia has adopted Unfair Retail Trade Practice 
Prohibition Law restricting the use of buying power of retailers against suppliers in 
order to balance the interests of suppliers and retailers in retail trade.29 The existence 
of such national laws, creates problems with alignment of B2B and B2C regimes.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
There are no studies analysing the need and effects of such an extension and its 
possible scope. Thus, it is impossible to draw unequivocal conclusions.  
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
29 Negodīgas mazumtirdzniecības prakses aizlieguma likums [Unfair Retail Trade Practice Prohibition Law]. 
Latvian Law adopted 21 May 2015. Available in English at 
http://vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Unfair_Retail_Trade_Practices_Prohibition_Law.p
df (last seen on 21.06.2016). 
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As was stated above, the stakeholders consider the black-list of practices to be useful 
for B2C transactions. The list could be likewise used for B2B transactions. However, in 
Latvia advertising is almost exclusively targeted at consumers. Thus, the need for 
such a list is questionable. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Currently, in Latvia there is no authority that would deal with the matter in respect to 
B2B transactions. Thus, it is impossible to speak of any cooperation mechanism at this 
moment.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
The stakeholders have in general expressed their preference for contractual 
consequences. If the scope of the MCAD is extended, then introduction of contractual 
consequences would be reasonable.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
The stakeholders have not indicated that this is necessary.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Latvian law does not provide contractual consequences for the breaches of the UCPD. 
Similarly, the law does not provide the right to avoid the contract due to such 
infringements.  
However, Article 25(8) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law provides that, if the 
CRPC establishes a violation of the consumer rights, which affects group consumer 
interests (collective interests of consumers) and may cause losses or harm to 
consumers, as well as to a particular consumer, the CPRC, having evaluated the 
nature and essence of the violation, as well as other aspects, may take, inter alia, the 
following measures: ‘1) propose that the manufacturer, trader or service provider 
makes a commitment in writing to rectify the violation within the specified time 
period; 2) take a decision, by which the manufacturer, trader or service provider is 
required to cease the violation, and to perform specific activities in order to rectify the 
impact thereof and which determine the time period for the implementation of such 
activities […].’30  
If the manufacturer, trader or service provider makes a commitment in writing to 
rectify the violation, it is considered that he/she has acknowledged the infringement of 
consumer rights and the CPRC abstains from making a decision requiring to cease the 
violation and perform specific activities in order to rectify the impacts of the 
infringement. However, if the commitment is not fulfilled, the CPRC requests to cease 
the infringement and to perform specific activities in order to rectify the impact and 
establishes a period for its implementation.  
30 Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības likums [Consumer Rights Protection Law]. Latvian Law adopted 18 March 
1999. Available in English at 
http://vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Consumer_Rights_Protection_Law.pdf (last seen 
on 21.06.2016). 
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 • Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Contractual consequences are not provided for in Latvian law; hence, no case-law on 
the matter.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
The stakeholders consider that introduction of contractual consequences would be 
beneficial for consumer protection in Latvia. Indeed, contractual consequences may be 
an efficient measure to strengthen protection of consumers and, notably, have a 
preventive effect upon businesses attempting to infringe consumer protection law. 
Notwithstanding that, the stakeholders have also pointed out certain problems related 
to the introduction of contractual consequences. For example, the stakeholders have 
indicated the difficulty of establishing that goods were bought due to the (misleading) 
advertisement. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
According to the stakeholders, the principle-based approach, all things considered, is 
more effective than the use of specific rules, as the latter would always contain gaps. 
The principle-based approach allows the authorities and adjudicators to apply the law 
in a flexible manner, taking into account all factual circumstances. Moreover, the 
approach adjusts to the changing values of society about legal, social and political 
processes.31 
This flexibility is illustrated by the following example. In one case, the court ex officio 
evaluated the principle of legal equality of the contracting parties (Article 5(1) of the 
Consumer Rights Protection Law). This rule provides that contractual terms shall be 
deemed to contradict the principle of legal equality of the contracting parties, if the 
terms reduce the liability of the parties prescribed by law, restrict the rights of the 
consumer to enter into contracts with third parties, stipulate privileges to the 
manufacturer, trader or service provide, and restrictions to the consumers and put the 
consumer in a disadvantageous position and are contrary to the requirements of the 
good faith (Article 5(2) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law). The Court 
acknowledged that the Consumer Rights Protection Law is not intended to release the 
consumer for any and all liabilities arising from the breach of the contract but the 
purpose of the law is to protect the consumer against the application of contractual 
terms, providing disproportionate liability for the non-execution of the contract. If all 
terms unfavourable to consumers were to be considered unfair, it would violate the 
principle of legal equality. The judge concluded that in the case at hand the consumer 
31 Vadlīnijas taisnīgu elektronisko sakaru pakalpojumu līguma sastādīšanai [Guidelines on Drafting Fair 
Electronic Communication Service Agreement] Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2012, p. 48. Available 
in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/vadlinijas_elektroniskie_sakari_ligumu_sastadisana.pdf 
(last seen on 11.07.2016). 
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had not fulfilled their obligations under the contract, thus had not acted in good faith. 
The creditor’s claim against the consumer was satisfied.32 
In certain areas, creating particular concern for consumer protection, the application 
of the principle-based approach has achieved notable results. For example, the 
supervision of contracts used in non-bank crediting has been an effective means of 
debtor protection.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
In 2014, the CRPC received 132 complaints regarding unfair terms. In 2015 the 
number increased to 164. In 2015, the majority of complaints (37 %) was about 
consumer crediting33 considered to be one of the most problematic sectors, even 
though since the introduction of the licensing in 2011 consumer crediting agreements 
are scrutinized by the CRPC. Namely, when the CRPC decides whether to issue 
licenses or not, it evaluates draft contracts, thus eliminating the unfair contractual 
terms.  
In the opinion of stakeholders and in practice a non-exhaustive black list of unfair 
terms is incorporated in Article 6 of the Consumer Rights Protection Law. It suggests 
that, contrary to the Directive, the list in the national law is not only indicative, i.e. 
providing examples for unfair terms, but also bears a mandatory character.34 Namely, 
unfair contractual terms listed in the law shall be regarded as unfair and not in effect if 
they are not mutually discussed by the contracting parties. 
The Supreme Court has stated that this Article provides just for the general list of 
possible violations of the principle of legal equality, describing their main 
characteristics; but it is impossible to indicate all unfair contractual terms.35 
Part 3(7) of Article 6 provides that contractual terms, which have not been mutually 
discussed by the contracting parties, shall be deemed to be unfair if they exclude or 
hinder the right of the consumer to apply to consumer rights protection institutions or 
to courts or to use rights protection means, especially those providing for adjudication 
of disputes only by arbitration tribunals, unjustifiably restrict the use of proof available 
for a consumer or impose a burden of proof on a consumer which in accordance with 
the laws and regulations is an obligations of other contractual party. However, the 
Article 10(2) of Law on Arbitration Courts provides freedom for any party to conclude 
an arbitration agreement.36 It is stated that the norm included in the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law is a special norm in connection with the norm included in the Civil 
Procedure Law (general norm)37. Thus in accordance with national law and para 1(q) 
of the Directive’s Annex38 contractual term providing only for the dispute settlement in  
32 Dobele region court’s judgment in the case No. C30624015 dated 30 May 2016. Available in Latvian at 
https://manas.tiesas.lv/eTiesasMvc/nolemumi/pdf/271015.pdf (last seen on 11.07.2016). See also 
Supreme Court’s judgment in the case No. C10100611 dated 14 September 2016. Available in Latvian at 
http://at.gov.lv/files/uploads/files/archive/department1/2016/SKC-116-2016.doc )last seen on 
01.02.2017). 
33 Official statistics of the CRPC. Available in Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/lv/content/statistika-par-
pateretaju-sudzibam-un-konsultacijam (last seen on 11.07.2016). 
34 See, B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, 
Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 110-111.  
35 Administrative Cases Department of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case No. C30519003 dated 7 
March 2006. 
36 Šķīrējtiesu likums [Law On Arbitration Courts]. Latvian Law adopted 11 September 2014. 
37 Civilprocesa likums [Civil Procedure Law]. Latvian Law adopted 14 October 1998. Available in English at 
http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Civil_Procedure_Law.pdf (last seen on 
11.07.2016). 
38 Unfair term (q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal 
remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by 
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arbitration can be deemed unfair.39 The Constitutional Court has also indicated: ‘when 
interpreting the restrictions determined in the Directive to bind the consumer with a 
jurisdiction clause, the European Court of Justice has pointed out that the potential 
unfairness and validity of such a clause shall be assessed by the court of its own 
motion [...]. The Constitutional Court holds that the courts of general jurisdiction of 
Latvia shall also act in the similar manner [...].’40 
The CRPC, frequently, faces contractual terms imposing upon consumers 
disproportionately large contractual penalties or other compensation for non-
performance or improper performance of the contractual obligations. These terms are 
considered unfair under Latvian law.41  
There is a recent example from the CRPC’s practice. The CRPC received number of 
consumer complaints regarding the parking services contracts. The parking contracts 
placed in the parking sites and on the web page of the service provider established 
that consumers were to pay several penalties for the same breach and their total 
amount was disproportionate and exceeded the contractual penalties provided by law. 
The services provider declined the CRPC’s proposition to eliminate the breach of 
consumer rights and to submit the written acknowledgment providing that the service 
provider would not offer or apply particular unfair terms. Taking into account that 
particular violation affected collective interests of the consumers, the CRPC decided to 
consider the specific contractual terms and required the service provider to stop 
applying the terms, to change them and to submit a new version of the contract for a 
review.42 The decision of the first instance court has been appealed and the litigation 
is pending.  
The list has helped eliminate the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts 
without them being individually negotiated.43 The state of arbitration in Latvia, in the 
eyes of the public, does not ensure comprehensive implementation of high ethical 
standards among arbitrators. Thus, the use of arbitration is considered to be non-
transparent and sometimes plainly unjust method of dispute settlement. This is even 
more so in consumer contracts, where the consumer would usually not understand all 
the consequences of the having the dispute decided in arbitration (in particular, when 
there is a risk that arbitrators/arbitration institution have certain links with the trader). 
The stakeholders have considered this to be the single most important improvement of 
the consumer practice in Latvia. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof 
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.  
39 Vadlīnijas taisnīga patērētāja kreditēšanas līguma sastādīšanai [Guidelines on Drafting Fair Consumer 
Credit Agreement] Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2010, Available in Latvia at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/vadlinijas_taisniga_pateretaja_kreditesanas_liguma_sasta
disanai.pdf (last seen 11.07.2016), p. 32. 
40 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia judgment in the case No. 2004-10-01 dated 
17 January 2005, para. 9.3.2. Available at http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/wp-
content/uploads/2004/05/2004-10-01_Spriedums_ENG.pdf (last seen on 11.07.2016). 
41 See: Administrative district court’s judgment in the case No. A42765709 dated 31 May 2012 available in 
Latvian at https://manas.tiesas.lv/eTiesasMvc/nolemumi/pdf/125753.pdf (last seen 01.02.2017); 
Administrative regional court’s judgment in the case No. 420563412 dated 16 October 2013. Available in 
Latvian at https://manas.tiesas.lv/eTiesasMvc/nolemumi/pdf/118686.pdf (last seen on 01.02.2017). 
42 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. 2-pk dated 8 October 2015. Available in 
Latvian at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemuma-izrakts-europarklatvia_2pi.pdf (last seen on  
30.07.2016). The decision was appealed by the service provider; however, the first instance court denied 
the appeal. See: Administrative regional court’s judgment in the case No. A420336415 dated 17 June 
2016. Available in Latvian at https://manas.tiesas.lv/eTiesasMvc/nolemumi/pdf/270650.pdf  (last seen on 
01.02.2017).  
43 Consumer Rights Centre’s decision in the case No.1/06 – 5338 dated 24 August 2005.  Available in 
Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_nr106_5338_2005_08_24._aas_baltijas_apdrosinasan
as_nams.pdf (last seen on 30.07.2016). 
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purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The black list is necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, the list simplifies the task 
of the CRPC of creating uniform practice on unfair contract terms and provides 
information to public. For example, currently the CRPC keeps a database of unfair 
contractual terms, which is available on the CRPC’s webpage. Moreover, in selected 
sectors the CRPC develops Guidelines on Drafting the Consumer Contracts, containing 
examples of unfair contract terms.44 This allows consumers and traders alike to assess 
contractual terms. An indicative list would provide lesser legal certainty and clarity.  
Secondly, the list has helped to eradicate certain practices, notably, the use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Their almost complete eradication from 
consumer contracts was positive development, bearing in mind that arbitration in 
Latvia is often short of highest international standards and its use in consumer 
disputes exposed consumers to unreasonable risk of denial of due process and access 
to justice. An indicative list would make such eradication slower, due to the case-by-
case assessment. The use of the black list provides a faster and more efficient 
solution.  
The practical application of the black list may be illustrated by the following example. 
The contract for telecommunication services provided that ‘[i]nformation about the 
changes in contract will be provided on [services provider’s] webpage. Information on 
prices, tariffs and additional costs of the service will be provided in writing or, if it is 
not against normative acts of the Republic of Latvia, via [services provider’s] 
webpage, mass media and/or in other suitable way.’ The CRPC referred to Article 
6(3)(12) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law, providing that the term permitting 
service provider to unilaterally amend the contractual terms shall be considered unfair. 
Further the CRPC stated that this norm in national law shall be interpreted within line 
of Annex 1, Article 1(j) and 2(b) of the Directive and Article 23 (3) Electronic 
Communications Law.45 The CRPC established that the law explicitly did not provide in 
which way the consumer shall be informed about the changes in electronic 
communication service agreement, but it was determined that the consumer should 
have ‘receive[d] an individual’ notice about changes in contract thus the CRPC 
imposed an obligation to change the particular term of the contract to the service 
provider and inform about the decision’s enforcement.46 
However, the introduction of the black list in national law does not mean that all terms 
listed therein are always unfair. The CRPC has published the cases when the term was 
not considered as unfair. For instance, in one case, the consumer complained that the 
contract provided for the contractual penalty of 2.5 % per day from the debt in case 
the consumer delays the payments.47 The CRPC evaluated the proportionality of the 
contractual penalty within the context of the Article 6(3)(4) of the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law, providing that the contractual term imposing a disproportionately 
large contractual penalty for non-performance of the contractual obligations upon a 
44 For example, Vadlīnijas taisnīgu elektronisko sakaru pakalpojumu līguma sastādīšanai [Guidelines on 
Drafting Fair Electronic Communication Service Agreement]. Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2012, p. 
48. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/vadlinijas_elektroniskie_sakari_ligumu_sastadisana.pdf 
(last seen on 11.07.2016). 
45 Elektronisko sakaru likums [Electronic Communication Law]. Latvian Law adopted 28 October 2004. 
Available in English at 
http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Electronic_Communications_Law.doc (last 
seen on 11.07.2016). Article 23(3) provides: „Subscribers have the right to terminate an electronic 
communications services contract without the application of penalties if the subscriber, upon receipt of a 
notification from the electronic communications merchant regarding changes in the conditions of the 
contract, does not agree to the offered changes in the contract conditions.” 
46 Consumer Rights Protections Centre’s Decision No. 25-lg dated 7 August 2006. Available in Latvian 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_nr.25_lg_2006.08.25_sia_bite_latvija.pdf (last seen 
on 11.07.2016). 
47 The CRPC does not decide on individual claims anymore.  
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consumer was unfair. In the case at hand taking into consideration the circumstances 
of the case, it was decided that the contractual penalty was fair.48 Thus the terms 
themselves allow to maintain certain flexibility in their application.  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
A judgment concerns only a particular consumer. This is illustrated by the following 
case. A consumer - the contracting party to a pledge agreement -, submitted the 
request to the CRPC, requesting to acknowledge that a number of the contractual 
terms were void. The CRPC decided not to initiate an administrative case, because 
some of the terms were fair, while in respect of the arbitration clause, the trader had 
given a public acknowledgment that it will not apply it. The consumer submitted the 
claim to the court. The case was reviewed by three instances, including the Supreme 
Court as cassation. The Supreme Court stated that in accordance with the law, the 
consumer itself cannot initiate the administrative case on breach of collective 
consumer interests in accordance with Article 25(81) of the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law.49 Secondly, in case of individual consumer disputes about unfair 
contract terms, the CRPC evaluates the complaints and replies stating its opinion 
regarding unfairness of the particular terms. Such a reply is not binding and does not 
constitute an administrative act. The CRPC protects collective consumer interests as 
provided in Directive No. 2009/22.50 
Some of the stakeholders, in particular consumer organisations, have indicated that 
after recent amendments, the dispute resolution of the individual disputes became 
more complicated.  
However, if the violation of the consumer rights, affecting group consumer interests 
(collective interests of consumers), has been established, and it may cause losses or 
harm to consumers, as well as to a particular consumer, the CRPC, having evaluated 
the nature and essence of the violation, as well as other aspects, is entitled inter alia 
to propose that the manufacturer, trader or service provider makes a commitment in 
writing to rectify the violation within the specified time period (Article 25(8) of the 
Consumer Rights Protection Law). The CRPC has published 16 such written 
commitments in 2015. The system helps curing amicably infringements and 
eliminating unfair terms from contracts, simultaneously protecting traders from 
punishment proceedings and fines.  
Moreover, while judgments concern only specific cases, the practice of the Supreme 
Court is normally followed by lower courts in similar cases. However, not always is 
there a dominant practice followed by all courts in all similar cases. While the precise 
48 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision No.19-lg dated 07 June 2006. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/ptac_lemumi/2006/lemums_nr.19_lg_2006.06.07_sia_ma
ksinet.pdf (last seen on 11.07.2016). 
49 This Article provide that the CRPC can initiate collective interest case upon its own initiative, on the basis 
of a submission of the association for consumer rights protection, on the basis of the information provided 
by such institution within the competence of which is the supervision and control of the relevant sector; 
on the basis of a submission of such institution of the European Union Member State which is included in 
the list referred to in Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests. 
50 Administrative Cases Department of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case No. A420299513 dated 11 
July 2014. Available in Latvian at http://at.gov.lv/files/uploads/files/archive/department3/2014/472-ska-
2014.doc (last seen on 13.07.2016). 
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effect is unknown, it could be speculated that this creates uncertainty for both traders 
and consumers, inflates costs of litigation, but equally motivates traders to use 
potentially unfair terms, expecting favourable court decisions. Thus most probably 
there is a need for the mechanism to extend the finding in one case to all consumer 
contracts, for example, in the national level the Supreme Court could publish 
summary of the judicature, i.e., recommended judiciary practices.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Article 6(2) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law provides that contractual terms 
shall be expressed in plain and comprehensible language. This implements the 
transparency requirement of the Directive. Within the meaning of this law, the 
principle of transparency means that an average consumer must be able to read and 
understand a consumer contract without lawyer’s assistance, and none of its terms is 
putting the consumer in disadvantageous position because he/she does not 
understand a particular term and cannot imagine that it can be applied against 
him/her.51 
The CRPC rarely deals with assessment of the contractual transparency requirements 
in practice. However, in some sectors, e.g., insurance, the use of non-transparent 
contractual clauses is a problem that is addressed by the institution.  
However, it must be noted that the CRPC, in its publicly available materials and 
guidelines for traders, underscores the need for transparent contractual language. The 
existence of such a legal requirement, even if not always easy to apply in practice, 
nevertheless, draws attention of traders to the language used in their contracts.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
In principle, Article 5(1) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law established equality 
between parties and extends to all terms, whether individually negotiated or not, if 
they are causing effects enumerated in Art. 5(2) of the said law. This means that, 
formally, Latvia has extended the application of Directive to individually negotiated 
terms and terms on the adequacy of the price.  
However, Article 6 of the said law, dealing with unfair terms, tackles only terms that 
were not individually negotiated. However, it still encompasses terms on the adequacy 
of the price and the main subject-matter, but only if they are not formulated in clear 
and understandable manner.  
In practice this means that the CRPC is dealing only with terms that were not 
individually negotiated. It may deal with terms on the adequacy of the price and the 
main subject-matter terms, provided they were not individually negotiated and were 
not formulated in clear and understandable manner. This means that these terms, for 
practical purposes, may only be assessed by a court. The court will assess whether the 
term is contrary to the principle of equality of parties. In practice this is a very unlikely 
occurrence. Thus, the effect of the extension is minimal, if any.   
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
51 Vadlīnijas taisnīga patērētāja kreditēšanas līguma sastādīšanai [Guidelines on Drafting Fair Consumer 
Credit Agreement]. Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2010, p. 9. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/vadlinijas_taisniga_pateretaja_kreditesanas_liguma_sasta
disanai.pdf (last seen on 11.07.2016). 
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practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
As was mentioned above, the sanction foreseen by the UCTD have been effective in 
some areas. For example, the invalidity of non-negotiated arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts to a large degree has alleviated problems related to their use in 
consumer contracts.  
However, there are a number of problems with application of these sanctions in 
practice. Firstly, while the CRPC may find that certain terms are unfair, it is sometimes 
hard to trace whether the trader has discontinued using the particular term in its 
contracts. Similarly, in cases when traders submit written commitments, it is not easy 
to control their observation.  
Secondly, for the majority of consumers, it is difficult to establish whether a 
contractual term is unfair or not. This subjects consumers to serious risks, if they 
incorrectly consider the term to be invalid and refuse to perform it.  For example, if 
the consumer considers that the contractual penalty is unfair and refuses to pay, this 
may lead to litigation. If the court finds that the term was not unfair, the consumer 
will be found to have breached the contract. Thus, to avoid the risk, the consumer 
would need first to contact the CRPC or bring a claim in a court. In accordance with 
the Article 26 of the Consumer Rights Protection Law, the CRPC cannot issue 
administrative decisions in cases of infringement of rights of individual consumers. 
Here, the CRPC can only consult the consumer and express its opinion about the 
alleged infringement. This means that at the end of the day, if the consumer believes 
that a contractual term is unfair, he/she will have to commence litigation. This makes 
application of sanctions difficult and costly.  
Pursuant to the observations of the stakeholders, the court practice is becoming more 
inclined to invoke unfairness of the contractual terms ex officio. This is due to two 
factors. Firstly, the line of reasoning has been approved by the Supreme Court.52 
Previously judges hesitated or were not informed about this principle, now there is an 
established case law by the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court, 
interpreting Article 6(11) of the Consumer Rights Protection Law53, established that 
the court shall evaluate the compliance of the terms in consumer contracts to 
requirements of good faith and shall not apply unfair terms, even if the consumer had 
challenged the term.54 The same was confirmed by the Constitutional Court.55 
Secondly, judges become more active participants of judicial training programs in 
consumer law.  
As it was stated above, the CRPC does not issue administrative decisions in individual 
cases. However, in accordance with Article 25(8) of the Consumer Rights Protection 
52 E.g., Civil Cases Department of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case No. SKC – 94/2016 dated 3 
March 2016. See also Civil Cases Departement of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case No. Skc-
108/2013 dated 12 March 2013. 
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a court must invoke invalidity of the unfair terms ex officio. In 
order to justify this conclusion, the Supreme Court referred to four cases by the CJEU: Court of Justice 
case No. C-618/10 dated 14 June 2012; Court of Justice case No. C-472/11 dated 21 February 2013; 
Court of Justice case No. C-488/2011 dated 30 May 2013; Court of Justice case No. C-169/2014 dated 17 
July 2014.  
53 “Upon resolving a dispute or carrying out other procedural actions arising from the contract entered into 
between a manufacturer, trader or service provider and a consumer, the court shall evaluate the terms of 
the contract and for the resolution of the dispute shall not apply the unfair terms provided for in the 
contract in relation to the consumer”.  
54 Civil Cases Department of the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case No. SKC-98/2015 dated 21 
September 2015. Available in Latvian at 
http://at.gov.lv/files/uploads/files/archive/department1/2015/SKC-98-2015.doc (last seen 14.07.2016). 
55 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia judgment in the case No. 2004-10-01 dated 
17 January 2005, para. 9.3.2. Available at http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/wp-
content/uploads/2004/05/2004-10-01_Spriedums_ENG.pdf (last seen on 11.07.2016). See reference in 
footnote 42. 
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Law, if a violation of the consumer rights has been determined, which affects group 
consumer interests (collective interests of consumers) and it may cause losses or 
harm to consumers, as well as to a particular consumer, the CRPC, having evaluated 
the nature and essence of the violation, as well as other aspects, is entitled to carry 
out one or several following activities: 1) to propose that the manufacturer, trader or 
service provider makes a commitment in writing to rectify the violation within the 
specified time period; 2) to take a decision, by which the manufacturer, trader or 
service provider is required to cease the violation, and to perform specific activities in 
order to rectify the impact thereof and which determine the time period for the 
implementation of such activities; 3) to publish the decision taken either fully or 
partially on the home page of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre and in the 
newspaper Latvijas Ve ̄stnesis [the official Gazette of the Government of Latvia] (the 
costs associated with the publication shall be covered by the manufacturer, trader or 
service provider).56  
If the CRPC takes a decision on the basis of said provision, it issues an administrative 
act.  
Finally, it should be noted that term ‘consumer’ appears only once in the Civil 
Procedure Law. Namely, Article 405 of the law provides that if the judge finds that the 
application for the undisputed enforcement is unfounded or the amount of penalty 
indicated in the application is disproportionate to the principal debt, or the document 
to be enforced contains unfair contractual provisions violating consumer rights, he or 
she shall take a decision on dismissal thereof. Therefore, it can be suggested that not 
only guidance by the CJEU is valuable, but also the national procedural law shall be 
adjusted to be more favourable for the consumers. Also a consumer organisation 
indicated that there are no procedural reliefs for the NGO’s protecting consumer 
interests – no reduction of court fees etc.   
Moreover, in the interviews it was suggested that there is a need for Commission’s 
guidelines. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The European Consumer Centre already provides graphical presentations and easy-to-
understand layouts of EU consumer law.57 However, it is questionable whether all 
contract terms can be expressed in graphical presentation.  
The CRPC provides a useful database of unfair contract clauses on the internet.58 
Currently the webpage contains information on all unfair clauses included in the list. 
Of course, a greater number of examples, preferably derived from practice, giving 
guidance to both consumers and traders about the state of law in this area, would 
further strengthen legal certainty.  
In addition, the CRPC webpage provides a database of unfair terms across different 
industries. These examples are also very useful to obtain an overview of the current 
state of affairs in the case law. Presentation of a large number of typical unfair clauses 
with commentaries by the relevant authority in a simple and understandable manner, 
56 According to scholars, the home page of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre is considered more 
accessible to general public; therefore, the CRPC does not use its right to publish decisions in the official 
Gazette of the Government of Latvia. See, B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of 
Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 351. 
57 Information provided by the European Consumer Centre is available in Latvian at 
http://www.ecclatvia.lv/lv/publikacijas/bukleti-brosuras (last seen on 17.07.2016). 
58 The databased of the CRPC is available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/docs/2014.11.26.%20pielikums_netaisnigu%20noteikumu%20
piemeri.pdf (last seen on 17.07.2016). 
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may be considered to be the best practice relevant for other Member States. Also, 
before issuing the licence to non-bank consumer creditors, the CRPC evaluates 
contractual templates, establishing whether the contractual terms are fair.  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
The stakeholders have not indicated such effects on cross-border trade. In general, 
any divergence may have a negative impact. However, cross-border trade develops 
slowly and traders hesitate to address new consumers in other Member States due to 
other obstacles such as lack of resources and knowledge of laws or particularities of 
the specific market. Due to the slow development of cross-border trade, Latvian 
traders do not have extensive experience of application of the general fairness clause 
in other Member States.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Pursuant to the view of the stakeholders, the black list of unfair contract terms is 
easier to understand as they set the clear proscriptive rules. The grey list, establishing 
just a rebuttable presumption of unfairness, may be more open to interpretation on a 
case by case basis that may vary among Member States. This may be a barrier to 
cross border trade as traders have to investigate the approach taken by the other 
Member State. However, there are no studies or information obtained from the 
stakeholders, providing any real life examples of such effects.  
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
There are no studies or information received from the stakeholders implying that other 
extensions of the application of the UCTD would represent a barrier to cross-border 
trade.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
This issue has not been discussed by legal scholars in Latvia. Thus, there is no clear 
academic opinion. However, Article 41 of the Consumer Rights Protection Law provides 
that the provisions of Chapters III (Conformity of Goods and Services to Provisions of 
a Contract) and IV (Information about the Goods and Services) of the law shall be 
applicable to such legal regulations, which are established between a trader or a 
service provider and a consumer, and also any other subject who expresses a wish to 
purchase goods or services for a purpose which is not related to economic of 
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professional activity of such subject. Thus, there is already protection for businesses, 
but only in the cases in which they are not acting in their business interests.  
Creation of wider protection may be questionable. Large businesses rarely will need it 
as their contracts are often prepared or reviewed by in-house lawyers. On the other 
hand, small businesses in regard to competence or bargaining power may be in a 
position similar to that of consumers. However, at least in Latvia, it is difficult to 
distinguish between businesses in need of such protection and those that do not. For 
example, in Latvia certain legal services may be provided by jurists established in the 
form of an enterprise with only a few people involved. Such an enterprise would hardly 
need additional protection.  
Moreover, if the protection is extended to certain categories of businesses, it may 
pose a problem of legal certainty. Normally, the larger businesses would need to know 
in advance whether their counterparties have only limited private autonomy.  
In addition, commercial law tradition underscores private autonomy. Across the board 
application of the UCTD in respect of such transactions would bring serious changes in 
traditional understanding of private autonomy and its limits in commercial law. At 
best, this approach could be acceptable for standard terms, but not for individually 
negotiated terms.  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Neither authorities, nor scholars have seriously considered and discussed this issue, 
thus it is hard to provide a definite answer. Overall, the use of good faith principle 
could be acceptable.   
The principle of good faith is also embodied in Article 1 of the Latvian Civil Law, 
making it part of private law. The use of a similar notion (although with an 
autonomous content due to its EU origins) in B2B transactions would not be something 
extraordinary for Latvian legal culture. The notion would give enforcement authorities 
and courts a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to apply the law in a nuanced 
manner.  
At the same time, in B2B transactions parties, usually, have lesser disparities of 
bargaining power and competence. Normally, imbalance of rights and obligations 
would be attributed to free exercise of private autonomy. Thus, if the concept of 
imbalance of rights and obligations is used it could apply only to most manifest cases. 
Otherwise, it would disrupt the basis of the market economy, where parties can design 
their own contracts.   
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
In B2B transactions, the standard terms carry the highest risk of creating imbalance 
between parties. If the scope of the UCTD is extended at all, this area should be 
tackled first. However, in Latvia use of standard terms in a commercial setting is not 
widespread.  
In principle, Latvian legal tradition would not favour wide-scope intervention into the 
contract law. Theoretically, if applicable to individually negotiated terms, it could 
extend only to terms manifestly unfair, beyond reasonable doubts, e.g., extremely 
high penalty clauses, extremely broad exemptions from liability, etc.  
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
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Some of such terms are already provided in the Latvian general civil law. E.g., Article 
1643 of the Latvian Civil Law provides that an agreement between parties excluding 
liability for intentional infringements is invalid. Similarly, terms that eliminate access 
to courts all together should be treated as unfair. However, most such manifestly 
unfair terms would be invalid in accordance with Latvian law anyway.  
These examples show that only terms that are outright incompatible with the most 
fundamental understanding of justice can be regarded as unfair in all circumstances. 
Other clauses, e.g., penalty clauses, may be unfair, if they provide extremely high 
penalties. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
In practice many B2B transactions are drafted in a heavy language with extensive use 
of legalese. But while transparency is welcomed, it is not obvious that the duty of 
transparency should be legally imposed upon parties.  
Firstly, B2B transactions are usually much more complicated than consumer contracts. 
Secondly, in B2B transactions, from the perspective of the current legal culture in 
Latvia, parties have freedom to choose the wording of their contract. This follows from 
the principle of private autonomy. It would seem that imposition of contractual 
transparency would function as serious restriction upon private autonomy. It is 
doubtful whether such a policy is appropriate for B2B transactions. B2B contracting 
should, in principle, remain controlled by parties. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
In cross-border transactions, the bargaining power among parties may vary more 
drastically than in domestic transactions. The extension of the UCTD to B2B 
transaction could eradicate some of the negative effects arising from this disparity. 
However, the practice of implementation and application of the EU directives may also 
vary, thus the benefit should not be exaggerated. It is also necessary to study the 
effect of such extension on the application of other international substantive private 
law instruments like the Convention on International Sales of Goods and UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. Thus, currently, it is impossible to 
foresee the benefits and drawbacks.   
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
There is no assessment of the possible effect of the extension of the UCTD to B2B 
transactions. However, on somewhat speculative bases, it has to be noted that 
fragmentary unification of contractual law would hardly provide sensible effect upon 
the conditions of SME providers/suppliers in Latvia. This type of harmonization would 
not eliminate legal barriers among Member States. Their full elimination would require 
across the board harmonization of private law.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
As stated above, such extension currently is not justified. It strongly interferes with 
private autonomy and makes it difficult to identify businesses that are protected by 
the extension.  
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?59  
According to the stakeholders, the out-of-court injunction procedures are effective and 
reduce the number of infringements.   
In 2015, the CRPC initiated 180 cases dealing with infringements of collective interest 
of consumers, including cases regarding commercial practices and contractual terms in 
consumer crediting, commercial practice in e-commerce and electronic communication 
etc.60 There have been 4 cases where traders were registered in other EU countries 
and in 3 cases infringements were amicably resolved.61 
The following case illustrates that some obstacles remain. Upon a number of 
complaints regarding two internet stores, collecting money without sending the goods 
ordered, the CRPC established that the trader conducted unfair commercial practice, 
inter alia, the trader did not send ordered goods on time and did not repay the 
received monies to a consumer. The CRPC made a decision requesting to end the 
unfair commercial practice and inflicted a penalty. After this decision, the webpages 
were closed, but the monies were not paid back to the consumers.62 In other words, 
although, the unfair commercial practice was terminated, the damages of the 
consumers were not compensated. Thus the problem of ‘rogue traders’ remains and 
has been acknowledged as topical by the interviewed stakeholders. 
The Health Inspectorate conducted 194 planned controls on advertisement of medicine 
products and in 35 % (67 cases) the infringements were established.63 
In contrast, there are no explicit special procedural rules on collective claims 
submitted in the court what is considered as fundamental disadvantage. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The most effective and widely used measure is the publication of corrective 
statements on the webpage of the CRPC. In 2015, 16 written commitments were 
published.  
 
59 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
60 Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības centra 2015. gada pārskats [Report of the Consumers’ Rights Protection 
Centre of 2015]. Consumer Rights Protection Centre, p. 30. Available in Latvian at 
http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/ptac_publiskais_parskats_2015.pdf (visisted 17.07.2016). 
61 Ibid., p.39. 
62 Consumer Rights Protection Centre’s decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K20-5 dated 14 May 2015. 
Available in Latvian at  http://www.ptac.gov.lv/sites/default/files/lemums_komercpr_k-20izraksts.pdf 
(visisted 17.07.2016). 
63 Veselības Inspekcijas 2015. gada pārskats [Report of Health Inspectorates of 2015], p. 32. Available in 
Latvian at http://www.vi.gov.lv/uploads/files/2015g_publiskais_parskats.pdf (last seen on 17.07.2016). 
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• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
No, the scope of application is not extended. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
In general, the same obstacles are in places as mentioned in the report on the 
Directive in 2012.  
According to the stakeholders, there were certain problems with the total amount of 
penalties for breaching the law. Namely, the Administrative Violations Code64 provided 
a penalty only up to EUR 14 000 for violation of the fair commercial practice rules, but 
after recent amendments in the Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law65, the 
penalty was increased to 10 % from the last year’s net turnover but not more than 
EUR  100 000. Now the penalty is reasonable, as the infringement can cause millions 
in damages. However, there are indications that some of the traders are not 
complying with the decision of the CRPC thus enforcement of the decisions is 
burdensome in some of the cases. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Pursuant to the opinion of the stakeholders, the new Consumer Directive shall be 
included in the Directive’s annex.  
There were important amendments to the injunction procedure in Latvia, thus, 
currently; it is difficult to indicate the best practices.  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
According to the stakeholders, there is no extensive practice of addressing 
infringements originating in other EU countries. It is problematic to address this issue 
because the legal rules and their interpretation differ among Member States.  
 
64 Administratīvā pārkāpuma kodekss [Administrative Violation Code]. Latvian Law adopted 25 October 
2001. Available in English at 
http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Administrative_Procedure_Law.doc (last 
seen on 17.07.2016). 
65 Negodīgas komercprakses aizlieguma likums [Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law]. Latvian Law 
adopted 22 November 2007 Available in English at 
http://vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/Unfair_Commercial_Practice_Prohibition_Law.do
c (last seen on 17.07.2016). 
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• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Some of the Member States try to protect their nationals. The interest of competent 
entities in different Member States to cooperate is also an important factor. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
According to the stakeholders, harmonisation of rules would be advisable. That would 
help addressing infringements more effectively. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The Injunction procedures are regulated separately. 
Article 25 of the Consumer Rights Protection Law provides injunction proceedings.  
Article 15 of the Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law states that the CRPC shall 
supervise commercial practices, assessing the impact of the potential violation on the 
collective interests of consumers, as well as ensuring balanced supervision of activities 
of persons implementing commercial practices. 
Article 213 of the Electronic Mass Media provides that if the audio-visual services 
threaten the consumers’ protection, the National Council of Electronic Mass Media 
informs media, other EU countries and the European Commission inter alia about the 
injunction.66 The Council is the responsible institution within the meaning of the 
Directive No. 89/552/EEC. 
Article 37 of the Cabinet of Ministers’ Regulations No. 378 Procedures for Advertising 
Medicinal Products and Procedures by Which a Medicinal Product Manufacturer is 
Entitled to Give Free Samples of Medicinal Products to Physicians establishes that the 
Health Inspectorate is the responsible institution as concerns the Directive 
No. 2001/83/EC.67 
 
66 Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu likums [Electronic Mass Media Law]. Latvian Law adopted in 12 July 
2010. 
67 Zāļu reklamēšanas kārtība un kārtība, kādā zāļu ražotājs ir tiesīgs nodot ārstiem bezmaksas zāļu 
paraugus [Procedures for Advertising Medicinal Products and Procedures by Which a Medicinal Product 
Manufacturer is Entitled to Give Free Samples of Medicinal Products to Physicians]. Cabinet of Ministers 
Regulations No. 378 adopted 17 May 2011. Available in English at 
http://vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/MK_Noteikumi/Cab._Reg._No._378_-
_Advertising_Medicinal_Products.pdf (last seen 21.07.2016). 
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• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The CRPC is the institution responsible for the injunction proceedings concerning all 
Directives included in the Annex 1 of the Injunction Directive, with the exception of 
the Directives No. 89/552/EEC and Directive No. 2001/83/EC. For the latter two 
Directives, responsible authorities are different and the procedures are simplified as 
explained above.  
There are minor differences between the injunction proceedings provided in the 
Consumer Rights Protection Law and Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law. For 
example, in case of violations of consumer rights affecting group consumer interests, 
the CRPC can initiate the case also upon request of Consumer Rights Protection 
Association; however, in the unfair commercial practice case there is no such 
provision. Those two procedures are coherent as there is one enforcing authority (the 
CRPC). 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
There are no studies calculating benefits and costs for consumers. The costs are 
usually associated with litigation. They involve legal costs: costs of legal services and 
comparatively high court fees, as consumers have no remissions. These costs are 
sometimes prohibitive. High costs of litigation are, possibly, also preventing the court 
practice from reaching the necessary level of uniformity to have preventive effect 
upon traders. If the court only rarely intervenes, many unfair terms and practices 
remain outside the purview of courts, diminishing preventive effect upon traders.   
The practice shows that in some cases mentioned above (elimination of arbitration 
agreements, excessive penalty clauses, elimination unfair commercial practices in 
non-bank crediting, etc.), implementation of the EU consumer law has allowed to 
eradicate widespread abuses of consumers. These are clear benefits for consumers. 
  
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
No specific data is available, but see the answer to the previous question.  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
No specific data is available.  
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Since the awareness of traders of consumer law remains unsatisfactory, it may be 
doubted whether traders make large investments to comply with the Directives. 
According to the information provided by the stakeholders, costs of dispute settlement 
before the CRPC, in cases where collective interests of consumers are concerned, are 
comparatively low.  
Litigation before courts may be long and expensive. Court fees depend upon the type 
and amount of the claim and lawyer’s fees. While the defendant does not pay court 
fees as such he/she has to reimburse court fees and lawyer’s fees (until a certain 
threshold) of the winning party (that is, a consumer).  
If the trader is initiating administrative proceedings against the decision of the CRPC, 
the court fees are EUR 28.46 to initiate litigation; EUR 56.91 for appeals litigation and 
EUR 71.14 (called the ‘security deposit’) for review of the lower court’s decision on 
points of law by the Supreme Court. The court fees are reimbursed, if the claimant 
succeeds.   
In principle, since the costs vary among Member States, this may be an obstacle to 
cross-border trade.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
There are no specific studies calculating such costs. Normally, supervision of the 
application of consumer law and administrative proceedings generate most costs for 
the CRPC.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
Implementation of the Directives is not expensive, expenses come with enforcement. 
However, according to the stakeholders, there are no indications that the enforcement 
is not cost-effective.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
As indicated above, the stakeholders expect further guidelines and commentaries to 
the EU Directives, as well as summaries of the best practices. This could reduce the 
costs of implementation and enforcement of the Directives. Better awareness of 
consumers and traders alike may reduce costs of supervision.  
Probably, it may also be considered whether the EU should enact rules harmonising 
court fees for consumer disputes.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
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A 2015 study on Latvian consumers’ knowledge about their consumer rights and their 
experience purchasing non-confirming or unsafe goods, showed that 39% of natural 
persons are very well informed about their consumer rights, while 58% of the 
respondents weight their knowledge as low. Even though this study shows the general 
tendencies, it also can be associated with the awareness of the requirements included 
in the Directives covered by this research. 
There are no statistics about the knowledge of traders. In some sectors the knowledge 
seems insufficient. In others like non-bank consumer crediting, the law requires that 
an institution, willing to enter into the market, must first receive a licence from the 
CRPC. Before providing the licence, the CRPC shall verify whether inner policies of the 
institution and contractual templates comply with consumer law. 
The public institutions enforcing sector-specific policies and the CRPC cooperate in 
order to implement the directives in practice. There are regular meetings held to 
discuss the sector policies and consumer rights. Judges are regularly trained regarding 
the consumer protection rights and court practice is becoming more uniform and 
constant.  
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The Ministry of Economics is a coordinator of the horizontal EU consumer law policies. 
The Consumer Rights Protection Law is general law and covers all areas of economy. 
Other ministries are responsible for sector-specific policies. E.g. the Ministry of 
Agriculture is responsible for the food sector, the Ministry of Transportation – for the 
transport sector.  
The CRPC is subject to the control by the Ministry of Economics. The CRPC is 
responsible for supervision of unfair commercial practices and unfair commercial terms 
in all sectors, except medicine. In the latter sector, supervision of unfair commercial 
practices is administered by the Health Inspectorate. Certain role in consumer 
protection is also played by other institutions, overviewing regulated industries.68  
The CRPC does not enforce sector specific rules; this is done by different authorities. 
According to the information provided by the CRPC, in order to preserve effective 
implementation of consumer law, the CRPC has regular meetings and discussions with 
other authorities.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Consumer legislation is drafted with participation of all authorities involved. This 
ensures clarity and coherence of legal rules. Currently, there are three overarching 
consumer protection acts (Consumer Rights Protection Law, Unfair Commercial 
Practice Prohibition Law and Advertisement Law), these acts are drafted and amended 
in a manner that ensures their compatibility. Cooperation with other authorities 
ensures that sector-specific legal acts are compatible with consumer protection law.  
68 B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, 
Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 339. 
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Notwithstanding that, the stakeholders do consider that occasionally there are 
problems concerning combination of horizontal consumer provisions and sector-
specific rules. In 1 January 2015, Latvia opened its electricity market, this has created 
frictions between sector-specific rules and consumer protection laws, in particular, in 
regards to consumer rights of withdrawal.  
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
There is no information about benefits or costs related to complementary application 
of sector-specific legislation and EU consumer protection legislation. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The stakeholders have emphasized that such clarifications are needed. Firstly, there is 
a need for general guidance on delimitation of different instruments. For example, 
advertising is both a commercial practice and object of the MCAD directive. This poses 
a question which instrument applies. Clarifications provided by the Commission’s 
guidelines would be valuable. Secondly, in particular, for Latvia, it is necessary to 
have clarifications regarding the interplay between EU consumer law and sector-
specific rules in the field of the electricity market. It is preferable that such 
clarifications are made in form of guidelines or commentaries of the relevant 
Directives.  
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Currently, Latvian national law does not extend consumer law to C2B relations. In 
practice such an extension is of minor importance. On the one hand, such transactions 
are less frequent as consumers are not normally producers or resellers of goods or 
providers of services. On the other hand, such relations pose smaller risks to 
consumers, as usually their main interest is to receive agreed remuneration. This 
allows evading more complicated questions of quality of goods and services, their 
return, etc. Moreover, such an extension would require not only extension of 
consumer law, but creation of new rules specifically protecting consumers in C2B 
relations. Overall, the stakeholders have considered these developments unnecessary.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
According to the information provided by the stakeholders, currently these notions are 
valid and fit for the purpose. As it was stated above, these notions (in particular, 
‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’) are sufficiently flexible for authorities 
to construe them in the light of particular circumstances.  
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• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The stakeholders did not indicate any specific omissions in these instruments.  
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
As indicated above, the introduction of the UCPD and UCTD into the Latvian legal 
system has been assessed as an extremely positive development by the stakeholders. 
To mention few examples: The implementation of the UCPD has introduced the notion 
of the aggressive commercial practices; this novelty is praised by scholars.69 The 
implementation of the UCTD has allowed for eradication abusive use of arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts and equally prevents the use of excessive penalties. 
Implementation of these instruments created the whole environment of consumer 
protection: 1. Ensured high standard of consumer protection; 2. Established a well-
structured system of supervision; 3. Helped (to a certain degree) raise awareness 
among traders and consumers. Thus, that these instruments have greatly improved 
consumer protection.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Indeed, the information to consumers regarding unit prices has improved since the 
implementation of the PID in national laws. As indicated above, the national law 
covers not only indication of prices but also services that is considered to be a very 
good solution. Moreover, the transposition of the PID rules helped during Latvia’s 
accession to the euro-zone. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Implementation of all Directives studied herein has improved the legal environment 
and provided better protection to all market participants (consumers or traders). This 
is also true for the MCAD. The Directive creates a complex, but flexible legal regime in 
the area of advertising that effectively reduces unfair competition.   
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
The stakeholders were unable to provide specific information on this issue. Likewise, 
there are no previous studies. In principle, similarity between legal regimes should 
simplify access to foreign markets. At the same time, a high level of consumer 
protection makes it safer to purchase goods and services abroad. This should 
stimulate cross-border trade. However, it is doubtful that harmonisation of consumer 
law has significantly simplified cross-border trade. Traders and consumers alike are 
driven by a number of considerations when deciding to participate in cross-border 
69 See, B. Vītoliņa, Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of Consumer Rights]. Rīga, 
Zvaigzne ABC, 2015, 243. 
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trade not all of them are related to the legal environment and even those that are may 
be related to other issues (taxation, law applicable to contracts of transportation of 
goods abroad, etc.).   
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
See the previous answer.   
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – LATVIA  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
 
Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, (Patērētāju 
tiesību aizsardzības likums, 
Latvian Herald, No. 
104/105, 15.04.1999) 
 Specific rules on legal equality of parties Yes Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, Article 5 
 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
  'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances (if a contractual term has not 
been mutually discussed by the contracting 
parties) 
Yes Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, Article 6  
 
  'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
No n/a  
  Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
No n/a  
  Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No n/a  
  Strict regulatory framework of consumer 
crediting 
Yes Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, Article 8 
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Unfair Commercial 
Practice Prohibition Law 
(Negodīgas komercprakses 
aizlieguma likums, Latvian 
Herald, No. 3775, 
12.12.2007). 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
No  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
No  
 
 
 
 
 
  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No  
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Procedures for Indication 
of Prices of Products and 
Services. Regulations 
No.178 of the Cabinet of 
Ministers, adopted 
18.05.1999  
 Extension of the application also to services 
Provides dual display of prices (in Lats and 
euros) and converting during Latvia’s accession 
to euro zone  
Yes Procedures for Indication 
of Prices of Products and 
Services, Article 1 
 
 
Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, (Patērētāju 
tiesību aizsardzības likums, 
Latvian Herald, No. 
104/105, 15.04.1999) 
Reference 
that the 
Cabinet of 
Ministers shall 
adopt 
regulation 
concerning 
procedures 
for indication 
of prices  (see 
above) 
 Yes Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, Article 17 (3)  
 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Advertising Law (Reklāmas 
likums, Latvian Herald, No. 
1918, 10.01.2000) 
   Advertising Law, Articles 8 
and 9, 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Law on Consumer Rights 
Protection, (Patērētāju 
tiesību aizsardzības likums, 
Latvian Herald, No. 
104/105, 15.04.1999) 
     
Unfair Commercial 
Practice Prohibition Law 
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Article 213 of the Electronic 
Mass Media and Article 37 
of the Cabinet of Ministers’ 
Regulations No. 378 
Procedures for Advertising 
Medicinal Products and 
Procedures by Which a 
Medicinal Product 
Manufacturer is Entitled to 
Give Free Samples of 
Medicinal Products to 
Physicians 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – LATVIA  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal 
acts 
 
 
Injunction procedure is foreseen in Article 15 
of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Prohibition Law, Article 25 of Consumer 
Rights protection Law,  Article 213 of the 
Electronic Mass Media and Article 37 of the 
Cabinet of Ministers’ Regulations No. 378 
Procedures for Advertising Medicinal 
Products and Procedures by Which a 
Medicinal Product Manufacturer is Entitled 
to Give Free Samples of Medicinal Products 
to Physicians 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
 
Consumer Rights Protection  Centre can 
bring this action upon request of the 
responsible authorities and institution 
mentioned in list of Directive 
No.2009/22/EK, Article 4(3)  
Also Health Inspectorate (in accordance with 
Directive 2005/29 in area of medicine and 
Directive 2001/83/EC); Council of National  
Electronic Media (Directive 89/552/EEC) 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms 
of the procedure, please explain in the 
comments column for which infringements 
the court or administrative procedure is 
foreseen 
- Administrative 
procedure 
 
CRPC’s decisions on injunctions can be 
appealed in Administrative court. 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
-The qualified 
entities are 
exempted from 
costs  
 
Article 25(11) of the Consumers Rights 
Protection Centre: The Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre, in recovering expenses in 
respect of the laboratory or other type of 
expert-examination of goods purchased or 
services utilised by consumers, shall be 
released from the payment of court costs. 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law that 
are not part of Annex I of the Directive, or 
consumer law in general? 
- No, scope of 
the Directive not 
extended 
 
Is protection of business' interests covered by 
the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
- No  
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Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including the 
consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
 
Injunction procedure is out-of-court 
procedure. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in the 
comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Article 25(8) Consumer Rights Protection 
Law provides that If a violation of the 
consumer rights has been determined, which 
affects group consumer interests (collective 
interests of consumers) and it may cause 
losses or harm to consumers, as well as to a 
particular consumer, the Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre, having evaluated the 
nature and essence of the violation, as well 
as other aspects, is entitled to carry out one 
or several following activities: 
1) to propose that the manufacturer, trader 
or service provider makes a commitment in 
writing to rectify the violation within the 
specified time period 
Article 15 of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Prohibition Law states that the Supervisory 
Authority, evaluating the conformity of 
commercial practices with the requirements 
of this Law, is entitled to request and to 
receive from the performer of commercial 
practices all information, documents and 
other evidence regarding the veracity of the 
information used in commercial practices, 
the conformity of the activity with the 
requirements of this Law, as well as to 
determine the time period for the 
submission of the documents and evidence 
necessary for the clarification of the case 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  
please specify in the comments column to 
who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, other 
sanction 
Sanctions are provided in the Latvian 
Administrative Violation Code. Article 1759 
provides  In the case of the non-provision of 
information at the disposal of a person to an 
advertisement or consumer rights protection 
supervisory institution after a request 
therefrom within a specified time period and 
in the specified amount or of the provision of 
false information, as well as of the non-
fulfilment of the lawful requests or decisions 
of the supervisory institution –a fine shall be 
imposed on natural persons in an amount up 
to EUR 700, but for legal persons – from 
EUR 70 up to EUR 14 000. Also Unfair 
Commercial Practices Prohibition Law 
provides for the sanctions. Article 15 states 
that supervising institution shall impose the 
fine for unfair commercial practice in 
amount of 10% of the annual turnover but 
not more than EUR 100 000 
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Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a corrective 
statement? 
- Yes 
 
Article 25(8) of the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law states that If a violation of 
the consumer rights has been determined, 
which affects group consumer interests 
(collective interests of consumers) and it 
may cause losses or harm to consumers, as 
well as to a particular consumer, the 
Consumer Rights Protection Centre, having 
evaluated the nature and essence of the 
violation, as well as other aspects, is entitled 
to carry out one or several following 
activities: 
1) to propose that the manufacturer, trader 
or service provider makes a commitment in 
writing to rectify the violation within the 
specified time period. In accordance with 
Article 151 of the Unfair Commercial Practice 
Prohibition Law (1) A written commitment is 
a document, which upon proposal of the 
Supervisory Authority is signed by the 
performer of commercial practices, 
committing to eliminate the detected 
violation within a specified time period. A 
written commitment may include the 
commitment of the performer of commercial 
activities: 
1) not to perform specific activities; 
2) to perform specific activities, also to 
provide additional information necessary in 
order to ensure the conformity of 
commercial practices with the requirements 
of this Law, to publish a notification in a 
communication medium conforming to the 
respective commercial practices, in which 
unfair commercial practices are withdrawn; 
3) to reimburse the losses caused to 
consumers. 
(2) Upon signing a written commitment in 
which the violation, as well as the way and 
time period for elimination thereof is 
indicated, the performer of commercial 
practices acknowledges that he or she has 
committed the violation detected. The 
written commitment shall be deemed 
received (enter into effect) from the moment 
when the Supervisory Authority has 
approved its acceptance, certifying in 
writing to the performer of commercial 
activities that the relevant measures are 
sufficient for elimination of the violation and 
its impact. The Supervisory Authority shall 
notify acceptance of the written 
commitment in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in the Law On 
Notification. The time period for elimination 
of the violation shall not exceed the time 
period necessary for the performer of 
commercial practices to take the intended 
measures and to ensure the conformity with 
the interests of consumers, and usually may 
not be longer than three months, except  
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cases when the nature of the intended 
measures justifies a longer time period. 
(3) If the performer of commercial practices 
commits, in accordance with Section 15, 
Paragraph five, Clause 2 of this Law, to 
eliminate the detected violation and the 
written commitment has entered into effect, 
the Supervisory Authority shall not take the 
decisions referred to in Section 15, 
Paragraph eight of this Law and shall 
terminate the administrative record-keeping 
in the part regarding the violation, which the 
performer of commercial activities is 
committing to eliminate. If the Supervisory 
Authority detects that the written 
commitment is not being carried out, it is 
entitled to take one or several of the 
decisions referred to in Section 15, 
Paragraph eight of this Law. 
(4) The performer of commercial practices 
shall, without delay but not later than within 
three working days after the end of the time 
period laid down in Paragraph three of this 
Section, inform the Supervisory Authority 
regarding carrying out, adding proof 
certifying the carrying out. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the infringement? 
- Yes 
 
Article 25 (10) of the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law provides that if the 
manufacturer, trader or service provider has 
not implemented the specified activities by 
the end  
of the specified time period, or has not 
informed the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre regarding the implementation 
thereof, the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre shall apply the administrative penalty 
provided for the relevant violation according 
to the procedures specified by law. 
Article 152 of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Prohibition Law provides that 
supervising authority can impose the fine as 
explained before.  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are paid 
to the public purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No There is no such possibility provided 
Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
- No There is no such possibility provided 
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
- No There is no such possibility provided 
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Can individual consumers base their individual 
claims for damages/remedies on the 
injunctions order?  
- No  
Can the qualified entity claim other measures 
beyond the injunction, e.g. evidence of 
compliance with the judgment? 
- Yes 
 
Article 25(10) of the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law states that before of the end 
of the specific time period in the decision, 
the manufacturer, trader or service provider 
shall inform the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre regarding the implementation of the 
specified activities. If the manufacturer, 
trader or service provider has not 
implemented the specified activities by the 
end of the specified time period, or has not 
informed the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre regarding the implementation 
thereof, the Consumer Rights Protection 
Centre shall apply the administrative penalty 
provided for the relevant violation according 
to the procedures specified by law. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders 
extended to the future infringements and/or 
same or similar illegal practices (of other 
traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
There are no such data available.  
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).70  
 
70 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other costs, if 
any (national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved 
for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 434.74 
Lawyer’s fees 
depend on 
individual 
lawyer’s fees 
Other costs can 
involve 
translation/expert 
costs but they are 
calculated 
individually in 
each particular 
case 
There are no 
such data and 
it is 
impossible to 
estimate and 
it might be 
different in 
each 
particular 
case. 
 
15 days for 
trader’s reply 
to the 
consumer’s 
complaint + if 
the dispute is 
not resolved 
the out-of-
court dispute 
resolver shall 
decide on 
case within 
90 days 
 
Out-of –Court 
dispute 
resolution  
For free or for 
reasonable fee 
Lawyers or 
other 
representatives 
shall not assist 
in out-of-court 
proceedings 
Other costs can 
involve 
translation/expert 
costs but they are 
calculated 
individually in 
each particular 
case 
It is 
impossible to 
estimate. 
Only since 1 
January 2016 
out-of- court 
consumers’ 
dispute 
resolution was 
introduced in 
Latvia. 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There are no particular statistics regarding cases in the courts of general jurisdictions.  
In 2015 the CRPC has received 164 complaints regarding unfair contract terms. In 136 
cases the CRPC has provided information or consultations. In 13 cases positive 
solution of the issue has been found.71  
In 2015 the CRPC has published 13 written acknowledgments by traders admitting 
that there were unfair terms in their consumer contracts and they are rectified. The 
acknowledgments are applied to all similar contracts concluded by the trader.72  
  
71 Statistics of the Consumer Rights Protection Centre, 2015 at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/lv/content/statistika-
par-pateretaju-sudzibam-un-konsultacijam (last seen on 07.07.2016).  
72 Information on Acknowledgments, 2015 at http://www.ptac.gov.lv/lv/table/rakstveida-apnemsanas (last 
seen on 07.07.2016). 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Consumer Rights Protection Centre/ 
ECC Latvia 
National consumer enforcement authority /  
European Consumer Centre 
28.06.2016 
Ministry of Economics Ministry 21.07.2016 
Latvian Consumers’ Association Consumer organisation 01.08.2016 
Competition Council National regulatory authority 02.08.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
B. Vītoliņa 2015 Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības pamati. [Basics of Protection of 
Consumer Rights]. Rīga, Zvaigzne ABC, 2015 
Administrative District 
Court 
2012 Judgment in the case No. A42765709 
Administrative Regional 
Court 
2013 Judgment in the case No. A420563412 
Administrative Regional 
Court 
2016 Judgment in the case No. A420336415 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
1999 Consumer Rights Protection Law 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
2001 Administrative Violation Code  
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
2007 Unfair Commercial Practice Prohibition Law 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
2015 Unfair Retail Trade Practice Prohibition Law 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
2015 Law On Arbitration Courts 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
1998 Civil Procedure Law 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
1999 Advertising Law 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2016 Decision in the case No. 18-pk  
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Decision in the case No. E03-PTU-F342-10  
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2010 Decision in the case No. 7-nk 
Cabinet of Ministers 1999 Regulations on Procedures for Indication of Prices of Products and 
Services  
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2014 Report of the Consumers’ Rights Protection Centre  
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre  
2015 Report of the Consumers’ Rights Protection Centre  
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Guidelines No. 21 on Indication of the Prices for Goods and Services 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2012 Guidelines on Drafting Fair Electronic Communication Service 
Agreement 
Dobele region court 2016 Judgment in the case No. C30624015 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Official Statistics 
Administrative Cases 
Department of the 
Supreme Court 
2006 Judgment in the case No. C30519003 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2010 Guidelines on Drafting Fair Consumer Credit Agreement 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Decision in the case No. 2-pk 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2005 Decision in the case No.1/06 – 5338 
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The Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Latvia 
2005 Judgment in the case No. 2004-10-01 
Saeima (Parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
2004 Electronic Communication Law 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2006 Decision No. 25-lg 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2006 Decision No.19-lg 
Administrative Cases 
Department of the 
Supreme Court 
2014 Decision in the case No. A420299513 
Civil Cases Department of 
the Supreme Court 
2016 Judgment in the case No. SKC-116/2016 
Civil Cases Department of 
the Supreme Court 
2016 Judgment in the case No. SKC-94/2016 
Civil Cases Department of 
the Supreme Court 
2015 Judgment in the case No. SKC-98/2015 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2014 Data base on Unfair Contractual Terms 
Civil Cases Departament 
of the Supreme Court 
2013 Judgment in the case SKC-108/2013 
Saeima (parliament) of 
the Republic of Latvia 
1937 Civil Law 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K20-5 
Health Inspectorate 2015 Report of Health Inspectorate 
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Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2012 Decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K115-39 
Cabinet of Ministers 2010 Regulations on Consumer Crediting 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2016 Decision in the case No. 18-pk 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2009 Decision in the case No. E03-REUD-31 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2009 Decision in the case No. E03-REUD-53 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2010 Decision in the case No. E03-REUD-49 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2013 Guidelines on Fair Commercial Practices in Consumer Crediting 
Consumer Rights 
Protection Centre 
2015 Decision in the case No. E03-PTU-K204-4 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report LITHUANIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Prior to the UCPD, Lithuania did not regulate fair commercial practices outside private 
law. Lithuania did not have any particular public law legal act regulating fairness of 
commercial practices and instead relied on general tort and contract law. Thus, the 
introduction of the UCPD completely overhauled the legal landscape of fair (unfair) 
commercial practices. The UCPD was transposed into the Law on Prohibition of Unfair 
Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter 
– the LPUBCCP) and the Law on Advertising of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – 
the Law on Advertising) as well as the Civil Code. 
The principle-based approach established under the UCPD is considered to be a 
positive step for the protection of consumers.1 Both enforcement authorities and 
consumer associations praise this approach as it affords protection to consumers 
against innovative traders and allows for punishing offenders even if their actions do 
not fall under any of the black-listed actions.  
One of the enforcement authorities confirmed that usually it finds an infringement of 
the general prohibition of unfair commercial practices rather than any particular black-
listed activities. Thus, for Lithuania, the principle-based approach met the 
expectations of the legislator. 
According to travaux preparatoires of the UCPD and Article 5(4) of the UCPD, one may 
conclude that usually a three step test should be concluded. Firstly, the practices 
should be evaluated in the light of the black-list; secondly, if they do not fall into the 
black-list, then they should be assessed in the light of provisions on misleading actions 
or omissions; and, thirdly, only if the commercial practices of the trader do not fall 
into any of the first two categories, they should then be reviewed in the light of the 
general fairness principle.2 The practice of the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative 
Court confirms that the Lithuanian courts tend to interpret the black-list as lex 
specialis compared with the general fairness clause.3 Thus, the general fairness test 
indeed acts as a ‘catch-all’ provision (safety net) and is only applicable when particular 
commercial practices do not fall into any of the first two categories. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The enforcement authorities consider the black-list to be an effective measure, 
because both the consumers and businesses are given a list of comprehensive 
situations in which commercial activities of traders are considered to be unfair without 
the need to collect any additional evidence. 
However, one of the enforcement authorities indicated that in some instances 
consumers intentionally incorrectly interpret the black-list and abuse their rights even 
1 RIMKEVIČIUS M. „Nacionalinės moralės“ išimtis Nesąžiningos komercinės veiklos direktyvoje. Teisė, 2011, 
t. 79. 
2 RIMKEVIČIUS M. Sąžiningos ir nesąžiningos komercinės veiklos samprata. Teisė, 2011, t. 81. 
3 Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of 23 December 2010 in case No A-502-1684/2010. 
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when the trader actually did not intentionally perform any unfair commercial practices. 
For instance, in one case, there was a technical error in an e-shop, where the 
consumer could buy a product for EUR 0 even though there were no products left. 
After the consumer was informed about the error and that there were no products left, 
the consumer still demanded to provide that product for EUR 0, claiming that the 
trader performed a black-listed commercial practice as provided in Clause 6 of Annex I 
of the UCPD. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Minimum harmonisation clauses always provide for at least basic protection for 
consumers, thus every action increasing the protection afforded to consumers is 
generally accepted positively by enforcement authorities and consumer associations, 
as well as ministries. Currently, the enforcement authority in Lithuania has not 
received any complaints in relation to UCPD in the field of financial services or 
immovable property, thus one may conclude that the minimum harmonisation clauses 
afford sufficient consumer protection in Lithuania in these fields. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
There is a clear division of competence between the authority responsible for the 
enforcement of the LPUBCCP and the Law on Advertising (both of them are the UCPD 
transposing national laws) and other sector-specific environmental or energy 
authorities. The authorities responsible for the enforcement of the requirements of 
LPUBCCP deal with complaints only with respect to unfair commercial practices of the 
suppliers. If the complaint is based on sector-specific grounds, the said enforcement 
authorities forward the complaint to competent sector-specific authorities. 
The application of UCPD in such sector-specific energy and environmental markets is 
rather effective. Lithuanian enforcement authorities dealt with cases both in energy 
and environmental sectors. For instance, one enforcement authority dealt with 
aggressive commercial practices of a supplier in energy sector (case was related to 
undue influence), as well as misleading actions of wastewater equipment suppliers. 
However, according to the experience of one enforcement authority, consumers often 
claim that suppliers in the energy sector perform misleading actions or aggressive 
commercial practices, however only in some of the instances is this found to be true. 
Consumers often falsely perceive the following actions of the supplier as being 
aggressive (undue influence) or being unfair commercial practice in general: (i) 
provision of a bill to the consumer by the supplier, (ii) calculation of energy-related 
prices (even though these prices are either set by state authorities or state authorities 
provide mandatory price calculation methods), (iii) necessary construction and repair 
works done by apartment building administrators, (iv) transfer of debt collection to 
debt collection companies, (v) mandatory change of old electricity meters. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The respondents agree that in each case of unfair commercial practices or misleading 
or unlawful comparative advertising, such actions are directed either at the society at 
large or at a particular group of consumers. The concept of the average consumer 
allows the enforcement authorities to assess the lawfulness of commercial practices 
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and advertising from the perspective of an average consumer, to whom such actions 
were directed, i.e. to step into the shoes of the particular consumer and evaluate 
whether the actions of the trader had any negative and unlawful impact on the 
average consumer.  
Lithuanian enforcement authorities and courts tend to establish whether the 
advertising or commercial practice was directed at the society at large or only a 
particular group of people. The amount and intensity of scrutiny depends on the 
identified average consumer. If it is determined that the average consumer is 
especially vulnerable, the examination of traders’ activities intensifies. Thus, in 
Lithuania, the concept of average consumer is applied rather flexibly and takes into 
account the circumstances and particularities of each case.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Lithuania properly transposed the requirements of the UCPD ensuring that vulnerable 
consumers are well protected. Lithuanian enforcement authorities and courts clearly 
identify three criterions that are used to establish whether the particular group of 
consumers are vulnerable: (i) mental or physical infirmity, (ii) age or (iii) credulity. 
From a practical perspective, if the enforcement authorities or courts establish that the 
commercial practice is directed to this specific category of vulnerable consumers, they 
assess such a commercial practice from the perspective of such an average vulnerable 
consumer.  
There were several cases in which the standard of the average vulnerable consumer 
was applied. For instance, the commercial practice was directed at elderly people 
(criterion of age) and people having health issues (criterion of physical infirmity).4 In 
another case the practice was directed at people having health issues (criterion of 
physical infirmity).5 There were also cases of aggressive commercial practices where 
the practice was directed at children (criterion of age), elderly people (criterion of 
age), poor (criterion of financial situation, which is not prescribed by the UCPD), 
indebted (criterion of financial situation, which is not prescribed by the UCPD), as well 
as people who speak another language (criterion of language, which is not prescribed 
by the UCPD). In such cases concerning vulnerable consumers, the enforcement 
authorities conduct a more intensive investigation. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
According to available data and opinions of stakeholders, self-and co-regulation 
actions show positive effects for consumer protection.  
Firstly, Lithuanian enforcement authorities tend to issue recommendations before 
commencing formal infringement proceedings. For instance, after the enforcement 
authority receives a complaint or ex officio notices a possible infringement, it notifies 
the trader and requests additional information. If the trader eliminates the 
infringement, in most cases the authority will not initiate a formal infringement 
procedure and will not impose a fine. Instead, the enforcement authority issues a 
further recommendation on some particular steps how to avoid further infringements. 
In other words, the enforcement authorities cooperate with the traders and, firstly, try 
to educate the traders on the requirements for proper commercial practices and 
marketing. Cooperation with the traders and issuance of such recommendations are 
4 Ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of 2013-05-23 in administrative case No A-502-731/2013.  
5 Ruling of the Competition Council of 2010-09-09 No 2S-20. 
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not suitable in situations where the traders do not intend to stop the unfair 
commercial practices or the dissemination of misleading or unlawful comparative 
advertising and do not acknowledge that their commercial activities or marketing 
materials possibly infringed applicable laws.  
Secondly, the Law on Advertising was amended in 2013 in order to boost the self-
regulation of traders. Traders were given a clear right to form self-regulation 
institutions and prepare ethics codes, the compliance with which such self-regulation 
institutions would monitor.  
In order to increase the popularity of such self-regulation of traders, the legislator 
provided for two incentives. Firstly, the enforcement authority may refuse to initiate 
an investigation if the respective self-regulation institutions provide the enforcement 
authority with proof that the particular piece of advertising was already reviewed for 
compliance with the ethics code, that the self-regulation institution already adopted a 
decision thereon, and that the trader stopped the dissemination of such infringing 
piece of advertising. Through this option, the traders are allowed to solve amongst 
themselves the lawfulness of advertising without the need for the enforcement 
authority to conduct an investigation and impose a fine. Secondly, if the enforcement 
authority initiates an investigation and establishes that the advertising was indeed in 
violation of the Law on Advertising, in such instances, if the trader followed the code 
of ethics and had no prior violations of the ethics code, such participation in self-
regulation may be considered as a mitigating circumstance and decrease the amount 
of the fine. 
One sectoral institution explained that they tried to initiate discussions on the adoption 
of such a code in the field of energy, however, due to lack of initiative on the part of 
the traders, no code was ever adopted. On the other hand, the banking sector 
adopted an ethics code, however it is of a very general nature, containing no concrete 
obligations in terms of fair commercial practices and advertising. 
Thirdly, one of the enforcement authorities issued publicly available guidelines on 
misleading advertising and unlawful comparative advertising. The document is 
available in two versions – first, a short guide of several pages to give a general 
overview of the regulation and, second, in an-depth guide of almost 100 pages. The 
short version is intended to assist advertising personnel of traders to quickly ascertain 
whether there is a risk of potential infringement, whereas in-depth guide should assist 
lawyers of traders’ internal legal departments to review the advertising materials in 
greater detail. Such promotion of self-regulation (internal company regulation) and 
education is intended to prevent or reduce the amount of infringements which are 
performed unknowingly or accidentally. 
Thus, Lithuania promotes self-and co-regulation as long as the traders are willing to 
stop dissemination of misleading or unlawful comparative advertising or unfair 
commercial practices in good faith. By doing so, in most cases the traders may avoid a 
considerable fine and even get further advice and recommendations from the 
enforcement authorities. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
From the practical perspective, most of the unfair commercial practices in Lithuania 
are recognized as either misleading actions or misleading omissions. Enforcement 
authorities identify and fine traders as a result of black-listed commercial practices on 
rarer occasions (mostly Clauses 6 and 7 of Annex I of the UCPD).  
However, one enforcement authority additionally explained that they had experienced 
some issues in applying a black-listed practice established in Clause 19 of Annex I of 
the UCPD. In this modern IT driven world a lot of advertising and promotion is done 
on the Internet. For instance, companies frequently make on social media the 
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following promotional campaigns: ‘Press like and share and after [X] days we’ll 
announce the winner who will win [X] prize’. Consumers often claim that they did not 
receive such a prize. The enforcement authority is then faced with an issue whether 
Clause 19 of Annex I of the UCPD would be applicable in this scenario. Thus, it should 
be considered whether Clause 19 or any other Clauses of Annex I of the UCPD should 
be revised or extended in connection with internet and social media driven advertising 
campaigns. There should also be a mechanism put in place to amend the black-list in 
response to new developments on the market. 
Other respondents believe that the current black-list is broad enough and should not 
be either extended or modified. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
According to the opinion of enforcement authorities, the following measures could 
improve the effectiveness of the UCPD: (i) education of consumers and traders, (ii) 
issuance of recommendations, (iii) effectively informing the public about fines imposed 
on the traders not only on the websites of enforcement authorities but also in other 
media. These steps should increase the protection of consumers afforded by UCPD 
and, possibly, reduce the amount of unintentional infringements of the UCPD 
requirements.  
One ministry additionally noted that currently consumer associations in Lithuania are 
underfunded, fragmented and small. One consumer association confirmed that due to 
the lack of staffing and funding they mostly act as a routing point (reroute consumers 
to the respective enforcement authorities or lawyers) and do not by themselves 
provide any assistance to consumers. 
One of the enforcement authorities also responded that in some instances consumers 
complain about the traders’ unethical or rude behaviour and claim that it is an 
aggressive commercial practice. However, the authority doubts whether there is a 
need to regulate unethical or rude behaviour and foresees difficulties in the potential 
enforcement thereof. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID was transposed into the Civil Code, the Law on Consumer Protection of the 
Republic of Lithuania and the Rules on the Labelling of Goods and Indication of Prices 
(approved by the Order of the Minister of Economy of 15 May 2002 No 170). 
The overall picture is that traders generally obey the PID rules. According to available 
data, there are no complaints and/or court cases pertaining to the current PID rules. 
Perhaps this is because unit pricing is mostly important in the sale of foodstuffs and 
other goods of daily use and the market for foodstuffs and such daily use goods is 
primarily dominated by large supermarket companies which try to maintain their 
reputation and would, most likely, not consider evading the PID rules. Perhaps, there 
may be the occasional infringement of the PID in smaller supermarkets or rural cities, 
however no practical data to support that is available.  
However, according to the data provided by the enforcement authority, there are 
some complaints with other PID-related matters, which are not currently regulated by 
PID. For instance, consumers often complain of the following: (i) the prices are 
indicated not clearly enough during sales or discounts in the shopping centres, (ii) the 
discount is only applicable to the holders of a loyalty card and for people who do not 
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own a discount card a prior higher price will apply, (iii) a particular price or discount is 
applied only when the consumer is paying by a particular payment method, for 
instance, a discounted price applies when the consumer pays in cash. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Respondents did not provide their opinion on this matter. As of November 2016 
instead of indicating the unit price of detergents, the traders may indicate the price of 
one wash. However, due to the fact that little time has passed since this amendment 
entered into effect, there are no further data available to us to give rise to any 
conclusions on the effectiveness of such exception. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Note: Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
According to the data available to us, there are no complaints and/or court cases 
related to the national derogation pursuant to Article 6 of PID. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD was implemented in the Law on Advertising. The position of the Lithuanian 
legislature was to implement the MCAD in a broad sense. Under the Lithuanian law, 
‘advertising’ means any information disseminated in any form and by any means and 
relating to a person’s commercial and economic, financial or professional activities, 
where it promotes the purchase of goods or use of services, including the purchase of 
immovable property and the takeover of property rights and obligations. Thus, 
Lithuanian legislature moved far beyond the minimum harmonisation of the notion of 
advertising under the MCAD. Every trader can claim that another trader’s commercial 
communication is advertising and thus the criteria of misleading advertising are 
applicable thereto. 
Lithuanian courts of all instances, including the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania, tend to interpret the notion of advertising extremely widely. For instance, 
practically any information which encourages buying products or the use of services is 
considered to be advertising by the Lithuanian courts.6 The information may be 
directed either at actual or potential consumers and still be considered advertising. 
Even if the information is provided after the consumer purchased the product, e.g. as 
an insert in the packaging of a product already bought, such an insert may still be 
considered advertising.7 
According to the data obtained during the interviews, the experience of the 
stakeholders with this wide scope has been favourable. 
 
6 Order of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 29 September 2005 in case No 15/02. 
7 Order of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 28 October 2013 in case No A-
442-1781/2013. 
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• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
According to the data obtained during the interviews, the experience of the 
stakeholders with the principle-based approach to misleading advertising is positive. 
In addition, as described in Table 1, with regard to the notion of the misleading 
advertising, Lithuanian legislator established that when determining whether 
advertising is misleading, account is taken of the criteria of (i) accuracy, (ii) 
comprehensiveness and (iii) presentation. The addition of these three main pillars 
allows to methodically, on the basis of these three major criteria, assess whether the 
particular advertising is misleading. This method maintains a principle-based approach 
and does not in any way narrow the scope of the notion of misleading advertising. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
According to the data obtained during the interviews, most stakeholders believe that 
the current Lithuanian implementation of the MCAD provides for a sufficient level of 
protection.  
A higher level of protection and legal certainty is provided by the three pillars – 
criteria of assessment – of misleading advertising under the Law on Advertising. Such 
criteria provide for more legal certainty to the advertisers. Due to the fact that 
businesses have such three criteria to rely on, they are able to evaluate by 
themselves, before the dissemination of the advertising, whether the particular piece 
of advertising poses any risks and may be considered as misleading. As a result, some 
pieces of possibly misleading advertising are not disseminated to the public, which 
ultimately benefits consumers and businesses. 
A competitor or any other natural or legal person, including a consumer, is given a 
right to apply to the Competition Council (the enforcement authority under the MCAD) 
and request it to initiate an investigation regarding allegedly misleading or unlawful 
comparative advertising disseminated by a trader. However, the complainants must 
provide arguments explaining how the dissemination of that particular advertising 
violated their rights and interests. The Competition Council may also initiate 
investigation ex officio.  
Any person (including consumers, competitors and any other persons) may also apply 
to a court with a claim on adjudication of damages sustained by dissemination of 
misleading advertising, as well as an injunction. 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that according to Article 5(6) of the Law on 
Advertising, the advertising is considered to always be misleading if it corresponds to 
the black-listed unfair commercial activities. Thus, both theoretically and in practice, 
traders are able to apply to the Competition Council and claim that another trader 
(e.g. competitor) disseminates misleading advertising by using black-listed unfair 
commercial activities. As described above, such a trader would have to provide 
evidence that the dissemination of such advertising violated their rights and interests. 
However, one may conclude that Article 5(6) of the Law on Advertising provides a tool 
for traders to use the black-list of UCPD against another trader. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
One of the ministries supports the consolidation of the legal framework and full 
harmonisation of comparative advertising and even advocates for full harmonisation of 
misleading advertising as well as other consumer-related rules. Full harmonization 
assists businesses in conducting multijurisdictional advertising projects and reduces 
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costs of adjusting advertising for each jurisdiction of other EU Member States. Thus 
full harmonization in all consumer-related matters would assist this aim even further.  
One of the enforcement authorities further notes that full harmonisation assists 
companies from other Member States in doing business in Lithuania, i.e. facilitates 
cross-border commercial activities. 
As mentioned in Table 1, the Lithuanian legislator to a certain extent deviated from 
the wording of the MCAD and slightly expanded the rules on misleading advertising.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
As specified above, one enforcement authority stated that there is a need for 
clarification in rules applicable to social media and other modern means of advertising, 
in particular, the situations of ‘like and share for [X] prize’. No other specific 
experiences were reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
According to the relevant literature, it is concluded that considerable differences still 
exist between national laws relating to minimum harmonisation clauses of the MCAD, 
thus, creating barriers to cross-border advertising projects.8  
In addition, the MCAD only provides for the notion of misleading advertising and does 
not indicate particular criteria, according to which the advertising must be evaluated. 
The determination of such criteria is left to the Member States. Such non-unification of 
criteria of misleading advertising has negative implications on cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
One of the enforcement authorities indicated that cross-border enforcement 
mechanism in B2B relations is necessary to ensure sharing of experiences in various 
EU Member States. No specific experiences were reported other than those stated 
above. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The level of awareness of individual traders corresponds with the level of organisation. 
In those industries and trades where traders are well organised and associated, they 
tend to have a better understanding of the regulatory boundaries. They also have a 
reputation which is at stake if they contravene the legal standards. From the practical 
perspective such bigger traders are rather responsible, attentive and are aware of the 
information requirements.  
It was also reported that education by national organisations helps to improve 
business conduct. In particular one of the enforcement authorities constantly issues 
8 RIMKEVIČIUS M. Klaidinančios reklamos vertinimo kriterijai Lietuvoje ir ES. Vilnius, 2012, p. 127. 
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recommendations and advice to businesses in relation to the essential information to 
be disclosed to consumers.  
Even though the information requirements under the UCPD and the CRD are 
implemented in different laws, the interviewees did not raise any issues with the 
increasing complexity of overlapping directives concerning (information) duties on 
businesses. An enforcement authority further confirmed that the information 
requirements under the UCPD are still useful and needed as the trader is made aware 
of a particular list of information which, under the circumstances, it needs to provide 
to the consumer. 
It must be noted that the Law on Advertising provides that if the advertising contains 
an invitation to purchase, in that context, the trader must provide the essential 
information, prescribed by Article 7(4) of the UCPD, otherwise the advertising might 
be considered misleading due to infringement of comprehensiveness criterion. Thus, in 
practice, the businesses mostly provide the required information either in the 
advertising (if it contains an invitation to purchase) or when presenting goods.  
The interviewed enforcement authority commented that they sometimes receive 
complaints of the consumers, that the businesses still do not provide enough 
information in advertising or in the point of sale, or the information is presented in a 
complex manner. In some instances the traders fail to provide their contact details. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Overlap and conflict between the UCPD and E-commerce Directive is reported. For 
instance, Article 5 of the E-Commerce Directive provides that information should be 
given on whether prices are inclusive of tax and delivery costs, whereas Art. 7(4) 
UCPD provides that prices in an invitation to purchase shall be inclusive of tax and 
costs. Such overlap and conflict also still exists under national law, as different 
transposing laws provide for different requirements under these directives. Such 
discrepancies should be eliminated.  
According to the data provided by the interviewees, the abundance of information 
requirements in general does not correlate to increased costs for the businesses or 
public authorities. However, the information requirements should be provided in a 
systematic, uniform and consolidated manner in order for the businesses to know 
particular requirements which should be followed. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Currently one of the enforcement authorities receives complaints from traders that 
other traders (e.g. competitors) infringe the requirements of the UCPD as transposed 
to the national law. The enforcement authority reviews the complaint and evaluates 
whether the evidence and arguments provided in the complaint gives rise to a 
conclusion that the interests of the consumers were infringed. If the authority 
identifies that the interests of the consumers were infringed, it initiates investigation 
on its own motion (the investigation is considered to be initiated by the authority ex 
officio, not by the (complainant) trader). The authority considers that by doing so it 
does not defend the interests of a particular trader, but instead protects the public 
interests and defends consumers.  
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As mentioned in other parts of this report, with respect to the other enforcement 
authority and its investigations on misleading and unlawful comparative advertising, 
the complainants must show, amongst other things, that their interests were infringed 
in order for the enforcement authority to initiate investigation.  
The authorities did not have any particular opinion on the need to extend or revise the 
UCPD and/or the MCAD in relation to B2B transactions. 
Articles 6.301 – 6.304 of the Civil Code provide for a specific tort, related to 
adjudication of damages sustained in connection with misleading advertising, as well 
as a possibility of an injunction. This legal instrument may be used both by consumers 
and businesses. 
According to legal scholars, the current division of B2B and B2C regimes in the field of 
fair commercial practices (marketing) is an artificial one. Commercial activities of the 
trader in general reach different addressees – a consumer, a competitor and the 
society at large. In other words, the behaviour of traders in the market by which the 
traders disseminate commercial information about their goods and/or services to 
consumers, competitors or other business subjects is an indivisible process. Since the 
behaviour of the traders in the market is an indivisible process, it should not be 
artificially split into several segments and thus, the assessment of the trader’s 
commercial activities should be also performed in a uniform manner, without 
artificially splitting them into several ‘autonomous’ pieces. In other words, the 
commercial activities of the trader should be assessed systematically and integrally, 
including commercial activities’ impact on the consumers, business clients and 
competitors.9 This opinion is also supported by the Advocate General V. Trstenjak in 
the joined cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB and Galatea. 
One of the ministries also indicated that the extension of UCPD to also cover B2B 
relations would require notable additional resources for the SCRPA (enforcement 
authority) as currently they would not be equipped to handle the increased workload. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
9 RIMKEVIČIUS M. Klaidinančios reklamos vertinimo kriterijai Lietuvoje ir ES. Vilnius, 2012, p. 150. 
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• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Lithuanian law does not provide for specific provisions which would allow for voiding 
any transactions concluded under the influence of unfair commercial practices. 
However, general private law instruments are used in practice. In particular, Article 
1.91 of the Civil Code provides that a transaction may be declared voidable by a court 
on the action of the aggrieved party if it was entered into due to fraud, duress, 
economic pressure or real threatening, or if it was formed by a malicious agreement of 
the agent of one party with the other party, likewise if, by entering into the 
transaction by reason of abusive circumstances, one party assumes obligations under 
unfair conditions.  
In addition, an unfair commercial practice is a tortious act which can result in 
damages, thus the consumer may seek redress by applying to the court of 
adjudication for damages or an injunction. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
One case may be reported, in which the enforcement authority (the State Consumer 
Rights Protection Authority (hereinafter – the SCRPA) found that the trader liable for 
performing unfair commercial practices and imposed a fine of almost EUR 6000.  
A consumer then, on the basis of the decision of the SCRPA, applied to a court seeking 
(i) invalidation of the sale – purchase contract, (ii) application of restitution and 
ordering the trader to pay back EUR 509.37 paid according to the contract, and (iii) 
adjudication of non-pecuniary damages in the amount of EUR 579.24. The claim was 
based on the fact that the contract was concluded due to the fraud of the trader 
(Article 1.91 of the Civil Code, as described in the answer above). The element of the 
fraud was proven by the decision of the SCRPA on performance of unfair commercial 
practice. 
The court upheld the claim, invalidated the contract, applied restitution (returned EUR 
509.37 paid under the contract) and adjudicated EUR 300 of non-pecuniary damages 
(slightly lower than requested). The court of appeal upheld the decision of the first 
instance.10 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
According to the data available to us, Lithuanian consumers tend not to challenge 
contracts in court which were concluded under the influence of unfair commercial 
10 Decision of Kaunas County Court of 12 May 2016 in case No e2A-862-657/2016. 
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practices. Therefore, in order to decrease the negative effects suffered by the 
consumers due to unfair commercial practices of the traders, the laws should provide 
a specific clause allowing a direct possibility to avoid any transaction concluded under 
the influence of unfair commercial practices. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCTD was transposed into Lithuanian law into the Civil Code of the Republic of 
Lithuania (mainly Article 6.2284) and the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic 
of Lithuania. According to the stakeholder interviews, the provisions of the UCTD were 
transposed properly. 
According to the practice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania, in 
consumer-related cases, including ones on unfair contract terms, the court has an 
obligation to be active, because the protection of consumer interests is a part of the 
public interest.11 It follows that if the court identifies that the case is related to a 
consumer contract, the respective provisions of the contract must be ex officio 
examined by the court in relation to their fairness12. Thus, the court must evaluate the 
compliance of the consumer contract with the laws transposing the UCTD on its own 
motion, regardless of the fact whether the consumer argues that such terms are 
unfair. This is in-line with the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in joined cases C-240/98 – C-244/98 of 27 June 2000. In addition, the courts must 
also always apply contra proferentem rule when interpreting standard provisions of 
the consumer contracts.13 
The principle of fairness is a general principle in the Lithuanian legal system. Article 
6.158 of the Civil Code provides that each party of a contract is obliged to act in 
accordance with good faith in their contractual relationships. The parties by their 
agreement may not change or exclude a duty to act in good faith. This is reiterated in 
Article 6.2284, which transposes the principle of fairness established in the UCTD. In 
particular, provisions of a consumer contract may be declared null and void if they are 
(i) contrary to the principle of fairness and/or (ii) essentially violates the balance of 
rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the consumer. According to 
the practice of the Lithuanian courts, the contents and application of the fairness 
principle depends on the factual circumstances of each case. 
According to the general principles of civil law, the fairness of a party is presumed 
unless the laws provide for a reversed presumption. Thus, with respect to the general 
principle based approach under the UCTD, the fairness of the trader is presumed 
unless proven otherwise. Thus, in this instance the burden of proof for the unfairness 
of the provision would fall on the consumer. 
The reversed presumption is provided in Article 6.228,4 which establishes a list of 
instances (provisions), which are by their nature presumed to be unfair. The list is 
transposed from the Annex of the UCTD. According to the legal literature14 and court 
11 Consumer protection in consumer contractual relations: legal regulation and case law review of the 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania No 30 of 24 March 2009. 
12 Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 12 October 2016 in case No e3K-3-438-
415/2016 
13 Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 7 October 2002 in case No 3K-3-1137/2002 
14 BUBLIENĖ D., ZEMLYTĖ E. Arbitražiniai susitarimai (arbitražinė išlyga) vartojimo sutartyse: per se 
nesąžininga sąlyga? Teisė, 2012, t. 84. 
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practice,15 such list is to be considered as a grey-list, as the trader may still prove that 
a particular provision of the contract in a particular situation is still fair, regardless of 
the fact that it corresponds to the situation described in the grey-list. The reason 
behind this is that, firstly, the court must find a balance of rights and obligations of 
the parties and if it finds that in particular instance the parties (consumer and trader) 
have equivalent negotiating power, the court may consider the provision to be fair 
even if it falls inside the scope of the grey-list. Secondly, the court will refuse to 
protect the interest of an unfair consumer, thus if the consumer acts unfairly, the 
court most likely would not consider a particular provision as unfair. 
Due to the ex officio application of the (un)fairness test, the principle-based approach 
is fairly effective, even taking into account the fact that the courts are required to 
evaluate the terms on a case-by-case basis, i.e. there is no black-list of terms that are 
considered to be unfair in all cases.  
With respect to some regulated sectors, for instance, the energy sector, the sector-
specific regulatory authority (ministry) approves standard clauses for contracts to be 
concluded with consumers, e.g. a standard set of clauses for energy supply 
agreements etc. Such standard terms, prior to their approval, are also reviewed by 
the SCRPA to ensure that they are not unfair. Standard terms are mandatory for 
traders of that specific sector. This is one of the examples of ultra-preventive control 
of unfair clauses in consumer contracts. 
However, some consumer associations call for such strict control of unfair contract 
terms in other sectors. One consumer association suggested that all consumer 
contracts in the field of banking should be in prior reviewed for their compliance with 
the principle of fairness. However, the association elaborated that due to limited 
resources of the SCRPA (enforcement authority), such a review should be done by 
independent attorneys-at-law and the costs should be borne by the financial 
institutions. For instance, the financial institution should submit each standard 
agreement for review by independent attorneys-at-law, who should approve that 
“according to their opinion, this agreement does not contain any unfair terms”. This 
would increase the confidence of consumers in the finance sector and would not call 
for any substantial investment from the part of the banks or other financial 
institutions.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The list created another layer of practical protection for consumers, since prior to the 
transposition of the UCTD, Lithuanian law did not have such an effective mechanism to 
combat unfair contract terms in consumer contracts. As described above, the 
indicative list of unfair terms annex to the UCTD was transposed as a grey-list of 
unfair terms, meaning that it provides presumptions on the unfairness of such terms. 
However, the trader may still argue that a particular term in a particular situation is 
considered to be fair. According to the responses and the relevant case law, this 
approach is effective, because, firstly, it affords a wide scope of protection for 
consumers and, secondly, shifts the burden of proof of the fairness of the term to the 
trader and only in exception cases such presumption can be rebutted.16 
One of the issues with the grey list of unfair terms transposed to Lithuanian law is that 
such unfair terms, even if they are presumed to be unfair under the law, they are not 
null and void per se. Thus, consumer is left with two options: firstly, apply to the 
SCRPA for them to conduct an investigation and adopt a non-binding resolution on 
15 Consumer protection in consumer contractual relations: legal regulation and case law review of the 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania No 30 of 24 March 2009. 
16 Consumer protection in consumer contractual relations: legal regulation and case law review of the 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania No 30 of 24 March 2009. 
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standard contract terms, suggesting the trader to amend the standard contract term 
that the SCRPA considers to be unfair, also informing the trader that the SCRPA may 
apply to a court for invalidation of the unfair contract term, or, secondly, apply to a 
court in individual proceedings and request the court to recognise a particular clause 
as unfair. Thus, it should be considered whether an EU-wide black-list of unfair 
contract terms that in all instances are automatically considered unfair, thus null and 
void, should be adopted. Consumer associations would support the adoption of such 
list. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
As described above, the consumer associations argue that the grey list of unfair terms 
that currently is implemented in Lithuania affords insufficient protection and a black-
list should be adopted. They argue that a consumer’s position would be much better if 
the term would be black-listed, as in such case the term would be considered unfair 
under all circumstances, irrespective of the circumstances of the case. Whereas under 
the grey list, the consumer would still have to show or argue that the term is unfair, 
i.e. even that the burden of proof is reversed and lies with the trader, the consumer 
would still have to respond to the arguments of the trader and the court thus would be 
required to test, on a case-by-case basis, whether the term may be justified given the 
specific circumstances of the case. Black-listing of a term also offers predictability and 
legal certainty to the parties. The national enforcement authority, however, claims 
that current legal framework (grey list) affords sufficient protection of consumer 
interests. 
In addition, one must also note that any list in general, i.e. either the grey or black is 
a positive thing, because it allows the trader with some degree of certainty to create a 
basic checklist and thus such a list acts both as a preventative measure in the field of 
unfair consumer contract terms and as a measure strengthening the consumer’s 
negotiating power. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In individual proceedings, all circumstances of the case must be taken into account, 
including those that are particular to this specific consumer or that specific trader, 
provided that these specific circumstances were known to the other party at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract. The effect is, however, that a court’s decision in such 
an individual case cannot be extended to all contracts of the trader concerned or even 
to the contracts of other traders, as the specifics of these contracts need to be taken 
into account instead of the specifics of the case that had been decided. This means 
that consumers and traders are uncertain as to the outcome of the unfairness test 
even in cases where the same or a similar term had been tested before and found to 
be fair or unfair. Notwithstanding what was said above, if a court is faced with a term 
which has been found unfair in an earlier case, there is a strong likelihood that the 
term will be found unfair in a later case as well, particularly if that term was used by 
the same trader. 
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However, in proceedings initiated by the SCRPA for protection of consumer public 
interest (abstract control), if the court satisfies the claim, the res judicata effect of the 
judgement applies to all the consumers having clauses in their contracts that have 
been declared void. The judgement becomes a legal precedent meaning that firstly, 
consumers cannot bring individual actions and secondly, the facts settled in the 
judgement become prejudicial facts and cannot be contested – therefore persons with 
the same or very similar factual circumstances may benefit from the decision of the 
court. Even though the court in its judgement declares the terms and conditions of the 
standard consumer contract as unfair, due to the contractual nature of the standard 
consumer contract, it would have to be amended individually. For example, a 
consumer may demand an amendment of the contract with reference to the 
judgement of the court declaring the particular terms and conditions unfair. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The requirement of contractual transparency is transposed into the Lithuanian laws, in 
particular in Article 6.2284 of the Civil Code. It requires that each written clause of a 
consumer contract must be clear and comprehensible. If the clause is not clear and 
comprehensible it is considered to be unfair.  
Legal scholars17 by summarising the relevant practice of SCRPA conclude that in 
practice, the following transparency related issues are most common: 
• Clauses contain unclear definitions or undefined definitions, especially in cases 
where the execution of the consumer’s rights or the consumer’s liability is 
based on such definitions; 
• Failure to indicate terms (periods of time) for provision of specific documents, 
when consumer’s liability is based on the provision thereof; 
• Failure to clearly describe the product sold to the consumer (to indicate its 
characteristics); 
• Provision of abstract references to legal acts; 
• Provision of references to internal documents of the trader, without indicating 
how the consumer may obtain such documents (especially for financial sector); 
• Failure to provide a clear procedure on the notification of the consumer in 
relation to changes to the contract (for instance, the SCRPA considers the term 
as non-transparent if it is indicated that the trader will inform the consumer in 
reasonable time prior to the changes to the contract on the website ‘x’ or with 
a prior notification). 
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania established that non-transparent 
contractual clauses cannot be considered to be fair, because the consumer, who does 
not understand the conditions of contract or does not have all the necessary 
information, cannot make a proper decision.18 
According to the responses from the most interviewees, the contractual transparency 
requirements under the UCTD are effective and sufficient. However, one of the 
consumer associations indicated that contracts in the financial (banking) sector are 
still not clear enough. The association indicated two main reasons behind this. Firstly, 
the agreements are too long – no consumer is expected to read through 10 – 15 
pages of a contract written in small fonts. As a solution, the agreements should be 
shorter and contain only the main provisions. Secondly, the agreements are written in 
the ‘lawyers’ language’. Thus, even though the terms are legally correct and can be 
17 BUBLIENE D, Vartotojų teisė į informaciją pagal naująjį vartotojų teisių direktyvos pasiūlymą: žingsnis 
pirmyn? Jurisprudencija, 2011, t. 18(4) 
18 Consumer protection in consumer contractual relations: legal regulation and case law review of the 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania No 30 of 24 March 2009. 
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understood by lawyers, an average consumer cannot be expected to understand 10 – 
15 pages of typical legal text. 
Another issue this consumer association raised is that in some instances banks tend to 
withhold the standard (general) terms of the contract until the very last minute of the 
transaction. In particular, the consumer and the bank negotiate some individual terms 
of the contract, e.g. the interest rate, and only after the parties find mutually 
acceptable individual terms, only then the consumer is given the general (standard) 
terms. In these instances the consumer usually elects not to read the 10 – 15 pages 
of a standard contract when the individual terms are already negotiated. This 
consumer association thus believes that the banks should be obligated to provide the 
consumer with the general (standard) terms of a particular transaction during the 
beginning of the negotiations. They also noted that banks could go even further and 
make all general (standard) terms publicly available on their websites so that the 
consumers would always be able to familiarize themselves with the clauses prior to 
conclusion of the contract or agreeing on the individually negotiated terms or 
contacting the financial institution.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
N/A. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
According to available data, national courts in Lithuania take up an active role in 
consumer related disputes. This obligation to be active in consumer related disputes 
was reaffirmed by numerous Supreme Court’s rulings.  
One of the enforcement authorities also welcomes all the guidance issued by the CJEU, 
because it provides concrete guidelines to be followed in a particular situation. 
As discussed above, one of the issues with the grey list of unfair terms transposed to 
Lithuanian law is that such unfair terms, even if they are presumed to be unfair under 
the law, are not null and void per se. Thus, consumer is left with two options: firstly, 
apply to the SCRPA for them to conduct an investigation and adopt a non-binding 
resolution on standard contract terms, suggesting to the trader to amend the standard 
contract term that the SCRPA considers to be unfair, also informing the trader that the 
SCRPA may apply to a court for invalidation of the unfair contract term, or, secondly, 
apply directly to a court in individual proceedings and request the court to recognise a 
particular clause as unfair. The unfair consumer contract clause does not automatically 
become void, thus in order for the unfair clause to become non-binding, some 
additional steps have to be taken. Taking this into account, an introduction of a black-
list of unfair terms, which would be unfair in all instances, should be considered. 
One of the ministries informed us that national enforcement authorities are faced with 
some sanction-related difficulties. There are some dishonest market players who use 
unfair terms in their consumer contracts. The enforcement authority in these cases 
applied to court for the recognition of these particular terms as unfair and the court 
upheld the claim. However, the dishonest market player amended the wording of the 
term in such a manner that the clause is still unfair, i.e. the actual clause is changed 
in terms of its form, however from the substantive perspective the reformulation does 
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not change the unfair effects of the clause. Thus, the enforcement authority had to 
apply to the court once more. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
One of the consumer associations confirmed that a graphical representation model of 
the most important terms of the consumer contract would improve the comprehension 
of the contract. No responses, other than already stated above, were received from 
the interviewees.  
Legal scholars propose several improvements that could assist in establishing a high 
level of consumer protection in Lithuania: 
• Publicity of violations. The SCRPA should inform the public about details of each 
violation. Currently the SCRPA publishes its decisions on unfair contract terms 
(non-binding resolutions), however, it does not provide (i) which particular 
clause was declared as unfair or (ii) detailed reasoning why this clause was 
considered as unfair. One of the ministries further noted that a registry of 
unfair consumer contract conditions should be established. 
• Close contact with the SCRPA. Businesses and business organisations, 
especially sector specific ones, should have a close contact with the SCRPA, for 
instance, provide the SCRPA with their standard terms for SCRPA to review 
them with respect to unfair consumer terms. Cooperation with the SCRPA even 
during the drafting of the standard terms would also be welcome. 
• The SCRPA should issue summaries of its practice and provide the list of the 
most popular unfair clauses found in consumer contracts. Such a list could 
assist the consumers in two ways. Firstly, the consumers could easily check 
whether their particular contract contains such an unfair clause. Secondly, this 
list could serve as a checklist for businesses when drafting their standard 
contracts. Furthermore, such list could be divided into separate sectors. List of 
common sector specific unfair clauses could further improve the effectiveness 
of the UCTD regime. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
Differences in legal regulation between EU Member States always provide a financial 
burden on the businesses. Thus, according to one of the ministries, maximum 
harmonisation clauses are always welcome due to their uniform application throughout 
the EU. No specific experiences were reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
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 • Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
General contract law provides for two relevant instruments: 
Firstly, Article 6.186 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that 
surprising conditions contained in a standard contract, i.e. such conditions that the 
other party could not reasonably expect to be included in the contract, are not 
effective.  
Standard conditions are not considered surprising if they were expressly accepted by 
the party when they were duly disclosed. In determining whether a condition is of 
surprising character, regard must be taken of its content, wording and form of 
expression.  
A party who joins a standard contract where the standard conditions are drawn up by 
the other party has the right to claim for termination or modification of that contract in 
the event where, even though the standard conditions of the contract are not contrary 
to the law, they exclude the party's rights and possibilities that are commonly granted 
in a contract of that particular class, or exclude or limit civil liability of the party who 
prepared the standard conditions, or establish other provisions which violate the 
principle of equality of parties, cause imbalance in the parties' interests, or are 
contrary to the criteria of reasonableness, good faith and justice. 
Secondly, Article 6.228 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a 
party may withdraw from the contract or its separate condition if at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the contract or its condition unjustifiably gave the other 
party excessive advantage. In such cases, among other circumstances, regard must 
also be paid to the fact that one party has taken unfair advantage of the other's 
dependent position, or of the other party's economic difficulties, urgent needs, or of 
the latter's economic weakness, lack of information or experience, their inadvertence 
or inexperience in negotiations; regard is also taken of the nature and purpose of the 
contract. 
Upon the request of the party entitled to claim for invalidity of a contract or its 
separate condition on the grounds established above, a court may revise the contract 
or its condition and adapt them respectively in order to make the contract or its 
separate condition meet the requirements of fairness and reasonable standards of fair 
dealing practices. 
Thus, there is no need to further strengthen the protection of businesses with regard 
to unfair contract terms. Interviewees did not provide dissenting views. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Standard conditions prepared by one of the parties are binding to the other if the 
latter was provided with an adequate opportunity to become acquainted with the said 
conditions (Article 6.185 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania). 
In the event where both parties to a contract are enterprises (businessmen), it is 
considered that the other party was provided with the opportunity referred to above if: 
• The party who prepared the standard conditions delivered these in written form 
to the other party before or at the time of signing the contract; 
• The party who prepared the standard conditions informed the other party 
before the signing of the contract that the contract would be formed in 
accordance with standard conditions which were accessible to the other party in 
the place indicated by the party who prepared the standard conditions; 
• A copy of standard conditions was offered to be sent to the other party if 
requested. 
Thus, there is no need to strengthen the protection of businesses with regard to 
contractual transparency. Interviewees did not provide dissenting views. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
No specific experiences reported other than stated above. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?19  
According to the publicly available data, no cross-border injunction proceedings were 
initiated in Lithuania. In addition, Lithuanian consumer associations also did not 
initiate any legal injunction proceedings before the national courts of other EU Member 
States according to the ID. The main reason behind this is high costs of foreign 
litigation and unfamiliarity with foreign legal systems. Interviewees believe it is much 
more effective to cooperate directly with consumer associations and/or enforcement 
authorities of other EU Member States and persuade them to initiate investigation 
and/or file a claim. 
With regard to national injunctions, the procedure is also rather rare. According to 
publicly available data, as well as reports from the interviewees, approximately five 
national injunction (general action for protection of consumer public interest) 
proceedings with no cross-border element have been initiated by consumer 
associations (defending the public interest). Four of these proceedings were initiated 
by the SCRPA (main consumer rights enforcement authority) and one by another 
consumer association, the association ‘Consumer Voice’. Four of these cases were 
related to an injunction against the trader, which failed to provide goods (failure to 
act), or an organiser of events, which failed to return money for an event which did 
not take place (failure to act). The last case was related to a request for the court to 
terminate the actions of a trader, which unlawfully collected a debt administration fee. 
According to the collected data, the injunction procedure in Lithuania in non-cross 
border matters works as means for protection of collective consumer interests, thus 
contributes to reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules 
and reduction in consumers’ detriment, as the traders are aware that the respective 
consumer association will be ready to defend the public interest of the injured 
consumers. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
According to the respondents, prior consultations and publications of the decisions are 
particularly effective tools. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
No, qualified entities of other EU Member States are entitled to apply for injunctions 
only in the areas of consumer law that are part of Annex I of the Directive. 
19  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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However, national entities may apply with a claim to a court for an injunction if a 
consumer public interest was infringed. The law does not limit the scope of ‘consumer 
public interest’ only to Annex I of the Directive. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Since 2012, an increase in injunction proceedings is visible. However, as described 
above, none of them have a cross-border element and are only concerned with 
defence of collective interest of Lithuanian consumers. One of the reasons for such 
increase in national injunction proceedings is increased education of consumers. 
Consumer associations and enforcement authorities are more active in informing the 
public about a possibility to apply to them in order for their rights be defended. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
According to the responses from the interviewees, the cross-border injunction 
procedure as prescribed by the ID is not effective whatsoever due to high financial 
costs and lack of knowledge of the legal system of another EU Member State. The 
Lithuanian enforcement authority and one ministry is of the opinion that it is much 
easier for enforcement authorities or consumer associations to co-operate directly with 
the authorities of another EU Member State and convince them to file an action. As 
described above, even national injunction procedures related to protection of collective 
consumer interests is rather rare in Lithuania.  
One of the possible improvements would be to increase the education of the 
consumers, encouraging them to apply to the respective consumer association or 
enforcement authority, since on receipt of a sufficient number of complaints the 
consumer association or enforcement authority would be more inclined to initiate an 
injunction procedure. One must also note that Lithuanian national consumer 
associations often are under-funded, thus the enforcement authority is more likely to 
initiate an injunction procedure. 
One consumer association noted that general consumer rights education is not 
effective because consumers generally are not willing to receive legal information 
when they do not need it. Thus, what the association proposed is having Consumer 
Information Points, where consumers either by phone, email or physically in place 
could consult with lawyers on their options in a particular case. That would most likely 
increase the general awareness and effectiveness of consumer rights in Lithuania. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
The general impression we have on the basis of the interviews is that the obstacles for 
Lithuanian consumer organisations to access foreign civil courts are insurmountable. 
The same probably applies for foreign organisations who seek to address a Lithuanian 
court since no such actions have been brought to date. 
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It stands to reason it makes more sense to liaise with befriended associations in those 
countries where the claims need to be brought and to persuade those home 
associations to help out. It seems that there are occasional contacts to that effect, for 
instance, just recently a Portuguese tour operator went bankrupt and to that extent 
Lithuanian supervisory authorities liaised with the Portuguese ones and as a 
consequence, recommendations to Lithuanian consumers affected by the bankruptcy 
were published on the website of the SCRPA.  
Thus, according to our impression and the interviews, cross-border cooperation 
between national supervisory authorities yields more tangible results.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
From a Lithuanian perspective, this option is not effective at all. The obstacles for 
Lithuanian consumer organisations to access foreign civil courts are insurmountable. 
Consumer organisations and enforcement authorities stress that the legal and financial 
obstacles for bringing claims to foreign courts are simply too great. We refer to the 
answers given above.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
According to the responses from the interviewees, the legal and financial obstacles for 
bringing claims to foreign courts are simply too great. From the practical perspective, 
cross-border cooperation between national supervisory authorities yields more 
tangible results. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
We refer to our answers above. The injunction procedure, as designed by the ID, 
related to either (i) foreign qualified entities or (ii) the right of Lithuanian qualified 
entities to initiate proceedings before the courts of other EU member states is 
regulated separately in the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania. 
However, non-cross border injunction proceedings by a Lithuanian competent 
authority are regulated separately as a part of the defence of a consumer public 
interest. 
The UCPD enforcement procedures are established in the LPUBCCP and the Law on 
Advertising. The enforcement procedures of the UCTD are established both in the Civil 
Code and the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (different 
provisions than the injunction procedure). The enforcement procedures of the CRD are 
provided in the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (different 
provisions than the injunction directive). 
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• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The procedures differ in time limits, sanctions, persons entitled to initiate proceedings 
and authorities conducting investigation. We refer to earlier answers. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
The interviewees confirm that the existence of the directives covered by this study 
clearly benefits the consumers. These directives create a high level of protection for 
consumers in the Republic of Lithuania, i.e. enforcement authorities actively defend 
the interests of the consumers against unfair commercial practices, unfair contract 
terms, unfair indication of prices. Furthermore, they grant a possibility (even if a 
theoretical one) that collective consumer interests (i.e. the interests of a large number 
of consumers) may be defended in cross-border infringement matters. Common set of 
rules and their uniform application gives consumers confidence in the consumer 
protection laws and authorities in general. 
One must note that the costs for individual enforcement of consumer rights in courts 
are considerable due to lack of legal knowledge and possible financial implications, 
thus preventing consumers in many cases from actually benefitting from consumer 
protection measures. However, collective consumer protection mechanisms, e.g. 
injunctions procedures, investigations (administrative procedures) conducted by the 
enforcement authorities in the field of unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms, provide sufficient assurances that interests of all or most of the consumers will 
be protected, since the consumer does not have to pay anything for the application to 
the enforcement authority with a complaint and, in case the complaint is unfounded, 
the consumer does not have to cover the legal expenses of the business (as opposed 
to individual enforcement). 
On the other hand, enforcement authorities issue fines to the infringers, thus the 
existence of the respective directives of this study is also to some extent beneficial to 
the state.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
There is no concrete number based evidence on the benefits for traders. However, the 
interviewees believe that the existence of uniform sets of rules brings tangible benefits 
to the traders in two ways. Firstly, decreases costs of cross-border activities. 
Secondly, such rules indirectly protect the businesses that abide by the rules, as non-
compliance with the consumer protection rules both implies negative publicity and 
considerable fines to infringers, thus encouraging fair competition. 
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• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
The costs for traders in order to respect consumer law legislation are difficult to 
quantify. However, according to the interviewees, it should save costs for the traders 
if they wish to conduct cross-border business. This would especially be true with 
regard to maximum harmonisation clauses of the directives. Lithuanian interviewees 
argue that the existence of uniform legal requirements minimises the expenses for 
foreign legal counsel, as well as investments and expenses related to adaptation of 
goods, services and marketing with legal requirements of other EU Member States. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
There are two main enforcement institutions related to the directives under this study. 
Firstly, the SCRPA, the primary objective of which is to ensure the consumer 
protection of Lithuania. Secondly, the Competition Council, which is the competent 
authority not only for misleading advertising matters, but also for investigations 
related to competition law and the law of protection against unfair competition. Thus, 
these state institutions were established to protect the interests of the consumers, as 
well as to perform other functions. The only related cost for the public enforcement of 
the directives covered by this study is the price for the maintenance of these public 
institutions. Other than that, the consumers do not have to pay anything (when either 
applying to the SCRPA or Competition Council, or the court) for the public enforcement 
of these rules.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
No such data is available or was provided by the interviewees. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
One of the ministries advocates for the adoption of maximum harmonisation clauses, 
as such clauses would ensure lower costs for businesses, as well as greater benefits to 
the consumers due to their uniform interpretation by all the member states. One of 
the enforcement authorities indicated that the costs should not be lowered in order to 
maintain the current level of protection for the consumers. No other data is available 
or was provided by the interviewees. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied 
in practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
UCPD and UCTD enforcement authorities, as well as sectoral authorities and consumer 
associations are well aware of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
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legislation. According to the data provided by one enforcement authority, the traders’ 
knowledge of such requirements is also rather good. However, consumers lack 
knowledge that horizontal EU consumer legislation is also applicable in sector specific 
situations. 
Every year the SCRPA conducts a consumer and trader survey. According to the data 
of 2015 study, 54 percent of traders acknowledged that they have good enough 
knowledge of consumer protection laws. 45 percent of consumers responded that they 
are happy about their knowledge in the field of consumer protection, whereas only 29 
percent reported that they lack consumer protection knowledge. During last year an 
increasing number of consumers actively show interest in consumer protection, most 
likely due to recent active consumer protection related campaigns.  
According to the data of the SCRPA’s 2016 study, which was published in February 
2017, 46 percent of consumers responded that they are happy about their knowledge 
in the field of consumer protection (1 percent increase compared with 2015 study). 
16 percent of consumers answered that their consumer rights were infringed – this is 
the lowest percentage from the year 2008, thus the SCRPA assumes that the traders 
are carrying out their obligations more responsibly.  
On the other hand, according to the data of Consumer Scoreboard 2015 (done by the 
European Commission), Lithuanian consumers have the second lowest level of 
knowledge of consumer rights in the EU. Lithuania also has the EU’s third lowest score 
on the complaints and dispute resolution composite indicator. 
Lithuanian laws, transposing the UCPD and UCTD, in particular, the LPUBCCP, the Civil 
Code and the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania are applied in 
practice by the Lithuanian enforcement authorities as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the sectoral areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Lithuania, different authorities are responsible for enforcement of horizontal EU 
consumer laws and the sector specific rules. According to Lithuanian law, for instance: 
• The Communications Regulatory Authority (Lith. Ryšių reguliavimo tarnyba) is 
responsible for enforcement of sector specific rules in the field of electronic 
communications; 
• National Commission for Energy Control and Prices (Lith. Nacionalinė kainų ir 
energetikos kontrolės komisija) and State Energy Inspectorate under the 
Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania (Lith. Valstybinė energetikos 
inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos energetikos ministerijos) are resnposible 
for enforcement of sector specific rules in the energy field; 
• Lithuanian Bank (Lith. Lietuvos bankas) is responsible for enforcement of 
sector specific rules in the field of consumer finance; 
• State Road Transport Inspectorate under the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (Lith. Valstybinė kelių transporto inspekcija prie Susisiekimo 
ministerijos) is responsible for enforcement of sector specific rules in the field 
of passenger transport. 
However, the enforcement of horizontal consumer protection directives, in particular, 
the UCPD and the UCTD is performed by the SCRPA and the Competition Council. In 
practice, the cooperation between institutions varies depending on particular situation: 
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• If the authority, responsible for the enforcement of sector specific 
requirements, receives a complaint, which mainly concerns the infringement of 
the requirements under the UCPD or UCTD, such authority passes the 
complaint to the SCRPA or the Competition Council; 
• If the authority, responsible for enforcement of sector specific requirements, 
during the examination of consumer’s complaint (if primarily it was not related 
to UCPD or UCTD) identifies that the requirements set forth by the UCPD 
and/or the UCTD were infringed, it stops the sector-specific examination and 
passes the complaint to SCRPA or the Competition Council to identify whether 
the requirements of UCPD or UCTD transposing laws were infringed. After they 
receive the response of the SCRPA or the Competition Council, the sector-
specific examination is resumed; 
• If the authority, responsible for enforcement of sector specific requirements, 
establishes that the requirements of UCPD or UCTD transposing laws were 
infringed absent of any consumer complaint, it may request the SCRPA or the 
Competition Council for ‘institutional assistance’, i.e. request to evaluate some 
specific situation in the light of UCPD or UCTD requirements as the enforcement 
thereof is the competence of the SCRPA and the Competition Council. 
The cooperation between sector-specific institutions and the SCRPA and the 
Competition Council is rather active. According to the opinion of the interviewees, such 
a distinction between the functions of state institutions is not burdensome for the 
consumer, since there is a clear division of competence and the examination of the 
consumer’s complaint is automatically shared by the institutions according to their 
competence. Such division does not have any negative impact on the effectiveness of 
the UCPD and/or UCTD. On the contrary, enforcement of the requirements of UCPD 
and UCTD is concentrated in two specialised institutions, thus allowing for the 
complaint to be examined effectively and professionally. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Horizontal consumer provisions and sector-specific rules provide for a rather clear and 
coherent legal framework.  
The LPUBCCP expressis verbis provides that the provisions of this law are applicable 
only if sector specific legislation does not provide for differing rules. Thus, if any 
sectoral legislation provides for any deviations, sector specific legislation would be 
applicable.  
With regard to UCTD transposing laws, they are applicable in all instances with respect 
to all contracts (with exceptions, as provided by the UCTD). Thus, the SCRPA 
evaluates all contracts in the light of unfair contract terms, including ones of regulated 
sectors.  
Attention should also be brought to the fact that with respect to some regulated 
sectors, for instance, the energy sector, the sector-specific regulatory authority 
(ministry) approves standard clauses for contracts to be concluded with consumers, 
e.g. standard set of clauses for energy supply agreements and etc. Such standard 
terms, prior to their approval, are also reviewed by the SCRPA to ensure that they are 
not unfair. Standard terms are mandatory for traders of that specific sector. 
None of the interviewees reported any contradictory provisions. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
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The UCPD and the UCTD provide for general concepts and their principle based 
approach helps to fill the gaps where there is no sectoral regulation. 
There is no quantitative information pertaining to the costs of the complementary 
application of the UCPD and UCTD in the regulated areas. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
None of the interviewees reported the need for clarification of the interplay between 
the EU sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law. According to both sector-
specific actors and the general consumer enforcement authority the current rules are 
well balanced and no further interplay related regulation is needed. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
According to the Lithuanian experience, there is a growing number of cases in which 
the consumer purchases goods repeatedly, thus the enforcement authority must 
ascertain whether the activities of such a natural person are business-related, i.e. 
whether such a natural person may be considered a consumer or instead, should be 
considered a trader. 
Regulation with respect to C2B relations would be necessary in the fast paced tech 
business world. For instance, consumer (a natural person) may be providing digital 
content to business (e.g. YouTube) for remuneration; however, a natural person would 
have no negotiating power against such businesses. The same could be said in 
instances when consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader, because such a transaction 
may be a rash one. There would also be a big misbalance of power between such a 
natural person (‘consumer’) and a trader. In both of these cases only general 
provisions of the Civil Code would be applicable, thus failing to afford any kind of 
special or additional protection to the weaker side (the natural person). Thus, in some 
C2B instances there rights and obligations might be heavily misbalanced and further 
regulation would be welcomed. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
According to the interviewees, the notions of ‘consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ work 
fine in practice. However, the notion of a ‘vulnerable consumer’ is less clear.  
In particular, one sectoral institution reported that sector-specific laws (energy sector) 
provide for their own notions of ‘vulnerable consumer’. For instance, the Article 3(7) of 
the Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity provides that 
‘each Member State shall define the concept of vulnerable customers which may refer 
to energy poverty and, inter alia, to the prohibition of disconnection of electricity to 
such customers in critical times. Member States shall ensure that rights and 
obligations linked to vulnerable customers are applied’. This requirement was 
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transposed by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania by adopting the Act on 
Application of Additional Guarantees for Socially Vulnerable Electricity Consumers of 
27 December 2015 No 527. The act provides that a socially vulnerable consumer 
means a consumer which in accordance with applicable laws is given monetary social 
aid. It is still unclear whether the SCRPA should apply the notion of ‘vulnerable 
consumer’ as provided by the UCPD (which does not evaluate financial situation of the 
consumer), or instead a sectoral one. The same issue is with the natural gas sector. 
Thus, the horizontal consumer protection directives and sectoral directives should be 
harmonised to that extent. 
One enforcement authority further elaborated that according to their practice, the 
notion that the average consumers is informed, observant and circumspect means 
that such an average consumer is socially active, having the ability to think critically 
and absorb the information provided to them, however, not having special knowledge 
in some circumstances to make an informed decision. The authority argues that 
practically, it is very difficult to establish how particular consumers fit in the concept of 
an average consumer and how they would make a decision. Thus, the notions of 
‘average consumer’ and ‘vulnerable consumer’ should not overshadow the properties 
of particular consumers at hand and their abilities to make an informed decision, i.e. 
the circumstances of each situation should be assessed individually. 
According to statistical data and stakeholder opinions, Competition Council with regard 
to its misleading advertising investigations keeps raising the bar of the average 
consumer, i.e. the consumer under the notion of average consumer is getting more 
and more observant, circumspect and is able to evaluate the nature of the advertising 
without being misled. This is supported by the declining number of Competition 
Council’s decisions on misleading advertising. For instance, in 2007 the Competition 
Council found 16 cases20 wherein the traders disseminated misleading advertising or 
unlawful comparative advertising, compared with 5 cases in 2015.21 This also may 
further be explained by the fact that the Competition Council approved its strategic 
objectives and criteria for minor infringements, under which the Competition Council 
refuses to launch an investigation if the infringements are minor or do not comply with 
the Competition Council’s strategic objectives.  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
One enforcement authority argues that in practice, it is very difficult to establish that a 
commercial activity was directed at a particular group of people who are vulnerable. In 
most instances, the alleged unfair commercial activities are not apparently directed at 
vulnerable consumers, but instead, are directed at the general society, even though 
such activities factually affect only vulnerable consumers. Thus, one may argue the 
protection which is currently afforded to vulnerable consumers in accordance with the 
UCPD is most likely intended to cover only such instances where the unfair commercial 
activities are obviously (apparently) directed to vulnerable consumers. Therefore, 
additional protection should be afforded to such vulnerable consumers as they 
perceive traders’ commercial activities (including advertising) very directly, and do not 
assess it critically or cautiously.  
On the other hand, the traders are not able to always foresee whether their 
commercial activities will ultimately unfairly result in unfair commercial practices to 
vulnerable consumers. In other words, the traders, when considering their commercial 
practices, most likely, consider how their activities will affect an average consumer 
and do not assess the results of their activities to vulnerable consumers. Thus, any 
20Competition Council‘s Annual Report for 2007 
(http://kt.gov.lt/uploads/publications/docs/745_7d7ac6cb3e3660489db75086ade2a70c.pdf)  
21Competition Council‘s Annual Report for 2015 
(http://kt.gov.lt/uploads/publications/docs/2312_e79524c4b4631f9394ee9e8893882ed1.pdf)  
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legislative initiatives for increased protection for vulnerable consumers should also 
take into consideration the possibilities of traders to judge beforehand the impact of 
their commercial practices on vulnerable consumers, if it is not directly (apparently) 
directed at them. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Yes, the adoption and implementation of the UCPD improved the protection of 
consumers, since prior to its implementation Lithuania did not have any specific public 
law provisions on protection of fair commercial practices. 
With respect to the UCTD, also yes. Before the transposition of the UCTD, consumer 
law issues were regulated by the 7 July 1964 Civil Code (Soviet code) and since 1994 
also by the Consumer Protection Act. But the Lithuanian law did not provide for a level 
of protection comparable to the UCTD.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Yes, the adoption and transposition of the PID into national legislation improved the 
provision of information on unit prices to consumers. This is confirmed by the 
interviewees. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Prior to the adoption and transposition of the MCAD in the Lithuanian law, the legal 
regulation of advertising was sporadic and fragmented in nature. The adoption of the 
Law on Advertising in the year 2000, which transposed the MCAD, greatly increased 
the protection of business against unfair marketing. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Yes, due to harmonisation of requirements for commercial practices and advertising, 
the traders are able to carry out commercial cross-border activities more effectively 
and in a unitary manner. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
The positive effects are attributable to the implementation of, firstly, maximum 
harmonisation clauses, and, secondly, minimum harmonisation clauses at the least. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Lithuania  
Directive Transposition legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Specific provisions going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
The Civil Code 'Black list' of terms considered 
unfair in all circumstances 
No   
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
Yes Article 6.228
4(2) 
of the Civil Code 
A full list of terms (a – q) provided in the 
Annex of the UCTD is transposed as a ‘grey-
list’.  
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive to individually negotiated 
terms  
No   
 Extensions of the application of 
Directive terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main subject-
matter 
No   
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a wider term established under 
point (a) of Annex of the UCTD 
Yes Article 
6.2284(2)(1) of the 
Civil Code 
Under the said article a term is considered 
unfair if it also excludes or limits the liability 
of a seller or supplier in the event of damage 
to the consumer’s property. 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a narrower term established 
under point (b) of Annex of the 
UCTD 
 Article 
6.2284(2)(2) of the 
Civil Code 
The said article does not contain an example 
of offsetting a debt. 
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  Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a wider term established under 
point (f) of Annex of the UCTD 
 Article 
6.2284(2)(6) of the 
Civil Code 
Under the said article a term is considered 
unfair if it permits the seller or supplier to 
retain any sums received by the seller or 
supplier prior to execution of the contract (in 
comparison the UCTD only concerns sums 
paid for services). 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a wider term established under 
point (h) of Annex of the UCTD 
 Article 
6.2284(2)(8) of the 
Civil Code 
Under the said article the term is considered 
unfair if it sets forth a requirement for the 
consumers to express their assent or dissent 
upon the extension of the contract 
unreasonably early. 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a narrower term established 
under point (j) of Annex of the 
UCTD 
 Article 
6.2284(2)(10) of 
the Civil Code 
Under the said article a term is considered 
unfair if it enables the seller or supplier to 
amend the contract conditions unilaterally 
either (i) without there being any contractual 
grounds or (ii) sufficient grounds. (two 
alternative grounds). 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a narrower term established 
under point (q) of Annex of the 
UCTD 
 Article 
6.2284(2)(18) of 
the Civil Code 
Under the said article a term is considered 
unfair if it requires the consumer to take 
disputes exclusively to the court of the 
seller’s or supplier’s legal seat. 
 
 Lithuania did not transpose Article 
1(a), 1(b) and 1(d) of Annex of the 
UCTD. Article 1(c) of Annex of the 
UCTD was transposed only partly, 
to exclude application only in 
relation to term (l). 
   
 
 Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a deviating definition of a 
consumer 
 Article 6.2281(2) 
of the Civil Code 
Under the said article a consumer also 
means any natural person who, in contracts 
covered by the UCTD, is acting for purposes 
which are outside their craft. 
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  Lithuanian transposing law provides 
for a deviating definition of a seller 
or supplier 
 Article 6.2281(3) 
of the Civil Code 
Firstly, similarly as under the comment 
above, the definition includes the craft. 
Secondly, one is also a seller or supplier if it 
acts in the name or for the benefit of the 
seller or supplier. Thirdly, not only natural or 
legal person is considered to be a seller or 
supplier, but also other organisations or their 
departments. 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law 
transposed Article 5 of the UCTD 
expansively.  
 Article 6.2284(6) 
of the Civil Code 
Under the said article if a term is not drafted 
in plain, intelligible language, it is considered 
to be unfair. 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law 
transposed Article 6(1) of the UCTD 
expansively.  
 Article 6.2284(8) 
of the Civil Code 
Under the said article if the court declares 
the term as unfair, such term is considered to 
be null and void from the moment of the 
conclusion of the contract (ab initio). 
 
 Lithuanian transposing law 
transposed Article 6(2) of the UCDT 
expansively. 
 Article 1.39(2) of 
the Civil Code 
Under the said article the right to make a 
choice of the law applicable shall not result 
in depriving or restricting the consumers of 
the right to protect their interests by the 
remedies determined by the provisions of the 
law of the state of their domicile if: (i) the 
formation of the contract in the state of their 
domicile was preceded by a special offer or 
by advertising in that country; (ii) the 
consumer was induced by the other 
contracting party to travel to a foreign state 
for the purpose of forming the contract; (iii) 
the order was received by the other party or 
their agent from the consumer in the state of 
the latter’s domicile. 
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 The Law on Consumer Protection    If the parties to a consumer contract have 
not made a choice of the applicable law, the 
law of the state in which the consumer is 
domiciled shall apply. The provisions above 
do not apply to contracts for carriage, 
contracts for the supply of services where the 
services are to be supplied to the consumer 
exclusively in a country other than Lithuania. 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Law on Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-
Consumer Commercial Practices 
Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Provisions regarding immovable 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
 Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
 
 Lithuania provided in the national 
law a broader definition of “code 
owner“, in comparison with one 
provided in Article 2(f) of the UCPD. 
 Article 2(11) of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Lithuanian transposing law’s illustrative list 
of subjects contains an additional subject - 
an independent monitoring body established 
by any person, including a commercial 
operator, a group of commercial operators. 
 
 Lithuanian authorities support the 
code owners as provided under 
Article 10 of the UCPD. 
 Article 11 of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under the said article Lithuanian responsible 
authority (the SCRPA) encourages the 
creation of the codes of conduct and 
cooperates both with the code owners and 
traders, who wish to assume obligations 
thereunder. Traders must inform the 
responsible authority about the fact that a 
code of conduct was created and the code 
owner.  
 
 Lithuania did not transpose to 
national law the definition of 
“regulated profession” as provided 
in Article 2(l) of the UCPD. 
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  Different from the UCPD, 
Lithuanian law transposing the 
UCPD provides for a definition of an 
average consumer. 
 Article 2(13) of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under national law an average consumer 
means a consumer who is reasonably well-
informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect, taking into account social, 
cultural and linguistic factors. 
 
 Lithuanian law provides an 
exemplary list of situations in which 
statement, which are not meant to 
be taken literally, are considered 
not to be unfair commercial 
practices under the second 
sentence of Article 5(3) of the 
UCPD. 
 Article 3(6) of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer C 
ommercial 
Practices 
Under national law unfair commercial 
practices does not include statements, which 
are not meant to be taken literally due to 
used aphorisms, ethical, cultural traditions, 
formed customs and similar. 
 
 Lithuania transposed Article 7(4)(c) 
of the UCPD in an expansive 
manner. 
 Article 6(3)(3) of 
the Law on 
Prohibition of 
Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under Lithuanian transposing law any 
additional expenses of the consumer are 
included (not only additional freight, delivery 
or postal charges as prescribed under the 
UCPD). 
 
 Lithuanian laws slightly deviate 
from Article 5(5) of the UCPD  
 Article 7 of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under Lithuanian transposing law the list 
provided in Annex I of the UCPD is presumed 
to be unfair. Thus, such presumptions might 
theoretically be rebutted. However, this 
conclusion is based only from linguistic point 
of view. From the practical perspective, this 
list is treated as a black-list. 
 
 Lithuanian laws slightly deviated 
from Article 20 of Annex I of the 
UCPD 
 Article 7(18) of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Lithuanian transposing law contains a model 
list of unavoidable costs, for instance, postal 
or telephone costs under standard rates or 
similar. 
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  Lithuanian laws slightly deviated 
from Article 9(d) of the UCPD 
 Article 8(2)(4) of 
the Law on 
Prohibition of 
Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under the UCPD only barriers imposed by the 
trader are taken into account, whereas 
under the Lithuanian transposing law not 
only imposed, but also intended to be 
imposed barriers must be taken into account. 
 
 Competitors are not allowed to 
initiate an investigation  
 Article 15(1) of the 
Law on Prohibition 
of Unfair Business-
to-Consumer 
Commercial 
Practices 
Under the Lithuanian transposing law only 
consumers, consumer associations and state 
and municipal institutions and 
establishments may apply to the responsible 
authority in order to initiate an investigation. 
Thus, competitors are barred from formally 
initiating the investigation.  The practical 
consequences of businesses submitting such 
complaints are explained in detail in the 
answer to first question in 1.1.6. above. 
 The Law on Advertising     
 The Civil Code     
Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
 Extension of the application to 
other sectors (e.g. for immovable 
property) 
No   
Civil Code Broadening of the concepts of a 
consumer and a trader. 
Yes Articles 6.228
1 (2) 
and (3) of the Civil 
Code 
Person’s commercial, professional, trade and 
craft activities are taken into account when 
assessing whether the person is a consumer 
or a trader. 
  Article 4(2) of PID was not transposed to national law. 
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 Rules on the Labelling of Goods and 
Indication of Prices (approved by the 
2002-05-15 Order of the Minister of 
Economy No 170) 
Lithuania waived the obligation to 
indicate the unit price of some 
products, as established in Article 5 
of PID 
Yes Article 29(1) – (3) 
of the Rules on 
the Labelling of 
Goods and 
Indication of 
Prices 
The obligation was waived in the following 
instances: 
(1) if the product’s selling price is the same 
price as the unit price; 
(2) if the product’s selling price does not 
depend on the weight, volume, length, area 
of the product or if the product’s neto 
amount is less than 5 g or 5 ml 
(3) if the product is sold using machines; 
 
 
 Lithuania waived the obligation to 
indicate the unit price, as 
established in Article 6 of PID 
Yes Article 29(4) of the 
Rules on the 
Labelling of Goods 
and Indication of 
Prices 
The obligation was waived in the following 
instances: 
(1) when the product, except for products 
sold in bulk, is sold: 
(1.1) in a market, kiosk or other temporary 
structure, from temporary sales facilities 
(stalls, carts), built outside, during activities 
of itinerant or deliverable trade,  as well as 
trading venues, equipped to serve individuals 
only during ongoing entertainment, sports, 
cultural and other events; 
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     (1.2) by a legal entity, engaged in retail 
trade, whose annual net sales turnover, as 
understood under the Law on Financial 
Statements of Companies of the Republic of 
Lithuania, and by a natural person, whose 
individual activity taxable income, as 
understood under the Law on Personal 
Income Tax of the Republic of Lithuania, in 
the last fiscal year did not exceed EUR 2 
million in a store with sales area not 
exceeding 120 sq. m.  
 
(1.3) when detergents are sold to the 
consumers and on their primary packaging 
the number of standard washing machine 
loads, as they are defined in the Regulation 
(EC) No. 648/2004, is indicated, which, if in 
accordance with recommended amount and 
(or) dosage instructions indicated on the 
primary packaging, are sufficient for the 
amount of detergent in the primary 
packaging. In this case, if the standard unit 
price is not indicated, the price of one wash, 
which is calculated by dividing the selling 
price of the detergent by the standard 
washing machine loads, indicated on the 
primary packaging, must be indicated. 
 
 
 Lithuania provided in the national 
law measures, going beyond 
minimum harmonisation, as 
allowed by Article 10 of PID 
 Article 32 of the 
Rules on the 
Labelling of Goods 
and Indication of 
Prices 
Prices must be indicated either on price 
labels or the product (the primary 
packaging). In some specific circumstances 
described in the provision, the prices are 
allowed to be shown in pricelists, electronic 
stands or other information presentation 
tools. 
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  Lithuania provided in the national 
law measures, going beyond 
minimum harmonisation, as 
allowed by Article 10 of PID 
 Article 33 of the 
Rules on the 
Labelling of Goods 
and Indication of 
Prices 
Prices must be shown in large-sized bold 
fonts on a contrasting light-coloured 
background, if possible, by using Arial, 
Tahoma, Verdana, Helvetica fonts and 
avoiding the use of italic or handwriting-
allusive fonts.   
 The Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania 
    
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
The Law on Advertising  Lithuania provided in the national 
law a broader definition of 
“advertising “, in comparison with 
one provided in Article 2(a) of the 
MCAD. 
 Article 2(8) of the 
Law on 
Advertising 
Under national law, advertising means 
information disseminated in any form and by 
any means and relating to a person’s 
commercial and economic, financial or 
professional activities, where it promotes the 
purchase of goods or use of services, 
including the purchase of immovable 
property and the takeover of property rights 
and obligations. 
 Lithuania deviated in the national 
law from the definition of 
“misleading advertising”, in 
comparison with one provided in 
Article 2(b) of the MCAD. 
Yes Article 2(3) of the 
Law on 
Advertising 
Two main differences in the definitions can 
be seen. Firstly, the words ‘deceive’, as used 
in the MCAD were replaced with ‘mislead’. 
Such difference, supposedly, should have 
cleared any linguistic discrepancies and 
connotations between the words mislead 
and deceive. Secondly, the word ‘competitor’ 
was replaced with ‘another person’s 
opportunities to compete’. Thus, not only 
impact on an actual competitor, but also a 
potential one might be taken into account. 
 Lithuania did not transpose Article 
2(e) of the MCAD. 
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 Lithuania deviated from Article 3 of 
the MCAD. 
Yes Articles 5(2) and 
5(5) of the Law on 
Advertising 
Article 5(2) of the Law on Advertising 
establishes that in determining whether 
advertising is misleading, account shall be 
taken of the criteria of accuracy, 
comprehensiveness and presentation (not of 
all of the features of the advertising, as 
provided under Article 3 of the MCAD). 
There are some further deviations from 
Article 3: 
    (1) Article 3(a) provides for a non-exhaustive 
list of characteristics of goods or services, 
whereas Article 5(5)(2) of the Law on 
Advertising provides for an exhaustive list of 
characteristics. Such national list contains 
only some of the characteristics provided in 
Article 3 of the MCAD, as well as some 
additional characteristics not foreseen in the 
MCAD. 
     
(2) With respect Article 3(b) of the MCAD, 
Article 5(5)(2) contains a non-exhaustive list 
of conditions on which the goods are 
supplied or the services provided. 
    (3) Article 3(c) of the MCAD provides a non-
exhaustive list of the nature, attributes and 
rights of the advertiser which should be 
taken into account. Article 5(5)(1) of the 
MCAD, firstly, provides an exhaustive list of 
specific characteristics which should be taken 
into account. Secondly, these characteristics 
could be attributed not only to advertiser, 
but also any other person mentioned in the 
advertisement.  
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    (4) Article 5(5)(4) and 5(5)(5) provides 
additional criteria, absent in the MCAD, 
which should especially be taken into 
account , for instance, consumer rights, risks, 
complaints handling, sponsorship of the 
advertiser or of the goods or services 
advertised and etc. 
 Lithuania deviated from Articles 
4(e) and 4(f) of the MCAD 
Yes Articles 6(6) and 
6(7) of the Law on 
Advertising  
The scope of Article 4(e) of the MCAD 
includes not only products with designation 
of origin, but also services with designation 
of origin (Article 6(6) of the Law on 
Advertising) 
The scope of Article 4(f) of the MCAD 
includes not only competing products, but 
also competing services as well (Article 6(7) 
of the Law on Advertising). 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
The Law on Consumer Protection of the 
Republic of Lithuania 
    
The Civil Code     
The List of European Union Legislation 
and Implementing Legislation of the 
Republic of Lithuania, Infringement of 
Which by the Actions of Sellers of Goods 
or Services (Suppliers) Acting in Lithuania 
Shall Allow European Union Member 
States’ Institutions and Organisations to 
File Claims Before the Courts of the 
Republic of Lithuania (approved by the 
order of the Minister of Justice of the 
Republic of Lithuania of 1 March 2007 No 
1R-91). 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Lithuania  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen 
by the Injunctions Directive regulated in 
your country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in separate 
legal acts 
 
 
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- the SCRPA (a 
designated public body) 
- consumer 
associations, complying 
with statutory 
requirements. 
- in cases prescribed by 
laws - other state or 
municipal institutions 
and legal entities  
Individual consumers may also 
submit a claim to the court and seek 
an injunction, however such claims 
are regulated by general rules of civil 
procedure and are not subject to 
requirements of legal acts 
implementing the Injunctions 
Directive. 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations 
are entitled to an exemption   of 
some/all cost related to the procedure 
please explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
- The costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing 
party 
If the claim is submitted for the 
protection of a public interest, the 
claimants are exempt from stamp 
duty (Article 83(1)(5)). Thus, all 
entities filing a claim under the legal 
acts implementing the Injunctions 
Directive are exempt from stamp 
duty. However, if they lose the case, 
the costs (litigation expenses) of the 
opposing party will still be borne by 
the losing party. 
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Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer 
law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
No, qualified entities of 
other EU Member 
States are entitled to 
apply for injunctions 
only in the areas of 
consumer law that are 
part of Annex I of the 
Directive. 
 
Yes, national entities 
may apply with a claim 
to a court for an 
injunction if a consumer 
public interest was 
infringed. The law does 
not limit the scope of 
“consumer public 
interest”.  
Please note that Annex I of the 
Directive was not fully transposed to 
the Lithuanian law, as the Lithuanian 
list does not contain the last addition 
to the list - Regulation (EU) No 
524/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on online dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes 
(Regulation on consumer ODR) 
Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their 
associations 
- Yes 
 
Legal acts transposing the Directive 
does not contain any additional 
provisions, however, filing a claim 
against several respondents is 
possible under general rules of 
Lithuanian civil procedure (Article 43 
of the Civil Procedure Code of the 
Republic of Lithuania). 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
- Yes, national qualified 
entities, before applying 
to a court with a claim 
for an injunction, must 
consult with the 
respondent. 
 
- Yes, qualified entities 
of other EU Member 
States: (i) must consult 
with the SCRPA and (ii) 
have a right (not an 
obligation) to consult 
with the respondent. 
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Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- No  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the 
comments column to who exactly should 
they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a fine 
for each day of non-
compliance 
The legal acts transposing the 
Directive do not contain any specific 
provision. However, under general 
rules of Lithuanian civil procedure, in 
cases where the respondent does not 
complies with an injunction, the 
court may issue a fine of up to EUR 
289 for each day of non-compliance. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes Consumer associations and other 
state or municipal institutions or 
other legal entities must: 
(i) no later than within 5 working 
days from the day the court accepts 
the claim as admissible, inform the 
SCRPA. The SCRPA will publish the 
information on their website. 
(ii) no later than within 5 working 
days from the day the court issues a 
decision, to provide a copy of the 
decision to the SCRPA. The Authority, 
after the decision enters into effect, 
will publish the decision on their 
website. 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
- Yes The legal acts transposing the 
Directive do not contain any specific 
provision. However, under general 
rules of Lithuanian civil procedure, 
the claimant may request the court 
to state in the decision that non-
compliance with the injunction incurs 
a fine of up to EUR 289 for each day 
of non-compliance. 
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public purse 
or to other beneficiary be brought within 
the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No Unless entity suffered damage itself 
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Can an action for damages or redress to 
be paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- Yes (theoretically) 4 cases cited in the report (1.4.1.) 
concerned a national injunction 
procedure against either a trader, 
which failed to provide goods (failure 
to act) or an organiser of events, 
which failed to return money for an 
event which did not take place 
(failure to act). In all these cases the 
SCRPA (enforcement authority) 
requested the court to order the 
respondent to stop the infringement 
of consumer public interest and 
return to the consumers money 
owed. All four decisions of the courts 
were interim, there is no data 
whether the courts rendered final 
decisions in these cases. 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies 
on the injunctions order?  
- Yes The facts settled in the judgement on 
injunction become prejudicial facts 
and cannot be contested - therefore 
persons with the same or very similar 
factual circumstances may benefit 
from the judgement of the court 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No Normal rules of enforcement of court 
judgements apply 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- No Injunctions only cover the actions 
indicated in the injunction and are 
only directed at a specific trade 
(respondent). 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
The 
SCRPA’s 
statistics 
1284 
cases 0.46 % 10.9 % 0.07 % 88.57 % 0 % 
Total of 
percentages 
should add 
up to 100% 
 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).22  
22 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other costs, 
if any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time involved 
for consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 0 
EUR 0 if no 
lawyer is involved 
(lawyer’s 
assistance not 
legally required). 
EUR 50 to 
EUR 700 if a 
lawyer is 
involved. 
If the 
consumer 
loses, they 
must pay the 
litigation 
expenses of 
the trader. 
Impossible to 
estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance and 
experience of 
consumer. 
 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0 
EUR 0 if no 
lawyer is involved 
(lawyer’s 
assistance not 
legally required). 
EUR 50 to 
EUR 700 if a 
lawyer is 
involved. 
 
Impossible to 
estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance and 
experience of 
consumer. 
 
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
According to the data supplied by the SCRPA, the SCRPA in 2015 adopted 140 
resolutions on standard contract terms (non-binding suggestions to the trader to 
amend the standard contract term that the SCRPA considers to be unfair, also 
informing the trader that the SCRPA may apply to a court for invalidation of the unfair 
contract term). In 2015 Lithuanian courts adopted 51 decisions on standard contract 
terms. 
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 C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Lietuvos bankų klientų asociacija (Lithuanian bank 
customers association) 
Consumer organisation 2016-08-05 
Lietuvos vartotojų organizacijų aljansas (Lithuanian 
Consumer Organisation Alliance) 
National consumer 
enforcement authority 
2016-08-05 
Lietuvos Respublikos teisingumo ministerija (Ministry 
of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania) 
Ministry 2016-08-10 
Lietuvos bankas (Bank of Lithuania) Sectoral regulatory 
authority 
2016-07-20 
Lietuvos Respublikos susisiekimo ministerija (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications of the Republic of 
Lithuania) 
Ministry 2016-08-26 
Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba (State 
Consumer Rights Protection Authority) 
Enforcement authority 2016-08-24 
Valstybinė Kainų ir Energetikos Kontrolės Komisija 
(National Commission for Energy Control and Prices) 
Sectoral regulatory 
authority 
2016-08-17 
Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba 
(Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania) 
Enforcement authority 2016-08-23 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
RIMKEVIČIUS M. 2012 Klaidinančios reklamos vertinimo kriterijai Lietuvoje ir ES (eng. 
Evaluation Criteria of Misleading Advertising in the European Union 
and Lithuania) 
RIMKEVIČIUS M. 2011 Sąžiningos ir nesąžiningos komercinės veiklos samprata (eng. Fair 
and Unfair Commercial Practices Concept) 
RIMKEVIČIUS M. 2011 „Nacionalinės moralės“ išimtis Nesąžiningos komercinės veiklos 
direktyvoje (eng. National Moral‘s Exception in the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive) 
BUBLIENĖ D., ZEMLYTĖ E. 2012 Arbitražiniai susitarimai (arbitražinė išlyga) vartojimo sutartyse: per 
se nesąžininga sąlyga? (eng. Arbitration agreements (arbitration 
clause) in consumer contracts: unfair term per se?) 
BUBLIENĖ D. 2011 Vartotojų teisė į informaciją pagal naująjį vartotojų teisių direktyvos 
pasiūlymą: žingsnis pirmyn? (eng. Consumer Right to Information 
according to the New Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights: 
the Step Forward?) 
BUBLIENĖ D. 2009 Vartojimo sutarčių nesąžiningų sąlygų kontrolė (eng. Control of 
Unfair Consumer Contract Clauses) 
BUBLIENĖ D. 2009 Vartotojų teisių direktyvos perkėlimas į Lietuvos teisę – tolesnis 
vartotojų apsaugos teisės dekodifikavimas ar kodifikavimas? (eng. 
Transposition of Consumer Rights Directive into Lithuanian Law – 
further codification of decodification of law on consumer 
protection?) 
BUBLIENĖ D. 2006 Skaidrumo principas ir Nesąžiningų sąlygų direktyva (eng. Principle 
of Transparency and Unfair Clauses Directive) 
BUBLIENĖ D. 2007 Silpnesnės šalies apsaugos principo įgyvendinimas nesąžiningų 
sąlygų kontrolėje (eng. Implementation of Principle of Protection of 
Weaker Party in Control of Unfair Conditions) 
KATUOKA S. et al. 2006 Vartotojų teisių apsauga Lietuvoje ir 
Europos Sąjungoje (eng. Consumer Protection in Lithuania and in 
European Union) 
MARKAUSKAS L. 2008 Reklamos teisinis reglamentavimas: teorija ir 
Praktika (eng. Legal Regulation of Advertising: Theory and Practice) 
MARKAUSKAS L. 2009 Reklamos kaip komercinės informacijos ribojimo doktrina Lietuvos 
Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo jurisprudencijoje (eng. Doctrine of 
Advertising as a Limitation of Commercial Information in the 
Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania) 
MARKAUSKAS L. 2009 Reklamos ribojimas: Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo ir 
Vokietijos Federalinio Konstitucinio Teismo požiūris (eng. Limitation 
of Advertising: Approach by the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Lithuania and Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2008 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 
98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers' interest 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2012 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers’ interest 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015 Notifications according to Article 32 and 33 of the CRD 
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SCHULTE-NÖLKE H., 
TWIGG-FLESNER C., EBERS 
M. 
2007 EC Consumer Law Compendium - Comparative Analysis - 
STUYCK J., TERRYN E., 
COLAERT V., VAN DYCK T., 
PERETZ N., HOEKX N., 
TERESZKIEWICZ P., GIELEN 
B. 
2007 An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer 
redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings 
CIVIC CONSULTING 2011 Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report LUXEMBOURG  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
On a preliminary basis, it should be noted that, in its public session of 13 December 
2016, the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (the national 
Parliament) approved a draft law which abrogates the ‘Loi du 30 juillet 2002 
réglementant certaines pratiques commerciales, sanctionnant la concurrence déloyale 
et transposant la Directive 97/55/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 6 
octobre 1997 modifiant la directive 84/450/CEE sur la publicité trompeuse afin d'y 
inclure la publicité comparative’ in order to substitute it with a new law entitled ‘loi sur 
les ventes en soldes et sur trotoire et la publicité trompeuse et comparative’1 
(hereafter, the ‘new law’). 
By this substitution, the intention of the legislator is to bring the legislation of 
Luxembourg into full compliance with the UCPD after the EU Commission sent a formal 
notice dated 6 June 2016 in the course of the infringement procedure against 
Luxembourg. 
In this respect, it is important to note that: 
• The new law does not involve an extension of the rules of UCPD to B2B;  
• In the explanatory statement of the draft law,2 the legislator assesses that the 
concept of ‘unfair commercial practices’ in a B2B perspective as defined in the 
abrogated law is in principle still covered by the ‘Code de la consommation’ in the 
UCP section which indirectly protects business from competitors who do not follow 
the rules of the UCPD,3 as well as by the competition law;4 
• This assessment is however not shared by the business representatives, both the 
‘Chambre de commerce’5 and the ‘Chambre des métiers’.6  
Regarding the legislative process of Luxembourg, this new Law should be promulgated 
by the Grand-Duc within three months of the approval and should enter into force 
three days after its publication in the official journal (the ‘Memorial’). 
As the draft law was introduced in Parliament on 31 August 2016, the answers given 
in this report by the stakeholders generally do not take into account this new 
legislative situation. 
 
1  See http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&id=7038#  
2  See page 6 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/PA_RoleEtendu/FTSByteServingServletImpl/?path=/export/exped/sexpdata/Mag/
149/601/164080.pdf 
3  Code de la Consommation, articles L.122-1 to L.122-8. 
4  Competition law in Luxembourg is mainly defined in the “Loi du 23 octobre 2011 sur la concurrence“ (an 
unofficial coordinated and updated version can be downloaded at 
https://concurrence.public.lu/fr/legislation/Version-coordonnee-de-la-loi-du-23-octobre-2011-relative-a-
la-concurrence.pdf) 
5  See 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/PA_RoleEtendu/FTSByteServingServletImpl/?path=/export/exped/sexpdata/Mag/
145/678/164747.pdf  
6  See 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/PA_RoleEtendu/FTSByteServingServletImpl/?path=/export/exped/sexpdata/Mag/
160/620/165199.pdf  
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1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Firstly, it seems useful to inform that, prior to the UCPD, Luxembourg had a tradition 
of regulating commercial practices mainly focused on B2B relations in order to avoid 
unfair commercial practices and unfair competition. This explains why the introduction 
of the UCPD was not a complete overhaul of the legal landscape of commercial 
practices. Nevertheless, the legal landscape of commercial practices of Luxembourg 
did have to be adapted to comply with the UCPD. 
Luxembourg had a specific Act on Commercial Practices before the UCPD, the ‘Loi du 
30 juillet 2002 réglementant certaines pratiques déloyales et transposant la directive 
97/55/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil modifiant la directive 84/450/CEE sur 
la publicité trompeuse afin d’y inclure la publicité comparative’ (here after ‘Loi du 30 
juillet 2002’). 
This Act focused on B2B relations, but consumer associations had and still have the 
power to initiate an injunction procedure against an unfair commercial practice as 
defined in this Act, including misleading and comparative advertising. 
Following the preliminary remark on this report, the new law will abrogate the ‘Loi du 
30 juillet 2002’ after the finalisation of this report. 
The UCPD was first implemented by a specific Act: ‘Loi du 29 avril 2009 relative aux 
pratiques commerciales déloyales et modifiant - la loi modifiée du 30 juillet 2002 
réglementant certaines pratiques commerciales, sanctionnant la concurrence déloyale 
et transposant la directive 97/55/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil modifiant la 
directive 84/450/CEE sur la publicité trompeuse afin d'y inclure la publicité 
comparative; - la loi modifiée du 28 décembre 1988 réglementant l'accès aux 
professions d'artisan, de commerçant, d'industriel ainsi qu'à certaines professions 
libérales et modifiant l'article 4 de la loi du 2 juillet 1935 portant réglementation des 
conditions d'obtention du titre et du brevet de maîtrise dans l'exercice des métiers; - 
la loi modifiée du 16 avril 2003 concernant la protection des consommateurs en 
matière de contrats à distance; - la loi modifiée du 18 décembre 2006 sur les services 
financiers à distance.’ 
On 12.04.2011, this Act was repealed by the Act introducing a ‘Code de la 
consommation’ (‘loi du 12 avril 2011 portant introduction d’un Code de la 
consommation’).   
Concerning the practical experience with the principle-based approach of the UCPD in 
Luxembourg, stakeholders were generally of the opinion that this approach is 
important in providing a general framework, which has the great advantage of 
covering all practices and offers a way of covering both old/traditional commercial 
practices and new ones. The principle-based approach is in line with the approach of 
the juridical order in Luxembourg, a civil law country.  
It seems that practitioners – both consumer and professional associations - welcomed 
the UCPD implementation and assess it as being effective. Having said that, the 
enforcement authority notes that the effectiveness of enforcement of the principle-
based approach of the UCPD needs clarifications, and that the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is necessary and useful in this regard. The CJEU 
case-law is probably particularly important for Luxembourg, a small country which 
does not have a significant body of important case-law in consumer matters, 
particularly in UCP matters. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
All stakeholders are quite happy with the black list as it is. No one expresses the 
desire to modify it.  
Regarding particularly the effectiveness, all stakeholders emphasise the legal certainty 
for both parties (consumers and professionals) offered by the black list. The black list 
also serves to clarify the principle-based approach by given examples which are like 
indicators to guide professionals to respect the implementation of the UCPD and, 
hence, to adopt fair commercial practices.  
Thus, even if it is not very tangible or concrete (failing specific case-law in 
Luxembourg), the practical benefits for consumers of the black list seem real.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
No answers from any stakeholders. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
No answers from any stakeholders. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The notion of the ‘average consumer’ already existed in Luxembourg before the UCPD 
as a criteria for unfair commercial practices under the ‘loi du 30 juillet 2002’, 
particularly regarding advertising. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
The practical benefits for consumers seem close to zero in Luxembourg. There is no 
case law in Luxembourg and stakeholders are more of the position that this notion is 
not useful. 
From the point of view of some stakeholders, the vulnerable person concept is not 
useful because similar concepts already exist in other legislation, e.g. a ‘minor’ or 
‘indebted person’. Nevertheless, it could simply reflect a poor understanding on the 
application scope of an unfair commercial practice (the action) and its juridical 
consequences (i.e. tort law).  
One of the stakeholders is of the opinion that this notion is contrary to legal certainty, 
and that its application in practice for professionals would be in conflict with personal 
and individual data protection. 
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• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Answers from stakeholders are that there are no such self or co-regulation actions. In 
Luxembourg, self and co-regulation actions are not very developed, especially in the 
consumer protection field. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
No need. Stakeholders seem quite happy with the current list. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Some measures put forward by stakeholders include: 
• Dialogue between enforcement authorities, consumers’ association, and 
business/professional associations; 
• Enhancement of the power of the CPCs in context of the CPC network; 
• The setting up of a consumer Ombudsman scheme. 
Regarding the dialogue between stakeholders, it is relevant to focus on the existence 
of the ‘Conseil de la consommation’, a committee with equal representation of 
consumer and professional interests.   
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID is implemented in the Code de la consommation, in the Legislative part (Book 
1, Title 1, chapter 2) articles L.112-1 – L.112-9 and in the Regulatory part, articles 
R.112-1 to R-112-5. 
The assessment of stakeholders is that consumers are effectively informed about the 
unit selling price. Very few complaints from consumers in this respect have been 
reported to the consumers association or enforcement authorities. 
It seems there is a high level of control of businesses on this matter. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
This topic seems to have been well-considered in Luxembourg and every stakeholder 
is in favour of a recognised measurement unit.  
Different opinions emerge on how to have an objective measurement unit and on 
setting up an independent organism. A project based on the method of measurement 
stated in the Regulation 648/2004 for detergents is in process.  
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 • The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
The derogation for small businesses exists in Luxembourg (i.e., businesses whose 
sales area is less than 400 m² and itinerant traders).7 No consumer complaints are 
reported. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD is implemented by the ‘Loi du 30 juillet 2002', articles 15, 16 and 17.  
Answers of stakeholders show that the notion of advertising provides protection for 
businesses. 
In Luxembourg, effective protection in B2B relations is also and mainly reached by the 
concept of unfair commercial practice defined in article 14 of the ‘Loi du 30 juillet 
2002’,  which allow to take into consideration other acts - and not only advertising - 
which are against the fair competition. 
With regard to the forthcoming entry into force of the new law, B2B relations will no 
longer be regulated by this article 14 but only by the rules implementing the MCAD, 
i.e. articles 3 to 7 of the new law. 
As indicated above, the disappearance of this unfair commercial practices concept is 
not well received by business representatives, which consider that some unfair 
commercial practices recognised by case law as an infringement of article 14 of the 
‘Loi du 30 juillet 2002’ will no longer be illegal, regarding both legal provisions from 
‘Code de la consummation’ (transposition the UCDP) as well as legal provisions from 
the competition law. 
It seems thus that the new law, which aimed to bring Luxembourg legislation into 
compliance with UCPD, may indirectly involve a decrease in B2B protection.  
Business associations, especially SME associations (Chambre des Métiers) assess that 
it should have better sanctions against misleading advertising, i.e. cancelation or 
termination of a contract concluded on that basis.8  
With respect to the legislative process of the new law, an SME association proposes to 
insert in the new law a general prohibition of misleading acts.9  
 
7  Code de la consommation, article L.112-5 « (1) L’indication du prix à l’unité de mesure des produits autre 
que ceux commercialisés en vrac, offert à la vente dans les commerces dont la surface de vente n’excède 
pas 400 m² ou dans un commerce ambulant, est facultative. (2) La dérogation prévue au paragraphe 
premier est exclue lorsque plusieurs commerces sont exploités par une même personne, physique ou 
morale, et que la surface de l’un d’entre eux excède 400 m². » 
8  It should be noted that it is already possible to cancel a contract under classical contract law in 
Luxembourg (Code civil, article 1103 and subsequent, but it is difficult to obtain mainly due by the fact of 
the burden of proof). 
9 “La Chambre des métiers propose que soit intégrée dans le projet de loi sous avis un principe général 
d’interdiction des actions trompeuses entre professionnels” 
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• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
This approach is important in providing a general framework which has the great 
advantage of covering all practices and offers protection both against old or traditional 
commercial practices and new ones. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
There are no national rules that go beyond the MCAD. In particular, there is no 
extension of the UCPD to B2B relations. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Comparative advertising is not in use in Luxembourg. 
Luxembourg authorities are in favour of the principle of maximum harmonisation. 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
No answer, mainly because comparative advertising is not in use in Luxembourg. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No answer. However, a business association said that advertising is mainly limited to 
specific national markets, and that businesses on either side of the border would have 
no interest in engaging in cross-border comparative advertising. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No answer from stakeholders. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No relevant answers for this question. The impact on cross-border trade of these 
disparities, if it exists, should be minor. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Having a uniform black list in all Member States simplifies the life of the consumer. It 
is an advantage for Luxembourg as a small country. Professionals know the black list 
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already and the obligations deriving from it. It is an advantage for cross-border 
business. The effect on the free movement of goods and services is positive. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experiences reported 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No specific experiences reported. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The level of awareness of individual traders seems to be commensurate with the level 
of organisation of the branch involved; in those industries and trades where traders 
are well organised and associated, they tend to have a better understanding of the 
regulatory boundaries. They also have a reputation which is at stake if they 
contravene the legal standards. 
Enforcement authorities pointed out that in the actions and advertising of businesses, 
the UCPD is respected most of the time, but that better information for professionals 
should be recommended, mainly by traders organisations. 
It appears from the stakeholders’ responses that there are disparities in the level of 
information between sectors and between SMEs and other enterprises. In the financial 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
754
sector, for example, almost all professionals have a juridical department and deal with 
pre-contractual information in a proper way. Very few complaints are reported in that 
respect. 
SMEs consider in general that legislation is too complicated, with too much 
information. A good number of SMEs are not really conscious of the scope of their 
obligations regarding information. The level of bureaucracy required to comply with 
information obligations is criticised by SMEs. 
Stakeholders overall assess that there is an overlapping of information requirements; 
a common point addressed at this point by the interviewees is the increasing 
complexity of overlapping Directives concerning information duties on businesses.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Overlap and conflict between the UCPD and E-commerce Directive is not reported.  
However, interviewees report overlap between the UCPD and CRD but they seem to 
say that such overlap can be justified. 
Authorities and business representatives emphasize that the complexity of the various 
overlapping rules should be a concern to the EU – adding more rules will further 
increase this complexity.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Whether the extension to B2B practices would benefit cross-border trade is uncertain. 
Interviewees are mainly in favour of the status quo. No academic articles were found. 
Some argue that current legislative tools are sufficient and offer adequate protection 
in B2B transactions if they are properly enforced, especially competition law and the 
Services Directive. Regarding the Services Directive, it emphasizes that enforcement 
of the principle of prohibiting discrimination by nationality bring benefits for cross-
border trade. This is particularly true for Luxembourg (as a small country), as it is 
reported by the Ministry of Economy that Luxembourg’s traders are common victims of 
discrimination for supply of goods in the internal market. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Interviewees are generally in favour of the status quo. No academic articles were 
found. Interviewees argue that the principles of freedom of trade and freedom of 
contract which regulate B2B and the regulation of the market by competition law are 
sufficient legislative tools.  
SME representatives have divergent opinions, and it appears that a not negligible 
percentage of SMEs are victims of fraud, generally based on cross-border misleading 
practices.10 An extension of misleading commercial practices to B2B (without 
10 See results of a 2013 Benelux study in this respect: http://www.cdm.lu/news/fiche/2013/07/les-
pratiques-frauduleuses-visant-les-professionnels-l-ampleur-du-probleme. 
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distinction between SME and others) could be a solution to stop this cross-border 
fraud. A protection against aggressive practices is not relevant. 
With respect to the legislative process of the new law, an SME association proposed to 
insert in the new law a general prohibition of misleading acts. This proposal will not be 
adopted by the Parliament and the new law does not include such a prohibition (see 
also above). 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Interviewees are generally in favour of the status quo.  
Even if SME representatives assess that it could be useful to extend protection against 
misleading practices to B2B transactions, this extension should cover only the pre-
contractual stage (for misleading practices only). 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Interviewees are generally in favour of the status quo. No black list is needed 
according to interviewees, except for an SME representative, which assessed that a 
black-list could be useful only to fraud, due to the fact that B2B frauds are mostly of 
the same type. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
The SME representative assessed that it could be useful to combat cross-border fraud 
(see above). Other stakeholders were in favour of the status quo.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
The SME representative assess it could be useful only to combat cross-border fraud 
(see above). Other stakeholders were in favour of the status quo. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
Stakeholders see no need for this. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
The Code de la consommation has a specific legal provision (article L.122-8) providing 
the nullity of a clause or a combination of clauses of a contract concluded in violation 
of the legal national legal provisions on unfair commercial practices. It is a relative 
cancellation, i.e. the consumer is the only admissible party to the contract to invoke 
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its nullity.11 It is important to emphasise that cancellation involves retroactive 
destruction of the contract, or at least of the clause or the combination of clauses of 
the contract which is based on the unfair commercial practice. 
The Civil Code can also be used by a consumer to ask for the ‘classical’ avoidance of 
the entire contract by invoking substantial error, irresistible violence or deceit (article 
1109 to 1117). In case of ‘lésion’ (i.e. in case of obvious disproportion at the moment 
of the conclusion of the contract between reciprocal performance) or in case of a 
contract based on an illicit cause (e.g. usury or other moral behaviour), avoidance of 
the contract is also possible (Code civil, article 1118 and articles 1131 to 1133). But 
this will hardly ever be applicable to unfair commercial practices. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
No case law based on the specific legal provision. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
There is no need for interviewees. 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Luxembourg was one of the pioneers in this respect with the ‘Loi sur la protection des 
consommateur du 25 août 1983’.  
The national law transposing UCTD is the Code de la consommation, Partie 1, Livre 2 
Titre 1 chapitre 1, section 2; articles L.-211-2 to 211-5. 
The open clause defined in article L.211-2 of the Code de la consommation is not the 
same as the unfairness test under Art. 3(1) UCTD. In Luxembourg a ‘significant 
imbalance’ in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract is not 
required. An ‘imbalance’ in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract is enough.12 
Following the case-law of the Court of Justice, the courts are required to apply the 
unfairness test of their own motion (i.e. ex officio). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
of the juridical order of Luxembourg (‘La Cour de cassation’) has not confirmed this 
requirement so far. 
Due to the ex officio application of the unfairness test, the principle-based approach is 
fairly effective, even where the courts are required to evaluate the term on a case-by-
case basis.  
11 Article L.122-8 (2) « Toute clause ou toute combinaison de clause d’un contrat, conclue en violation du 
présent titre, est réputée nulle et non écrite. Cette nullité ne peut toutefois être invoquée que par le 
consommateur. » 
12  On the notion of “imbalance”, see following case law : Président du tribunal d’arrondissement de 
Luxembourg siégeant en matière commerciale, Ordonnance n° 480/10 du 26 mars 2010 et Ordonnance 
n° 199/11 du 18 février 2011 (referenced in page 114 of the following link : 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/codes/Code_de_la_Consommation/Code_de_la_Conso
mmation.pdf) 
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The usual situation is that the court must take into account all circumstances of the 
case, including specific circumstances that are to the advantage of the trader.  
However, under the open clause of article L.211-2 of the Code de la consommation, it 
is the consumer who bears the burden of proof that the term is unfair.13  
Concerning the practical experience with the principle-based approach of the UCTD in 
Luxembourg, stakeholders were generally of the opinion that this approach is 
important in providing a general framework, with the advantage to cover all practices 
and offer a level playing field. The principle-based approach is in line with the 
approach of the juridical order in Luxembourg, a civil law tradition country.  
The case law in Luxembourg, although rare in consumer protection matters, gives 
several examples of application of the open clause.14 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
A black list, including the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the UCTD, is object 
of article L.211-3 of the Code de la consommation. There is no grey list. 
The black list works in practice and all interviewees were quite happy with this tool. 
Traders’ organisations consider that their members know this list and estimate that 
the sanction of avoidance of a clause or combination of clauses without avoidance of 
the whole contract is appropriate. 
A black list represents an advantage both for traders and consumers due to the fact 
they both know whether a clause is unfair or not. It is an advantage when 
professionals write general terms and conditions, in terms of legal certainty. It is a 
huge advantage for consumers in terms of the burden of proof. A clause in the black 
list is unfair in all circumstances. 
A black list is also an advantage for enforcement authorities, as they do not have to 
argue with professionals as to whether a clause falls under the scope of the open 
clause.  
The case law in Luxembourg, although rare in consumer protection matters, gives 
several examples of application of this black list.15 
 
13  See Président du tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg siégeant en matière commerciale, 
Ordonnance n° 480/10 du 26 mars 2010 et Ordonnance n° 199/11 du 18 février 2011 (referenced in 
page 114 of the following link : 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/codes/Code_de_la_Consommation/Code_de_la_Conso
mmation.pdf )  
14 See pages 114 et 116 of the following link : 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/codes/Code_de_la_Consommation/Code_de_la_Conso
mmation.pdf   
15 See, for example, Cour d’appel, 10/12/2011, ULC c. Luxembourg on line, n° 36.698, Pas. Lux. N° 1/2013, 
referenced in page 114 of the following link : 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/codes/Code_de_la_Consommation/Code_de_la_Conso
mmation.pdf   
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• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In individual proceedings, all circumstances of the case must be taken into account, 
including those that are particular to the specific consumer or the specific trader, 
provided that these specific circumstances were known to the other party at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract. 
In Luxembourg, a court decision has binding effects only for the parties in this specific 
proceeding: a court’s decision in such an individual case cannot be extended to all 
contracts of the trader concerned or to the contracts of other traders, as the specifics 
of these contracts need to be taken into account instead of the specifics of the case 
that had been decided. This means that consumers and traders are uncertain as to the 
outcome of the unfairness test even in cases where the same or a similar term had 
been tested before and found to be fair or unfair.  
This is different for terms that are black listed, as it may be assumed that another 
court would come to the same conclusion.  
Notwithstanding what was said above, the Consumentenbond notes that if a court is 
faced with a term which has been found unfair in an earlier case, there is a strong 
likelihood that the term will be found unfair in a later case as well, particularly if that 
term was used by the same trader. 
Nevertheless, the Code de la consommation, article L.211-4, provides that a 
professional who invokes against a consumer a clause or combination of clauses 
declared unfair by a court sentence which have force of res judicata, should be guilty 
of a (administrative) fine.16 This sanction has plays a preventative role in avoiding 
unfair clauses in practice. 
The case law against a professional can also be used by other consumers to invoke the 
avoidance of the unfair clause, especially if this case law is published by national 
newspapers, or by the consumer associations, for example. 
The Code de la consommation, published by Legilux, contains a case law part.17 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Interviewees assess the Directive to be effective in practice. A consumer association 
recalls that when a term is not transparent, its interpretation must be in favour of the 
consumer. 
 
16  Code de la Consommation, art. L.211-4 : « Le professionnel qui invoque à l’encontre d’un consommateur 
une clause ou une combinaison de clauses, déclarée abusive et comme telle nulle et non écrite, par une 
décision judiciaire ayant autorité de la chose jugée intervenue à son égard, est puni d’une amende de 300 
à 10.000 euros. »  
17 http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/codes/Code_de_la_Consommation/Code_de_la 
_Consommation.pdf 
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• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Luxembourg law provides the extension to individually negotiated terms. There is no 
extension to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-matter. 
This extension is not a problem for business and represents a real advantage for 
consumers, who can ask avoidance of abusive clause even if it was negotiated. 
The ratio legis is that, even if the consumer negotiates, they are not as well informed 
as the professional, so the consumer is still in a position of weakness. 
Having said that, the Cour de cassation (Supreme Court of the juridical order in 
Luxembourg) by a Judgement of 5 December 2013, seems to avoid the extension 
made by the national legislator (by the law of 25 August 1983, so actually before the 
existence of UCTD). Following the Supreme Court, a contract concluded by the 
intermediary of a notary public is not a standard contract within the meaning of the 
law of 25 August 1983 regarding the protection of the consumer (now integrated in 
the Code de la consommation) and Directive 93/13/CEE on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts.  
According to an author who comments on this Judgment18 by reference to 
parliamentary works, this interpretation of the Supreme Court should not prevail and  
a contract concluded by a consumer does not have to be a standard contract to be in 
the scope of the national legislation (i.e. article L.211-2 and subsequent). 
Another well-known author,19 who based his opinion on two Judgments of the Court of 
appeal,20 the scope of the Code de la consommation (and by consequence, the UCTD) 
does not involve real estate transactions with a public notary. Nevertheless, the same 
author quotes another Judgement of the Court of Appeal which sets aside a clause in a 
real estate contract concluded by the intermediary of a notary public as it was 
considered to be unfair.21 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
An unfair term may be avoided by the consumer. Technically, avoidance should take 
place by a court decision. However, in practice, a consumer can refuse to act as 
stipulated in the unfair term and ask for the avoidance of this term if a professional 
seeks to apply it. Traders will sometimes not accept the avoidance of the term, in 
which case the consumer needs to turn to a court or an ADR institution.  
There is no information as to whether national courts take up the active role imposed 
by the Court of Justice. As mentioned above, as Luxembourg is a small Member State 
with a population of less than a million, case law in consumer protection is rare. There 
is no case law in which a court invokes unfairness ex officio. 
There is no administrative authority or committee with equal representation dealing 
with unfair commercial practices. 
18 P. Goerens, Observations sous Cass. 5 décembre 2013, n° 71/13, Journal des Tribunaux luxembourgeois, 
2014, n°34, p.109 et suivantes. 
19 G. Ravarani, La responsabilité civil des personnes privées et publiques, 3e édition, Pas. Lux. 2014, pages 
788 à 810, see point 759. 
20 Court of appeal, 14.03.2011, n° 24 030 and Court of appeal, 19.12.2012, n° 38.550. 
21 Court of appeal, 27.11.2012  Pas. 32, p. 307. 
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Some interviewees are of the opinion that standard terms and conditions (including 
some obligatory terms and conditions while allowing for contractual freedom for 
another provisions) can be improved and could be very useful for SMEs. Nevertheless, 
professionals should still have the power to adapt a contract to their specificities. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems? Please provide examples, if relevant] 
No relevant experience was reported by authorities or associations. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
No relevant experience was reported by authorities or associations. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No relevant experience was reported by authorities or associations. Associations of 
professionals have not reported any problem with the extension to individually 
negotiated terms. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Interviewees (authorities and associations) are of the opinion that the freedom of 
contract must prevail in B2B.  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Interviewees (authorities and associations) are of the opinion that it is not appropriate 
for B2B transactions.  
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
See above. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Interviewees assess there are not such specific contractual terms often used in B2B 
transactions. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
No need. Authorities assessed that obligations of transparency play in favour of big 
companies (multinationals) and penalize small structures (which have fewer human 
resources and financial means). 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Interviewees assess that there is no benefit for cross-border trade. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No opinions 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
No opinions 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?22 
It is important to note that the injunction procedures relating to directives listed in 
Annex 1 of the ID which offer juridical protection of consumers take place in part 3 of 
the Code de la consommation (legislative part).23 
There is one exception: the injunction procedure for some infringements (which offer 
protection not only to consumers) of the Directive on E-commerce (n° 8 of Annex I of 
ID) takes place in article 71-1 of the Law on E-commerce dated 14 August 2000 titled 
‘Loi relative au commerce électronique modifiant le Code civil, le Nouveau Code de 
22  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
23 Article L.320-1 to L.320-7 
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procédure civile, le Code de commerce, le Code pénal et transposant la directive 
1999/93 du 13 décembre 1999 relative à un cadre communautaire pour les signatures 
électroniques, la directive 2000/31/CE du 8 juin 2000 relative à certains aspects 
juridiques des services de la société de l’information, certaines dispositions de la 
directive 97/7/CEE du 20 mai 1997 concernant la vente à distance des biens et des 
services autres que les services financiers.’ 
Persons, authorities or organisations who are legally allowed to introduce an injunction 
procedure depend on the infringement to the consumer protection rule affected. 
Pursuant to the extension allowed by article 7 of ID, the injunction procedure for an 
infringement against the UCPD or UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing), is the 
most open procedure and can be activated by any person (who can prove a right of 
action),24 a professional organisation, a qualified organisation (both national25 and 
foreign26) whose interests are injured, company/associations whose purpose justifies 
the legal action, the Ministry competent for consumer protection, the national financial 
sector enforcement authority (‘Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier’) and 
the national insurance sector enforcement authority (‘Commissariat aux 
Assurances’).27 
The extent of contribution to the reduction in the number of infringements to 
consumer protection law is important for several reasons: 
• An enlargement of res judicata offered by a Judgment rendered within the 
framework of the injunction procedure. Classically, res judicata of a Judgment is 
only binding for the parties involved in the procedure. But in case of a Judgment 
rendered within the framework of the injunction procedure, this effect is enlarged 
to every case of the trader. 
• The case-law effect, which prevents similar infringement. This effect might be more 
effective if the possibility of publication of the Judgment (entire or a part) in a 
public location (with a large sovereign power of the Judge) at the infringer’s cost is 
used;28 
• The ability to couple with an order a periodic penalty payment (known as ‘astreinte’ 
in Benelux) in case of non-compliance; 
• The criminal sanctions provided for every injunction procedure in case of 
infringement of a Judgement rendered in the framework of the injunction 
procedure; 
• Ministry of Economy and Foreign Affairs (currently competent for consumer’s 
protection) and the consumer organisation can threaten a rebellious trader with an 
injunction procedure. 
Stakeholders feel that the use and/or the threat of use of the collective injunctions 
procedure is highly relevant for national cases. Hence, stakeholders revealed that, 
when an injunction procedure is brought against a trader, a dialogue could start and 
an agreement can be found. 
The instrument of cross-border injunction before civil courts has not proved relevant 
at all, due to the fact there have been no cross-border injunctions yet. It seems that 
foreign consumer associations are either unfamiliar with the legal possibilities or the 
obstacles are too high. 
 
24 Specifically a consumer who concluded a contract with the traders prosecuted 
25 Referred to in article L.313-1 of Code de la consommation  
26 Referred to in article L.313-2 of Code de la consommation, those association inscribed in the list published 
in OJEU pursuant to article 4, point 3 of the ID 
27 It is important to notice that the last two authorities are competent authorities in the framework of the 
CPC Regulation (see article L.311-5 of Code de la consommation) 
28 This possibility has not been used yet. 
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• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Mainly, the summons procedure: a first hearing is generally fixed after 2-3 weeks of 
the injunction procedure is initiated. 
Criminal sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order, which can be up to 
EUR 120 000, are particularly dissuasive. It is important to mention that criminal 
sanctions may have a direct impact on the incorporation permit of the trader. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes, additionally consumer rights covered are: 
• Protection in the indication of the prices of products and services offered to 
consumers (injunction procedure provided in article L.320-1 (refers to infringement 
of articles L. 112-1 to L.112-8); 
• General obligation to provide consumers with information before they sign a 
contract (injunction procedure provided in article L.320-7 (refers to infringement of 
article L. 111-1). 
Note that ‘new’ rights from the CRD are also covered. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
It seems that the legal landscape for injunctions is favourable in Luxembourg. The 
main obstacles seem to be financial rather than legal.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
For the enforcement authority, the summons procedure is a key point and focus 
should be placed on it. 
Persons, authorities or organisations who are legally allowed to introduce an injunction 
could be extended (see above). 
The scope of the Injunctions Directive could be extended to the protection of collective 
business' interests, especially regarding frauds described above. 
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1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Not applicable, as the cross-border injunction procedure has not been used in 
Luxembourg. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
Not applicable. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Not applicable. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Yes; see earlier answers as well as the following. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
These procedures are regulated separately in a single legal act (Code de la 
consommation), for the satisfaction of consumers and traders (see answers above). 
The main difference between procedures is the persons or entities that can bring the 
procedure. For the UCPD and UCTD, the injunction procedure is open to a large range 
of persons and entities (see earlier answers).  
For the CRD: qualified entities (both national and foreign) and the Minister competent 
in consumer protection matters are the only entities that may bring the injunction 
procedure. 
By this main difference, the UCTD and UCPD injunction procedures go beyond 
measures foreseen by the Injunctions Directive (see above answers). 
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1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
According to stakeholders, it is difficult to prove the benefits that consumers gain from 
European Union consumer rules, but they have no doubt that there are benefits.  
Mainly, EU consumer rules offer a legal framework creating a level playing field, and 
as a consequence, offer legal certainty and confidence for consumers. 
ECC Luxembourg points out that is very often difficult to make traders admit their 
fault or illegal practices in an extrajudicial amiable approach (excluding both ADR and 
judicial schemes).  
By consequence, consumers should bring a judicial action to claim the protection 
offered by EU consumer rules. This means of settlement is very often associated with 
lawyer fees that are very often disproportionate given what is at stake. This is the 
main aspect that limits benefits for consumers. In this respect, ECC Luxembourg 
points out the European procedure for small claims as representing progress in terms 
of the effectiveness of consumer rules. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
According to stakeholders, benefits of EU consumer rules result from a legal 
framework which creates a level playing field, and as a consequence, offers legal 
certainty and confidence for consumers and helps to eliminate practices harming the 
reputation of specific economic sectors. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Types of cost faced by traders include legal advice to check the compliance of or write 
standard terms and pre-contractual information, for legal research, legal monitoring, 
and compliance. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
The Ministry of Economy assesses it to be important to have EU texts that are clear 
and coherent relative to the limited costs of public enforcement. Luxembourg 
enforcement authorities have no performance duty, contrary to some other EU 
Member States. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
No indication from stakeholders. 
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• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
The Ministry of Economy points out the question of establishing the right balance 
between legal duties for traders and the cost of compliance and outlines 
Luxembourgish pleas to eliminate the cost for traders resulting from the need to 
adjust to 28 different laws, to the extent that there is no maximum harmonisation or 
minimum harmonisation with mutual recognition.  
SME representatives and trader organisations recommend making the use of models 
(for example, indicating the right of withdrawal) more widespread in EU consumer 
rules. 
ECC Luxembourg assesses that it should be set up a system in which consumers are 
not forced to bring an action, for example, in model similar to the EU small claims 
procedure. 
Codification, a better coherence between EU consumer directives, and an effort of 
simplification were also indicated by interviewees. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
According to stakeholders, the Code de la consommation is very important for the 
awareness of the consumer legislation for businesses, consumers and specific public 
enforcement bodies. 
The Ministry Of Economy points out the website www.guichet.lu that covers all useful 
information for citizens and businesses. 
According ECC Luxembourg, difference of awareness may be found between SMEs and 
other businesses. SMEs are generally not as well informed as other businesses, due 
mainly to the fact that SMEs often do not have legal counsel. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
As is explained by the Ministry of Economy, in Luxembourg there are several 
regulators competent to supervise and enforce consumer protection legislation in 
addition to the Ministry of Economy, which is the main regulator in this area.  
The Authority of Financial Markets (Commission de surveillance du secteur financier - 
CSSF) is competent with regard to financial services. 
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The Authority of Insurance Market (Commissariat aux assurances) is competent with 
regard to insurance services. 
The Institut luxembourgeois de la Réglementation (ILR) supervises compliance with 
regard to telecom services and energy services. 
Cooperation between the regulators mentioned above works well and the share of 
responsibilities is defined in part 3 of the Code de la consommation (articles L.311-4 & 
L.311-5). 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
According to stakeholders, there are no issues, overlaps or conflicts. 
CSSF points out that the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive rules are always 
compatible with EU consumer rules with the same aim, to protect the investor or 
consumer. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
No relevant answer. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The Ministry of Economy points out that, for coherence between specific sectors, the 
definition of consumer should be the same as the definition in horizontal EU consumer 
law. Otherwise, there is no need of clarification according to stakeholders. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
According to the Ministry of Economy, C2B relations are, in reality, B2C relations, 
since a consumer uses a service provided by a business. This position may be based 
on the definition of ‘consumer’ and ‘professional’ gives by the Code de la 
consommation (Article L.010-1). Those definitions permit the identification of the 
application scope of the consumer law, which is every contract between a consumer 
and a professional, as defined in the Code de la consommation. As a consequence, 
consumer law rules are still applicable in C2B transactions in favour of consumers. 
Although none of the stakeholders explicitly answered as such, precedent answers in 
this report would suggest that the professional does not need protection in C2B 
transactions (see above, section 1.2.3.). 
There is no literature on this question. 
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The notions of ‘consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ work fine in practice, but the notion 
of a ‘vulnerable consumer’ is not actually used in practice. 
According to stakeholders, the other concepts used continue to be valid. It may be 
pointed out that almost all stakeholders refer ‘average consumer’ to the classical civil 
law concept of ‘bonus pater familia’. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
No answer available. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
According to the Ministry of Economy, there is a positive impact, even if it is difficult to 
quantify it. According to ECC Luxembourg, however, implementation of the UCPD and 
UCTD has no significant impact on the consumer’s protection. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
See precedent answer. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
According to the Ministry of Economy, there is a positive impact, even if it is difficult to 
quantify it. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
According to the Ministry of Economy, consumers of Luxembourg have always been 
cross-border consumers, that is why it is difficult to assess whether Directives subject 
to this study have an impact. The fact that EU consumer law and contact points are 
developing is a positive sign for consumers. 
According to ECC Luxembourg, introducing the Euro had probably more impact on 
cross-border consumption than the EU consumer rules.  
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• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
See answer above. The Ministry of Economy points out that European law permits a 
realisation for businesses of the advantages of the single European market with 
harmonised mutual recognition. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – LUXEMBOURG 
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Code de la consommation, art. 
L.211-1 to L.211-7 
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Code de la 
consommation, art. 
L.211-3 
 
  'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
No   
  Extensions of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
Yes Code de la 
consommation, art. 
L.211-2 
 
  Extensions of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Code de la consommation, art. 
L.121-1 to L.122-8 
 Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Provisions regarding 
immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Application of UCPD to 
B2B transactions 
No   
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of 
products offered 
to consumers 
Code de la consommation, art.  
L.112-1 to art. 112-9 
 Extension of the 
application to other 
sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
Yes Code de la 
consommation, art. 
L.112-8 
Extension to 
services, except 
liberal professions, 
of the obligation to 
indicate unit price 
for every 
professional of all 
usual services 
proposed by the 
professional 
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Code de la 
consommation, article 
L.112-3 (3), use of the 
option under Art. 5 (1) 
PID   
 
Point 1): derogation 
for enumerated food 
products to indicate 
unit price 
    Code de la 
consommation, article 
L.112-3 (3), use of the 
option under Art. 5 (2) 
PID   
 
Point 2) : mandatory 
indication of the 
price unit for 
enumerated  non-
food products  
    Code de la 
consommation, article 
L.112-3 (3), use of the 
option under Art. 3 (2) 
PID   
 
Points 3) : 
derogation to 
indicate the unit 
price for products 
supplied in the 
course of the 
provision of a 
service 
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Loi du 30 juillet 2002 réglementant 
certaines pratiques commerciales, 
sanctionnant la concurrence 
déloyale et transposant la directive 
97/55/CE du Parlement Européen et 
du Conseil modifiant la directive 
84/450/CEE sur la publicité 
trompeuse afin d’y inclure la 
publicité comparative, articles 15 -
19 (loi de 2002) 
This law will be abrogated in the 
near future by a new law voted 
on 13 December 2016 titled 
« Loi sur les ventes en soldes et 
sur trottoir et la publicité 
trompeuse et comparative »  
  Loi de 2002, article 15 to 
19 + 23 
 
Substituted in the near 
future by Loi du 13 
décembre 2016 sur les 
ventes en soldes et sur 
les trottoir, articles 3 to 
10 
 
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Code de la consommation, articles 
L.320-2 to L.320-7  
     
Loi du 30 juillet 2002 réglementant 
certaines pratiques commerciales, 
sanctionnant la concurrence 
déloyale et transposant la directive 
97/55/CE du Parlement Européen et 
du Conseil modifiant la directive 
84/450/CEE sur la publicité 
trompeuse afin d’y inclure la 
publicité comparative, articles 23 
(loi de 2002) 
This law will be abrogated in the 
near future by a new law voted 
on 13 December 2016 titled 
« Loi sur les ventes en soldes et 
sur trottoir et la publicité 
trompeuse et comparative »  
Articles 8 to 10 
    
loi modifiée du 27 juillet 1991 sur 
les médias électroniques 
Article 28 – paragraphe 5 
     
loi modifiée du 27 juillet 1991 sur 
les médias électroniques 
Article 28 – paragraphe 5 
     
Loi du 11 avril 1983 portant 
réglementation de la mise sur le 
marché et de la publicité des 
«médicaments», article 19-1 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – LUXEMBOURG  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the Injunctions 
Directive regulated in your country separately (as a 
separate procedure or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer 
Law Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
No, single procedure  
 
 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction? - Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer 
associations (see code de la 
consommation, articles L.313-& 
L.313-2) 
- Individual consumers 
- Other : professional 
organisation 
Individual consumers 
and professional 
organisation are 
entitled to bring an 
action seeking an 
injunction in UCPD 
and UCTD matters 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative procedure 
is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   of 
some/all cost related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the comments column. 
- Each party bears its own costs, 
the court estimate is 
inequitable to let a part of the 
costs to a party 
 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to cover 
areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part 
of Annex I of the Directive 
- Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover consumer 
law in general 
Code de la 
consommation, 
article L.320-1. 
Extension regarding 
price display 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the comments 
column regarding  type of business' interests covered by 
the injunctions procedure 
Yes and no Business’ interest is 
indirectly protect only 
for UCPD & UCTD 
matters. Business’ 
interests type 
protected is fair 
competition 
(injunction procedure 
is foreseen among 
others for B2B unfair 
commercial practices 
in the loi de 2002 but 
this law will be 
abrogated in the 
near future) 
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Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
Yes (UCTD) 
 
Possible only for 
UCTD matters 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the injunction 
procedures? (not including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
No  
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the prior consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
No such requirement  
Does the national legislation provide for measures ensuring 
summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
Yes and no Luxembourg 
legislation foresees 
that the classical 
summary procedure 
rules govern, but this 
not guaranteed a 
time limit of the 
procedure 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should they 
be paid 
Yes, penalty of a fine for each 
day of non-compliance 
 
Penalties should be 
paid to the plaintiff 
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
Yes 
 
Publications can be 
order in and/or out of 
the point(s) of sales 
of the infringer 
and/or in newspapers 
and/or any other 
manner 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure for 
sanctions for the infringement? 
No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a 
result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other beneficiary 
be brought within the injunction procedure? 
No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified entity 
or the public purse be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No  
Can individual consumers base their individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
Yes and no Consumers may 
argue that the 
infringement initially 
leading to the 
injunction order 
caused damages, but 
there is no automatic 
causal link or 
assumption of 
liability 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond the 
injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- Yes 
- No 
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Are the effects of individual injunctions orders extended to 
the future infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
n.a. n.a.        
 
Neither the number of B2C disputes in court nor the legal basis of decisions is 
registered in Luxembourg, so it is very difficult to give either statistics or even an 
estimate for the stakeholders. Similarly, even if a number of B2C ADR decisions could 
be found, again the legal basis of decisions is not registered. 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).29  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
(Justice de 
paix) 
EUR 0 Assistance of 
a lawyer is 
not legally 
required. If 
any, as a 
minimum: 
EUR 800 
Bailiff fees 
EUR 130 
(required for 
the classical 
procedure) 
As a minimum 4h 
(without assistance 
of a lawyer), 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance and 
experience of 
consumer. No time 
needed in case 
court tests term of 
its own motion in 
the course of a 
procedure. 
 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 0 Assistance of 
a lawyer is 
not legally 
required. If 
any, as a 
minimum: 
EUR 800 
-- As a minimum 2h 
(contact with the 
ADR, fill in the 
questionnaire, 
possible hearing, 
etc) 
The Luxembourg 
ADR scheme 
competent should 
be the ‘Commission 
luxembourgeoise 
des litiges de 
voyages’30 
 
29 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
30 https://www.ulc.lu/fr/Organes/Detail.asp?T=1&D=descr&ID=5  
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Neither the number of B2C disputes in court nor the legal basis of decisions is 
registered in Luxembourg, so it is very difficult to give either statistics or even an 
estimate for the stakeholders. Similarly, even if a number of B2C ADR decisions could 
be found, again the legal basis of decisions is not registered. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
ECC Luxembourg European Consumer Centre 5 September 2016 
Ministère de l'Economie et du Commerce 
extérieur –  Direction du marché intérieur et de 
la consommation 
Ministry 13 September 2016 
Ministère de l'Economie et du Commerce 
extérieur –  Direction générale PME et 
Entrepreneuriat 
Ministry In writing 
Chambre des Métiers Business association 6 September 2016 
clc (Confédération luxembourgeoise du 
commerce) 
Business association 21 September 2016 
Union Luxembourgeoise des Consommateurs Consumer organisation 17 May 2016 
 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
781
Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
G. Ravarani / éd. Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise, 3e édition, 
p.788 à 810 
2014 La responsabilité civile des 
personnes privées et publiques 
P. Ancel, B. Christmann, X. Dieux, F. Kutscher-Puis / Annales 
de droit luxembourgeois n° 21 , p. 105-155 
2011 Modalités de la réglementation 
des clauses d’indexation de prix 
au Luxembourg, en France, 
Belgique et Allemagne 
Elise Poillot/ JTDE 2013 Droit de la consommation, 
Chroniques 
Pierre GOERENS / JTL 2014 Note sous Cass. 5 décembre 2013 
(JTL2014, page109) 
N. Thieltgen, A-M KA / Bulletin droit et banque n° 42 2008 Chronique de jurisprudence de 
droit bancaire luxembourgeois 
N. Thieltgen, A-M KA / Bulletin droit et banque n° 42, 44, 46, 
50, 52, 54, 56, 58 
2008 - 
2016 
Chronique de jurisprudence de 
droit bancaire luxembourgeois 
Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise 2006-
2016 
Recueil de jurisprudence 
Bulletin d’information sur la Jurisprudence 2005-
2016 
Recueil de jurisprudence 
Code de la consommation / Service Central de Législation 2016 Partie VI. Jurisprudence 
A. Prüm (sous la direction) / Collection de la Faculté de Droit, 
d’Economie et de Finance de l’Université de Luxembourg, 
Larcier 
2009 La Codification en droit 
luxembourgeois du droit de la 
consommation 
Chambre des Métiers 
http://www.cdm.lu/news/fiche/2013/07/les-pratiques-
frauduleuses-visant-les-professionnels-l-ampleur-du-
probleme. 
2013 Les pratiques frauduleuses visant 
les professionnels, l’ampleur du 
problème 
Chambre des députés 2016 Projet de loi n° 7038 sur les 
ventes en soldes et sur trottoir et 
la publicité trompeuse et 
comparative 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report MALTA  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD was implemented as Part VIII of the Consumer Affairs Act (Chapter 378 of 
the Laws of Malta).1 The inclusion of the provisions under Maltese law implementing 
the UCPD overall are a positive measure providing the competent national 
enforcement body namely the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA (Malta Competition and 
Consumer Affairs Authority) with an important tool in curbing unfair commercial 
practices. 
It is only the DG Consumer Affairs who can take regulatory action if there is a breach 
of Part VIII of the Consumer Affairs Act. Sector specific regulators such as the 
Regulator for Energy and Water Services (REWS) or the Malta Communications 
Authority (MCA) may at most as ‘qualified entities’ under the Consumer Affairs Act 
(Cap. 378 of the Laws of Malta) request the DG Consumer Affairs to issue a 
‘compliance order’ (which is the equivalent of an injunction’ order under the ID) if they 
believe that an unfair commercial practice has been committed in relation to the 
sector that they oversee.2  
To date this has occurred in one instance when the MCA in 2012 formally requested 
the DG Consumer Affairs to issue a compliance order in relation to alleged unfair 
practices by an electronic communications service provider.3  
In practice recourse to the national provisions implementing the UCPD has been 
muted. This is confirmed both by the low number of regulatory measures taken by the 
competent authorities in relation to non-compliance with Part VIII of the Consumer 
Affairs Act (which implements the UCPD), and more so by the very few cases before 
the Maltese courts disputing regulatory measures taken based on alleged non-
compliance with the provisions under Maltese law implementing the UCPD.  
On the basis of the information available only two compliance orders with regard to 
alleged non-compliance with Part VIII of the Consumer Affairs Act have so far been 
issued.4 The compliance orders issued in these two instances were contested in 2012 
before the Consumer and Competition Appeals Tribunal (CCAT).5 At the time of writing 
the case is still pending before the CCAT (which is the competent review tribunal) for a 
final ruling.  
No information was provided on the actual number of requests for the issue of such 
orders (read ‘injunction orders’).  
1 As per Act II of 2008.  
2 See Chapter 378 article 2 the definition of “qualified entity”. Under article 94 a qualified entity can as the 
DG Consumer Affairs to issue a compliance order in relation amongst other things if there is an unfair 
commercial practice.  
3 Two compliance orders were issued against two sister companies. The orders however related to the same 
issue – the use of misleading advertisements to describe products offered in the telecommunications 
sector.   
4 These two compliance orders related to the same issue and were issued against sister companies.  
5 The said orders are the subject of the same case currently pending before the CCAT. 
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Under the applicable provisions a compliance order comes into force ‘with immediate 
effect’.6 According to article 110G of the Consumer Affairs Act, any decision (including 
therefore a compliance order issued by the DG Consumer Affairs) even if contested 
before an appellate forum, stands and must be adhered by all the parties to whom the 
decision applies. The CCAT may however on the application of a party to the appeal 
suspend the regulatory decision – in this case the compliance order issued by the DG 
Consumer Affairs pending the final determination of the appeal.7 The law further 
provides that in the case of a compliance order, the CCAT may instead of suspending 
the order modify the said order ‘as it deems necessary instead of suspending it’.8 
Some interviewees observed that in many instances compliance is obtained through 
negotiation, thereby avoiding the initiation of formal proceedings alleging non-
compliance with the applicable provisions of Part VIII. This may serve to explain the 
small number of injunction orders issued to date.9     
A consumer organisation said that the principle-based approach is laudable, however 
criticised what it described as the lack of pro-active vigilance by the competent 
authorities. Another consumer organisation noted that the DG Consumer Affairs 
MCCAA has limited resources and powers.  
A sector specific regulator said that overall the principle based approach of the UCPD 
is very effective and consumers have benefited from such an approach. Conversely a 
business organisation argued that UCPD is ineffective and that it has been asking the 
competent authorities to take action for some time, but to no avail. 
   
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The practical benefit of the inclusion of the black list is that it provides a specific and 
clear list of practices which can be referred to, therefore facilitating regulatory 
intervention by reference to a list of practices which complements the general concept 
of unfair commercial practices under UCPD.  
Having a black list is a positive measure. However there should be some latitude for 
each Member State to revise such a list according to national circumstances, in 
particular to include any new practices as from time to time may emerge. In very 
small countries like Malta, where most of the commercial firms fall under the definition 
of micro-enterprises (coupled also with the consideration that Malta is a small island), 
markets operate differently from larger markets in larger Member States.  In such 
circumstances lack of enforcement may have a greater impact on consumers. 
A consumer organisation said that given that this is a maximum harmonisation 
directive, Malta consequently cannot add other practices to the list which may be 
particular to local circumstances. This organisation said that a Member State should 
have the faculty of adding to the list of practices considered as unfair in order to deal 
with practices that may be particular to that MS.  
A public authority commented that the inclusion of a black list has proved to be very 
effective for consumers but did not amplify. No further specific comments were made.  
  
6 See article 96 of the Consumer Affairs Act.  
7 Ibid. article 110G.   
8 Ibid proviso to article 110G(2).  
9 Injunction orders are under Maltese law normally referred to as ‘compliance’ orders.  
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• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Such a measure is considered as beneficial by most interviewees especially with 
regard to financial services.  
A consumer organisation remarked that this measure has the advantage of giving 
Member States some flexibility to deal with new unfair commercial practices relating to 
these two areas. This organisation suggested that minimum harmonisation should 
actually extend to all areas. 
The consumer organisation argued that the Directive should overall be a minimum 
harmonisation directive whereby a Member State can impose measures which go 
beyond the practices listed in the Annex to UCPD.  
    
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
To date the measures under the UCPD have not been applied in relation to either of 
these sectors. Therefore one cannot comment in depth on effectiveness or practical 
benefits in this context.  
A consumer organisation observed that there is a need for genuine transparency on 
how the price of petrol and diesel in Malta is fixed, reflecting international rates which 
have been decreasing in recent years, and on the quality and grading of petrol or 
diesel. This organisation also referred to advertising and information relating to 
alternative sources of energy, remarking that should be a clear separation between 
what constitutes advertising material, and what constitutes accurate and objective 
information about the product in question.  
A business organisation remarked that in the energy sector there is a dominant 
supplier and minimal effective enforcement, noting that in part at least, this stems 
from the fact that there is lack of competition.  
    
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
This issue per se has not been considered in depth so far in Malta. No regulatory 
decisions have been given relating to the measures provided for under the national 
law implementing the UCPD dealing with the interpretation of the ‘average 
consumer’.10    
Some interviewees noted that there is a lack of information on the subject (business & 
consumer organisations), with one interviewee (a public advisory organisation) 
suggesting that there should be a clear definition of the term ‘average consumer’.  
A consumer organisation observed that the concept of ‘average consumer’ is not being 
applied realistically, adding that a substantial number of consumers cannot be termed 
as ‘average consumers’ unless they are adequately informed and educated. This 
interviewee suggested that the concept should be revised to reflect a wider range of 
individuals.  
10 The subject of the vulnerable consumer has however been dealt with in some court decisions relating to 
UCTD. See for example F (Advertising) Limited (C27689) vs Joe u Nathalie konjugi Mifsud, decided by the 
First Hall of the Civil Court on the 21 November 2014, and Malta Property Auctioneers Limited vs Malcolm 
Becker et decided by the First Hall of the Civil Court on the 29 November 2012.  
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Another consumer organisation noted that this point in practice to date has not arisen 
since neither the term ‘average consumer’ nor the term ‘vulnerable consumer’ have 
any precise and clear definition under Maltese law. According to this organisation the 
only exception in relation to the latter term is in the energy sector where those below 
a certain income are given a small subsidy on their bills.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
To date no specific issues have been raised in this regard, though in certain areas 
there are vulnerable consumers in relation to whom specific protection and attendant 
measures should be considered.  Hence for example in the area of electronic 
communications with the rapid changes being made and attendant increasing 
technological complexity, many elderly consumers risk being marginalised because of 
their difficulties in coping with new forms of communications. The UCPD seems to be 
oblivious to their plight and more consideration should be given to the needs of such 
consumers possibly within the context of new norms under the UCPD. It is relevant to 
note that sector specific regulation as provided for under Maltese law does recognise 
the need and importance of specific social groups.11   
One sector specific regulator noted that new categories of vulnerable consumers have 
been recognised (mentioning pensioners and minors) but did not elaborate.  
A consumer organisation noted that awareness has increased about the needs of such 
groups however practical suggestions for policies have not been put into action. It 
referred in particular to pressure on Government by NGOs involved in social assistance 
which organisations seek to address the needs of vulnerable groups in relation to such 
issues such as habitual household indebtedness and usury.    
  
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
In practice self-regulation and co-regulation in Malta are not exercised. Some sporadic 
attempts at self-regulation were made in the past, but none were of long lasting 
duration or effective as a means of self-regulation or of co-regulation.  
The recent adoption of measures implementing the Consumer ADR Directive (Directive 
2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes) may lead to 
some developments in the near future in this regard.12 It is however still early to 
comment given that the relevant legislation was introduced a few months ago.      
It was observed that in certain sectors such as public transport and the electricity 
retail market there is only one operator involved. In these sectors it was further noted 
that to date no self-regulation or co-regulation initiatives have been undertaken. 
A consumer organisation said that self-regulation and co-regulation are effectively 
non-existent, adding that regrettably Malta lacks a solid tradition of effective and 
meaningful self-regulation by the business sector.  
11 See for example Article 4(2)(v) of the Electronic Communications (Regulation) Act (Chapter 399 of the 
Laws of Malta) which article refers to the importance of “addressing the needs of specific social groups, in 
particular disabled end-users, elderly end-users and end-users with special social needs”. This provision is 
based on Article 8 paragraph 4(e) of Directive 2002/21/EC. 
12 See Part VI of the Consumer Affairs Act entitled “Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution” and the 
regulations made thereunder namely the Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (General) 
Regulations (SL 378.18 of the Laws of Malta).  
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
A consumer organisation suggested that there should be a mechanism which 
periodically revisits the black list given continuous developments in many sectors and 
new unfair commercial practices that may consequently emerge. This organisation 
suggested that the black list in the Annex should not be a maximum harmonisation 
measure, arguing that each Member State should have the ability to update the list to 
reflect unfair practices specific to that Member State. In doing so it suggested that a 
notification requirement be introduced whereby the Commission and other Member 
States are duly notified of any new unfair practices. This would have the benefit of 
alerting all Member States of new practices considered as unfair which may possibly 
also impact other Member States. This organisation said that there should be an EU 
wide data base updated periodically to complement such a measure.  
A public authority remarked that the list is exhaustive.  
  
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Some interviewees emphasised the importance of empowering sector specific 
regulators to have powers under horizontal consumer law in so far as UCPD and UCTD 
are concerned. Suggestions in this regard were made both by the consumer 
organisation and some of the sector specific regulators.  
A consumer organisation remarked that sector specific public authorities should have 
the power to take regulatory measures directly possibly by having concurrent powers 
with the competent national consumer authority (DG Consumer Affairs - MCCAA) so as 
to ensure more effective compliance with the measures under UCPD in so far as these 
relate to the specific sectors (e.g. financial services, the various utilities etc.). A 
similar comment was made by a sector specific regulator.   
Under the current situation in Malta a sector specific authority has to request the 
national consumer authority – namely the DG Consumer Affairs - to take action. The 
same consumer organisation observed that it makes more sense if the sector specific 
regulator enjoys concurrent enforcement powers whereby it can take direct action 
itself against non-compliant traders if there is an unfair commercial practice relating to 
the sector/s it supervises.  
A consumer organisation suggested that there should be an EU wide data base by 
subject matter, which lists the unfair practices in each Member State and the 
regulatory measures taken with regard to that practice. Such a data base should be 
accessible to all those entities listed as entities qualified to bring an action under 
Article 2 of the Injunctions Directive (ID).   
Another consumer organisation remarked that there is a need for stronger and more 
effective enforcement measures by different authorities, with better coordination to 
ensure effective and prompt compliance. 
Various sector specific regulators made different points. One emphasised the need for 
better and more information for consumers to know what their rights are, whereas 
another suggested that emphasis should be placed on professional diligence. A third 
regulator highlighted the importance of effective and timely action being taken in 
cases of identified breaches of these directives to mitigate any negative impact on 
consumers, suggesting that the opinion and position of the sector specific regulator 
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should be factored prior to the taking of any action by the national consumer authority 
(i.e the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA) to avoid overlap between the national consumer 
authority and the sector specific regulator.  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
There is a general consensus amongst both the consumer organisations and business 
lobby that consumers are not generally well informed about unit pricing, and that 
more needs to be done in this regard. Conversely a public authority felt that 
consumers are adequately informed.  
A consumer organisation said that to date no surveys have been carried to establish 
the extent of the awareness of consumers about unit selling price, noting that it does 
not result that any extensive campaigns have been carried out in this regard to inform 
consumers other than occasional write-ups in the media or during talk shows on 
television or radio. The same organisation questioned the effectiveness of the PID as 
transposed and applied in Malta, contending that in practice consumers are not 
adequately informed about the norms relating to unit selling price. This organisation 
strongly criticised a provision under Maltese law which according to this organisation 
effectively means that a substantial percentage of retail outlets are exempted from 
some the requirements regulating unit pricing.  
Another consumer organisation noted that generally consumers are not adequately 
informed and that better regulation and monitoring are needed. 
Comments from other interviewees mentioned the need for an awareness campaign so 
that consumers can make informed choices, whereas conversely another interviewee 
(a public authority) said that consumers are adequately informed.  
  
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The majority of interviewees (including consumer organisations and a public authority) 
argued that this should be per performance, arguing that ultimately this is what many 
consumers ask about.  
Conversely one interviewee (a public consumer advisory organisation) argued in 
favour of a unit price.  
  
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
A public authority noted that the option for a derogation was taken up in relation to 
Article 6 of PID in so far as it relates to the space available in the shop premises of the 
trader, whereas a consumer organisation strongly criticised this derogation since this 
effectively meant that a substantial number of commercial outlets were exempted 
from some of the requirements of the PID.  
The same consumer organisation voiced strong reservations about the derogation 
under Article 6 of PID and contends that the derogation effectively undermines the 
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application of the PID depriving consumers of important consumer protection 
measures.13  
No other comments were made, in particular no mention was made of the number of 
consumer complaints in relation to alleged non-compliance with the norms regulating 
unit pricing.  
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
No comments were forthcoming whether the existing norms should be revisited and in 
particular extended beyond the notion of ‘advertising’. The responses by those 
interviewees who replied were that the protection under MCAD is advantageous and 
that it encourages fair competition.     
The measures introduced by MCAD (the measures under Maltese law are reflected in 
the Commercial Code – Chapter 13 of the Laws of Malta - notably in articles 32A to 37 
thereof) has led to informative advertising by competing businesses notably in certain 
sectors such as telecommunications. Prior to the enactment of the applicable Maltese 
legislation, comparative advertising within the parameters set by the MCAD was not 
possible. To date there have been only a couple of lawsuits relating to the 
interpretation of the applicable comparative advertising provisions.14  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Overall the current approach is considered to be effective (comments from business 
organisations and a public authority). There has been no call for any review of the 
existing legislative (national) norms.   
There have been few lawsuits on the basis of which one can analyse the overall 
effectiveness in this regard (see also reply to previous question). In the case of 
business versus business disputes, the means of redress under current national law is 
based on purely civil remedies, and does not involve regulatory intervention by the 
competent national consumer authority (unless the issue also constitutes an unfair 
commercial practice under the Consumer Affairs Act, in which case the DG Consumer 
Affairs may then intervene).  
If there is a breach of the relevant national provisions implementing the MCAD 
(namely articles 32A to 36A of the Commercial Code), then the injured trader can 
seek redress (and if applicable sue for damages) before the competent court of civil 
jurisdiction. 
 
13 Note: according to the feedback from the competent public authority Malta has in fact availed itself of the 
derogation under Article 6 of PID. See also comments to previous question by one of the interviewees. 
14 See for example Kram Trading vs Oleg Barkov trading under the name Barkov Distribution – decided by 
the First Hall of the Civil Court on the 28 May 2015.  
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The national law does not vary from the norms provided for under the MCAD. As 
explained above, the remedy available to the injured trader is to seek civil redress 
including damages, before the competent court of civil jurisdiction. In practice to date 
only a few lawsuits has been made even though the applicable measures under the 
Commercial Code were introduced in 2008.15    
One business organisation argued that due to national circumstances the minimum 
harmonisation provisions should be retained. However it did not elaborate further. 
There were no other specific comments.   
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Overall the effects are positive, though use of comparative advertising in practice has 
been somewhat limited. The overall reaction to the introduction of the measures under 
national law transposing the MCAD is positive.  
One business organisation remarked that MCAD provides protection for traditional 
marketing practices but has limited effectiveness because of modern digital means of 
communications (e.g. social media). There were no other specific comments.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
The rules are seen as providing an effective legal framework. To date the general 
reaction to the norms introduced on comparative advertising is positive. There were 
no specific comments.  
Only a few lawsuits has been filed and decided based on the applicable provisions 
regulating comparative advertising.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No adverse comments were made on the current legislative framework under the 
Commercial Code whereby the remedies available are purely those of civil redress for 
the injured trader.16  No comments were made by business organisations about the 
impact on cross-border transactions.  
Until 2008, comparative and misleading advertising was regulated under the 
Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378), and regulatory intervention was then possible by the 
(then) Director of Consumer Affairs within the (former) Consumer and Competition 
Department. As explained earlier this is no longer the case. 
15 It is pertinent to note that prior to 2008, comparative and misleading advertising were regulated under 
the Consumer Affairs Act whereby the then Director of Consumer Affairs was empowered to take 
regulatory measures. With the amendments enacted in 2008 implementing the UCPD, the norms relating 
to MCAD were amended with new provisions of a purely private civil law nature introduced in the 
Commercial Code whereby private business can seek redress in accordance with articles 32A to 37 of that 
Code.   
16 See Commercial Code articles 32A et seq. Act II of 2008 amended the Consumer Affairs Act deleting 
former articles 48, 49 and 50 of that law whilst providing for the inclusion of new provision in the 
Commercial Code.  
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In the case of comparative advertising, following amendments in 2008 to the 
Commercial Code regulating comparative advertising under that Code, the competent 
national consumer authority (currently the DG Consumer Affairs) has no remit to 
regulate comparative advertising unless such advertising constitutes an unfair 
commercial practice under the Consumer Affairs Act (see also previous replies in this 
sub-section).  
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
There were no specific remarks. The general attitude is that the existing legislative 
regime under Maltese law based on civil remedies for the injured trader coupled with 
the norms regulating unfair commercial practices, is adequate. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No adverse comments were forthcoming from any of the interviewees – including from 
representatives of business organisations.   
To date there have been no specific issues in this regard. Formal regulatory measures 
and litigation on the application and interpretation of UCPD has been restricted to a 
few cases. There has been no noticeable impact on cross-border trade.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
A consumer organisation said that the list should be a minimum harmonisation 
measure, allowing Malta (and obviously other MS) to include other measures specific 
to national circumstances. It argued that the inclusion of such a measure would enable 
the competent authorities to control more effectively new unfair practices. No other 
specific comments were made.    
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
This point has not to date arisen.  
A consumer association suggested that there was scope in considering whether the 
applicable rules allowing minimum harmonisation derogation should extend to sectors 
other than financial services and immovable property.  
There were no adverse comments. The current minimum harmonisation character of 
MCAD is seen as adequate and does not present a barrier to cross-border trade. More 
specifically no instances were mentioned by any of the interviewees whereby the 
aforesaid provisions could be seen as representing a barrier to cross-border trade. 
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The general reaction is that the MCAD is overall a positive measure and has helped to 
enhance competition. No disparities were identified which may have a negative impact 
on cross-border trade.  
One business organisation said that the MCAD has been effective in eliminating 
obstacles in the internal market, observing however that it is difficult for some SMEs 
to understand the concept underlying the Directive.  
No other specific comments were made.  
   
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
This point does not appear to be of any particular concern. There is general 
satisfaction with the measures on misleading advertising as currently applied under 
national law. No adverse comments were made and no suggestions for change to the 
MCAD provisions were made.  
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
There is general satisfaction with the measures on comparative advertising as 
currently applied under national law. No adverse comments were made and no 
suggestions for change to the MCAD provisions were made.  
There do not appear to be any concerns on the matter.  
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
To date the lack of a cross-border enforcement mechanism is not perceived as a 
barrier to cross-border trade. Though it is pertinent to note that this may be due to 
the fact that no specific instances have been encountered which might therefore raise 
concerns in this regard. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The general level of awareness of traders with regard to the aforesaid information 
requirements is poor among SMEs, though much better with the larger businesses. In 
some sectors – notably the telecoms and transport industries - there appears to be 
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more awareness of such requirements, and overall of the applicable provisions of the 
national provisions implementing UCPD.   
Overall there has been little practical application of these rules, in part because 
general awareness is poor (see comments below by consumer organisations).  
The information requirements under the UCPD are seen as useful. The issue however 
raised is that there is little awareness of their existence. The focus in the case of Malta 
should be on more information campaigns to alert businesses – especially SMEs - 
about the existence of these norms.  
To date regulatory measures in relation to non-observance of the national provisions 
implementing these norms and indeed of UCPD in general has been minimal.    
A sector specific regulator noted that according to its experience there was a high 
level of awareness amongst the traders it regulates, observing that the applicable 
rules are communicated through various forms of communication including dedicated 
sections on websites, and information boards in prominent public areas.  
Another sector specific regulator noted that in the sector that it regulates, the major 
service providers have a dedicated regulatory team which monitors regulatory 
developments and obligations with regard to the services offered, including 
compliance with advertising requirements.  
Business stakeholders took contrary positions on this topic. A business organisation 
noted that there is a poor level of awareness especially amongst SMEs, whereas 
another business organisation said that traders are aware of such requirements and 
that traders ensure their application through agreements and information in 
brochures. 
A consumer organisation observed that whilst traders are very much aware of 
information requirements at the advertising stage, there is however lack of correct, 
unambiguous information in the advertising techniques used, mentioning specifically 
the use of small print for relevant essential information about for example product 
safety or prices. It argued that there should be a clear separation between what is 
purely advertising and what constitutes important information about the product.  
Another consumer organisation said that awareness in general is poor, though in 
certain industries such as telecoms there is more awareness especially among the 
main communications service providers. 
   
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Some overlap may arise given that the enforcement of UCPD and the measures 
applicable under the E-commerce Directive are enforced by two different enforcement 
authorities in Malta.17  It was remarked that though, informally, co-ordination does 
exist, there are no formal Memoranda of Understandings (MoU) between the 
competent authorities concerned.  
A consumer organisation remarked that enforcement should either rest with the same 
authority or alternatively there should be a structured formal mechanism which 
ensures that any regulatory action is undertaken in a timely and co-ordinated fashion 
ensuring that there is no overlap.  
17 In Malta the UCPD norms as implemented under Cap. 378 are enforced by the DG Consumer Affairs 
MCCAA whereas the E-Commerce norms are enforced by the MCA (a sector specific regulator).   
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A business organisation remarked that there is overlap and that this leads to confusion 
as to which regime applies, whereas another business organisation said that there is 
no overlap. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Two business organisations said that they are in favour of extending UCPD to B2B 
transactions. One of these organisations said that the extension of the UCPD to B2B 
transactions could have positive benefits for cross-border trade.   
A concern expressed by a consumer organisation is that given the limited supervisory 
resources available to the competent regulatory authorities, these resources would be 
even more severely impacted if, in addition, their role is extended to the supervision 
of unfair practices which relate to B2B transactions. This Association argued that the 
resources of the competent national authority would be even more stretched thereby 
impacting its ability to deal with unfair practices which affect consumers negatively.  
No other comments were made. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
For reasons stated in the previous reply, it would be more suitable to have separate 
regimes for B2B and B2C transactions. The main concern is that the extension of 
UCPD to B2B issues may severely impact the ability of the competent authorities to 
continue to deal with unfair practices which affect consumers. As discussed elsewhere, 
so far there have been few regulatory measures in relation to alleged non-compliance 
with the national norms implementing the UCPD. The possibility of extension to B2B 
transactions would probably reduce the capabilities of active regulatory action to 
protect consumers.  
One option would be to devise specific norms – perhaps within a minimum 
harmonisation context - where negatively impacted businesses can seek civil redress 
(seeking damages, rescission of agreements etc.) and therefore lessen the burden and 
dependence on regulatory intervention. This would have the added benefit of having 
impacted businesses seek appropriate remedies against unfair practices and in doing 
so indirectly protect the interests of consumers.  
Two business organisations said that they are in favour of aligning legal regimes for 
B2B and B2C transactions in the area of commercial transactions.  
There were no other comments.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Business organisations said that they are in favour. One business organisation added 
that such transactions are normally covered by contractual agreements. No other 
specific comments were made.    
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• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
If such measures are introduced the black-list of practices should be a minimum 
harmonisation measure, thereby allowing Member States to cater for other practices 
specific to national circumstances.   
Three interviewees (business organisations and a public authority) remarked that they 
were in favour of such a measure. One of the business organisations added that it was 
in favour especially with regard to what it described as the ‘supply chain 
management’. 
  
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Two business organisations replied they favour such a mechanism with one 
organisation stating that it was especially in favour when such a cooperation 
mechanism factors in the international supply chains. None however elaborated any 
further. No other specific comments were forthcoming.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Under the current national regime the injured trader has the possibility of suing for 
civil damages and of asking for ‘any other remedy’ to remove the act contrary to the 
applicable provisions implementing the comparative or misleading advertisement 
norms.18 The introduction of provisions providing for contractual consequences should 
also be factored.   
No specific remarks were forthcoming from any of the interviewees.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
The measures adopted appear to be sufficient. However (see previous reply) 
consideration should be given to the inclusion of civil remedies in a revised Directive 
providing redress to the injured business in relation to contractual consequences. 
Ultimately what the injured business is really concerned about is adequate redress in a 
timely manner, where it has incurred damages as a result of misleading or illegal 
comparative adverting.  
One business organisation said that it favours adapting the rules on comparative 
advertising but did not elaborate. No other specific comments were made.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
There are no specific provisions under the Consumer Affairs Act (which implements 
the UCPD) that relate to the contractual consequences in the case of a breach of the 
provisions implementing the UCPD. Redress may be possible under general civil law – 
18 See article 37 of the Commercial Code – Chapter 13 of the Laws of Malta. To date there has only been 
one reported court decision in relation to the application of this provision (Kram Trading vs Oleg Barkov 
decided by the First Hall of the Civil Court on the 28 November 2015.  
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namely under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (Cap. 16 of the Laws of 
Malta) - if for example consent to purchase was procured by fraud or violence.19   
A consumer organisation suggested the inclusion of a measure under the Consumer 
Affairs Act providing for contractual nullity if an agreement was procured as a result of 
an unfair practice, arguing that such a measure would be beneficial for consumers. No 
other specific comments were made. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
On the basis of the information available to date it appears that only two compliance 
orders (relating to the same issue) have been issued within the context of the UCPD. 
These orders are being contested and a decision (by the Consumer and Competition 
Appeals Tribunal) is scheduled for next October. 
The Civil Courts have in some instances – within the context of civil damages sought 
by consumers - compensated consumers who were at the wrong end of an unfair 
commercial practice (see for example Evelyn Farrugia et vs Global Capital Financial 
Management Unit Limited decided by the First Hall of the Civil Court).20  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
A public authority referred to a former practice whereby a service provider was over 
charging non-Maltese citizens and argued that there is a need to develop contractual 
consequences.  
A sector specific regulator noted that sector specific rules in the sectors it regulates 
require that service providers establish compensation schemes applicable when quality 
of service standards is not met, this without prejudice to the right of an aggrieved 
consumer to seek civil redress. It was suggested by this regulator that consumers 
should be entitled to redress where it results that a service provider has been 
engaging in unfair commercial practices.  
A consumer organisation said that it would be beneficial to provide for contractual 
consequences, where  an unfair commercial practice has impacted negatively on the 
consumer’s transaction to buy-particular reference was made to consumer credit and 
home loans. 
 
19 See Civil Code – Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta – Part II, Title IV Sub-title I in particular article 974 et 
seq.  
20 See decision dated 11 July 2016 of the First Hall of the Civil Court in the names Evelyn Farrugia et vs 
Global Capital Financial Management Unit Limited, whereby the Court ordered defendant company to 
compensate consumers who had suffered substantial financial losses as a result of gross negligence and 
trickery by the said company.  
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1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
There are two aspects to consider. One is regulatory intervention in curbing the use of 
unfair terms, and the other is the use of civil redress by consumers in relation to the 
use of such terms in contracts to which they are party to.  
To date formal regulatory intervention has been minimal. However in some instances 
issues were resolved through negotiation between the competent regulatory authority 
and the non-compliant business. As a result various issues were resolved following 
voluntary compliance by the business concerned.  
There have been some cases whereby consumers contested certain terms in contracts 
they were a party to and where a request for partial or full nullity of the contract was 
granted by the competent court.21 
Overall the civil redress measures applicable are effective. However consumers have 
rarely utilized the possibility of making collective actions in seeking redress, including 
cases where consumers were collectively impacted negatively by the same term/s (the 
law introducing collective actions for consumers was introduced four years ago). 
Measures should be considered to facilitate such actions.   
A consumer organisation observed that there may be a lack of awareness of the 
general remedies available at law in relation to unfair contract terms including even 
amongst the legal profession.  
Other interviewees (a public authority and business organisations) said that a 
principle-based approach is effective, whereas another interviewee (a consumer 
organisation) noted that whilst the applicable norms were transposed correctly, in 
practice they are ineffective as there is simply no enforcement. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
In the case of Malta, a black list approach has been adopted, therefore in practice one 
cannot comment about the effectiveness of an indicative (grey) list. The Minister 
responsible for consumer affairs after consultation with the (Maltese) Consumer Affairs 
Council has the faculty of amending this black list.22  
The consumer organisation expressed its preference for a black list as this has the 
merit of providing certainty (see below next answer).   
Some interviewees (businesses organisations and a public authority) consider that the 
indicative list of unfair terms in the Annex to the Directive works in practice.  
Another interviewee (a consumer organisation) said that in the present circumstances 
it is not possible to comment about the practical effectiveness of the list, given the 
21 See for example F(Advertising) Limited (C27689) vs Joe u Nathalie konjugi Mifsud decided by the First 
Hall of the Civil Curt on the 21 November 2014. In this case the Court specifically made reference to a 
term include in the ‘black list’ of terms under article 44 of the Consumer Affairs Act.  
22 See article 44 of the Consumer Affairs Act (Chapter 378 of the Laws of Malta).  
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very limited reference to the list whether by the competent public authority or in the 
course of civil lawsuits. 
    
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
In the case of Malta, a black list has been adopted. The inclusion of such a list has 
been instrumental in providing clarity in relation to specific cases of unfair terms and 
is considered by the consumer organisation as an important measure in protecting the 
rights of consumers in such instances even though limited reference has in practice 
been made to the list. 
A consumer organisation favours having a definitive list of terms which at law are 
considered as unfair as this facilitates matters effectively, serving to curb the use of 
the relevant terms. Conversely having an indicative list may give rise to doubt and 
conflicting interpretations.    
A public authority noted that the black list serves for classification and guidance in 
identifying terms which are unfair, noting that such a list has a positive impact on  
consumers who can rely on a definitive (black) list rather than a purely indicative 
(grey) list. 
No other specific comments were made.     
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
The effects of the court decisions given to date have been limited to the specific cases 
dealt with. Under Maltese law, the rule of precedent does not apply and a court is not 
necessarily bound to follow the same line of thought taken by another court deciding a 
similar case, though of course due weight is given to any previous judgements. 
A consumer organisation noted that the number of cases is low, and there has been 
no general application in these cases. This association argued that this impacts on the 
effectiveness of the measures which though they exist on paper, are in practice never 
applied. The main issue appears to relate to the overall lack of awareness even 
amongst the legal profession, of the importance of the legal provisions on unfair 
terms.  
This organisation further remarked that there are various useful tools at law which 
however are barely used, and which if used properly could serve to protect the 
legitimate interests of consumers. This situation is demonstrated by the few cases 
filed before the Maltese courts on this subject. Hence to take one example there has 
to be date been no lawsuits before the Competition and Consumer Appeals Tribunal 
dealing with an injunction order (compliance order) relating to the use of a term 
considered as unfair (this Tribunal was set up in 2011).  
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• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Under Maltese law – and case law interpreting that law – contractual transparency 
requirements when applied have proved to be effective in dealing with terms which 
were considered to be unfair.23 Maltese law – notably articles 44 to 47 of the 
Consumer Affairs Act – applies to all types of terms in business to consumer contracts 
(B2C) including those which may have been individually negotiated.24  
A public authority remarked that by ensuring contractual transparency in line with the 
UCTD, consumers are empowered and given the necessary information to exercise 
their rights. As a result overall effectiveness can be assessed throughout the complaint 
handling process and everyday dealings with consumers.  
Two business organisations commented positively whereas a consumer organisation 
said that in practice there was no effect whatsoever.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
The applicable provisions under Maltese law (see also previous reply) extend to 
individually negotiated terms. The law makes no exemption and simply applies the 
protection afforded under the norms regulating unfair terms to all contracts 
irrespective of whether the terms have been individually negotiated or not. This 
approach is seen by the consumer organisation as a positive measure in favour of 
consumers.   
One interviewee (a public consumer advisory body) said that the extension to 
individually negotiated terms is a positive measure in favour of consumers, whereas 
another interviewee (a consumer organisation) observed that in Malta’s case 
application of the UCTD as implemented under national law applies to all terms 
including those individually negotiated. This places consumers at an advantage doing 
away with possible issues as to whether the term was or was not individually 
negotiated. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
National courts have not undertaken an ‘active role’ by invoking the unfairness of a 
term ex officio. No reference has ever been made by national courts seeking guidance 
from CJEU in this regard.  
An administrative remedy is applicable since the Director General Consumer Affairs 
(MCCAA) may issue a compliance order on any person (including any business) 
requiring the deletion or alteration of any terms in a consumer contract which the DG 
23 Vella Gera Ian thesis entitled Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts under Maltese Law’ , see pages 84 
et seq.  
24 See articles 44 and 45 of the Consumer Affairs Act. See for example court decisions in F Advertising 
Limited (C-27689) vs Anthony u Mary Rose konjugi Tabone decided by the Court of Magistrates (Malta on 
the 4 October 201, F (Advertising) Limited (C27689) vs Joe u Nathalie konjugi Mifsud decided by the First 
Hall of the Civil Court on the 21 November 2014, and F (Advertising) Limited (C27689) vs Anthony Falzon 
et decided by the First Hal of the Civil Court on the 30 November 2012.  
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considers to be unfair in accordance with the provisions of articles 44 to 47 of the 
Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378). The DG is further empowered to incorporate any 
terms in a consumer contract which they consider to be necessary to better inform 
consumers, or for preventing a significant imbalance, for the benefit of consumers.25 
Overall interviewees commented positively about the effectiveness of the sanction. 
One interviewee (a consumer organisation) commented however that sanctions work 
only if the case is taken to court, observing that very often consumers do not seek 
redress before the courts because of the money and time involved. This same 
organisation argued that there is an urgent need for better law enforcement by the 
competent public authorities. It further noted that conversely business is adequately 
resourced in dealing with court action that may arise in this regard whereas 
consumers are not.  
Another interviewee (another consumer organisation) said that the sanction is 
laudable, however in practice if the issue is the subject of litigation, then court 
proceedings can be lengthy, time-consuming and (unless it is a claim under €3,500 in 
which the issue may end up before the CCT (‘Consumer Claims Tribunal’)) costly to 
pursue. In most cases where large commercial interests are involved, consumers 
invariably face an uphill struggle as such firms are supported by specialist lawyers.     
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The low level of litigation relating to unfair terms, reveals not that the use of such 
terms does not exist in Malta, but rather that limited recourse is made by aggrieved 
parties to the provisions at law which protect their rights in such instances. It is here 
not a question of the law being deficient, but of the need to promote more awareness 
about the practical application of the norms under national legislation which 
implement the UCTD.  
A consumer organisation said that there is not enough awareness about the remedies 
provided for as a result of the national law implementing the UCTD, referring to the 
low number of compliance (injunction) orders issued, and the low number of lawsuits 
relating to the UCTD even within the context of purely civil lawsuits between 
consumers and traders. This organisation argued that the remedies at law are barely if 
ever used.  It is not simply an issue of informing consumers, but possibly also of 
‘educating’ the legal profession who ultimately in the case of civil disputes involving 
the use of unfair terms, advise consumers how best to proceed at law when seeking 
redress.  
A public consumer advisory organisation said that a graphical (or visual) presentation 
would help. It did not however list any best practices in Malta. No other specific 
comments were made.   
 
25 See article 94(1)(a) of the Consumer Affairs Act – Chapter 378 of the Laws of Malta. To date no such 
orders have been issued, though in some instances informal negotiations were held and matters resolved 
accordingly. The various sector specific authorities who can, in relation to certain consumer laws that they 
enforce, issue similar compliance orders have similar though not identical powers. Of particular interest is 
the faculty of the DG Consumer Affairs in the case of unfair contract terms to incorporate terms which 
they consider to be necessary for the better information of consumers which is not applicable in the case 
of most of the sector specific authorities (other than the MFSA).   
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1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
There has been very little debate on this point as recourse to the general fairness 
clause has been minimal. The main concern is tied mainly to a lack of reference to the 
clause which might indicate also that there is no sufficient understanding of the 
principle underlying the application of such a clause.   
On the basis of the responses given and of case law there does not appear to be an 
issue with regard to the above. In particular both the business sector and the 
consumer organisations in their responses did not remark or note any specific issues 
with regard to the general fairness clause and the understanding of the principle 
underlying such a clause.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
One interviewee (a business organisation) said that a barrier to cross-border trade 
may exist but did not elaborate. The other interviewees did not express any concerns 
or make any adverse comments.   
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
A consumer organisation was adamant on the importance of Malta’s retaining the 
faculty to go beyond the minimum requirements and cater for individually negotiated 
contracts, and include other ‘unfair’ terms on the black list of terms applicable under 
Maltese law (as is currently the position under Maltese Law). No other specific 
comments were made by the other interviewees.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
If such a measure is taken forward, then given the concerns expressed by the 
consumer organisations, the remedies available should at least initially be limited to 
purely civil redress by the aggrieved traders.   
Two business organisations said that they believe that there is a need to strengthen 
the protection of businesses (especially SMEs). A consumer organisation noted that if 
such measure is taken forward, the rights and remedies that consumers enjoy must 
not be negatively impacted in so far as the competent regulatory authorities may 
consequently be unable to cope with effective monitoring of unfair terms that impact 
consumers. No other specific comments were made.  
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 • Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Business organisations agree that such a system of protection would be appropriate 
for B2B transactions. One organisation observed that protection in the UCTD based on 
the concept of good faith and significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations would be a step forward.  
Other interviewees did not make any specific comments.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
One business organisation argued that protection is required especially when there is 
an imbalance of power between the traders concerned, whereas another said that 
protection should be extended to all aspects referred to above. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
No remarks were forthcoming on this point.  
If such a measures is taken forward then certain terms included in the Annex to the 
UCTD should be included (though obviously the wording should be amended where 
applicable) such as those listed in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the Annex to the 
UCTD.  
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
A similar provision should be introduced given that in some instances there may be an 
evident imbalance of resources - for example contractual agreements between a large 
commercial bank and a SME with limited resources. It is suggested that the 
application of such requirements should be the norm in all transactions where there is 
a clear disparity between the parties involved including those relating to B2B.  
Two business organisations said that there is such a need in B2B transactions. No 
other comments were made. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
There is no reason why it would not bring such benefits. It would enable businesses 
especially SMEs to negotiate with more confidence even with regard to cross-border 
trade, in the knowledge that they too have certain remedies if such unfair terms are 
inserted in the contracts entered into. One cannot ignore the reality that in some 
commercial transactions there may be a considerable disparity between the 
businesses concerned – for example on the one hand a large multinational firm 
dealing with a small local SME with limited human and financial resources. 
Two business organisations argued in favour of an extension, with one of these 
organisations emphasising that this would provide for a level playing field between 
different traders of possibly unequal resources.  
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• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Such an extension should positively impact on SMEs, leading to innovation and new 
market opportunities as it would allow SMEs to conduct business with more confidence 
in the knowledge that they too have some protection at law in relation to the 
application of the norms under the UCTD at least in so far as civil redress is 
concerned. This consideration is particularly relevant in a small nation like Malta where 
many businesses are small undertakings.  
One business organisation replied in the affirmative. No other specific responses were 
given.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Overall such an extension would have more positive than negative consequences. The 
sole reservation voiced by one of the consumer organisations, was that whilst 
protection by way of civil remedies should be considered vis-a-vis SMEs dealing with 
larger businesses, one should act with extreme caution in requiring regulatory 
intervention by the competent national consumer authorities if this impacts negatively 
on the regulatory role of such public authorities in protecting consumer rights. 
A business organisation said that the benefits would exceed the negative 
consequences, but did not elaborate. No other specific points were made. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?26  
To date the injunction procedure (under Maltese law the term used to refer to 
injunction procedure is ‘compliance order’) has been barely used. Moreover no cross-
border injunction has to date ever been made by any Maltese qualified entity. 
The transposition of the ID under Maltese law is in part catered for under the 
Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378) which is enforced by the DG Consumer Affairs within 
the MCCAA, and in part by various sector specific public authorities or regulators 
administrating other consumer protection laws relating to different sectors27 (see 
below reply to 1.3.3.). 
There is a lack of awareness, and possibly even some confusion, about the existing 
injunction procedure under Maltese law, by some interviewees including by some of 
the entities listed as ‘qualified entities’ and therefore entitled at law to seek the issue 
of an injunction order. This appears to be the main problem rather than the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the procedure per se. One also needs to take into 
account that some of the qualified entities – in particular the consumer organisations – 
26  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
27 Hence for example the Malta Tourism Authority deals with injunctions – ‘compliance orders’ in so far as 
these relate to timeshare and package travel directives.  
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lack the human and financial resources to adequately pursue requests for the issue of 
an injunction order under Maltese law, let alone in other MS.   
A sector specific regulator observed that in the sector it regulates the national 
measures implementing the ID have never been used. It remarked that an option to 
be considered would be to give it concurrent powers under the applicable provisions of 
the Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378) to enforce the relevant provisions implementing 
the UCPD and the UCTD in so as these related to that sector. This would have the 
merit of ensuring that enforcement measures are taken directly by the specialised 
sector specific regulator.  
Another sector specific regulator said that under art. 94 of Cap. 378, as a qualified 
entity it may formally request the DG Consumer Affairs to issue a compliance order 
(injunction order) in relation to unfair commercial practices or unfair contract terms 
impacting the sector that it regulates. This regulator observed that it has on more 
than one occasion used this tool. 
A public authority remarked that it considers the injunction procedure as a necessary 
tool to deal with consumer rights violations, and that such a procedure is an effective 
tool where other means of enforcement are less appropriate.  
One of the consumer organsisations said that it lacks practical experience, noting that 
injunctions are ‘beyond’ its remit.   
Another consumer organisation said that the effect of the use of injunction procedure 
in contributing to a reduction in infringements is to date practically nil. This 
organisation referred to a request it had made to a public authority to issue an interim 
order on the basis of unfair commercial practices committed by a public transport 
service provider. The public authority in question declined on the basis of the principle 
of lex specialis, arguing that it had no remit to investigate the case and to consider the 
issue of a compliance order. The said consumer organisation then took the public 
authority to court. In 2014 the consumer organisation won the case but the public 
authority appealed this decision.  The case is currently pending before the Court of 
Appeal.   
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The injunction procedure has rarely been used. Based on this consideration, it is 
difficult to establish whether the measures under national legislation implementing the 
ID have proved to be effective.  
This said, in some instances issues of non-compliance were resolved without the need 
to have recourse to the issue of a formal compliance (injunction) order. It appears 
that in some cases the consequence of facing administrative fines coupled with the 
publication of corrective statements (and therefore negative publicity in the media), 
effectively acts to persuade some businesses to comply voluntarily rather than face a 
compliance order coupled with the attendant sanctions and negative publicity in the 
media. In a small country like Malta negative publicity rather than punitive sanctions 
can be much more ‘persuasive’ on non-compliant businesses.  
A consumer organisation noted this procedure has barely been used and therefore it is 
difficult to gauge its effectiveness, noting that as far as it is aware this procedure has 
only been used once, adding that it has some concern as to whether enough is being 
done to make the most effective use of the available legal tools to protect consumer 
interests. No other specific comments were made. 
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 • Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Under the Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378) the injunction procedure applies to all 
provisions of the said Act and any regulations made thereunder. Regulations made 
under the Act which are currently not listed in Annex I of the ID and in relation to 
which the injunction procedure applies, include:  
• SL 378.10 – Home Loan Regulations;  
• SL 378.14 – Denied Boarding (Compensation and Assistance to Air Passengers) 
Regulations (which relates to EU Regulation No. 261/2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and repealing 
Regulation (EC) no. 295/91); 
• SL 378.19 Consumer Rights Regulations (which transposes Directive 
2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights). 
Furthermore the Minister for consumer affairs may extend the application of the 
injunction procedure to any other laws dealing with consumer rights. 
A consumer organisation noted that the injunction procedure covers most consumer 
laws enforced by the DG Consumer Affairs within the MCCAA including the Consumer 
Rights Regulation and the Home Loan Regulations.  
No other specific comments were made. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
Lack of awareness about the availability of the injunction procedure at law, and the 
rights that qualified entities enjoy thereunder, is one of the main ‘obstacles’ (see also 
previous replies in this Part). In one instance from the reply given during an interview 
it was obvious that the interviewee in question was not even aware of its right to ask 
for the issue of an injunction order under different consumer protection laws.  
The other more practical issue is the lack of resources – both financial and human - 
especially in the case of consumer organisations to formally request the issue of 
injunction orders by the competent regulatory bodies.  
The ‘obstacle’ at this stage is not the actual norms under national law which transpose 
the ID, but the lack of awareness about the said norms by some of the ‘qualified 
entities’ entitled under Maltese law to seek the issue of an injunction order.  
A public authority said that a main obstacle is the time it takes for a case to be 
decided by the CCAT once a compliance order has been contested.  
A consumer organisation referred to the lack of financial and human resources 
available to consumer associations as constituting an obstacle in its capacity to 
request the issue of injunction orders.  
No other specific comments were made.  
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• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
A consumer organisation argued that the ID should apply as a matter of course to all 
consumer protection legislation, including laws in the sector specific areas such as 
energy, telecommunications and financial services which aim at providing measures to 
protect consumers. This organisation argued that this would be a positive measure, 
adding that there is no reason why this should not be the case. The same organisation 
added that one must ensure that there is adequate awareness about the existence of 
injunction procedure, the benefits of using such a procedure and the possible positive 
end results for consumers.   
A public authority suggested the extension of ID to the Mortgage Directive 
2014/17/EU. The same interviewee said that it did not agree that the ID should be 
extended to cover collective business interests, but did not explain why. It also 
observed that it is a standard practice that the injunctions procedure is availed of 
when other measures have not proved to be adequate or appropriate to address a 
specific issue. It did not however elaborate further on this practice.   
A business organisation argued that the ID should be extended to collective business 
interests.   
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
A consumer organisation said that the injunction procedure in such instances would be 
effective only if qualified entities had the adequate resources to act in such instances, 
adding that the consumer organisation lacks the adequate resources to deal with 
infringements in Malta.  
A public authority noted that to date it does not result that the injunction procedure 
has ever been used in such instances. 
  
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
The main issue relates to the lack of resources - both financial and human - in dealing 
with the application of injunctions in another MS. This in practice applies to both 
consumer organisations and to the competent public authorities in Malta. 
A consumer organisation said that lack of resources - both human and financial – is 
the main obstacle, adding that in practice it is practically impossible to undertake 
effective action in another Member State let alone in Malta (see previous answers in 
this subsection).  
A public authority noted that any enforcement action is ultimately only effective if the 
trader has sufficient assets in that particular jurisdiction, hence in order to ensure that 
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enforcement action is effective one needs to be able to seek an injunction in that 
Member State where the trader is based/their assets are.  
No other specific remarks were made. 
   
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
There are no best practices in Malta which could serve as a model for the injunction 
procedure at EU level. The approach from legislative and enforcement angles is to 
have the injunction procedure applicable to the various public authorities responsible 
for the different national laws which transposed the EU Directives listed in the Annex 
to the ID (see also replies below).  
In some instances recourse requesting the issue of injunction order under the 
applicable injunction procedures in Malta was not undertaken as a result of informal 
negotiations between the competent public authority and the non-compliant business 
concerned whereby the latter agreed to voluntarily remedy matters rather than face 
the consequences of an injunction order, resultant sanctions and negative publicity. 
A public authority noted that in the case of conflict of jurisdiction the ‘lis pendens’ rule 
should be followed in relation to concurrent measures.  
A consumer organisation said that it lacks the effective capacity to be able to take 
action in other MS. At present this however is not a major issue. According to this 
organisation what is effectively the main concern in this context is the lack of 
adequate resources to take action in Malta. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The transposition of the ID was made through various laws enforced by different 
public authorities and sector specific regulators depending on the subject matter as 
reflected in the Annex of the ID which lists the various consumer protection directives 
in relation to which the ID applies.  
The majority of Directives as listed in the aforesaid Annex to the ID are catered for in 
the Consumer Affairs Act (Cap 378) which law is enforced by the DG Consumer Affairs 
within the MCCAA. The Directives in relation to which the injunction procedure as 
applied under the Consumer Affairs Act are (or were in the case of those Directives 
which have since 2009 been superseded by other EU legislation):  
• Council Directive 85/577/ECC (now superseded by the Directive 2011/83/EU on 
consumer rights); 
• Council Directive 87/102/EC (now superseded by Directive 2008/48/EC on 
consumer credit); 
• Council Directive 93/13/EEC; 
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• Directive 97/7/EC; 
• Directive 1999/44/EC;  
• Directive 2005/29/EC. 
The other Directives listed in the Annex to the ID are dealt with by other public 
authorities or sector specific regulators who under the relevant legislation can issue 
injunction orders28 or their equivalent. Hence with regard to:  
• Council Directive 90/314/EEC (on package travel) and Directive 2008/122/EC 
(on timeshare) – the competent sector specific authority which can issue 
injunction orders is the Malta Tourism Authority;29 
• Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities - the competent sector specific 
authority which can issue injunction orders is the Malta Broadcasting 
Authority;30 
• Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects on information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce in the internal market - the competent sector 
specific authority which can issue injunction orders is the Malta 
Communications Authority;31  
• Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code relating to medicinal products 
for human use - the competent sector specific authority which can issue 
compliance orders is the Medicines Authority;32  
• Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services – the competent sector specific authority which can issue compliance 
orders is the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA).33 
No specific comments were made by the interviewees. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The injunction procedures as explained in the previous reply are dealt with under 
different laws enforced by different public authorities depending on the subject matter 
in question.  
The bulk of consumer protection legislation covered by the ID is dealt with under the 
Consumer Affairs Act enforced by the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA. The Directives 
covered under that law include the UCTD, the UCPD, the PID, the Consumer Credit 
Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive. The procedural norms followed by 
specific sector regulators stated in previous reply are in substance similar to those 
under the Consumer Affairs Act, in that qualified entities may ask for the issue of an 
28 The term used in Maltese law to refer to injunction orders is in most instances ‘compliance order’. See for 
example Part XI of Chapter 378 of the Laws of Malta.   
29 See Subsidiary Legislation 409.17 entitled “Injunctions for the Protection of the Interests of Consumers 
(Package Travel and Protection of Buyers in contracts for time sharing of immovable property) 
Regulations.   
30 See Subsidiary Legislation 460.12 entitled “Advertising, Sponsorship and Teleshopping (protection of 
Consumers’’ Interest) (Television Broadcasting Injunction) Order.   
31 See the Electronic Commerce Act – Cap. 426 of the Laws of Malta.  
32 See Subsidiary Legislation 458.51 entitled “Medicines Products (Injunction to advertising) Regulations.   
33 See Subsidiary Legislation 330.07 entitled “Distance selling (Retail financial services) Regulations.  
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injunction order. The competent public authority has the faculty of issuing an 
injunction order and imposing penalties if the order is not complied with, also requiring 
publication where necessary of that order. There is also the right of appeal from the 
decision of the competent authority in deciding whether or not to issue an injunction 
order.  
A consumer organisation noted that the measures give considerable leeway to the DG 
Consumer Affairs MCCAA not simply in dealing with any act or omission in this regard, 
but actually empowering the DG to take measures to ensure compliance (see art. 
94(1) of Cap. 378).  
No other specific comments were made. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues 
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
No research has to date been conducted in this regard.  
In practice there are no fees if a qualified entity decides to formally request the issue 
of an injunction order. Substantial litigation costs may however be incurred if the 
competent regulatory authority to whom a request for the issue of a compliance order 
is made, decides not to uphold a request and the qualified entity decides to contest 
that ruling before the competent adjudicative review forum.  
A consumer organisation observed that in practice no benefits can be identified since 
there has been no pro-active enforcement. It added that there would be substantial 
benefits if there is pro-active enforcement, noting that these Directives are very 
important for a small country like Malta where competition is restricted due to the 
small size of the market.  Effective enforcement of the norms reflected in these 
Directives in practice would result in great benefits to consumers and would make 
local markets more competitive.  
This consumer organisation further noted that the costs to exercise these rights 
through the legal system are potentially high, adding however that in civil disputes 
where the amount of money involved is small, a consumer can make use of the 
Consumers Claims Tribunal (CCT) where costs are reasonable and the procedure 
relatively straight forward. 
The same consumer organisation referred to its experience, whereby it requested the 
DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA to initiate an investigation under article 12A and to issue 
an interim measure pending such an investigation.34 The request related to allegations 
about the alleged shortcomings of a public transport service provider which - 
according to the consumer organisation in question - constituted an unfair commercial 
practice. This organisation said that the DG Consumer Affairs refused to take any 
34 The consumer organisation concerned did not actually ask for the issue of an injunction order but for an 
interim order. However the experience of this organisation is relevant in that it illustrates the difficulties 
that such organisations can face if the issue ends up in court.  
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measures as requested, with the end result that it had to undertake legal proceedings 
to contest the DG’s position, taxing its limited resources in the process.35    
A public authority noted that the benefits for consumers as a result of the protection 
provided by the UCPD and the UCTD are that consumers have their rights set out in a 
legal instrument which identifies and explicitly prohibits unfair commercial practices 
and unfair contract terms. In relation to the costs this authority observed that 
consumers can exercise their rights under these Directives by taking action before the 
CCT for a relatively small fee.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
No research has been conducted and no statistics are available on this point.  
A public authority argued that compliance with the consumer protection norms that 
each trader should uphold, creates a level playing field, whereby traders compete in a 
competitive environment where due consideration is given in providing adequate 
customer care.  
A business organisation said that the benefits for traders as a result of such measures 
militate in favour of a level playing level, whilst curbing dishonest practices, thereby 
enabling honest traders to expand their business. 
  
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
A public authority said that compliance with the requirements of the said Directives 
obviously meant additional costs on traders, adding however that consumers would be 
more inclined to deal with a trader who they know is fully compliant with the said 
requirements.  
Similarly a business organisation noted that effective compliance leads to additional 
costs. 
No research was undertaken and statistics are available. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
A public authority noted that in order to have fully effective enforcement one needs to 
have ample human and financial resources.  
No other specific comments were made.  
No statistical information or studies are available.  
The costs involved would be that of the use of officers of the competent regulator in 
investigating the alleged non-compliance. If a regulatory measure such as injunction 
order is taken, and this is contested, one would need to factor in the litigation costs of 
defending before the competent court the regulatory decision taken.  
35 See Benny Borg Bonello nomine vs Awtorita ta’ Malta ghall-Kompetizzjoni u ghall-Affarijiet tal-
Konsumatur u d-Direttur Generali (Affarijiet tal-Konsumatur). The case was in substance decided in 
favour of the consumer association by the Competition and Consumer Appeals Tribunal on the 26 
February 2014 and is now before the Court of Appeal following an appeal by the Director General of the 
decision given by the Tribunal.  
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• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
From information available, no injunction orders have been issued by any of the 
competent public authorities (other than the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA) empowered 
to do so with regard to the sector specific laws that they enforce and which empower 
them to issue injunction (or ‘compliance’) orders. 
A consumer organisation noted that a clear indication that the ID may not have been 
implemented in a cost-effective manner is the low number of injunction orders issued 
and of lawsuits before the CCAT since the establishment of this adjudicative review 
forum in 2011 with only one case being filed further to the issue of an injunction 
order.  
A public authority noted that there is no indication that the directives in question have 
not been implemented. A similar response was given by a business organisation. No 
other specific comments were made.  
  
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
There does not appear to be any plausible possibility of lowering the costs involved.  
The issue within a local context to date does not appear to relate to the costs incurred 
but to the lack of awareness about the measures available at law. In practice there are 
no significant costs for qualified entities in filing a formal request to a competent 
public authority to take regulatory measures, in particular to issue an injunction order. 
Costs will occur if regulatory measures taken by the competent public authority are 
contested in court and the qualified entity is a party to such proceedings.  
There will also be costs related to the effective enforcement of any final orders issued. 
In practice however no measures can be identified that may significantly reduce such 
costs without compromising the effectiveness of the regulatory measures that need to 
be taken.  
A public authority observed that effective enforcement comes at a price, whereas a 
consumer organisation suggested that a practical and simple measure would be to 
extend the upper limit of the sum of the claims made by consumers that may be 
referred to and determined by the CCT.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
Formal enforcement proceedings relating to infringements of both the UCPD and the 
UCTD are rare.  
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In the case of injunction orders, to date only two have been issued (relating to alleged 
unfair practices in the telecoms sector). There was a case (in the transport sector) 
where a consumer organisation requested the initiation of investigations and the issue 
of an interim order by the competent national consumer authority (namely the DG 
Consumer Affairs – MCCAA). The said authority declined to proceed arguing that the 
matter falls within the remit of the sector specific regulator. The consumer 
organisation contested this ruling with the court of first instance deciding in favour of 
the consumer organisation. The issue is currently pending before the Court of Appeal 
following an appeal for the decision of the court of first instance (in this case the 
CCAT).   
In practice many issues investigated by the competent national consumer authority 
are resolved after informal negotiations with the businesses concerned, with such 
businesses preferring to rectify matters voluntarily rather than face formal regulatory 
measures (see above previous replies on the same subject).  
A consumer organisation said that the level of awareness overall is weak, though there 
are specific sectors – such as telecommunications and transport – where the level of 
awareness amongst the service providers is much better.  
Another consumer organisation noted that consumers are increasingly becoming more 
aware of the rights they have at law. However implementation is far from transparent 
and the terms of a contract not always understood properly by some consumers.  
A sector specific regulator observed that the service providers it regulates are aware 
of the requirements emanating from the said two Directives.   
Another sector specific regulator noted that in one of the sectors it regulates there is 
no specific data about the awareness of either business or consumers in relation to the 
UCPD or the UCTD, noting however that the MCCAA does provide information over the 
various media about the norms applicable under horizontal national legislation.  
A third sector specific regulator said that in the sectors that it regulates the major 
businesses have a dedicated regulatory team which monitors regulatory requirements 
closely. It added that in relation to the complaints/enquiries that it received from 
consumers about alleged non-compliance with the UCPD or the UCTD, it invariably has 
to provide further guidance.  
A public authority said that despite its continuous efforts to inform traders about their 
obligations under the UCPD and the UCTD there are still traders – especially those 
operating small businesses – who are not well-informed. 
A business organisation said that there is lack of awareness both amongst businesses 
and consumers about their rights and duties under these Directives. Conversely 
another business organisation said that businesses are aware of their rights and duties 
whereas there is not enough awareness amongst consumers.  
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The enforcement of UCPD, PID and UCTD is the sole responsibility of the DG 
Consumer Affairs MCCAA, whereas the sector specific rules on consumer protection 
are the responsibility of the various sector specific regulators – Malta Tourism 
Authority (travel package, timeshare and tourism related issues), Malta 
Communications Authority (electronic communications, e-commerce and postal 
services), the Regulator for Energy and Water Services (energy including electricity 
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and gas, and water), the Malta Financial Services Authority (financial services), and 
the Authority for Transport in Malta (transport, including public transport). 
There are no formal institutionalised cooperation agreements between the DG 
Consumer Affairs MCCAA and any of the sector specific regulators. However most of 
the sector specific regulators cooperate informally with the DG Consumer Affairs 
communicating as necessary to take coordinated action where necessary.  
Some of the aforesaid regulators are considered under Maltese law as ‘qualified 
entities’ and as such can request other public authorities – notably the DG  Consumer 
Affairs – to issue injunction orders if there is a breach of UCPD or UCTD relating to the 
sectors that they supervise.36 This to date has occurred at least in relation to one 
sector specific regulator – the MCA - which requested the issue of a compliance order 
(injunction order) by the DG Consumer Affairs for an alleged breach of the norms 
relating to UCPD.  
A sector specific regulator said that it had as a qualified entity requested on ’several 
occasions’ the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA (and before the MCCAA, the former 
Consumer & Competition Department) to issue injunction orders in relation to 
infringements of the national law implementing the UCTD and the UCPD in relation to 
the sector it regulates. No specific figures where provided.37 The same regulator said 
that it does not have any statistics on the application of UCTD or UCPD, as it is not the 
competent authority for the enforcement of these directives, adding that it is 
responsible for the enforcement of sector specific rules whereas the DG Consumer 
Affairs MCCAA is responsible for horizontal consumer protection rules. It also noted 
that whilst it has no formal institutionalised agreement with the DG Consumer Affairs, 
it communicates regularly on an informal basis with the DG’s office.  
Other sector specific regulators noted that to date they have not requested the issue 
of any injunction orders by the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA.  
One business organisation said that as far it is aware there is no formal 
institutionalised cooperation between the different public authorities and the sector 
specific regulators.  
A consumer organisation said that different public authorities are responsible for these 
two sets of rules adding that sector specific regulators as qualified entities may apply 
with the national consumer enforcement authority if they consider that there is a 
breach of UCPD or UCTD in relation to the sectors that they supervise. It added that it 
is not aware of any memorandum of understanding or agreement for co-operation, 
between on the one hand the national consumer enforcement authority and on the 
other hand the various sector specific regulators. 
 
36 Article 2 of the Consumer Affairs Act interprets a qualified entity as meaning amongst other entities “an 
independent public body, having a legitimate interest in ensuring the protection of the collective interests 
of consumers in Malta”. In the laws establishing some of the sector specific regulators such as the MCA 
and REWS one of the objectives listed is precisely the protection of consumer interests. See for example 
art 4 of the Malta Communications Authority Act (Cap.418) and article 4 of the Electronic 
Communications (Regulation) Act (Cap. 399) and article 5 of the Regulator for Energy and Water 
Services Act (Cap. 545).   
37 On the basis of the information available only two compliance orders (relating to the same issue but 
against different companies) have to date been issued by the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA. No 
information was provided as to the number of the actual formal requests for the issue of an injunction 
order.   
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• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
The competent national consumer authority (MCCAA) and the sector specific 
regulators co-operate informally with each other when an issue arises which may be in 
breach of both horizontal consumer law (e.g. involves a breach of UCPD or UCTD) and 
sector specific consumer protection rules. This for example has occurred on various 
occasions in the telecoms sector where the two authorities concerned – namely the 
DG Consumer Affairs within the MCCAA and the MCA - acted in liaison to ensure that 
the issue was effectively dealt with, whilst avoiding overlap.  
As stated elsewhere, there are no formal MoUs though in some instances such as in 
the telecoms sector the sector specific regulator and DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA are 
required by law to co-operate and share information within ‘an appropriate timeframe 
taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the issues involved’.38 
A consumer organisation referred to the Consumer Affairs Council which has the role 
of coordinating and enhancing cooperation, noting that to date there has not been 
much development in this area. It noted that some years back informal meetings were 
being held between different regulators and the MCCAA. This initiative however was 
discontinued. The same organisation suggested that sector specific regulators should 
be empowered (limitedly to the sectors that they are responsible for) to have direct 
enforcement powers in relation to the applicable national legislation relating to UCPD 
and to UCTD. Alternatively it suggested that one should consider having a 
comprehensive ‘general’ consumer authority which can take regulatory action both 
under the horizontal consumer law and under the sector specific consumer law. This 
would ensure for more effective regulatory action.  
A public authority said that there are no conflicting provisions. In doing so it referred 
to the legal norm that ‘lex specialis derogate generalis’ – which provides that the 
sector specific rule prevails over any general rule which may be in conflict. 
A sector specific regulator noted that under the Consumer Affairs Act it has as a 
qualified entity under that law on more than one occasion asked the DG Consumer 
Affairs to issue an injunction order in relation to UCPD and to UCTD, adding that the 
consumer horizontal rules and the sector specific rules do not overlap.   
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
A consumer organisation said that the taking of measures under the two directives 
ultimately lies with the DG Consumer Affairs, whereas sector specific consumer 
protection rules are enforced by the different sector specific regulators. This 
organisation argued in favour of sector specific regulators having direct powers to 
issue injunction orders in relation to both UCPD and UCTD in so far as they relate to 
their respective sectors rather than depending on measures taken by the DG 
Consumer Affairs. This would also do away with potential overlaps and (worse) the 
possibility of conflicting regulatory measures.  
It further argued that direct application by the sector specific regulators would avoid 
overlap and lead to better co-ordination, avoiding the costs related to parallel 
investigations by different regulatory authorities in what (in substance) might be the 
same issue. It also suggested having in place a common data base of any regulatory 
measures taken, observing that this should help to minimise regulatory costs and 
38 See Article 4(9) of the Malta Communications Authority Act – Cap. 418 of the Laws of Malta. 
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allow for more coordination. This organisation argued that ideally there should be one 
focused national authority able to act in a comprehensive manner, applying where 
necessary the national norms which transpose both the UCPD and the UCTD, and the 
sector specific consumer protection norms. It observed that as much as possible one 
should strive to have a comprehensive well-resourced authority able to enforce the 
applicable legislation, arguing that having different authorities may lead to added 
costs and delay in addressing instances of non-compliance which may need to be dealt 
with in short order.  
A public authority said that complementary application may be beneficial, whereas a 
business organisation said that this would be conducive to more transparency.  
A sector specific regulator said that complementary application of UCTP & UCTD has 
the advantage of providing a comprehensive framework whereby consumers are 
consequently protected in most of their interactions with traders. It noted that there 
can be instances where aspects of the same practice are regulated by both sets of 
norms.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Clarification would help considering Malta’s overall regulatory set-up given that the 
norms relating to UCPD and UCTD are the exclusive responsibility of the DG Consumer 
Affairs MCCAA, whereas sector specific consumer protection measures are the 
responsibility of the various sector specific regulators. In practice regulatory issues 
which may cross the remit of the national consumer authority and a sector specific 
regulator are dealt with on an informal and practical basis where the public authorities 
concerned cooperate with each other.  
From the responses provided, it emerges that there are no formal MoUs in place to 
date between on the one hand the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA, and on the other 
hand the sector specific regulators. 
A consumer organisation said that this is an area which the European Commission 
should analyse carefully (taking into account particular national circumstances) with a 
view to eliminating duplication of effort whilst ensuring that practices detrimental to 
consumers are dealt with in a timely and effective manner. 
A sector specific regulator said that clarification would be a positive measure, though 
there does not appear to be a pressing urgency for such a measure in the short term 
as there are no specific sector issues in the sector it regulates relating to either UCPD 
or UCTD.  
Another sector specific regulator said that it regularly receives enquiries/complaints 
from consumers who do not distinguish between sector specific rules and horizontal 
consumer protection rules, and where consequently it has to direct them to the 
MCCAA if the issue relates to a horizontal rule (i.e. involves a possible breach of the 
national law implementing UCPD or UCTD). It observed that more should be done to 
inform consumers about the interplay between sector specific rules and horizontal 
consumer law. 
A public authority said that it is not aware of any need for clarification between the 
sector specific consumer law and horizontal consumer law (notably UCPD and UCTD).  
A business organisation noted that there is a need for clarification with regard to the 
interplay between the sector specific rules and the horizontal rules, as there may be 
some confusion about the proper application of either regime.    
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1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
A public authority said that UCPD and UCTD directives should be limited to business to 
consumer transactions, whereas business organisations said that where a party to the 
transaction is a consumer then the UCPD and UCTD norms should apply.  
A consumer organisation said that if a consumer is acting as a ‘business’ by providing 
services etc. then the same rules should apply.  However, in practice a single 
consumer even when acting as a supplier, has minimal power in contrast to a business 
concern.    
No further comments were made.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
There are no precise definitions under Maltese consumer law in relation to any of 
these terms. There has been one court decision relating to unfair terms whereby the 
court expressly referred to the old age and low level of education of the consumers in 
determining whether the terms of a contract were unfair.39  
There is a general consensus among interviewees that there is scope for a more 
detailed interpretation of such concepts. 
A sector specific regulator commented that it is not aware of any instances whereby 
these concepts have been dealt with in relation to the sectors it regulates or by the 
competent courts. Another sector specific regulator said that to date it has not carried 
out any analysis to determine the use or definitions of such terms which result from 
laws which it does not administer. 
A public authority argued that such terms allow for subjective interpretation and 
therefore further qualification is recommended. 
A business organisation observed that there are different interpretations, noting that 
in Malta ‘vulnerable consumers’ for example are interpreted as including ‘low income’ 
earners. Another business organisation argued that there is scope for a definition of 
the term.  
39 See F(Advertising) Limited (C 27689) vs Joe u Nathalie konjugi Mifsud decided by the First Hall of the Civil 
Court on the 21 November 2014. The Court in deciding that various terms of the contract were unfair 
remarked also that from the evidence it was very clear that the consumers were an elderly couple with a 
basic level of education and were informed of the terms in what the court described as “l-aktar 
telegrafiku” (very telegraphic).The issue related to the agency fees in relation to the sale of a property 
and that the consumers were misled into believing that they were dealing with an estate agency and not 
an advertising firm. In another case again involving fees due to services provided in advertising a 
property – namely Malta Property Auctioneers Limited (C40799) vs Malcolm Becket et decided by the 
First Hall of the Civil Court on the 29 November 2012 – the Court. in determining whether a particular 
term was unfair or not, considered that the consumer in question was a person familiar with business 
transactions and involved in the trusts sector noting that the consumer had stated that he had contact 
with nine other estate agents.   
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A consumer organisation said that to date, in practice, the concepts of ‘vulnerable 
consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ do not effectively have any role in Malta.  The only 
exception is in the electricity market where a certain number of low income consumers 
are given a subsidy.  It commented that it is not aware of any case law on the subject. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
There is a general consensus amongst interviewees that there is scope for more 
specific norms to protect vulnerable consumers providing for clear criteria to identify 
such consumers.  
A consumer organisation emphasised that the UCPD should not be a minimum 
harmonisation version, in particular that the list of practices listed as unfair should be 
a minimum list to which Malta can add further practices particular to national 
circumstances. It emphasised that the UCPD should be a minimum harmonisation 
directive therefore allowing for a Member State to go beyond the consumer protection 
measures therein provided for. In the few cases relating to UCTD there have been 
instances where vulnerable consumers – in particular the elderly and those with a 
basic level of education - were considered to have been taken advantage of, and 
therefore the terms entered agreed to were considered to be invalid (see answer to 
previous question and reference to the case quoted in that reply). This organisation 
suggested that the concept of an unfair term should also factor in criteria such as the 
age and level of education which may render some consumers especially vulnerable.  
A sector specific regulator remarked that on the basis of its experience specific 
provisions protecting vulnerable consumers should be introduced, notably in the 
UCTD. Another sector specific regulator said that it was not aware of any cases in this 
regard in relation to the sector it regulates.  
A public authority suggested that vulnerability of consumers due to old or young age, 
disability etc., should be addressed in a specific manner thereby improving on the 
general rules of UCPD.    
Business organisations noted that the existing rules under UCPD are not adequate vis-
a-vis vulnerable consumers.40  
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The introduction of national legislation transposing the UCPD and UCTD was a positive 
measure. The main issue is that overall there has been limited recourse to the 
protection afforded under the national law implementing these two directives 
especially with regard to UCPD.  
As discussed elsewhere in this report very few regulatory measures have been taken 
despite the fact that the relevant laws have now been in place for several years (UCPD 
was implemented in 2008 and the UCTD in 2000). The consumer organisation 
expressed repeated concern on this point referring both to lack of awareness, possible 
lack of resources, with one of the consumer organisations remarking also that the 
competent authorities are not pro-active enough and should do much more.    
40 See comments Cutajar Sara in her thesis ‘Maximum Harmonisation in EU Consumer Protection Legislation’ 
at pages 106 et seq.   
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A sector specific regulator noted that the implementation of these two directives has 
led to less litigation, though it did not elaborate why. The same regulator said that 
overall protection of consumers has improved following the implementation of these 
directives.  
Another sector specific regulator observed that to date there was no apparent impact 
consequential to these Directives in relation to the sector it regulates.  
A third sector specific regulator said that the implementation of these Directives has 
significantly strenghtened consumer protection in Malta by providing for a 
comprehensive framework to tackle unfair commercial practices. This regulator noted 
that before the implementaton of these Directives, consumers could resort to a 
number of remedies which however existed on a piecemeal basis mainly under general 
civil law. It added however that there is room for more coordinated enforcement 
action by the public authorities and regulators concerned to tackle emerging practices 
which are potentially in breach of these Directives. 
A public authority noted that the protection afforded to consumers as a result of the 
implementation of these Directives has led to significant improvement, but did not 
elaborate.   
Business organisations commented positively about the impact of these two Directives 
in relation to consumer protection in Malta.   
A consumer organisation commented positively on the impact of these Directives, 
however remarked that there is a lack of pro-active enforcement and monitoring by 
the competent authorities.  
Another consumer organisation said that awareness and protection against unfair 
commercial practices has increased mainly because of more use of social media, 
referring to dedicated columns in the media and information sessions on the media. It 
further added that consumer organisations are working more closely with different 
sector specific regulators. It also referred to the increase in cross-border transactions 
using the internet, adding the importance of consumer organisations familiarising 
themselves with new EU laws regulating such transactions and of providing new 
means of redress (it mentioned ODR as an example). 
   
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Some information campaigns have been undertaken. However no surveys have been 
undertaken to establish the level of awareness of the relevant national legislation 
implementing the PID.   
Business organisations replied in the affirmative. Conversely one of the consumer 
organisations replied that this is not necessarily the case, noting that whilst the norms 
in the Directive are positive, it has strong reservations about their effective 
implementation.   
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Overall protection has improved especially within the context of comparative 
advertising which until the introduction of the norms regulating such advertising was 
not expressly dealt with at law. However not that many businesses engage in 
comparative advertising. Furthermore there has only been a handful of lawsuits 
relating to the norms on comparative advertising.    
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Contrasting replies were given by the business organisations. One replied in the 
affirmative whereas the other replied in the negative. No specific reasons by either 
organisation were given for their respective positions.  
No other comments were forthcoming.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Overall there has been improvement in cross-border trade both in the case of 
businesses in Malta, and more so in the case of consumers in Malta to directly 
purchase cross-border from businesses in other MS, especially in relation to certain 
services such purchase of digital content, holidays (especially booking of 
accommodation) amongst other things.  
A public authority remarked that it has become much easier for consumers to 
undertake cross-border transactions, noting that the Directives in question have 
undoubtedly contributed to improvements, providing consumers in Malta with a level 
of consumer protection when undertaking such transactions which is on a par with 
that provided on a national level.   
A business organisation said that it was becoming easier for businesses to conduct 
cross-border trade. Another business organisation conversely replied in the negative. 
Neither organisation elaborated.   
A consumer organisation replied that it is becoming easier for consumers to buy cross-
border, however it remarked that practices such as geo-blocking should be curbed, as 
they contradict the principle of a single market to the detriment of consumers.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
A public authority noted that overall the implementation of the Directives has had a 
positive and significant impact on Malta.  
A sector specific regulator suggested that the measures under the Directives – notably 
UCPD and UCTD – would be more effective if sector specific regulators had concurrent 
powers to enforce the national laws implementing these Directives in so far as these 
related to the sectors that it enforces.  A business organisation remarked that the 
Directives have served as a catalyst for national legislation and other pro-consumer 
measures.  
A consumer organisation said there is more uniformity in the norms applicable, though 
significant differences still exist. Improvements have also resulted due to the work 
done by the ECC (European Consumer Centre in Malta).  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Malta  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in consumer 
contracts 
Consumer Affairs Act 
(Chapter 378 of the Laws 
of Malta) Part VII 
entitled “Unfair Contract 
Terms” – articles 44 to 
47C   
Was enacted as 
per Act XXVI of 
2000 which law 
amended Cap. 378 
introducing the 
measures 
implementing the 
UCTD 
'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
 
Yes Consumer Affairs Act  
Articles 44  
Article 44(2) provides for a black 
list of terms  
The list may be extended by the 
Minister responsible for 
consumer affairs after 
consultation with the Consumer 
Affairs Council [see Article 44(3) 
& (4)] 
not applicable     'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
None none  Not applicable  
Cap. 378   Provisions apply to 
all terms including 
those which are 
individually 
negotiated  
Extensions of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
Yes Consumer Affairs Act  
Article 44 
Article 44(1). Law provides that it 
is unlawful in consumer contracts 
to use unfair terms. The law does 
not include any exceptions or 
qualifications in relation to terms 
that are individually negotiated. 
Hence protection is provided to 
all terms.  
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Cap. 378    Extensions of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No Consumer Affairs Act  
Article 45(2) proviso 
thereto  
Article 45(2) provides that if the 
term is in plain intelligible 
language then the assessment of 
the term shall not relate to the 
adequacy of the price or 
remuneration as against the 
goods/services supplied.  
Directive 2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal 
market 
Consumer Affairs Act 
(Chapter 378 of the Laws 
of Malta) Part VIII 
entitled “Unfair 
commercial practices 
and illicit schemes”, Title 
I “ Unfair commercial 
practices”-  articles 51A 
to 51J   
 
 Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes   Article 51I(e) of Cap. 378    This article states that the 
provisions of Part VIII are without 
prejudice to any requirement 
imposed in any other law  in the 
field of financial services which is 
more restrictive or prescriptive 
that those under the aforesaid 
Part VIII. 
Same as above   Provisions regarding 
immovables going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Article 51I(e) of Cap. 378  Article 51I(e) of Cap. 378 which 
states that the provisions of Part 
VIII are without prejudice to any 
requirement imposed in any 
other law  in the field of 
immovable property which is 
more restrictive or prescriptive 
that those under the aforesaid 
Part VIII 
Same as above   Application of UCPD to 
B2B transactions 
No Not applicable  Measures apply only in relation 
to commercial practices which 
target consumers and not other 
businesses 
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Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection in the 
indication of the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
Consumer Affairs Act 
(Price Indication) 
Regulations 
Subsidiary Legislation 
(SL) 378.09 of the Laws 
of Malta  
 Extension of the 
application to other 
sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No Not applicable   
Same as above   Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes SL 378.09 – regulation 6   Reg. 6 of SL (‘Subsidiary 
Legislation’) 378.09 lists the 
instances to which the said 
norms do not apply namely:  
(a) goods supplied for the 
purpose of re-selling 
(b) goods sold in the course of 
the provision of a service 
(c) sales by auction or sales of 
works of art or antiques  
(d) advertisement for such goods 
unless the price is indicated in the 
advertisement  
     Furthermore the Director 
(Consumer Affairs) may exempt 
other goods if they consider that 
adherence would be ‘excessively 
onerous’ subject to any 
conditions that they may impose.  
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Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising 
Commercial Code (Cap. 
13 of the Laws of Malta)  
Part I  Title II sub-title III 
entitled “Limits of 
Competition” articles 
32A, 32B, 36A and 37  
 None   See articles 32A, 32B and 
37 of Chapter 13  
The remedies available are of a 
civil nature where the injured 
trader may seek redress against 
the offending trader before the 
competent civil court.  
 
A trader who acts in breach of 
prohibitions relating to 
comparative or misleading 
advertising may be sued by the 
injured party for damages or else 
be subject to a penalty. See art. 
37 of Cap. 13.  
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' 
interests* 
Affairs Act (Cap. 378 of 
the Laws of Malta) Part 
XI  
     
Injunctions for the 
Protection of Interests of 
Consumers (Package 
Travel and Protection of 
Buyers in Contracts for 
Time Sharing of 
Immovable Property) 
Regulations – SL 409.17 
of the Laws of Malta  
     
Medicines Products 
(Injunctions to 
Advertising) Regulations 
- S.L. 458.51 of the Laws 
of Malta  
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 SL 460.12 of the Laws of 
Malta entitled: 
‘Advertising, 
Sponsorship 
Teleshopping (Protection 
of Consumers’ Interest) 
(Television Broadcasting 
Injunction) Order.’ 
     
 
SL 330.07 of the Laws of 
Malta entitled “Distance 
Selling (Retail Financial 
Services) Regulations, 
     
 
Electronic Commerce Act 
(Chapter 426 of the Laws 
of Malta) 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Malta  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as 
foreseen by the Injunctions Directive 
regulated in your country separately 
(as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives 
(the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts administered by 
different public authorities (see 
next column).  
The majority of the Directives 
listed in the annex to the ID are 
dealt by the equivalent of the 
injunction powers (described as 
‘compliance orders’ under Maltese 
law) of the Director General 
Consumer Affairs within the 
MCCAA. The DG can issue 
compliance orders with regard to 
the national laws implementing 
the following directives:  
UCPD 
UCTD 
Consumer Rights Directive 
Consumer Credit Directive 
Services Directive (2006/123/EC).  
The power to issue injunctions in 
relation to the other Directives 
listed in the annex of the ID is 
exercised by different sector 
specific authorities as described 
earlier.  
The procedures adopted in the 
applicable national legislation 
reflects to principal requirements 
of the ID and there is no 
substantial difference other than 
in the case of the injunction 
powers of the DG  and of the 
MFSA are to some extent more 
feasible in so far as these 
authorities in the issue of 
injunction orders may also require 
any person to take any such 
measures as may be specified in 
the order in order to ensure 
effective compliance.  
The other point to note is that 
injunction order can be contested 
before diverse appellate fora 
which vary according to the 
authority which is issuing the 
order. Hence in the case of the 
Director General contestation of 
an injunction order may be lodged 
before the Consumer and 
Competition Appeals Tribunal, 
whereas contestation of an order 
by the MCA has to be lodged 
before the Administrative Review 
Tribunal.     
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Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
In accordance with article 2 of the 
Consumer Affairs Act , a ‘qualified 
entity’ – namely: 
A consumer association registered 
in accordance with Part IV of the 
Consumer Affairs Act (Cap. 378). 
The Minister may furthermore 
include any other voluntary 
organisation under this heading 
after consulting with the Consumer 
Affairs Council,  
an independent public body which 
has a legitimate interest in ensuring 
the protection of the collective 
interests of consumer in Malta or 
any other Member State (‘MS’) 
where such bodies exist, 
a voluntary organisation in any 
other MS whose purpose is to 
protect the collective interests of 
consumers  
Any qualified entity from any other 
MS including in the list of qualified 
entities published in the Official 
Journal of the EU.    
As explained earlier the 
Injunctions Directive has been 
implemented in different laws 
depending on the subject matter. 
The majority of the Directives 
listed in the Annex to the 
Injunctions Directives are catered 
for in Cap. 378.  
 
In the other instances the 
approach taken in identifying 
which entities are entitled to make 
an action seeing an injunction is 
similar to that under article 2 of 
Cap. 378 (cited in the first 
column). See for example the 
definition of ‘qualified entity’ reg.2 
of  Distance Selling (Retail 
Financial Services) Regulations 
(SL330.07).  
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Is the injunction procedure a court or 
an administrative procedure? 
 
 
 
If your country legislation foresees 
both forms of the procedure, please 
explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
It is an administrative procedure 
with the right of review of the 
administrative decision taken by 
the competent regulatory body 
before an independent adjudicative 
or quasi-adjudicative body. 
 
Hence in the case of ‘compliance 
orders’ (the technical name used to 
describe ‘injunction order’ under 
Cap. 378) a request for a 
compliance order may be made to 
the DG Consumer Affairs MCCAA. 
The DG’s decision on whether or 
not to issue the order may then be 
contested by an aggrieved party 
(either the qualifying entity which 
asked for the issue of the order or 
the business against whom the 
order was requested) before the 
Competition and Consumer Appeals 
Tribunal. 
In the case of compliance orders 
issued under SL 330.07 the request 
for the issue of a compliance order 
is made to the Malta Financial 
Services Authority (MFSA) and that 
decision may then be contested 
before the Financial Services 
Tribunal. Similarly in the case of a 
compliance order issued by the 
Malta Communications Authority 
(MCA) in relation to the national 
provisions which implement the e-
commerce directive, such an order 
can be contested before the 
Administrative Review Tribunal. 
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Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer 
organisations are entitled to an 
exemption   of some/all cost related 
to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in 
the comments column. 
- The costs are as a rule borne by 
the losing party 
- Each party bears its own costs 
-The qualified entities are 
exempted from costs  
 
Each party bears its own costs in 
relation to the procedures before 
the competent regulatory 
authority. If the decision of the 
regulatory authority in relation to 
the issue of the compliance order 
is contested before the competent 
appellate forum – provisionally 
each party will bear its own costs 
– however the competent 
adjudicative body may decide on 
the matter of costs in favour of 
one party or the other. 
 
There are no exemptions as to 
who bears the costs in such 
proceedings    
 
Is the scope of application of 
injunctions extended to cover areas 
of consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer 
law in general? 
- Yes, scope of application extended 
to cover areas of consumer law that 
are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive (see reply on the next 
column).  
 
In the case of the Consumer Affairs 
Act – the injunctions procedure 
applies to Cap. 378 and any 
regulations made under that Act, 
and to any other laws relating to 
consumer protection as the 
Minister may designate (see art. 
94(1)(c) of Cap. 378). 
Amongst the laws not relating to 
any of the Directives listed in the 
Annex in relation to which the 
injunctions procedure applies one 
can include the following:  
SL 379.10 ‘Home Loan 
Regulations’ 
SL 378.14 ‘Denied Boarding 
(Compensation and Assistance to 
Air Passengers) Regulations 
SL378.17 Consumer Rights 
Regulations (which transposed the 
Consumer Rights Directive).  
 
 
 
    
Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions 
procedure?  
If scope of application extended to 
the protection of business' interests, 
please provide details in the 
comments column regarding  type of 
business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure 
No Not applicable   
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Is it possible to bring an injunction 
action jointly against several traders 
from the same economic sector or 
their associations 
- debateable (see next column) 
 
Law does not expressly envisage 
such a procedure in the context of 
the issue of a compliance order.  
There does not appear to be any 
express prohibition for a joint 
injunction.  
  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? 
(not including the consultation stage 
under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes  
 
The competent authority is before 
deciding whether or not to 
proceed with the issue of 
compliance order, is required to 
first seek voluntary compliance by 
the person/s concerned.  
See for example article 100 of the 
Consumer Affairs Act, whereby the 
DG Consumer Affairs is required to 
first consider seeking voluntary 
compliance.  
Has your Member State taken 
specific measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, there is a requirement for 
party seeking injunction to 
undertake prior consultation with 
the defendant. 
 
The qualified entity must satisfy 
the competent authority 
responsible for the issue of an 
injunctions order that it has tried 
to achieve cessation of the 
infringement in consultation with 
the business concerned 
[see for example art. 94(2) of Cap. 
378 and reg. 13(1) of  
SL 330.07) 
Does the national legislation provide 
for measures ensuring summary 
procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of 
the procedure (subject matter/time 
limits) in the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
The DG Consumer Affairs in 
relation to a request to issue a 
compliance order is required in all 
cases to “act as expeditiously as 
possible” and in any case to give a 
decision within 15 days from the 
receipt of an application to issue 
such an order (see art. 95(4) of 
Cap. 378).   
 
Are there sanctions for non-
compliance with the injunction order 
(Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the 
comments column to who exactly 
should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a fine for each day 
of non-compliance 
- Yes, other sanction (please 
specify) 
 
In the case of compliance orders 
und Cap. 378 the DG (Consumer 
Affairs) may impose both a one off 
administrative fine and /or a daily 
administrative fine (see art. 106A 
of Cap. 378).  
Administrative fines may also be 
imposed under the other sector 
specific laws implementing the 
injunctions directive – see for 
example reg. 13 of SL 409.17 and 
reg. 24 of SL 330.07. . 
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Has your Member State taken 
specific measures regarding the 
publication of the decision and/or 
the publication of a corrective 
statement? 
- Yes 
 
Yes in the case of compliance 
orders under Cap. 378 the DG may 
require ‘any person’ to publish the 
order in full or in part in such form 
as the DG ‘consider to be 
appropriate and adequate’  
The DG may moreover require the 
publication of a corrective 
statement as may be required in 
the order.  
Cap. 378 further states that 
publication must be made in at 
least two daily newspapers and if 
appropriate in any other medium 
of communication and this at the 
expense of the person against 
whom the order is issued.  
If publication is not made then the 
DG may proceed to effect 
publication themselves in which 
case they are empowered to 
recover any covers relating thereto 
from the person against whom the 
order was made.  (See art. 101 of 
Cap. 378). 
Similar though not identical 
measures exist under the other 
national (sector specific) laws 
which implement the ID (see for 
example: reg. 20 of SL 330.07).  
 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions 
for the infringement? 
- Yes 
 
Yes it is.  
Failure to comply with a 
compliance order may lead to the 
imposition of one-off and/or daily 
administrative fines. The sanctions 
varies according the national law 
implementing the injunctions 
directive.(see for example art. 
106A of Cap. 378).   
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order 
that those profits are paid to the 
public purse or to other beneficiary 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No Cap. 378 does not envisage any 
such action, though such action 
may be considered under general 
civil law provisions. 
The situation is similar in the other 
sector specific laws.   
Can an action for damages to be paid 
to the qualified entity or the public 
purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No Cap. 378 does not envisage such 
an action.  
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Can an action for damages or redress 
to be paid to the consumers 
concerned be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No No under the context of the 
specific norms relating to the 
injunctions procedure  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the 
injunctions order?  
- No There are no specific norms in this 
regard 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No  No  
Are the effects of individual 
injunctions orders extended to the 
future infringements and/or same or 
similar illegal practices (of other 
traders)? 
- Debateable  The relevant provision of the law 
empowers the DG to require any 
person engaging or proposing to 
engage in any unfair commercial 
practice to discontinue or refrain 
or to take any measures as may be 
specified in the order. One may 
argue that such a provision can be 
applied to all persons who may be 
engaging in such a practice. To 
date however there has been no 
specific order in this regard and 
consequently there is no case law 
which may assist in interpreting 
this provision. (See art. 94(1) of 
Cap. 378).    
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
831
B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
There are no official statistics. Our understanding is that few cases have actually been 
decided.  
One revealing statistic available is the low number of appeals from decisions taken by 
the DG (Consumer Affairs) before the Competition and Consumer Appeals Tribunal. 
This adjudicative forum has been in place since May 2011. According to the 
information available there have been only two cases contesting a compliance order 
before that Tribunal.  
There was another case lodged by one of the consumer associations requesting the 
Director General Consumer Affairs to investigate alleged unfair practices by a public 
transport provider. The Director General declined to do so, this on the basis that this 
issue fell within the remit of the sector specific regulator. The case is currently before 
the Court of Appeal after the CCAT (the Tribunal of first instance) upheld the request 
of the association that the Director General should investigate the allegations made.41   
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number of 
B2C 
disputes 
(number 
of cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
 
No statistics were provided or are available. We are aware of only one formal case 
before the CCAT relating to UCPD. 
41 See Benny Borg Bonello nomine vs Awtorita ta’ Malta ghall-Kompetizzjoni u ghall-affarijiet tal-Konsumatur 
u d-Direttur Generali (Affarijiet tal-Konsumatur) decided by the Consumer and Competition Appeals 
Tribunal on the 26 February 2014.  
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).42  
This depends on the quantum of the monetary values involved. If it is less then 
EUR 3 500, the case would be heard before the Consumer Claims Tribunal (CCT), if 
proceedings are filed by the aggrieved consumer. 
If the amount is more than the case would be before the ordinary courts of justice – 
either before the Court of Magistrates (for values between EUR 5 000 up to 
EUR 10 000) or if more, then the case would have to be filed before the First Hall of 
the Civil Court.  
If the monetary value is between EUR 3 500 and EUR 5000 then the claim would have 
to be filed before the Small Claims Tribunal which is the lowest tier of courts of 
ordinary jurisdiction. 
 
42 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other costs, 
if any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time involved 
for consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
 
Court of 
Magistrates 
(cases 
between 
EUR 5000 to 
EUR 10 000)  
minimum of 
EUR 150  
Depends on the 
nature of the 
case and the 
number of 
sittings 
involved – 
would vary 
between  
EUR 50 up to    
EUR 500 [based 
on official court 
taxed fees]  
 
Time that 
consumer would 
dedicate varies 
according to 
nature of claim. 
On an average 
anything between 
10 to 50 hours 
factoring 
research, court 
attendance etc. 
Attendance in 
court would 
depend on the 
number of 
witnesses.  
There may also be 
some waiting time 
as the case may 
be scheduled for 
hearing with other 
cases. The current 
practice is to give 
an approximate 
appointment for 
each case.  
On a rough 
estimate anything 
between two to 
ten sittings spread 
over a couple of 
years if the case is 
contested and 
involves the 
hearing of 
evidence.  Cases 
before the lower 
courts and CCT 
would generally 
be dealt with in 
much shorter time 
span (see below).  
Sittings would 
be held on an 
average once 
every one to 
three months 
with circa 15 to 
30 minutes per 
sitting  
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Small Claims 
Tribunal 
(lowest tier of 
the ordinary 
courts)  
Up to 
EUR 5000 
EUR 50  
Minimum of 
EUR 80. 
Increases if the 
amount in 
dispute 
exceeds 
EUR 582 – then 
fees calculated 
according to 
rates applicable 
for proceedings 
before the 
Court of 
Magistrates     
 
Period varies 
between three 
months to a year  
 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
Consumer 
Claims 
Tribunal 
(CCT) 
 
 
Varies 
according to 
amount in 
dispute from 
EUR 10 up to 
EUR 26 (may 
vary marginally 
according to 
the number of 
notifications 
that need to be 
made)   
With the CCT one 
to three sessions 
on an average 
over a period of 
circa three 
months to a year  
Procedure is 
relatively 
informal, not 
expensive & 
relatively 
‘quick’ when 
compared to 
the procedure 
before the 
ordinary courts. 
 
The only 
alternative 
effective 
procedure to 
date as an 
alternative to 
court 
proceedings is 
the procedure 
before the 
Consumer 
Claims Tribunal.  
ADR processes 
to date are still 
very much in 
their infancy 
and are 
restricted 
mainly to 
mediation   
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
With regard to the hypothetical examples referred to above, given that the claim is for 
EUR 5 000 then it would have to be filed before the lowest tier of the ordinary courts – 
namely the Small Claims Tribunal which determines any type of civil disputes where 
the amount in contestation is of less than EUR 5 000. If the amount exceeds 
EUR 5 000 then the competent forum is the Court of Magistrates.  
The claim cannot be presented before the Consumer Claims Tribunal which is an 
‘outside court’ dispute resolution forum (a sort of ADR) as this tribunal is only 
competent to determine consumer versus trader disputes if the amount in dispute 
does not exceed EUR 3 500.43  
No statistics are available for the number of court or ADR proceedings are used in 
relation to such cases. 
 
  
43 It is pertinent to note that the Consumer Claims Tribunal may also award up to EUR 500 as ‘moral’ 
damages for distress, inconvenience incurred by the consumer. This measure is unique to claims filed 
before the Consumer Claims Tribunal.    
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
 [1] General Retailers & Traders Union (‘GRTU’) 
(represents SMEs in Malta) 
 
[2] Malta Employers Association (MEA) 
 
 
[3] Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and 
Industry (MCCEI 
Business association 
 
[1] 14 June 
2016 
 
 
 
 
[2] 23 June 
2016  
 
 
 [1] Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority 
(‘MCCAA’) 
 
National consumer enforcement 
authority 
 
[1] 24 June 
2016  
 
 
 
[1] Malta Communications Authority (‘MCA’) 
 
 
[2] Regulator for Energy and Water Services (‘REWS’) 
 
 
[3] The Authority for Transport in Malta (‘Transport 
Malta’ or ‘TM’) 
National sector specific regulatory 
authority  
National sector specific regulatory 
authority 
[1] 16 June 
2016 
 
 
 
 
[2] 21 June 
2016 
 
 
 
[3] 13 June 
2016  
[1] European Consumer Centre – Malta  (Cross-border) European 
Consumer Centre 
[1] 17 June 
2016  
[1] Ghaqda tal-Konsumaturi (Consumer Association – 
Malta)  
[2] Association for Consumer Rights 
Consumer organisation 
  
[1] 15 June 
2016  
 
 
[2] 20 June 
2016  
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
www.justiceservices.gov.mt  Ongoing 
website  
Both for consolidated versions of the applicable 
Maltese law and court decisions.  
Grixti Isabella (thesis submitted for LL.D. – 
University of Malta)  
2006  ‘The concept of ‘unfairness’ in commercial 
transactions in EC Consumer Law’ 
Vella Galea Ian (thesis submitted for LL.D. 
– University of Malta) 
2006  ‘Unfair terms in standard form contracts under 
Maltese Law’  
Buttigieg Eugene (paper presented during 
Conference held in Malta in March 2006) 
2006 ‘Consumer Protection against Unfair Commercial 
Practices in Malta – the Impact of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive’. 
Cutajar Sara (thesis submitted for LL.D. – 
University of Malta)  
2013 ‘Maximum harmonization in EU Consumer 
Protection legislation. Its impact on the scope of 
the protection afforded to consumers by national 
law’.  
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report THE NETHERLANDS  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Prior to the UCPD, the Netherlands did not have a rich tradition of regulating 
commercial practices outside private law. This explains why the introduction of the 
UCPD was not used to completely overhaul the legal landscape of commercial 
practices. The Netherlands did not have a specific Act on Commercial Practices, nor 
did it have statutory ‘black lists’ similar to the Annex to the UCPD. Instead, Dutch law 
relied on general tort and contract law as a source of private law remedies against 
unfair commercial practices.  
Moreover, the Dutch legislature had already revoked most of its specific legislation on 
marketing and sales practices in the deregulation periods of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Much of the legislation on pricing and marketing (such as rules on sales periods, 
rebates, joint offers, gifts, et cetera) was thus abandoned and revoked. Meanwhile, 
the lengthy project of recodification of the Dutch Civil Code, which culminated in the 
introduction in 1992 of the New Dutch Civil Code (hereafter: DCC), was a powerful 
engine for the development of comprehensive consumer protection standards in civil 
law. Therefore, the 1984 Misleading Advertising Directive was implemented and 
assimilated within the new Civil Code framework (as were most other generic 
consumer protection Directives). 
As far as unfair commercial practices were concerned, Dutch consumer protection was 
dominated for a long time by self-regulation. This involved the Dutch government 
stimulating or even informally brokering Codes of Conduct and other forms of 
alternative regulation between representative organisations from trade, industry and 
services on the one hand and consumer organisations on the other. Although these 
self-regulatory codes did not involve heavy-handed sanctioning, they were binding on 
most of the traders involved through their membership of the association who owned 
the Code and was held responsible politically for its success. The quality assurance 
through this modern day version of self-regulatory ‘guilds’ was and still is rather 
successful. For instance, most of the case law on the 1984 Misleading Advertising 
Directive did not come from criminal courts or civil courts but from the private ADR 
Complaints Board for the Advertising Industry (Reclame Code Commissie; RCC). It 
applied (and still does so) both the rules and standards derived from (now) the UCPD 
and autonomous standards on fairness and good taste. 
This brief overview shows that the Dutch situation is complex in the sense that prior to 
the implementation of the UCPD, an extensive legislative body of law on unfair 
commercial practices did not exist. On October 15, 2008, the Wet oneerlijke 
handelspraktijken (Wet OHP; Unfair Commercial Practices Act 2008) came into force. 
The Act implemented the UCPD by amending the 1992 Burgerlijk Wetboek (the Dutch 
Civil Code; DCC) and the Wet Handhaving Consumentenbescherming (Whc; Consumer 
Protection Enforcement Act 2007). Thus, the UCPD was implemented generically. No 
explicit exceptions to the UCPD regimes were introduced.1  
The Unfair Commercial Practices Act 2008 does two things: it treats unfair commercial 
practices as both wrongful acts in private law (tort law) and as administrative offences 
1 See Van Boom et al 2009; Verkade 2009; Loos & Van Boom 2009; Van Boom 2010. 
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in public law. As far as the private law aspects are concerned, private individuals may 
seek prohibitory and mandatory injunctions in civil court. Individuals affected by an 
unfair commercial practice may request a court order holding that the defendant who 
is pursuing such a practice is prohibited from continuing that practice and/or 
mandatorily ordering cessation of that practice (and possibly restoring the status ex 
ante quo). Failure of the defendant to comply with the court-ordered injunction results 
in recurring penalty payments due to the claimant. In practice, mere injunctions are 
rarely sought by individuals. Individuals usually pursue claims for damages in tort 
(and possibly also, as the case may be, avoidance and restitution). Representative 
associations and foundations may also seek prohibitory and mandatory injunctions in 
collective action proceedings pursuant to Art. 3:305a DCC. This is a method commonly 
employed by such bodies to enforce consumer law. 
As far as the public law remedies are concerned, the Consumer Protection 
Enforcement Act 2007 provides literally that ‘a trader shall abide by the provisions laid 
down in section 6.3.3A of the Civil Code’.2 Offending against this provision constitutes 
an administrative offence. The Act lists the various available sanctions. The competent 
authority may, subject to judicial review,  
• Impose a fine of maximum (as per 1 July 2016) EUR 900 000 per committed 
offense or 10 percent of annual turnover,3  
• Issue a stopping order (an administrative order made by the competent public 
authority ordering the trader to stop a certain practice, on penalty of a fine),  
• Issue a compliance order (an administrative order holding a positive mandatory 
duty to comply, issued either after commission of the offense or, by way of 
anticipatory remedy, where the offense is imminent), and  
• May publish its order or a voluntary undertaking by the trader.  
As far as public law enforcement of the Unfair Commercial Practices Act 2008 is 
concerned, either the Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Authority Consumer & Markets; 
ACM) or the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets; AFM) is the competent authority.  
Pursuant to the relevant parts of the Consumer Protection Enforcement Act 2007, the 
ACM can initiate legal action against unfair practices generally, with the exception of 
such practices pertaining to ‘financial services and activities’. The Act exclusively 
burdens the AFM with enforcement in the area of such services and activities. Besides 
the ACM and AFM, there are some minor competent authorities for specific niche 
areas. 
Concerning the practical experience with the principle-based approach of the UCPD, 
there are diverging experiences. For instance, private law practitioners seem to be 
more at ease with this approach than administrative law practitioners who adhere 
more strictly to the nulla poena sine lege certa principle. From the viewpoint of this 
‘lex certa’ principle, the principle-based approach of using open-textured concepts of 
‘misleading’ and ‘aggressive’ practices offers less legal certainty for traders in advance 
than the specific list of practices deemed unfair per se does. That said, as noted by the 
ACM and the ECC (Europees Consumenten Centrum, in charge of facilitating cross-
border requests), the open textured approach of the UCPD nevertheless offers leeway 
to competent authorities to develop their enforcement strategy. Moreover, some 
report that this flexibility also offers room to traders to innovate. Consumer 
organisations, however, feel that the principle-based approach does not prevent 
certain sharp practices that border on unfairness but fall just outside the scope of 
what constitutes an UCP.   
 
2 See Art. 8.8 Whc. 
3 See Art. 2.15 (2) Whc. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The enforcement authority ACM is quite happy with the list as it is – although 
consumers will be mostly unaware of the list, it is considered to be a welcome addition 
to the toolbox for enforcement purposes. Consumer organisations point out that the 
black list is relatively short and the procedure for amending the list is not clear; they 
emphasize the need for a flexible and quick procedure for amending the list so that 
the list can be adapted to ‘new’ UCPs. Our overall impression is that all involved 
appreciate the concept of a list as such since it offers relative clarity, predictability and 
– simply put – examples and illustrations so that businesses can get a flavour of what 
is unacceptable behaviour. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The minimum harmonisation clause is said to allow more stringent rules concerning 
cold calling, faxing and spamming, investment solicitation, commission churning, 
dedicated and detailed rules on information transparency, standardised wealth 
warnings and the like. The minimum harmonisation clause is highly appreciated in 
these areas. This does not mean, however, that it is the use of the minimum 
harmonisation clause that has caused better protection of consumers in these areas; 
here, it seems to be a case of reversed order: the higher level of protection was 
(mostly) already in place when the UCPD 2005 was implemented.  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
As of yet, the ACM has not applied the UCPD in the context of environmental claims. 
In the consumer energy market, however, several unfair practices have been exposed 
(by media) and the traders have been fined by the ACM. For instance, several energy 
suppliers have been fined for misleading and aggressive practices in telemarketing as 
well as in doorstep selling. The ACM reports a drop in consumer complaints as a result 
of this enforcement strategy. It was stressed by stakeholders that it was not always 
clear what the hierarchy was between the generic UCPD and the sectoral rules 
applicable to energy and also, e.g., telecom. Stakeholders in the energy retail 
business use the case law of the self-regulatory advertising standards body RCC as 
their point of reference more than the underlying UCPD itself. Note that the UCPD is 
enforced by the ACM (and AFM) and that there may exist the risk of divergence of 
interpretation by the RCC and the ACM (and courts).    
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The ACM is quite content with the concept of ‘average consumer’ but it does note that 
in some cases the bar is raised too high by the ECJ. A government representative of 
the Department for Economic Affairs suggested that the use of such abstractions has 
its advantages and drawbacks but remains unavoidable as the law must make use of 
such abstract concepts to operationalize the UCPD. However, consumer organisations 
are not happy with the way national courts use the ‘average consumer test’ to justify 
a lower level of protection than could otherwise be given. It seems, so it is said, that 
judges tend to overestimate the cognitive abilities of consumers and by referral to the 
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‘average consumer’, they can ignore dissonant evidence from consumer psychology. 
This issue has also been raised in scholarly writing.4  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
In its enforcement practices, the ACM informally distinguishes between groups of 
vulnerable consumers (senior citizens, youngsters) but it does not always include this 
analysis in its enforcement decisions. It would welcome guidance as to whether 
credulity as such constitutes vulnerability in the case of specific consumer groups. 
Stakeholders suggested that senior citizens as a group may merit further attention. 
However, the question was also raised whether the maximum harmonisation character 
of the UCPD allows for the extension of the concept of vulnerability. Note that there 
are also national rules on protection vulnerable individuals in the context of alcohol 
and gambling.  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders] 
In the Netherlands, there is a longstanding tradition of self-regulation in consumer 
affairs.5 This is also the case for the advertising industry. The Dutch Complaints Board 
for the Advertising Industry (RCC) is considered to be effective in ‘regulating’ the 
advertising industry to adhere to UCPD standards. There are, however, issues to 
consider.  
For instance, the interpretation of the UCPD framework by the RCC may not always 
converge with the interpretation by the ACM or indeed the courts. Moreover, the 
enforcement of self-regulatory codes of conduct through Art. 6 (2) (b) UCPD hinges on 
whether a code of conduct is phrased firmly enough to produce actual commitments; 
this does not always seem to be the case.    
Stakeholders pointed to the fact that there needs to be a common and shared 
understanding within a particular branch of business or industry of what constitutes 
fair and unfair practices. Without this shared responsibility, Codes will not work and 
regulation needs to intervene. Moreover, in the opinion of the authors of this report 
one should not overlook the fact that self-regulation cannot perform miracles: it has 
not prevented major catastrophes in the financial services markets such as mis-selling 
of financial products (e.g., endowment policies and swap contracts). Therefore, it 
seems that self-regulation may be useful (as long as it is not used to distort 
competition and raise barriers to entry)6 but it cannot be expected to deliver miracles.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Enforcement authorities do not suggest amendments and Ministry representatives are 
quick to emphasize that a balance is needed between open textured norms and 
concrete norms, and that a further increase of complexity of EU legislation should be 
avoided. Consumer organisations seem to favour extension of the list and a more 
transparent procedure for amending the list.  
4 See, e.g., Duivenvoorde 2013; Duivenvoorde 2015. 
5 See Pavillon 2014. 
6 See Van Boom et al. 2009. 
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 • Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
In the Netherlands, there are plans to introduce the court adjudication of mass 
damages claims in a Dutch class action procedure. The Netherlands already has 
legislation in place to award damages to consumers through a collective settlement, 
which has been declared binding by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Also, it has been 
argued that enforcement authorities such as AFM and ACM should be given regulatory 
powers to impose compensation awards on regulated industries for the benefit of 
consumers.7 Perhaps this could bolster the toolbox available to ACM and AFM in 
combating UCPs and in offering proper redress for consumers as an alternative to 
administrative fines.  
Another point for reflection is the Dutch legal tradition of cooperative negotiation 
between trade and business associations and consumer associations. Within this legal 
culture, it has been possible to take significant steps towards better and fairer 
practices. That said, it is acknowledged that the market circumstances and the 
typically Dutch legal tradition play an important role in that respect; it cannot be 
guaranteed that using this as a template in other jurisdictions will actually work.  
Finally, the point of access of consumer organisations to administrative proceedings 
against businesses was raised. One consumer organisation representative pointed out 
that in the Netherlands, the main consumer organisation CB has standing as an 
interested third party in administrative prosecution procedures; this might be an 
example for other EU countries to follow.   
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
The PID is implemented by means of the Prijzenwet 1961 (Prices Act 1961), as 
amended in 2002 (Staatsblad 2002, 217), and the 2003 Royal Decree on Pricing of 
Products (Besluit prijsaanduiding producten 2003, amended in 2014, Staatsblad 2013, 
146). Annex I to the 2003 Royal Decree lists a number of exceptions, where traders 
are not obliged to disclose unit prices (e.g., antiquities, auctioned goods).  
The overall picture is that traders generally obey the PID rules; complaints or 
(criminal) court cases are rare. Perhaps this is because unit pricing is mostly important 
in the sale of foodstuffs and the market for foodstuffs is dominated by large 
supermarket companies who have reputational effects to take into consideration: they 
would not dare consider evading the PID rules. Perhaps, there may be the occasional 
infringement of the PID in open markets and fairs for foodstuffs but the authors of this 
report are not aware of such practices.  
The real issues are with price obfuscation, price partitioning and other sharp practices 
which may bedazzle consumers and which may interfere with their ability to assess 
the full price.8 There are numerous complaints raised with the RCC and ACM 
concerning air travel, magazine subscriptions and other revolving and/or fixed term 
contracts, ‘free’ deliveries and hidden surcharges. However, most of these complaints 
fall outside the scope of the PID and are mostly considered to fall within the UCPD 
framework. These practices are particularly difficult since they operate on the fringes 
of what is allowed under the UCPD; traders make clever use of these practices to 
7 See Van Boom et al. 2009. 
8 See generally Van Boom 2011. 
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boost demand for ancillary services and products and to increase demand for the main 
product on offer as well. Price partitioning with locked-in customers is an example, 
where for instance the price for home printer hardware is kept artificially low in order 
to persuade customers to buy a particular brand of printer hardware, while the unit 
price of subsequent printer ink cartridges is kept high. The UCPD does not oblige 
traders to mention a ‘price per printed sheet’.  
A related practice which is not within the PID scope concerns dynamic pricing. A 
consumer organisation representative mentioned that some consumers mistakenly 
believe that this pricing practice constitutes an UCP. Since the UCPD does not oblige 
traders to offer their products at identical prices to different customers, traders can 
offer different prices depending on variables such as the time of day of the purchase. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The authors of this report have not noticed enthusiasm for this alternative. It seems 
that there is a fear of confusing consumers with alternative price indications. Since the 
concept of ‘recognised measurement’ is rather vague, the ACM prefers to have both 
indications displayed. Consumer organisations seem to favour the use of unit prices so 
as to avoid confusion.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
No complaints received; the authors of this report think that the derogations under 
Dutch law cause hardly any problems given the fact that none of the stakeholders 
flagged (legislation implementing) the PID as problematic in any way. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD was implemented in Art. 6:194 ff. DCC and so is the current MCAD. The 
original position of the Dutch legislature was to implement the MCAD in a broad sense; 
not only advertising but any commercially relevant public announcements fall within 
the scope. In the past, courts have therefore used the MCAD (and obviously, 
nowadays the same applies to the application of the UCPD to B2C practices) to 
evaluate not only advertising but also annual business reports, investment 
documentation, flyers, folders, public statements on business results outlook 
etcetera.9 Therefore, because of the initial choice to go beyond the minimum 
harmonisation character of the 1984 Directive, the Netherlands had already introduced 
a wider scope, which was continued with the MCAD. It is the impression of the  the 
authors of this report that the experience with this wider scope has been favourable, 
given the fact that the 1984 Directive has been used multiple times to address 
misleading prospectus and other written statements concerning financial products 
other than advertising sensu stricto. 
 
9 See generally Geerts & Vollebregt 2009; Verkade 2011. 
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• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
See above. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The position in the Netherlands, as described above, is one of a higher level of 
protection. It seems that Ministry spokesmen would not reject further harmonisation 
unless this meant that the level of protection in the Netherlands would have to be 
lowered. Business representatives seem to take a different stance; given the fact that 
the Netherlands is a small trade nation with a lot of foreign markets to serve, it would 
improve predictability and therefore lower the cost of doing business if rules on 
misleading advertising were truly uniform.   
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
No specific effects of the full harmonisation character itself are known. In comparative 
advertising, the clarification by national courts and the ECJ as to what distinguishes 
lawful from unlawful comparison was welcomed by business. Some respondents raised 
the issue of obstacles for cross-border comparison (such as geoblocking, the practice 
where access to internet content is restricted based on geographical location of the 
internet user) which may stand in the way of true cross-border competition in some 
markets.  
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The principle-based approach leaves room for divergence between the approaches in 
different countries, as is demonstrated throughout the literature.10 The experience of 
10 See, e.g., Van Boom et al. 2014. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
845
businesses as reported in the interviews does not contradict this literature but the 
position seems to be that the differences between EU states are taken as a given and 
a cost of doing business. Whether these costs are considerable, is unclear since there 
are no tangible data on such costs. The interviewees do not report major problems.  
Note that in in certain markets such as energy supply, there is no real cross-border 
competition at the retail level.  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
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1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
The level of awareness of individual traders seems to be commensurate with the level 
of organisation of the branch involved; in those industries and trades where traders 
are well organised and associated, they tend to have a better understanding of the 
regulatory boundaries. They also have a reputation which is at stake if they 
contravene the legal standards. However, several interviewees also point out that 
businesses are sometimes unaware of their duties under Art. 7 (4) UCPD and that 
guidance by the ACM is welcomed. Also, it is reported that ‘education’ by national and 
cross-border organisations such as ECC helps to improve business conduct. Other 
businesses knowingly ignore the rules of Art. 7 (4) UCPD.  
A common point addressed at this point by the interviewees is the increasing 
complexity of overlapping Directives concerning (information) duties on businesses. In 
particular, the concept of ‘invitation to purchase’ is felt to be ambiguous and a cause 
of confusion among traders and the advertising industry. For instance, it is not always 
clear what type of information with what kind of specificity should be given at what 
stage of the marketing and contracting process. Here, the CRD and the UCPD seem to 
diverge somewhat, notes the ACM.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Overlap and conflict between the UCPD and E-commerce Directive is reported. For 
instance, Art. 5 E-Commerce Directive provides that information should be given on 
‘whether prices are inclusive of tax and delivery costs’, whereas Art. 7 (4) UCPD 
provides that prices in an invitation to purchase shall be inclusive of tax and costs. 
These discrepancies are not desirable, so the ACM holds; indeed, the ACM 
representatives even state that the legal framework is extremely complicated to 
operate for supervisory authorities such as the ACM itself.  
Consumer organisations also report overlap and friction between UCPD and CRD but 
they seem less convinced that such friction should be removed since the goals of the 
UCPD and the CRD are different (preventing misleading practices vs having clarity on 
what the concluded contract actually entails), such overlaps can be justified. As far as 
overlap with the Services and the E-commerce directives are concerned, the position 
seems to be that these Directives could be brought more in tune so to avoid 
discrepancies.   
Others, including business representatives and Department lawyers emphasize that 
the complexity of the various overlapping rules should be a concern to the EU – 
adding more rules will further increase this complexity.  
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1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Although in scholarly writing, some have propagated the extension of consumer 
protection to small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), the Dutch lower courts have 
not developed a fixed position.11 One business representative argued that such 
extension of protection runs counter to entrepreneurial self-responsibility. Yet, in 
2016, an important statutory extension of the UCPD regime was introduced in Art. 
6:194 (2) – (4) DCC. The new statutory regime opens up the possibility for businesses 
to claim on the basis of the tort of misleading omission of essential information and 
the tort of not properly and timely disclosing the commercial purpose of the 
information.12 This statutory amendment is aimed at supporting traders who were 
duped by unfair commercial practices.  
In our opinion, it is uncertain whether the extension to B2B practices would benefit 
cross-border trade. In the Dutch academic debate, this issue has not been raised let 
alone answered on a firm empirical basis.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
11 See the references above para 1.2.3 to the concept of Indizwirkung. 
12 See Staatsblad 2016, 133. 
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1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
The DCC has a general clause on nullity of contracts contrary to good morals and 
public order,13  but this will hardly ever be applicable to UCPs. The avoidance of 
contracts for misrepresentation, fraud or abuse of hardship seems more appropriate.14 
However, more specifically relevant are the remedies for UCPs. A UCP is a tortious act 
which can result in damages but since June 2014, Art. 6:193j (3) DCC also offers the 
possibility to avoid any transaction concluded under the influence of an UCP.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Art. 6:193j (3) DCC has been applied several times.15 Note that consumer can also 
invoke Art. 6:193j (3) DCC without going to court; the possibility of avoidance is also 
available extra-judicially.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Given that Dutch law has integrated the UCPD into both civil law and administrative 
law, the position is that there are already many remedies available. The main question 
that divides respondents from consumer organisations and business organisations is 
whether the existing remedies are applied correctly by courts. For instance, national 
legal doctrines of pre-contractual tort duties, avoidance for misrepresentation and 
liability for negligent selling already exist but they are not always applied to benefit 
the consumer – in many cases, the ‘caveat emptor’ doctrine remains potent. For 
instance, on numerous occasions banks and insurance companies have been taken to 
court for negligent mis-selling of inherently risky financial products to allegedly 
unsuspecting or ignorant consumers. In many of these cases, however, courts have 
held that consumers bear full or partial responsibility for their own investment 
decisions and that they are to be expected to actually process and comprehend the 
product information provided by sellers.  
A further issue is whether supervisory authorities such as ACM should be given the 
(public law) powers to order reinstatement of consumers (payment of damages, 
restitution of amounts paid). The authors of this report refer to earlier remarks made 
on that issue.  
 
13 See Art. 3:40 DCC. 
14 See Art. 3:44 DCC and Art. 6:228 DCC. 
15 See District Court Noord-Holland 17 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:9422; District Court Midden-
Nederland 30 September 2015, ECLI:NLL:RBMNE:2015:6985. 
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1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The 1992 DCC introduced a set of rules dedicated to the testing of fairness of general 
contract terms; these rules offer both a test of proper inclusion of the general contract 
terms and a substantive fairness test concerning the ‘unduly onerous’ character of the 
general contract terms involved. Art. 6:233 sub (a) DCC introduced a principle-based 
fairness test. Furthermore, art. 6:236 (‘black list’) and 6:237 DCC (‘grey list’) 
introduced lists with specific contract clauses deemed unfair (‘black list’) or presumed 
unfair (‘grey list’). These lists need to be checked in case of fairness testing of general 
terms in contracts involving consumers.  
The open clause of Art. 6:233 sub (a) DCC is interpreted as being equivalent to the 
unfairness test under Art. 3 (1) UCTD.16 Following the case-law of the Court of Justice, 
the Dutch Supreme Court decided in Hoge Raad 13 September 2013, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691, NJ 2014, 274 (case note H.B. Krans), TvC 2013/6, p. 262 
(case notes M.B.M. Loos and R.M.M. de Moor) (Heesakkers/Voets) that the lower 
courts are required to apply the unfairness test of their own motion (i.e. ex officio). 
This is true for cases where the consumer is not present, and for cases where the 
consumer was assisted by a lawyer who could have invoked the unfairness of the term 
but has failed to do so. The same is true for cases dealt on appeal, where the ordinary 
rules of civil procedure would not have allowed for that, provided that the claim which 
would be affected by the potentially unfair term would still be part of the legal dispute 
– implying that either the consumer or the trader would have had to appeal against 
the decision of the court of first instance, irrespective whether or not the lower court 
had in fact decided on the potentially unfair nature of the term. If it is unclear whether 
the term is invoked against a consumer (instead of against a trader), but there are 
indications that the party is a consumer, the court must determine of its own motion 
whether that party is indeed a consumer. In addition, the court must take measures of 
instruction necessary to determine whether the term is unfair, which may imply that 
the trader is required to submit the standard terms or to substantiate what the legal 
basis for a particular claim is.  
Due to the ex officio application of the unfairness test, the principle-based approach is 
fairly effective, even where the courts are required to evaluate the term on a case-by-
case basis. The ordinary situation is that the court must take into account all 
circumstances of the case – including specific circumstances that are to the advantage 
of the trader.17 However, under the open clause of Art. 6:233 sub (a) DCC, it is the 
consumer who bears the burden of proof that the term is unfair.18 Where the 
consumer does not prove the unfairness, and the court does not find proof thereof in 
the information provided by the parties, if need be after it has taken an instruction 
measure, the court will not find the term to be unfair. 
In addition, it should be mentioned that it is common practice that consumer 
organisations and trade associations negotiate sets of standard contract terms within 
the framework of the Social and Economic Council (in Dutch: Sociaal Economische 
16 See Loos 2013, no. 169. 
17 See CJEU 14 March 2013, case C-415/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:164 (Aziz); Hoge Raad 21 September 2012, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW6135, NJ 2013/431 (case note H.J. Snijders), TvC 2013/1, p. 30 (case note E.H. 
Hondius) (Van Marrum B.V./Wolff). 
18 See the parliamentary proceedings: Parl. Gesch. Inv. Boek 6 p. 1652. See also Court of Appeal ’s-
Hertogenbosch 17 March 2009, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2009:BH6958, NJF 2009, 285, JOR 2009, 310 (Van 
Bommel/Engelman Architecten B.V.); District Court Gelderland (location Arnhem), 10 April 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2013:CA0523 (X/Mactwin Security B.V.). 
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Raad, SER). Such negotiated sets of standard contract terms are referred to in legal 
practice as two-sided standard terms. Where an agreement is reached as to the 
content of standards terms used in a branch of the economy, these consumer 
organisations lose their right to collective action combatting the relevant standard 
terms,19 which guarantees that the consumer organisations do not agree too hastily. 
In turn, the trade associations agree to the installation of small claims tribunals 
(alternative dispute board, i.e. ADR), which ensures that consumers can actually 
submit claims against traders. The traders that are members of these trade 
associations are required by the by-laws of these associations to make use of the 
agreed sets of standard terms. The negotiations as to the standard terms obviously 
take the existing legislation into account, including the open clause of Art. 6:233 
under (a) DCC. Where such agreements exist, there is therefore a good chance that 
the set of standard contract terms contains (at least primarily) terms that will not be 
considered unfair. However, in individual consumer cases the fact that a term is 
included in a set of two-sided standard contract terms is but one of many factors that 
is taken into account when assessing the unfairness of the term, albeit that the court 
may assume that an onerous term may be compensated by a particularly favourable 
term more easily.20 
The industry is of the opinion that the general principles function properly, but argues 
the importance of a careful alignment of the enforcement of open clauses in order to 
prevent differences in the interpretation of these clauses in the Member States. In 
addition, the business associations ask for the possibility of ex ante testing of 
commercial practices and contractual terms. In particular regarding new practices and 
new types of contract it may also for bona fide businesses be difficult to determine 
what is allowed and what is not. 
ACM, the principal regulator in the area of consumer law, confirms that the 
enforcement of the open clauses as such do not lead to problems. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
Note that in 1992, the Dutch legislature had already introduced a set of lists (art. 
6:236 (‘black list’) and 6:237 DCC (‘grey list’)) with specific contract clauses deemed 
unfair (‘black list’) or presumed unfair (‘grey list’). The legislature felt that Dutch law 
already met the standards set by the UCTD and that it needed no further transposition 
concerning this issue.21  
According to the business associations, the indicative list has also not proved to have 
much added value. This view is confirmed by the Consumentenbond, the largest 
consumer organisation in The Netherlands, which argues that this is caused by the 
abstract formulation of the terms on the indicative list. The formulation is cause for 
interpretation, which requires legal-technical knowledge that ordinary consumers do 
not possess, the Consumentenbond argues. 
However, in lower case-law, the fact that a term that falls within the scope of a term 
on the indicative list is frequently seen as an important factor in the application of the 
unfairness test.22 An example is Court of Appeal’s-Hertogenbosch 9 January 2007, 
ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2007:AZ5890 (term requiring to notify a lack of conformity within a 
short period after delivery of a construction work under threat of losing a right to 
claim damages- qualified as a term limiting the legal rights of the consumer in case of 
the trader’s non-performance, as per indicative list 1b). Another example is the 
19 See Art. 6:240 (5) DCC. 
20 See Hoge Raad 3 February 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BT6947, NJ 2012, 261 (case note F.M.J. Verstijlen) 
(Dix q.q./ING Bank N.V.); see also Loos 2013, nos. 215-219. 
21 Cf. Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 26470 nr. 3.   
22 See Loos 2013, no. 345. 
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evaluation of penalty clauses (indicative list, 1e). Dutch courts tend to consider such 
clauses to be unfair in particular where there is no maximum for the penalty, implying 
that the penalty in theory could be unlimited.23  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The consumer’s position is much better if the term is blacklisted under Art. 6:236 
DCC, as in such case the term is considered unfair under all circumstances. An 
example may be article 6:236 under (b) DCC: a limitation or exclusion of the right to 
termination is considered unfair irrespective of the circumstances of the case, whereas 
under the UCTD the consumer would have to show or argue that the term is unfair 
and the court is required to test, on a case-by-case basis, whether the term may be 
justified given the specific circumstances of the case. Blacklisting of a term also offers 
predictability and legal certainty to the parties. Similarly, under the grey list of Art. 
6:237 DCC a term is presumed unfair, unless the trader proves that under the 
circumstances of the case the term in fact is fair. Where the trader fails to provide any 
justification for the term, or does not convince the court of the fairness of the term, 
the term will be found unfair. Effectively, the grey list thus leads to a reversal of the 
burden of proof as to the (un)fairness of the term. Both the black list and the grey list 
therefore make it much easier for the court to determine that a term is unfair, and 
therefore provide far better protection to the consumer than the open clause does. 
The Consumentenbond remarks that traders have the tendency to avoid terms that 
are black or grey listed. Moreover, during the negotiations as to two-sided standard 
contract terms between consumer organisations and trade associations the black and 
grey lists function as a touchstone in the evaluation of terms. Finally, both courts and 
ADR institutions rule on the basis of the lists, the Consumentenbond remarks in the 
interview. The Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' – a smaller consumer organisation 
in The Netherlands, active in the financial sector – indicates, however, that the Dutch 
legislator should evaluate and update the black and grey lists, but refrains from doing 
so. The ACM, the main regulator in the area of consumer law, is of the view that 
consumers would benefit from removing some terms from the grey list and placing 
them on the black list. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In individual proceedings, all circumstances of the case must be taken into account, 
including those that are particular to this specific consumer or that specific trader, 
provided that these specific circumstances were known to the other party at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract.24 The effect is, however, that a court’s decision in 
such an individual case cannot be extended to all contracts of the trader concerned or 
23 See for instance District Court Groningen 31 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2010:BM1402, TvC 2010/5, p. 
218 (case note M.B.M. Loos) (Visa Card Services/X); District Court Assen 20 July 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBASS:2010:BN4807, NJF 2010, 368 (Visa Card Services/X); District Court Arnhem 15 
December 2010, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2010:BO9665, Prg. 2011/60 (International Card Services B.V./X). 
24 See Loos 2013, no. 222. 
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even to the contracts of other traders, as the specifics of these contracts need to be 
taken into account instead of the specifics of the case that had been decided. This 
means that consumers and traders are uncertain as to the outcome of the unfairness 
test even in cases where the same or a similar term had been tested before and found 
to be fair or unfair. This is different for terms that are black listed, as it may be 
assumed that another court would come to the same conclusion. This is true to a 
much lesser extent also for grey listed clauses, as the trader may then argue that in 
his specific case the term is actually fair and that the earlier court’s ruling on the same 
or similar term is not applicable to his contract in the latter case. Notwithstanding 
what was said above, the Consumentenbond notes that if a court is faced with a term 
which has been found unfair in an earlier case, there is a strong likelihood that the 
term will be found unfair in a later case as well, particularly if that term was 
incorporated by the same trader. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The effectiveness of the transparency requirement is unclear. The reason for this is 
that European law does not indicate explicitly what the consequences are when a term 
is not drafted in plain and intelligible language, and that this requirement is somewhat 
at odds with the contra proferentem rule mentioned in the same article of the 
directive. According to the Consumentenbond, the UCTD contains insufficient 
encouragement for traders to draft terms in an understandable manner. The 
Consumentenbond adds, however, that even two-sided contract terms are not always 
easily understandable to ordinary consumers as the terms often have a rather specific 
and technical meaning and may be very lengthy. 
The Dutch Supreme Court seems to be of the opinion that the mere fact that a term is 
not drafted in plain and intelligible language is not a separate cause for avoidance of 
the term, but rather is a factor that is to be taken into account when determining the 
unfairness of the term.25 In literature it is argued that the fact that a term is not 
drafted in plain and intelligible language should be taken into account as an important 
factor when assessing the unfairness of the term.26 However, it has been noted that in 
practice the breach of the transparency requirements hardly seem to play a role in the 
application of the unfairness test (cf. Pavillon 2013, no. 31). This calls the 
effectiveness of the sanction for a breach of the transparency requirements into 
question (Loos 2013, no. 242). In this respect, it seems symptomatic that the 
regulator, the ACM, indicates that it does not have an opinion regarding the overall 
effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Under Dutch law, the scope of the unfairness test has not been extended to core 
terms, provided that they have been drafted in plain and intelligible language.27 The 
Dutch legislator has refrained from extending the scope in order to prevent that a 
limited form of the iustum pretium-doctrine would be accepted.28That doctrine was 
rejected explicitly by the Dutch Supreme Court already in 1936.29  
25 See Hoge Raad 7 December 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BB5078 (X c.s./ABN Amro Bank N.V. 
26 See Loos 2013, no. 241; Hijma 2010, no. 42; Asser-Hartkamp/Sieburgh 6-III, no. 482. 
27 See Art. 6:231 under (a) DCC. 
28 See Asser-Hartkamp/Sieburgh 6-III*, no. 467. 
29 See Hoge Raad 13 November 1936, NJ 1937, 433 (Moorman/Bureau Materiaalstaat) 
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The legislator has chosen to extend the scope of the unfairness test to individually 
negotiated terms either: only standard contract terms may be subject to the 
unfairness terms, and the consumer invoking the unfairness is required to prove that 
the terms are intended for being used in a number of contracts. According to the 
parliamentary proceedings, this requirement is in any case met where it is proven that 
the terms have been used five times or more.30 In doctrinal works it is argued that 
even if the terms have only been used once one may speak of standard contract terms 
if the party accepting the trader’s terms could not have any influence on the pre-
drafted terms,31 if the trader indicates that it intends to use the terms in other 
contracts, e.g. by referring to the standard contract terms in the heading or footer of 
his company’s stationary or by registrating the terms at the Chamber of Commerce.32 
Where the terms are (substantially) changed during negotiations, they are no longer 
standard contract terms and they are no longer subject to the unfairness terms. 
Where the terms are discussed but remain the same, they are still considered to be 
standard contract terms and therefore subject to the unfairness test.33 The fact that 
the parties have discussed the terms is, however, relevant when determining the 
(un)fairness of the term.34 No negotiations have taken place where the consumer has 
merely been offered a choice between to different (sets of) pre-drafted terms, one 
where the term is substantively better but comes with a higher price, and one where 
the term is worse but the price for goods or services is lower.35 
The ACM remarks that where foreign national law provide better protection than 
follows from the UCTD, enforcement of the additional protection offered by that legal 
system is difficult, time-consuming and not prioritised by the regulator. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
An unfair term may be avoided by the consumer. Technically, avoidance takes place 
by a declaration by the consumer towards the trader stating the avoidance, or by a 
court decision.36 This implies that in theory it is rather easy for consumers to avoid an 
unfair term. However, in practice traders will often not accept the avoidance of the 
term, in which case the consumer needs to invoke legal assistance and turn to a court 
or an ADR institution. The Consumentenbond indicates that this is often too 
demanding of individual consumers. In order to prevent such discussions from 
occurring, the Consumentenbond takes part in negotiations in order to come to sets 
with two-sided standard contract terms. 
Where the court has tested the term of its own motion, and has found the term to be 
unfair, it will avoid the term of its own motion as well, unless the consumer has 
opposed that sanction. The consumer is likely to oppose only in the case where the 
unfair term was a core term that had not been drafted in plain and intelligible 
language, as avoidance of the term would then lead to avoidance of the whole 
contract.37 At the official website of the judiciary38 many cases may be found where 
terms have been tested by courts of their own motion, in particular since the Hoge 
30 See Parl. Gesch. Inv. Boek 6, p. 1546-1547.  
31 See Hijma 2010, no. 10; Loos 2013, no. 6. 
32 See Parl. Gesch. Inv. Boek 6, p. 1538; Asser-Hartkamp/Sieburgh 6-III*, no. 464. 
33 Asser-Hartkamp/Sieburgh 6-III*, no. 465; Hijma 2010, no 15; Loos 2013, no. 7. 
34 Hijma 2010, no 15; Loos 2013, no. 7. 
35 Loos 2013, no. 7. 
36 See Art. 3:49 ff. DCC. 
37 See Art. 3:41 DCC; see further Loos 2013, nos. 425-427. 
38 www.rechtspraak.nl 
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Raad confirmed the Court of Justice’s case-law and indicated how that case-law was to 
be applied in the Dutch legal context.39 This view is also confirmed by the Vereniging 
'Consument & Geldzaken' and the Consumentenbond. 
An avoided term will generally be considered as void in its entirety. An exception may 
be made where the term in fact regulates two different matters which could just as 
easily have been regulated in two separate provisions and where only one part of it 
may be seen as unfair. In case of such ‘dividable’ terms, the avoidance of the term 
may be restricted to the unfair part.40 A reduction of the unfair term to what would 
have been an acceptable term is not allowed under European law.41 In Unicaja 
Banco,42 the Court added that the unfair term may also not be replaced by the 
otherwise applicable default rule, unless this would lead to the avoidance of the whole 
contract. The Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden confirmed that the contractual 
interest clause (which it had found to be unfair under the circumstances of the case) 
could not be replaced by the default rules on statutory interest.43 Without explicitly 
stating so, the Court of Appeal Amsterdam44 had come to the same result by simply 
denying claims based on an unfair contractual interest clause and an unfair clause on 
compensation for the costs for out-of-court procedures. Case-law to this extent is, 
however, still scarce. Moreover, courts sometimes come to a different conclusion. One 
case45 involved a standard term in an insurance contract pertaining to medical health 
stating that if the consumer has wrongly informed the insurance company as to the 
facts of a claim, the insurance company was allowed to refuse the claim, to claim back 
any payments made to the consumer and to terminate the contract, even in the case 
where the wrong information was the result of a minor error on the part of the 
consumer and where these sanctions would not be proportionate to the consumer’s 
mistake. This clause was in breach of mandatory insurance law, as Art. 7:961 (5) DCC 
allows these remedies for the insurance company only if the remedies are justified 
under the circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeal thus found that the term 
was in breach of mandatory insurance law and therefore unfair, and then ruled that 
the insurance company could rely on the provision of insurance law to claim back to 
amounts paid if the facts of the case would justify that. This appears not to be in line 
with the CJEU’s case law in Unicaja Banco, quoted above, as that case-law seems to 
suggest that the Court of Appeal should have decided that the insurance company was 
not entitled to claim back these amounts irrespective of the circumstances of the case. 
According to the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' the avoidance of only the unfair 
term in a contract pertaining to a financial product does not help consumers much as 
they remain bound by a contract which typically is very disadvantageous to them. 
Such contracts should be avoided in full, the Vereniging argues. 
Both the Consumentenbond and the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' state that 
the guidance of the CJEU is useful, in particular where the court’s decision is specific 
(concrete). 
 
39 See the case Heesakkers/Voets, mentioned above. 
40 See Loos 2013, no. 430. 
41 See CJEU 14 June 2012, case C-618/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, Banco Español de Crédito; CJEU 30 May 
2013, case C-488/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341, Asbeek Brusse. 
42 CJEU 30 April 2014, case C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282, Kásler; CJEU 21 January 2015, joint cases C-
482/13, 484/13, 485/13 and 487/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:21, Unicaja Banco. 
43 Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden, location Arnhem, 10 March 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2101 
(X/NMT I); Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden, location Arnhem, 21 July 2015, 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:5453 (X/NMT II). 
44 Court of Appeal Amsterdam 3 February 2015, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:165, NJF 2015/167, WR 2015/84, 
Prg. 2016/53, 
45 See for instance Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden, location Leeuwarden, 15 March 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:2196, NJF 2016/284 (Zorg en Zekerheid/X). 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' indicates that a graphical presentation of the 
risks of investment products does have a profound effect on consumers. This could 
suggest that the same could be true with regard to standard contract terms. According 
to the Vereniging, this would require creativity, as sets with standard contract terms 
are often very lengthy and technical. The ACM confirms that if traders would be 
required to present their terms in shorter and more understandable language and in a 
better manner, this could help consumers. 
Empirical research, however, suggests that simplifying and shortening standard terms 
results in higher trust and more positive attitudes towards the standard terms, and in 
increased readership and understanding of the terms. Moreover, this research also 
shows that although the standard terms are shortened, consumers do not feel that 
they miss relevant information, which suggests that, at least from consumers’ 
viewpoint, short and simple standard terms can be at least as informative as long and 
complex standard terms. These effects were found to be similar for domestic and 
foreign online stores. Moreover, a second experiment showed that where a reading 
cost cue was added on a website indicating that reading the standard terms would 
take less than five minutes roughly doubled the number of consumers opening the 
standard terms (from 9.4% to 19.8%). Adding a reading cost cue thus seems to result 
in more consumers actually reading (parts of) the standard terms.46  
In addition, as the Consumentenbond suggests, the European legislator could promote 
the Dutch practice of two-sided standard contract terms (and the prior negotiations 
between consumer organisations and trade associations) as a means to prevent unfair 
terms from being used in consumer contracts. It should be noted, though, that such 
action may require financial support for consumer organisations, as such negotiations 
take time and costs staff time – and therefore money. The Vereniging 'Consument & 
Geldzaken' indicates in this respect that consumer organisations lack the full capacity 
to follow the markets properly, and as a result are often reactive as regards unfair 
terms instead of proactive. The ACM, i.e. the public regulator, also admits that with 
regards to unfair terms it often is reactive.  
The Consumentenbond further suggests the introduction of sector-specific black and 
grey lists (which may be better targeted than generic black and grey lists), and an 
overview of black and grey lists of terms, which could subsequently be added to the 
European list. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs consumers shopping cross-border might 
be put on the wrong footing by the fact that other Member States have different rules 
for standard terms then the Netherlands have. However, there is no empirical 
evidence that unfair terms legislation- let alone diverging application or 
46 See Elshout et al. 2016. 
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implementation of the UCTD – plays any role in the decision of businesses or 
consumers to conclude cross-border contracts. It cannot be excluded that the fear of 
the existence of such differences may deter (some) consumers and businesses from 
contracting cross-border. Consumers are typically not aware of such differences and 
typically are not well-informed of the status of the law in any country, including their 
own. Much more important for the decision to conclude a contract with a particular 
trader, is whether or not a trader is ‘familiar’ to a consumer – which is more likely to 
be the case for a trader that is located in the consumer’s own country and/or 
advertises in that country, and whether the contract can be concluded in the 
consumer’s own language.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
Whereas traders could in theory be taken aback by extended indicative lists, black lists 
or grey lists, there is no empirical evidence that they indeed are. Since consumers 
typically do not read standard terms in the first place and are not aware of their 
consumer rights,47 the existence of any type of list is unlikely to influence their 
decision to contract cross-border. According to stakeholders, however, consumers that 
do shop cross-border are relatively well aware of their rights, and as such they might 
be aware of a European list of unfair terms, whereas national lists in the trader’s 
country might be less accessible to these consumers. The ACM, who is the primary 
regulator in The Netherlands, however, remarks that the fact that the indicative list 
differs from national black and grey lists in any case is very impractical – suggesting 
at least that enforcement of national black and grey lists is difficult and time-
consuming. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
It seems highly unlikely that consumers or traders would be withheld from concluding 
contracts cross-border contracts for the reason that core terms are exempted from the 
unfairness test in one Member State and not in another as neither consumers nor 
traders are generally aware of these differences or the current situation in their own 
legal system. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Under Dutch law, SMEs may invoke the open clause against unfair terms in standard 
terms used by their counterpart.48 The SME bears the burden of proof that a term is 
unfair. This is the same system as the system of the Directive. SMEs cannot invoke 
the protection of the black list or the grey list; see also further below. 
 
47 See Elshout et al. 2016. 
48 See Art. 6:233 sub (a) DCC. 
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• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Art. 6:233 sub (a) DCC is considered as the equivalent of Art. 3 (1) UCTD.49 It is 
applied to B2C and B2SME contracts alike.50 However, businesses that make use of 
the same set of standard terms, or that have 50 employees or more, or that are 
required to publish their annual financial statements including their balance sheet and 
the income statement and explanatory memorandum (large and medium-sized 
enterprises under European company law), are excluded from the protection of the 
unfairness test.51 Moreover, in cross-border B2B contracts the unfairness test does not 
apply, irrespective of a choice for Dutch law as the applicable law and irrespective 
whether the party relying on the standard terms is the Dutch or the foreign 
business.52 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Under Dutch law (apart from the restrictions indicated in the previous answer) the 
conditions for the application of the unfairness test are the same as for B2C contracts. 
This implies that the protection against unfair terms is restricted to standard terms; 
core terms are excluded from the unfairness test unless they have not been drafted in 
plain and intelligible language.53 In literature an extension to core terms or individually 
negotiated terms is not advocated either for B2C or for B2B contracts. Remarkably, 
the ACM remarked that the protection of SMEs should extend to the main subject-
matter of the contract as ‘(m)ost SMEs and micro enterprises are not able to negotiate 
about terms and conditions’. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Businesses cannot invoke the protection of the black list or the grey list. However, 
these lists may have an Indizwirkung (may provide an indication for the potential 
unfairness of the term) in B2SME-contract where the transaction could also have been 
concluded by a consumer and the SME in this particular case resembles a consumer 
(e.g. a micro-enterprise concluding a contract for the supply of energy under the same 
conditions as a consumer).54 However, in practice (as in the two cases cited), 
Indizwirkung is hardly ever awarded to SMEs as typically the contract is too much 
related to the business activities of the SME to be seen as a consumer-like contract. In 
that case, only the open clause may be invoked by the SME.55 The ACM suggests, 
however, that SMEs should be able to benefit from the protection of the black list or 
the grey list with regard to clauses that allow unilateral changes to the contract, to 
clauses that allow for unlimited price changes and to clauses relating to the duration of 
the contract. 
 
49 See above, 1.2.1. 
50 See the previous answer. 
51 See Art. 6:235 (1) and (3) DCC. 
52 See Art. 6:247 (2) DCC. 
53 See Art. 6:231 DCC. 
54 See for instance recently Court of Appeal Amsterdam 19 April 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:1548 (lease of 
business premises); Court of Appeal The Hague 5 July 2016, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2016:1845 (Proximedia, 
business advertising on internet). 
55 See Hijma 2010, no. 32; Loos 2013, nos. 401-406. 
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• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
There is no convincing argument why the contractual transparency requirements 
should not equally apply to B2B transactions, apart from the general argument that 
businesses should take care of their own interests. The ACM indicates that it is of the 
view that the transparency requirement should be applicable also to B2B transactions 
as it may facilitate fair competition and stimulate a level playing field. The matter has, 
however, not received much attention in legal literature, given also the fact that the 
transparency requirements hardly play a role in the evaluation of the fairness of unfair 
terms in B2C contracts.56  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
It is uncertain whether the extension of the UCTD to B2B contracts would have much 
influence on cross-border trade. It seems that this may indeed be the case to some 
extent as it would be clear that the unfairness test would be applied in all Member 
States, and in (at least more or less) the same manner, whereas the unfairness test is 
currently applied to B2B contracts in some Member States and not in others. SMEs 
could thus be reassured that they would receive more or less the same protection as 
they would in their own country. On the other hand, consumer organisations are 
sometimes afraid that extending consumer protection to SMEs may result in watering 
down consumer protection measures, which would then lead to a decrease in 
protection of consumers. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
It seems unlikely that the introduction of the extension of the unfairness test to B2B 
contracts would have any influence on innovation, and it would seem to have little 
effect on market opportunities for SMEs, as typically price and performance 
capabilities are more important for trading parties than the content of standard terms. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
There are not many negative effects that may be attached to unfairness protection in 
B2B-contracts as businesses may both benefit and suffer from such protection, 
depending on whose terms are applied in the contract. As a result, the fact that SMEs 
may be reassured that they would receive similar protection as in their own legal 
country may have some positive effects on their willingness to conclude cross-border 
contracts. This is likely to have some positive effects, outweighing the negative effects 
(if there are any). 
 
56 See Pavillon 2013, no. 31; Loos 2013, no. 242. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?57  
In 1992, the DCC had already introduced a collective procedure for injunction in unfair 
contract terms.58 In 1994, an additional, general collective injunction procedure was 
introduced.59 Especially the latter one is highly relevant for the enforcement of 
consumer law.60 So, the ID did not add or change much what was already there in 
place for purely national cases. The 1998 ID was implemented by means of the 2001 
Act which introduced Art. 3:305c DCC. This provision opens up standing in Dutch 
courts to qualified entities from outside the Netherlands to lodge cross-border actions 
for the cessation of intra-community infringements of consumer rights derived from 
the List referred to in Art. 1ID. This system was obviously continued with the 2009 ID. 
So, the ID was implemented within civil procedure and the ID is therefore completely 
part of the standing in court of associations and foundations in civil procedure.  
It is worth mentioning that for the purpose of national enforcement of consumer 
rights, the DCC does not distinguish between qualified and non-qualified entities. Any 
organisation or association which according to its articles of association or foundation 
purports to represent the collective interests of consumer generally or a specific group 
of consumers, has standing in court to file for prohibitive and positive injunction as 
well as for a declaratory judgment. Since 1 July 2013,61 Art. 3:305a DCC has been 
fortified somewhat by providing that the claim of the organisation shall be struck out if 
the interests of the persons in whose interest the claim is lodged, are ‘insufficiently 
served’ by the claim. This test was introduced to counter frivolous demands by 
organisations with inadequate internal governance structures that lack a proper 
constituency.  
Hence, Art. 3:305c DCC concerning qualified entities is only relevant in cross border 
claims before Dutch civil courts.  
Stakeholders feel that the use of the collective injunctions procedure of Art. 3:305a 
DCC is highly relevant for national cases, the instrument of cross-border injunction 
before civil courts has not proved relevant at all. It seems, so it was said, that foreign 
consumer associations are either unfamiliar with the legal possibilities or the obstacles 
are too high. As one representative of consumer organisation noted: it is easier to go 
to court in your own country than elsewhere.  
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
All of the elements stated above have a positive effect on the use of Art. 3:305a DCC. 
The available case law shows that the instrument is a useful addition to the tools 
57  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
58 See Art. 6:240 DCC. 
59 See Art. 3:305a DCC. 
60 See, e.g., Weber & Van Boom 2011. 
61 See Staatsblad 2013/255. 
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available in civil procedure for collective redress. One of the relevant legal points 
decided by the Dutch Supreme Court in favour of representative organisations 
concerns the pre-summons costs of investigation and claim collection. In Hoge Raad 
13 October 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AW2080, it was held that such costs – provided 
they are reasonable, it was reasonable to incur them and they directly relate to the 
case – can be fully claimed from the defendant if the court finds that the defendant 
indeed acted wrongfully vis-à-vis the constituency of the representative organisation. 
This decision was welcomed because it made it possible for these organisations to 
claim such pre-trail costs (which can run into ten thousands of Euros; e.g., 
consultants, evidence, experts, logistics).   
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes, it has (or rather, it was the other way round: the DCC already had a collective 
injunctions procedure which was much broader than the ID offered). Given the open-
ended nature of the Dutch civil procedural rules on standing in court of consumer 
associations and foundations who file a collective claim for injunction, the scope of 
application is fully open. Any and all relevant substantive rules of law (including 
contract, tort etc.) pertaining to consumer protection can be taken as a starting point 
for injunctive relief. This has been the case since 1994 when Art. 3:305a DCC was 
introduced (and even before that on the basis of case law) and ever since. The 2001 
implementation of the ID merely meant the introduction of similar rights for cross-
border injunctions filed by foreign entities. No particular requirements such as 
qualification through a state-backed listing of some sort are set. So: any organisation 
may claim on any basis.  
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
It seems that the legal landscape for injunctions is favourable in the Netherlands. The 
main obstacles seem to be financial rather than legal.62 Consumer organisations point 
to the fact without financial means, no injunction procedure will be initiated; 
obviously, this is not a new problem. What is new, is the surge in commercially driven 
ad-hoc foundations ‘representing’ consumers in recent years. This development has 
prompted discussion whether the Dutch legal system should step away from the broad 
open access of any association/foundation to a more contained system of ‘qualified 
entities’ with pre-approval by relevant authorities. This discussion has not reached a 
final conclusion but it seems unlikely that the Dutch ‘tradition’ of this open access to 
courts for representative organisations will be abandoned. It seems more likely that in 
case of mass damages claims further restrictions to commercially driven damages 
actions will be introduced but that injunctive remedies will remain widely available to a 
broad range of organisations.63  
 
62 See Tillema 2016 and Faure & Visscher 2015. 
63 See Tillema 2016. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
The Dutch example shows that the use of pre-approved listing (qualification of 
entities) is not vital for the collective remedy of injunction in civil procedure. So, 
extending the coverage would probably not do harm but it would not do anything for 
purely national enforcement procedures concerning Dutch consumers. It would 
obviously be relevant for cross-border injunctions lodged before a Dutch court under 
the regime of Art. 3:305c DCC.  
One representative of a consumer organisations argued that the ID should include 
damages actions as well, in order to enable representative organisations to claim for 
reinstatement and compensation of consumers who experienced detriment as well as 
allow them to invoke rescission, termination or enforced performance for the benefit of 
consumers.  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
The general impression of the authors of this report on the basis of the published case 
law and the interviews is that the obstacles for Dutch consumer organisations to 
access foreign civil courts are insurmountable. The same probably applies for foreign 
organisations who seek to address a Dutch court since no such actions have been 
brought to date (leaving aside highly exceptional cases – the authors of this report 
only know of one case where a foreign consumer authority (successfully) sought 
redress in The Netherlands: District Court Breda 9 July 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2008:BD6815 (Office of Fair Trading/Best Sales B.V.). 
It stands to reason it makes more sense to liaise with befriended associations in those 
countries where the claims needs to be brought and to persuade those home 
associations to help out. It seems that there are occasional contacts to that effect. 
Whether any cross-border activities concerning injunction – if they exist – would 
actually do any good to the internal market, is debatable. Our impression is that the 
cross-border cooperation between national supervisory authorities yields more 
tangible results.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
From a Dutch perspective, this option is not effective at all. The obstacles for Dutch 
consumer organisations to access foreign civil courts are insurmountable. Consumer 
organisations stress that the legal and financial obstacles for bringing claims to foreign 
courts are simply too great. The authors of this report refer to the answers given 
above.  
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Consumer organisations stress that the legal and financial obstacles for bringing 
claims to foreign courts are simply too great. They do not offer concrete solutions. 
Here it is useful to note that Dutch consumer associations are not financed by the 
State for bringing claims to court – they mostly need to rely on private donations and 
their memberships. Hence, if the Injunctions Directive really aims to stimulate cross 
border litigation by qualified entities, they need to be financially compensated in some 
form or other.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The authors of this report refer to earlier answers. All collective proceedings for the 
benefit of consumers are either based on the general principles of Art. 3:305a ff. DCC 
(or, as far as UCTD is concerned, Art. 6:240 ff. DCC). Therefore, the private law 
enforcement procedures for private associations and organisations are not separate 
but integrated into civil law and civil procedure. Note that claims brought by foreign 
qualified entities before Dutch courts are covered by Art. 3:305c DCC rather than Art. 
3:305a DCC. However, these two provisions lead to identical procedural steps 
(provided the cross-border claim concerns issues covered by the List of Directives 
referred to in Art. 1 ID). 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The authors of this report refer to earlier answers. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
According to the Consumentenbond, it is difficult to prove the benefits that consumers 
reap from European directives, but it has no doubt that there are benefits. Public 
enforcement certainly is of use to consumers, but does not lead to compensation for 
the detriment caused to individual consumers but to fines, which ultimately benefit the 
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State. The ACM confirms that its existence benefits consumers. The costs for individual 
enforcement of consumer rights, according to both the Consumentenbond and the 
ACM, are considerable, preventing consumers in many cases from actually benefitting 
from consumer protection measures. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
The Consumentbond states that bona fide traders should profit from consumer 
protection rules, but that rogue traders need to be persuaded to abide by the law. Key 
here is the risk of ‘getting caught’, which should be increased. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
The costs for traders in order to respect consumer law legislation are difficult to 
quantify, according to the ACM. The ACM, however, remarks that at least theoretically 
it should save traders costs if they have clear checklists they need to abide by in order 
to be ‘safe’. For this reason, the ACM has developed a checklist with regard to 
information obligations for webshops. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
At present it is not possible to calculate what the costs are for public enforcement of 
the UCPD and the UCTD, as the public enforcement agencies do not keep track of 
single enforcement instruments.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
Both the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Justice state in 
their interviews that they implement European directives as cost-effectively as 
possible, in particular by seeking to implement directives in existing legislation and by 
making use of existing instruments. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
It seems hard to cut implementation and enforcement costs without lowering 
consumer protection. Less enforcement implies also less risk for rogue traders of 
‘getting caught’ and thus may serve as an incentive to take unfair advantage of 
consumers. The Ministry of Economic Affairs does point to the possibility to introduce 
fewer central general clauses and to replace them by more specific clauses, which may 
be easier and therefore cheaper to enforce. The ACM rather points to the possibility to 
restrict the overlap between European legislative instruments. However, if the ACM 
were smaller in size, it would not be able to deter traders from infringing consumer 
protection legislation sufficiently, the regulator indicates. 
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1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs companies active in regulated sectors 
tend to look at sector-specific legislation and may believe that horizontal EU consumer 
legislation such as the UCPD and the UCTD is not applicable to their sector. The 
Consumentenbond notes that consumers typically are aware of the content of the 
UCPD, even though they do not know the rules themselves, as the rules of the UCPD 
by and large are self-evident. The UCTD is less well-known by consumers as the 
contents of standard contract terms legislation are less apparent for consumers. As 
traders are professional parties, they are expected to be aware of the law, and 
ignorance thereof is not a valid excuse, the Consumentenbond argues. 
According to the Consumentenbond, the Authority Consumers and Markets (ACM), 
which is the primary regulator in the area of consumer law is well aware of the 
requirements of the UCPD, but other regulators are less familiar with these 
requirements. In specific sectors, other regulators are charged with the enforcement 
of specific instruments, but not with the enforcement of the horizontal instruments. 
This is confirmed by the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken', which indicates that 
fines imposed by the financial markets regulator, the Authority Financial Markets 
(AFM), generally are not based on the UCPD, and that it is possible that these 
regulators work in isolation. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
As is explained by the ACM, in The Netherlands are several regulators competent to 
supervise and enforce consumer protection legislation in addition to the Authority 
Consumers and Markets (ACM), which is the main regulator in this area. For instance, 
the Authority Financial Markets (AFM) is competent with regard to financial services 
(with the exclusion of the ACM). The Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate 
(Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport, ILT) supervises compliance with passenger 
rights, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit, NVWA) is competent with regard to food claims and 
labelling of products. In addition, where consumers are not merely misled but are 
subject to fraud, the police and the public prosecutor are competent to take action 
under criminal law. Cooperation protocols have been developed between regulators 
and there are regular contacts between the contact persons of these regulators within 
the Markttoezichthoudersberaad (Market supervisors deliberation). The cooperation 
protocols have been formally published.64  
 
64 See for instance that between ACM and AFM in Staatscourant 2014, no. 14473. 
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• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs traders that try to treat consumers fairly 
have no problem with the legal framework, but rogue traders may benefit from 
uncertainty as to the applicability of sector-specific or horizontal legislation. The 
Consumentenbond notices an overlap between the provisions on the supply of 
information under the UCPD and the provisions under sector-specific legislation. An 
example is Art. 23 of Regulation 1008/2008, which contains provisions on the pricing 
or airline tickets. That provision may be seen as a lex specialis of the UCPD. The 
Regulation led to an amendment of the Act on enforcement of consumer protection 
(Wet handhaving consumentenbescherming), but it remained unclear which regulator 
was competent for the enforcement of Art. 23 of the Regulation. Since then this has 
been repaired – now the ACM is competent to enforce this provision in the same 
manner as it is competent to enforce the implemented provisions of the UCPD. The 
Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' remarks that the requirements of the UCPD and 
the UCTD do not match well with the sector-specific legislation for the financial sector, 
which is not developed with consumer protection as its primary goal. As a 
consequence, the instruments in part overlap and in part are contradictory. The AFM 
confirms this. 
The ACM also confirms the overlap, but remarks that since it is competent to enforce 
both the UCPD and the UCTD, as well as sector-specific legislation in the area of 
telecom, transport, postal services and energy, this overlap may spring to mind more 
easily in The Netherlands than in Member States where these sectors are supervised 
by different supervisors. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
The Consumentenbond and the Ministry of Security and Justice  are of the opinion that 
the general rules of the UCPD and of the UCTD should be applicable also in the 
regulated sectors as consumers have similar expectations of the commercial practices 
of airlines as of sellers of consumer goods, and a uniform application of these rules is 
beneficial from the point of view of legal certainty. Sector-specific legislation is added 
to this to cater for the specific characteristics of these markets, which imply that the 
horizontal instruments are not sufficient by themselves. The Consumentenbond points 
to the existence of specific unfair terms, such as terms forbidding consumers to make 
use of a return ticket for their return flight if they have not also made use of the 
outbound flight – such terms are difficult to combat with the general ban on unfair 
terms, the Consumentenbond argues. The ACM confirms this, but remarks that too 
much overlap may prevent effective enforcement. 
There is no quantitative information pertaining to the costs of the complementary 
application of the UCPD and UCTD in the regulated areas as these costs are not 
calculated separately. The costs of public enforcement in the financial sector are 
passed on to the financial institutions, the AFM remarks – and undoubtedly they are 
ultimately passed on to the consumer, as the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' 
points out. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
In Dutch law, specific legislation normally takes precedence over generic (horizontal) 
legislation (lex specialis derogat legi generali). The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
indicates that at the European level this principle is not always explicitly applied In this 
respect there is a need for clarification indeed, the Ministry argues. This is confirmed 
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by the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken', that indicates that the interplay is not 
transparent at the moment, which may cause problems when the rules are enforced, 
and which may prevent the (financial) regulator from timeously intervening in the 
market. The AFM, on the other hand, argues that it is clear that sector-specific 
legislation trumps horizontal legislation, but agrees that it sometimes may be difficult 
to determine which rules are applicable in a particular case. For that reason, it also 
requests clarification. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The Consumentenbond argues that traders are not in need of protection in such cases, 
but consumers may be as the power balance between the parties is uneven also in 
these types of cases. The Consumentenbond is of the view that consumers indeed 
need the protection of the UCPD and the UCTD in these cases. At present, consumers 
are protected primarily by rules of general contract law, which largely are of a default 
nature only and from which the parties thus may derogate. In literature the question 
has been raised whether there is a need for consumer protection, in particular in the 
case where consumers sell their cars or motorcycles online to traders – which 
frequently occurs in situations where consumers are in need of ‘quick cash’ and may 
take rash decisions – and traders may take advantage thereof. In such cases, the 
rules implementing the Consumer Sales Directive do not apply as these provisions 
require the seller to be a trader and the buyer to be a consumer. For the same reason 
it seems unlikely that the rules implementing the CRD may be applied – which could 
otherwise offer the consumer a right of withdrawal. However, the rules implementing 
the UCPD may be applied in this situation. Moreover, also the rules implementing the 
UCTD, however, will apply in the case where the trader (the buyer) makes use of 
standard terms and introduces these terms into the contract. The Dutch black and 
grey lists,65 however, primarily assume that the consumer is the buyer or the client 
instead of the seller or the service provider, and as a result often cannot help 
consumers in this situation. It has been argued that Indizwirkung should be 
considered, as the terms incorporated into C2B contracts often mirror terms listed on 
the black and grey lists.66  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the notions of ‘consumer’ and ‘average 
consumer’ work fine in practice, but the notion of a ‘vulnerable consumer’ is less clear. 
Whether or not a consumer is vulnerable may determine on the nature of the 
transaction or the situation (e.g. doorstep selling). The Ministry does not suggest 
amending the notion, though. The ACM indicates that the notion of ‘credulity’ needs to 
be clarified. 
65 See Art. 6:236 and 237 DCC. 
66 See Loos 2015. 
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The Consumentenbond is rather of the opinion that particularly the ‘average 
consumer’-notion is outdated as behavioural research has shown that consumers are 
much more vulnerable than the ‘average consumer’-notion takes account of. The 
Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken' supports the Consumentenbond’s view in this 
regard, specifically pointing to Duivenvoorde 2015.  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the introduction of specific provisions 
protecting vulnerable consumers in the legislation on unfair terms would lead to 
further complexity which would not help consumers in practice. Similarly, business 
associations are of the opinion that there should not be specific legislation protecting 
vulnerable consumers. This is more or less confirmed by the Vereniging 'Consument & 
Geldzaken', which indicates that it is difficult to develop a well-defined category of 
‘vulnerable consumers’, with the possible exception of minors. Other underprivileged 
consumers, such as dyslexic consumers or consumers with a low IQ, are not as such 
recognisable to traders, and it seems difficult to develop legislation specifically for 
such groups. Similarly, the ACM indicates minors may, but need not, be vulnerable, 
and that there are huge differences between older people. 
Instead, business associations argue that businesses should discuss with individual 
consumers whether or not tailored facilities are needed. The Consumentenbond comes 
to the same outcome, but based on the idea not that the ‘vulnerable consumer’-notion 
should be extended, but instead that the ‘average consumer’-notion should be 
amended to protect ordinary consumers instead of the cognitively highly developed 
consumer. This viewpoint is confirmed by the Vereniging 'Consument & Geldzaken', 
which argues that all consumers concluding a contract for a complex financial product 
at some point may be seen as ‘vulnerable’. The AFM more or less confirms this 
viewpoint where it states that consumers that conclude payday loans are vulnerable, 
but not within the meaning of the UCPD. Similarly consumers that invest their whole 
pension may be vulnerable given the importance of the transaction for their future 
financial well-being, but again they are not considered vulnerable within the meaning 
of the UCPD. 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
In the area of unfair terms, before the implementation of the UCTD, Dutch law in 
many respects already offered better protection for consumers than the UCTD does. 
The most prominent examples thereof are the black and grey lists, which offer 
consumers better protection then the non-binding European list. However, in specific 
areas – such as the rule on transparency – the implementation of the UCTD has 
improved consumer protection, although it should be noted that in practice the breach 
of the transparency requirements hardly seems to play a role in the application of the 
unfairness test.67 Similarly, the requirement that courts must test the unfairness of 
terms of their own motion, has improved consumer protection, in particular in those 
cases where the consumer does not appear in court. 
With regard to unfair commercial practices, Dutch law did not have a similar 
instrument prior to the implementation of the UCPD, although a similar level of 
protection could be obtained through general tort law. Nevertheless, EU consumer law 
67 See Pavillon 2013, no. 31. 
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has certainly led to an improvement of consumer protection as the problem of 
commercial practices is much more recognisable. The Dutch legislator has recently 
added to this protection by introducing a provision indicating that where a contract 
was concluded under the influence of an unfair commercial practice, the consumer 
may avoid the contract.68 The Consumentenbond, the largest consumer organization 
in The Netherlands, advocates the introduction of such a remedy at the European level 
to improve the effectiveness of the UCPD. 
Business associations remark that the introduction of additional information 
obligations has not always been to the benefit of consumers. They argue that 
consumers typically spend only a limited amount of time when choosing a particular 
product. Within that time consumers cannot possibly digest all information that traders 
are legally required to provide them with. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Prior to the PID, there was already national legislation on pricing information. The 
authors of this report have no evidence of any improvement or deterioration after 
introduction of the PID regime. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Prior to the MCAD, there was already national tort law available. The authors of this 
report have no evidence of improvement after introduction of the MCAD regime but 
respondents do seem to think that, as concerns comparative advertising, the legal 
framework has improved since the MCAD regime was introduced.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
The development of e-commerce has significantly enhanced the possibilities of 
consumers and traders to conclude cross-border contracts, both as it has become 
easier to come into contact with foreign traders and to compare goods and services 
and prices. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
The creation of similar or the same protection measures throughout the European 
Union may have taken away (some of) the fear of consumers that consumer 
protection rules and rules on performance and remedies for non-performance differ 
radically, leaving them unprotected in case of problems. Similarly, businesses may feel 
more secure in taking advantage of the internal market, as the ACM observes. It is 
difficult, however, to prove whether this has had a profound influence on the 
willingness of consumers and traders to conclude cross-border contracts. 
 
68 See Art. 6:193j (3) DCC. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – the Netherlands  
Directive Transposition legislation 
(National law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (DCC), as 
enacted in 1992  
The 1992 Dutch civil Code 
already met the 
requirements of the 1993 
Directive, with minor 
exceptions that do not 
pertain to the elements 
discussed here. The 
provision of Art. 6:234 DCC 
discussed below has 
undergone changes in order 
to implement the (less-
consumer friendly) Services 
Directive 
'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
Yes Art. 6:236 DCC  
Burgerlijk Wetboek (DCC), as 
enacted in 1992 
 'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
Yes Art. 6:237 DCC  
  Extensions of the 
application of Directive to 
individually negotiated 
terms  
No   
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  Extensions of the 
application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of 
the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
Burgerlijk Wetboek (DCC),as 
enacted in 1992, and amended 
to conform with the Services 
Directive (Act of 12 November 
2009, Staatsblad 2009, 503) 
 Trader’s obligation to 
provide standard contract 
terms before or at 
conclusion of the contract 
(at penalty of avoidance of 
the terms) 
Yes Art. 6:233 sub (b) and 234 
DCC 
 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Act of 25 September 2008, 
Staatsblad 20089, 397 
 Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Art. 4:19, 20, 22, 25, 73 
Financial Supervision Act 2006 
jo. Besluit Gedragstoezicht 
financiële ondernemingen Wft 
(BGFO; Financial Supervision 
Act (Supervision of Financial 
Enterprises Conduct) 
Regulations. 
Art. 3 Dutch Gambling Act 
 
Wet Handhaving 
Consumentenbescherming 
(Consumer Protection 
Enforcement Act 2006), Act of 
20 November 2006, Staatsblad 
2006, 591, in force as of 29 
December 2006 (Staatsblad 
2006, 592)  
     
Wet Tegengaan 
acquisitiefraude (Act 
Prevention Acquistionfraud), 
Act of 29 March 2016, 
Staatsblad 2016, 133  
 Application of UCPD to 
B2B transactions 
Yes Art. 6:194 (2) and (3) DCC  
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Prijzenwet 1961 (Prices Act 
1961), as amended in 2002 
(Staatsblad 2002, 217) and the 
2003 Royal Decree on Pricing 
of Products (Besluit 
prijsaanduiding producten 
2003, amended in 2014, 
Staatsblad 2013, 146).   
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes In Annex I of the 2003 Decree 
on Pricing of Products, the 
option under Art. 3 (2) PID to 
exclude works of art, services, 
auctions, and antiques is 
exercised. Moreover, in 
Annex I use is also made of 
the option under Art. 6 PID to 
exclude certain small 
businesses. Annex I under E 
excludes ‘products offered for 
sale on public markets by 
means of sales eloquence, 
where the sales price or unit 
price of the product are not 
settled in advance’    
 
The following articles 
of the PID have been 
implemented without 
a specific focus on B2C 
transactions and 
therefore seem to 
apply to B2B 
transactions as well: 
- Art. 3 (1) PID, 
implemented in art. 
3(1) of the 2003 Royal 
Decree on Pricing of 
Products (Besluit 
prijsaanduiding 
producten 2003 
- Art. 3(3) PID, 
implemented in art. 3 
(4) of the 2003 Royal 
Decree on Pricing of 
Products (Besluit 
prijsaanduiding 
producten 2003 
- Art. 4(1) PID, 
implemented in art. 4 
(2) of the 2003 Royal 
Decree on Pricing of 
Products (Besluit 
prijsaanduiding 
producten 2003 
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (DCC)    Art. 6:194-196 DCC  
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (DCC),as 
enacted in 1992  
     
Wet Handhaving 
Consumentenbescherming 
(Consumer Protection 
Enforcement Act 2006) 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – the Netherlands 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen 
by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
in your country separately (as a 
separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive or/and by the Consumer 
Rights Directive)? 
 
Yes and no. The general procedure of 
Art. 3:305a – c DCC apply to all 
procedures, apart from the specific 
collective action procedure for unfair 
terms, which is regulated in Art. 6:240-
243 DCC. The Supreme Court recently 
decided, however, that this specific 
procedure does not derogate from the 
general procedure, which implies that 
the general procedure is available to 
consumer organisations also in case of 
unfair terms (but only can serve to 
have the terms declared unfair 
without further consequences).69  
Art. 3:305a – c DCC offers 
standing in court for any 
association or foundation 
incorporated with the aim to 
represent the interests of 
consumers in any consumer 
related case. 
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
Foreign qualified entities70 
Other  
For national cases, any 
association or foundation 
with legal personality can 
bring claims.71 For cross-
border claims by foreign 
entities the requirement of 
qualified foreign entity listed 
in their country of origin  
applies.72 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or 
an administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain 
in the comments column for which 
infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations 
are entitled to an exemption of 
some/all cost related to the procedure 
please explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
The costs are as a rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
Cost shifting rules are 
operated on the basis of 
modest tariffs, not full cost 
orders 
 
Is the scope of application of 
injunctions extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer 
law in general? 
Yes, scope of application extended to 
cover consumer law in general 
 
For national cases the scope 
is broad: any claim for the 
benefit of the constituency of 
the organisation will be 
heard. For foreign qualified 
entities, the Annex I applies 
69 See Hoge Raad 29 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:769 (Stichting Erfpachtersbelang Amsterdam et 
al./Gemeente Amsterdam). 
70 Art. 3:305c DCC. 
71 Art. 3:305c DCC. 
72 Art. 3:305c DCC 
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Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments 
column regarding  type of business' 
interests covered by the injunctions 
procedure 
No In principle no but if the 
organisation can show that a 
particular rule serves to 
protect business interests as 
well as consumer interests, 
the case may be heard.  
Is it possible to bring an injunction 
action jointly against several traders 
from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
Yes 
 
Normal rules of joinder of 
defendants apply 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? 
(not including the consultation stage 
under Art. 5 of the ID) 
No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
Yes, requirement for party seeking 
injunction to consult with the 
defendant 
 
 
Does the national legislation provide 
for measures ensuring summary 
procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of 
the procedure (subject matter/time 
limits) in the comments column. 
Yes 
 
Provisional injunction 
available usually within 1-2 
month after summons issue 
(3 months at most) 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the 
comments column to who exactly 
should they be paid 
Yes, penalty of a fine for each day of 
non-compliance 
 
To be paid to claimant 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of 
the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
No 
 
General rules apply 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions for 
the infringement? 
No  
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that 
those profits are paid to the public 
purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
Yes and no In theory an order to directly 
refund moneys paid by 
consumers without cause can 
be obtained; not that this is 
not an order for restitution of 
profits (disgorgement) but an 
order for restitution (refund) 
of moneys paid by consumers 
without legal justification. 
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No Unless entity suffered 
damage itself 
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Can an action for damages or redress to 
be paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies 
on the injunctions order?  
Yes 
 
The injunction claim can 
have informal res judicata 
effect on the points of law to 
benefit of individual 
consumers   
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
No Normal rules of enforcement 
of court orders apply 
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
No No ex parte effects. 
However, the injunction 
claim can have informal res 
judicata effect on the points 
of law to benefit of others in 
similar cases 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
 
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
         
 
B2C disputes are part of the total number of civil law claims at the level of the sector 
kanton (small claims section), but these include also family, labour and rental cases. 
Neither the number of B2C disputes nor the legal basis of decisions is registered in 
The Netherlands, so it is impossible to give either statistics or an estimate for the 
stakeholders.  
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).73  
 
73 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 223 EUR 0 if no 
lawyer is 
involved 
(lawyer’s 
assistance 
not legally 
required). 
EUR 75 to 
EUR 700 if a 
lawyer is 
involved. 
EUR 77.75 
for 
introducing 
the claim by 
a bailiff; 
EUR 74.83 
for serving 
the court’s 
decision to 
the trader 
Impossible to 
estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance 
and experience 
of consumer. 
No time 
needed in case 
court tests 
term of its own 
motion in the 
course of a 
procedure. 
 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
EUR 127.40 EUR 0 if no 
lawyer is 
involved 
(lawyer’s 
assistance 
not legally 
required). 
EUR 75 to 
EUR 700 if a 
lawyer is 
involved. 
-- Impossible to 
estimate, 
depends on 
knowledge, 
literacy, 
perseverance 
and experience 
of consumer. 
No time 
needed in case 
ADR institution 
tests term of its 
own motion in 
the course of a 
procedure 
(however: it is 
unlikely that 
this happens). 
Competent ADR 
Institution: 
Geschillencommissie 
Reizen, part of De 
Geschillencommissie. 
Competence based on 2-
sided standard terms, i.e. 
terms agreed by the 
Consumentenbond (the 
largest consumer 
organisation) and the 
ANVR (branch 
association of tour 
operators). Tour 
operators that are a 
member of ANVR are 
required to make use of 
these terms. The chances 
that the unfair term is 
included in these terms 
is (almost) 0. 
This may only be 
different if the tour 
operator is not a 
member of ANVR, but 
has accepted the 
competence of the 
Geschillencommissie 
Reizen nonetheless (and 
has paid the associated 
fees).  
  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
878
  
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Neither the number of B2C disputes in court nor the legal basis of decisions is 
registered in The Netherlands, so it is impossible to give either statistics or even an 
estimate for the stakeholders. Similarly, even if a number of B2C ADR decisions could 
be construed, again the legal basis of decisions is not registered. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Raad Nederlandse Detailhandel Business association 20 June 2016 
Detailhandel Nederland Business association 20 June 2016 
Energie Nederland Business association N/A 
Authority Consumer and Markets (ACM) National consumer enforcement and 
regulatory authority 
22 June 2016 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets (AFM) 
National consumer enforcement and 
regulatory authority 
7 July 2016 
Ministry of Security and Justice Ministry 11 July 2016 
Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry 23 June 2016 
Europees Consumenten Centrum European Consumer Centre 24 June 2016 
Consumentenbond Consumer organisation 2 June 2016, 16 
June and 28 June. 
Vereniging ‘Consument en Geldzaken’ Consumer organisation 6 June 2016 
Geschillencommissie ADR institution N/A 
Complaints Board for the Advertising 
Industry (Reclame Code Commissie) 
National regulatory authority (self-
regulation in the area of advertising) 
30 June and 11 
July 2016 
 
Note: (i) The Geschillencommissie was not available for interviewing; (ii) The interview with business 
associations Raad Nederlandse Detailhandel and Detailhandel Nederland took place in a joint session. A third 
business association, VNO-NCW/MKB could not participate in the meeting; iii) the Reclame Code Commissie 
communicated various issues but was unable to provide answers to the questionnaire. 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Asser-Hartkamp/Sieburgh 
6-III* 
2010 A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht; 
Verbintenissenrecht, deel 6-III*: Algemeen Overeenkomstenrecht, 
Deventer: Kluwer, 13th ed., 2010 
Duivenvoorde 2013 B.B. Duivenvoorde, ‘De gemiddelde consument als standaard bij 
misleiding. Een kritische blik vanuit de gedragswetenschappen’, in: 
W.H. van Boom, I. Giesen & A.J. Verheij (red.), Capita civilologie. 
Handboek empirie en privaatrecht, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2013, p. 147-168 
Duivenvoorde 2015 B.B. Duivenvoorde, The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, Springer 2015 (dissertation 
University of Amsterdam 2014) 
Elshout et al. 2016 M. Elshout, M. Elsen, J. Leenheer, M. Loos and J. Luzak, Study on 
consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs), Final 
report, 2016 (report on behalf of the European Commission, not 
made public yet) 
Faure & Visscher 2015 M.G. Faure en L.T. Visscher, Een rechtseconomische visie op 
collectieve actie (preadvies Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht), 
Zutphen: Paris 2015 
Geerts & Vollebregt 2009 P.G.F.A. Geerts & E.R. Vollebregt, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken, 
misleidende reclame en vergelijkende reclame, Deventer: Kluwer 
2009 
Hijma 2010 Jac. Hijma, Algemene voorwaarden, Monografieën NBW nr. B-55, 
Kluwer, Deventer, 3rd edition 2010 
Loos 2013 M.B.M. Loos, Algemene voorwaarden, The Hague: Boom, 2nd 
edition 2013 
Loos 2015 M.B.M. Loos, ‘Consumentenbescherming bij de 
consumentenverkoop van auto’s’, WPNR 2015/7062, p. 423-424 
Loos & Van Boom  2009 M.B.M. Loos and W.H. van Boom, Handhaving van het 
consumentenrecht - preadviezen Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht, 
Deventer: Kluwer, 2009 
Parl. Gesch. Inv. Boek 6 1990 W.H.M. Reehuis, E.E. Slob (red.); C.J. van Zeben, J.W. du Pon 
(eindred.), Parlementaire geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burgerlijke 
Wetboek, Invoering Boeken 3, 5 en 6; Boek 6, Algemeen gedeelte 
van het verbintenissenrecht; Deventer: Kluwer, 1990 
Pavillon 2013 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, ‘De invloed van Europese richtlijnen op de 
Nederlandse regeling van algemene voorwaarden (afdeling 6.5.3 
BW)’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, L.A.D. Keus (red.), De invloed 
van het Europese recht op het Nederlands privaatrecht, deel II, 
Deventer: Kluwer, 2nd ed., 2013 
Pavillon 2014 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, ‘The interaction between the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive and Self-Regulation: The Case of Codes of 
Conduct’, in : W.H. van Boom et al., The European Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive: Impact, Enforcement Strategies and 
National Legal Systems (Series: Markets and the Law), Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing 2014, p. 137-172 
Tillema 2016 I. Tillema, 'Commerciële motieven in privaatrechtelijke collectieve 
acties: olie op het vuur van de claimcultuur?', Ars Aequi 2016, p. 
337-346 
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Van Boom et al.  2009 W.H. van Boom et al., Handelspraktijken, reclame en zelfregulering 
– Pilotstudy Maatschappelijke Reguleringsinstrumenten (WODC 
Rapport 1535) (BJU, Den Haag 2009) 
Van Boom et al. 2009* W.H. van Boom, B.J. Drijber, J.H. Lemstra, V.C.A. Lindijer, T. 
Novakovski, Strooischade (onderzoeksrapport, uitgebracht i.o.v. 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken), Rotterdam/Den Haag 2009 
Van Boom 2010 W.H. van Boom, Handhaving consumentenbescherming- Een 
toelichting op de Wet handhaving consumentenbescherming, 
Zutphen: Uitgeverij Paris 2010 
Van Boom  2011 W.H. van Boom, ‘Country Report The Netherlands’, in: Civic 
Consulting, Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on 
Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU - Part 2 – Country Reports, 
Berlin 2011 
Van Boom 2011* W.H. van Boom, ‘Price Intransparency, Consumer Decision Making 
and European Consumer Law’, Journal of Consumer Policy 2011/3, 
p. 359-376 
Van Boom et al. 2014 W. van Boom, A. Garde & O. Akseli (eds.), The European Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive: Impact, Enforcement Strategies and 
National Legal Systems (Series: Markets and the Law), Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2014 
Verkade 2009 D.WF. Verkade, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken jegens consumenten 
(Mon. BW B49a), (Kluwer, Deventer 2009) 
Verkade 2011 D.W.F. Verkade, Misleidende (B2B) reclame en vergelijkende 
reclame (Mon. BW B49b), Deventer: Kluwer 2011. 
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Settlement of Mass Damage Act (WCAM 2005)’, Contratto e 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report POLAND  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
In Poland, the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices (Ustawa o 
przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym, 23 August 2007, Dz.U. 2007 Nr 
171 poz. 1206) implemented the UCPD. Article 4 of this Act contains a general clause 
that is based on the general clause prohibiting unfair competition in Polish law, as 
adopted in Article 3 para 1 of the Act on combating unfair competition (Ustawa o 
zwlaczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji, 16 April 1993, Dz.U. 1993 Nr 47 poz. 211). The 
principle-based approach is expressed through a requirement for the test of unfairness 
of a commercial practice to check whether the practice is ‘contrary to the principle of 
good practices’ (‘zasada sprzecznosci z dobrymi obyczajami’). On the face of it, there 
is thus a contradiction between the requirements for unfairness in Polish and EU law,1  
but the courts could interpret Polish provisions pursuant to the UCPD, thus using the 
unfairness test of a general clause (Article 5 UCPD).2 
The compliance test of a given commercial practice to the principle of good practices is 
easier to conduct for Polish courts than the test of professional diligence from the 
UCPD. Polish courts are very familiar with the standards of ‘good practices’, as this 
test is long present in Polish law. The old Polish law regulating unfair competition (as 
old as of 1926) used this term as meaning the trader’s honesty and fairness,3 and 
generally it refers to ethical and moral standards of behaviour that could be expected 
from traders, and does not require the trader’s fault to establish breach (fault could be 
required if the test of professional diligence was applied instead) (this interpretation 
has been upheld in the above-mentioned Act of 1993). The Polish Supreme Court 
applies this test, considering also the professional diligence standard as adopted in the 
UCPD, ensuring that the scope of the general clause of good practices is not broader.4  
From this perspective, the introduction thereof by the Polish legislator could be seen 
as an effective consumer protection tool. 
It should, however, be mentioned that the scope of the application of the general 
clause has only recently been clarified in Polish law, following the CJEU’s judgment in 
the case C-388/13 UPC Magyarország, with the change to the Act on prevention of 
unfair commercial practices applicable as of December 25, 2014 (Dz. U. 2014 poz. 
827), establishing that it did not need to be conducted when the commercial practice 
also fell under the misleading or aggressive commercial practice test or was contrary 
to codes of conduct.5 
Generally, stakeholders agree that the principle-based approach provides for an 
effective approach to consumer protection. It allows for courts and other national 
enforcement authorities to be flexible when deciding whether a given commercial 
practice could be perceived as unfair under the provisions of the Directive. This also 
1 See e.g. Stefanicki 2010; Strzelecki. 
2 See e.g.: III SK 47/14 of 9 April 2015; III SK 24/14 of 16 April 2015; III SK 80/13 of 27 August 2014; III 
SK 45/13 of 8 May 2014. 
3 See e.g.  Namysłowska & Piszcz (eds.), Strzelecki. 
4 See e.g.: III SK 47/14 of 9 April 2015; III SK 24/14 of 16 April 2015; III SK 80/13 of 27 August 2014; III 
SK 45/13 of 8 May 2014. 
5 See e.g. Polish Supreme Court case III SK 34/13 of 4 March 2014. 
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means that the protection against unfair commercial practices is capable of applying 
whenever modern technology is employed or whenever a new, unfair commercial 
practice appears on the market. 
However, the consumer organisation sees principle-based approach as problematic 
before the dispute goes to court. They perceive consumers and traders as unaware of 
what this test could cover within its scope. Consumers are helpless to realize whether 
their rights have been infringed and even if they are aware thereof, they usually would 
not know what measures and remedies were available to them and had no resources 
to file a claim or a complaint. Consumer organisations are also often helpless since 
they have limited resources (both financially and with regard to staff). 
In some sectors, e.g. energy, stakeholders underlined the fact that the amount of 
unfair commercial practices has risen in the past few years (since 2010), mainly, in 
their opinion, due to the change of market players on the market (third party access 
policy). New market players, who needed to win over clients when entering the 
market, have at times even adopted an unfair practices model as their business 
model. However, simultaneously, almost all stakeholders mentioned during the 
interviews that the enforcement of consumer protection against unfair commercial 
practices is strong and only getting better. 
Another, briefly signalised problem by the consumer organisation, stems from the 
principle-based approach and flexibility, as well. Namely, the general notions used in 
the UCPD often provide opportunities for traders to claim that they may not be 
accused of an unfair commercial practice. For instance, they would claim that in the 
relation to the client their practice has been a ‘one time’ occurrence, and, therefore, it 
may not be called a ‘practice’, not to mention an unfair practice. Despite the recent 
judgment of the CJEU (C-388/13 UPC Magyarország) clarifying this issue to the benefit 
of consumers, it is unlikely that Polish consumers and their lawyers would know to 
invoke it any time soon, according to the consumer organisation. In this respect, the 
consumer organisation would appreciate more clarity and guidance from the 
legislators rather than the CJEU, as that would be easier to invoke and had a potential 
to reach more parties. 
The consumer authority UOKiK (Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
– Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów) mentioned here that they tend to base 
their cases, protecting collective interests of consumers, on the general clause of 
unfairness rather than on the black lists (please see the answer below on the two 
black lists binding currently in Poland). The reasons for it are uncertain (some 
practices might have been popular at the moment of writing the black lists, but then 
disappeared from the market, replaced by new modern practices; the lists are so clear 
that traders know not to use these practices anymore; etc.), but it seems that there 
are almost no practices on the Polish market that fall under the ones written on the 
black lists. The flexibility of the general clause allows, however, to protect consumers 
interests well in this area. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The Polish legislator introduced a black list of misleading commercial practices in 
Article 7 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices and a black list of 
aggressive commercial practices in Article 9 of this Act. The black lists became thus an 
integral part of the system of consumer protection in Poland. 
Just like the European legislator’s, the Polish legislator’s intention was to allow the 
black lists to alleviate the burden of proof on consumers claiming that a given trader’s 
commercial practice is unfair, and to ensure that at least the 31 defined commercial 
practices are always perceived as unfair and prohibited. Although in Polish law there is 
also a reversal of the burden of proof when the consumer claims that the practice is a 
misleading one – it is for the trader to prove then that the practice was not misleading 
(Article 13 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices). Still, due to the 
black lists the national court should start the unfairness’ assessment by comparing the 
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practice to the black lists of unfair commercial practices, prior to asking traders to 
justify the fairness of their practices. This last step will not be necessary, if the 
practice is indeed on one of the black lists.6  The presence of the black lists may thus 
avoid costly and timely litigation and facilitates court’s assessment of unfairness.  
The introduction of two black lists of unfair commercial practices contributed to the 
significant diminishment of the presence of such practices on the market, pursuant to 
the stakeholders representing traders. They also claim that it increases the awareness 
of traders of prohibited practices, which they are helped in due to information 
campaigns organized by the UOKiK and by the business associations.  
The consumer organisation sees the black lists as also helpful in the enforcement, 
since it enables them to easier assess whether a particular case has more chances to 
be resolved to the consumer’s benefit. 
The UOKiK mentions indeed that the black-listed practices are rarely noticed on the 
Polish market, but is unsure as to the reasons for it. It could be that the black lists 
have had a deferring effect on Polish traders, but possibly these practices might also 
have become outdated and have been replaced by more modern ones. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
N/A as Poland did not extend consumer protection in these areas. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
The UCPD as implemented by the above-mentioned Act on prevention of unfair 
commercial practices may be applied to protect consumers against misleading 
environmental claims and in addressing misleading practices in the energy market.7  
The UCPD may be applied in the energy market and in tackling misleading 
environmental claims by the President of the UOKiK, but only to protect collective 
consumer interests against unfair commercial practices, based on Article 24 of the Act 
on protection of competition and consumers, last modified in August 2015 (Ustawa o 
ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, 16 luty 2007, Dz. U. 2015 poz. 184). 
Stakeholders are of the opinion that the UOKiK is quite effective and active in its 
enforcement procedures. The UOKiK mentioned that a big problem in this area is the 
infamous Volkswagen case, where the authority is still working on the case against 
Volkswagen, but is likely to base it on the infringement of a prohibition of misleading 
commercial practices. The ‘green claims’ as part of the ‘environmental claims’ would 
likely be controlled for their fairness and non-misleading character by sector 
regulators, e.g. Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection (Inspekcja Jakości Handlowej 
Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych) or State Sanitary Inspection (Państwowa Inspekcja 
Sanitarna). The President of the UOKiK has a horizontal competence to enforce UCPD 
also in case of such claims, but, due to limits in its capacity and resources, trusts that 
such agencies are performing their tasks on the market. These agencies are unlikely 
to use UCPD provisions, but would rather base their own cases on sector rules and 
regulations, e.g. on how information on dietary supplements is to be provided on a 
label.  
Pursuant to ECC Poland the regulators of market sectors in Poland enforce legal 
provisions of a given sector and are less familiar with, and less interested in, general 
consumer protection rules, e.g. protection against unfair commercial practices. 
6 See e.g. Namysłowska 2014. 
7 Nestoruk. 
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Therefore, consumers are less protected in certain specific areas (health, transport, 
energy, etc.), since the UOKiK is more focused on general consumer protection and it 
may escape its attention that certain sectors’ specific conditions may create new 
consumer issues. Consumers themselves are not unaware of the level of protection 
due to them, so they cannot enforce themselves their rights. 
The regulator of the energy market URE (Polish Energy Regulatory Office – Urząd 
Regulacji Energetyki) may not start proceedings against traders in the energy market 
on the basis of Polish provisions implementing the UCPD and in the interview 
expressed the wish their competences were extended to this area.  
Even if the enforcement by the President of the UOKiK of the UCPD in these matters 
may be effective,8  stakeholders complained that it will rarely provide practical 
benefits to consumers. However, before the President of the UOKiK issues an 
administrative decision, it enables traders to negotiate a settlement, combined with 
the trader ceasing to continue with the unfair commercial practice. This settlement 
involves a trader suggesting a satisfying solution to the problem of the unfair 
commercial practice, e.g. introduction of a change in a consumer contract; lowering 
the price; repayment of undue collected fees; fulfilment of untrue promises; enabling 
consumers to terminate the contract or to file a complaint; providing required 
information. This solution presents thus a practical benefit for consumers (so-called in 
Polish ‘przysporzenie konsumenckie’). 
Still, stakeholders identified as one of the problems in this area the lack of any 
(contractual) effects for individual consumers that could follow from the enforcement 
by the regulators/authorities of the UCPD in this sector. In their opinion, consumers, 
who are victims of misleading or aggressive commercial practices in the energy sector 
or with regard to misleading environmental claims, rarely will enforce any consumer 
protection in courts. 
However, again, at least in theory consumers have such options, granted to them by 
Article 12 of the above-mentioned Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices to 
claim in court that an unfair commercial practice infringed their interests. They may 
claim from the trader: (1) cessation to continue with the unfair commercial practice; 
(2) removal of the consequences of this practice; (3) making a public statement; (4) 
compensating caused damage, especially by terminating the concluded contract with 
an obligation of mutual restitution and repayment of purchase-related costs; (5) 
awarding an appropriate sum of money for a social cause specified by the consumer, 
which may encompass financing further protection of consumers. If consumers are 
inactive, they may be represented by the Citizens Ombudsman, Financial 
Ombudsman, consumer associations or local consumer ombudsmen, however, only in 
raising above-listed claims (1), (3) and (5). 
Stakeholders representing traders claim that most environmental and energy claims 
on the Polish market are verified prior to their publication. Consumer organisations 
mention that most unfair commercial practices in this area are a clear deceit, e.g. 
presenting a new contract with a new energy provider as an adjustment of an old 
contract, with consumers signing it unaware of the fact that they are concluding a new 
contract, until it is 14 days later and first bills from the new provider are arriving; 
often these contracts would also have a penalty in standard contract terms for 
annulling this contract. While there are provisions theoretically protecting consumers 
in such situations against unfair contract terms (against penalty clauses) and unfair 
commercial practices (against concluding a contract without realizing it), if a consumer 
organisation would like to protect consumers against such practices, they would get 
involved in a prolonged legal procedure (a couple of years duration) and that would tie 
up its resources. 
 
8 E.g. by fining energy providers for limiting consumer options to report faulty energy meters, which 
decision the trader appealed from in Polish courts, and which decision was finally upheld by the Polish 
Supreme Court, III SK 24/14 of 16 April 2015. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied rigidly?] 
The average consumer notion as a person who is reasonably knowledgeable, 
observant and circumspect has developed gradually in Poland, also as a result of the 
influence of EU law and of the CJEU’s case law. Prior to the implementation of the 
UCPD in Poland there were some judgments, especially in the area of misleading effect 
of trademarks on consumers, in which consumers have been perceived as 
knowledgeable and capable of protecting their interests on the market.9 However, 
traditionally in Polish law average consumers were often seen as not careful and 
forgetful.10  The average consumer notion has been correctly implemented in Article 2 
para 8 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices. Therefore, Polish 
courts are applying nowadays uniformly the model of an average consumer as defined 
in EU consumer law.11  In another Polish Supreme Court judgment12 it was also added 
that an average consumer should be a person acting rationally. He or she should also 
have certain knowledge of current economic market and its conditions.13 
However, interestingly, an average Polish consumer can still be perceived by Polish 
courts as less knowledgeable and careful than other European average consumers, 
with Polish courts taking into account the possibility to account for social, cultural and 
linguistic factors as per Recital 18 of the UCPD and Art. 2 Para. 8 of the above-
mentioned Act. In a case of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw14 it was stated that 
average Polish consumers, due to cultural and social factors, have a low awareness of 
law; as well as, that Polish average consumers are not comparable with regard to their 
knowledge, carefulness and awareness to Western European average consumers, who 
for decades have been exposed to consumer education, pursuant to the Polish court. 
With regard to how an average consumer is being defined, the Polish Supreme Court 
refers to the need to look first to the type of consumer product or service being 
advertised, and second to the type of medium used for this advertisement. Together, 
these criteria will allow defining the intended and actual recipients of the 
advertisement. The model of an average consumer will then be created based on the 
qualities that a consumer to whom the advertisement is directed, and whom it 
reaches, should have.15 Polish courts stress the need to apply these two criteria in the 
above-mentioned order.16 When applying the benchmark of an average consumer, 
Polish judges evaluate reasonable expectations as to consumer behaviour based on 
logic and their life experience, refusing to allow parties to provide empirical evidence 
as to consumer behaviour.17   
In the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court,18  an average consumer in a car market 
had an ability to read and understand advertising materials, is reasonably critical, 
mature, knowledgeable and careful, and thus could not be seen as not paying 
attention and likely to be confused as to who will take care for his or her car. 
In the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court19  an average consumer in the insurance 
market has been seen as one that would verify insurance agents’ claims about future 
9 See Polish Supreme Court e.g. I CKN 1319/2000 of 11 July 2002. 
10 See on this Polish Supreme Court e.g. III CSK 377/07 of 23 April 2008. 
11 Idem. See also e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 116/14 of 18 June 2015. 
12 See Polish Supreme Court I CSK 87/13 of 29 November 2013. 
13 See e.g. Polish Supreme Court III SK 34/13 of 4 March 2014. 
14 VI Aca 1069/12 of 17 January 2013, 
15 See Polish Supreme Court e.g. I CKN 1319/00 of 11 July 2002; I CK 358/02 of 2 October 2007; III CSK 
377/07 of 23 April 2008. 
16 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 1685/14 of 30 November 2015. 
17 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 116/14 of 18 June 2015; Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 
1685/14 of 30 November 2015. 
18 I CK 358/02 of 2 October 2007. 
19 I CSK 43/15 of 14 January 2016. 
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profits and insurance conditions. However, even a reasonable average consumer 
would not be expected to check whether the insurance agent, remaining under the 
supervision of the insurance company, has indeed transferred consumer’s money to 
that company. 
In a case concerning advertising in online banking, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw 
decided that the average consumer would be an Internet user and a user of banking 
services, who is knowledgeable about banking services and banking products, as well 
as familiar with the online environment. Since online banking is not considered by the 
Polish court as an everyday transaction, potential consumers of such services should 
be perceived as being more circumspect than usual, and, therefore, more difficult to 
mislead.20 This led the court to conclude that it could not have been misleading to the 
consumer that there were payments related to the use of an online banking account, 
when the advertisement promoted free online banking, since an average consumer is 
aware that there are many banking services that could not have been enumerated in 
the advertisement and that most banking services need to be paid for. 
Consumer association claims that the ‘average consumer’ concept may be harmful 
since most consumers who fall victim to unfair commercial practices are often 
unaware, older, ill, etc.; these ‘average’ consumers should, therefore, more often 
qualify as vulnerable consumers, but this is not really acknowledged by courts, which 
continue to apply the ‘average consumer’ standard in such cases. This, among other 
things, also leads to a crisis of confidence of consumers towards traders that were 
traditionally perceived as trustworthy, e.g. banks. ECC Poland also mentions that the 
‘average consumer’ notion as a norm is being invoked as a standard nowadays by 
Polish courts, while vulnerable consumers are still a relatively unknown and unused 
category (see also below). 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts recognised new categories of vulnerable consumers 
not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Vulnerable consumers are rarely referred to in case law and taken as a standard of 
consumer protection. There is, however, a judgment of the Polish Supreme Court,21 in 
which a member of a specific group of consumers has been identified as an average 
consumer – a consumer of a medicine. Ill consumers have been perceived as having 
less awareness, less capability for rational and critical decision-making; when they are 
additionally elderly, this further weakens their transactional position, as they are more 
prone to suggestion. Often, Polish courts would reject the arguments of the President 
of the UOKiK that e.g. a given advertisement is directed at young or old, and, 
therefore, vulnerable, consumers, and instead would apply the average consumer 
benchmark.22 
Pursuant to some stakeholders, the concept of the vulnerable consumer is not working 
well in practice. For example, in the energy sector it is often older, illiterate or 
handicapped consumers that have concluded contracts due to unfair commercial 
practices directed at them. Stakeholders believe that it is not sufficient to take the 
standard of the vulnerable consumer as a yardstick for the assessment of whether an 
unfair commercial practice took place, but rather that such consumers should be 
granted additional remedies; easier procedural options; etc. Consumer associations 
mention here that consumers would not be aware that they could ask for a different 
standard of protection by claiming that they belong to this vulnerable consumer 
category – they would not be aware that there is a difference in assessment there. 
Polish courts would not be likely to inform consumers of such an option or apply the 
vulnerability of a consumer as a standard of their own motion, as the contradictory 
20 Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 1685/14 of 30 November 2015. 
21 II CSK 289/07 of 2 October 2007. 
22 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 1685/14 of 30 November 2015. 
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process in Polish law is seen as prohibiting judges’ intervention in such cases (see 
further on ex officio issues). 
ECC Poland draws attention to the fact that Polish courts presiding over consumer 
claims are general district courts, not specialising in consumer protection and, due to 
their lack of experience with consumer cases and consumer protection, they will not 
provide additional protection to these consumers who should be classified as 
‘vulnerable’. This, while there is direct marketing targeted at vulnerable (especially 
old) consumers, which is commonly reported in the media, indicated by consumer 
organisations and ECC Poland, but this does not seem to influence courts. Again, likely 
due to the decentralisation of resolution of consumer law cases (they do not go to one, 
specialised court).  
There is a difference in the administrative procedures, where the collective consumer 
interest is at stake. The UOKiK states that if during the procedure the President of the 
UOKiK manages to show that a given commercial practice was directed at a particular 
consumer group, a member of that group is then used as a representative ‘average’ 
consumer for this group. The main vulnerable consumers in Poland are old or young 
consumers – age remains the main vulnerability criteria. Based on the vulnerability, 
the level of knowledge and experience with contracting expected of the consumer 
would be lowered, e.g. old Polish consumers are still used to the concept of monopoly 
on the energy market and may not expect other companies to be active on that 
market. Therefore, a higher standard of carefulness would be expected from traders 
when providing consumers with information in such situations. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Stakeholders representing traders believe that self-regulation, especially adoption of 
codes of conduct by business organisations, is crucial for the proper functioning of 
consumer protection against unfair commercial practices in Poland. First, they believe 
self-regulation adds another level of flexibility to the existing consumer law 
regulations, which allows individual sectors to promptly reply to current needs of the 
market, reacting to newly reported unfair commercial practices. Second, it seems that 
compliance with codes of conduct can be strictly monitored, on more than one level, 
as well. That is to say, when traders applies to join a business organisation they need 
to comply with their code of conduct, but also annually there are compliance audits 
taking place in some business organisations. Such compliance audits have proven to 
be a good incentive to follow the code of conduct. However, not all traders’ 
associations implement such thorough compliance checks, as the interviews showed. 
Third, despite being competitors traders learn from one another through adopting and 
following self-regulation together, meeting together, discussing particular case 
scenarios. Sectoral regulators may also advise informally through the business 
organisations as to how practices of a particular trader should be adjusted. Finally, 
business organisations may also design education campaigns for their consumers. 
In the energy sector, there are two main business organisations – one for more 
established, traditional energy and telecommunication companies; the other – newer, 
for more alternative, smaller energy providers. In the second case, self-regulation was 
more problematic at the beginning of the functioning of this organisation, pursuant to 
the stakeholders. 
Aside from codes of conduct adopted by traders’ associations, there are also many 
ethical pledge schemes available for traders to join (e.g. Przedsiebiorstwo Fair Play 
(Business Fair Play),23 Teraz Polska (Now Poland)24, or Rada Reklamy (Union of 
Associations Advertising Council) with its Kodeks Etyki Reklamy (Code of Ethical 
23 See http://przedsiebiorstwo.fairplay.pl/ 
24 See http://www.terazpolska.pl/ 
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Advertising))25 that have their own codes of conduct, regulations and organize 
competitions of best practices for their associated traders. Traders’ incentive to join 
such schemes is to obtain a certificate that they can attach to their marketing 
materials (e.g. website) but also place on the packaging of their products. Traders’ 
associations encourage such participation and claim that consumer awareness of many 
of these certificates and what they represent is good, as these have been used for 
many years now in practice. The last of the above-mentioned codes of self-regulation 
schemes – Code of Ethical Advertising – focuses specifically on ensuring fair 
advertising practices and has been adopted by, a very active in its enforcement, 
association of advertisers: Union of Associations Advertising Council. ECC Poland also 
mentions the importance of this last, specific self-regulation in the area of advertising 
practices, even though their activity is not seen as fully preventing advertisers from 
using misleading advertising. Their influence on the traders and advertisers is limited. 
Moreover, ECC Poland and the UOKiK mention that there are still significant market 
sectors, e.g. air passenger transport, telecommunication, that are not regulated by a 
trader’s association, which do not organize themselves. 
Consumer association considers soft law as not effective for providing consumer 
protection in Poland. In many cases, pursuant to them, traders’ codes of conduct 
would copy provisions of law and reaffirm the rights that consumers already have, 
instead of protecting them additionally. The UOKiK is of the same opinion about most 
codes of conduct in Poland. As an example of a good code of conduct and its 
enforcement, the UOKiK also mentioned the Code of Ethical Advertising. Moreover, 
they mentioned a new initiative on the financial market in Poland pertaining to the 
regulation of good practices in advertising consumer credits, which seems to provide 
more guidance to credit lenders in Poland than the current regulations, e.g. as to in 
what font size provide a consumer credit. Since, together with the UOKiK, it was the 
Association of Polish Banks (Związek Banków Polskich) that drafted this regulation, 
Polish banks will need to apply this guidance, but not all credit lenders. The adoption 
of these rules is new, thus it is yet not possible to assess their enforcement and 
compliance with them. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Stakeholders did not express a wish for such an extension. Generally, current Polish 
law implementing the UCPD is perceived as satisfactory and in no need of additional 
changes. However, pursuant to the research of the European Commission Poland has 
not yet fully complied even with the existing black list, which suggests that there may 
be a general reluctance from prohibiting more commercial practices as unfair.26 
ECC Poland and the consumer association see the two Polish black lists as well 
construed, but would like to see them better enforced in practice. 
ECC Poland mentions that many of the blacklisted practices are focused on the pre-
contractual relations with the consumer, as well as the moment of conclusion of a 
contract, while their concept should be applicable also to the performance of the 
contract. Even if the UCPD provisions should apply and regulate also this performance 
of the contract, the black lists are less helpful here. 
Both the UOKiK and the regulators on the energy market draw attention to a recent 
problem in Poland with unfair door-to-door sale of energy and gas (targeting 
vulnerable, older consumers; not providing truthful, full information; clearly 
misleading consumers). They would see some general rules being adopted to remedy 
this situation, possibly a provision on one of the black lists prohibiting or at least 
25 See https://www.radareklamy.pl/kodeks-etyki-reklamy 
26 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5162_en.htm 
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limiting such commercial practices. However, they also acknowledge that the interests 
of traders who have their business model set up on door-to-door practices and 
conduct fair commercial practices would need to be considered. It is expected that 
well-established traders in this sector would welcome such proposals, as well, since 
the bad reputation of such door-to-door unfair commercial practices also tarnishes the 
trust consumers have in them.  
The mechanism of subsequent inclusion should be adopted to easier adjust to modern 
technologies and new practices appearing on the market, pursuant to the UOKiK. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Obtaining more financial resources for educational campaigns could contribute to 
raising consumer awareness, the lack of which is a major concern and a significant 
contributor to the rising number of unfair commercial practices. Sector regulators 
warn, however, that some educational campaigns may have backfired in the past and 
became a source of new unfair commercial practices on the market. E.g. when a 
brochure on consumer rights was sent out, some traders might have carried it around 
as ‘proof’ that they observe rules mentioned in this brochure; additionally, since the 
brochure mentioned that consumers should be active in comparing contract terms and 
not be afraid of switching service providers, traders were using this argument as a 
reason that consumers need to switch to their services. Stakeholders representing 
traders agree that additional educational campaigns tend to improve the effectiveness 
of consumer protection. 
Sector regulators mention also the following: providing consumers with additional 
contractual remedies (despite Polish law already providing quite a few of these). 
Stakeholders representing traders favour more attention being placed on certificates 
confirming that a given trader follows codes of conduct. 
Both sector regulators and the UOKiK also mention the need to further limit the option 
for concluding door-to-door contracts, especially since traders often target vulnerable 
consumers. Since this would limit trade options for some market players (some of 
them focus only on door-to-door sales), the consequences of such limitations should 
be considered (cost-benefit analysis, as well as the effect on the freedom of provision 
of services), but some further limitations, if not full prohibition, are definitely 
necessary. This view has also been supported by the consumer organisation, which 
stressed that they often encounter problems with consumer protection in door-to-door 
situations, especially with regards to unfair commercial practices being sold by  
door-to-door salesmen. 
Consumer organisation focuses on the need to improve enforcement of consumer 
protection rather than to change the substance of these provisions. Pursuant to them, 
in Poland, attorneys rarely take on consumer cases, consumer organisations have 
resources to only take a few cases a year. Since consumers are unable to enforce their 
rights, they do not realize how Polish law works, and the legal system of consumer 
protection is also complex, consumers are usually unable to successfully represent 
themselves and have trouble finding representation. From a substantive point of view, 
further clarification of a few concepts could help, e.g., that an unfair commercial 
practice does not need to be repetitive, which means that a trader could not use a 
defence that this was not a ‘practice’ but rather an incident (there was a CJEU 
judgment in this area, but Polish judges would be more inclined to follow a legal 
provision that clarifies this).  
Further education of judges on rules of consumer protection is also seen as desirable 
by consumer organisations. Especially with regards to rulings of the CJEU, which seem 
to be applied by Polish courts with quite a delay.  
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Furthermore, Polish law provides for a specific remedy in individual consumer cases; 
namely, it gives consumers an opportunity to demand that a trader who harmed their 
interests, aside individual damages for consumers, also pays a certain amount for a 
social cause,27 which concept includes a possibility to finance activities of consumer 
associations (it is the consumer’s choice what social cause will be financed). 
Consumers could, therefore, act socially and not only claim their own damages, but 
also improve the general consumer protection by contributing to consumer 
association’s financing. However, Polish law seems to discourage them from doing so 
by estimating the value of the dispute, on the basis of which the procedural costs are 
calculated, as not only covering the damages claimed by the consumer but also these 
additional payments for a chosen by consumer social cause. Therefore, if consumers 
lose the case, they have to pay more for the procedure, if they asked not only for their 
individual damages to be compensated, but also for the trader to contribute to a social 
cause. Consumer organisations would be happy to see this provision changed. 
ECC Poland mentions that it could be useful to have a ‘name and shame’ practice 
established, where decisions recognizing certain commercial practices as unfair or 
standard contract terms as abusive would be published and could be consulted easily 
by consumers, media etc. This could prove to be an effective consumer protection 
measure. Especially, since Polish court’s judgments (especially of district courts, which 
preside over consumer cases in the first instance) are rarely made public, which 
means that courts in different towns may issue different decisions in similar cases; 
consumers are unaware of what they may expect, etc. 
Moreover, ECC Poland mentions that it would be good to further finance activities of 
consumer organisations, e.g. to conduct more educational activities like having a radio 
or a TV show dedicated to consumer issues, writing regular columns for newspapers 
and blogs etc. Currently there are no resources for this in Poland. They compare Polish 
situation to the UK’s, where “Which?” has such resources and consumers know to get 
in touch with them when they have issues, to consult their magazine and use their 
practical tips and guidance. 
None of the stakeholders have mentioned the possibility to add consumer education to 
the school curriculum, but the introduction of such a measure could also increase the 
effectiveness of consumer protection. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
A new law was adopted by the Act of 9 May 2014 on informing about prices of 
products and services (Ustawa z dnia 9 maja 2014 r. o informowaniu o cenach 
towarów i usług, Dz. U. 2014 poz. 915). The definition of the unit selling price (Art. 3 
Para. 1 No. 2 and Art. 3 Para. 2 of this Act) does not deviate from the PID. The 
transparency requirements comply with the PID, as well. Polish legislator requires 
traders to inform consumers about the reason for a discount in price, when it applies 
(Article 4 of this Act). If there is a difference or confusion as to prices, consumers may 
demand that a product or a service is sold to them at the most favourable price 
(Article 5 of this Act).  
This Act also gave the authority to the Minister of Commerce to issue a regulation on 
publishing prices of products and services, which was published on December 9, 2015 
and started applying as of January 1, 2016 (with traders being given time till 
September 30, 2016, to adjust their practices to new rules). Pursuant to Article 4 of 
this Regulation the unit selling price refers to litres, cubic meters, kilograms, tonnes, 
meters, square meters or pieces, depending on what is being sold (e.g. by length or 
27 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Katowice, I ACa 648/15 of 22 January 2016. 
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surface). The unit selling price does not need to be disclosed (Article 7 of this 
Regulation) when: it is identical to the product’s price; products are sold in sets due to 
their purpose; selling non-foodstuffs exclusively in pairs due to their purpose or 
characteristics; selling medicines. 
Stakeholders representing traders are of the opinion that consumers are effectively 
informed about the unit selling price. There is no evidence of lack of compliance, 
pursuant to them, in this area, and consumers are paying more attention to this 
disclosed information. Consumer association mentions here that generally there are 
not so many consumer complaints about how consumers are informed about prices. 
Polish enforcement authority in this respect – Inspection of Commerce (Inspekcja 
Handlowa) – has had, however, a number of cases on misleading prices in 2015 – 
625.28 The Administrative Court in Warsaw has also adjudicated that there is a 
difference between indicating the goods’ price and their unit selling price and that 
traders are obliged to indicate the unit selling price when the goods’ packaging 
determines the content in grams or litres.29    
A Consumer association has noticed, additionally, that consumers complain about the 
new change in Polish law that took away the obligation of big supermarkets to provide 
consumers with a price reader. A price reader in a big supermarket was seen by 
consumers as enabling them to verify displayed prices easily and prevented disputes 
at the cash register. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
As mentioned in the previous answer, Polish law defines specifically what 
measurement units may be referred to in a unit selling price (Article 4 of the 
Regulation). 
Stakeholders representing traders do not see the need for a change of a designated 
unit price. Currently, traders may place information on performance measurement 
units on the product packaging, but they do not relate it to the price. Relating it to the 
price could potentially lead to a misleading commercial practice, pursuant to the 
stakeholders, as such performance measurement units are always estimates (e.g. 
number of washloads for detergents will depend also on consumer’s water supply, 
hard vs. soft water causing a difference). Moreover, stakeholders do not believe that 
consumers would pay attention to this unit price or that it would influence their 
decision-making. The UOKiK is of a similar opinion, also fearing increased 
opportunities for a misleading commercial practice, increased confusion of a consumer 
and definitely would not advise introduction of such new measurement units instead of 
traditional ones, if anything, alongside them. 
A consumer association mentions that due to the change in Polish law, e.g. gas 
provided to consumer homes stopped being calculated in cubic meters and the 
measurement started to be provided to consumers in kWh. This change has been 
criticised by consumers, who claim not to be mathematically capable to assess the 
value/quality/etc. of such gas units. Also, providing consumers with many different 
units adjusted per product category would add another complication, make the 
assessment less transparent. They also indicate as an example of such a complexity 
the change in the evaluation of the energy efficiency – where the introduction of more 
categories (from maximum A category to A+++ category) have proved to be less 
transparent for consumers, and might have contributed to more misleading practices. 
 
28 See: https://www.uokik.gov.pl/aktualnosci.php?news_id=12210&news_page=6 . 
29 Administrative Court in Warsaw, VI SA/Wa 1406/15 of 19 November 2015. 
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• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
N/A 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
Advertising that is prohibited by the provision of Art.16 Para. 1 of the Act of 16 April 
1993 on combating unfair competition (Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 1993 r. o 
zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji, Dz. U. 2003 Nr 153 poz. 1503 ze zm.) falls under 
the following (exemplary) categories: advertising that is illegal, contrary to the 
principle of good practices or infringing human dignity; misleading advertising that 
may influence transactional decision-making; advertising referring to emotions by 
instigating fear, praying on superstitions or children’s gullibility; advertising that is 
framed as a provision of objective information; advertising that significantly infringes 
privacy, especially by bothersome approaching clients in public places, inertia selling 
or spamming. The Act implemented the MCAD and contains the same rules concerning 
unfair advertising as MCAD, including separate requirements for misleading 
advertising (Art. 16 Para. 2 of this Act) and comparative advertising (Art. 16 Para. 3 of 
this Act). The Act itself does not define the notion of ‘advertising’. It has been, 
however, defined in another Act of 29 December 1992 on radio and television (Ustawa 
z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji, Dz. U. 2004 Nr 253 poz. 2531 ze 
zm.), its Art. 4 Para. 6 defining it as any transmission not coming from the sender that 
aims at promotion of sale or other forms of benefitting from products or services, 
supporting specific issues, ideas or achieving other desired by an advertiser effects, 
that has been sent for any sort of payment. This definition applies to any advertising 
on radio or TV. Two elements are perceived by the scholars as necessary to recognize 
advertising in general: (1) information about the product or service and (2) 
encouragement to either purchase the product or service or use it otherwise (without 
purchasing it), but still in exchange for payment.30 
Polish stakeholders do not see a reason to change the notion of ‘advertising’ applied in 
this law nor to extend protection granted to businesses, alike the model of consumer 
protection against unfair commercial practices. Their resistance in this area comes 
either from the conviction that current rules are sufficiently efficient (business 
associations) or that they do not feel competent to discuss these issues (e.g. the 
UOKiK). 
The UOKiK mentions that traders are generally protected through private law 
measures, with traders able to go to court and enforce their protection on the basis of 
provisions of the Act on combating unfair competition. The President of the UOKiK 
could have some competence here if an unfair competition act would simultaneously 
infringe/harm collective consumer interests, which is feasible and the Act on 
combating unfair competition deliberately, through the use of general clauses, allows 
for such a situation to occur. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
30 See e.g. Jaworska-Dębska; Skubisz. 
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Misleading advertising test is defined in Art. 16 Para. 2 of the Act on combating unfair 
competition as requiring assessment of all elements of the advertising, especially 
concerning quantity, quality, ingredients, performance, suitability, applicability, repair 
options of the advertised goods or services, as well as the client’s behaviour.  
Stakeholders consider the flexibility granted by the principle-based approach as 
contributing to the increased effectiveness of these provisions, as well. Again, there is 
not much they could say about issues in this area in practice. The lack of 
administrative enforcement in this area has also not been seen as a problem for the 
protection of traders’ interests. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
There is no additional protection granted to traders in this area in Poland and 
stakeholders continue to see it as unnecessary to introduce additional protection. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Comparative advertising is seen as unfair competition, if it is contrary to the principle 
of good practices and Art. 16 Para. 3 of the Act on combating unfair competition lists 
requirements for this assessment. The full harmonisation in this area is seen as 
providing more legal certainty, especially for cross-border advertising. However, the 
use of a general clause, principle-based approach provides certain flexibility and may 
still lead to divergent evaluation of whether a given comparative advertising is unfair. 
Again, the interviews did not point out any specific issues in this area. 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Generally, stakeholders perceive this as an effective legal framework, but this is 
mainly the result of them not being able to name any issues in this area. Most 
interviews have been, however, conducted with experts on consumer protection and 
they have, therefore, less practical experience with enforcement of provisions 
protecting traders. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
In case of unfair competition acts, traders, whose interests might have been harmed 
or infringed, may file a claim on the basis of Article 18 of the Act on combating unfair 
competition and demand from a trader: (1) cessation to continue with the unfair 
competition act; (2) removal of the consequences of this act; (3) making a public 
statement; (4) compensating caused damage; (5) returning unjustified enrichment; 
(6) awarding an appropriate sum of money for a cultural cause, but only if the unfair 
competition act was deliberate. The rights of traders in case of an unfair competition 
act and of consumers in case of an unfair commercial practice are, therefore, very 
similar. 
Pursuant to Art. 25 Para. 2 of the Act on combating unfair competition, unfair 
competition acts in the sphere of advertising can also be penalized. At the moment, 
there is a case pending at the Polish Constitutional Court submitted by the Polish 
Citizens’ Rights Ombudsman that this provision of law is not in compliance with the 
Polish constitution. 
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• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Stakeholders did not identify any such measures or best practices. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders consider the maximum 
harmonisation in the area of UCPD as effective and are not aware that any disparities 
between national laws of different Member States have caused problems for Polish 
traders. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders consider the maximum 
harmonisation in the area of UCPD as effective and are not aware that any disparities 
between national laws of different Member States have caused problems for Polish 
traders. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
N/A as Poland did not extend consumer protection in these areas. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders also had no opinion on these 
issues. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders also had no opinion on these 
issues. 
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• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders also had no opinion on these 
issues. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The representatives of business associations in the financial sector in Poland did not 
feel like there is much cross-border trade in their market and, thus, could not address 
these questions. Other stakeholders representing traders also had no opinion on these 
issues. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Art. 6 Para. 4 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices transposes Art. 7 
Para. 4 UCPD into Polish law. It has not been changed by the transposition of the 
Consumer Rights Directive in Poland. There is, thus, a certain overlap of information 
requirements at the moment. It is unlikely that this overlap would constitute a burden 
for traders or consumers, considering that traders by providing e.g. once information 
on their geographical address comply with both sets of rules at the same time. It may 
be easier for courts and enforcement authorities to have separate lists of information 
requirements, to better know what to enforce, in which situation and under which law. 
However, considering that, pursuant to the Directive, Art. 6 Para. 2 of the Act on 
prevention of unfair commercial practices defines as material information any 
mandatory information requirement under other regulations, the list of Art. 6 Para. 4 
of the Act will only be relevant for such practices that fall outside the scope of the 
CRD.  
Stakeholders representing traders consider traders to be aware of these information 
requirements, especially since the UOKiK and traders’ associations conduct educational 
campaigns any time there is a new provision introduced, placing additional information 
requirements on traders. In their opinion, the overlap between information 
requirements in UCPD and CRD is not problematic, as traders knowing what 
information to provide will provide it just once and fulfil both requirements at once. 
They do not see the need to change the law. The UOKiK confirms that many efforts 
have been made to educate traders and make them aware of information obligations 
upon the introduction of the CRD. Therefore, traders not complying with information 
duties would rather not do it due to awareness but rather wilfully. Perhaps with an 
exception of some incidental online traders, e.g. using online marketplaces like Allegro 
(Polish eBay) who may indeed still be unaware that these rules also may apply to 
them. Also, if traders had doubts as to how to provide particular information and 
whether they were compliant, they could have asked for explanation and guidance 
from the UOKiK, which was then provided. The UOKiK also does not think that much 
has changed with regard to information obligations of traders or that any changes 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
897
have caused them many problems (aside the cost to hire lawyers to adjust their 
standard terms and conditions, regulations). 
If information from Art. 6 Para. 4 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial 
practices is not provided to consumers in an online trader’s regulation, in a way that 
would allow consumers to easily reach this information, and that regulation sets terms 
and conditions for provision of services by the trader, the trader is in breach of this 
provision .31 
A consumer association pays most attention to whether consumers were provided with 
pre-contractual information, the lack of which could lead to the annulment of the 
contract. Inspection of Commerce (Inspekcja Handlowa) is the authority controlling 
the compliance of traders with information duties, but they are often more focused on 
other compliance issues than proper performance of duties to inform, pursuant to 
consumer associations. 
Traders in Poland are mostly focused on conducting their business in the most cost-
efficient way and less on the quality of provided services, which may lead them to 
either be unaware of information duties they are to provide consumers with or ignore 
these provisions, pursuant to the ECC Poland. As an example of improper provision of 
information, that is occurring regularly, ECC Poland mentions that Polish traders 
selling to foreign consumers often provide only the basic information in the language 
of the consumer (or English or German), and all the detailed standard terms and 
conditions would still be written in Polish, thus mostly illegible to foreign consumers. 
The UOKiK mentions that the main problem in this area remains in the contracts 
concluded at a distance, e.g. via phone, where it is also more difficult to check for 
compliance and enforce it. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The Services Directive has been transposed in Poland by the Act of March 4, 2010 on 
provision of services at the territory of Poland (Ustawa z dnia 4 marca 2010 r. o 
świadczeniu usług na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz. U. 2010 Nr 47 poz. 
278). Pursuant to its Article 10 the service provider has some information 
requirements that also overlap with the ones mentioned in the UCPD, with regard to: 
service description and price; trader’s name and address.  
The E-commerce Directive has been transposed in Poland by the Act of July 18,  2002 
on electronic provision of services (Ustawa z dnia 18 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu usług 
drogą elektroniczną, Dz. U. 2002 Nr 144 poz. 1204). Pursuant to its Art. 5 Para. 1 the 
e-commerce service providers also needs to inform consumers about their name and 
address; Article 8 sets the need for the service provider to publish a Regulation that 
would define the services provided, as well as conditions of contract termination and 
complaint procedures. Again, thus, there is a certain overlap. 
Stakeholders representing traders do not perceive any additional costs for businesses 
due to this overlap, since traders knowing what information to provide will provide it 
just once and fulfil both requirements at once. Stakeholders do not see the need to 
change the law. 
ECC Poland states that all the information duties for traders towards consumers create 
a puzzle and take away clarity from traders as to their obligations. Especially 
considering that aside all EU consumer law-based information obligations, traders also 
have to comply with many national duties when setting-up a business. 
The UOKiK mentions that there are some issues in the telecommunication sector due 
to divergent rules on information obligations between the telecommunication 
31 See e.g. Polish Supreme Court III SK 4/14 of 15 October 2014. 
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regulations and general consumer law provisions, especially after the adoption of the 
CRD. The UOKiK has prepared a common statement together with the regulator of the 
telecommunication sector UKE (Office of Electronic Communication – Urząd 
Komunikacji Elektronicznej) on information duties as to what provisions should be 
applicable and what traders’ obligations in this area are, to avoid different assessment 
and simplify enforcement. They, otherwise, do not perceive the costs of enforcement 
to be higher due to different provisions providing information duties to traders in 
various regulations and acts. They do, however, state that if an information duty is 
unclear, they are less hesitant to enforce its compliance with traders. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Currently, Polish law has two separate Acts in this area. While the Act on prevention of 
unfair commercial practices implements UCPD, it provides for remedies only for 
consumers as a result of an unfair commercial practice, as mentioned above. If 
traders want to invoke an unfair commercial practice, they should prove that it 
involves unfair competition acts, as well, pursuant to the Act on combating unfair 
competition (which might be the same material test, with just a different procedure). 
The second Act implements MCAD, but is still considered by scholars and courts as 
indirectly applicable also to relations B2C, as it was prior to the adoption of the UCPD. 
Consequently, currently, the legislative framework in Poland does not clearly 
distinguish between the two regimes of liability, from UCPD and MCAD. An unfair 
competition act may also be perceived as harming collective consumer interests, 
enabling the UOKiK to start an administrative procedure. Even though the protection 
of traders in the Act on combating unfair competition provides generally only for a civil 
procedure. The revision of the MCAD regime could be beneficial to the clarity of the 
Polish legal system.32 This does, however, not necessarily need to imply granting more 
rights to traders in B2B situations and the effect of such a change on cross-border 
trade remains uncertain. 
Business associations do not believe that the protection of B2C should be extended to 
B2B. They mention the problem of a ‘slippery slope’ – how could it be assessed to 
which trader this protection should be granted? They believe that consumer protection 
is a special regime, the justification for introducing it lies in the special needs of 
natural persons and their weak contractual position, and this justification does not 
apply, pursuant to them, even to micro-businesses, who have more resources than 
consumers. No signals have been received by stakeholders representing traders from 
traders engaging in cross-border trade on the need to extend this protection to B2B. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
In Poland the definition of the consumer was originally not limited to natural persons 
since the old Art. 384 Para. 3 of the Polish Civil Code identified a ‘person’ as a 
consumer, without excluding legal persons from this definition. On the basis of this 
provision consumer protection could, potentially, be extended to legal persons, even 
though some scholars questioned this interpretation.33 In 2003 this provision has been 
adjusted, as was claimed – to better follow EU law, and now consumer notion refers 
only to natural persons. One of the justifications given was that a broader notion of a 
32 See e.g. Namysłowska 2015. 
33 See e.g. Gnela. 
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consumer led to the worsening of the legal position of Polish traders in comparison to 
foreign traders. Therefore, if the change came from the European level and required 
adjusting all national laws in the EU, this objection could be removed. 
Moreover, if the definition of a consumer is not extended to cover legal persons, the 
separate legal regimes established by the UCPD and the MCAD could be abolished and 
be replaced by one common regime. This has been previously suggested in the 
scholarship as a solution that would introduce more legal certainty.34 This certainty 
would be achieved by removing materially similar, but procedurally different regimes 
of liability for unfair commercial practices in B2C relations and misleading/comparative 
advertising in B2B relations. 
In the opinion of some sector regulators the protection of weaker parties should be 
extended at least to some, smaller businesses since they are transactionally as weak 
as natural persons. 
Business associations do not believe that the protection of B2C should be extended to 
B2B. They mention the problem of a ‘slippery slope’ – how could it be assessed to 
which trader this protection should be granted? They believe that consumer protection 
is a special regime, the justification for introducing it lies in the special needs of 
natural persons and their weak contractual position, and this justification does not 
apply, pursuant to them, even to micro-businesses, who have more resources than 
consumers. 
The UOKiK mentions also that currently there is a draft law being discussed in Polish 
Parliament about unfair commercial practices between suppliers, distributors and 
traders in the sector of trade of food and agriculture products.35 This suggests that 
current law does not provide sufficient clarity as to protection of traders’ interests in 
such relations, even though the Act on combating unfair competition could cover these 
scenarios. For clarity sake, protection against unfair commercial practices in such 
relations would then be placed in this separate act and would be enforced by the 
UOKiK, provided that this law is adopted. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
See previous answers – no stakeholder has expressed a need for such an additional 
protection in B2B transactions. Stakeholders representing traders are of an opinion 
that general contract law rules applicable in Poland are at the moment of a 
satisfactory quality and no additional protection should be introduced. 
The UOKiK mentions the current works in the Polish Parliament on a new law that 
would regulate performance of contracts between traders and their suppliers and 
distributors,36 to prohibit more clearly unfair commercial practices in such vertical 
relations, specifically in the sector of food and agriculture products. This suggests that 
eventually the adoption of new rules is more required at the transactional and post-
transactional stage than pre-contractually. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
See previous answers – no stakeholder has expressed a need for such an additional 
protection in B2B transactions. Stakeholders representing traders are of an opinion 
that general contract law rules applicable in Poland are at the moment of a 
satisfactory quality and no additional protection should be introduced. The current Act 
34 See e.g. Namysłowska 2015. 
35 See http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=RPL&Id=RM-10-82-16 
36 See http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=RPL&Id=RM-10-82-16 
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on combating unfair competition does contain specific provisions in its Chapter 2 on 
what constitutes an unfair competition act. 
It remains to be seen whether the new law, if it is adopted, regulating the 
performance of B2B contracts between traders and suppliers/distributors would 
contain any black list.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
See previous answers – no stakeholder has expressed a need for such an additional 
protection in B2B transactions. Stakeholders representing traders are of an opinion 
that general contract law rules applicable in Poland are at the moment of a 
satisfactory quality and no additional protection should be introduced. 
However, the new rules that might be adopted in Poland would introduce a possibility 
of administrative enforcement of traders’ interest, by giving the UOKiK authority to 
enforce its provisions. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Also with respect to this question stakeholders representing traders do not see the 
need for an additional protection regime being introduced. Currently, Article 18 of the 
Act on combating unfair competition, as mentioned above, provides traders with 
remedies in case misleading or comparative advertising is found, as an example of an 
unfair competition act (see above for the list thereof). 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
Also with respect to this question stakeholders representing traders do not see the 
need for an additional protection regime being introduced. There is a general feeling of 
satisfaction with how the national law functions at the moment. No complaints from 
the traders suggest such a need for a change either. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Consumers may claim avoidance of the contract concluded as a result of an unfair 
commercial practice, with an obligation of mutual restitution and the trader’s 
obligation to pay back consumer’s costs related to the purchase of the product, 
pursuant to Art. 12 Para. 1 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices.37 
This was a novel remedy introduced for consumers in Polish law, not quite compatible 
with other forms of avoiding the contract from the Polish Civil Code and could be 
compared to putting consumers in the same position as if they were withdrawing from 
a contract.38 
Before the President of the UOKiK issues an administrative decision while protecting 
the collective interests of consumers, it enables traders to negotiate a settlement, 
combined with the trader ceasing to continue with the unfair commercial practice. This 
37 See also e.g. Sieradzka 2008b; Nestoruk 2015. 
38 See e.g. Nestoruk 2015. 
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settlement involves a trader suggesting a satisfying solution to the problem of the 
unfair commercial practice, e.g. introduction of a change in a consumer contract; 
lowering the price; repayment of undue collected fees; fulfilment of untrue promises; 
enabling consumers to terminate the contract or to file a complaint; providing required 
information. This solution presents thus a practical benefit for consumers (so-called in 
Polish ‘przysporzenie konsumenckie’). It has yet not gone as far as to allow consumers 
to withdraw from a contract or to nullify the contract. This is seen by the UOKiK, as 
potentially beneficial for consumers in some cases, but also dangerous, as consumers 
might not want their contracts, even if concluded on the basis of an unfair commercial 
practice, annulled. Therefore, taking such a decision would require a careful balance of 
all the consequences of such an annulment, which would prolong the procedure, 
require individual consumers to become part of it and would defy the purpose of 
protecting collective consumer interests. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
The consequences have been specified by the legislator for consumers claiming their 
rights in individual cases in front of district courts in Article 12 of the Act on prevention 
of unfair commercial practices, thus there is no need for additional protection being 
granted by the courts. Courts should apply the above-mentioned provision. However, 
this protection would only be applied when consumers claim it, and this does not 
happen often, as also mentioned by consumer organisations, mainly due to 
consumers’ lack of awareness of their rights. 
The President of the UOKiK’s decisions do not have a direct effect on individual 
consumer contracts, but consumers could invoke decisions of the President of the 
UOKiK in front of district courts in their individual cases, the President of the UOKiK 
could then also provide explanations to the court. There is no data, how often 
consumers actually use decisions of the President of the UOKiK in their individual 
cases. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Potentially, there is such a need with respect to the enforcement of sector specific 
rules protecting consumers, which e.g. in the energy sector does not provide sector 
regulators with an opportunity to intervene on behalf of individual consumers. Such 
individual consumer complaints would be re-directed to the UOKiK, which can then 
collect such complaints and its President may then act to protect collective consumer 
interests against a given trader on the basis of Article 24 of the Act on protection of 
competition and consumers. Individual consumers thus usually do not directly benefit 
from the proceedings conducted by the regulators that may fine (President of the 
UOKiK) or try to take away trader’s concession or conduct mediation with traders 
(sector regulators). 
However, individual consumers may either go to court or approach regional/local 
consumer ombudsmen, filing for individual consumer remedies, as described above, 
encompassed in Article 12 of the Act on prevention of unfair commercial practices. 
These individual remedies award consumers also with an option to annul the 
concluded contract, thus they are quite far-reaching. Plus, as described above there is 
an option for some interventions of the UOKiK to provide for contractual consequences 
to individual consumers, with traders voluntarily taking on an obligation to adjust 
consumer contract terms. 
Stakeholders representing traders do not see the need to further develop these 
consequences. Consumer associations claim that these contractual consequences 
should go further, ensuring that traders do not benefit at all from breaking the law 
and disposing consumers of their rights and their protection. The general idea would 
be to ensure that traders are concerned about whether they are conducting an unfair 
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commercial practice, since currently they are not worried that much about the 
consequences. For example, a telecommunication provider would likely act differently 
knowing that if they provide misleading advertisement or coerce a consumer’s 
signature on a contract, they would lose the mobile phone that was issued to the 
consumer with a contract, and not only have to admit their wrongdoing, cease the 
practice and potentially compensate some damages (if these can be proven). 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
UCTD has been transposed to Polish law by the Polish Civil Code and the Act on 
protection of competition and consumers, last modified in August 2015 (Ustawa o 
ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów, 16 luty 2007, Dz. U. 2015 poz. 184). Article 
3851 of the Polish Civil Code introduces the general test of unfairness, using the 
principle-based approach, that is prohibiting a standard term and condition that is 
contrary to the principle of good practices. In the individual consumer claims against 
unfairness of standard contract terms, this test replaces the ‘good faith’ requirement 
from the UCTD, but in practice there is not much deviation in understanding of these 
two principles. Accordingly, the Polish Supreme Court perceives a standard term and 
condition as contrary to the principle of good practices when it undermines the 
contractual balance of parties’ rights and obligations.39 The significant imbalance to 
the detriment of the consumer is a separate requirement that in the same judgment 
was interpreted as unjustified disproportion in the parties’ rights and obligations to the 
detriment of the consumer40. 
The Act on protection of competition and consumers also uses a principle-based 
approach when regulating a possibility of in abstracto control of standard contract 
terms, unrelated thus to an individual consumer claim. Pursuant to a new Article 99a 
of the Act on protection of competition and consumers it will be the President of the 
UOKiK who in an administrative procedure will decide on the abusive character of a 
standard term in abstracto. Consumers, consumer ombudsmen, ombudsmen of the 
insured, consumer associations and foreign organisations entitled to start injunction 
proceedings, may notify the President of the UOKiK about an infringement regarding a 
trader using an abusive clause, contrary to the prohibition in Article 23a of this Act. 
This last provision prohibits traders from conducting practices that harm collective 
consumer interests, meaning practices that are unlawful or contrary to the principle of 
good practices (Article 24 of the Act on protection of competition and consumers). In 
particular, this provision defines as a practice that harms collective consumer 
interests: the use of unfair commercial practices; the breach of the information duties, 
i.e. providing consumers with comprehensive, truthful and accurate information; as 
well as, offering consumers financial services that do not meet their needs, which were 
assessed pursuant to the information available to the traders. This provision used to 
refer also to a catalogue of unfair standard contract terms that was published by the 
District Court in Warsaw XVII Division of Consumer and Competition Protection (SOKiK 
– Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów) (see below further on the change as to 
this catalogue that function as a sort of ‘black list’ in Polish law). 
Again, stakeholders representing traders find that a certain level of flexibility, for 
which the principle-based approach allows, is a good addition to the unfairness test. 
39 See e.g. I CK 832/04 of 13 July 2005. 
40 See also e.g. I CSK 125/15 of 15 January 2016. 
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The UOKiK mentions that they are likely to base most of their cases on the grey list 
rather than on the general clause, as traders continue to make the same mistakes in 
practice and fall under one of the categories placed on the grey list. However, the 
general test of unfairness provides additional options for enforcement and is useful in 
practice. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list is not being used in practice by Polish courts during the individual 
control of unfairness, since the general clause described above is supplemented by the 
grey list of potentially unfair clauses in Article 3853 of the Polish Civil Code. This 
provision transposed the indicative list from the Annex to the UCTD into Polish law. 
Stakeholders did not identify any Polish judgments where the indicative list of the 
Annex would be referred to rather than the grey list from the Polish Civil Code. A 
consumer association stressed that Polish judges would be more inclined to put more 
emphasis on Polish rather than European law. As a result, European law would be 
applied more indirectly. 
The UOKiK mentions that in their administrative procedures they also tend to use the 
grey list from the Polish Civil Code rather than the indicative list of the Annex and they 
do not see the need to just repeat the same point from the indicative list in the Annex. 
They could not recall a case, when the indicative list would have been used. However, 
they did not exclude a possibility to invoke the Annex, if its interpretation in European 
law could guide Polish law in the future, e.g. if the Directive is more clear on a certain 
issue, especially as there are slight differences between the list in the Annex and the 
list from the Polish Civil Code. 
Stakeholders did not have an opinion on this matter. 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists, key aspects 
to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it make a difference to 
have such a list?] 
Aside the grey list adopted in Polish Civil Code (as mentioned above), the UOKiK 
published decisions of the SOKiK that found certain standard terms unfair in in 
abstracto control of unfairness. The registry, in which these decisions were published, 
was perceived as a factual black list, prohibiting the use of certain standard terms 
against all consumers of a particular trader, but not against all traders (even though 
some scholars argued for giving it such an erga omnes effect). The rules on the 
control in abstracto have recently been changed and any cases started after April 17, 
2016 will not have their decisions added to the registry (further explained later in this 
report). The registry consists of almost 2000 pages and 6597 entries. Instead of 
classifying a type of a contract term that has been considered unfair and organizing 
decisions pursuant thereto, it just lists specific clauses found unfair in particular cases. 
For example: ‘Under circumstances not accounted for in a given Contract, decisions 
will be taken by MeCom in the form of a decree.’41 or ‘in case of the loss or damage to 
the client’s wardrobe, damages will be limited to the amount representing its value, 
not exceeding, however, the 10-times worth of the price of the performed service’.42 
Some of the contract terms that have been mentioned by stakeholders as often found 
in consumer contracts and leading to unfairness were e.g. penalty clauses;43 exclusion 
41 Decision XVII Amc 27/01 of 27 February 2002. 
42 Decision XVII Amc 7/00 of 16 January 2002. 
43 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, I ACa 125/13 of 17 July 2013. 
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of jurisdiction of courts (of consumer residence).44 Both of these type of contract 
terms could fall under the scope of Article 3853 of the Polish Civil Code, respectively its 
Paragraph 17 or 23. Scholarship mentions also: allowing businesses to adjust the price 
without notifying the consumer; providing improper notification of a change to 
standard terms and conditions to the consumer (e.g. announcing it on a poster in the 
business’ offices); allowing business’ to keep consumer money if the consumer 
overpaid (up to a certain amount); or placing a condition on providing a service to a 
consumer, from the consumer concluding more than one contract with the same 
provider. The last condition could fall under Art. 3853 Para. 6 or 7 of the Polish Civil 
Code, but other of the above-mentioned type of terms are not directly prohibited. For 
example, Art. 3853 Para. 20 of the Polish Civil Code prohibits contract terms that allow 
the trader to determine or raise the price or compensation after the conclusion of the 
contract without granting a consumer a right to terminate this contract. This provision 
does not specifically provide a duty to notify the consumer. 
Stakeholders consider lists of unfair contract terms as helpful for increasing awareness 
of unfair contract terms among both businesses and consumers and consider it rather 
comprehensive and broad in protecting consumer interests. 
The UOKiK considers the grey list as very effective, but would be concerned if a black 
list was introduced to the Polish Civil Code. It considers Polish traders as creative and 
adjusting their provisions only slightly when these are assessed as unfair, e.g. if a 
penalty clause of 15% would be assessed as abusive, traders would adjust it to 
14.9%, which would require new evaluation as a new provision. Since a black list 
would need to be very precise, it would be difficult to place on it certain terms that are 
most problematic in practice. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: Have the effects of court decisions establishing the unfairness of an 
unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned or to the 
contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this work in 
practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects of court 
decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
In Poland there has been some extension of the effects of the court’s assessment of 
an unfair character of a contractual term. Pursuant to Articles 47936 – 47945 of the 
Polish Civil Procedure Code, standard terms and conditions have been controlled for 
unfairness in abstracto. This means that a consumer, a consumer ombudsman or the 
President of the UOKiK could have claimed at the SOKiK that a certain clause in the 
standard terms and conditions was unfair in all circumstances, regardless of the 
individual situation of a given consumer. If a clause used by a particular trader has 
been assessed as unfair in all circumstances, it was published as such in the registry 
of the SOKiK and it may not have further been applied by the trader. Consequently, 
also in already concluded contracts, with other consumers, this clause should 
automatically be not binding. This last effect has recently been codified by the new 
Article 23d in the Act on protection of competition and consumers. This extended 
effect is not applicable to cases when consumers raised individual complaints at their 
district courts due to traders using unfair standard terms and conditions in light of 
performing specific contracts. While not all traders would automatically adjust 
contracts with all their consumers upon the issue of the decision on unfairness, this 
could lead to administrative penalties, as well as individual consumer claims, in which 
the administrative decision could be invoked.45 
44 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, VI ACa 1571/12 of 26 April 2013. 
45 See e.g. Court of Appeal in Warsaw, I ACa 125/13 of 17 July 2013. 
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However, this effect did and does not stretch to other traders who may be using 
identical or similar clauses,46 despite some claims having previously been made in the 
scholarship and in some judgments of the Polish Supreme Court about such a 
possibility.47 Ultimately, the view that has prevailed is that the unfairness control in 
abstracto analyses unfairness of a clause in view of the whole contract, which may 
lead to different results for other traders.48 The above-mentioned Supreme Court’s 
judgment prohibits also that a claim is raised against a trader on the basis of the same 
standard term for a second time. This seems to suggest that even if the trader 
changed the set of standard terms and conditions, but placed the same perceived as 
unfair term in them, it would automatically be recognized as unfair.  
The recent modernisation of the Act on protection of competition and consumers has 
given the authority to the President of the UOKiK to conduct unfairness control in 
abstracto and taken it away from the SOKiK. As it has previously been mentioned, the 
procedure is now administrative rather than judicial, more alike the protection of 
collective consumer interests against the use of unfair commercial practices. Since it is 
only very recently introduced in Poland, it is impossible to evaluate at this point its 
effectiveness and consequences. 
Stakeholders representing traders mention that despite the lack of extended effect of 
decisions on unfairness of standard contract terms, traders who use clauses similar or 
identical to the ones that have been declared unfair, often in practice decide to change 
their standard terms and conditions.  
Consumer association mentions that the previous system, of registering and 
publishing standard terms which have been assessed as unfair might have been 
abused, but was effective for consumer protection. The abuse could consist of some 
organisations approaching traders who apply similar or same provisions to the ones 
already assessed as unfair, and threatening them with starting procedures against 
them, while the unfairness assessment could be different in individual cases, when all 
circumstances of the case would be considered. Still, according to the consumer 
association some standard terms are so evidently and grossly unfair that there should 
be a possibility to use a decision in a particular case towards other traders using the 
same term. Currently, this option does not exist in Polish law, since there is no black 
list of unfair contract terms and courts, including the Supreme Court, are not allowed 
to extend the unfairness assessment to the whole sector. 
The UOKiK also mentions that it would wish more consumers invoked the 
administrative decisions issued in their individual cases to support their individual 
claims and encourage them to do so. They also mention that if another trader just 
copies a standard term that has already been assessed as unfair in another 
administrative procedure, consumers should have an easier option to prove unfairness 
of such a term than just by following the whole procedure from the start. This would 
also take away some of the burden of the consumer authority, limiting the number of 
procedures that would need to occur. Although, if such an easier unfairness procedure 
were adopted, the trader should still be given an option to prove that a term is not 
unfair considering the contract as a whole. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
In Polish law if a standard term and condition is not transparent, it may be seen as 
being contrary to the principle of good practices, which would make it unfair pursuant 
to Art. 3851 Para.1 of the Polish Civil Code.49 However, the consumer association 
mentions that they rarely see it that Polish courts would take into account the lack of 
46 See e.g. the Polish Supreme Court III CZP 17/15 of 20 November 2015. 
47 See e.g. III CZP 80/08 of 7 October 2008. 
48 See e.g. the Polish Supreme Court III CZP 17/15 of 20 November 2015. See also e.g. Namysłowska & 
Piszcz (eds.) 2016. 
49 See e.g. Polish Supreme Court I CSK 313/12 of 15 February 2013. 
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transparency as a reason to allow consumers to avoid a contract in practice. The 
UOKiK assesses the lack of precision of T&Cs as an indication of unfairness and 
potential non-binding character of a non-transparent term; but e.g. a term written in 
overly small font would be less likely to automatically lead to such a consequence, but 
would rather lead to the assessment that the information was not provided in a full 
form, thereby leading to the infringement of collective interests of consumers, or as a 
misleading commercial practice.  
Transparency is perceived as providing consumers with understandable information 
(both as to content and as to the form, in which it is provided), as well as lack of 
ambiguity (referred only to the content). Both these conditions need to be 
simultaneously fulfilled to consider a term transparent.50 Generally, and also in this 
judgment, a benchmark of an average consumer is used to assess the term’s 
transparency. Interestingly, in this case the term was considered transparent, despite 
it using a notion that has been included in the Polish Civil Code in a different meaning 
than in this legal provision. The Polish Supreme Court did not think that average 
consumers would have legal knowledge that would lead to them being confused by 
this term and, thus, decided that the term was unambiguous. However, the Polish 
Supreme Court’s assessment that average consumers lack legal knowledge may also 
lead to the finding of non-transparency of standard contract terms that may confuse 
consumers as to their legal rights.51 
In another judgment the Polish Supreme Court decided that if the consumer correctly 
understands a standard term, it is irrelevant for the assessment of transparency, 
whether he or she also agrees with what the term states.52 
Specifically, Art. 24 Para. 1 of the Act on protection of competition and consumers 
mentions as a practice harming collective consumer interests a trader’s breach of 
providing consumers with reliable, truthful and full information. This means that a 
non-transparent (if considered: not reliable, not truthful or not full information) 
standard term may be controlled in abstracto for unfairness, which administrative 
procedure excludes the possibility to apply other individual sanctions from the UCTD, 
such as the use of the rule contra proferentem.53  
In general, stakeholders perceive transparency requirements as having been given a 
proper sanction in Polish law.  
Generally, sector regulators stated that in their own sectors the transparency of 
contractual terms and conditions has improved in recent years. They perceived unfair 
commercial practice to be more problematic in the market than unfair contract terms, 
at the moment.  
Also stakeholders representing traders are confident that Polish traders provide all the 
required information and that the form, in which the information is provided, is 
satisfactory. They also mention that transparency requirements may have little 
practical relevance, considering that consumers do not usually read information that is 
provided to them. They did not, at the same time, consider it a priority to invest time 
and money in order to increase consumer’s readership of standard terms and 
conditions. 
A consumer association and the UOKiK consider lack of transparency to be a huge 
problem, especially in the financial system. Consumer contracts are too long, with 
many annexes, written in small print, too, and in a complex language. Often also the 
most important terms for consumers would be hidden somewhere in the text and 
written in smaller, less visible print. Traders may express here the willingness to 
provide transparent contract terms, but they lack more specific direction what would 
be perceived and assessed as transparent, e.g. how many pages a contract would 
50 See also Polish Supreme Court e.g. I CSK 72/15 of 4 March 2016. 
51 See e.g. I CSK 125/15 of 15 January 2016. 
52 See e.g. I CSK 531/13 of 10 July 2014. 
53 See also Polish Supreme Court e.g. I CSK 72/15 of 4 March 2016. 
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have, what size font is seen as transparent. No authority or legislator provides for 
specific information on what is perceived as transparent pursuant to the consumer 
organisation. The UOKiK gives an example here of the new code of conduct for credit 
lenders in Poland, that does provide such further guidance on transparency, including 
e.g. the use of what size font could be perceived as transparent. However, this code of 
conduct is quite novel and it is not yet certain how effective it will be. Moreover, it is 
exceptional in the level of details it provides to traders on how to provide 
(transparent) information to consumers. 
The UOKiK mentions that it is difficult to combat too long T&Cs (since there is no 
standard on what is too long and there are many information obligations that need to 
be fulfilled) or T&Cs written in a complex language (since lawyers draft them and it 
can be expected they would use legalise). However, they often combat the use of 
imprecise language (the use of ‘in particular’ etc.) as well as the visibility of T&Cs 
(paying attention the font size and graphic display). The assessment of lack of 
transparency would rather be conducted ad hoc, there are no general indications of 
what is non-transparent. Different methods of display of information are accounted for 
to assess transparency, as well as the consumers themselves – e.g. for vulnerable 
consumers different font size may be required to make a term transparent. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
N/A as Poland did not extend consumer protection to such terms. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Stakeholders representing traders think that the decision on unfairness forces traders 
to remove unfair clauses from their contracts, which is a satisfactory and appropriate 
sanction and should discourage traders from using abusive clauses.54 Stakeholders 
were, however, not convinced of the active role of Polish courts in enforcing consumer 
protection ex officio. On the contrary, they believe that if a consumer will not raise the 
possibility of unfairness of a contract term, the court will not look for it – due to the 
procedural rule of courts investigating only upon parties’ complaints. Consumer 
organisations also see the conflict between the CJEU’s rulings on ex officio taking into 
consideration of consumer interests and Polish procedural legal system that requires 
courts to remain neutral and only engage in arguments presented by both parties. 
Polish courts, generally, would only then provide procedural guidance to parties. 
Additional complication in taking into account consumer rights is that in Poland there 
are no courts that specialise in consumer protection. Consumer law cases go to all 
district courts’ judges, who then have little experience in consumer law, as only a 
small percentage of their cases would pertain to consumer protection. 
The administrative remedy for consumers is to notify the President of the UOKiK about 
an unfair contract term pursuant to the new Article 99a of the Act on protection of 
competition and consumers. The President of the UOKiK may protect collective 
consumer interests by instigating an in abstracto control of standard contract terms 
(see more in other paragraphs). The ECC Poland considers this administrative 
protection of consumer interests as the main advantage of the current system of 
54See also e.g. Namysłowska & Skoczny 2015 at:   
http://www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl/tresc/badania/07/Ekspertyza_naukowa_dla_ZBP.pdf 
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consumer protection, since the UOKiK is active in enforcing protection of collective 
consumer interests and in abstracto control of standard terms and conditions. The 
judicial enforcement of individual consumer rights is perceived as less effective. 
The new administrative procedure that started as of April 2016, has not yet been 
applied in practice and, therefore, it is impossible to assess its effectiveness. 
Previously, the enforcement of collective interests of consumers has been a judicial 
procedure, but as of April 2016 it became an administrative procedure, alike to the 
ones allowing the President of the UOKiK to protect collective interests of consumers 
against the use of unfair commercial practices. For now, only first explanatory 
proceedings have started. The UOKiK states that they will need time to assess the 
effectiveness of the new procedure. Especially with regard to the consumer benefits 
(przysporzenie konsumenckie), they would need to act carefully, e.g. with regard how 
to annex consumer contracts when a certain provision would need to be removed or 
adjusted. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
Consumer association considers that, generally, it would be useful to adopt some 
general rules on unfairness, e.g. either adoption of a black list of unfair contract terms 
or providing courts (Supreme Court) with a possibility to ban the use of grossly and 
evidently unfair contract terms from the whole market and not just by a specific 
trader. There should be an easier possibility to prohibit the use of certain categories of 
contract terms, without the need to adjust legislation. The UOKiK agrees here that 
consumers should be able to more easily claim unfairness of a contract term that has 
already previously been assessed as unfair towards another trader, even if the whole 
T&Cs differ from each other. 
The last modification to the Act, established a new enforcement procedure for the 
President of the UOKiK. Namely, identified in Article 99a of the Act on protection of 
competition and consumers entities (see above) may notify the President of the UOKiK 
on the existence of potential unfair standard terms and conditions. The President of 
the UOKiK has discretion whether to start a formalized unfairness control in abstracto 
as a result of such a notification. 
Another new enforcement tool enables consumers who started an individual case at 
their district courts against a trader for the use of an unfair standard term, to ask the 
President of the UOKiK to intervene in their case. Pursuant to the new Article 31d of 
the Act on protection of competition and consumers, the President of the UOKiK will do 
so, if the public interest demands this. This new possibility allows the President of the 
UOKiK to share his experience with the court. The UOKiK mentioned that it would wish 
individual consumers paying more attention to the decisions of the President of the 
UOKiK, invoking more often its decisions in individual cases. This would, however, be 
likely to require the use of legal aid by consumers. 
ECC Poland mentions that it could be useful to have a ‘name and shame’ practice 
established, where decisions recognizing certain commercial practices as unfair, or 
standard contract terms as abusive, would be published and could be consulted easily 
by consumers, media etc. This could prove to be an effective consumer protection 
measure. Especially, since Polish court’s judgments (especially district courts which 
preside over consumer cases) are rarely made public, which means that courts in 
different towns may issue different decisions; consumers are unaware of what they 
may expect, etc. 
Moreover, ECC Poland mentions that it would be good to further finance activities of 
consumer organisations, e.g. to conduct more educational activities like having a radio 
or TV show dedicated to consumer issues, writing regular columns for newspapers and 
blogs etc. Currently there are no resources for this in Poland. They compare Polish 
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situation to the UK’s, where ‘Which?’ has such resources and consumers know to get 
in touch with them when they have issues, to consult their magazine and use their 
practical tips and guidance. 
Another point raised by ECC Poland is that there should be more attention given to the 
fact that unfair contract terms could be found in other traders’ communication to 
consumers than just their regulations, codes of conducting business. Most complaints 
submitted to national courts and the UOKiK, pertain to unfairness of terms in these 
regulations and the public opinion would, thus, be likely to ignore the fact that also 
other terms could be unfair. 
One possibility is to establish a black list with a provision, pursuant to which 
consumers may terminate a contract concluded for a definite period of time, but only 
if they pay a penalty fee (any penalty fee). Currently, consumers are often dissuaded 
from terminating contracts by such penalty clauses finding their way into standard 
terms and conditions and being invoked by the trader. Polish law prohibits at the 
moment through the grey list in the Polish Civil Code such penalty clauses as unfair, 
but only if they are one-sided or if they are exorbitant, which estimation depends on 
the enforcement authorities. On the one hand, instead of introducing a blacklisted 
prohibition of the use of penalty fees, the enforcement authorities could interpret the 
notion ‘exorbitant’ broadly and factually prohibit the use of most penalty clauses. On 
the other hand, since any such fee may, however, discourage consumers from 
terminating the contract, a complete prohibition was argued for by the stakeholders. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
None such disparities have either been reported to or noted by the stakeholders 
representing traders. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
None such barriers have either been reported to or noted by the stakeholders 
representing traders. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
None such barriers have either been reported to or noted by the stakeholders 
representing traders. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
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• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Also with respect to this question stakeholders representing traders do not see the 
need for an additional protection regime being introduced. 
Polish law provides partially an extended protection against unfair contract terms, e.g. 
Article 805 of the Polish Civil Code in its paragraph 4 allows for such a control in case 
of insurance contracts concluded by any natural persons acting for purposes related to 
their trade or profession. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Stakeholders representing traders generally believe that the general contract law rules 
are sufficiently protecting traders at the moment. They consider consumer law to 
specifically be designed to protect weaker transactional parties, consumers, which 
system would then, according to them, not suit protection of traders and their 
interests. They would not welcome the same standards being applied to B2B relations 
as to B2C. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Also with respect to this question stakeholders representing traders do not see the 
need for an additional protection regime being introduced. Based on the available 
evidence and the interviews, it is concluded that such an extension is not needed. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
None such terms have been reported to stakeholders representing traders. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
Also with respect to this question stakeholders representing traders do not see the 
need for an additional protection regime being introduced. Based on the available 
evidence and the interviews, it is concluded that an introduction of this principle in 
B2B transactions is not needed. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No such benefits have been observed by the stakeholders. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
Stakeholders perceive any such extension to be problematic for businesses, as 
consumer regime has not been drafted with them in mind. They have not, however, 
mentioned any specifics. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
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Based on the available evidence and the interviews, it is concluded that such an 
extension is not desired.  
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment? 
ECC Poland does not perceive the injunction procedure as particularly beneficial to 
consumers in cross-border disputes. This lack of effectiveness is related to the fact 
that often, even if an action is taken, the trader may be difficult to find in another 
country, thus a decision rarely leads to practical benefits for consumers. ECC Poland 
has also limited resources to act on a particular case – only a few cases a year are 
being picked up. On national level, the injunction procedures are perceived as more 
beneficial, even if they may take too long, and even if the President of the UOKiK has 
discretion as to when to act (which means that not all infringements of consumer 
rights are being picked up).  
The UOKiK does not have an opinion on whether there is a reduction in the number of 
infringements as a result of them applying the injunction procedure. They state that 
they are active in this field; they have also sufficient work in this area. There is 
definitely some positive effect of the injunction procedure - discouraging traders from 
infringing consumer interests, but new infringements continue to occur.  
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The UOKiK mentions here the financial penalties as sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction that discourage traders from further infringing consumer interests, as 
one of the effective elements of the procedure. Moreover, the possibility to publish the 
decision or have the trader issue a public corrective statement acts in a discouraging 
way, as traders fear the effect this may have on their reputation on the market and 
consumer trust. Of course, the sole possibility to issue an injunction is already an 
effective enforcement measure. 
There are three phases of the administrative procedure. The first one is not 
formalized, where the UOKiK issue a light statement to the trader notifying him, when 
the infringement is slight and could easily be remedied, that certain incorrectness has 
been found and should be remedied. The notification contains a list of sanctions that 
may be applied if the infringement is not corrected. Usually traders act upon these 
notifications, as they are often directed at traders who were not aware of their 
obligations, rather than those who have acted wilfully. The second phase is the 
explanatory procedure, started when the case is bigger and when the UOKiK needs 
more information to proceed with the case. The UOKiK demands then information from 
traders and the traders are obliged to provide it. This second phase also often leads to 
traders receiving an incentive to change their practices and results in traders ceasing 
with the infringement. This means that statistics on issued decisions do not reflect the 
actions of the UOKiK. Most procedures would end on the second, explanatory stage. 
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The third, actual injunction procedure would then only occur when the trader really 
‘insists’ on it, pursuant to the UOKiK. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Yes, the President of the UOKiK has authority to act on any infringement of collective 
consumer interests, not only pertaining to the infringement in the areas listed in the 
Annex I to the Injunction Directive. E.g. there are proceedings protecting collective 
consumer interests in the consumer construction area, pertaining to contracts 
concluded with developers. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
A consumer association mentions that the injunction procedure may take too long and 
could, therefore, due to this lengthy process be ineffective, since often when the 
decision is published, it is too late to fully reverse the negative effect of a concluded 
contract for consumers. The new change in the provisions of the Act on the protection 
of competition and consumers is yet too recent to evaluate its effectiveness in 
correcting this obstacle. 
The UOKiK mentions that the biggest obstacle to the effectiveness of the injunction 
procedure is that the traders may be registered nowadays anywhere and it is difficult 
to ‘catch’ them. Even if the UOKiK knows that certain Polish traders conduct e.g. unfair 
commercial practices, if these traders have their commercial online activity registered 
outside Poland it is more difficult to start effective injunction proceedings against them 
(even though theoretically in the EU it should not matter where the registered seat is). 
In cross-border cases, the President of the UOKiK’s decisions may be effective towards 
foreign traders, but only if these traders take their business and the regulators 
seriously. If they do not, they may just not pick up the decision of the President of the 
UOKiK and act as if they are unaware thereof.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Stakeholders representing traders do not report any need for the protection of 
collective business’ interests to be introduced. 
ECC Poland mentions that it would be useful to look more closely into which parties 
have a right to notify the President of the UOKiK that there was an infringement and 
that there is a need for the injunction procedure to be started by the President of the 
UOKiK. While it is reasonable to grant this right to consumers, consumer 
organisations’ motions should be treated differently than these of consumers. That is 
to say, consumer organisations’ motions should be seen less like an indication of an 
infringement that could or could not be acted upon by the President of the UOKiK, and 
more as a direction to do so. 
The UOKiK mentions that in Poland e.g. there are many regulations, regulating 
different sectors and protection of consumers in these different sectors, that would not 
directly indicate the applicability of the procedure of injunction in this area. This 
means that sector regulators enforcing consumer protection in this area may not know 
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that there could also be an option of the President of the UOKiK starting an injunction 
procedure on the basis of Polish law in this area – to protect collective consumer 
interests there. This does not flow from the EU law, this is the extension applied in 
Polish law, so the UOKiK does not quite see how the EU legislator could help here. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
ECC Poland does not perceive the injunction procedure as particularly beneficial to 
consumers in cross-border disputes. This lack of effectiveness is related to the fact 
that often, even if an action is taken, the trader may be difficult to find in another 
country, thus a decision rarely leads to practical benefits for consumers. ECC Poland 
has also limited resources to act on a particular case – only a few cases a year are 
being picked up. On average, each year ECC Poland notifies the President of the 
UOKiK of about five to six  practices, as potentially infringing consumer protection in 
cross-border transactions. The President of the UOKiK may decide to act upon such a 
notification and instigate protection of collective consumer interests. The President of 
the UOKiK has discretion in this. 
The UOKiK again mentions here the problem with the enforcement of such injunction 
proceedings against foreign traders, if these are not well-known traders or traders 
who take their business and compliance obligations seriously. However, the UOKiK 
considers that in most injunction cases against foreign traders, these cease with the 
infringements upon notification. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
ECC Poland does not perceive the injunction procedure as particularly beneficial to 
consumers in cross-border disputes. This lack of effectiveness is related to the fact 
that often, even if an action is taken, the trader may be difficult to find in another 
country, thus a decision rarely leads to practical benefits for consumers. ECC Poland 
has also limited resources to act on a particular case – only a few cases a year are 
being picked up. On average, each year ECC Poland notifies the President of the 
UOKiK of about five to six practices, as potentially infringing consumer protection in 
cross-border transactions. The President of the UOKiK may decide to act upon such a 
notification and instigate protection of collective consumer interests. The President of 
the UOKiK has discretion in this. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
Currently, mostly due to the increased relevance of e-commerce, it is easy for traders 
to disguise where they are located. This hinders enforcement process of injunction 
proceedings, pursuant to the UOKiK.  
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1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure as regulated by the Injunctions Directive is split between the 
provisions on the injunction procedure in cases falling under the UCTD and all other 
consumer protection issues. Article 99a (and further) of the Act on protection of 
competition and consumers regulates injunction proceedings against traders using 
unfair contract terms. Article 100 (and further) of this Act regulates injunction 
proceedings when traders harm other collective consumer interests. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
One of the main differences in the procedures is that in case of injunctions related to 
the use of unfair contract terms only certain, specified categories of entities are 
entitled to notify the President of the UOKiK about this (Article 99a of the Act). In case 
of infringements of provisions on unfair commercial practices or implementing CRD – 
anyone may serve this notification (Article 100 of the Act). In case of procedure 
against infringement of UCPD- or CRD-based rules, the President of the UOKiK may 
also issue a temporary injunction for the trader to cease with such a practice, when 
continuation of this practice, until a decision is issued, could severely harm consumer 
interests (Article 101a of the Act). 
Previously, collective consumer interests in UCTD cases have been protected through 
judicial procedures. The recent change in Polish law, adding an administrative 
procedure for protecting collective consumer interests against abusive standard terms 
and conditions, brought thus these two injunction procedures together, establishing an 
administrative mode for both of them. Generally, the explanatory procedure will be 
likely to look the same way now in Polish law (although the change is recent and it 
remains to be seen how the new provisions will be applied in practice). 
The protection of collective consumer interests is very broad in Polish law and goes in 
its scope beyond the list of the Injunctions Directive. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
Consumer association perceives as a definite benefit for consumers that the whole 
consumer protection system has been improved in past years, thanks to the 
Europeanization of consumer law. This system is imperfect, but it is still an 
improvement. The cost thereof is that the legal system became more complex and 
that the consumer has to now have more extensive knowledge thereof than in the 
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1990s in Poland. However, this cost pursuant to the consumer association is difficult to 
avoid. One tip could be to look more into effectiveness of consumer protection and 
whether consumers make use of the highly complicated provisions. It is highly unlikely 
that it would be possible to make these procedures so transparent that all consumers 
would benefit from them and understand them; but it could be feasible to educate at 
least some consumers better, and to improve at least some enforcement procedures. 
This would lower the cost of consumer protection while keeping its benefits. 
The UOKiK’s opinion is that the consumers’ costs of enforcement of consumer rights 
are not high, thus consumers should be benefitting significantly from the established 
consumer protection. However, the question remains whether consumers actually 
enforce their rights. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Stakeholders representing traders find the harmonized rules beneficial. They assess 
Polish traders to be more aware and better informed about consumer needs and their 
rights, since the introduction of the legislation based on EU law to Poland. Moreover, 
they think that cross-border trade became easier due to consumer protection 
measures becoming increasingly more subject to full harmonisation. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Stakeholders representing traders do not perceive these costs (legal advice mostly in 
order to assure compliance) to be substantial.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Sector regulators mention that they have few means given to them to publicly enforce 
consumer protection. They could potentially take away concession of a particular 
trader, for non-compliance with consumer rights, the few that there are, expressed in 
the sector legislation. This court procedure is, however, perceived as a last resort 
measure, that, in practice, is rarely taken, since it also harms consumers if their 
service provider disappears from the market. Moreover, Polish courts require strong 
evidence of continuous breaches of legislation, before they would issue an order to 
take away the concession. 
The UOKiK cannot estimate the costs involved in the public enforcement of consumer 
protection, but it establishes that there are more cases submitted to it with every 
year; these cases are more and more complex; and the cases are more and more 
relevant, where the intervention of the President of the UOKiK is indeed then actually 
necessary. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
Not one stakeholder has mentioned this. Based on the available evidence and the 
interviews, it is concluded that there is no indication of the implementation being not 
cost-effective. 
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• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
See above. The UOKiK mentions that one of the measures that could improve cost-
effectiveness of their work would be to allow for decisions on abusive clauses to have 
an effect erga omnes or at least to allow such a decision to simplify following 
procedures against other traders that are using the same standard terms.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
In the energy sector, pursuant to the stakeholders, traders are quite aware of 
consumer rights, aside the new players on the market, who sometimes learn as they 
go. The business organisations also provide information to traders on what rules they 
should be compliant with, audit their members. Consumer awareness is really low – 
regulators constantly receive individual complaints, without specific rights being 
mentioned in them, and then need to direct consumers either to starting a legal action 
in court (rarely occurs) or to the UOKiK. Unfair commercial practices are often based 
on consumer unawareness, especially with regard to traders targeting in door-to-door 
sales vulnerable consumers, e.g. older consumers. 
Pursuant to ECC Poland the regulators of market sectors in Poland enforce legal 
provisions of a given sector and are less familiar with, and less interested in, general 
consumer protection rules, e.g. protection against unfair commercial practices. 
Therefore, consumers are less protected in certain specific areas (health, transport, 
energy, etc.), since the UOKiK is more focused on general consumer protection and it 
may escape its attention that certain sectors’ specific conditions may create new 
consumer issues. Consumers themselves are not aware of the level of protection due 
to them, so they cannot enforce themselves their rights. The UOKiK to an extent 
agrees that sector regulators would be more likely to apply sector rules to protect 
consumers and could be less active in invoking general consumer protection rules 
(also often would not have a competence to do so), but they are cooperating with the 
UOKiK, may refer consumers to the UOKiK and often attend trainings etc. organized 
by the UOKiK on general consumer law-related issues. 
The UOKiK generally would not welcome being more involved in consumer protection 
in particular sectors as that would likely increase the financial and resources’ burden 
for it. However, it does mention that currently it cooperates with sector regulators and 
that some more visibility of general consumer rights could be useful there. 
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• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
Only the President of the UOKiK is competent to enforce horizontal EU consumer law 
with regard to protection of collective interests of consumers. Enforcement of sector 
specific rules lies in the competence of sector regulators, thus whenever consumer 
complaint is based on horizontal EU consumer law, sector regulators refer consumers 
to the UOKiK, which then accumulates consumer complaints and its President may act 
in protecting their collective interests. 
The cooperation between sector regulators and the UOKiK is very good, pursuant to 
stakeholders. They often informally cooperate in motivating traders to observe 
consumer rights. For example, sector regulators may collect consumer complaints and 
publish a list of service providers that consumers report as using unfair commercial 
practices. Upon publication of such a ‘blacklist’, talks are holding place with traders to 
convince them to change their practices. UOKiK takes part in these meetings and if 
traders will not adjust their practices may act instead of sector regulators against 
them. Moreover, when there is an overlap of information obligations in sector 
regulations and in the general consumer protection provisions, the UOKiK would agree 
with sector regulators on the interpretation thereof. The UOKiK mentions, however, 
that all this cooperation is incidental and not institutionalized. Sometimes this 
cooperation is friendly and on equal footing, sometimes the UOKiK subtly indicates 
that certain consumer protection measures are not sufficiently protected in a given 
sector and they inquire then why this is so. The last situation is very delicate and all 
regulators and authorities attempt then not to close the open door of cooperation 
between them due to an overlap in their competences.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
As mentioned in the answer to question 1.1.5 there is some overlap between 
consumer provisions in horizontal and sector-specific rules, but this follows from the 
overlap between European provisions that had to be transposed to the Polish legal 
system. The Polish legislator did not significantly extend further information 
requirements or provide for more consumer protection rules in sector-specific 
legislations.  
Stakeholders mention that while currently there may not be much overlap or problems 
with the existing overlapping provisions, which suggests that the system is coherent, 
it could be desirable to provide for more consumer protection in sector-specific rules. 
Especially sector-specific regulators would appreciate receiving more enforcement 
tools. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
The benefit thereof is that sector-specific regulators may direct and instruct 
consumers who come to complain about unfair commercial practices or unfair contract 
terms about remedies they could use, authorities (the UOKiK) they could approach. 
Pursuant to the stakeholders, there are costs related to the fact that consumers tend 
to think that in sector-specific issues, it is the sector-specific regulator that they 
should approach first. This means that manpower, time and money are devoted to re-
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directing consumers to the UOKiK or informing them that their only option is to start a 
judicial procedure. Stakeholders suggest thus that these costs could be avoided in the 
future, if consumers were better educated on their rights and better knew which 
authorities could help them. 
The UOKiK appreciates the possibility to protect collective consumer interests on the 
basis of general consumer protection provisions allowing for the protection of 
consumer collective interest, also in cases, where there are sector-specific rules 
applicable. This supplements the activity of sector-specific regulators that often may 
be focused on other matters than consumer protection. However, simultaneously the 
UOKiK does not express a wish to be further involved in the enforcement of consumer 
protection in sector-specific matters (see above). 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
This hasn’t been brought up by the stakeholders. Based on the available evidence and 
the interviews, it is concluded that such a clarification is not needed. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
Stakeholders representing traders have not encountered this as an issue in Polish law. 
General contractual rules should be applicable in such situations and are perceived as 
sufficiently protective of parties’ interests.  
Consumer associations perceive any extension of B2C protection – whether to C2B or 
B2B relations – as impractical, since consumer associations already do not have 
enough resources to protect consumers and this extension would only provide more 
subjects that would need to be protected. Moreover, this could further complicate the 
understanding of traditional legal definitions (such as ‘consumer’), introduce 
distinction between distributors that could even be perceived as discrimination 
between traders (depending on the type of conducted commercial activity) or as an 
unfair competition act (since it could distort market conditions, providing more 
incentives to only trade with bigger companies). 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Most stakeholders perceive the notion of a consumer and of an average consumer as 
working well and having been fully adopted in Polish law. The notion of a vulnerable 
consumer provides some difficulties in practice, as in individual cases Polish courts 
seem not likely to change the level of consumer protection, if the issue is that of a 
vulnerable consumer. The President of the UOKiK tries to take the special position of 
vulnerable consumers into account during collective consumer protection proceedings. 
Sector regulators are helpless in protecting small businesses, since consumer 
protection is not extended to them. They would like to see the definition of consumer 
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being widened. Stakeholders representing traders, however, consider the currently 
binding definitions satisfactory and would not want them changed. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Sector regulators do not consider the level of protection of vulnerable consumers as 
adequate, since they are more prone to be victims of unfair commercial practices, 
some market players specifically take as their clients only such consumers. Still, they 
have the same remedies as other consumers and often are helpless in enforcing their 
individual rights. Consumer association, the ECC Poland and the UOKiK – all mention 
the problem of Polish traders often targeting vulnerable consumers, especially older 
consumers in door-to-door sales and targeting young consumers through 
advertisement. It seems, however, that the level of protection would not increase just 
by changing legal provisions and, e.g., introducing a concept of vulnerable consumers 
to the UCTD. Rather, it would be more necessary to improve enforcement of the 
application of a different standard for assessment of commercial practices, if a 
vulnerable consumer is a target thereof.   
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
All stakeholders think that consumer protection has improved due to Europeanisation 
of consumer law. Sector regulators believe, however, and are adamant about it, that 
there are still too few individual remedies available to consumers. Moreover, consumer 
organisation claims that consumers could easier claim remedies on the basis of 
general contract and consumer law rather than provisions about protection against 
unfair commercial practices, e.g. they would rather try to terminate a contract as 
concluded under mistake, than invoke unfair commercial practices. The latter is due to 
the complex system of unfair commercial practices and its enforcement. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Stakeholders representing traders and consumers both believe this is so. Generally, 
not many issues have been noticed with regard to the proper provision of a price per 
unit to consumers. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Stakeholders did not have an opinion on this topic. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Stakeholders representing traders believe it is easier to trade cross-border nowadays 
and for consumers to purchase from foreign traders. There is even special advice 
given online by these stakeholders to traders inquiring about how to set up cross-
border trade. Any problems that traders or consumers may encounter during their 
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cross-border experience are not, however, being reported back to traders’ 
associations. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
All stakeholders think that consumer protection has improved due to Europeanisation 
of consumer law. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Poland  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
Article 3851 (and further) 
Polish Civil Code 
 'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
No  On the basis of old provisions of the Act on 
protection of competition and consumers (prior 
to April 2016), the UOKiK published a registry of 
decisions of the Court Protecting Competition 
and Consumers (SOKiK) on these standard 
terms and conditions that have been assessed 
as unfair in abstracto; this worked a de facto 
black list – even though only a given trader was 
prohibited from applying this term 
Act on protection of 
competition and consumers, 
last modified in August 2015 
(Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentów, 
16 luty 2007, Dz. U. 2015 
poz. 184) 
 'Grey list' of terms which may 
be considered unfair 
Yes Polish Civil Code, 
Article 3853 
 
  Extensions of the application 
of Directive to individually 
negotiated terms  
No   
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  Extensions of the application 
of Directive terms on the 
adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
No   
  Assessment of unfair 
contract terms in abstracto 
Yes Act on protection 
of competition 
and consumers, 
Article 23a, 24 & 
99a 
Consumers, consumer ombudsmen, 
ombudsmen of the insured, consumer 
associations and foreign organisations entitled 
to start injunction proceedings, may notify the 
President of the UOKiK about an infringement 
regarding a trader using an abusive clause. 
 
  Contractual consequences of 
lack of transparency 
Yes Polish Civil Code, 
Article 3851 
Non-transparent standard terms and conditions 
perceived as contrary to the principle of good 
practices and thus unfair 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Act on prevention of unfair 
commercial practices 
(Ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu 
nieuczciwym praktykom 
rynkowym, 23 August 2007, 
Dz.U. 2007 Nr 171 poz. 1206) 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Provisions regarding 
immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
Act on protection of 
competition and consumers, 
last modified in August 2015 
(Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentów, 
16 luty 2007, Dz. U. 2015 
poz. 184) 
 Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No  Act on combating unfair competition (Ustawa o 
zwlaczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji, 16 April 
1993, Dz.U. 1993 Nr 47 poz. 211) applies a 
similar test for recognizing misleading and 
comparative advertising in B2B claims as for 
unfair commercial practices, though. 
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  Enforcement of protection of 
collective consumer interests 
 Act on protection 
of competition 
and consumers,  
Article 24  
Generally, unfair commercial practices harming 
collective interests of consumers are prohibited 
by this provision and the President of the UOKiK 
is entitled to protect these collective interests 
(also implementation of the Injunctions 
Directive). 
Directive 98/6/EC on 
consumer protection 
in the indication of 
the prices of 
products offered to 
consumers 
Act of 9 May 2014 on 
informing about prices of 
products and services 
(Ustawa z dnia 9 maja 2014 
r. o informowaniu o cenach 
towarów i usług, Dz. U. 2014 
poz. 915) 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Act of 9 May 2014 
on informing 
about prices of 
products and 
services, Article 4 
The Act gave the authority to the Minister of 
Commerce to issue a regulation on publishing 
prices of products and services, which was 
published on December 9, 2015 and started 
applying as of January 1, 2016 (with traders 
being given time till September 30, 2016, to 
adjust their practices to new rules). 
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Act on combating unfair 
competition (Ustawa o 
zwlaczaniu nieuczciwej 
konkurencji, 16 April 1993, 
Dz.U. 1993 Nr 47 poz. 211) 
 Penalization of unfair 
competition acts, including 
misleading and comparative 
advertising 
Yes Act on combating 
unfair 
competition, 
Article 25 
Pursuant to Article 25 para 2 of the Act on 
combating unfair competition, unfair 
competition acts in the sphere of advertising 
can also be penalized. At the moment, there is 
a case pending at the Polish Constitutional 
Court submitted by the Polish Citizens’ Rights 
Ombudsman that this provision of law is not in 
compliance with the Polish constitution. 
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Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' interests 
Act on protection of 
competition and consumers, 
last modified in August 2015 
(Ustawa o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentów, 
16 luty 2007, Dz. U. 2015 
poz. 184)  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Poland  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate procedure 
or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other 
EU Consumer Law Directives (the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by 
the Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in a 
single legal act 
 
 
Act on protection of competition and 
consumers provides the President of the 
UOKiK with an authority to protect 
collective consumer interests. The 
President may thus start injunctions 
proceedings, negotiate with traders 
cessation of unfair practices etc. Article 
99a (and further) of this Act regulate 
injunction proceedings against traders 
using unfair contract terms (see described 
in the text of the study). Art 100 (and 
further) of this Act regulate injunction 
proceedings when traders harm other 
collective consumer interests. 
One of the main differences in the 
procedures is that in case of injunctions 
related to the use of unfair contract terms 
only certain, specified categories of entities 
are entitled to notify the President of the 
UOKiK about this (Article 99a of the Act). In 
case of infringements of provisions on 
unfair commercial practices or 
implementing CRD – anyone may serve this 
notification (Article 100 of the Act). In case 
of procedure against infringement of 
UCPD- or CRD-based rules, the President of 
the UOKiK may also issue a temporary 
injunction for the trader to cease with such 
a practice, when continuation of this 
practice until a decision is issued could 
severely harm consumer interests (Article 
101a of the Act). 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Individual 
consumers 
- Other  
Under Article 100 of the above-mentioned 
Act – anyone may notify the President of 
the UOKiK, who then may seek an 
injunction. 
Under Article 99a of the above-mentioned 
Act – individual consumers, consumer 
ombudsmen, ombudsmen of the insured, 
consumer associations and foreign 
organisations entitled to start injunction 
proceedings may notify the President of 
the UOKiK, who then may seek an 
injunction. 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Administrative 
procedure 
 
It is an administrative procedure, however, 
the appeal from the administrative 
decision is to be submitted to the District 
Court in Warsaw – Court Protecting 
Competition and Consumers (SOKiK) 
pursuant to Article 81 of the above-
mentioned Act. 
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Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
-The qualified 
entities are 
exempted from 
costs  
 
Pursuant to Article 77 of the above-
mentioned Act trader who was found 
infringing the provision of the Act is bound 
to pay the costs of an injunction procedure. 
Para 2 of this provision specified that in 
justified circumstances traders may be 
obliged to pay the costs only partially or 
not at all.  
Article 78 specifies that regardless of the 
outcome of the procedure, traders may be 
obliged to pay costs resulting from their 
obviously wrongful behaviour (e.g. hiding 
information). 
Pursuant to Article 58 para 2 of the above-
mentioned Act, if one of the parties asks of 
an expert’s opinion they may be obliged to 
pay a deposit to cover some of the expert’s 
costs. If no practice harming collective 
consumer interests is found, these expert’s 
costs are covered by the State Treasury, 
Article 58 para 3.  
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the Directive, 
or consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
consumer law in 
general 
 
Pursuant to  Article 21 para 1 and 2 of the 
above-mentioned Act, any practice 
harming collective consumer interests is 
prohibited and examples from Annex I are 
only listed as indication of possible 
infringements of such collective interests 
Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including 
the consultation stage under Art. 5 of the 
ID) 
- Yes 
 
Prior to the injunction procedure, pursuant 
to Article 47 para 2 of the above-
mentioned Act the President of the UOKiK 
may conduct an explanatory procedure to 
e.g. establish whether there is an 
infringement justifying beginning of 
injunction procedures (Article 48). 
Additionally, pursuant to Article 49a of this 
Act, the President of the UOKiK does not 
need to start an injunction procedure but 
instead may address the trader and the 
trader may provide a statement on the 
matter 
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Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement 
for party seeking 
injunction to consult 
with the defendant 
and a qualified 
entity 
 
Yes, before the UOKiK issues an 
administrative decision, it enables traders 
to negotiate a sort of settlement combined 
with the trader ceasing to continue with 
the unfair commercial practice. This 
settlement involves a trader suggesting a 
satisfying solution to the problem of the 
unfair commercial practice, e.g. 
introduction of a change in a consumer 
contract; lowering the price; repayment of 
undue collected fees; fulfilment of untrue 
promises; enabling consumers to terminate 
the contract or to file a complaint; 
providing required information. This 
solution presents thus a practical benefit 
for consumers (so-called in Polish 
“przysporzenie konsumenckie”). 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Pursuant to Article 99e of this Act an 
injunction procedure against unfair 
contract terms should be completed within 
4 months (5 months if the issue is 
complex). The same timeframe is granted 
to other injunction procedures  in Article 
104. 
One month is granted for appealing from 
the decision of the President of the UOKiK 
in Article 81. The documents of the case 
need to be transferred to the SOKiK within 
3 months. The documents need not be 
transferred if, notified about the appeal, 
the President of the UOKiK changes or 
annuls its administrative decision.  
 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day of 
non-compliance 
 
Pursuant to Article 107 of the Act, for every 
day of non-compliance the President of the 
UOKiK may fine a trader with a monetary 
fine of an equivalent of up to EUR 10 000 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
Pursuant to Article 23b of the Act if the 
President of the UOKiK assesses a standard 
contract term as unfair, the President may 
oblige the trader to issue a corrective 
statement in a form and with content as 
stated in the decision. The President of the 
UOKiK may also decide to publish the 
decision, partially or in full, at the trader’s 
expense. Article 26 of the Act states the 
same for other injunction procedures. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- Yes 
 
In its decision the President of the UOKiK 
may state what measures should be taken 
by the trader to remove consequences of 
the infringement of collective consumer 
interests (also Article 23b and 26 of the 
Act). 
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Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
Pursuant to Article 23b of the Act the 
decision of the President of the UOKiK may 
oblige traders to inform their consumers 
about the findings of unfairness of a 
standard contract term by the President of 
the UOKiK. 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future infringements 
and/or same or similar illegal practices (of 
other traders)? 
- Yes 
- No 
The injunction order is extended to past 
and future practices of the same trader 
against other consumers, but not to 
practices of other traders. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
dispute
s 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comment 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. 
CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 
Inspection 
of 
Commerce 
(Inspekcja 
Handlowa) 
statistics 
   625*    
Note: There is no statistical data on this available. The UOKiK does not gather such data; Polish district courts pertinent 
to adjudicate in individual consumer cases do not generally publish their judgments; etc. there is little transparency of 
the individual consumer law enforcement in Poland. *Decisions regarding improper information about prices. 
 
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).55  
55 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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 Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure      
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
     
Notes: There is no statistical data on this available. Consumer cases are not standard and may take from months to 
(more likely) years, at different courts, with different representation fees being applicable. 
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There is no statistical data on this available. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
931
C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
KPF (Conference of Polish 
Financial Businesses) 
Business association 05-07-2016 
KIG (Polish Chamber of 
Commerce) 
Business association 12-07-2016 
UOKiK (Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection)  
National consumer enforcement 
authority 
27-07-2016 
UKE (Office of Electronic 
Communication) 
National regulatory authority 27-06-2016 
URE (Office of Energy Regulation) National regulatory authority 06-07-2016 
European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 19-07-2016 
Federacja Konsumentów 
(Consumer Federation) 
Consumer organisation 18-07-2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
M. Namysłowska & A. 
Piszcz (eds.) 
2016 Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentow z 
5.8.2015 r. Komentarz. C.H. Beck 
M. Namysłowska 2015 ‘O koniecznosci uchylenia ustawy z dnia 16 kwietnia 1993 r. o 
zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji’ in: J. Ożegalska-Trybalska, D. 
Kasprzycki (eds.) Aktualne wyzwania prawa wlasnosci intelektualnej 
i prawa konkurencji. Ksiega pamiatkowa dedykowana Profesorowi 
Michalowi du Vallowi. Warszawa. 
M. Namysłowska 2014 Czarna lista nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych a granice prawa 
zwalczania nieuczciwej konkurencji w Unii Europejskiej. Analiza 
prawnoporownawcza. Wolters Kluwer 
M. Namysłowska 2014 ‘Stosowanie dyrektywy 2005/29/WE o nieuczciwych praktykach 
handlowych w swietle pierwszego sprawozdania Komisji’ in: 
Europejski Przeglad Sadowy vol. 2 
K. Horubski  2014 ‘Nieuczciwosc praktyki rynkowej w swietle ustawy o 
przeciwdzialaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym’ in: Prace 
Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wroclawiu vol. 372 
K. Kopaczyńska-Pieczniak 2012 ‘Czyn nieuczciwej konkurencji a nieuczciwa praktyka rynkowa’ in: 
Monitor Prawa Handlowego vol. 3 
I.B. Nestoruk 2011 ‘Marketing ekologiczny w prawie polskim – przeglad regulacji’ in: 
Prace z Prawa Wlasnosci Intelektualnej vol. 113 
R. Stefanicki 2010 ‘Wymogi starannosci zawodowej przedsiebiorcy (w swietle 
dyrektywy o nieuczciwych praktykach handlowych)’ in: Panstwo i 
Prawo vol. 3 
M. Namysłowska 2010 ‘Znaczenie czarnej listy nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych – uwagi 
na tle orzecznictwa TS’ in: Europejski Przeglad Sadowy vol. 8 
G. Rączka 2010 ‘Niedozwolone postanowienia umowne w umowach rachunku 
bankowego’ in: Przeglad Prawa Handlowego vol. 4 
W. Jarosiński & B. Widła 2009 ‘Odpowiedzialnosc cywilna wedlug ustawy z dnia 23 sierpnia 2007 r. 
o przeciwdzialaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym w swietle 
dyrektywy 2005/29/WE o nieuczciwych praktykach handlowych’ in: 
Transformacje Prawa Prywatnego vol. 1-2 
M. Grochowski 2009 ‘Wadliwosc umow konsumenckich (w swietle przepisow o 
nieuczciwych praktykach rynkowych) in: Panstwo i prawo issue 7  
D. du Cane 2009 ‘Nieuczciwa konkurencja a dobre obyczaje oraz class action po 
polsku’ in: Przeglad Prawa Handlowego vol. 3 
R. Stefanicki 2009 ‘Dyrektywa 2005/29/WE o nieuczciwych praktykach handlowych i 
jej implementacja do krajowego systemu’ in: Przeglad Prawa 
Handlowego vol. 1 
M. Namysłowska 2008 ‘Reklama porównawcza w orzecznictwie ETS’ in: Europejski Przeglad 
Sadowy vol. 1 
M. Namysłowska & K. 
Sztorbyn 
2008 ‘Ukryta reklama po implementacji dyrektywy on nieuczciwych 
praktykach handlowych’ in: Panstwo i prawo vol. 11 
M. Sieradzka 2008 ‘Prawnokarne aspekty stosowania nieuczciwych praktyk rynkowych’ 
in: Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa Karnego vol. XXIII; Wroclaw (2008a) 
M. Sieradzka 2008 ‘Actio popularis jako instrument ochrony interesow konsumentow 
przed nieuczciwymi praktykami rynkowymi’ in: Przeglad Prawa 
Handlowego vol. 3 (2008b) 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
933
M. Strzelecki 2008 ‘Klauzula generalna nieuczciwej praktyki rynkowej’ in: Przeglad 
Prawa Handlowego vol. 11 
B. Gliniecki 2008 ‘Ustawa o przeciwdzialaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym’ in: 
Monitor Prawniczy vol. 1 
M. Jagielska 2007 ‘Skutki wpisu postanowienia wzorca umownego do rejestru 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report PORTUGAL  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD was transposed into Portuguese law by Decree-Law no. 57/2008 (March 
26). There were no specific rules for unfair commercial practices prior to the 
transposition. Decree-Law no. 57/2008 was amended recently so as to include some 
protection for B2B relations. 
Several authors argue that the complexity of the UCPD and of Decree-Law no. 
57/2008, coupled with the several requirements and definitions that must be taken 
into account (commercial practice, professional diligence and to materially distort the 
economic behaviour of consumers) make it almost impossible to apply the general 
clause of Decree-Law no. 57/2008 (article 5).1 This conclusion also applies to articles 
6 (misleading actions) and 9 (misleading omissions) of Decree-Law no. 57/2008, since 
they are worded in very broad terms. 
Jorge Pegado Liz states that the definitions in article 3 are ‘subjective and cannot be 
verified objectively based on scientific or verifiable standards’.2 
Overall, the interviewed stakeholders share this view. A public authority emphasizes 
that there are difficulties in applying Decree-Law no. 57/2008 due to the use of vague 
concepts. The regulatory authorities and a consumer association agree with this 
perspective, arguing that the use of vague concepts undermines the existence of a 
clear and complete legal framework and raises problems for punitive actions. A 
business association adds that the use of vague concepts is not desirable and 
considers that they should be replaced whenever possible but recognizes that in some 
situations it would be difficult to do so. 
There is not a single reference to Decree-Law no. 57/2008 in a brief search of the 
Supreme Court of Justice’s case law database3 and in the five courts of appeal there 
are only three references to this legislation. Considering that it came into force eight 
years ago, this data points to a very limited application of the regime.  
However, a public authority stresses that the UCPD is the most important consumer 
directive involved in the study, not only because of its full harmonisation approach but 
also because it involves practices that are extremely important for consumer 
protection.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Generally, the stakeholders think that the black list is very useful and that it should be 
extended. 
However, same stakeholders also claim that the list should be more specific instead of 
relying on vague concepts that are difficult to apply. 
1  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 82. 
2  Jorge Pegado Liz, “Práticas Comerciais Proibidas”, 2014, p. 107. 
3  Available in http://www.dgsi.pt/jstj.nsf?OpenDatabase.  
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A regulatory authority gives the example of a practice that consisted in presenting as 
an advantage something that is imposed by law (e.g. para 10 refers to ‘Presenting 
rights given to consumers in law as a distinctive feature of the trader’s offer’). The 
trader argued that it was simply information and not an advantage. This regulatory 
authority defends that, in order to avoid any doubts there should be a clear distinction 
between advantages and commercial information in the leaflets. Such a practice may 
be addressed without any amendment to the current wording of the UCPD. 
An enforcement authority states that the ‘black list’ of unfair commercial practices is 
out-dated, since it relies on a closed set of practices. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
No data is available in Portugal for immovable property.  
As for financial services, the conclusions in another study show that sectoral national 
legislation has provided for control of commercial practices that were not set out in the 
UCPD, for example tying different contracts, or the calculation of interest.4 In addition, 
the rules on misleading actions and omissions and aggressive practices in the financial 
sector are not entirely based on EU Directives.5 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
A regulator reports that complaints about advertising in the energy sector are mostly 
related to cases where minors take part in an advertisement (since article 14, no. 2, of 
the Advertisment Act, limits their involvement), and with tying (e.g. different products 
are sold together and one or all of them are not available separately). Misleading 
practices may be at stake in the latter case. 
As for environmental claims, a few years ago there was an advertisement concerning 
natural gas where water was wasted. Although this advertisement did not involve any 
misleading practice, it is the only example of an environmental claim gathered during 
the interviews.  
In general, Portuguese consumers still show little sensibility in this regard. The 
country’s economic situation probably explains why this is so, as consumers focus on 
saving and, thus, traders build their message around the price.  
 
4   Article 28 of Decree-Law no. 133/2009 (June 2) deals with usury. Under this provision, the credit 
agreement will be usurious if the annual percentage rate of charge exceeds a certain limit, calculated 
according to the medium annual percentage rate of charge offered in consumer credit agreements during 
the previous trimester. In this case, the annual percentage rate of charge set out in the credit agreement 
is automatically reduced to half of the maximum limit. 
5  Study on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices in the EU, Civic 
Consulting, 2011, pp. 38-56. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
A national authority points out that the concept of average consumer, as established 
by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is hardly applicable to 
Portuguese consumers.  
There is some debate in Portugal concerning this concept. 
Particularly when cheap and mass-consumption goods are involved, Portuguese case 
law defines the average consumer as hasty and distracted6 or absent-minded7 and it 
also takes into account the targeted population group.8  
On the other hand, an author states that the average consumer is a normal consumer, 
e.g. with a medium level of information and regularly diligent. According to this 
perspective, consumers with a low level of information or that fail to be diligent are 
not average consumers.9  
The concept of average consumer presents several disadvantages when used as the 
standard to assess whether a commercial practice is unlawful. 
First, it fails to take into account the effect of Decree-Law no. 57/2008 covering 
specific circumstances that reveal weakness on the part of the consumer, even when 
they are known and used by the trader to distort the consumers’ economic behaviour, 
in violation of the professional diligence. This means that the trader may take 
advantage of the consumer’s weakness in order to unduly influence him or her, as 
long as the average consumer would not be affected by that practice.10-11 
Second, this standard sets a very low standard for the trader. The law does not 
appropriately protect those consumers that are less capable and more careless, since 
it does not take into account their economic behaviour when faced with the 
commercial practice. The average consumer concept does not provide sufficient 
protection to a significant number of consumers.12 
The average consumer can be used with positive results in competition law or in 
industrial property (B2B relations), with the objective to determine whether a certain 
commercial practice affects another trader. In consumer law, it is inadequate as an 
effective safeguard of consumers, as it denies protection to those that need it the 
most.13 
 
6  Supreme Court of Justice (26/9/1995); Lisbon Court of Appeal (19/1/2010); Lisbon Court of Appeal 
(15/4/2010); Supreme Court of Justice (13/7/2010). 
7  Lisbon Court of Appeal (25/2/2014). 
8  Lisbon Court of Appeal (28/5/2013). 
9  Ana Maria Guerra Martins, “O Direito Comunitário do Consumo”, 2002, p. 78. 
10  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 85. 
11  Sara Fernandes Garcia, As Práticas Comerciais Desleais, 2014, p. 58. 
12  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 85. 
13  Luís Silveira Rodrigues, “Tendências Recentes sobre a Protecção do Consumidor na União Europeia”, 
2003, p. 315; Jorge Pegado Liz, “A «Lealdade» no Comércio ou as Desventuras de uma Iniciativa 
Comunitária”, 2005, p. 77. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
A national authority argues that the concept of vulnerable consumer is very important, 
particularly when economic vulnerability is at stake. This concept must be considered 
in a case-by-case basis, thus making it difficult to extract conclusions in the abstract. 
There is a widespread view that this concept should be extended to cases of economic 
vulnerability. Over-indebtedness is a serious problem in Portugal and a cause of added 
vulnerability to those affected by it. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
For some regulators, even when the law provides for it, there is no self-regulation. 
Apart from internal codes of conduct (mainly, in some big companies) and internal 
procedures based on international standards (in the electronic communications 
sector), as a rule there are no codes of conduct. 
There are, however, some exceptions. In advertising, the Civil Institute of Advertising 
Self-Regulation (ICAP, in Portuguese) has issued a code of conduct for advertising and 
other means of commercial communication.14 
An enforcement authority reports that it carried out a recent initiative together with 
the ICAP regarding symbols of quality (such as ‘Product of the Year’ or ‘Flavour of the 
Year’). In addition to an information sheet detailing the symbol– the Product of Year 
takes into account the packaging, while a small group had tasted the Flavour of the 
Year – this authority prepared a recommendation on the information that should be 
conveyed to consumers on these symbols. Some traders voluntarily comply with this 
recommendation. 
The business associations have a very different perspective. In addition to their self-
regulation instruments, these associations report that there are also sectoral self-
regulations mechanisms for agriculture and alcoholic beverages, among others. At the 
European level, the ‘Supply Chain Initiative’15 has been a success in Portugal: with 
about 1200 companies registered, Portugal was the first country to meet its 
registration threshold. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
A consumer association points out that commercial practices are rapidly evolving and 
suggests the creation of a mechanism designed to allow the list’s update over time. It 
also argues that the list should include practices that involve an artificial reduction of 
prices (e.g. ‘Black Fridays’).  
The same association adds that some sectoral legislation already includes lists of 
specific unfair commercial practices that go beyond the UCPD and Decree-Law no. 
57/2008. 
 
14  Available in http://www.icap.pt/images/memos/Novo_CodConduta_ICAP_Pub_ComComercial.pdf. 
15  See http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu  
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• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
A consumer association argues that the good results that have been obtained with the 
implementation of other EU Directives on consumer protection, were a result of the 
minimum harmonisation approach. The full harmonisation on the UCPD does not allow 
Member-States to go further in the protection of consumers.  
Drawing on the Portuguese legislation on unfair contract terms (Decree-Law no. 
446/85), the same association defends the creation of a ‘grey list’ with commercial 
practices that may be considered unfair depending on the specifics of the case. From 
its perspective, experience gathered from the application of the national legislation on 
UCT suggests that this ‘grey list’ could further consumer protection. 
For two enforcement authorities, the main problem of UCP national legislation is 
related to proof. This is particularly striking when the question involves circumstances 
that are prior to the conclusion of the contract.  
In the energy sector, there are several complaints about cases where a trader’s 
representative presents him or herself as a representative of another trader. Since the 
contract is concluded with a certain trader and the documents have the symbol of that 
trader, the question hinges on proof and it is very difficult to apply the UCP rules. To 
avoid this situation, it would be necessary to impose certain additional duties on 
traders (such as better documentation and identification of their representatives), but 
that would imply additional costs and, consequently, reflect on prices. 
As for electronic communications, a regulatory authority emphasizes the importance of 
creating an obligation on the traders to deliver the recording of telephone calls to the 
competent regulatory authority, as well as the communication of some internal 
procedures, in order to facilitate supervision. 
Other authorities emphasize the difficulties in articulating the rules on advertising and 
UCT national legislation, as some unfair commercial practices are connected to 
advertising. Each of these aspects is regulated in a different Directive (UCPD and 
MCAD) and the scope of application of these Directives differs greatly. In Portugal, 
advertising is under the supervision of the Directorate General for Consumers (in 
Portuguese DGC), while the supervision of the UCP in all matters not connected to 
advertising is carried out by the Food and Health Security Authority (ASAE) or by 
regulatory authorities. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The PID was transposed into Portuguese law by Decree-Law no. 138/90 (April 26), 
amended by Decree-Law no. 162/99 (May 13). There were pre-existing rules on price 
indication in Portugal.  
The stakeholders do not identify any major problems concerning the indication of 
prices in business premises. The data gathered by an enforcement authority between 
2010 and 2016 shows a steady decrease in processes issued on the basis of the PI 
national legislation (Decree-Law no. 330/90): 1222 processes in 2010 and only 90 
processes in 2016. 
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A consumer association’s perspective points to a widespread indication of prices, 
although the measurement unit is not always the same (while some traders use kilos, 
others use grams, which makes it harder for the consumer to compare prices). An 
indication such as ‘100 washloads per package in our container’ must be accompanied 
by the size of the container in order to be measurable. This association considers that 
it would be important to adopt a common measurement unit so that the consumer 
would be able to compare all products available in the market. 
A business association reports that many traders indicate several prices for the same 
good (e.g. price per pack and per litre), even though it is not very clear if this 
information is necessary or relevant for consumers. Another business association 
argues that the price per unit of the measurement is often not indicated, namely when 
the goods are sold in a pack. This association agrees with the possibility of indicating 
the price by reference to a recognised unit of measurement.  
Several stakeholders point out that Decree-Law no. 330/90 goes beyond the PID, as it 
applies to both goods and services (article 10). In one of the interviews, it was 
suggested that the PID should be amended in order to include the indication of prices 
in services contracts.  
However, in E-commerce, particularly in international websites, prices are sometimes 
indicated in a misleading way. For instances, in contracts related to air transport, 
some components of the price are not presented transparently. In both these 
contracts and accommodation contracts, there are cases where traders indicate a non-
final price or a price that will only apply if a certain method of payment is used 
(without prior information to consumers). There are also cases of error in the 
indication of prices, mainly in online platforms. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
In Portugal, Decree-Law no. 138/90 contained a provision that exempted itinerant 
trading from the obligation to indicate the unit price. However, this provision was 
repealed in 2002. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Decree-Law no. 330/90 (October 23) set out special rules for misleading and 
comparative advertising. The MCAD was transposed into Portuguese law by Decree-
Law no. 57/2008, through an amendment to pre-existing legislation. 
In Portugal, comparative adverting is an unusual practice and, as a rule, it complies 
with the applicable rules (article 16, Advertising Act). However, there was recently a 
problem with an advertisement concerning a deodorant that made references to 
another brand. The enforcement authority fined the trader. This advertisement is 
common in other EU countries, but this authority does not know of other decisions. 
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
A business association points out that, as a rule, minimum harmonisation is especially 
problematic for cross-border trade and E-commerce and so EU Directives on consumer 
law should be based on full harmonisation, as is the case for comparative advertising. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
An enforcement authority emphasizes that full harmonisation is essential for the 
development of the common market. According to the same authority, the 
harmonisation of procedural rules is more important than the harmonisation of 
substantive rules, in order to grant a minimum and homogeneous set of powers to 
regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
An enforcement authority reports that in administrative procedures involving traders 
located in other EU Member States, the trader’s native language must be used in the 
notice. In several cases, it is not possible to do so due to lack of resources. Although 
many traders do not raise this procedural question, when they do so, the procedure is 
closed. This example illustrates the need to simplify the procedural rules applying to 
cross-border infringements. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A business association emphasizes that the positive effects stemming from full 
harmonisation on comparative advertising is thwarted by the lack of application and 
supervision of the legislation and also by the lack of punishment for violations to these 
rules.  
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
As a rule, business associations seem to prefer a legal framework that is clear and 
easy to apply, in order to reduce uncertainty and costs. Therefore, these associations 
would prefer a rule-based approach, even if they recognize that in some cases vague 
concepts cannot be replaced. 
The black list of unfair commercial practices has the advantage of detailing some of 
the more harmful practices and the fact that this list is uniform in EU Member States, 
leads to a single legal framework. This means that companies know, a priori, that 
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certain practices are forbidden in the common market. By reducing uncertainty, the 
uniform black list is a helpful tool for fostering cross-border trade. 
There was no feedback on the effects (positive or detrimental) of the derogation from 
full harmonisation in financial services and immovable property, as this is a very 
specific question and the business associations that were interviewed do not deal in 
great detail with these sectors. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Again, as a rule, business associations seem to prefer a legal framework that is clear 
and easy to apply, in order to reduce uncertainty and costs. Therefore, these 
associations would prefer a rule-based approach, even if they recognize that in some 
cases vague concepts cannot be replaced. 
A business association argues that minimum harmonisation is particularly problematic 
for cross-border trade and E-commerce, since it means that different rules may apply 
inside the common market. However, another business association points out that full 
harmonisation is not always the solution, as in some cases it is necessary to consider 
the particular circumstances of each Member State 
Specifically for comparative adverting, a business association praises the full 
harmonisation approach, while also adding that its effects are thwarted by the lack of 
application and supervision of the legislation and also by the lack of punishment for 
violations of these rules.  
No specific reference was made in the interviews to the need to create cross-border 
enforcement mechanisms, although one of the business associations points out that 
the lack of coordination between regulators may explain, to some degree, the 
problems in applying the legislation.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
A regulatory authority points out that there is a clear contrast between oral and 
written information. As a rule, there are no problems when information is provided in 
writing; on the contrary, when the information is oral, there is a perception that not all 
pre-contractual information is communicated to the consumer. 
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For a business association, EU consumer law Directives have intensified the traders’ 
duties of information. Sometimes, excessive information is required - for example, the 
label on a bottle of water must contain a series of indications that, normally, 
consumers do not read. This association argues that information to consumers should 
be more focused on their rights and on mechanisms of dispute resolution. 
The Portuguese Government appears to be concerned with the various duties of 
information that result from legislation aimed at protecting consumers, as they may 
represent an excessive burden on traders. In the near future, a legislative initiative 
may be taken in order to simplify and/or organize these information duties. It is 
important to stress that in Portugal consumer protection policy is assigned to the 
Ministry of Economy. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
During the interviews no problems were identified in this regard. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
As indicated before, the UCPD was implemented into national legislation by Decree-
Law no. 57/2008, which initially only applied to consumer contracts. 
In 2015, Decree-Law no. 205/2015 amended Decree-Law no. 57/2008 and, among 
other aspects, broadened its scope of application to some B2B relations. Article 1, 
no.2, determines that national legislation on unfair commercial practices now applies 
to some misleading actions in B2B relations. 
Article 7, no. 3, clarifies that those misleading actions include misleading actions 
relating to the existence or nature of the product; its characteristics; the extent of the 
trader's commitments, the motives for the commercial practice and the nature of the 
sales process, any statement or symbol in relation to direct or indirect sponsorship or 
approval of the trader or the product; the price or the manner in which it is calculated, 
or the existence of a specific price advantage and the nature, attributes and rights of 
the trader or of a trader’s agent. 
In the interviews, two public bodies emphasize that this amendment to Decree-Law 
no. 57/2008 came as a reaction to misleading practices involving business directories 
that affected mainly small companies. A regulatory authority points out that it has 
received complaints on other unfair commercial practices in B2B relations (affecting 
primarily SME’S) that are still not included in Decree-Law no. 57/2008. 
The MCAD applies only to B2B relations. The Directive was implemented through the 
Advertising Act (Decree-Law no. 330/90, in its current wording). The full 
harmonisation approach adopted in the MCAD for comparative advertising means that 
these rules could not apply to B2C relations (article 43 of the Advertising Act). By 
contrast, misleading advertising is established by reference to the notion of misleading 
actions as set out in Decree-Law no. 57/2008 (article 11 of the Advertising Act). 
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• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
With the exception of article 7, no. 3, of Decree-Law no 57/2008, B2B relations are 
governed by the general rules of the Civil Code, of the Penal Code and of other legal 
acts. These rules also apply to B2C relations when they are more favourable for 
consumers or in the absence of special rules.  
Thus, there are no specific rules for commercial practices in B2B relations. This raises 
some difficulties, particularly when it is impossible or ineffective to address certain 
unfair commercial practices directed at small businesses in accordance with the 
general rules of civil and/or criminal law. 
An additional amendment to Decree-Law no. 57/2008 in order to cover more aspects 
of B2B relations would involve, as stressed by some stakeholders, deciding whether 
the scope of protection would be micro-enterprises (for example) or all companies, 
regardless of their size. There is some concern among stakeholders that large 
companies would monopolize the regulator’s activity. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
The problems, although relevant, are not frequent. The best solution might be to 
create rules that cover all possible situations, regardless of the moment in which they 
occur (e.g. in the pre-contractual, contractual or post-contractual stage). 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
In B2B relations, it is easier for traders affected by unfair commercial practices to 
react, in comparison with the typical lack of reaction by consumers. For this reason, a 
black list of unfair commercial practices might be less relevant in B2B relations. 
However, one must keep in mind that experience in Portugal, particularly regarding 
unfair contract terms, shows that judges are more likely to apply the prohibitions that 
are included in a list rather than the general clause. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
An enforcement authority considers that the creation of a centralised mechanism of 
enforcement for cross-border infringements, might be a good idea. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
In Portugal, misleading advertising is simultaneously an unfair commercial practice, 
which means that contractual consequences may apply. 
On the contrary, rules on comparative advertising are not aimed at protecting the 
consumer and so no contractual consequences apply. When a lack of conformity 
results from comparative advertising, the Directive on the sale of consumer goods 
provides an appropriate answer. Between competing traders, contractual 
consequences are not in question. 
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• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
The only problem identified in the interviews is the need to clarify the interplay 
between the rules on comparative and misleading adverting and the rules on unfair 
commercial practices. It would be important to clarify whether certain practices (such 
as business directories) should be dealt with by the UCPD or by the MCAD. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Article 14, no. 1, Decree-Law no. 57/2008 provides that contracts concluded under the 
influence of an unfair commercial practice are voidable on the consumer’s initiative, in 
accordance with the rules of the Civil Code. The consumer has one year to act (article 
287, no. 1, Civil Code) and the decision that annuls the contract has retroactive 
effects (article 289, Civil Code). 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Most case law of the Portuguese higher court is available in an online database.16 A 
search of this database came up with no decisions annulling a contract on the basis of 
unfair commercial practices. In a brief search of the website of several consumer 
arbitration centres, no decisions were found on unfair commercial practices. 
In Portugal, public bodies may not impose civil penalties.  
During the interviews, stakeholders described having received several complaints 
about some of the following unfair commercial practices: pyramid selling, aggressive 
sale of mattresses or cookware, omission of pre-contractual information and practices 
that involve falsely informing that binding periods are not admissible (specific of 
contracts concerning electronic communications) or that a certain product is able to 
cure illnesses, dysfunctions or malformations. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
A consumer association criticizes the option to render the contract voidable, since this 
sanction is less strong compared to both the invalidity (unfair contractual terms) or 
the rights conferred to the consumer in the event of lack of conformity of consumer 
goods. For this association, this might be one of the reasons behind the limited 
practical application of the unfair commercial practices rules, together with the costs 
of bringing a judicial action. 
A regulatory authority emphasizes that the abstract nature of Decree-Law no. 57/2008 
may lead to the conclusion that nullity would not be an easy or proportionate sanction. 
For this authority, the key issue is to guarantee that sanctions create an effective 
protection for consumers. Nullity was introduced for some distance contracts in 
legislation aimed specifically at electronic communication (article 48, no. 3, Law no. 
25/2004). 
A consumer arbitration centre considers that the sanction of article 14 is sufficient, 
since enforcement and regulatory authorities may apply fines and interim measures. 
16  See www.dgsi.pt 
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 1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Article 15, Decree-Law no. 446/85, sets out that ‘standard contract terms contrary to 
good faith are illegal’. This provision relies on a fundamental principle that applies to 
all private law, expressed through a vague concept (‘good faith’),17 in order to 
overcome the difficulties in an abstract determination of all the situations where the 
content of a contractual clause may be unbalanced.18 A consumer organisation praised 
this solution. 
The main problem in using a vague concept is not so much in its interpretation 
(although this does bring a degree of uncertainty concerning the applicable rules), but 
in the knowledge of the law by the public and, namely, the party that is faced with 
standard contractual terms. This explains the relatively little use of the general 
clause.19 
The criterion set out in article 3 of the UCTD was not expressly implemented into 
Portuguese law, although it is clearer and more in line with the objective to guarantee 
some balance between the parties. This criterion must also be assessed on a case-to-
case basis. 
The significant (or disproportionate) imbalance20 to the detriment of the party that is 
faced with standard contractual terms should also be used in interpreting the 
Portuguese law,21 even though the imbalance concept is not expressly set out, along 
with other criterion,22 always by reference to the contents of the contract as a 
whole.23 In consumer relations, this solution results from article 9, no. 2, par. b), of 
the Consumer Protection Act (Law no. 24/96). 
 
17  Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, “O Controlo do Conteúdo dos Contratos”, 2005, p. 5. 
18  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 104. 
19  Ana Prata, Contratos de Adesão e Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 2010, p. 323; José Manuel de Araújo 
Barros, Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 2010, p. 181. 
20  Supreme Court of Justice (10/4/2014). 
21  José de Oliveira Ascensão, “Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, Cláusulas Abusivas e Boa Fé”, 2000, p. 589; 
Almeno de Sá, Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais e Directiva sobre Cláusulas Abusivas, 2001, p. 72; Ana 
Prata, Contratos de Adesão e Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 2010, p. 341. Case law: Coimbra Court of 
Appeal (23/1/2008); Supreme Court of Justice (27/5/2010); Lisbon Court of Appeal (10/10/2013); 
Lisbon Court of Appeal (20/2/2014); Supreme Court of Justice (27/9/2016). 
22  Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, Síntese do Regime Jurídico Vigente das Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 1999, 
p. 24, n. 25; Yara Miranda, “As Cláusulas Contratuais Abusivas em Matéria de Relações de Consumo”, 
2007, p. 716. 
23  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 107. 
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• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 includes four lists of unfair terms (articles 18, 19, 21 and 22). 
These lists are aimed to help interpreting articles 15 and 16 of the Decree-Law24, since 
they provide several examples of terms that may be considered unfair. They are not 
exhaustive, meaning that even if a certain contractual term is not included in a list, it 
may still be considered unfair, on the basis of the general clause of article 15. Even 
so, Portuguese courts tend to apply the lists without directly invoking the general 
clause. 
These lists implement the two annexes to the UCTD with three exceptions: pars. c) 
and d) of Annex I and par. a) of Annex II were not transposed into Portuguese law. 
The rules of Annex II do not apply to B2B contracts. In addition, the lists also contain 
other terms that are not set out in the Directive – for example, terms that impose 
permanent obligations or that set out a competent jurisdiction that is highly 
inconvenient for one party when the interests of the other party do not justify it. 
The lists are organized, firstly, by taking into account the relation between the parties 
to the contract. In accordance with article 17, in B2B relations only the lists in articles 
18 and 19 may apply. In all other cases, namely in B2C and C2C contracts, all four 
lists may apply (article 20). This means that the lists in articles 21 and 22 are aimed 
at consumer contracts and, in general, to all other contracts that do not involve a B2B 
relation.  
The lists are then organized in accordance with the intensity of the prohibition. Thus, 
the black lists contain terms that are absolutely banned (articles 18 and 21) and the 
grey lists include terms that are relatively banned (articles 19 and 22). 
The terms included in the black list are considered unfair in all circumstances. There is 
no need to analyse the context that underlies the term or the circumstances of the 
contract and of its conclusion or even to determine whether the term is contrary to 
good faith. In these cases, the law considers that the terms are always contrary to 
good faith,25 namely because it causes or is likely to cause a substantial imbalance 
between the rights and obligation of the parties. 
On the contrary, the terms included in the grey lists are unfair in accordance with “the 
standardised framework of negotiation” (see below). While the terms in the black lists 
are automatically considered unfair, those in the grey lists may be considered unfair 
but only after being analysed.26-27 
Unlike the black lists, the grey lists use many vague concepts that must be interpreted 
in accordance with the standardised framework of negotiation.28 Articles 19 and 22 
include terms that provide for excessive deadlines, disproportionate penalty clauses or 
cause severe inconvenience, among others. 
24 Lisbon Court of Appeal (19/1/2016). 
25  António Pinto Monteiro, “Contratos de Adesão”, 1986, p. 755; Almeno de Sá, Cláusulas Contratuais 
Gerais e Directiva sobre Cláusulas Abusivas, 2001, p. 76; Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, O Problema do 
Contrato, 2003, p. 455, n. 503. 
26  Guimarães Court of Appeal (10/7/2008). 
27  Almeno de Sá, Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais e Directiva sobre Cláusulas Abusivas, 2001, p. 77. 
28  Filipe Vaz Pinto, “Os Limites à Liberdade de Estipulação em Matéria de Denúncia”, 2007, p. 60. 
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The “standardised framework of negotiation” does not involve a case-by-case 
approach that takes into account the specific circumstances of each contract in order 
to conclude whether a certain term is unfair.29 This concept entails an analysis in 
abstract of the typical context in which a certain term is inserted into the contract,30 in 
order to allow its assessment in the injunction procedure.31  
Such an analysis shall take into account good faith and, specially, the (im)balance32 
between the parties arising from the term in question.33 This approach is compatible 
with articles 19 and 21.34 
The lists of unfair contract terms are a success in Portugal.  
For a consumer association, the courts have tested these lists and there was a clear 
evolution in the terms used in some types of contract (for example, in banking 
contracts). However, this association argues that the lists should be updated.  
A regulatory authority emphasizes that there have been no problems with unfair 
contractual terms in the energy sector. 
There is an on-line database35 with several contractual terms that have been declared 
unfair by the courts. This database contains about 294 decisions and includes 
contractual terms used in different sectors (banking, insurance, electronic 
communication and fitness centres, for example).  
A consumer arbitration centre states that terms allowing for an automatic increase of 
prices depending on inflation or for the renewal of a contract’s binding period, are very 
frequent in electronic communications. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
The decision establishing the unfairness of a contractual term may be raised as an 
incidental question by any counterpart to the trader concerned in future proceedings 
(article 32, no. 2, Decree-Law no 446/85). However, the decision has no erga omnes 
effect, meaning that other traders using the same term are not bound by it.  
A consumer association argues that an erga omnes effect of the decision would be 
important to increase its effectiveness (since it would avoid the need to start new 
proceedings against another trader), but raises questions related to the adversary 
principle. As a rule, the association issues proceedings against all traders that use the 
term in question. 
 
29  Hugo Ramos Alves, “Nótula sobre a Venda à Distância”, 2012, p. 287. 
30  António Pinto Monteiro, “Contratos de Adesão”, 1986, p. 755; Almeno de Sá, Cláusulas Contratuais 
Gerais e Directiva sobre Cláusulas Abusivas, 2001, p. 260; Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, O Problema do 
Contrato, 2003, p. 455, n. 503. 
31  António Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado de Direito Civil Português, Vol. I, Tomo I, 2005, p. 630.  
32  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 109. 
33  Lisbon Court of Appeal (2/3/2010); Lisbon Court of Appeal (27/4/2010). 
34  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 109. 
35  See http://www.dgsi.pt/jdgpj.nsf?OpenDatabase 
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• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Decree-Law no. 446/85 provides a complete and effective protection to consumers in 
relation to the inclusion of terms that are not individually negotiated in the contract. 
These rules also apply to B2B and C2C relations. 
A standard contractual term will only be included in the contract if it meets three 
requirements. First of all, there must be some connection between the term and the 
contract (article 4).36 Secondly, the term shall be communicated in an appropriate and 
timely manner, considering its complexity and the relevance of the contract (article 5). 
Finally, there is a duty of clarification (article 6). If one of these requirements is not 
met, the term is immediately excluded from the contract without the need to assess 
the other requirements.37 
A consumer arbitration centre stresses that most complaints about Decree-Law no. 
446/85 are related to contractual transparency. There are also numerous decisions 
from Portuguese courts excluding terms from a contract based on articles 4 to 6. A 
regulator reports that there have been some problems in electronic communications 
related to transparent information in the digital market.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Authors sometimes discuss whether Decree-Law no. 446/85 should also apply to 
terms covering the contracts’ main or characteristic aspects (e.g., in the more usual 
scheme, the main goods and services, on the one hand, and the price, on the other 
hand). The UCTD excluded such terms, but this rule was not implemented into 
Portuguese law.38 As Decree-Law no. 446/85 was approved prior to the Directive and 
no subsequent amendment was made to exclude those terms, the rules on unfair 
contract terms apply to them. There is no Portuguese case law on this specific topic. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Unfair contractual terms are null (article 12, Decree-Law no. 446/85), a sanction that, 
in the opinion of a consumer association, is appropriate. The consumer may invoke the 
nullity at any time (article 286, Civil Code). Portuguese higher courts follow the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in deciding that the court may 
assess the nullity ex officio.39 However, the party that uses the standard contractual 
terms may not invoke the nullity, as article 12 is aimed exclusively at protecting the 
counterpart in the contract. Article 13 points to such conclusion when it confers on the 
party that was confronted with standard contractual terms the option between 
invoking the nullity or maintaining the contract, without the unfair term.40 
36  Pedro Caetano Nunes, “Comunicação de Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais”, 2011, p. 518. 
37  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, p. 73. 
38  Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, pp 70 e 71. 
39  Lisbon Court of Appeal (18/6/09); Lisbon Court of Appeal (19/11/2013); Supreme Court of Justice 
(27/9/2016). 
40  António Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado de Direito Civil Português, Vol. I, Book I, 2005, p. 626; Cláudio Petrini 
Belmonte, A Redução do Negócio Jurídico e a Protecção dos Consumidores, 2003, p. 147. 
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There are no administrative sanctions, but a periodic penalty payment may be applied 
to the defendant if he continues to use or recommend a contractual term that has 
been found unfair by a decision with res judicata effect (article 33). 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A consumer association argues that, in addition to the judicial control, there should be 
mechanisms that would allow a subsequent administrative control of the same or 
similar contract terms in other contracts involving the same trader or different traders. 
The obligation to deposit a draft contract with the regulatory authority had important 
results for electronic communication, but not in banking.  
Although an obligation to deposit the draft contract exists for electronic 
communications, since 2011 the regulatory authority may only engage in the 
assessment of the terms following a complaint and the analysis takes into account 
sectoral legislation. In some cases, this authority has forced traders to replace or 
amend certain terms. 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
As stated above, Portuguese courts tend to apply the lists without directly invoking the 
general clause. This rule-based approach seems to be more beneficial for reducing 
costs and uncertainty as to the applicable rules.  
However, the extension of Decree-Law no. 446/85 to terms dealing with the adequacy 
of the price and main subject matter and the extended lists of unfair contract terms, 
lead to a legal framework that might be different from that in other Member-States. 
This is connected to the more general question of minimum vs. full harmonisation: a 
business association points out that minimum harmonisation is especially problematic 
for cross-border trade and E-commerce, thus concluding that EU Directives on 
consumer law should be based on full harmonisation. However, another business 
association argues that in some cases it is necessary to consider the particular 
circumstances of each Member-State, which would be more difficult under a full 
harmonisation framework. 
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1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
Decree-Law no. 446/85 applies almost entirely to B2B relations (as well as to C2C 
contracts), meaning that SMEs and micro-enterprises are already protected. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
The system of protection set out in the UCTD is not seen as problematic in Portugal. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Decree-Law no. 446/85 applies to terms covering the contracts’ main or 
characteristics aspects and no problems have been detected. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
During the interviews, no such contractual terms were mentioned. This may be due to 
the very specific nature of the question. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
The rules on the inclusion of standard contractual terms in a contract (articles 4 to 8, 
Decree-Law no. 446/85) apply to B2B relations. No problems have been identified 
until now. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
In Portugal, as Decree-Law no. 446/85 applies to B2B relation, these questions may 
be asked in the present tense: in practice, whether this option has more positive or 
negative consequences? 
The rules on unfair contract terms are based on the existence of contractual terms 
that one of the parties does not have the possibility to negotiate. Thus, it seems 
appropriate to apply the regime to B2B relations where terms are not negotiated 
individually, as there is an imbalance between the parties. 
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1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?41 
Following a recent problem with a trader, a regulatory authority recommended 
consumers that were affected to present the case to a public body with legal standing 
to start an injunction procedure. The regulator has not received any further 
information on whether an injunction procedure was brought against this trader. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
The rules that exempted injunction procedures from costs (articles 11, no. 1, 
Consumer Protection Act, and 29, no. 1, Decree-Law no. 446/85) have been tacitly 
repealed in 2008. In fact, article 25, no. 1, Decree-Law no. 34/2008, repealed all 
existing cost exemptions that were not specifically set out in that legal act. 
Consequently, the cost exemption only applies to the Public Prosecutor’s Office [article 
4, no. 1, par. a), Decree-Law no. 34/2008] and to the Directorate General for 
Consumers [article 4, no. 1, par. g)]. 
Before 2013, injunction procedures followed the summary procedure. The Code of Civil 
Procedure of 2013 created a single form of process (article 548), thus eliminating 
summary procedure. However, the judge may use the case management powers to 
adapt the pace or structure of proceedings to the case at hand (article 547), in order 
to create a more flexible procedure. 
A consumer association praises the elimination of the rules that imposed a summary 
procedure for injunctions, as they applied regardless of the claim’s value or the 
specific characteristics of the case. Rules shortening most procedural time limits or 
limiting the number of witnesses could be appropriate in some cases and inappropriate 
in others. 
The Consumer Protection Act provides for the mandatory publication of decisions 
concerning practices that violate consumers’ rights (article 11, no. 3).  
It is discussed whether the same rule applies to unfair contractual terms. Despite the 
fact that article 30, no. 2, Decree-Law no. 446/85, refers to a “request by the 
applicant”, this provision must be interpreted in accordance with the Consumer 
Protection Act (which was approved subsequently). Thus, the decision establishing the 
unfairness of a contractual term is also automatically published.42 
If the injunction order is not complied with, the court may apply, on request, a 
periodic penalty payment (article 10, no 2, Consumer Protection Act, and article 829-
A, Civil Code). This penalty is not aimed at compensating for any damage caused, but 
at forcing the trader to comply with the order or, in other words, not to use nor 
41  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
42 Ana Prata, Contratos de Adesão e Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 2010, pp. 627-628; José Manuel de 
Araújo Barros, Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, 2010, p. 383. 
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recommend terms that were considered unfair. Damage can only be compensated for 
through civil liability. 
There is no mechanism of prior consultation in Portuguese law. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Law no. 25/2004 implemented into national legislation the ID. Article 2, no 2, of the 
Law, applies to injunction procedures concerning any violation of consumers’ rights. 
These include both the injunction procedure of the Consumer Protection Act and of 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 (unfair commercial terms). The list of EU Directives in the 
Annex to Law no. 25/2004 is merely illustrative, since the law applies to all consumer 
legislation.  
As a rule, stakeholders praise this approach (namely, a consumer association and a 
national authority), since it does not involve a permanent adaptation of the list of 
legislation, in contrast to the ID. Cross-border injunctions have still not been used by 
the qualified entities in Portugal.  
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
As for national injunctions, the main difference since 2012 is that they no longer follow 
the summary procedure. A consumer association considers that this is more beneficial, 
as it allows the court to tailor the procedure to the specific circumstances of the case. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
A consumer association points out that injunction procedures are appropriate to 
prevent or cease certain harmful practices, but inadequate for compensating for any 
damage caused.  For this purpose, it suggests that it would be important to focus on 
collective actions. 
This association adds that the major difficulty in European injunction procedures lies in 
the great disparity between injunction orders in the several Member-States. In a 
recent concerted effort between different consumer associations, injunction 
procedures were started against the same company in some Member-States. 
However, both the decisions and the arguments were different in each Member-State. 
Finally, this association also argues that the list of qualified entities (articles 3 to 5, 
Law no. 5/2004) is only useful for cross-border injunctions, since consumer 
associations are entitled to start injunction proceedings in Portugal in accordance with 
Portuguese law [article 26, no. 1, par. b), Decree-Law no. 446/85, and article 13, par. 
b), Consumer Protection Act. 
A business association claims that injunction procedures are working well in Portugal 
and should be extended to collective business’ interests. 
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1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
The data collected in the interviews suggests that the cross-border injunction 
procedure has still not been used by any of the qualified entities in Portugal. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
The list of qualified entities in Portugal is composed of four entities: two consumer 
associations (the Portuguese Association for Consumer Protection – DECO - and the 
Association of Portuguese Consumers - ACOP) and two public authorities (the 
Directorate General for Consumers and the Prosecutor’s Office). While the public 
authorities were automatically included in the list, both consumers associations had to 
submit an application (article 5, Law no. 25/2004). 
A consumer association points out that cross-border injunctions are as of yet a field to 
explore in Portugal. However, there is an intention by several consumer associations 
to issue a cross-border injunction in one of the Member-States to test how the 
procedure works. For a national authority, the very limited application of Law no. 
25/2004 is related to a lack of knowledge of its existence. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
In the perspective of a national authority, the European Commission’s 
Recommendation of 11 June 2013, on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning 
violations of rights granted under Union Law, raises some problems of compatibility 
with the ID. For the same authority, this is particularly the case concerning the legal 
standing to start an injunction procedure (article 4 of the Recommendation). 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Law no. 25/2004 is specifically aimed at transposing the ID’s provisions on cross-
border injunctions (articles 3 to 5). As for national injunctions, the procedural rules 
are set out in the Consumer Protection Act (articles 10, 11 and 13) and in Decree-Law 
no. 446/85, for unfair commercial terms (articles 24 and following). Decree-Law no. 
57/2008, on unfair commercial practices, refers to the Consumer Protection Act 
(article 16). 
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• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
There is an interesting difference between the Consumer Protection Act and Decree-
Law no. 446/85: trade unions’ legal standing to start an injunction procedure is limited 
to unfair contractual terms (article 26, no. 1, par. b), Decree-Law no. 446/85), as they 
are not included in the list of qualified entities set out in the Consumer Protection Act 
(article 13). 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
In Portugal, the implementation of EU Directives based on minimum harmonisation 
has made it possible to grant more protection to consumers: as seen above, this was 
so for the UCTD (Decree-Law no. 446/85 includes four broad lists of unfair terms) or 
the PID (Decree-Law no. 138/90 extended the rules on indication of prices to 
services). 
A consumer association also argues that the minimum harmonisation allows the 
legislator to go further in the protection of consumers and criticizes the full 
harmonisation approach in the UCPD.  
A regulator does not share this view, as it emphasizes that full harmonisation 
guarantees that consumers have the same level of protection within the internal 
market. This perspective seems to focus on the market and not on the consumer. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Portuguese implementation of EU Directives based on minimum harmonisation has 
granted an increased protection in B2B relations. This is particularly clear both for 
unfair commercial terms, since Decree-Law no. 446/85 also applies to B2B relations, 
and for misleading advertising, which is established in Decree-Law no. 57/2008 by 
reference to the broader concept of misleading actions.  
Even in the case of UCPD (full harmonisation), Decree-Law no. 57/2008 applies partly 
to B2B relations, in order to protect SMEs. 
However, one must take into account that a substantial number of traders operate at 
EU level. This is why business associations prefer a legal framework based on full 
harmonisation, with one of them adding that minimum harmonisation is especially 
problematic for cross-border trade and E-commerce.  
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• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
A business association argues that the lack of clarity in legislation results in litigation 
costs. The instability of the legal framework also leads to costs, since changes in 
internal procedures or in the production process require the acquisition of new 
equipment and the training of human resources. Bureaucracy also has significant 
costs, so legislation should be simplified.  
For another business association, procedural costs are considerable and in many cases 
judicial fees serve as a deterrent to start judicial proceedings. Information costs do 
not seem to be relevant. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Regulators and enforcement authorities have several costs with the enforcement of 
consumer law. These costs involve human and material resources, as well as 
investment in technical knowledge and in continuous training. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
It was not possible to gather any indication on these questions from the interviews. 
This is probably due to the fact that there is no numerical data on the concrete costs 
and benefits stemming from the implementation of EU Directives. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Note: Elaborate based on stakeholder assessment. Key 
question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in practice by national authorities and 
courts as a legal basis to combat unfair commercial practices and unfair standard 
terms in contracts in the regulated sectors?]  
The stakeholders’ assessment of consumer awareness on the national legislation 
transposing EU Directives varies greatly. There is a perception that consumers are 
more aware of the rules on unfair contract terms. On the contrary, they seem to be 
unfamiliar with the legislation on unfair commercial practices, as several stakeholders 
still report receiving complaints about scams. Nevertheless, in the energy sector, 
some consumers are very conscious of the rules applicable to the social tariff for 
energy and gas.  
As for traders, a regulator claims that they have a better knowledge of the sectoral 
legislation by comparison with horizontal rules. While a regulatory authority suggests 
that they are unfamiliar with the unfair commercial practices regime, another 
regulator argues traders have been developing training courses on this subject and, as 
a rule, know the applicable rules. A business association states that SMEs have little 
information about consumer law legislation and suggests that it is necessary to carry 
out initiatives aimed at informing both consumers and SMEs. 
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In what concerns regulators, the major complaint by a business association is not 
related to their knowledge of the legislation, but with the lack of application. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
In Portugal, there are several authorities responsible for enforcing the horizontal rules. 
Sectoral legislation is enforced as follows:  
 
 
 
A national authority criticizes this option, arguing that it affects consistency in the 
application of the legislation, as the regulators have different procedural rules, and 
suggests that a single point of enforcement should be created for consumer law. 
The data collected in the interviews suggests that there are no formal coordination 
mechanisms in place between these authorities. However, the authorities that were 
interviewed admit using informal mechanisms, such as bilateral meetings or meetings 
within the Centre of Studies on Public Law and Regulation (CEDIPRE). 
In a more general perspective, the different stakeholders have mixed feelings on how 
this coordination works: while some point to problems in specific areas (e.g., unfair 
commercial practices, complaints book), some regulatory and enforcement authorities 
do not detect any problems.  
This is particularly so for business associations. One association emphasizes that there 
are no problems of lack of coordination between regulators. However, it also reports 
that sometimes, within the same authority, there are different interpretations of the 
same rule and, consequently, uncertainty as to the applicable rules. 
On the contrary, another business association argues that there is a lack of 
coordination between regulators, partly due to the dispersion that underlies regulation 
Sector Regulatory authority 
Energy Energy Services Regulatory Authority (ERSE) 
Electronic communications National Communications Authority (ANACOM) 
Passenger transport Mobility and Transports Institute (IMT) 
Financial services Bank of Portugal (BdP), Portuguese Insurance Institute (ISP) and (Securities 
and Exchange Commission) 
Legislation Enforcement authority 
Unfair contractual terms 
(Decree-Law no. 446/85) 
Not applicable, as this is a contractual matter 
Unfair commercial practices 
(Decree-Law no. 57/2008) 
Authority For Economic and Food Safety (ASAE) in the absence of a 
sectoral regulator 
Price Indication  
(Decree-Law no. 138/90) 
Authority For Economic and Food Safety (ASAE) in the absence of a 
sectoral regulator 
Comparative Advertising 
(Decree-Law no. 330/90) 
Directorate General for Consumers 
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in Portugal, and that difficulties increase when the regulators are not subordinated to 
the same ministry. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
The assessment on the combination between sectoral and horizontal legislation varies 
greatly. 
For a regulatory authority, as a rule there is no need to articulate Decree-Law no. 
57/2008 with sectoral legislation, since they are not applied simultaneously. In fact, 
this authority claims that the rules on unfair commercial practices are broader and, 
therefore, include more practices, while sectoral legislation sets out more detailed 
information duties. For this reason, each set of rules has a favoured scope. Another 
authority claims that there is a tendency to apply sectoral rules instead of horizontal 
legislation as a result of the dispersion of enforcement powers.  
These statements point to the fact that sectoral regulators tend to apply almost 
exclusively sectoral legislation. 
A consumer association points out that there are difficulties in combining the rules on 
unfair commercial practices and distance and off-premises contracts (namely, the right 
of withdrawal, its effects and consequences) with sectoral legislation applying to the 
energy sector.  
A business association recognizes the importance of sectoral legislation, as some 
sectors have particularities that demand specific responses, but adds that sometimes 
it is hard to coordinate sector-specific rules with horizontal rules. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation? 
As regulators tend to apply sectoral legislation instead of the UCT or UCP national 
legislation, it is unclear whether complementary application in fact exists. 
Even so, a business association emphasizes that the existence of horizontal rules and 
sectoral legislation results in costs for traders. These rules should be coordinated, in 
order to avoid overlaps and conflicts. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Several stakeholders report that there are problems with the application of the rules 
on distance and off-premises contracts (CRD, implemented into national law by 
Decree-Law no. 24/2014) to the energy and electronic communications sector. 
Specifically regarding the Directives included in this study, it would be important to 
clarify whether sectoral legislation may set out specific unfair commercial practices 
going beyond the UCPD. While this would allow considering the specificities of each (or 
some) sector, it is important to assess whether it could frustrate the full harmonisation 
approach. 
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1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
In Portugal, the more frequent C2B relations involve the sale of used cars or gold (a 
practice which developed as a consequence of the economic crisis). 
A consumer association stresses that consumer law is specifically aimed at B2C 
relations, which makes it difficult to consider its application, as a whole, to C2B 
relations. However, it recognizes the importance of extending some consumer law 
rules to both B2B and C2B relations.  
On the contrary, an enforcement authority defends that it might make sense to grant 
a specific protection to consumers in C2B relations, even though they act as sellers. 
Portuguese law has shown this concern for unfair contractual terms (Decree-Law no. 
446/85 applies to C2B relations and, in a large part, to B2B relations) and for the sale 
of consumer goods (Decree-Law no. 67/2003 confers upon the seller a right of 
recourse against the producer in the event of lack of conformity). 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
While EU Consumer Directives adopt, as a rule, a narrow definition of consumer 
(excluding legal persons), the Portuguese Consumer Protection Act relies on a broad 
notion of consumer. Article 2, no. 1, Law no. 24/96, provides that consumer is anyone 
that acquires goods, services or rights outside the scope of a professional activity from 
someone acting within a professional activity aimed at obtaining profits. Under this 
definition, an association (legal person) may be a consumer if it concludes the contract 
for its daily activity. 
In the interviews, there was a clear division between stakeholders on the possibility of 
including micro-enterprises or self-employed professionals on an even broader notion 
of consumer.  
Some regulators and a business association defend this perspective, arguing that 
sometimes their vulnerability brings them closer to consumers than to traders. A 
regulatory authority adds that in its sector the legislation protects the user, which 
includes all persons, irrespective of the destination (professional or private) of the 
service that is provided.  
However, a consumer arbitration centre and a consumer association stress that such 
an option could jeopardize the concept of consumer, although recognizing that micro-
enterprises or self-employed professionals must be protected by other means. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The concept of vulnerable consumer set out in Decree-Law no. 57/2008 includes 
mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity [article 6, par. a)] but does not mention 
economic vulnerability. In fact, economic vulnerability is only relevant in the energy 
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sector, where Decree-Laws no. 138-A/2010 and 101/2011 (social tariff for electricity 
and gas, respectively) use the concept of “economically vulnerable final customers” as 
a basis for a discount in energy tariffs. 
Once again, stakeholders have contrasting opinions on the importance of economic 
vulnerability in unfair commercial practices. 
An enforcement authority stresses that the special protection for vulnerable 
consumers should not be extended to cases of economic vulnerability. A national 
authority and a business association take the opposing view. A consumer association 
defends that consumer are, by definition, vulnerable. According to this association, 
protection should be increased for essential public services (water, electricity, 
electronic communications, among others) and financial services; in all other cases 
(including unfair contractual terms), the key element should be the consumer’s level 
of information.   
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 was approved prior to the UCTD and already conferred a high 
level of protection to both consumers and traders in contracts with general contract 
terms, by setting out requirements for the inclusion of a term in a contract, lists of 
unfair commercial terms and an injunction procedure. The implementation of the 
UCTD broadened its scope of application to pre-formulated standard terms, which 
meant a higher level of protection in these cases. 
On the contrary, national legislation had no specific rules for unfair commercial 
practices, thus making it necessary to apply the general rules of the Civil Code or 
other consumer legislation. The UCPD, implemented by Decree-Law no. 57/2008, 
increased the consumers’ level of protection. 
A consumer association considers Decree-Law no. 57/2008 as an essential piece of 
legislation, since it applies to situations where the problem is not in the good or 
service that is provided, but rather in a commercial practice. This association adds 
that the experience gathered from injunction procedures based on an unfair 
commercial practice is very positive. Its experience with the unfair commercial terms 
regime is also relevant and globally positive. 
An enforcement authority states that the legal framework for misleading adverting 
seems to have improved with Decree-Law no. 57/2008, even though the Advertising 
Act already protected consumers sufficiently. 
However, some stakeholders are less enthusiastic about Decree-Law no. 57/2008. A 
regulator argues that the substantial reduction of complaints received in 2014 and 
2015 (between 17% and 37%, depending on the subject-matter) is more related to 
the specific dynamics of the market and less to the application of the rules on unfair 
commercial practices. Another national authority adds that the effect of EU Directives 
is mainly indirect (traders voluntarily comply with the legislation) since the lack of 
awareness by consumers limits a direct impact. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Decree-Law no. 138/90 confers a high level of protection to consumers concerning 
price indication. Among other aspects, it has a specific provision on the indication of 
prices in services contracts (article 10). This article sets out that prices must be 
indicated through lists or posters in the business premises; when there are numerous 
services with different clauses, the indication may be included in a catalogue. If the 
service is provided hourly or by task, the price shall be indicated per hour or per task. 
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The PID was implemented into national legislation through minor amendments to 
Decree-Law no. 138/90. 
A national authority argues that the PID should be extended to services contracts, in 
order to create consistency between the legislation of EU Member-States and, 
consequently, to better promote the internal market. A consumer association notes 
that the existence of several EU Directives applying to price indication has rendered 
the PID less important. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
In Portugal, comparative adverting is an unusual practice and, as rule, it complies with 
the rules of the Advertising Act. 
A business association emphasizes that the positive effects on costs and certainty as 
to the legal framework that stem from the full harmonisation envisaged by the EU 
Directives are thwarted by the lack of application and supervision of the national 
legislation and also by the lack of punishment for violations to these rules. This 
situation seems to be a consequence of several factors, including costs, lack of 
knowledge and lack of coordination between regulators. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
EU Directives on consumer law have played an important role in providing for a more 
clear and consistent legal framework. This is considered essential for the development 
of cross-border trade. 
Although not all Directives are based on full harmonisation, which means that the legal 
framework is not uniform, and despite the problems detected by business associations 
in both the application and quality of national legislation, the differences between the 
Member-States’ legislation seem to be reducing. If this is so, a growth in cross-border 
trade should be expected. 
The Flash Eurobarometer 396 on Retailers’ Attitudes towards Cross-Border Trade and 
Consumer Protection (conducted between March and April 2014) shows that 
Portuguese traders report a percentage of cross-border transactions that is within EU 
average: 29%.43  
On the contrary, there seems to be some problems on the consumers’ side. The Flash 
Eurobarometer 397 on Consumer Attitudes towards Cross-Border Trade and Consumer 
Protection (conducted in April 2014) shows that Portugal is one of the countries with 
the lower percentage of purchases made via the Internet (only 38%), which is the 
main channel for cross-border trade. Cross-border trade through other channels is 
only 7%.44  
 
43  Flash Eurobarometer 396 on Retailers’ Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade and Consumer Protection, 
2015, TNS Political & Social. 
44  Flash Eurobarometer 397 on Consumer Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Trade and Consumer Protection, 
2015, TNS Political & Social. 
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• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
Most stakeholders seem to agree that consumer law legislation has improved following 
implementation of the EU Directives included in this study.  
It is important to stress that Portugal already had very advanced legislation in some 
areas: for example, Decree-Law no. 446/85 created a special regime for some unfair 
contractual terms, Decree-Law no. 138/90 provided for a wide-ranging obligation to 
indicate the prices and Law no. 24/96 contained special procedural provisions for 
injunction procedures.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Portugal  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 
(October 25), amended by 
Decree-Laws no. 220/95, 
249/99 and 323/2001. 
UCT national 
legislation is 
prior to the 
Directive. 
 
Initially, it was 
only applied to 
general contract 
terms. 
 
The Directive 
was 
implemented 
through two 
amendments to 
the national 
'Black list' of terms considered unfair in 
all circumstances Yes 
Articles 18 and 21, 
Decree-Law no. 446/85. 
Articles 18 and 19 apply to 
all contracts, while articles 
21 and 22 are limited to 
B2C, C2B and C2C 
contracts. 
 
The lists implements annex 
I to the UCTD with two 
exceptions [pars. c) and d)] 
'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair Yes 
Articles 19 and 22, 
Decree-Law no. 446/85. 
Extension of the application of Directive 
to individually negotiated terms No 
Article 1, no. 2, Decree-
Law no. 446/85. 
UCT national legislation is 
limited to pre-formulated 
standard contracts and to 
general contract terms. 
Extensions of the application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
Yes 
Article 1, Decree-Law no. 
446/85 
UCT national legislation 
was not amended to 
exclude these aspects. 
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45 Jorge Morais Carvalho, Manual de Direito do Consumo, 2016, pp. 71-72. 
legislation.  
 
Application to B2B contracts Yes 
Article 1, Decree-Law no. 
446/85. 
The scope of application of 
the UCT national legislation 
does not draw a distinction 
between B2C and B2B 
contracts. 
 
The lists of unfair terms in 
articles 21 and 22 do not 
apply to B2B contracts. 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Exclusion of contract terms based on 
mandatory provisions or on provisions 
or principles of international 
conventions 
Yes 
Article 3, pars. a) and b), 
Decree-Law no. 446/85. 
Some authors defend that 
the exclusion does not 
apply to some mandatory 
rules on the inclusion of 
standard terms into a 
contract45. 
Exceptions for certain contract terms 
used by suppliers of financial services Yes 
Article 22, nos. 2 and 3, 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 
The lists implements annex 
II to the UCTD with one 
exception [par. a)]. 
 
These exceptions do not 
apply to B2B contracts. 
Application of the transparency principle 
to all contracts Yes 
Article 5, Decree-Law no. 
446/85 
Contract terms shall be 
communicated in an 
appropriate and timely 
manner, considering the 
relevance of contract and 
the complexity of the terms. 
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Contractual consequences associated to 
the use of intransparent terms. Yes 
Article 8, par. a), Decree-
Law no. 446/85 
Intransparent terms are not 
included in the contract. 
Erga omnes effect of the decision 
establishing the unfairness of a contract 
term 
Limited  
Article 32, no. 2, Decree-
Law no. 446/85 
The effect of the decision is 
limited to contracts 
concluded with the trader 
concerned. 
 
Other traders that use 
similar contract terms are 
not bound by the decision. 
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Decree-Law no. 57/2008 
(March 26), amended by 
Decree-Law no. 205/2015. 
Prior to the 
Directive, there 
were no specific 
rules for unfair 
commercial 
practices. 
 
UCP national 
legislation was 
amended in 
2015 so as to 
include some 
protection for 
B2B relations. 
Provisions on financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
 
 
 
Yes 
Specific legislation of the 
financial sector 
 
Commercial practices that 
are not set out in the UCPD. 
 
Misleading actions and 
omissions. 
 
Aggressive practices 
Provisions on immovable property going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes/No  No data available. 
Contractual consequences of unfair 
commercial practices Yes 
Article 14, no. 1, Decree-
Law no. 57/2008 
The contract is voidable on 
the initiative of the affected 
party. 
Application of UCP national legislation to 
B2B transactions Yes 
Article 7, no. 3, Decree-
Law no. 57/2008 
Some misleading practices 
(e.g. concerning the 
trader’s identity, the price 
or the object of the 
contract) are extended to 
B2B contracts. 
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Decree-Law no. 138/90 
(April 26), amended by 
Decree-Law no.  162/99. 
 
PI national 
legislation is 
prior to the 
Directive.  
 
The Directive 
was 
implemented 
through an 
amendment to 
national 
legislation.  
 
 
 
Extension of the application to other 
sectors (e.g. for immovable property) No 
  
Application to services contracts Yes 
Article 10, Decree-Law 
no. 138/90 
PI national legislation sets 
out a few specific rules for 
the indication of prices in 
services contracts. 
Application to products supplied in the 
course of a provision of a service No 
Article 4, no. 1, par. b), 
Decree-Law no. 138/90  
Application to sales by auction or to 
sales of works of art and antiques No 
Article 4, no. 1, par. e), 
Decree-Law no. 138/90  
Exclusion of the obligation to indicate 
the unit price where it is not useful or 
may lead to confusion 
Yes 
Article 4, no. 2, Decree-
Law no. 138/90 
PI national legislation 
includes a list of products 
that do not have to indicate 
the unit price (e.g. products 
sold in quantities below 
certain limits or by the 
piece and different 
products sold in the same 
package). 
Exclusion of the obligation to indicate 
the unit price where it represents an 
excessive burden to small retail 
No   
Narrow definition of consumer  No 
Article 2-1, Law no. 
24/96 (July 31) 
Both legal and natural 
persons may be qualified as 
consumers as long as the 
goods or services are not 
used for business purposes. 
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Decree-Law no. 330/90, 
(October 23), amended by 
Decree-Laws no. 275/98 
and no. 57/2008. 
 
Decree-Law no. 57/2008 
(March 26), amended by 
Decree-Law no. 205/2015. 
Decree-Law no. 
330/90 set out a 
definition of 
misleading 
advertising. 
 
That definition 
was amended 
with the 
implementation 
of both the 
MCAD and the 
UCPD. 
Definition of misleading advertising 
going beyond minimum harmonisation Yes 
Article 11, no. 1, of 
Decree-Law no. 330/90 
 
Article 7, Decree-Law no. 
57/2008. 
MA national legislation 
relies on the UCPD’s 
definition of misleading 
actions, which is broader. 
 
This definition applies to 
both B2C (directly) and B2B 
contracts (by virtue of 
article 11, no. 1, of Decree-
Law no. 330/90). 
Decree-Law no. 330/90 
(October 23), amended by 
Decree-Laws no. 275/98 
and no. 57/2008.  
 Definition of comparative advertising in accordance with the Directive Yes 
Articles 16 and 43, 
Decree-Law no. 330/90  
Decree-Law no. 57/2008 
(March 26), amended by 
Decree-Law no. 205/2015. 
 Application of the regime on comparative advertising to consumers Limited 
Article 7, no. 2, par. a), 
Decree-Law no. 57/2008. 
In B2C transactions, 
comparative advertising is 
only prohibited when it 
causes confusion with any 
goods or services, trade 
marks, trade names and 
other distinguishing marks 
of a competitor. 
   Other rules protecting B2B transactions Yes 
Article 1, Decree-Law no. 
446/85 
 
Article 7, no. 3, Decree-
Law no. 57/2008 
The UCT national legislation 
includes B2B contracts. 
 
The UCP national 
legislation applies to some 
misleading practices in B2B 
contracts. 
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Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Law no. 25/2004      
Law no. 24/96 (Consumer 
Protection Act – CPA)      
Decree-Law no. 446/85      
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive –Portugal 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your country 
separately (as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law Directives (the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
  
Law no. 25/2004 (July 8) 
implemented into national law 
the ID.  
 
The injunction procedure is set 
out in separate legislation: 
a) Law no. 24/96 (Consumer 
Protection Act – CPA) applies to 
all cases not covered by specific 
legislation.  
b) Decree-Law no. 446/85 
covers unfair commercial terms. 
 
Decree-Law no. 446/85 only 
applies when there is no specific 
provision on the CPA. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
National injunctions 
- Designated public 
bodies (Prosecutor’s 
Office and 
Directorate-General 
for Consumers); 
- Consumer 
associations; 
- Trade associations; 
- Individual 
consumers. 
 
Cross-border 
injunctions 
- Designated public 
bodies (Prosecutor’s 
Office and 
Directorate-General 
for Consumers); 
- Consumer 
associations 
included in a list 
notified to the 
European 
Commission. 
National injunctions 
Article 13, CPA and article 26, 
no. 1, Decree-Law no. 446/85. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-border injunctions 
Articles 3 to 5, Law no. 25/2004. 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
Court procedure. 
 
Article 11, CPA. 
 
In some sectors, a draft of the 
contracts must be deposited 
with the regulatory authority. 
The powers of the regulatory 
authorities in this regard are 
unclear. 
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Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   
of some/all cost related to the procedure please 
explain the characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
Consumer 
associations and 
consumers 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party. 
 
Designated public 
bodies   - Exemption 
from court costs. 
  
Article 25, no. 1, Decree-Law no. 
34/2008 (February 26) repealed 
all previous exemptions. 
 
Article 4, no. 1, pars. a) and g), 
Decree-Law no. 34/2008. This 
exemption does not apply to 
other costs (e.g. with 
attorneys). 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to 
cover areas of consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer law in general? 
Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to cover 
consumer law in 
general 
 
Article 2, no. 2 of Law 25/2004. 
 
The injunction procedure 
applies to any practice that 
violates consumers’ rights. 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the 
comments column regarding type of business' 
interests covered by the injunctions procedure 
Yes, but only in the 
UCT national 
legislation. 
The injunction procedure set out 
in the UCT national legislation 
may be used in B2B relations. 
 
In this case, the trader is not 
entitled to start proceedings. 
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly 
against several traders from the same economic sector 
or their associations 
Yes Article 27, no. 2, Decree-Law no. 
446/85 (for UCT) and articles 36 
and 37, Civil Procedure Code 
(CPC), for all other cases. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the 
injunction procedures? (not including the consultation 
stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
No  
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
No such 
requirement 
 
Does the national legislation provide for measures 
ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
The law does not set 
out any summary 
procedure for 
injunctions. 
  
Article 548, CPC, repealed all 
existing rules referring to 
summary proceedings. 
 
The judge may use case 
management powers to adapt 
the pace or structure of 
proceedings to the case at hand 
(article 547, CPC).  
Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the 
injunction order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should 
they be paid 
Yes, penalty of a fine 
for each day of non-
compliance (periodic 
penalty payment). 
 
 
Article 10, no. 2, CPA. 
 
The fine is divided in equal parts 
between the State and the 
applicant. 
Has your Member State taken specific measures 
regarding the publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective statement? 
Yes 
 
The decision is published 
automatically (article 11, no. 3, 
CPA). 
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Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure 
for sanctions for the infringement?  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
Yes (civil liability) Article 22, pars. 1 to 3, Law no. 
23/95 (class actions). 
 
Article 483 and following, Civil 
Code (non-contractual liability). 
 
Articles 798 and following, Civil 
Code (contractual liability). 
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as 
a result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified 
entity or the public purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
No  
Can individual consumers base their individual claims 
for damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
Yes, but only when 
unfair contract 
terms are 
concerned. 
 
The counterpart may raise the 
decision on the unfairness of the 
contract term as an incidental 
question in future proceedings 
against the trader concerned 
(article 32, no. 2, Decree-Law no 
446/85). 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond 
the injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
No Qualified entities may apply for 
a provisional prohibition to use 
certain contract terms (article 
31, Decree-Law no. 446/85).  
 
However, this procedure is 
independent from the injunction 
procedure. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders 
extended to the future infringements and/or same or 
similar illegal practices (of other traders)? 
Yes (trader 
concerned) 
 
No (other traders) 
Injunction orders are limited to 
the same or similar unfair terms 
used by the trader concerned 
(article 32, no. 2, Decree-Law no 
446/85). 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(number 
of cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consume
r 
legislatio
n not 
based on 
EU 
directive
s 
2015 
Estima-
tion 
(court 
proce-
dures) 
1 000 1% 40% 0% 
39% (mainly 
Sales Directive 
and Consumer 
Credit 
Directive) 
20% 
(mainly 
services of 
general 
interest) 
Most consumer 
cases in 
Portuguese 
courts are 
related with 
unfair contract 
terms, sale of 
consumer 
goods and 
consumer 
credit. 
2015 
Estima-
tion 
(ADR, 
incl. 
Peace 
Courts) 
15 000 5% 15% 0% 
20% (mainly 
Sales 
Directive) 
60% 
(mainly 
services of 
general 
interest) 
The high 
number of 
cases related to 
services of 
general interest 
(v.g., water, 
electricity or 
electronic 
communication
s, among 
others) may be 
explained by 
the rule that 
imposes 
arbitration on 
the trader for 
these disputes 
(Article 15, Law 
no. 23/96). 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).46  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism 
Estimated court 
fees (national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved 
for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Court 
procedure 
EUR 204 (each 
party). The court 
fees may be 
returned (totally or 
partially) to the 
winning party. 
As a rule, no lawyer 
would be needed 
unless the case is 
worth EUR 5000 or 
more, but it is 
preferable to have 
one 
 
Officially-appointed 
lawyers: EUR 204 
 
All other cases, no 
less than EUR 500 
Additional 
payments 
may be 
needed for 
some 
procedural 
issues and 
appeals. 
+50 hours +1 year to a decision 
Peace Courts EUR 35 (each party). 
The court fees may 
be returned (totally 
or partially) to the 
winning party. 
As a rule, no lawyer 
is needed - 
10 to 20 
hours 
2/3 months to 
a decision 
Consumer ADR Mediation: from 
EUR 0 to EUR 10 
(each party) 
Arbitration: from 
EUR 0 to EUR 40 
(each party) 
The fees depend on 
the Centre; most 
centres are free of 
charges. 
No lawyer is 
needed - 5 to 10 hours 
1/2 months to 
a decision 
 
46 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
The unfairness of standard contract terms is often invoked before Portuguese courts. 
Our estimation points to 80 cases per year. In analysing this data, it is important to 
consider that the rules on unfair contractual terms (Decree-Law no. 446/85) apply to 
all contracts and not only consumer contracts.  
It is less common for the unfairness of standard contract terms to be invoked in 
consumer ADR procedures. This is probably due to the fact that consumers are not 
represented by lawyers in these procedures. In the interviews, a consumer arbitration 
centre confirmed receiving a substantial number of complaints on Decree-Law no. 
446/85, but added that the majority was related to contractual transparency. We 
would estimate 60 cases per year related to unfair contractual terms. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
 
 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Directorate General for Consumers 
(DGC) 
National consumer enforcement 
authority 
June 30, 2016 
Energy Services Regulatory Authority 
(ERSE) 
National regulatory authority (energy) June 28, 2016 
National Communications Authority 
(ANACOM) 
National regulatory authority (electronic 
communications) 
July 1, 2016 
Directorate General for Consumers 
(DGC) 
National enforcement authority 
(advertising) 
July 12, 2016 
Authority for Economic and Food 
Safety (ASAE) 
National enforcement authority June 22, 2016 
European Consumer Centre – Portugal European Consumer Centre June 20, 2016 
Portuguese Association for Consumer 
Protection (DECO) 
Consumer organisation June 21, 2016 
Portuguese Commerce and Services 
Confederation 
Business Association July 7, 2016 
Portuguese Association of Distribution 
Companies 
Business Association July 8, 2016 
Arbitration Centre for Consumer 
Disputes of Lisbon 
Consumer Arbitration Centre July 12 , 2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source Year Title of publication 
Almeno de Sá 2001 Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais e Directiva sobre Cláusulas Abusivas 
(Almedina, Coimbra) 
Ana Maria Guerra Martins 2002 “O Direito Comunitário do Consumo” (Estudos do Instituto de 
Direito do Consumo, vol. I) 
Ana Prata 2010 Contratos de Adesão e Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais (Almedina, 
Coimbra) 
António Pinto Monteiro 1986 “Contratos de Adesão” (Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, ano 46) 
António Menezes 
Cordeiro 
2005 Tratado de Direito Civil Português, Vol. I, Tomo I (Almedina, 
Coimbra) 
Cláudio Petrini Belmonte 2003 A Redução do Negócio Jurídico e a Protecção dos Consumidores 
(Coimbra Editora, Coimbra) 
Civic Consulting 2011 Study on the Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in the EU 
Filipe Vaz Pinto 2007 “Os Limites à Liberdade de Estipulação em Matéria de Denúncia” 
(Sub Judice, n.º 39) 
Hugo Ramos Alves 2012 “Nótula sobre a Venda à Distância” (Liber Amicorum Mário Frota, 
Almedina, Coimbra) 
Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro 2005 “O Controlo do Conteúdo dos Contratos” (Revista da Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade Federal do Paraná, n.º 42) 
Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro 2003 O Problema do Contrato (Almedina, Coimbra) 
José de Oliveira Ascensão 2000 “Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais, Cláusulas Abusivas e Boa Fé” (Revista 
da Ordem dos Advogados, ano 60) 
José Manuel de Araújo 
Barros 
2010 Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais (Coimbra Editora, Coimbra) 
Jorge Morais Carvalho 2016 Manual de Direito do Consumo (3rd ed., Almedina, Coimbra) 
Jorge Pegado Liz 2005 “A «Lealdade» no Comércio ou as Desventuras de uma Iniciativa 
Comunitária” (Revista Portuguesa de Direito do Consumo, n.º 44) 
Jorge Pegado Liz 2014 “Práticas Comerciais Proibidas” (Estudos do Instituto de Direito do 
Consumo, vol. IV) 
Luís Silveira Rodrigues 2003 “Tendências Recentes sobre a Protecção do Consumidor na União 
Europeia” (Estudos de Direito do Consumidor, n.º 5) 
Mário Júlio de Almeida 
Costa 
1999 Síntese do Regime Jurídico Vigente das Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais 
(Universidade Católica Editora, Lisboa) 
Pedro Caetano Nunes 2011 “Comunicação de Cláusulas Contratuais Gerais” (Estudos em 
Homenagem ao Professor Doutor Carlos Ferreira de Almeida, Vol. II, 
Almedina, Coimbra) 
Sara Fernandes Garcia 2014 As Práticas Comerciais Desleais (photocopied text) 
TNS Political & Social 2015 Flash Eurobarometer 397 on Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Cross-
Border Trade and Consumer Protection  
TNS Political & Social 2015 Flash Eurobarometer 396 on Retailers’ Attitudes Towards Cross-
Border Trade and Consumer Protection 
Yara Miranda 2007 “As Cláusulas Contratuais Abusivas em Matéria de Relações de 
Consumo” (Direito Privado e Direito Comunitário – Alguns Ensaios, 
Âncora, Lisboa) 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report ROMANIA  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive; 
Implementation of the UCPD by Law 363/2007 is rather more formal than functional in 
Romania. Interpretation of the principle-based provisions of the UCPD is left to the 
implementing authority (National Consumer Protection Authority-NACP) and the 
courts. Although, no detailed legal provisions were enacted to assist the enforcement 
of the principle-based UCPD, the authorities did not signal significant interpretation 
problems in connection to the UCPD because of its principle-based approach. 
Nevertheless, consumer associations have a different opinion, although they could not 
report significant practical experience on the UCPD. Consumers perceive it to be 
difficult under the principle-based approach to identify the unfair practice. It was 
emphasized that consumers prefer to opt for administrative enforcement rather than 
going to court when they feel harmed by a commercial practice. They proceed in this 
way because they consider the practice unfair in a general sense, not because they 
can identify the technical legal infringement and know their rights under the UCPD. 
This was also confirmed by the NACP, which usually receives complaints that do not 
indicate the legal basis of the claim, but only describe the potential ‘offence’ 
committed by the business entity against the consumer. It was further mentioned that 
the consumers are more interested in the contractual consequences of the unfair 
commercial practice and not in the factors leading to unfairness, despite the strong 
interplay of the two. It is rare that, subsequent to an administrative investigation, 
individual consumers go to court against infringing companies to ask for damages, 
upon identifying themselves as victims of the unfair commercial practice.  
The administrative decisions of the NACP against the infringing companies are not 
made public on the website of the authority, only press releases and other studies on 
the investigations conducted under the UCPD are available to consumers. However, 
Law 363/2007 provides in Article 12(3) (among the sanctions) for the publication in a 
largely distributed newspaper of what the infringement has cost the infringing 
company. In most cases the consumers remain passive to such news – they do not 
identify themselves as affected by the unfair practices.  
Conflicting case law was also mentioned as discouraging consumers from enforcing 
their rights. However, the interviewed consumer associations could not recall any 
collective action initiated in the past on the basis of the UCPD, as the focus of their 
efforts in assisting consumers is mostly on unfair contract terms law. It seems that 
from a consumer point of view, it is rather a task for the authorities to intervene in the 
field of unfair commercial practices. Consumers do not have an active role in 
enforcement through private law suits.  
On the contrary, the business sector is satisfied with the general approach of the 
UCPD.  It was mentioned that marketing practices change so quickly that it is better to 
have principle-based rules. The business sector does not see need for more regulation 
at European level or more detailed national implementing rules on the UCPD. 
However, no cases can be reported when business associations made use of 
administrative enforcement against their competitors at the central enforcement 
authority. On the basis of the extremely low number of administrative complaints or 
court cases initiated by consumers, competitors or by consumer associations it can be 
assumed that the market seems not to be reacting often enough to unfair practices. 
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Unfair commercial practices are an issue concerning consumers primarily and the 
institutional framework on the enforcement of the UCPD supports this.  
The NACP is the central enforcement authority where complaints may be submitted 
not only by consumers and empowered entities to act in the interest of the consumers 
(Article 10, para. 1), but also by business entities (Article 10, para.2). However, the 
NACP has no special procedure on complaints submitted by business entities, these 
being considered rather simple notifications of the NACP upon which it may start the 
investigation of the case in the interest of the consumers. The NACP made mention of 
such complaints, but it keeps no separate record of the number of the inquiries 
coming from business entities.  It also mentioned that, if it is in the interest of 
consumers, it could extend its competence also to B2B relations in which small and 
medium size enterprises are involved.  However, the Ministry of Economy remains in 
charge of these relations, small and medium size enterprises being not considered as 
the weaker party vis a vis other larger business entities. In line with its concern for 
entities other than individual consumers, the NACP extended its competence to 
housing cooperatives.  
The NACP considers the principle based approach as suited to the purpose of the 
policy aim it pursues. However, the NACP mentioned during the interview that in the 
view of its staff, the previous directives based on a vertical approach and more 
detailed rules were easier to apply in practice, whereas especially during the first 
years of implementation they had difficulties to ‘circumstantiate’ the principle based 
rules of the UCPD to the concrete case. Today the NACP has more expertise and more 
practical experience to handle the principle based approach.  
Since in the field of unfair commercial practices private enforcement is weak in 
framing legal compliance, the NACP remains the main and only actor with an impact 
on companies’ behaviour in the field of unfair commercial practices. Thus effectiveness 
of enforcement may be assessed mainly on the basis of the activity of the NACP which 
has extensive competencies to impose sanctions. It can stop the incorrect practice 
under the sanction of enforcement penalties, may impose fines, and as a 
complementary sanction it may also order the suspension of the activity of the 
infringing company until it stops the incorrect practice (Article 15). It can also initiate 
court action against the company if the public interest justifies such a measure (Article 
10, para. 1). In addition Law 51/2016 reinforced the contractual consequences for 
unfair commercial practices. According to Article 12 of this law, the business entity 
concerned must pay back to the consumer the price of the goods and services 
contracted as a result of the unfair commercial practice. However, consumer 
organisations have complained, fines and enforcement penalties were low in Romania 
and due to this, the impact of the UCPD on the market behaviour of business entities 
is low. In 2015 the legislature reacted to this problem and Law 33/ 2015 raised the 
level of fines and enforcement penalties. Whereas in the past for misleading 
commercial practices, the NACP could impose fines from RON 3 000 [approx. 
EUR 665] up to RON 30 000 [approx. EUR 6 647],1 these were increased to 
RON 5 000 – 100 000 [approx. EUR 1108 – 22 155], the upper level being more than 
three times more than before. Non-compliance with the measures imposed by the 
NACP, can lead to fines ranging from RON 6 000 – 600 000 [approx. EUR 1329 – 
132 930]. For aggressive practices separate higher fines were introduced in 2015. 
These ranged from RON 2 000 to 100 000 [approx. EUR 443 to 22 155]. In 2016 this 
system was amended by Law 51/2016, which in Article 17 refined the level of fines 
function of the annual turnover of the business entity and the number of employees. 
Thus for misleading practices and non-compliance with the sanctions imposed by the 
NACP the fines range now from RON 2 000 to 10 000 [approx. EUR 443 to 2 215] for 
companies with less than 9 employees and net annual turnover less than 
EUR 2 000 000; RON 3 000 to 50 000 [approx. EUR 665 to 11 077] for companies 
with 10-49 employees and net annual turnover less than EUR 50 000 000; and 
RON 5 000 to 100 000 [approx. EUR 1108 to 22 155] for larger companies. The 
1  The official exchange rate of the National Bank of Romania on September 20, 2016 for 1 EUR was 4.45 
RON. 
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enforcement penalties for non-compliance with the measures of the NACP as well are 
established on the basis of number of employees and the annual net turnover of the 
infringer company.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
All interviewed entities (NACP, specialised regulatory authorities in the field of 
communications and energy services, business organisations and consumer 
associations) share the view that the black list of the UCPD helps enforcement. For the 
NACP it would be useful if such lists would be more often updated at European level, 
based on an institutionalised exchange of data and networking among the national 
central implementing authorities in order to let them to react quickly onto the fast 
changing marketing techniques that spread cross-border within the EU.  
Business associations consider that such updated lists would assure more predictability 
and would enhance legal certainty under the principle-based approach. Consumers 
also align to this approach, stressing that consumer awareness is not as low as in 
general, when it comes to the examples of the black list of the national implementing 
law. However, they need to be informed about that list, and that list should be often 
updated by the authority, to keep track with the developments in commercial 
practices. However, one consumer association remarked that the average consumer 
cannot distinguish between a correct and incorrect commercial practice even if 
informed; consumers suffer from information asymmetry mainly due to the 
technicality of information not because of a lack of information. They go to the 
authority or to a consumer association when they perceive that practice to be 
incorrect, not because they are aware of their rights under the UCPD or they recognize 
a practice as unfair on the basis of the black list. The NACP also confirmed that 
consumers do not identify on the basis of the black list the infringing behaviour of the 
company they complain at the authority; they simply describe the act of the company. 
Publicity may help consumer awareness, as well as the publication of the 
administrative decision in a national newspaper that is the main channel of 
information for consumers, but consumer associations have no financial resources to 
conduct large campaigns even upon major cases on unfair commercial practices. Here 
as well the consumer association mentioned the information asymmetry problem of 
the consumer even when it has the information, since it will be not able to identify the 
information due to a lack of market skills. Thus the black list helps primarily the 
administrative enforcement authority. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Implementation of the UCPD is formalistic in Romania. Romania did not make use of 
the possibility to introduce higher level of protection where the Directive would have 
allowed, thus has not yet exploited the minimalistic approach of the Directive to the 
benefit of its consumers.  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
This type of marketing practice concerns primarily the cleaning service sector in 
Romania. An assessment conducted in 2011 by the NACP on the compliance of 
cleaning services with Article 6 (1) a) and b) of the UCPD revealed that consumer 
claims are insignificant, although the number of infringements is high. The market 
surveillance concerned 565 cleaning services companies out of which 403 infringed 
consumer legislation and 28 infringed the provisions of the UCPD on environmental 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
979
claims. In all these cases the NACP imposed fines and ordered the companies to stop 
the illegal marketing practice. The number of environmental claims could not be 
provided by the NACP.2  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
Although the implementing law of the UCPD uses the general term of consumer, the 
concept of ‘average consumer’ as elaborated by the CJEU is taken literally by the 
Romanian enforcement authorities. Administrative decision and court decisions do not 
adapt the concept in a sector-specific way and do not debate it within the context of 
domestic economic, social, cultural conditions. However, the NACP mentioned the 
need for a more flexible interpretation of the concept underlining that the average 
consumer is different at Member States level depending on culture, level of economic 
development, and may vary even within the same Member State, with the average 
consumer being different in the urban and rural areas.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Vulnerability of certain categories of consumers is not considered for the purposes of 
unfair commercial practices law. There is no debate in the legal literature yet in 
Romania on the specific regulatory needs of certain categories more exposed or 
exposed differently to unfair commercial practices than average consumers due to 
their economic condition, education or health. Neither the legal profession nor the 
consumers raise this issue in court cases. However, the designated consumer 
protection association considers that in certain fields, such as consumer loans, the 
consumers are indeed vulnerable. In its view, vulnerability should be a question of law 
and not left to the discretion of the judiciary, i.e. vulnerability should be defined by 
legal criteria.  
However, the legislative policy on unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms indicates that no such measures are expected in the near future. The Romanian 
legislative did not remedy so far consumer over-indebtedness by specific legislative 
measures aimed at acknowledging the vulnerability of certain categories of consumers 
against unfair commercial practices. The consumers of financial services are treated as 
any other consumer categories, although over-indebtedness had high social and 
economic impact in Romania.3  Even in those sectors such as the financial market and 
the market of telecommunications where in many cases unfair terms are the 
consequence of unfair commercial practices, this interplay is not sufficiently debated in 
the enforcement practice. The policy discourse in these sectors as well focuses 
exclusively on unfair contract terms law and within this context unfair commercial 
practices have an ancillary role only. In addition, Romania is under an infringement 
2  Statistical data could not be obtained from the NACP for the purposes of this project on the reason that 
statistics on administrative enforcement is not conducted separately on fields of consumers law or the 
legal basis of the administrative measures. The recording system of the NACP functions under different 
criteria; statistics is built on economic sectors, from which cannot be deduced the number of 
investigations on the specific directives. The yearly reports of the NACP are built on the same system, 
contain only general data on the total number of consumer complaints, without being specified the legal 
basis or the consumer law field of such complaints. In addition the individual decisions of the NACP are 
not made public on its website, therefore estimates cannot be made for the number of investigations and 
sanctions imposed on companies. 
3  On the dimension and causes of consumer over-indebtedness see: B. Andresan Grigoriu, M. Moraru, 
Country Report Romania, in H. W. Micklitz, I. Domurath (eds.) Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion, Hart, 
2015, pp. 114-133.    
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procedure for not implementing the consumer credit directive in time, which would 
have at least increased the level of protection of the consumers of financial services 
for the future. Instead, Romania opted for a different policy that of promoting more 
consumer self–responsibility by enacting Law 151/2015 on personal insolvency that 
will enter into force by December 31, 2016.  Even Law 77/2016 on debt discharge was 
not designed with consideration for the vulnerability of certain categories of 
consumers and their need of special protection. It contains no criteria on how to 
identfy over-indebted consumers, because it applies to anyone. Thus it is 
characteristic of recent legislative solutions that in response to special protection 
needs of certain categories of persons, a measure is adopted which is not detailed or 
concrete enough to be applied to that category which most needs such protection. This 
measure caused opposition from the business sector.  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The interviewed sector specific regulatory authorities were not aware of the existence 
of such self-regulation initiatives or codes of conduct. One of the sector specific 
business organisations shared its view that such self–regulation would have reduced 
the risks and costs of liability, but the market is not yet aware enough of the function 
and benefits of such self-regulation in order to reach agreement on the need for it. 
The NACP could either report on codes of conduct from other fields or on ongoing 
cooperation with business associations aimed to promote the enactment of such codes 
in the near future, although the legal framework also provides for business entities 
themselves to elaborate and enforce such codes. The implementing law of the UCPD, 
Law 363/2007 allows in Article 14, para. 1 the control of the market by entities 
responsible to enforce codes of conducts and provides for their possibility to apply 
sanctions to their members in case of non-compliance with such codes of conducts, 
without banning the possibility of parallel administrative enforcement of consumer 
rights by the NACP or the judicial enforcement. The same provision also provides for 
the right of the organisations in charge of implementing the codes of conduct to ask 
for administrative control and sanctions from the NACP in case of infringements of 
such codes by their members.  
Neither the NACP nor the specialized regulatory authorities practice co-regulation. 
Regulation and enforcement continue to be perceived as a state attribute and it seems 
that on this issue both the state and market players agree.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
The NACP was insisting on the need to update the list and on the need for an 
information exchange mechanism at EU level.  It was also emphasized that the black 
list should be designed in such way that national authorities could adapt it to the 
national realities.  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Since there is no reach administrative case law on unfair commercial practices in 
Romania, no large range of best practice can be reported for the purposes of this 
assessment. However, the introduction of contractual consequences for unfair 
commercial practices within the administrative procedure is an approach that may 
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drive a higher level of protection of consumers in those countries such as Romania, 
where, due to an extremely weak litigation culture of the consumers, private 
enforcement is not effective. The establishment of a European information exchange 
system as suggested by the Romanian authorities that would allow close networking 
among the national enforcement authorities may be also considered as a tool 
enhancing enforcement of the UCDP not only in cross-border cases, but also at 
domestic level, since marketing practices are increasingly global.  
The general finding based on case law assessment and interviews with stakeholders is 
that in Romania the weak chain in enforcement is private enforcement both by 
consumers and competitors which creates the need for stricter administrative 
enforcement. This is also contributed to by the focus of private enforcement on unfair 
contract terms law-making the function of unfair commercial practices law ancillary to 
contract unfairness. Since the enforcement authorities did not mention significant 
interpretation difficulties related to the approach of the UCPD, it seems that the 
national toolbox of enforcement, namely the balance of private and public tools, need 
to be reconsidered to strengthen enforcement under the national conditions.  
During 2015 the NACP reported 195 administrative cases on Law 363/2007, whereas 
in the case law database of the Ministry of Justice only 7 ongoing cases could be 
identified on Law 363/2007.4 These are appeals of business entities against the 
administrative decision of the NACP and not civil law suits on damages initiated by 
consumers. In the database of the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție-ÎCCJ (the highest 
court of Romania) the number of cases on Law 363/2007 is very low. For the period of 
January 2008 – June 2016, only 13 cases were identified. These cases concern unfair 
contract terms in the field of consumer finances, mostly loan agreements denominated 
in foreign currency. However, the ÎCCJ never entered into an analysis of the issue 
raised under Law 363/2007 by the plaintiff at first instance, the focus of the analysis 
being always on unfairness of the terms, and usually the factors leading to the unfair 
contract term or unfair contracting practices are not analysed. Law 363/2007 is only 
mentioned as part of the basket of legal basis on which the applicant built the case, 
but no further analysis can be found on the issue whether the unfair commercial 
practices being challenged had led to the unfair contract term. Some of the decisions 
also revealed that the consumers and their legal representatives were not fully aware 
about the temporal application of Law 363/2007 and they attempted to invoke Law 
367/2007 even for contracts concluded before 2007. Thus no highest court guidance is 
available to the consumers, business or legal profession on the UCPD. However, 
Romanian courts have not yet referred questions to the CJEU on the interpretation of 
the UCPD. In comparison to this very poor case law on unfair commercial practices, 
during the period of 2008-2016 the ÎCCJ issued 169 decisions in the field of unfair 
contract terms, whereas only in 13 of these cases it was raised by the applicant (the 
consumer) in first instance that it could be the case of unfair commercial practice 
behind the unfair term.  
As long as court enforcement is weak and poor, the administrative sanctions remain 
the only and main tool to reduce the number of infringements. However, consumer 
association complained about the low impact of the fines on subsequent behaviour of 
the companies and mentioned that it would have a higher preventive function if 
certain unfair commercial practices were classified by law as criminal acts and it would 
also imply the civil law liability of the persons initiating the unfair commercial practice.  
 
4 Tribunalul Suceava, Dosar 6145/285/2013, Tribunalul Caras-Severin, Dosar 4165/290/2011; Judecătoria 
Slobozia Dosar 8656/279/2010; Judecătoria Piatra Neamț 4037/312/2008; Judecătoria Piatra Neamț, 
Dosar 4062/279/2015; Tribunal of Neamt, Dosar 1493/279/2014; Tribunal Neamț Dosar 6473/279/2014 
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1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID was implemented into the Romanian law by Government Decision 947/2000 
which appointed the NACP as central enforcement authority (Article 13). Infringement 
of the obligations to indicate the price constitutes administrative infringement and can 
be sanctioned with fines ranging from RON 500 to 2 500 [approx. EUR 110 to 554]. 
These fines are considered by the NACP as sufficiently corrective for companies under 
the Romanian circumstances. In its view the large companies usually comply with the 
requirements of the PID, where awareness of these legal requirements at level of 
small companies is lower. Consumer associations signalled the opposite, complained 
about the lack of compliance at large shopping centres, although in their view the 
Romanian consumers are not interested in and not guided in their market decisions by 
unit selling prices. There are frequent cases when there is one price on the shelves 
and another when the consumer pays, the updating of prices being a problem in large 
shopping centres. The impact of the requirement on unit price indication does manifest 
differently in specific fields. For example, there are problems in those areas where 
prices are mentioned in EUR but the price will be paid in RON at the exchange rate of 
the seller’s bank (practiced by car dealers and immovable agencies). In such cases the 
consumers may be confused by the fact that the exchange rate is not that of the 
National Bank of Romania. The lack of compliance is more visible in the sector of 
mobile telephones. Here as well the real difficulty for the consumer is not the lack of 
unit prices, but the accessibility of the information for the consumer on the price and 
performance, thus here again information does not reach the consumer in a way that 
actually influence their market decision, but risks to distort it. In this context the 
consumer association mentioned also the risk that by unit price indication the sellers 
often promote the purchase of larger quantities and promote this way unplanned 
consumptions rather than the economic interest of consumers. This phenomenon may 
have even negative impact on consumer health if for financial reasons the consumers 
over-consume certain products such as nutrition supplements besides that in such 
cases the financial interest of the consumers also suffers by buying large quantities of 
goods. However, the NACP signalled no specific enforcement problems in this field and 
mentioned that the number of complaints on the implementing law of the PID is 
insignificant compared to infringement concerning other fields of consumer protection 
law.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The interviewed business associations did not express their view on this issue. 
However, in the opinion of the NACP primarily the international units should be 
mentioned and additionally the performance per unit.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not applicable in case of Romania.  
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1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The Ministry of Public Finances, which is the central implementing authority on the 
MCAD for business entities, is of the opinion that the notion of ‘advertising’ as defined 
in the MCAD captures well even the modern forms of advertising practiced on the 
Romanian market. No court case law can be reported on the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘advertising’. The NACP in charge of consumer complaints shared the view 
of the Ministry of Public Finance.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
No opinion on this matter can be reported from the interviewed enforcement 
authorities or from the business sector.  Consumer associations consider that 
vulnerable consumers are the most affected by comparative and aggressive 
marketing. In their view rules on less information and more comprehensive 
information would better serve the interest of the consumers.  
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The Romanian implementing norms of the MCAD introduced by Law 158/2008 did not 
go beyond minimum harmonization. The MCAD was not extended to B2B transactions 
in Romania. No such regulatory demand can be reported from the business sector. 
Initially the Ministry of Economy and Finance was appointed as implementing authority 
in charge of Law 158/2008, respectively the National Council of Audiovisual (Article 7) 
where natural persons, legal persons, associations and organizations could submit 
complaints about infringements. Thus the same authorities were solving B2C and B2B 
disputes, consumers being protected by a ministry in charge of economic policy. This 
institutional framework was amended by Law 202/2013 of June 27, 2013 under which 
enforcement of Law 158/2008 is split between the NACP and the Ministry of Public 
Finances. In charge of consumer complaints is the NACP whereas business entities 
may ask for intervention from the Ministry of Public Finances where a specialized 
department on state aids and unfair commercial practices solves claims coming from 
business entities concerning also the infringements of the implementing law of the 
MCAD by competitors.  
Competitors may inform the Ministry of Public Finances also about infringements of 
law by organizations in charge of code of conducts in case such codes of conduct 
encourage infringement of the legal provisions on misleading and comparative 
advertising (Article 8). Thus the implementing rules of the MCAD also raise awareness 
of businesses on the market function of codes of conduct. Both the NACP and the 
Ministry of Public Finances may act against business entities and associations in 
charge of codes of conduct applying market practices forbidden by Law 158/2013. 
Both authorities may issue an order to stop the illegal commercial practice and may 
impose fines.  
However, the NACP may not impose enforcement penalties in case the companies 
refuse to comply with the decisions of the authorities. The administrative procedure 
may last for 3 months at the NACP and appeals may be made in 15 days against its 
decisions. Fines continue to remain low in Romania ranging from RON 3 000 to 30 000 
[approx. EUR 665 to 6 646], regardless of the yearly turnover of the company. Law 
158/2013 did not change the level of sanctions. 
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The administrative procedure at the Ministry of Public Finance may last up to 6 months 
and the administrative decision may be appealed in court in 15 days.  During 2015 the 
Ministry of Public Finance acted on its own motion in 90 cases whereas the number of 
complaints submitted by business entities was much lower at 35. Out of its decisions, 
13 were appealed in court. In the period of 1 January 2016 - 31 June 2016 the 
number of complaints were higher (14) than in 2015 and during the first 6 months the 
authority acted on its own motion 51 times. However, the Ministry of Public Finance 
could not report any cross-border complaints concerning infringement of the MCAD.  
There is no data available on the number of complaints submitted by the consumer to 
the NACP concerning the MCAD.  
Due to the lack of central statistical data, no estimates can be made on the yearly 
number of court cases on the MCAD. No highest court decisions were identified on the 
implementing law of the MCAD; no preliminary references were submitted to the CJEU 
by Romanian courts.  
The stakeholders’ attitude towards the effect of full harmonization on comparative 
advertising is positive. Legal literature does not debate the European regulatory 
approach.   
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
No information was provided on this issue during the interviews. Legal literature does 
not discuss this issue.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No opinions were expressed by the interviewed entities on cross border issues. 
Romanian business associations made mention of weak cross-border presence of 
Romanian companies, thus they lack experience with the legislation and enforcement 
mechanisms of other Member States.  
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
According to the enforcement body in charge of solving complaints of business entities 
on infringements committed by competitors, it would enhance the enforcement of the 
MCAD directive to establish a European enforcement agency in the field of misleading 
and comparative advertising that would also provide uniform guidelines to the national 
enforcement authorities on the interpretation of the MCAD. The establishment of a 
black list that should be periodically updated was also mentioned by the authority as 
measure that could enhance effectiveness of the MCAD.  
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue since 
they do not have significant cross–border activities.   
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• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.   
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.   
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.  
  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.   
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.   
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The interviewed entities could not report on practical experience on this issue.  
  
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
According to the administrative authority in charge of complaints from the business 
sector, companies are aware of the information requirements at the advertising stage. 
Neither this authority nor the NACP raised difficulties regarding the interplay of the 
UCPD and the CRD.  
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• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The authorities did not specify extra enforcement costs arising out of the multiplicity of 
information requirements.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions has not been subject to academic debate in 
Romania. The business sector is of the opinion that neither the UCPD nor the MCAD 
should be extended to B2B transactions for the reason that they do not need to be 
protected by such tools. 
      
•  Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Business association consider that there should remain in place two separate regimes.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
No opinion from business entities can be reported on this issue.  
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
No opinion from business entities can be reported on this issue.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
No opinion from business entities can be reported on this issue.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
Business associations would be against such rules. This should remain in their opinion 
a matter for private law.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No opinion from business entities can be reported on this issue. 
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1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Law 51/2016 issued on March 30, 2016, amending Law 363/2007 on unfair 
commercial practices, contains rules on contractual consequences for use of unfair 
commercial practices, and as explained by the NACP such possibility was available 
even before, but it was difficult to apply in practice. By Law 51/2016 a new article was 
introduced in Law 363/2007, Article 151, according to which the inspectors of the 
NACP may order the business entity that employed unfair commercial practices to 
return the price of the product or the services provided to the consumer. This is a 
complementary sanction that applies together with administrative fines. The law also 
provides for significant enforcement penalties (RON 5 000 to 50 000 [approx. 
EUR 1 107 to 11 077]) in case the business entity does not comply with the decision 
of the inspector. Under this possibility the consumers should not have to go to court 
and bear the risks and costs of a civil law suit. However, the NACP mentioned that on 
contractual consequences of the UCPD usually they apply the UCTD and not Law 
51/2016 if there is the case of unfair contractual clauses. For this reason no 
administrative decisions can be reported by the NACP on Law 51/2006. Usually not the 
consumers but the authority establishes the legal basis of the claim (as mentioned by 
the authority), depending on what the consumer wants to achieve with their 
complaint, and as a rule the consumer is interested in having the contract or its 
clauses declared void, thus the UCTD applies in most of these cases. 
Therefore, if the authority does not opt for the administrative rendering of the 
contractual consequences of the incorrect commercial practice, consumers remain 
unaware of this possibility, although they would be better off because the court 
decisions on finding the terms unfair are declaratory and do not rule on damages. In 
fact the unfair commercial practice dimension of the case is vanishing this way, by 
being turned into an unfair contract terms case, although the risks and costs of such 
litigations are far higher compared to the administrative procedure. In order to 
become “law in action”, Article 151 of Law 51/2016 needs to be better publicised 
among the consumers. The legal literature has not yet discussed the provision and its 
potential in enhancing effectiveness in enforcement.   
The consumer associations interviewed emphasized the high risks and costs of civil 
law litigation on damages, as well as the lack of information for consumers on 
administrative investigations on the basis of which they could go to court. However, 
they did not mention having initiated any collective action to ask for restitution for the 
price of the goods and services for the affected consumers under the administrative 
procedure.  
The courts focus on unfair contract terms law, although usually the consumer or their 
legal representative builds the case on a selection of legal bases, among which 
however rarely can be found Law 363/2007 on unfair commercial practices. No cases 
on damages can be reported in which the consumers would have tried to obtain 
compensation under the general provisions or special provisions of contract law, such 
as usury or other immoral behaviour.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Article 12 of Law 51/2016 does not render the issuing of damages caused to 
consumers by unfair commercial practices. Damages may be asked within a separate 
civil law suit. Case assessment reveals that Law 363/2007 usually appears as part of 
the legal basis in cases on unfair contract terms. Unfair commercial practices law has 
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a rather marginal and ancillary role in unfair contract terms cases even in civil law 
litigation. The courts do not really elaborate on the infringement of these rules, with 
the focus in legal reasoning being on finding unfairness in the terms challenged by the 
consumer.  
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The implementing Law 193/2000 does not detail the principle based approach, nor 
does it contain rules that would grant to the consumers more protection than the 
Directive does under its minimalistic approach.  
Consumer organisations and business associations share the view that the principle 
based approach negatively affects the enforcement of the UCTD in Romania. In their 
opinion it would have been better to have ‘rule based control’ on unfair terms, because 
the principle based approach leads to conflicting decisions at both the administrative 
and judicial level. However, while the NACP did not signal significant interpretation 
problems related to the UCTD, it considers that guidance provided by the CJEU does 
not suffice. It has emphasized that it is clear that the CJEU rules directly apply in the 
Member States, but to facilitate an easier access by all the interested stakeholders, 
especially for consumers, these interpretation rules should be transposed into 
legislation. 
However, in light of highest court decisions and appeal court decisions on unfair 
contract terms, one can establish that the judiciary did cope successfully with the 
interpretation problems arising from the interplay of the traditional principles of 
contract law and civil procedural law on one hand and the national implementing law 
of the UCTD on the other hand. Nevertheless, isolated cases of conflicting decisions on 
the very same state of facts and legal questions at different levels of jurisdiction can 
be reported. In these cases as well the ÎCCJ provided ultimate justice to the 
consumers finding the challenged clauses unfair.5 
The rulings of the CJEU have a high impact on the enforcement of the unfair contract 
terms law in Romania. This is why not as many preliminary references reach the CJEU 
from Romania as from Spain or Hungary: only 11 were sent from Romania, out of 
which 4 were withdrawn.6 In May 2013, the ÎCCJ established that obligation of the 
courts to interpret the implementing law in light of the UCTD also implies the use of 
the methodology of the CJEU.7 In July 2016, 11 800 cases could be identified as 
registered under the legal basis of Law 193/2000 in the database of the judiciary. A 
large proportion of these cases concern consumer loans, predominantly mortgage loan 
cases.  
The NACP also mentioned an increase in the number of consumer complaints 
regarding unfair contract terms during recent years due to problems in credit 
contracts, and to pro-consumer rulings of the CJEU. In 2014, the NACP registered 
5 For example: ÎCCJ Decizia 310 din 14 februarie 2016; ÎCCJ Decizia nr. 3864 din 4 decembrie 2014; ÎCCJ 
Decizia 3234 din 23 octombrie 2014; ÎCCJ Decizia nr.1453 din 10 aprilie 2014. 
6  Rulings delivered: C-348/14 Maria Bucura v SC Bancpost SA; C-110/14 Horațiu Costea v SC Volksbank 
Romania; C-143/13 Bogdan Matei, Ofelia Ioana Matei v SC Volksbank Romania SA; C-74/15 Dumitru 
Tarcău și Ileana Tarcău. Pending reference: C-534/15 Pavel Dumitras, Miorara Dumitras v BRD Grupe 
Societe Sucursala Judeteana Satu Mare. Rejected reference: C-92/14 Liliana Tudoran et al, v SC Suport 
Colect SRL; Withdrawn reference: C-236/12; C-123/12; C-108/12; C-571/11; C-47/11;   
7  îCCJ Decizia 193/2013 
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1993 consumer complaints on unfair contract terms, concluded 69 fact finding 
statements, and deferred 23 possible unfair clauses to the court. In 2015 the NACP 
issued 27 fact finding statements regarding possible infringements of the UCTD and 
brought the business entities to court. During the period of January 2016 to June 2016 
the NACP asked the court to rule on the unfairness of the clauses in 21 cases and to 
impose administrative fines on the infringing companies. 
The NACP is a specialized enforcement authority for financial services and from its 
yearly reports, it seems that it has assumed an active role in the service of the 
consumers. Unfortunately, these decisions are not made public on the website of the 
authority and thus no information can be provided on the interpretation problems 
which they raise. The database of the judiciary revealed that the NACP initiated 
procedures against almost all large financial institutions which practiced unfair 
contract terms on a large scale in Romania, thus there are several pending cases 
against financial institutions.8 Important to mention in this context are also the first 
class actions won by the NACP in the last instance9 and another two in the first 
instance.10  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The NACP emphasized that in order to achieve uniform interpretation and uniform 
enforcement at EU level, the indicative list of the UCTD should be updated on the basis 
of Member States’ experience, since at the Member State level other types of practices 
may harm the economic interest of the consumers than those currently listed in the 
UCTD. Such a periodic updating of the indicative list would impede the cross–border 
export of unfair contract terms. In addition to the need to periodically update the 
indicative list in order to keep track with developments in contracting practices applied 
cross-border, consumer associations mentioned that such a list should be unfair per 
se. The view that the indicative list needs to be updated was also shared by business 
organisations. Nevertheless, the case law assessment has shown that the unfair 
clauses practiced in the Romanian market usually are not those on the indicative list of 
the UCTD.  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
Romania opted for a grey list, which strictly followed the indicative list of the UCTD, 
but administrative practice shows that the majority of unfair clauses in practice are 
not those mentioned on the grey list. The NACP considers the grey list useful and it 
emphasized here again the need for an institutionalized exchange of information at the 
European level about unfair contract clauses, which spread cross-border because 
administrative and judicial control is often one step behind the developments in unfair 
contracting practices. A European database would therefore promote a prompt 
reaction of the authorities to unfair contracting practices.   
There is no black list of unfair terms in Romania publicly available to consumers and 
business entities that would raise more awareness as to the consequences of using 
8  Dosar 1409/2/2015; Dosar 1513/2/2015; Dosar 1192/2/2015; Dosar 1106/2/2015; Dosar 286/2/2015; 
Dosar 857/2/2015; Dosar 7069/2/2014; Dosar 434/2/2015; Dosar 1408/2/2015; Dosar 956/2/2015; 
Dosar 14484/3/2015; Dosar 4051/2/2015; Dosar 13864/3/2015; Dosar 13863/3/2015.  
9  Curtea de Apel București, Decizia nr. 17 din 10 Februarie 2016. 
10 Tribunalul Sibiu, Dosar 3295/306/2011; Tribunalul Tg. Mures, Dosar 2377/325/2013, Decizia 390/2015 
din 9 martie, 2015. 
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unfair terms and also prevent companies from using such terms. Nevertheless, in the 
opinion of the financial sector, such black lists would be useful for the market.   
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Declaratory judgements on unfairness of contract terms have an erga omnes effect in 
Romania since November 1, 2013. Law 193/2000 on unfair terms, as amended by Law 
76/2012, provides that the NACP and consumer NGOs which meet certain legal 
requirements can ask the courts for the removal of the unfair terms from all the 
contracts concluded with the trader. If the court decides that a term is unfair, the 
trader is obliged to amend all the ongoing standard contracts and not to use the term 
in future contracts. Law 193/2000 does not contain sanctions for non-compliance with 
the court decision to amend existing contracts and the NACP cannot order the 
business entity by administrative decision to amend the contract containing unfair 
terms.  
However, it does not apply to other business entities which apply the same term with 
their clients. The court in addition will also impose an administrative sanction since 
Article 1 (b) of Law 193/2000 provides the obligation for the business entities not to 
apply unfair contract terms in consumer contracts. However, these fines are low, 
ranging from RON 200 to 1 000 [approx. EUR 40 to EUR 220]. The procedure starts at 
the NACP, which either on its own motion or upon private complaints or complaints of 
entitled entities, examines the contract and if it finds the term unfair then it brings the 
business entity to court, either at the domicile of the consumer or at the place of 
business of the business entity, asking the court to compel the business entity to 
amend all contracts in force or those intended to be used by eliminating the unfair 
terms from the contract and to impose fines. Previously, the business entity was sued 
at its place of business and at first instance court. Law 82/2012 conferred such cases 
to the competence of tribunals, where there is much more specific expertise than at 
the level of a lower court. Another important development introduced by Law 82/2012 
is that it conferred competence to courts to order the business entity to amend not 
only its contracts in force, but also all its standard contracts elaborated to be used in 
the future. However, the main shortcoming of these pro-consumer revisions of the 
implementing law is that these provisions only apply for the future, for litigations 
started in the period of 15 February 2013 to 30 September 2013. Such limitation in 
time of the temporal effect of the rules on the erga omnes effects finding unfairness 
was introduced by a subsequent Emergency Ordinance of the Government no. 4/2013. 
Another shortcoming of this procedure is that courts do not rule on damages. Thus, 
the consumers must bear the risks and costs of another time consuming civil law suit. 
This is the main reason why consumer confidence is so low in justice provision on 
unfair contract terms.  The consumers do not see the contractual consequences of 
finding unfairness in their contracts in terms of compensation for the loss they 
suffered. In fact the compensatory consequence of a finding of unfairness is of very 
limited effectiveness.  
The same applies to the preventive/corrective function of the unfair terms law as 
implemented in Romania. Although the court may declare the terms void and order 
the business entity to amend its contracts, i.e. to remove the unfair terms, the 
infringing entity may escape with a symbolic administrative fine that is below the 
average minimum net salary in Romania. This happened in the first class action won 
by the NACP against a financial institution when the Appeal Court of Bucharest 
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confirmed the finding on unfairness and the fines established by the NACP in value of 
RON 700 [approx. EUR 157]. The financial institution applied the terms that were 
found unfair with 8000 clients. Due to the lack of specific provisions on collective 
actions in civil law suits, the effect of such administrative sanctions compared to the 
economic harm caused to its clients and the costs of civil law litigations for the 
consumers is more than disproportionate and thus ineffective on the market of 
consumer loans where the unfair terms were employed with thousands of clients.  
Although in this case the Appeal Court of Bucharest refused the inquiry of the financial 
institution to suspend the litigation for reason of constitutional control of Article 13 of 
Law 193/2000, which was requested by the financial institution, it could not stop the 
financial institution exercising this right. This has become a custom by the financial 
institutions, done in order to suspend the administrative litigation or even stop the 
enforcement of final court decisions. At the end of June 2016, there were 39 decisions 
on unfair contract terms cases on the webpage of the Constitutional Court and another 
19 pending cases can be reported. These inquiries challenge Article 1211 and Article 
1312 of Law 193/2000 together or separately Article 13 only. Although  the challenged 
provisions of Law 193/2000 were not found unconstitutional in any of these cases, the 
constitutional control severely delays the provision of justice to the consumer. Even 
more, some of the financial institutions refer the same questions for which an opinion 
has already been delivered by Constitutional Court, since there is no acte clair doctrine 
in place at the Constitutional Court on the basis of which it could refuse repeated 
inquiries on the same legal issue.  
Business entities invoke the infringement of the following constitutional principles and 
rights by the judicial intervention into contracts and the erga omnes effects of finding 
unfairness: non-retroactivity of the law (for challenging that Law 82/2012 was not in 
force when the contracts were concluded), the right of conduct economic activity and 
the right to commerce (for defending that contracts are freely negotiated and the 
courts should not intervene in private law contracts), the right to property (for 
challenging the order of the court to pay back to the consumer the amounts charged 
under the unfair term) the separation of powers in state (for challenging the 
competence and obligation of the court to rule on the nullity of the unfair clause and 
to order the modification of the contracts based on the suit of the administrative 
enforcement authority).13 This practice not only delays consumer justice provision, but 
also turns the Constitutional Court into a private law court, contributing to the 
proceduralisation of the unfair contract terms law, whereas in the meantime the 
Romanian courts did comply with the guidance of the CJEU on the interpretation of the 
provisions of the UCTD on own motion and erga omnes effect of nullity.  
The practice of the business entities to challenge Article 13 of Law 193/2000 at the 
Constitutional Court is not new, and was not only generated by the legislative 
provisions of the erga omnes effects of finding the term unfair. First, the companies 
have challenged the possibility of the judiciary to intervene into business contracts and 
11 Article 12 of Law 193/2000:  
In case they discover the use of unfair terms the enforcement entities mentioned in Article 8 will sue the 
professional at the tribunal at his domicile or at his place of business, aking the court to oblige the 
professional to amend its contract in course of implementation;  
(…) 
Associations of consumer protection which fulfill the conditions of Article 30 and 32 of the Emergency 
Government Ordinance no. 21/1992 on consumer protection (are designated entities) (...) may sue the 
professional who applies unfair contract terms at the court mentioned at (1) in order for this to impose to 
the professional to stop using the unfair terms and to amend the contracts in course of implementation 
containing such terms, by eliminating the unfair terms.  
12 Article 13 of Law 193/2000:  
In case the court finds the contract terms unfair it will order the professional to amend all its standard 
contracts in course of implementation and to eliminate the unfair terms from its contract intended for 
future use.  
In cases when para (1) applies the court will also apply the administrative sanctiones mentioned in Article 
16.  
13 Curtea Contituțională Decizia nr. 245 din 19 aprilie 2016.  
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order the nullity of the clause on the basis that such a possibility harms their right to 
fair procedure, by challenging the competence of the NACP to bring the companies to 
court.14 The opposition of the business sector to the erga omnes effect is thus 
significant in Romania.  
Consumer associations are of the opinion that court decisions should have an erga 
omnes effect against other companies which apply the same term. The consumer 
associations also raised the issue of mandatory ex-ante submission of the contracts at 
the authority for an unfairness check, even if with a consultative function, which later 
could be used by the judge. This would be very important in the opinion of consumer 
associations especially for unwritten clauses that are an integral part of the contract, 
such as general terms and conditions.  
The NACP also is on the opinion that such declaratory judgement should have erga 
omnes effect in the whole banking sector to assure effective consumer protection. 
However, the business associations of the banking sector put forwards the argument 
against the extension of such effects to other business entities that the unfairness test 
should remain as it is, based on all circumstances of the contract and such an 
extension of the effect therefore would not be fair from a market point of view. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The function and role of contractual transparency within the test of fairness is 
increasing. There is case law on the meaning of this requirement and preliminary 
questions were also referred to the CJEU by Romanian judges, although several legal 
acts detail the requirements on contract transparency at least in the field of consumer 
credit. However, since such legal provisions were not in place at the moment of 
contract conclusion, the main guidance for the Romanian courts remains the 
preliminary rulings of the CJEU on this issue. Court case law on this issue is rather 
uniform, since judges share the view that average, well informed consumers can take 
the right market decision. Investigations undertaken by the NACP and court cases 
initiated by the NACP are few in number compared to the high number of civil law 
cases, which usually were initiated by the business entities (financial institutions and 
providers of services such as mobile telephony service providers) for late performance 
or non-performance of payment obligations by the consumers under the clauses that 
were subsequently challenged as unfair.  
The NACP is of the view that the rulings of the CJEU should be transposed into the 
implementing law of the UCTD in order to achieve more legal certainty and to ensure 
easy access to the information off all parties, especially consumers. The need for a 
guide on contractual transparency has been suggested, covering what kind of 
information should be included in the contracts in order to comply with the 
requirement of transparency.  
Case law assessment confirms that not the obligation of own motion but rather the 
NACP and the consumer associations are the main engine of the unfairness control in 
civil law actions. However, the consumers have no administrative remedies where the 
judge does not comply with the obligation to act ex officio.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
14 Curtea Contituțională Decizia nr. 464/2011 din 12 aprilie 2011; Curtea Contituțională Decizia nr. 1376 din 
26 octombrie 2010; Curtea Contituțională Decizia nr. 1535/2009 din 17 noiembrie 2009. 
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Romania did not extend the unfairness control to the main subject matter of the 
contract or the adequacy of the price, although the 2014 amendments15 to Law 
193/2000 introduced a new provision on the obligation of the NACP to inform the 
European Commission on stricter rules than those in Directive 93/13, especially when 
the provisions extend the unfairness control to individually negotiated clauses, on the 
adequacy of the price or on lists of terms considered unfair. However, no stricter rules 
were introduced on these aspects so far, although attempts by the Romanian courts 
can be reported where the judges referred such question to the CJEU in the hope to 
receive reinforcement on the judicial extension of the material field of application of 
the UCTD.16 Although in reply of similar references also from other Member States, 
the CJEU opened the possibility only to the legislature of the Member States to enact 
legislation that allows for such an extension, but not to the judiciary by way of 
interpretation, the Romanian legislature did not opt for raising the level of protection 
of the consumers this way.  
The lack of response from the legislature to issues raised in practice is in line with its 
general approach in the field of unfair contract terms law, that of not intervening, not 
going beyond the minimalistic approach of the UCTD. In general, Romania did not 
enact special laws and did not amend general contract law and civil procedural law 
when existing provisions of general contract law or that of the national civil procedural 
law were raised in consumer contract litigations in a manner conflicting with the aim 
and scope of the Directive or the case law of the CJEU. The solution of such conflicts 
was left to the judiciary which succeeded well in integrating the policy based reasoning 
beyond the rulings of the CJEU into the national judicial reasoning and built the bridge 
between the policy of the UCTD and traditional principles of contract law, smoothing 
the conflict.  
Nevertheless, despite this reality, the public opinion in general and the opinion of 
affected consumers especially is that the case law on unfair contract terms is not pro-
consumer. However, the reason behind this perception is as explained above that the 
judgements adopted under the implementing law of the UCTD, Law 193/2000, are 
mostly declaratory judgements, which only establish unfairness, and do not render the 
contractual relationship between the parties in light of the unfairness in terms of what 
will happen with contract enforcement without the unfair terms, or how the situation 
before contract conclusion will be remedied in cases where the whole contract fails 
because of the unfair clause, or the issue of damages to be paid to the consumers 
injured as consequence of the unfair clause. For these questions the courts did not 
have specific legislation at hand other than the provisions of general contract law that 
would have provided solutions suited to render the consequences of unfairness of long 
term social contracts, such as mortgage loans, or contracts that affect hundreds of 
consumers, such as in the case of communications services.    
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Romanian courts understood relatively early under the guidance of the ÎCCJ, based on 
the policy reasoning of the CJEU, the function of the sanction of nullity of the unfair 
terms and of acting on their own motion. The ÎCCJ based its reasoning on the 
obligation to interpret the implementing law in line with the Directive and the case law 
of the CJEU17 as a consequence of Romania’s EU membership,18 and on the policy 
15 Emergency Government Ordinance 34/2014 of June 13, 2014.  
16 C-236/12 Volksbank România v Comisariatul Județean pentru Protecșia Consumatorilor Argeș, C-108/12 
Volksbank România v Ionuț Florin Zglimbea, Liana Zglimbea; C-571/12 Volksbank România SA v Andrea 
Câmpan și Ioan Câmpan. 
17 ÎCCJ Decizia 686/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 1719/2014. 
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consideration that the UCTD does not only protect individual interests, but is targeted 
at the consumers as a collective, thus it protects public order under a special 
protection regime.19 From this follows in the approach of the highest court, the 
obligation of the national judge to act on own motion and sanction of absolute nullity 
of the contract as a consequence of unfairness.20 In highest court case law, the public 
interest argument was much emphasised beyond the obligation to act on own motion 
by referring to cases C-240/98 Oceano,21 C-840/98 Claro22, C-241/98 Salvat 
Editores23 and C-76/10 Pohotovosť.24 For this reason, in Romania the interplay of the 
public law provisions of the domestic consumer credit law with those of the UCTD or 
between the UCTD and civil procedural law did not cause major interpretation 
problems. In cases where the defence invoked the principles of general contract law 
against the consumer policy arguments of the courts, the ÎCCJ did not hesitate to 
establish that the Directive attenuates the principle of pacta sunt servanda, conferring 
to the court the right to declare void the unfair clauses, by emphasizing that 
contractual freedom does not mean an absolute and discretionary freedom of 
contracting.25 Since contracts must respect the law and Article 1(3) of Law 193/2000 
states the obligation of the business entities to not apply unfair clauses in consumer 
contracts, it was not a question for the courts to consider the UCTD as prevailing over 
the general principle of freedom of contracts. Both the ÎCCJ and appeal courts use 
without difficulty the policy-based reasoning of the CJEU for the elucidation of 
interpretation problems, binding and tying the implementing law with the living EU 
law, as framed by the CJEU. Case law assessments confirm that the Romanian 
judiciary succeeded in well-integrating the methodology of the CJEU into judicial 
reasoning. This is an extraordinary achievement in a strongly positivistic judicial 
culture, such as the one in Romania. The central merit of the ÎCCJ consists in the legal 
theoretical clarification of the function and the place of the new private law institution 
– “the unfairness test” - within the system of domestic contract law, including the 
interplay of policy on unfair contract terms law with the general principles of contract 
law. 
However, in contrast with this successful, public policy focused approach of the 
judiciary on the question of absolute nullity and the obligation of own motion, the 
consumers have no administrative tools in case it happens that the courts do not act 
on own motion. Only the appeal can remedy such situation. This is of major 
importance from consumer perspective, because the number of civil law suits when 
the business entity brought the consumer in court for non-payment is far more 
significant than the number of cases initiated by the NACP, especially in the field of 
financial services, but also in the sector of telecommunications. Also significant in 
number are the court cases based on an enforcement order or evictions in the field of 
mortgage loans when the consumers raise the objection of unfairness among other 
grounds of contract invalidity.  
Case law assessment confirms that the obligation of own motion in civil law actions is 
not the main engine of the unfairness control, but rather the NACP and the consumer 
associations is the main engine. However, the consumers have no administrative 
remedies in case the judge would not comply with the obligation to act ex officio. The 
NACP considers that the guidance of the CJEU does not suffice on this matter, the case 
law of the CJEU should be transposed into the national legislation.  
 
18 ÎCCJ 686/2013. 
19 ÎCCJ Decizia 3234 din 23 octombrie 2014; ÎCCJ Decizia 3864 din 4 decembrie 2014.  
20 ÎCCJ Decizia 3885/2013 din 12 noiembrie 2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 586/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 950/2013, ÎCCJ 
Decizia 288/2012. 
21 Trib. Brasov Decizia 53/2012. 
22 ÎCCJ Decizia 3885/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 950/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 288/2012. 
23 ÎCCJ Decizia 3885/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 586/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 950/2013. 
24 ÎCCJ Decizia 3885/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 2875/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 686/2013, ÎCCJ Decizia 950/2013. 
25 ÎCCJ Decizia 2875 din 26 septembrie 2013.  
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The UCTD was turned into the main instrument of consumer protection after the 2008 
global financial crisis impacted consumer contracts, especially in the field of mortgage 
loans. Consumer contract justice is thus currently framed mainly by judicial 
developments in the field of consumer loans, according to the judicial needs of this 
sector that makes a mark on the standard of substantive justice in consumer 
contracts, in general. 
Due to lacking specific legal provisions to render contractual consequences for unfair 
contract terms between the parties and to lacking innovative judicial solutions suited 
to respond to the specific needs of long term social contracts, such as housing loans, 
the general consumer perception is that enforcement of the UCTD is weak in Romania. 
However, the reality is that the Romanian judiciary including lower courts and the 
highest court succeeded to functionally integrate the policy of the UCTD and the 
rulings of the CJEU in the domestic private law reasoning. This has led to a pro-
consumer interpretation of the implementing law of the UCTD in Romania in issues 
that fall under the UCTD. The methodology of Romanian courts may be considered as 
best practice in Central- Eastern Europe.26 In Romania the interpretation problems of 
the UCTD in the context of the domestic private law and domestic procedural law were 
solved by judicial rules and the legislature had not to intervene retroactively into 
contracts, thus the system and policy of traditional contract law both under the old 
and New Civil Code (entered into force on October 1, 2011) was interpreted in line 
with the UCTD being adapted to the specific needs of the consumers. This is the sole 
merit of the Romanian highest court and of the judicial system that coped with the 
interpretation problems without being backed up by doctrinal solutions.27 Today the 
ÎCCJ has settled case law on the UCTD, based on a significant number of decisions 
adopted since 2008 (169 are published on the website of the ICCJ): 25 in 2015, 38 in 
2014, 49 in 2013, 20 in 2012, 43 in 2011, 4 in 2010, 4 in 2009, 9 in 2008. The large 
majority of the cases concern consumer finances, especially mortgage loans. At the 
time of drafting this report the database of the Ministry of Justice showed 614 pending 
cases on Law 193/2000 in the lower courts. Thus, the effectiveness of enforcement of 
the UCTD is not low in Romania compared to other EU countries.  
However, effectiveness suffers a serious deficit when it comes to the consequences of 
unfairness on the contractual relationship between the parties, especially in those 
sectors, such as in case of long contracts, including mortgage loans for housing 
purposes, where restoration to the situation before contract conclusion under the 
traditional principles of general contract law may not serve the interest of the 
consumers. Given the lack of special rules, there is the risk that if the terms of the 
contract were found unfair the consumer would be put in the situation to repay at 
once the value of loan contracted for several decades, if no agreement is reached with 
the financial institution to continue the contract without the unfair term. There are 
cases when, given the lack of agreement between the parties on another contract 
term on the interest rate that was found unfair, the court ruled for the termination of 
the contract and restoration of the situation before contract conclusion, without 
awarding damages for the consumer.28  Since there are mass litigations in the field of 
consumer finances where thousands of consumers will need to be reimbursed for the 
26 On judicial methodology of the Romanian courts see: M.Józon, The Methodology of Judicial Cooperation in 
Unfair Contract Terms Law, in F. Cafaggi, S. Law (eds.) Judical Cooperation in European Private Law, 
Edwards Elgar, 2017 (forthcoming).  
27 Doctrine on unfair contract terms law, as on consumer private law and consumer public law in general, is 
poor, rather descriptive than reactive or innovative. This is why the very few journal articles and books on 
consumer law published in Romania assessed for the purposes of this project are not quoted in this 
Report. 
28 For example: Judecătoria Ploiești, secția civilă I, decizia nr. 154270/2014 (Court of First Instance of 
Ploiești) 
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value of payments charged under the unfair terms for long periods of time, innovative 
solutions may not come from courts soon, as they remain reluctant to assume the role 
of policy framers by using innovative solutions for damages. Thus legal uncertainty is 
still high in this respect in Romania and this implies costs for both the consumers and 
the banks.  Consumers urge new rules to complete the process of justice provision, 
since finding unfairness with the help of the UCTD is only the starting point. Given the 
lack of specific rules the consumers and banks often opt for mediation.  
In 2015, a specialized institution was established for alternative dispute resolution 
between consumers and financial institutions – the Centre for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the Banking Sector (Centrul de Soluționare Alternativă a Litigiilor din 
Domeniul Bancar-CSALB)29 which started its activity on March 1, 2016. The procedure 
at CSALB is free of charge. In its activity report published on June 30, 2016 for the 
first 4 months of activity, the CSALB reported 117 written complaints and 450 
telephone inquiries. In total, 79 requests for alternative dispute resolutions arrived at 
the CSALB in that period out of which 42 were rejected for various reasons, such the 
lack of acceptance of the alternative dispute resolution by the credit institution 
because of ongoing court litigation, because they proceeded in reaching an agreement 
with the consumers, or because they started eviction proceedings against the 
consumers. Thus 37 requests are in resolution, out of which in 5 cases saw decisions 
adopted in favour of the consumers. However, the finding of the CSALB is that the 
consumers are not yet aware that the alternative dispute procedure is not mandatory 
procedure for the financial institutions, and that there is a lack of consumer confidence 
in the alternative procedure that is quicker than the court procedure and is free of 
charge.30 The same report also mentioned the reluctant attitude of the financial 
institutions to comply with the solutions of the CSALB in case they agree with the 
consumers on alternative dispute settlement by CSALB.  
The consumer associations consider that mandatory rules are needed and not default 
rules on issues where Member States have autonomy in establishing the details 
necessary for making the UCPD workable within the context of their domestic private 
law, and that full harmonization would have served better their interest, given the lack 
of specific rules in issues left to Member State law. They also urge rules on legal 
consequences when administrative authorities or the courts would not comply with the 
requirements arising from the UCTD, including state liability. Even when the 
consumers have in hand a final decision with an erga omnes effect in a case won by 
the NACP, they need to go to court to obtain an execution of the court decision since 
the NACP does not have the legal means to impose administrative sanctions on the 
business entity if it refuses to comply with the court decision. The NACP can employ 
only the existing judicial mechanisms to achieve compliance with the court decision. 
It was also suggested by consumer associations that more administrative procedures 
should be available; only in extreme cases should the consumers go to court, and the 
law should give less room to courts and less room for adjudication on contract 
fairness. The main consumer organisation, which is a qualified entity to proceed in the 
interest of the consumers, could only report on 1 court case they initiated concerning 
the directives which are the subject matter of this assessment. Nevertheless, this 
consumer association submitted more than 100 complaints to the NACP. However, 
today the enforcement mechanism of the UCTD is based largely on courts and not on 
the administrative enforcement authority. The role of the NACP only consists in the 
identification of the unfair clauses within its regular market assessment or on the basis 
of consumer complaints, whereas unfairness must be reinforced by a court decisions, 
and fines may be imposed only by the courts. The fines that may be established for 
infringement of the UCTD are no more than symbolic for a company (EUR 200 to 
1 000).31 This does not diminish the role of the administrative procedure which is free 
29 The CSALB functions as a non-governmental, non-profit, public interest entity, which transposes at 
national level the requirements of Directive 2013/11/EU and of Directive 2009/22/EC. 
30 The report is available at: www.csalb.ro/images/PAPORT.PDF  
31 On August 1, 2016 RON 1000 amounted to EUR 225 at the official exchange rate of the National Bank of 
Romania.   
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of charge for the consumers and the litigation costs are supported by the NACP may 
not win in court.  
As long as legal sanctions are missing where business entities do not comply with 
court decisions on fairness, the provision of justice is perceived by the consumers as 
incomplete.  This also weakens the effectiveness of the administrative enforcement 
and the success of the judiciary in enforcing the European unfair contract terms law in 
issues that fall under the UCTD. These are the risks of minimalistic and partial 
harmonisation for the consumers of those Member States where the market values 
and consumer values are strongly competing in the policy approach on contract 
fairness, where business entities continue to question in Constitutional Court the 
legitimacy and legality of the approach of the European unfair contract terms law, that 
protection of the consumer is public interest. Consumer associations urge the adoption 
of procedural rules that would ban the suspention of the execution of final court 
decisions by reason of constitutional control, which so often requested by business 
entities who have infringed the unfair contract terms law. 
Both consumer associations and business associations interviewed were of the opinion 
that a graphical representation of general terms and conditions would have a positive 
impact on consumer comprehension of contracts. In the same line, the NACP added 
that it should better assist the consumers and businesses if the UCTD would contain a 
list of pre-contractual information to be provided to the consumers similar to the 
approach of the Consumer Credit Directive. However, the NACP did not mention what 
such a list should contain. This proposal neglects however that general information is 
not sufficient to alleviate the information asymmetry of the consumers, which in 
specific fields need specific information. Additionally, more information does not 
necessarily reduce the risk of unfair terms. Considering the consumers attitude 
towards unfair commercial practices, it would be more efficient to institute an ex ante 
control of the general terms and conditions by a sectoral authority instead of providing 
more pre-contractual information (horizontal information) to the consumers.  
Last but not least, another weak chain of the enforcement of the UCTD must be also 
mentioned: the lack of reaction in the affected markets to the large scale use of unfair 
terms, lack of acknowledgement by the business that unfair contract terms law is 
market regulation that protects not only the consumers but the competitors as well, 
and that unfair terms distort the market. The NACP could not recall instances of 
notifications coming from business entities about cases of infringement of Law 
139/2000 by competitors. Although business entities may inform the NACP about an 
infringement of Law 193/2000, this possibility remains so far unexplored by business 
entities.  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
No information from business associations on this issue can be reported. 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
No information from business associations on this issue can be reported.  
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 • Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No information from business associations on this issue can be reported.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms; 
The need to protect small business is not raised in the legal literature on unfair 
contract terms law. However, court judgements can be reported where small 
companies tried to invoke the implementing norms of the UCTD in order to challenge 
the fairness of contracts concluded with financial institutions or large industrial 
companies. However, lower courts and also the ÎCCJ stay bound to the definition of 
the UCTD and the case law of the CJEU on the concept of consumer.32  Companies 
repeatedly brought the issue also to the Constitutional Court, which refused to 
consider Article 2 of Law 193/2000 unconstitutional regarding the definition of the 
consumer on the basis that the limitation of the definition of the concept of consumer 
to natural persons is an ‘omission of the legislative’, and thus is a question of policy 
which cannot be substituted via judicial interpretation.33 In these requests for 
constitutional control, the companies advanced the argument that framework 
contracts practiced by large companies impose clauses onto small companies that 
cannot be negotiated due to their market position, thus these contracts fall under the 
unfair contract terms law.  
The concept of the consumer is interpreted strictly by the Romanian courts due to the 
lack of domestic legislation that would empower them to give an extensive 
interpretation of the concept. Considering that so far Romania did not make use of the 
possibility granted to the Member States by Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights 
(the Consumer Rights Directive) to extend the test of the UCTD also to B2B contracts, 
the current jurisprudence will hardly change in the near future. However, Romanian 
courts started testing the boundaries of the consumer concept in those cases when the 
contract seems to have a mixed nature. The preliminary question referred to the CJEU 
by Romanian courts in the cases C-143/13 (Matei); C-110/14 (Costea); C-534/15 
(Dumitraș); C-74/15 (Tarcău) aimed at clarifying where the borders are between the 
consumer interest and the business interest. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
The business association interviewed is against such an extension for the reason that 
business entities do not suffer from information asymmetry and are not weaker 
parties in negotiations (so do not need similar protection to consumers).  
 
32 ÎCCJ, Decizia nr. 763/2015 din 10 martie 2015  
33 Curtea Constitutională, Decizia nr. 464/2011 din 12 aprilie 2011, Curtea Constitutională, Decizia nr. 
621/2012 din 12 iunie, 2012, Curtea Constitutională, Decizia nr. 360/2013 din 24 septembrie, 2013, 
Curtea Constitutională, Decizia 2013/2014 din 15 aprilie 2014.  
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
No such details were provided by business associations since they are against the 
extension of the UCTD to B2B.  
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?34  
The ID was implemented in Romania by Government Decision 1153/2004. Romania 
opted for the administrative injunction. Two of the directives that constitute subject 
matter of this assessment fall under the procedure of injunction: UCPD and UCTD. 
Such injunctions may be submitted by qualified entities (consumer associations 
empowered by law to represent the collective interest of the consumers) to the 
enforcement authority (the NACP), which under an emergency procedure (within 20 
34  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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day upon the receipt of the consumer complaint) in well justified cases will take the 
measures and impose the administrative sanctions provided by the implementing laws 
of the these directives in order to stop, limit or remedy the effects of the unfair 
practices. Government Decision 1553/2004 does not institute special procedures and 
does not confer additional competencies on the enforcement authorities in relation to 
the injunction procedure.  
The injunction procedure has very low practical relevance in Romania, and is not used 
so far by the consumers. Only one single injunction case could be reported by the 
NACP (registered in 2015). This case was advanced by a designated consumer 
protection association upon it received more than 100 inquiries from consumers 
concerning the infringement of Law 193/2000 on unfair commercial terms and Law 
363/2007 on unfair commercial practices. The NACP did not grant the injunction in 
this case for the reason that some of the consumers had pending cases in court 
against the same financial institution for the infringement of the same provisions.  
The NACP considers that the consumers are not interested in the injunction procedure 
because they are satisfied with the procedure at the NACP which is free of charge and 
quick, even if a little longer (the injunction being 20 days). Since the NACP can issue 
orders to stop the infringement and impose sanctions onto the infringing companies ‘a 
procedure such as the injunction is not inevitably necessary’.  The NACP could not 
report any injunction submitted from other Member States. 
The reasons behind the low relevance of the injunction procedure are complex. First of 
all, there is the approach on implementation, namely the option for the administrative 
injunction instead or beside the court injunction. The Romanian consumers need 
assistance in courts, private enforcement being the weakest chain of the enforcement 
mechanism in the case of both the UCPD and the UCTD. Another obstacle for its large 
scale use is that it does not bring more assistance for the consumers in procedural 
terms (did not introduce new procedures), whereas it is more risky and costly if the 
consumer goes first to a consumer association and that association will proceed in the 
interest of the consumers. In case the complaint fails, the consumer must pay the 
litigation fee, whereas in case where the NACP brings the business entity to court 
under the UCTD, then the NACP pays the litigation cost, and the same applies if the 
business entity challenges the administrative decision of the NACP in court.   
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Compared to the ‘direct’ enforcement procedure at the NACP, the length of the 
procedure was mentioned as being the only advantage for the consumers in case of 
injunction. Whereas the administrative procedure may take up to 30 days and may be 
prolonged one time for 15 days, the injunction would take up to 20 days.   
Concerning the costs of injunction, the administrative procedure is free of charge, the 
consumer must not pay any fee and the cost of the litigation falls on the NACP, 
whereas in a case where the consumers ask a consumer association to represent their 
interests, the procedure will be free of charge, but if the court rules for litigation costs, 
than such costs will be paid by the consumers.   
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The scope of injunction was not extended.  
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• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
No progress can be reported since 2012.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
There is no best practice to report, as no successful injunction cases can be 
mentioned.  
Nevertheless, the qualified entity which is empowered to act in the interest of 
consumers in Romania considers that injunctions could have a major role in curing the 
current deficit in legislative and judicial solutions on the award of damages to the 
consumers affected by unfair terms, if the European legislation would impose onto the 
Member States the obligation to adopt rules on collective procedures for cases that fall 
under the ID.  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
No such case was reported by authorities.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
No such case was reported by authorities.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
In the opinion of the NACP, the injunction procedure should be extended to include 
collective redress.  
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1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Injunction is governed by a separate law, which however does not contain a distinct 
procedure. Thus in case of injunctions the procedure will be determined by the law 
under which the injunction takes place, from those listed in the Annex of the ID. 
  
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Not the case for Romania.  
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
The administrative enforcement mechanism of the implementing laws of the UCTD and 
the UCPD are of high benefit for consumers in Romania. The risks and costs of court 
actions far exceed those of administrative enforcement. When NACP refers a case to 
the court, consumers do not bear any cost. However, the administrative enforcement 
does not have contractual consequences between the parties. The court will render the 
contract clause of the contract void if the case may be.  
In the case of the UCPD, consumers save costs, taking into account that redress in 
case of damages is ensured by the administrative procedure. In the case of the UCTD, 
consumers save the costs of establishing the unfairness of a term, but they would 
have to address themselves to the court to receive redress.  
A consumer organisation could represent consumers in front of the court, and in this 
case, neither consumers, nor the organisation pay the taxes imposed by the court.  
In case the consumers complain at the NACP about a potentially unfair term, the NACP 
proceeds to assess the contract under the UCTD and if considers that the interest of 
consumers justifies it, it will initiate a court case against the company. This procedure 
is free of charge for consumers, and the consumers prefer to complain under this 
administrative procedure instead of going to court directly to challenge the fairness of 
the terms and of the contracting practice of the business entity. This procedure is not 
only costless but also last less time than a civil law suit. The NACP solves the 
complaints within 30 days.  The risks and costs of litigation are fully on the NACP. This 
is why so far the Romanian consumers did not make use of injunctions. Despite the 
net benefits of this procedure for the consumers, they have not made use of it at a 
large scale in order to prevent the business entity from bringing the consumer to court 
under the unfair terms. The number of civil law suits initiated by business entities 
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against consumers for late performance or non-performance of their payment 
obligations under contract clauses that turned out later to be unfair is much higher 
than the number of complaints submitted by consumers to the NACP before they were 
brought to court for non-performance. This reality indicates that there is still low 
awareness among consumers on the benefits of the administrative procedure on the 
unfair contract terms carried out by the NACP. However, in this context it must be also 
mentioned that since there are no specific laws on the consequences of finding 
unfairness and declaring the terms void in terms of how the courts should restore the 
situation before and how the damages should be calculated, the UCTD only opens the 
way for contract justice, which is then completed under the domestic approach for 
damages. 
The NACP does not have competence to go to court in the field of the UCPD. Its role 
stops by finding the commercial practice incorrect and imposing sanctions against the 
infringing business entity. This administrative procedure is also free of charge. 
However, since in such cases the NACP does not bring the business entities to court, 
the procedure is shorter. Usually the business entity challenges the finding of the 
NACP in court. It is indeed a very significant step in Romania to have contractual 
consequences for finding the commercial practice incorrect, although this procedure is 
not applied by the NACP, which builds cases on the UCTD when the complaints of the 
consumers focus on the contractual consequences of the unfair commercial practice. A 
similar legislative solution would be more than welcome also for unfair contract terms.   
Last but not least, the NACP considers that if commercial fairness would improve by 
enhancing enforcement of the UCPD and the MCAD, then this would have positive 
impact also on unfair contact terms law. This acknowledgment of the NACP fully 
depicts the Romanian realities.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
No opinion can be reported from business associations on this issue. However, 
considering the low reaction coming from the market, in terms of complaints at the 
NACP (on unfair commercial practices and comparative and misleading advertising), it 
seems that business entities are not fully aware of the market regulatory function and 
the effect of these directives on competition. The NACP could not recall any single 
complaint or notification on the use of unfair terms by competitors, and only isolated 
cases of complaints on unfair commercial practices were mentioned. No court 
decisions can be reported from Romania that would provide information on cases 
when business entities went to civil law courts to sue their competitors who infringed 
the UCPD or the UCTD.  
Unfair commercial practices and unfair commercial terms continue to be employed at a 
large scale in Romania. It seems that instead of complying with the laws implementing 
these directives, the companies prefer to assume the risks and costs of liability. This 
supports the assumption that in Romania the preventive effect of post-ante control on 
unfair commercial practice and unfair commercial terms is still low, considering the 
weak reaction of the market (no complaints from competitors), the low value of fines 
that can be imposed by the NACP, the length and costs of litigations, and the lack of 
clear contractual consequences (exception being the administrative sanction of 
repayment of the price of marketed goods or services in case of unfair commercial 
practices).  
However, the NACP considers that due to the active role of the NACP less unfair terms 
are applied by the business entities, although the number of investigations and court 
cases are still high.  
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• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
The NACP considers that companies invest in high quality expertise to defend their 
case, but invest far less in legal compliance. They hire the best law firms in case of 
administrative investigations.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Administrative enforcement is free of charge for consumers. Where the NACP decides 
to bring the business entity to court and the court establishes litigation costs, such 
costs will be supported by the NACP. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
Not the case for Romania. Both the NACP and the national associations of consumers 
carry on their activities under a low budget.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
In the opinion of the NACP and consumer associations any reduction of their financing 
would be at the expense of the consumers. The NACP emphasized the need for 
continuous training in order to grant to its staff updated information on case law.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
In Romania enforcement of the UCPD and UCTD falls into the competence of the NACP 
and not of the sectoral authorities. Concerning the institutional framework on 
enforcement of the horizontal consumer directives, the NACP considers it important for 
effective consumer protection that consumer policy is framed by an entity that is 
independent of and not under the subordination of an economic ministry (although the 
NACP is in the coordination of and financed from the budget of the Ministry of 
Economics). In the view of the NACP the current institutional set up is appropriate in 
the sense that other ministries or regulatory authorities which are in charge of issuing 
authorisations for companies and supervise the market along market policies do not 
have sector specific enforcement competencies in relation to the consumer protection 
directives. In the opinion of the NACP, conflicts of interest may be avoided this way. It 
has also emphasized that consumer issues should be presented and defended at EU 
level as well by the national consumer protection authorities and not by ministries of 
economies as usually happens. Thus the NACP considers that the current institutional 
framework should not change, enforcement of these directives should remain under 
the umbrella of the central enforcement authority, free from economic policy 
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considerations in order to assure effective consumer protection by way of uniform 
administrative practice.    
For this reason the national authorities in the regulated sectors contacted for the 
purposes of this assessment (National Authority for Regulation in the Field of 
Communications and the National Regulatory Authority for Energy Services) have no 
legal competence to take measures (stop the practice and impose fines) in case they 
notice incorrect commercial practices or unfair contract terms within their sector. They 
can only report such cases to the NACP, which will take the necessary measures for 
the protection of consumers. Thus, in the regulated sectors as well, the consumers can 
complain only to the NACP about cases of unfair commercial practices and unfair 
commercial terms. The NACP will consider sector specific legislation to the extent that 
this is related to the consumer rights mentioned in the horizontal legislation (UCPD 
and UCTD), especially the information obligations of the business entities towards the 
consumers. However, there is no mandatory legal obligation for the regulatory 
authorities to involve the NACP in their sector or vice versa. Although there are in 
place bilateral protocols on collaboration between the NACP and the regulatory 
authorities, notifications towards the NACP and vice versa work rather on a voluntary 
basis and only very few instances of such cooperation were mentioned by the NACP. 
One can conclude from the interviews that such cooperation is not regular and there is 
not a tight procedural framework. However, the NACP would see a need for more 
involvement for example in the unfairness check of the standard contracts in the field 
of public utility services in the energy sector.  
The energy sector is specific from the point of view of the interplay of horizontal and 
sector specific legislation concerning the provision of public utility services to 
consumers. Here the companies must submit for approval to the sector specific 
authority the standard contracts they apply with consumers. Due to this ex ante 
control of the standard contracts in this sector the chances of service providers to 
apply unfair terms is very low. If the service providers do not comply with the 
standard terms approved by the sectoral authority, then the consumers may complain 
to the NACP, which will take measures against the company. However, if the 
consumer leaves the regulated market of public service and procures the energy from 
the free market, then they lose this protection. The sectoral regulatory authorities 
have no competence in their fields to implement the UCTD except in this sector.   
Concerning unfair commercial practices, the special regulatory authorities can only act 
when the unfair commercial practice also infringes the conditions of authorisation. 
Then the regulatory authorities may suspend the authorisation. At this point, although 
not mentioned by the NACP or the interviewed regulatory authorities, there may be a 
case of overlap, since the NACP as well may suspend the activity of the business entity 
in case it refuses to comply with the measures that the NACP adopts upon finding that 
questioned commercial practice is unfair.  
The sector of financial services has a special institutional framework; here the NACP 
has a special competence and has a separate department in charge of handling 
consumer claims. The NACP takes the sector specific legislation into consideration in 
its investigations and assessments on commercial practices and unfair terms, 
especially on the information obligations towards consumers.  
Sector specific case law on unfair contract terms reveals that the consumers are aware 
of their rights in the field of financial services and telecommunications (especially 
mobile telephone services). Court cases on unfair terms in consumer loan contracts far 
exceed the number of unfair contract terms cases in other fields.    
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• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
Sectoral policies are mainly enforced by the sectoral authorities. These have no 
competencies related to the UCTD for which the NACP is in charge, whereas for the 
UCPD the competence is shared between the NACP and the Ministry of Public Finances. 
Their main competence is the authorisation of business entities to conduct sectoral 
activities and supervision of the markets. However, their competence to approve the 
framework contracts of the service providers has indeed a positive impact on legal 
compliance by the companies with the requirements under the UCTD, although  the 
sectoral authorities do not have post ante control competence on the implementation 
of the consumer contracts. This falls in the competence of NACP and the courts. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the two directives (UCTD and UCPD) are not 
applied complementarily by the NACP. It applies either the UCTD or the UCPD and 
when the consumers are more interested in contractual consequences of the business 
unfairness the NACP uses the UCTD as legal basis and not the UCPD. 
There are bilateral protocols in place between the NACP and sectoral authorities in the 
field of energy and telecommunications. These bilateral protocols contain detailed 
provisions on cooperation and information between the authorities. In the field of 
unfair contract terms, the sectoral authorities have the competence to approve 
framework agreements of the service providers and in case they discover unfair terms 
such contracts will be forwarded to the NACP which will take the necessary measures. 
Sectoral authorities do not have competence to impose sanctions where they discover 
unfair terms and unfair commercial practices.  
By Government Decision 162/2016, which entered in force on March 22, 2016, a 
specific legal framework on interinstitutional cooperation was established to fight 
against unfair competition. The Interinstitutional Council is built of the Ministry of 
Public Finance (enforcement authority of the MCAD) National Consumer Protection 
Authority (enforcement authority for UCTD and UCPD), National Council of Audiovisual 
(enforcement authority for MCAD), Competition Council, and State Office for 
Inventions and Trademarks. Among the competencies of the Council is the 
harmonisation of the competencies of the stakeholder authorities and cooperation in 
the process of elaborations of policies aimed at the prevention of unfair competition. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
In general the horizontal and sector specific provisions provide a coherent legal 
framework on information obligations. Nevertheless, overlaps and gaps may be 
identified in the sector of electronic communications between the horizontal and 
sectoral legislation with an impact on information obligations of the service providers. 
Thus, for example overlaps between the transposition act of Directive 2011/83/UE 
(Emergency Government Ordinance 34/2014 (Article 4, para. (1) lit. a), c), d) and f) 
which has horizontal application (implemented by the NACP) and the specific 
information obligations governed by Article 11 of Decision no. 158/2015 lead to cases 
when the same company is fined by both authorities on different legal basis, although 
Decision 158/2015 adapts the requirements to be sector specific. However, in other 
cases, the overlap does not cause costs because although the sectoral legislation 
provides for sectoral competence the sectoral authority does not have competence to 
impose sanctions.  As concerns compliance by the service providers with the terms of 
their standard contracts, according to Article 7 (c) intent 3 of Government Ordinance 
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21/1992 (GO 21/1992 has general provisions – lex generali) NACP can impose 
sanctions, if there is no specific legislation (lex specialis). 
A competence gap in enforcement was also signalled in the energy sector where the 
sectorial legislation provides for information obligations of the utility providers towards 
the consumers, although the sectoral authority has no competence to enforce these 
provisions and impose sanctions.  
Sectoral authorities mentioned the lack of competence to enforce sectoral legislation 
on information obligations as a deficit of the sector specific legislation. In the opinion 
of the sectoral authority for telecommunication services, more sectoral competence 
would bring more sectoral expertise that would enhance enforcement of the horizontal 
directives, at least in the sector of communications. Such a need was not mentioned in 
the energy sector, where the authority is in charge of ex ante control of the general 
terms and conditions of the public utility service provider, although it does not have ex 
post control competencies on such contracts. However, the central enforcement 
authority is committed towards the current division of competencies, in order to avoid 
possible conflicts of interest with the regulatory authorities which are in charge of the 
authorisation of the service providers.     
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
No such costs were mentioned by the stakeholders. The horizontal and sectoral 
requirements are different, and there are no overlaps in their opinion. The UCPD and 
UCTD are implemented by the NACP, whereas the sectoral legislation implemented by 
the sector specific authorities is of a different nature.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
See above. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
There is no legal provision or case law to report that applies the UCPD or the UCTD to 
C2B relations. However, the NACP signalled that lease contracts between C2B 
concerning lands or buildings may present fairness problems. The NACP is entitled to 
receive such complaints from the consumers concerned and then to assess the 
contract. According to the authorities and consumer associations there should be 
consumer protection in place also for C2B contracts since in these transactions as well 
the consumer remains the weaker party.  
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1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The concept of consumer in horizontal and sectoral legislation follows the policy 
approach of the directives. In Romania there are no special legal provisions in place 
aimed at providing special protection to vulnerable consumers concerning the 
directives under assessment. How formalistic or how flexible the concept of consumer 
is depends on the authority and the courts concerned and is interpreted on a case by 
case basis.   
Courts strictly refer to the policy preamble of the directives and the policy reasoning of 
the CJEU on the concept of average consumer. Therefore, no court case can be 
reported where the courts would have discussed the vulnerability of the consumers.  
Consumer associations made mention of lower court cases in the field of unfair 
contract terms where the private person contracting with the business entity was not 
considered to be an average consumer, due to his or her profession, although the 
contract was concluded outside of business and professional purposes. 
However, the NACP has considered the vulnerability of the consumers in its decisions 
in certain cases, especially in case of elderly persons, in the field of unfair terms. In its 
opinion the standard of ‘average consumer’ needs to be circumstantiated depending 
on the economic and social conditions of the consumers; it should be defined distinctly 
at least considering the field where it applies. The current concept is considered too 
vague and difficult to be adapted in practice especially for over-indebted consumers 
and elderly people, according to the NACP. There is a need for special provisions on 
vulnerable consumers in the UCPD and UCTD in the authorities’ view. The NACP drew 
attention to over-indebted consumers who are vulnerable on the financial market 
because of their need for short term loans for daily subsistence. Such cases have not 
yet reached the NACP, but are considered critical from the point of view of the affected 
consumers.  
In the context of the Romanian economic, social and judicial conditions of the 
directives under assessment, it would be more than justified to treat vulnerable 
consumers differently. Vulnerability is justified in certain transactions, such as life-long 
contracts for housing purposes. The age and mental conditions (elderly people) and 
business education of the consumers, especially their financial education and the 
characteristics of certain markets which are not able to correct market failures, also 
justify different treatment. Business entities have in the past abused consumer 
vulnerability that has led to consumer over-indebtedness with significant social and 
economic impacts in Romania. The weak impact of the UCPD in Romania and the weak 
corrective force of the market on unfair commercial practices also support the need for 
special protection of vulnerable consumers. Since special protection seems not to 
evolve via judicial law, only a special legal regime is therefore able to grant to the 
vulnerable consumers the protection they need.  However, the legislative solutions 
come slowly. Illustrative in this respect is the legislative process on defining the 
concept of vulnerable consumer in the energy sector. Here the framework provisions 
were enacted in 2012 by Law 123/2012 but the implementing rules providing concrete 
criteria to establish who is vulnerable are still to come. The law was not yet put in 
practice for this reason. Only at end of 2015 had the Ministry of Labor made public a 
bill on what the level of minimum income would be for vulnerable consumers. Law 
123/2012 defined the vulnerable consumer as: ’end consumers belonging to the 
category of residential consumers, who for reason of age, health or low income, are at 
risk of social marginalization and for the prevention of such risk benefit from social  
protection, including protection of a financial nature [i.e. financial aid].’  
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• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
As argued above, a high level of over-indebtedness among Romanian consumers and 
weak market reaction on incorrect commercial practices require specific protection on 
the consumers of financial services. Consumers of energy services are also vulnerable.  
 
1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
According to the NACP the level of protection has significantly improved due to the EU 
directives on unfair commercial practices and unfair contract terms. However, 
consumer associations consider that one can talk only of a moderate improvement in 
terms of effectiveness of enforcement.  
  
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Consumer associations consider that there is a significant improvement in this field. 
  
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
No information from business associations on this question.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
No information from business associations and consumer associations on this 
question.  
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
Consumer associations and enforcement authorities consider that the role of the EU 
directives is crucial for improvements in consumer protection in Romania.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – ROMANIA 
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Law 193/2000 on unfair 
contract terms 
 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
No   
Law 76/2012 and 
Emergency Government 
Ordinance 34/2014 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be considered 
unfair 
Yes Annex of Law 193/2000  
Law 157/2015 on the 
approval of Emergency 
Government Ordinance 
34/2014 
 Extensions of the application of Directive to 
individually negotiated terms  
No   
  Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No   
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1011
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Law 363/2007  Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Not by Law 
363/2007.  
However, 
specific 
legislation on 
financial 
services 
contains more 
restrictive 
provisions 
than UCTD. 
  
Law 33/2015 amending 
Law 363/2007 
 Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
See answer 
above. 
  
Government Ordinance 
37/2015 on the 
modifications of certain 
legal acts in the field of 
consumer protection  
 Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No   
Law 51/2016 on the 
approval of Government 
Ordinance 37/2015 
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Government Decision 
947/2000 on the 
modalities of indicating 
the price of products 
offered to consumers  
 Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
No   
Government Decision 
796/2011 amending 
certain legal acts in the 
field of consumer 
protection  
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations No   
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Law 158/2008 on 
comparative and 
misleading advertising  
     
Law 202/2013 on 
modification and 
completion of Law 
158/2008 
 Designated entities also may notify the 
enforcement authority   
Yes   Article 7 of Law 158/2008  
  Legal facilities may be directed jointly against a 
number of traders?  
Yes  
 
Article 8 lit. a) of Law 
158/2008 
 
  Legal facilities may be directed against code 
owners 
Yes Article 8 lit. b) of Law 
158/2008 
 
  Voluntary control by self-regulatory bodies  
 
Yes Article 19 of Law 158/2008  
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Government Decision 
1553/2004 on certain 
measures to stop practices 
that may affects the 
collective interests of the 
consumers  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Romania 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
Injunction was introduced by a 
separate legal act in Romania: 
Government Decision no. 
1553/2004 subsequently amended 
by Government Decision no 
1822/2004; Government Decision 
no. 957/2008 on modification of 
the Annex of Decision 
no.1822/2004; Government 
Decision no. 404/2010, 
Government Decision no. 
795/2011. 
However, no special procedure is 
provided for in the implementing 
act, thus the procedures under the  
laws enlisted in the annex to 
Government Decision 1553/2004 
will apply in case of an injunction 
that only provides a single 
procedural rule, the 20 day 
timeframe within which the 
authority must solve the 
complaints.  
The framework law does not 
go beyond the provisions of 
the ID.  
Injunction is not a separate 
procedure from the 
enforcement procedures of the 
implementing laws mentioned 
in the Annex of Government 
Decision no. 1553/2004 that 
enlists 13 legal acts for which 
an injunction is allowed. This 
annex does not go beyond the 
Annex of the ID.  
 
 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking 
an injunction? 
Designated entities (consumer 
associations entitled by law to 
represent the collective interest of 
the consumers. 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
An injunction is primarily 
administrative procedure within 
which the authorities may impose 
administrative sanctions that are 
provided in the laws that fall under 
injunction.  
However, injunction does not 
prevent individual consumers to 
defend their individual rights or 
the consumer associations to act 
according to their competence in 
the interest of consumers under 
other laws.  
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations 
are entitled to an exemption   of some/all 
cost related to the procedure please 
explain the characteristic of such 
exemption in the comments column. 
This is established in the laws that 
fall under injunction. Most of these 
laws provide for free of charge 
administrative procedure.  
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
No, scope of the Directive not 
extended 
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Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their 
associations 
No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage 
in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
No  
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
 
No 
 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be 
paid 
The competent authorities apply 
the sanctions provided in the 
specific legislation that has been 
infringed.  
 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
No   
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
No 
 
 
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
No  
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Can an action for damages or redress to 
be paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
No 
The law does not govern the issue 
of damages, since this is an 
administrative procedure.  
However, it allows the consumers 
or consumer associations to go to 
civil law court and ask damages.  
 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies 
on the injunctions order?  
No information available on this. 
However, the injunction order is 
not compulsory for the court, it 
may confirm or may reject the 
finding of the administrative 
authority  
 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 Court 
statistics 
More than 
1000 
adminis-
trative 
cases in 
which the 
NACP is 
litigating 
party  
 
The 
number of 
civil court 
cases is 
significant  
1 case  5930 
cases  
2 cases  Such data is 
not available  
Such data is 
not 
available  
Due to lack of 
data the 
percentage 
cannot be 
established  
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).35  
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s 
fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time involved 
for consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
No submission 
fees/stamp 
duty for 
consumer 
claims at 
courts 
since 29 June, 
2013  
RON 750 – 
3 000 (4 000) 
 
[approx. 
EUR 166 – 664 
(885)] 
- According to 
one consumer 
association it 
takes for a 
consumer on 
average 5-6 
hours to 
prepare a 
complaint   
Consumers must 
provide evidence 
on previous direct 
negotiation with 
the credit 
institution. 
 
Litigations may last 
from 2-7 years, the 
average length is of 
4 years.  
Some cases have 
last for 6-7 years. 
ADR  No submission 
fee/stamp 
duty  
Likely to be 
similar as 
above since 
the costs 
follow the 
lawyer fees  
- Likely to be the 
same as above. 
Consumers must 
provide evidence 
on previous direct 
negotiation with 
the credit 
institution. 
 
It may last 3-4 
months, including 
the decision of the 
judge. 
35 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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CSALB (in the 
banking field) 
functions only 
from March 1, 
2016 
Free of charge Free of charge - Likely to be the 
same as above. 
Consumers must 
provide evidence 
on previous direct 
negotiation with 
the credit 
institution 
 
90 days which may 
be prolonged by 3 
months. 
 
According to latest 
information the 
procedure at CSALB 
is extremely quick 
within the time 
frame provided by 
the law. The 
shortest so far was 
17 days in August 
Notes: (1) Emergency Government Ordinance no. 80/2013 abolished the submission fee/stamp duty for consumers in 
litigations initiated against business entities. (2) The 5-6 hours time is used by consumers to prepare a complaint to be 
submitted at the NACP, which will act in the interest of the consumers. This is used for gathering information on the 
internet or on consumer blogs and for exchange of information on unfair terms with other consumers as well as on how 
should be drafted the complaint and what evidence must be provided to the authority. No information is available on 
the time needed for the consumer to provide the necessary information to a law firm or an individual lawyer when the 
consumer opts for civil litigation. It will certainly take less time.  
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
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 • Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
Number of court cases on unfair contract terms law based on data available on the 
website of the Ministry of Justice.36  
2016 (January-June): 2091 cases 
2015: 5930 cases  
2014: 3522 cases  
2013: 1055 cases  
2012: 865 cases  
2011: 843 cases  
2010: 995 cases 
One can notice an increase in the number of court cases from 2013 under the impact 
of the case law of the CJEU.  
 
 
36 See www.portal.just.ro/  
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Romanian Banking Association  Business association 30 June 2016  
Romanian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry  
Business association 28 June 2016 
National Consumer Protection Authority National consumer enforcement 
authority 
29 June 2016  
National Authority for Management and 
Regulation in Communications  
National regulatory authority 28 June 2016 
Regulatory Authority for Energy National regulatory authority 30 June 2016 
Ministry of Finance  Ministry Written and phone 
interview  
European Consumer Centre  European Consumer Centre 29 June 2016 
Association Pro Consumer Consumer organisation 29 June 2016  
Association of Romanian Users of 
Financial Services 
Consumer organisation 29 June 2016 
Competition Council   Written interview  
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Cristina Dana Enache 2012 Clauze abuzive în contractele încheiate între profesioniști și 
consumatori (Unfair terms in contracts concluded by professionals 
with consumers), Editura Hamangiu, 2012. 
Sorna Popa Dreptul  
3/2015 
Dreturile consumatorilor în statornicirea Ordonanței de Urgență a 
Guvernului nr. 34/2014 privind drepturile consumatorilor în cadrul 
contractelor încheiate cu profesioniști (The rights of consumers in 
Emergency Government Ordinance 34/2014 on consumer rights in 
contracts with professionals).  
Carmen Adriana 
Gheorghe 
Curierul 
Judiciar 
1/2014 
Clauzele abuzive în contractele cu consumatori (Unfair terms in 
consumer contracts) 
 
Anca Nicoleta 
Gheorghe, Camelia 
Spasici 
2012 Dreptul consumației (Consumer Law), Editura Hamangiu, 2012.  
 
Ana Juanița Goicovici 2014 Credite pentru consumatori și investiții imobiliare Commentarii și 
Explicatii (Loans for Consumers and Investments in Immovable) 
Editura Ch. Beck, 2014. 
Lucian Bercea Curierul 
Judiciar  
6/2013 
Configurarea contractelor standard. O aplicație la noile acțiuni de 
înlătrare a clauzelor abusive în contractele de consum (Standard 
agreements configurations. Applications on new actions for the 
removal of unfair terms from consumer contracts) 
Ioan Ilieș Neamț Revista 
Română de 
Drept Privat  
6/2013 
Considerații generale cu privire la acțiunile       reglementate în art. 
12 și 13 din Legea 193/2000. Analiză de drept comparart. (General 
considerations on the actions governed by Article 12 and 13 of Law 
193/2000. Comparative analysis.)  
Beatrice Andreșan 
Grigoriu, Mădălina 
Moraru 
2015 Country Report Romania, in Hans. W. Micklitz, Irina Domurath 
(eds.) Consumer Debt and Social Exlcusion, Hart, 2015, pp. 114-
133.   
Mónika Józon 2016 The Methodology of Judicial Cooperation in Unfair Contract Terms 
Law, in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Stephanie Law (eds.) Judical Cooperation 
in European Private Law, Edwards Elgar, 2016 (forthcoming).  
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report SLOVAKIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach proved to be the only effective way to prevent and 
remove the use of unfair commercial practices. Its effectiveness has been verified by: 
a) findings of the Commission on the Assessment of Terms in Consumer Contracts and 
of Unfair Commercial Practices established at the Ministry of Justice, (hereinafter 
referred as ’Commission on Assessment’), b) decisions of Slovak Trade Inspection 
(authorised administrative authority, hereinafter referred as ’STI’) and c) the fact that 
court decisions clearly indicate, that the list of practices will never be exhaustive and 
complete to cover all misleading or aggressive practices. To sum up, the court 
decisions and the decisions and findings of administrative authorities tend to use the 
general clause or directly the black list proportionately. This overview of the relevant 
decisions shows that the courts tend to prefer the use of the general clauses enabling 
them to grasp the complexity of the cases where more sophisticated forms of abuse of 
the trader’s position occurred. The reasons for such a finding may be that decisions in 
such cases were more complicated and could not been solved out of court (one may 
argue that when a practice is identified as the one of the black list practices, the 
solution of the case is clear without court proceedings therefore the sanction of 
administrative authority and other ways of dispute solution are easily available). 
The following list contains the examples of cases where the principle-based approach 
was used:  
• Decision of Supreme Court of 25 May 2015, no. Sžo/32/2014: misleading 
commercial practice in relation to the price of service and its calculation; 
• Decision of Regional Court in Bratislava of 14 November 2013, no. S/154/2011-
113: unfair commercial practice that consisted of unauthorised and misleading 
ticking the box ‘for purposes relating to the profession’ - in the relevant case the 
consumer was a pensioner; 
• Decision of Regional Court in Trnava of 4 May 2016, no. 24 Co/448/2015: unfair, 
misleading practice of the trader inducing the consumer to acknowledge the debt 
without real knowledge and the understanding by the consumer of the effects of 
such conduct presented in the standard  contract form; 
• Decision of STI of 7 May 2010, no. P/0110/05/2010: misleading practice in 
relation to the price of the product;  
• Findings of Commission on Assessment of 11 December 2012, no. 
56208636/2011-110.292,315,12156/2012110.20,23,24,25,26,28,30,36,41,46,60, 
71,91,142,172,178: The trader (the electric energy provider represented by its 
commercial agents) concluded doorstep contracts where they falsely informed the 
consumer that a) they represent the former provider, b) the contract is limited 
only to the change of the former contract regarding its content;  
• Findings of Commission on Assessment of 22 April 2016, no. 28052/2015-20.78, 
118, 253, 290, 349a, 379, 429, 33083/2016-20.120: misleading commercial 
practice in relation to the price of service and its calculation. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The everyday practice of STI, the body authorised to control the traders’ practices, 
shows that the black list is an important tool for prompt progress in their work. If a 
commercial practice falls under the black list it is not necessary to determine whether 
such a practice satisfies the requirements of a general clause. It also strengthens the 
legal certainty and the uniform decisions of authorised bodies.  
The black list proves to be useful as the easier way to decide on the concrete case and 
it may also serve as the educative tool both for traders and consumers. The list clearly 
indicates the border not to cross for traders and it may help to build up the 
argumentation in the relevant case for the reasonable and well informed consumer. 
The following list contains the examples of cases where the black list of unfair 
commercial practices was applied: 
• Decision of District Court Bratislava IV of 3 September 2014, no. 5C/64/2009, 
unfair commercial practices under Annex I, misleading: no. 7, 17, 20, aggressive: 
no. 24; 
• Decision of STI 19 July 2013, č. P/0076/04/13, unfair commercial practices under 
Annex I, misleading: no.7, aggressive: no.31; 
• Warning of STI for Slovak consumers about unfair commercial practices of Israeli 
traders where the STI has no inspection authority, unfair commercial practices 
under Annex I, misleading: no. 7, aggressive: no. 31;1 
• Findings of Commission on Assessment of 13 August 2014, no. 02097/2013-
110.120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 139, 140, 142, 146, 183, 186, 190, 191, 
192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 221, 
224, 226, 228, 263, 266, 269, 275, 293, 321, 331: aggressive commercial 
practices under Annex I, no. 31. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
In Slovakia, the deficiency of the implementation of UCPD has finally been removed 
only by the amendment of CPA by the Act 102/2014 Coll. by which the scope of 
consumers’ protection against UCPs has been broadened to the products including not 
only movable things (goods) but also services, immovable property, rights and 
obligations. The lack of previous regulation was evident and it restricted the 
entitlement of STI to control traders.2  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
In relation to the Directive 2006/95/EC on the harmonisation of the laws of Member 
States relating to electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits, 
STI realised the inspection of the electrical appliances where the investigations of STI 
indicated among the breaches also the non-conformity in the regard to information 
1  Available at: 
http://www.soi.sk/files/documents/rspotreb/spotrebite%C4%BEsk%C3%BD%20prieskum%20nekal%C3
%A9%20praktiky.pdf  
2  Machútová, 2013.   
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provided to consumers about voltage limits and performance per watt. The problems 
consisted of faulty labelled voltage limit or misleading performance per watt.3  
Experiences of consumer organisations indicate problems with misleading information 
about the performance of domestic home appliances. On the other hand, business 
associations complain about the conflict and gap between standards for performance 
(e.g. new performance standards for vacuum cleaners) and the expectations of 
consumers regarding the performance and long-standing use of the electronic 
equipment. At the same time the business associations acknowledged that the 
improved technology may allow for very good performance of the sustainable 
characteristics. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The courts frequently employ the term ‘average consumers’ without paying special 
regard to the assessment of their qualities. Also stakeholders indicate that there is a 
presumption that the consumer in the particular proceeding is an average one, 
therefore this category seems to be self-explanatory and it is questionable whether it 
is useful to have it in the text of directive’s articles. It may be sufficient to include this 
term only in the recitals. On the other hand, in the academic literature the demand 
was raised of the need to stipulate the objective criteria for average consumer by the 
law.4 This plea seems to be rare, as the court practice does not indicate such need. 
District Court Poprad in its decision 17C/113/2010 of 20 December 2011 held with the 
reference on decisions of CJEU (C-201/96, C-220/98) that the average consumer on 
the internet does not materially differ from the average consumer in the ‘brick and 
mortar’ or ‘walk-in’ shops nowadays, as the great number of consumers use on-line 
sales and on-line services without any special education. The court referred to the 
statistics of www.telecom.gov.sk as a proof of the extensive use of internet in Slovakia 
that suggests that the average consumer could not be differentiated from the common 
user of internet. 
Attention should be paid to the fact that the average consumer in the Slovak republic 
is highly influenced by the price of the product as the Slovak average income 
(EUR 882 per month in 2015) is in comparison to the EU average a relatively low one.5 
Supreme Court in its decision of 26 April 2012, no. 8 Sžo/40/2011 argued at the same 
line of reasoning: ‘The average consumer gets primary orientation on market by the 
prices of the products, and it should be stressed that every consumer does not 
regularly buy the goods in instalments and is not experienced in such a form of sale’. 
The Regional Court in Prešov in its decision of 25 February 2013, no. 16 Co 24/2013 
argued that the average consumer is not able to assess all circumstances decisive for 
the case alone and therefore the appeal by the consumer organisation as the 
intervener should be admissible also against the consumer’s will. This decision has 
been thoroughly criticised on the grounds of the excessive over-protection of the 
consumer.6  
In some decisions there is a link created between the notions ‘average consumer’ and 
‘vulnerable person’ (e.g. decision of District Court in Nitra of 1 April 2014, no. 
3  Available at: http://www.soi.sk/sk/Kontrolna-cinnost/Vysledky-kontrol-SOI/Vyhodnotenie-sektoroveho-
programu-dohladu-SOI-nad-trhom-pre-elektricke-zariadenia-pouzivane-v-u.soi?ind=  
4  Graban, 2012. 
5  Vozár, 2013. 
6  Available at: http://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/nazor-ochrana-spotrebitela-napriek-jeho-nesuhlasu-alebo-
ks-presov-urcuje-co-je-pre-priemerneho-spotrebitela-najlepsie.html?print=1   
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15C/55/2013, decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 November 2015, no. PLz. ÚS 
5/2015). 
Business associations expressed the opinion that the protection of consumers is 
generally reasonable but also the concern that the notion of ‘average consumer’ is 
sometimes interpreted as meaning a person without a sound mind. Such an 
interpretation may endanger not only traders but consumers as well, as it results in 
higher prices for the products and services. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
As already stated above sometimes there is a tendency to identify the vulnerable 
person with the consumer.  
The explicit use of the provision on the protection of vulnerable consumers in the 
decisions of relevant authorities in connection to UCPD is not frequent, but on the 
other hand, the judges usually take into account all relevant circumstances of the case 
and the vulnerability of the concerned person may be one of them, i.e. the relevant 
authorities do not explicitly create new categories of consumers but they pay attention 
to their situation (poor, indebted) as the personal situation of the consumers is the 
important factor in their transaction decision.  
District Court Bratislava IV in its decision of 3 September 2014, no 5C/64/2009 held 
that the defendant was vulnerable because of her age (pensioner) (regarding an unfair 
commercial practice: falsely claiming that a product is able to cure illnesses). 
Sector specific directives (energy sector) have introduced the notions of ‘energy 
poverty’ and ‘vulnerable customer’. The sectoral protection of the vulnerable 
customers seems to be an efficient measure (in relation with the generally applied 
UCPD). Some stakeholders argued that generally the notion of the vulnerable 
consumer is redundant; its importance may be manifested only in the sectoral 
regulation. Otherwise they found the general regulation targeted on the average 
consumers as a sufficient tool. On the other hand, the consumer organisations would 
prefer to introduce this category also into UCTD. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
As one of the examples of the quite successful self-regulation action may be 
considered the activity of the Council for the Advertisement.7 The Council is the non-
governmental body encompassing the various subjects from trade, advertisement and 
media. They declare as the main objective of their existence to provide and promote 
honest, decent, legal and truthful advertising in the Slovak Republic. Their Code of 
Ethics for Advertisement Practices serves as the basis for the decisions of their 
Arbitration Committee based exclusively on a written suggestion of the complainant. 
The complaint may be submitted by any legal or natural person, except the members 
of the Committee. The awards of the Arbitration Committee frequently tackle aspects 
of unfair commercial practices and misleading advertisements. The reference to the 
findings of the Arbitration Committee and their reasoning may be found in the 
decisions of the state authority (STI). The cooperation between Slovak Trade 
Inspection and the Council for the Advertisement works in both directions. Also the 
advertisement in accordance with the legal requirements may be contrary to some 
ethical requirements envisaged by the Code of Ethics. In such a case, STI may 
7 Rada pre reklamu, http://www.rpr.sk/en 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1026
reassign the complaint to the Council for proceeding and the Arbitration Committee 
may hold the advertisement as breaching the Code of Ethics despite the fact that this 
advertisement is in accordance with CPA or Act on Advertisement.8 
The regulatory authorities emphasised problems in the area of enforcement of 
obligations stipulated under the code of conduct by code owners. The traders ranking 
among the group of traders bound by code frequently do not indicate in a commercial 
practice that they are bound by the code. It is also questionable whether the trader is 
obliged to communicate this information under Article 6 (1) UCPD. Monitoring 
compliance with the code by those who have undertaken to be bound by the code is 
not in practice frequently executed by the code owner. Also where the code owner has 
knowledge about non-compliance, an effective enforcement mechanism is not 
available.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Stakeholders point out the lengthy procedure for the amendment of a directive. In this 
regard the principle based approach seems to be a sufficient tool in the long term. On 
the other hand if there was an admissible procedure for updating the black list without 
need to go through the legislative process, this would improve the functioning of the 
protection against unfair commercial practices.  
According to stakeholders these practices should be added to the list: 
• Television contests, games or fortune-telling, where practices of non-transparent 
fees, manipulation with connection to TV studio or the intentional disinformation 
occur, or there is intentional provision of false or incorrect information about how 
to proceed in the game or to solve the task (the idea being to prevent the 
consumer gaining the envisaged benefits); 
• Subliminal advertising; 
• Court practice suggests that attention should be paid to the frequent practice 
where the consumer is offered to conclude an instalments agreement, but its 
effect regarding the renewal of prescription period by acknowledgent of the debt is 
‘hidden’/‘unsaid’ and the consumer concludes this agreement without real 
knowledge about its effects on the prescription period (by acknowledgment of the 
debt the new 10 year period begins). Courts held that such conduct constitutes an 
unfair commercial practice and dismissed trader’s claim (e.g. decisions of Regional 
Court in Bratislava of 21 April 2016, no. 9Co/659/2013; Regional Court in Trnava 
of 4 May 2016, no. 24Co/448/2015; District Court in Michalovce of 2 May 2016, 
no. 24C/3/2016 and others).  
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
Very problematic areas for protection of consumers (apart from consumer credits) are 
firstly contracts negotiated away from business premises and secondly the 
enforcement of consumers’ debts.  
Concerning the contracts negotiated away from business premises, the traders 
organise various ‘presentations and advertisement actions’ at spaces accessible to the 
public, such as restaurants, hotels or during excursions. In reality these actions 
labelled e.g. as ‘cookery show’, ‘wine tasting’, etc. were very aggressively organised 
8 Kršková, Pániková, 2016. 
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sales events. The use of unfair commercial practices was so frequent that the Slovak 
republic had to introduce special administrative rules for these actions. Under article 
11 of Act on Distance and Off-premises Sales and Services effective from 1 May 2014 
the trader is obliged to notify a ‘sale action’ in advance (20 days before action takes 
place) to STI, particularly to provide the invitation to the action and the contract 
terms, list of products offered and prices required. STI will assess the information 
provided and if it is in accordance with law, it will publish the action on their website. 
The breach of obligations of the trader at the ‘sale action’ has important 
consequences, particularly the consumer contract concluded in such action is 
considered as not ‘concluded’. The strict regulation of the rights and obligations of the 
providers at the ‘sale actions’ has led to a pronounced decrease in the use of unfair 
commercial practices at ‘sale actions’. Consumer organisations approved of this 
measure.  
Similarly troublesome for consumers proved to be contracts for supply of gas, 
electricity and water negotiated and concluded on the occasion of the unsolicited visit 
of trader or their representative at the consumer’s home. These findings have been 
obtained mainly from decisions of STI and from findings of the Commission on the 
Assessment of Terms in Consumer Contracts and of Unfair Commercial Practices. 
Future regulations or improvements of UCPD should also concentrate on preserving 
the dignity of the consumer and preventing the use of the illegal and immoral 
enforcement of the consumers’ debts. Humiliation or defamation of consumer should 
not belong to the regular practices of traders. In this regard the Regional Court in 
Prešov in its decision of 27 November no2 Co/116/2011 held that trader is ordered to 
cease the commercial practice: sending the notices to the consumer to pay debts 
under the threat of publication, sending shaming notices in the envelopes labelled as 
‘how to get rid of debts’ or addressed explicitly to ‘the debtor’ and to cease any 
advertising of consumer as a debtor. (The stage of enforcement is partly covered by 
Annex 1 no. 25, 26 of UCPD).    
Regulatory authorities indicated that consumers have to face serious problems in 
cross-borders relations, partly due their lack of experience and understanding and the 
lack of differentiation between domestic and foreign providers of services. Consumers 
claimed protection at the domestic regulatory authority because they encountered 
serious problems in communication with foreign regulatory authorities, the information 
from foreign regulatory authorities was provided only in a state language of the 
foreign Member State and cooperation proved to be problematic and time-consuming. 
     
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price; 
Stakeholders have not expressed problems in this area. PID and the obligations of the 
traders stemming from this regulation are relatively easily and therefore also 
frequently reviewed by the state authorities. The findings of the STI suggest that the 
breaches in this area are frequent, but many of them are also caused by negligence 
and the breaches are not always intentional.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
There is not unanimity among consumer organisations on how to solve this question: 
some of the stakeholders would prefer ‘performance measurement’ while some of 
them would prefer both ways of indicating the ‘unit price’. 
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Business associations point out the risks involved in labelling such products only by 
performance, as the inspection would not be easy and the criteria of the measurement 
per 1 kg or 1 litre is more objective. Moreover the consumers have different 
performance expectations and such subjective criteria may cause more difficulties 
than any real gain that could be achieved.  
As the proof of differentiated opinions may serve the answer provided by the 
government officials preferring the measurement by number of washloads and 
referring to this method as employed also by STI. 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not applicable. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
Business associations expressed satisfaction with the current state of regulation. The 
prominent Slovak legal scholar discusses non-commercial advertising or social 
advertising and its possible effects on trade and the market (e.g. quitting smoking, 
preference of home-made products, etc.).9 The scope of Directive in this sense 
depends on the interpretation of Article 2(a) of MCAD.      
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach seems to be the inevitable solution in the legal practice 
in Slovakia in regard to the misleading advertising (and other forms of unfair 
competition as well) as the court practice and academics require a double test,10 i.e. 
the misleading advertising should not only fulfil the requirements of its legal definition 
in sec 45 of CommC, but its unfair nature must also be tested under the general 
clause of unfair competition under sec 44 of CommC (see e.g. Decision of the 
Supreme Court of 20.3.2008, no. 6Obo302/2002). On the other hand, while the self- 
standing nature of the particular clauses of unfair competition without any need to test 
them under general clause of unfair competition has been upheld by the Decision of 
the Supreme Court 5 Obo 138/2000, this approach seems to be sporadic and not 
generally accepted.11 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The regulation of misleading advertising is implemented in CommC within the frame of 
unfair competition regulation (sec 45 of CommC). The definition of misleading 
9 Vozár, 2013,  
10 Vozár, 2013.  
11 Závadová, 2015b. 
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advertising has been implemented almost verbatim from Art. 2 b) of MCAD, only in 
the Slovak regulation it has already included assets involved (the advertising of goods, 
services, real estates, a business name, trademark or designation of product origin 
and other rights and obligations).12 A more important feature of Slovak regulation is 
the alternative prerequisite that can indicate the misleading nature of advertisement, 
i.e. the advertisement is misleading also in the cases where it may injure consumers. 
In this regard the Slovak implementation provides a higher level of protection as the 
consumers are also entitled to claim legal protection against unfair competition under 
sec 53-55 of CommC. On the other hand, such regulation clearly blurs the borders 
between decisions of courts on unfair competition and unfair commercial practices. 
The reasoning in unfair competition cases has been therefore heavily influenced by the 
implementation of UCPD.13 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
Comparative advertising is not often used among traders as the risk of its illegality 
prevails over the positive effects and there was also opinion expressed that the legal 
regulation of its admissibility is vague and too general.14 Another scholar argues that 
the legal regulation of comparative advertising is at the satisfactory level and the 
reasons why this type of advertising has not been used frequently lies in the lack of 
information, inexperience and the concern about taking risks.15 Arguments of both 
abovementioned scholars however relate to the already repealed directive 84/450/EC 
and its transpositions into the Slovak legal order, but the frequency of the use of 
comparative advertising has not changed in the last years.16 Some of the stakeholders 
also expressed the opinion that ‘abstract’ regulation is applicable only with massive 
support of the relevant decisions of CJEU. Provided that everybody looks at this type 
of advertising as ‘risky business’ and considering the evident shift of its application to 
the area of internet and digital technologies, the full harmonization seems to be a 
reasonable choice. Moreover it does not hinder the use of article 8 para 3, 4 of MCAD 
nor the accommodation of its regulations to the particular restrictions applicable in the 
national state.17 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Government officials consider the legal framework in this regard as satisfactory. Some 
stakeholders point out the growth of the digital market and raise the issues of liability 
of information society service providers, where they feel a need for full clarification in 
relation to advertising. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Government officials do not consider enforcement in cross-border transactions to be 
efficient. They emphasised that the regulation on consumer protection cooperation 
(2006/2004/EC) solves the relevant matters in relation to consumers, but the 
enforcement in relation to B2B relations is not sufficiently supported and existing 
national enforcement arrangements are not adapted. 
 
12 Vozár, 2013. 
13 Vuongová, 2011. 
14 Jakab, 2005. 
15 Kubinec, 2005. 
16 One of the rare decisions in this area was decision of Supreme Court in case Tesco vs Kaufland of 28 
January 2010, no. Obdo V 84/2007. 
17 Vozár, 2011. 
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• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The regulatory authorities recommended including in the law regulating advertising 
the clarification of CJEU in relation to a) the requirement of verifiability (C-356/04), b) 
identification of the other competitor (C-44/01) and c) criteria necessary to consider 
for establishing the existence of the competitive relationship between the advertiser 
and the undertaking identified in the advertisement (C-381/05). 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
None of the stakeholders expressed concerns and problems in relation to this 
question. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
The uniform black list provides the same rules for all EU countries and therefore it 
prevents traders from using certain unfair practices in the EU as a whole. Stakeholders 
appreciate that it brings about clarity and certainty both for traders and consumers, 
allowing them to determine which conduct is not allowed. In this regard a mechanism 
for the subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD would be beneficial. 
Otherwise the general clause provides a reliable flexible rescue net.   
Slovak consumers are not satisfied with the frequent trade practice where food, 
laundry detergents, or washing powder sold under the same label or trademark 
everywhere are of a different quality in Austria, Germany or in Slovakia. Such practice 
is allowed by relevant EU provisions where producers are entitled to accommodate 
local tastes or requirements but some argue that such a law allows Central and 
Eastern European Member States to be provided with products of lower quality.18 Such 
conduct is regarded as an unfair commercial practice by Slovak consumers.   
   
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Slovakia does not make use of this minimal harmonisation. There was no input from 
stakeholders. 
 
18 http://www.hlavnespravy.sk/vieme-co-kupujeme-rozdielne-zlozenie-potravin-pod-rovnakou-znackou-
problem-celej-post-komunistickej-europy/649441  
 http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/300757/europoslankyne-si-dupli-nechcu-iny-tovar-pre-zapadny-a-
vychodny-trh/  
 http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/velke-porovnanie-potravin-nas-rakusku-rovnaky-tovar-ina-
kvalita.html 
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific answer was provided on the experience of businesses when conducting 
cross-border trade with other Member States, as observed by their associations and 
authorities.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
As already stated above some notions in regard to comparative advertising in the 
MCAD were considered too abstract and vague and there is a question whether the 
interpretation of CJ EU provides a sufficient solution in the long run. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The judicial cooperation and cross-border enforcement of court decisions in civil and 
commercial matters have been supported by a reliable legislative framework: unfair 
competitions claims involving misleading advertising or comparative advertising could 
be enforced under these rules. Stakeholders have however pointed out that the 
administrative enforcement and language barriers hinder administrative enforcement.  
   
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
It may be noted that big and medium enterprises are generally aware of information 
requirements as indicated by responses from representatives of traders and 
authorities. All stakeholders are unified in the point that there is an overflow of 
information and the consumers are thereby discouraged to read it. Experiences of the 
relevant authorities clearly indicate that consumers do not read information provided. 
Therefore the question whether the information should be more comprehensive does 
not target the real problem. Moreover the presumption that the majority of consumers 
make rational decisions is not verified by the practice of stakeholders. Rational 
decision making is undermined by factors such as low IQ, low financial literacy, no 
legal knowledge, the practices of some traders, needs of consumers, emotional 
factors, etc. Stakeholders also argue that the information provided to consumers 
exceeds the real possibility of human perception taking in regard complexity of life. As 
the example they provide European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS) under 
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Directive 2014/17/EU, is ineffective due to the large number of pages, although it may 
still be better than the lengthy standard contract terms of some banks.   
Business associations emphasised the costs (not explicitly in numbers) incurred in 
fulfilling all information obligations (legal advice, software, hardware, printing, wages 
of employees- where oral information is provided), all these costs must be reflected in 
the price of the product and business associations feel the lack of the serious statistics 
or research whether consumers are aware of the costs of protection they have to pay 
in the higher prices of the products.  
The level of the information requirements at the advertising stage covers substantial 
characteristics of the product essential for the consumer’s decision and nobody raised 
the need to broaden them in line with CRD. Moreover, the words ’if not already 
apparent from the context’ in Article 7 (4) and the link created by the Article 7 (5) 
seems to provide protection, too. Business associations appreciated that uniform 
requirements for the invitation to purchase created equal opportunities for businesses 
on the single market. 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
The information requirements in Article 22 of the Services Directive apply in addition 
to the information required for invitations to purchase under Article 7(4) of the UCPD. 
There is no discussion of this point in the Slovak literature. Only one reaction in 
interviews came from the government officials stating that information requirements 
laid down in the different laws significantly worsen the position of traders as it is 
demanding to be very well aware about all duties, therefore they recommend to unify 
the requirements and to eliminate the overlaps.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
It should be noted that a frequent unfair commercial practice that has been found is 
the practice of some providers (e.g. in the area of consumer credits) to illegally force 
the consumer to become the trader and to arrange the trade licence for him or her in 
order to obtain credit. By this way the traders are trying to exclude the application of 
consumer protective legislation. Such a relationship should be materially assessed as a 
B2C contract but the burden of proof is not easily shifted and this may cause 
problems.  
The experiences show that the application of the rules on unfair commercial practices 
in regard to SME should be probably extended. Otherwise there is a prevailing opinion 
that national law (sec 265 of CommC) where the exercise of a right that is contrary to 
the principles of honest business relations shall not enjoy legal protection and rules on 
unfair competition (including the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive) 
may be sufficient tool in B2B relations without any need to enact the special legislation 
in this field. The role of good manners and the application of doctrine of honest 
business relations in B2B relations have been supported also by the judgments of the 
Supreme Court of 18 June 2009, no. 3 Obdo 11/2008 or of 6 May 2008, no. 4 Obo 
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161/2007 or the Constitutional Court (I ÚS 457/2010 of 7 December 2010, I ÚS 
26/2010 of 8 December 2010).19 
The notions of unfair commercial practice and unfair contract term have already been 
introduced into the CommC in the regulation of B2B contracts by the implementation 
of the Late Payment Directive. Government officials assume that regulation of unfair 
commercial practices in B2B relations may deepen the protection already existing in 
the field of misleading and comparative advertisement. Generally they do not 
recommend application of the UCPD regime to B2B relations.  On the other hand they 
recommend the creation of a black list of unfair commercial practices in B2B relations, 
as such a list would support uniform decisions of authorities and legal certainty for 
participants in legal relations.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
Some of the stakeholders are extremely careful to support the regulations in the area 
of B2B relations. It is questionable whether it is feasible to draft a directive with a 
common principle–based approach for both B2B and B2C regimes.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
No specific experiences reported or literature to mention other than stated above. 
    
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Unfair commercial practices can significantly affect the EU single market in the cases 
when domestic retailers in some countries generally unofficially deny foodstuffs from 
other Member States (mainly new ones). As an example, it is possible to see other 
forms of such practices where a supermarket chain (owned by a foreign entity) prefers 
products from its home country over local products. With regard to higher production 
costs in the trader’s home country as well as higher transport costs, these products 
are being sold for a price lower than production costs, and this loss is covered by the 
supermarket chain with a high price mark-up imposed on local products, which is then 
reflected in low saleability due to the high price.20 
As stated above, government officials are slightly in favour of such list.  
The businesses are very often endangered by so- called ‘catalogue firms’, offering 
registration in their evidence, misleadingly creating the impression that the 
registration is compulsory or approved and required by the state authorities and 
falsely informing about the fee required or creating the impression that the service is 
free of charge.21 As a reaction to such practices, the amendment of CommC was 
adopted in 2013  in the part of unfair completion where the subsection 2 of  sec 47  
was added as follows: ‘In addition to the cases under Subsection 1, conduct 
contributing to mistaken identity also refers to an entrepreneur’s conduct in which 
their selection of a business name or use of the designation of an enterprise is 
objectively capable of leading the addressees of their business documents to 
19 See also Rostáš, 2014, Ovečková, 2011. 
20  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-trading-
practices/docs/contributions/public-authorities/slovak-republic-ministry-agriculture-and-rural-
devlopments_en.pdf  
21 Machútova, 2013, Biroščáková, 2007. 
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mistakenly identify the entrepreneur as a public register or another register 
maintained under the law.’  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
Government officials would like to support the revision and improvement of the 
mechanism of the cross- border enforcement in marketing and advertising in B2B 
relations. The civil law claims in unfair competition do not encounter problems.  
Government officials do not consider the enforcement for cross-border transactions as 
being efficient. They emphasised that the regulation on consumer protection 
cooperation (2006/2004/EC) solves the relevant matters in relation to consumers, but 
the enforcement in relation to B2B relations is not sufficiently supported and existing 
national enforcement arrangements are not adopted. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
The regulation of misleading advertisements in the Slovak republic covers also cases 
where such conduct may injure the consumer. In that respect the regulation of 
misleading advertising and misleading commercial practices overlaps and gives rise to 
contractual consequences already provided for in regulation and judicial decisions 
developed under the UCPD (see 1.1.7). It is questionable whether there is a 
contractual relationship between the injured person and the person in breach. The 
reply is a negative one in the majority of cases. Therefore there is no need to create 
contractual consequences linked to the breaches of the Misleading and Comparative 
Advertising Directive, the existing tools (administrative authority or court) are 
sufficient. Furthermore, it could be presumed that in the rare cases where the 
contractual link does exist, the breach of MCAD may also constitute a breach of some 
of the auxiliary duties in the relationship and in such a case the existing remedy may 
be activated. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
Government officials recommended to include into law regulating the advertising the 
achievements and clarification of CJEU in relation to a) the requirement of verifiability 
(C-356/04), b) identification of the other competitor (C-44/01) and c) criteria 
necessary to consider for establishing the existence of the competitive relationship 
between the advertiser and the undertaking identified in the advertisement (C-
381/05). 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
The general part of the Civil Code (CC) regulates the general prerequisites for the 
validity of legal acts and this part of CC also contains the general provisions on 
consumer contracts and the regulation of the unfair contract terms in B2C contracts. 
These provisions create a legal basis for contractual consequences in case of a breach 
of the UCPD. Slovak courts often review the category of unfair commercial practices 
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and the category of unfair contract terms together, depending on circumstances of the 
concrete case.22   
Unfair commercial practices are regulated in the Consumer Protection Act, CPA; this 
act prohibits unfair commercial practices before, during and after executing the 
commercial transaction (sec 7 para 1).  
Unfair commercial practices usually represent conduct (or omission) which is contrary 
to good morals (bonos mores).  This is defined solely for the purposes of the 
Consumer Protection Act (sec 4 para 8) as a conduct that is contrary to the 
conventional traditions and includes elements of apparent discrimination or departs  
from the rules of morality recognized at the sale of product or provision of service or 
that may cause harm to the consumer for breach of good faith, honesty, usages and 
practices, making use of mistake, deceit, threat, significant inequality of parties and of 
breach of contractual freedom.  
Validity of the contract has to be tested under the general clause for the invalidity of 
legal acts under section 39 of CC (A legal act is invalid if the content or the purpose 
thereof violates or evades the law or it is inconsistent with good morals). Taking into 
regard the above mentioned provisions (sec 7 para 1 of CPA, alternatively section 4 
para 8 of CPA), consumer contracts concluded with usage of unfair commercial 
practices can be invalid (under section 39 of CC).  
The misleading commercial practices may also give arise to a right of the consumer to 
invoke the invalidity of contract under section 49a of CC, where a legal act is invalid if 
a person acted in error arising from a circumstance decisive for its creation and the 
person to whom the legal act was addressed gave rise to the error or had to be aware 
of the error. A legal act is also invalid if the error was caused by the other person 
intentionally. The aggressive commercial practices may create a real threat for the 
consumer, in such a case, the contract will be invalid ex officio under sec 37 para1 of 
CC where a legal act has to be made freely and seriously, clearly and concisely, 
otherwise it is invalid. 
Use of an unfair commercial practice may be a reason for the application of sec 3 para 
1 of CC, under which exercise of rights and duties following from civil legal 
relationships must not interfere with rights and legitimate interests of others without 
legal cause and must not be in conflict with good manners. In these cases the court 
does not provide legal protection to the subject which violates the provision. 
Sec 53d of CC expressly states that a consumer contract containing a term already 
held unfair by a court (issued sooner that the contract was concluded), and which was 
entered into as a result of an unfair commercial practice or usury, is invalid. This new 
provision of Slovak CC is effective from 1st of June 2014 and it has been introduced 
under the influence of the Judgment of CJEU in case Perenič, Pereničova C-453/10.23 
In accordance with new civil procedure legislation (Civil Dispute Procedure Code 
effective from 1 of July 2016), if a court determines some contract term as invalid for 
its unfairness, then the court explicitly specifies wording of this unfair contract term in 
the dictum of the judgment (Section 298 para 2).  The explicit regulation of usury was 
introduced in 2014 in section 39a of CC. This provision makes usury invalid provided it 
is done by a natural person who is not an entrepreneur and misuses the other party's 
distress, inexperience, mental condition, stress, trustfulness, improvidence, financial 
dependence or inability to fulfil the other party's obligations and accepts, either for 
himself or for another person, a promise or provision of performance, the proprietary 
value of which is grossly disproportionate to their mutual performance. 
Under section 53c of CC if the consumer contract is made in writing, the subject-
matter and the price must not be written in smaller letters than other parts of the 
same contract, except for the title of the contract and its parts. The provisions of a 
consumer contract, as well as provisions contained in general commercial terms and 
22 Dobrovodský 2013, Budjač, 2013. 
23 Budjač, 2015. 
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conditions or in any other contractual documents related to the consumer contract, 
must not be written in letters that are unreadable for the consumer or smaller than as 
set out in an implementing regulation. Any contract made contrary to this provision 
shall be invalid. The breach of this provision may also imply the breach of the 
requirements of the professional diligence under Art. 5 (2a) UCPD, but as the second 
prerequisite under Art.5 (2b) UCPD shall not be probably fulfilled and the breach of the 
formal requirements is the sole reason for the invalidity of the written contract, this 
reasoning is not of such a great importance.24 
Apart from the invalidity of the contract, breach of UCPD may entitle the consumer to 
withdraw from the contract under section 49 CC, where a party that concluded a 
contract in distress under clearly disadvantageous conditions has the right of 
withdrawal from the contract.  
Under the above mentioned regulation of ‘sale action’, non-compliance with the 
requirements of special act leads to the legal non-existence of the contracts concluded 
at the action.  
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
The following list contains some of the relevant decisions:  
• Decision of the District Court in Prešov of 12 July 2010 no 17C/56/2010: The 
assignment of the claim by the trader (transfer of the contractual position) to the 
another subject seated outside EU has been regarded as an unfair commercial 
practice aimed at worsening the consumer’s position in relation to the trader as it 
creates obstacle for the consumer to claim the unjustified enrichment from the 
assignee, such transfer violates law and it is contrary bonos mores, the 
assignment is invalid under 39 CC; 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Prešov of 28 October 2014, no. 20Co/229/2013: 
Unfair commercial practices are prohibited. In this regard it is important to take 
into account good morals under sec 4 para 8 of CPA. The legal act that is contrary 
to the provisions of law is invalid (sec 39 CC). Legal act which is contrary to sec 4 
para 8 of CPA is invalid for the conflict with the law; 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Trenčín of 26 March 2014, no. 5Co/269/2013: 
The fraudulent inducement of the consumer to acknowledge the statute – barred 
debt constitutes an unfair commercial practice in the form of misleading omission 
and such practice is contrary to the requirements of the professional diligence, 
therefore the acknowledgement of debt by consumer is an invalid legal act under 
sec 39 CC. (Similar problem solved by the Decision of the Regional Court in 
Prešov of 7 June 2012 no 11Co/37/2012); 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Prešov of 14 July 2011, no. 6CO 1/2011: The 
assignment of the claim against the consumer to the assignee in the bankruptcy 
proceedings constitutes the unfair commercial practice, this assignment causes 
the material distortion in the commercial relations as the claimant in the 
bankruptcy is not obliged to pay the court fees. Moreover the consumer as the 
debtor will be unwilling to seek professional legal advice if he or she is sued by 
such assignee, because the reimbursement of the costs of the legal counsel for 
the consumer may prove as a problematic if that the other party is in bankruptcy 
and the consumer’s claim for reimbursement will not have any priority. The court 
decided that the assignment (which took place in many similar cases) is invalid 
under sec 39 of CC; 
• Decision of the District Court in Piešťany of 26 January 2012, no. 10C/5/2010: 
The package travel contract. The measure of damages awarded to the consumer 
24 Závadová, 2015a. 
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in this decision has been probably influenced also by the misleading commercial 
practices of the travel agent at the conclusion of the contract. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
As already stated above, such a link has already been created by the legislator in sec 
53d of CC or by usage of the category of good morals (sec 4 para 8 of CPA). 
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The principle based approach under this directive proved to be effective in establishing 
a high level of consumer protection, but such state has been reached only in recent 
years. To sum up the reasons, it took some time to tune in the legal regulation to the 
needs of consumers and for the court practice to take over the active role in the 
protection of the consumer. The Slovak Republic has adopted the regulation where 
next to the definition of the unfair terms by the general clause there is a list of unfair 
terms. The general clause states that consumer contracts must not contain provisions 
that cause considerable imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties to 
the detriment of the consumer. This shall not apply if such are contract terms that 
refer to the main subject matter of performance and reasonability of the price, if such 
contract terms are expressed distinctly, clearly and concisely, or if the unfair terms 
have been agreed individually. Provisions that the consumer had an opportunity to 
familiarise himself with before the signing of the contract but could not affect the 
content thereof, shall not be considered as individually agreed contract provisions. 
Unless the trader can prove the contrary, contract terms agreed between the trader 
and the consumer shall not be considered individually agreed. The unfairness of 
contract terms shall be assessed with regard to the nature of the goods or services for 
which the contract was concluded, and to all the circumstances of formation of the 
contract at the time of concluding the contract, and to all other contract terms or 
other contracts such are dependent on. The transposition of UCTD has begun in 2004 
(Act no 150/2004 Coll.), and in coordination with European Commission that had 
invoked the deficiencies of transposition in the preceding years, the nowadays 
regulation (the last fundamental amendments of regulation of unfair terms were 
executed in 2014) covers the substantial needs of society and the courts have been 
able to work effectively with the legal regulation. The transposition of the unfair terms 
in 2004 also positively influenced the legal status of consumers in contracts concluded 
before 1 April 2004 as under sec. 879f para 3, 4 of CC consumer contracts concluded 
prior this date should be brought into accordance with the provisions of CC and those 
contract terms that are not brought into agreement with the provisions of Section 53, 
54 and 57 of CC shall become invalid after the lapse of three months from the 
effective date of this Act.  
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• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list in the directive served as an inspiration for the Slovak legislator 
because in the course of the last twelve years it had been transformed with slight 
amendments to the CC in the form of the list of unfair terms.  
Government officials appreciate the indicative list in the directive as the important 
basis for the Member States to create the legislation. For the future regulation they 
would recommend the black list adopted in the directive in the form of minimum 
harmonization, so same practices would be regarded as unfair in all Member States. 
This should not preclude the Member States to broaden and supplement this list 
according to the domestic requirements and needs.  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
Slovakia has adopted the list of contract terms in section 53 para 4 of CC. The terms 
shall be regarded as unfair in particular if:  
a) the consumer has to fulfil them, but did not have the opportunity to become 
familiarised with them prior to concluding the contract;  
b) they permit the trader to transfer the rights and obligations from the contract to 
another trader without the agreement of the consumer, if the transfer would adversely 
affect the enforceability or securing of the consumer's claim;  
c) they exclude or limit the trader's liability for action or omission resulting in the 
consumer's death or injury;  
d) they exclude or limit the consumer's rights to claim liability for defects or liability 
for damage;  
e) they permit the trader to retain sums paid by the consumer even where the 
consumer does not conclude a contract with the trader or withdraws from it;  
f) they permit the trader to withdraw from the contract without any contractual or 
legal justification, while not allowing the consumer to do so;  
g) they entitle the trader to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without 
reasonable notice even in the absence of any reasons meriting special consideration;  
h) they require the consumer to fulfil all obligations even if the trader has not fulfilled 
the obligations which have arisen;  
i) they permit the trader to alter the contract terms unilaterally without a reason 
agreed upon in the contract;  
j) they state that the price of the goods or services is to be determined at the time 
when the goods or services are provided, or they entitle the trader to increase the 
price of the goods or services without making it possible for the consumer to withdraw 
from the contract if the price agreed when the contract was concluded has been 
significantly exceeded at the time when the goods or services are provided;  
k) they require any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum as a penalty;  
l) they restrict access to evidence or impose on the consumer a burden of proof which, 
according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract;  
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m) in the case of the trader's partial or complete failure to fulfil his obligation they 
unduly restrict or rule out a possibility for the consumer to exercise his rights vis-à-vis 
the trader, including the right to offset the claim against the trader;  
n) they extend the validity of a fixed-term contract after the expiry of the fixed period, 
while granting the consumer only a disproportionately short period to consent to the 
extended validity of the contract;  
o) they entitle the trader to decide on whether his performance is in line with the 
contract, or they grant the right to interpret the contract solely to the trader;  
p) they limit the trader's liability where the contract was concluded by an 
intermediary, or they require that the contract concluded by an intermediary be 
concluded in a specific form;  
r) they enable to solve the dispute between parties in arbitration proceeding without 
observing the prerequisites set by the special act;  
s) they require the consumer to ensure the fulfilment of his obligation at an amount 
disproportionately higher than that deriving from his obligation under the consumer 
contract when the agreement providing for the consumer to fulfil the obligation was 
concluded;  
t) they require a consideration from the consumer for a service, the provision of which 
by the trader is to a large extent against the interests of the consumer;  
u) they require the consumer to be bound by the contract for an unreasonably long 
time, even when it was clear when the contract was concluded that the object of the 
contract may be achieved in a significantly shorter time;  
v) they require reimbursement from the consumer for performances of which the 
consumer was given no prior information before concluding the contract, 
reimbursement for which was not regulated in the contract or for which the consumer 
does not receive the consideration agreed upon.  
w) they require the consumer to provide or remit to a third party or for the benefit of 
a third party any performance arising from or connected with the consumer contract, 
which is not, for the most part, for the consumer's benefit, or to fulfil any obligations 
to a third party in connection with such performance. 
There is almost general consensus among academics that this list constitutes a black 
list of contract terms,25 but hesitations were also expressed, as the present wording of 
Sec 53 para 11 of CC, which requires assessment of the unfairness of terms with 
regard to the nature of the goods or services and to all the circumstances of formation 
of contract, may favour the idea of ‘grey list’.26 The preference of the ‘black list’ over 
the ‘grey list’ has been firmly established in the court practice of the last years where 
the occurrence of unfair terms from the black list of terms in the contract does not 
presuppose the further testing of the material misbalance of the interests involved and 
therefore has been favoured by the judges. This position might be strengthened by 
the overload of consumer cases in the Slovak courts, where the list of unfair terms 
proved to be very helpful. Nevertheless, the serious arguments raised recently by 
some authors27 point out the legislatively unclear wording of Sec 53 para 4 of CC that 
allows also the interpretation that the list in the section 53 para 4 of CC is a grey list, 
and the particular term has to be tested by the general clause of unfairness. The 
indicative list of unfair terms expressly stated in CC has been a step in the right 
direction supporting the awareness of consumers.28  
 
25 Budjač, 2015, Csach, 2009. 
26 Lazíková, Števček 2013. 
27 Závadová, 2015b. 
28 Cirák, 2009. 
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• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
Under sec 53a para 1 of CC, if the court determined some contract term in the 
consumer contract concluded in multiple cases (i.e. as a part of standard contract 
terms), and it is usual that the consumer does not affect the content of the contract in 
a significant way, or in the standard business terms, to be invalid due to the 
unfairness of such term, or did not award the performance to the trader due to such a 
term, the trader shall refrain from using such term or any term with the same 
meaning in contracts with all consumers. The trader shall have the same obligation 
even if the court ordered the trader to render the consumer unjust enrichment, 
compensate for damages or pay adequate financial compensation on grounds of such 
term. The legal successor of the trader shall have the same obligation. This provision 
has been included in CC as effective from 1 of March 2010 in order to secure the full 
effect to the Article 7 para 1 of UCTD. The effect of a court decision establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term is not limited to the individual relationship between the 
specific trader and the consumer, but it could be regarded as extended to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader.29 Some authors argue that sec 53a of CC may be 
understood as an establishment of precedential character of the judicial decisions in 
consumer matters.30 Violation of the injunction by trader is considered as a 
particularly serious breach of obligations (sec 4 para 10 CPA). Such breach may lead 
to the sanctions by the Trade Office and to the suspension of their trade licence (sec 
58 of Trades Licencing Act). Under sec 3 para 5 CPA consumers’ organizations can sue 
the trader in cases of collective interests of consumers with the purpose of refrain of 
violation and eliminate unlawful situation created by the trader. 
At the beginning the effectiveness of sec 53a para 1 of CC had been contested by the 
traders objecting that the various district courts made different judgments concerning 
the same contract term. These objections have not been well reasoned because the 
full effect of the CC regulation and the protection of both parties at the court 
proceeding had been safeguarded by simultaneous amendment of the Civil Procedure 
Code (CPC) effective till 30 June 2016.31 This introduced the admissibility of the 
appellate review (extra-ordinary legal remedy) under section 238 paragraph 3 CPC 
against a judgment of a court of appeals by which a judgment of a court of first 
instance has been confirmed, if confirming a judgment of a court of first instance by 
which the court of first instance has declared the invalidity of a contract term under 
Section 153 para 3 and 4 of CPC.32  
29  Straka, 2013. 
30  Fekete, 2014. 
31  Budjač, 2015. 
32  Sec 153 para 3 CPC In the judgment regarding disputes arising from or in connection with a consumer 
contract, the court may state, even without any proposal, that a certain term used in consumer contracts 
by the supplier is unfair; in such case, the court shall state in the statement of the judgment the wording 
of such contractual term as agreed in the consumer contract.  
 Sec 153 para 4 CPC If the court has determined any contractual term in a consumer contract 16ab) or 
general commercial terms to be invalid due to the unacceptability of such term, has not awarded 
performance to the supplier because of such term, or the court has imposed an obligation upon the 
supplier to provide the consumer with unjust enrichment, compensate a damage, or pay reasonable 
financial compensation based on such term, the court shall explicitly state that term in the decision 
verdict, even without any proposal, in the statement of the judgment the wording of such contractual 
term as agreed in the consumer contract.  
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The Civil Dispute Procedure Code effective from 1 July 2016 has special provisions on 
consumer disputes. This new regulation has not only taken over the abovementioned 
instruments (determination of the unfair term in the judgment without proposal of 
participants or admissibility of the extraordinary appeal) but also introduced the long- 
awaited abstract control of unfair terms in consumer contracts. The final judgments in 
the proceedings on abstract control of consumer contract will be effective for 
everybody (sec 306 of The Civil Dispute Procedure Code). The proceedings on abstract 
review of consumer matters (review of unfair standard terms or unfair commercial 
practices) is a new type of procedure which is justified by the implementation of 
directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests 
(explanatory report to section 301 of CDPC). The courts of second instance (concretely 
Regional Court in Bratislava, Regional Court in Banská Bystrica, Regional Court in 
Košice) will decide these cases in the first instance. So, under Slovak legislation 
effective from 1 of July 2016 it is possible for the court to extend the effects of a court 
decision to all contracts of the trader (in the case inter-partes – quasi-precedential 
character of the court decision), and it is possible to sue the traders in abstract review 
of unfair contract terms (without necessity of individual dispute). In abstract review, 
complaint against trader can be filed by the consumer organisation or the national 
enforcement authority (e.g. Slovak Trade Inspection) and violations of injunction in 
abstract review can be sanctioned by administrative mechanism.    
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Contractual transparency requirement proved to be one of the most effective 
measures under the UCTD in connection with the important guiding role of CJEU ( e.g. 
C-143/ 13 Matei, C-26/13 - Kásler a Káslerné Rábai.   
The numerous court decisions and findings of the Commission on the Assessment of 
Terms in Consumer Contracts and of Unfair Commercial Practices have been based on 
breach of the transparency requirement. In order to strengthen the transparency one 
of the recent amendments of CC employed new measure in Section 53c of CC ‘If the 
consumer contract is made in writing, the subject-matter and the price must not be 
written in smaller letters than other parts of the same contract, except for the title of 
the contract and its parts. The provisions of a consumer contract, as well as provisions 
contained in general commercial terms and conditions or in any other contractual 
documents related to the consumer contract, must not be written in letters that are 
unreadable for the consumer or smaller than as set out in an implementing regulation. 
Any contract made contrary to this provision shall be invalid.’ This legislation targeted 
the frequently applied unfair practices rules where traders used a very small font size 
in contracts, as well as in general contract terms and conditions. The contract was 
thus difficult to read, making it hard for consumers to adequately familiarize 
themselves with the contract.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
The extensions of the application of UCTD to individually negotiated terms or to terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-matter do not apply in Slovakia. 
The possibility to review the individually negotiated terms had been opened for the 
consumer contracts concluded before 1 January 2008, as the revision of unfair terms 
restricted only to standard contract terms has been implemented in CC only by Act 
568/2007 Coll. This has been stressed by the important decision of the Regional Court 
in Prešov of 31 May 2011, no 20 COE/24/2011.  
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• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Invalidity of juridical acts in Slovak legal order may be absolute (juridical acts are 
void) or relative (juridical acts are voidable). The regulation of the unfair terms is 
based on the principle that invalid terms are absolutely invalid (void), such invalidity 
arises from the statute itself (ex lege) and its effects are universal (erga omnes), i.e. 
anyone may claim that a term is void (this rule is in the procedural law restricted by 
the admissibility to file a claim to the court by the entitled claimant). Absolute 
invalidity is taken into consideration by courts (or other public authorities) of their own 
motion (ex officio). Absolute invalidity may not be remedied by subsequent approval 
(ratification) or rendered valid by subsequent termination of invalidity. Performance 
provided under a void juridical act constitutes unjustified enrichment. Absolute 
invalidity is not subject to limitation or expiration.33 On the basis of invalidity of the 
unfair term, it may be ordered to restore unjustified enrichment, to pay damages or 
an adequate pecuniary satisfaction (sec. 3 para 5 CPA) to the consumer by the court. 
If the court decides that only part of a contractual term is unfair, this duty applies only 
with respect to that part. Furthermore, this duty also applies to the supplier’s legal 
successors. 
As already mentioned above, CPC and the newly effective Civil Dispute Procedure 
Code enhance the determination of the unfair term in the judgment without proposal 
of participants.  
The most discussed problem in the relation to the ex officio duty of court to examine 
the unfair terms used to be connected to the final arbitration awards, where the 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, 
particularly in the form of an arbitration clause in the consumer contract has arisen, 
later, only at the stage of its enforcement. The problems were so frequent that the 
amendment of CC in 2007 (Act no. 568/2007 Coll.) has also included into the list of 
unfair terms in sec. 53 para 4 (r) the following term ‘requires from the consumer in 
the frames of agreed arbitration clause to solve the disputes with the trader solely in 
the arbitration proceeding’.34 This regulation proved to be insufficient to protect 
consumers’ interests in the arbitration and many court decisions can be referred to 
solving the matters related to the arbitral awards based on the unfair arbitration 
clauses or if an arbitration clause itself has not proved to be unfair, where the 
protection of the consumer has been disregarded in the arbitration proceeding. Real 
choice and protection in arbitration proceedings has been substantially restricted for 
the consumer and the personally interconnected circle of suppliers, arbitrators and 
solicitors or even judicial executors has proven detrimental for the protection of 
consumers.35 The following list contains the extracts from the relevant case-law: 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Prešov of 31 may 2011, no. 14CoE/39/2010 - 
the arbitration clause as an unfair term; 
• Decision of the Supreme Court of 21 March 2012, no. 6 Cdo 1/2012 - the 
interpretation of Sec 44 para 2 of the Enforcement Act, the enforcement order 
that violates law on the grounds of the unfair terms; 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Trnava of 9 August 2011, no. 10CoE/326/2010 - 
the arbitration award as a substantially unenforceable order;  
• Decision of the Regional Court in Košice of 15 April 2013 no 6Co/383/2013 - the 
admissible period for the abolishment of the arbitration award; 
33 Jančo,2010. 
34 Csach, 2008, Magál, Kubina, 2008, Výboch, 2013  
35 Budjač, 2015. 
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• Decision of the Regional Court in Banská Bystrica of 26 October 2012 no 
17CoE/175/2012- substantially unenforceable enforcement order Sec 57 para 1 a) 
of the Enforcement Order, non- existent jurisdiction of the arbitration court. The 
court also expressed the idea that the principle vigilantibus iura scripta sunt has 
been overpowered by the need to protect the weaker party in the B2C relations; 
• Decision of the Regional Court in Prešov of 28 September 2012 no 
6CoE/210/2012, the arbitration clause as an unfair term, sector specific regulation 
on bank arbitration does not prevent the obligation of the bank employee to 
inform the consumer and to enable him the possibility of the choice in regard to 
arbitration.  
Perspectives in relation to the arbitral awards have improved only recently, after the 
enactment of the Act on Consumer Arbitration which provides a new and separate 
regulation covering alternative dispute resolution methods applicable to contracts 
involving consumers.36 The changed situation has been also reflected in the list of 
unfair terms in  sec 53 para 4 (r) of CC where present wording relates to the special 
requirements set out for the consumer arbitration ‘they enable to solve the dispute 
between parties in arbitration proceeding without observing the prerequisites set by 
the special act’.   
As far as the administrative remedy is concerned, the section 3 para 3 of CPA states 
that the consumer has a right to be protected against the use of unfair contract terms. 
The administrative authority (e.g. State Trade Inspection) executes the control of 
fulfilment of obligations by traders under CPA. Within the framework of this control it 
may review the standard contract terms, but the court is the sole authority at the level 
of private law relationship to decide whether the contract term is unfair or not; the 
protection of consumer by the administrative authority has therefore only preliminary 
character.37 The Civil Dispute Procedure Code (sec 193) stipulates that court is bound 
by the decision of the administrative authority that the administrative offence 
punishable under special regulations has been committed and who has committed it. 
In this regard the decision of the administrative authority is definite in relation to 
respective trader and the relevant contract term in the particular case. Some 
academics argue that effects of the decisions of the administrative authorities extend 
beyond the particular case.38  
Nevertheless, some consumers prefer to notify the administrative authorities of 
breaches of trader’s obligations before taking recourse to a judicial proceeding. The 
risk of an administrative fine and other sanctions seems to be in some cases a more 
persuasive compliance mechanism than the risk of a judicial proceeding with its length 
and costs.39 The administrative authority is also entitled to order the interim measure 
on the request of consumer organisation under section 21 CPA (see the part on 
effectiveness of ID).  
Government official emphasised that the length of court proceedings is the greatest 
problem for consumers discouraging them to claim their rights at the court. They 
assume that the lack of the reliable administrative enforcement of consumers’ rights 
against traders is the blind spot in Slovakia. 
The consumers successful in protection of their rights (also by invoking unfairness of 
contract terms) are entitled to claim the financial compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage under sec 3 para 5 of CPA (e.g. Decision of District Court in Lučenec, no 13Cb 
132/2009). 
The important role in the assessment of the unfair terms (and unfair commercial 
practices) is played by the Commission on Assessment of Terms in Consumer 
Contracts and of Unfair Commercial Practices. This authority is part of the Ministry of 
36 Maslák, 2015. 
37 Budjač, 2015. 
38 Csach, 2014. 
39 Csach, 2016. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1044
Justice, its creation was presupposed by sec. 26a of CPA and its role is to review the 
standard contract terms. If there is a breach, the Commission on Assessment shall 
pass their findings to the relevant state authorities or shall contact consumer 
organisation to give them incentive for a claim at the relevant state authority. Traders 
are obliged to cooperate with Commission.            
Court judgments on unfair terms in consumer contracts are available on the internet 
and the most important decisions on consumer matters are also available separately 
at the internet pages of Ministry of Justice in connection to the work of the 
Commission on Assessment. These decisions are classified into groups and this 
classification proves to be extremely instructive as it significantly shows the most 
problematic areas in consumer disputes, these are: the enforcement against 
consumers, the arbitral awards and their enforcement, transfer of a right for securing 
the debt of consumer, consumer credit agreements, the local competence of the court 
in consumer matters, maximum permissible consideration and unreasonable 
contractual fines and fees, exercising of the lien, unfair terms, unfair commercial 
practices, court fees  and finally also the decisions of the penal courts in matters 
dealing with credit and loan agreements. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A graphical presentation model would probably significantly improve the readability 
and comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs. One of the most relevant obstacles for 
consumers to understand and become acquainted with their rights and obligation is 
the huge amount of information. In this regard it could be only recommended that EU 
would not broaden the information requirements for traders: stakeholders do not 
regard this tool as effective, consumers do not have time and knowledge to read them 
and understand them, it is generally acknowledged that the lengthy T&Cs only serve 
as a place to hide a surprising term, and also fair and just terms are not easily found 
and understood in standard contract terms. To sum up, a graphical presentation 
model may bring about easier way for consumers to be informed about their rights 
and obligations.   
In Slovakia, there were frequently used unfair practices leading to the incorporation of 
unfair terms in contract in relation to the representation of the consumer.40 Traders 
nominated a person to be the representative for consumer in advance and this 
representative was authorised for the future: to create a security in the name of 
consumer, to represent the consumer at the stage of performance and the stage of 
enforcement, and to acknowledge the debt. Such a representative of the consumer 
was usually a close person to the trader and it could be assumed that there was a 
conflict of interests between representative and the principal (consumer). These 
practices were forbidden and the legal acts arisen out of such representation are 
invalid. The regulation in sec 5a of CPA however has its deficiencies because its 
interpretation may lead to results that the consumer may not use the representative 
at all. It is also questionable whether the problematic situation could not be solved by 
the general provisions on the conflict of interests in representation (sec 22 para 2 of 
CC). The explicit regulation in CPA however proved to be effective.  
 
40 Decision of the Supreme Court of 11.June 2013, no. 1Sžr/150/2012 
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1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
Stakeholders have not referred to any problems in this area.  
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
The advantages of targeted national protection probably prevail over the creating of a 
hypothetical barrier. Moreover, none of the stakeholders indicated that differently 
construed lists or prerequisites for unfairness of terms in the different Member States 
would represent barriers to cross border trade. The differences regarding the 
guarantees or sale of consumer goods may have more significant impact, similarly 
with languages barriers and types of products or services clearly unsuitable to be 
offered in cross-border trade.    
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
As already stated above, and the opinions of some stakeholders confirm this 
assessment, there is almost a negligible difference between small business (especially 
microenterprise) and consumers with regard to their knowledge, experience or 
negotiating power. Otherwise the views of stakeholders, particularly business 
associations, are not in favour of the regulation of contract terms between businesses. 
The knowledge and understanding of contract terms proved to be the relevant criteria 
and in the assessment of this point the need to clarify the terms of ‘professional’ or 
‘expert’ may be raised. In this respect the criteria of the appropriate skills and 
knowledge may sometimes be a more relevant factor than the status of an enterprise 
or consumer.  
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
In Slovakia the concept of good faith is not present in the legal regulation. Good 
manners could not be regarded as the fully equivalent term and in the area of 
commercial relations they are substituted by so called ‘honest business relations 
principle’. The concept of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ as used in UNIDROIT principles 
or as suggested in CESL proposal where ‘good faith and fair dealing means a standard 
of conduct characterised by honesty, openness and, in so far as may be appropriate, 
reasonable consideration for the interests of the other party to the transaction or 
relationship in question’, would be the appropriate yardstick. 
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The notion of unfair contract terms has been already implemented in CommC in the 
process of implementation of the Late Payment Directive. The criteria for assessment 
of contract term as ‘unfair” are as follows (sec 369d para 8 of CommC): a) compliance 
with the principle of honest business relations, b) the nature of the subject of 
fulfilment of the obligation, c) the existence of a justified reason for the debtor’s 
deviation from the default interest rate under law, the period of payment of the 
debtor’s monetary obligation under law and the amount of the compensation of costs 
connected with the enforcement of a receivable under law. A contractual agreement 
concerning the period of payment of a monetary obligation, the rate of default 
interest, or lump-sum compensation of costs connected with the enforcement of a 
receivable that is grossly disproportionate to the rights and obligations arising from 
the contractual relation for the creditor and without the existence of a justified reason 
for such agreement is invalid. The invalidity of an unfair contractual condition or 
prohibition of an unfair business practice may also be demanded by a legal entity 
founded or established for protecting the interests of entrepreneurs.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
Various theories offer the reasons for the control of standard contract terms: 
constitutional concepts, including fundamental rights and freedoms in the horizontal 
relations, contractual theories (e.g. Richtigkeitsgewähr), unequal bargaining power, 
procedural justice, transaction costs and information asymmetry, economy theories 
e.g. abuse of the participation in the market competition.41 The arguments expressed 
the need for the control of standard contact terms. In the relations between traders it 
is not easy to recommend protection also in regard to the individually negotiated 
terms, the main subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price. 
Stakeholders prefer the traditional tools of contract law in the area of individually 
negotiated terms. The above conclusion probably should not be applied to small 
enterprises where protection similar or almost same as for consumers would be the 
reasonable step forward. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
There is a special law in Slovakia regulating the relations between suppliers and 
purchasers of food enacted as the reaction to the frequent unfair practices in this 
branch of trade; the Act no. 362/2012 Coll. on unreasonable terms in trade relations 
objects of which are foodstuffs entered into force on January 1, 2013. The act has 
been covering only the sphere of trade relations with foodstuffs and determined 
(without having the general clause) 44 unreasonable terms for which any contractual 
party, benefiting from agreed unreasonable terms, may be sanctioned. The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development of the SR is the inspection body.  Upon the act, as 
an unreasonable term is regarded the financial/nonfinancial performance without 
adequate counter performance.42 The serious objections of effectiveness of this act 
were raised by prominent scholars in Slovakia43 (e.g. the protection of suppliers 
against food supply chains targeted by this act would be effective only if enacted by 
EU law.44 The question remains whether sectoral solution should be a preferable 
instrument in this area or whether there is a need for a principle-based approach. 
 
41  Csach, 2009. 
42  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-trading-
practices/docs/contributions/public-authorities/slovak-republic-ministry-agriculture-and-rural-
devlopments_en.pdf  
43  Csach, 2015b. 
44  Vozár, 2013. 
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• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
The need for contractual transparency belongs to the general requirements of modern 
contract law and there is not any reason why it should be excluded in B2B relations.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
No relevant data could be obtained to provide an answer to these questions.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
Lando argued that the differential treatment of B2B and B2C contract terms is not 
justified in the area of standard contract terms.45 The need to protect against 
surprising unfair terms should probably prevail over the negative consequences of 
regulation in this area but business associations are not much in favour of such 
regulation, some of them find the general rules of contract law and contra 
proferentem rule to be the suitable and satisfactory solution.     
Government officials recommend a thorough analysis in order to decide whether 
extending the scope to business-to-business transactions would be beneficial for 
trade. They recommend protection only to relation to microenterprises and do not 
recommend such regulation in relation to small and medium sized traders. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?46  
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
Under sec. 3 para 5 of CPA, consumer organization may apply to a court to claim that 
the breaching party shall refrain from unlawful conduct if it injures collective interests 
of consumers. Collective interests of consumers are interests of consumers which are 
not just the mere sum of the individual interests of consumers affected by a breach of 
consumer rights, but it is a conduct of the infringer applicable to all consumers.  
In the relation to this provision there is a related regulation of unfair competition, 
under sec. 54 para 1 of CommC: ‘The right to demand that an offender refrains from 
their illegal conduct and eliminates the improper state of affairs may also be 
45 Lando, 2014. 
46  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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exercised, except for cases referred to in sec. 48 through 51, by a legal entity entitled 
to protect the interests of competitors or consumers.’ Consumer organizations are 
entitled to sue the infringer in cases of unfair competition generally and in cases of 
following specific merits of unfair competition: misleading advertising, misleading 
designation of goods and services, conduct contributing to mistaken identity, 
endangering the health of others and the environment. Consumer organizations have 
right to sue and they are party of proceeding, not only a representative of 
consumers.47  
The question is what the concept ‘to remove the unlawful state of affair’ means in 
practice (mentioned in sec 3 para 5 CPA). Does it represent a right of the consumer 
organization to demand damages, unjust enrichment or financial compensation in 
favour of consumers? The answer is a negative one. The impossibility to demand 
monetary compensations by consumer organizations is confirmed also by the 
legislative change of sec 3 para 5 of CPA in the 2013. Wording of the relevant 
provision entitling the consumer associations to claim for removal of the unlawful state 
of affair was changed in that respect that their right expressed by words ‘including 
unjust enrichment” was deleted.48 Another reason is that a consumer organization is 
not a representative of consumers (under sec 3 para 5 CPA or sec 54 para 1 CommC), 
but a party of a legal proceeding. Under sec 456 CC the object of unjust enrichment 
shall be surrendered to the person at whose expense it was gained (and this person is 
not consumer organization but consumers). A consumer organization in proceedings 
defends the interests of consumers, but it is not the representative of consumers; the 
organization is acting in its own name in proceedings. 
As a result, consumer organizations cannot make financial claims (unjust enrichment, 
damages, financial compensation) in favour of consumers who suffered damage in 
cases of protection of collective interests of consumers. If the possibility of requiring 
financial claims by consumer associations under general norm stated in sec 3 para 5 
CPA was permitted, it would bring the substantial risk of abuse of this procedure and 
this is not desirable. Therefore, consumers whose rights have been violated and who 
have suffered financial loss must exercise their rights individually. The Ministry of 
Economy of the Slovak Republic in its policy document about Consumer Policy 
Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the years 2014-2020 notes that they are planning 
to introduce measures to enable financial claims by qualified entities in favour of 
consumers. However, nowadays the professional level of consumer organizations is 
not sufficiently developed for the proposed measure, the legal background in the 
Slovak Republic is not ready for application of that measure and there is a risk of it 
being abused.49  
Impediments to the effective protection of collective consumers’ interests are also 
created by insufficient material and personal sources of consumer organizations in the 
Slovak Republic.50 Stakeholders (consumer organizations) unanimously indicated this 
fact. Consumer organizations are exempted from paying the court fees (sec 4 para 2 
letter c) Court Fees Act), nevertheless court proceedings may be expensive with 
respect to the possible future compensation of legal counselling in the event of failure 
in the proceeding (sec 255 para 1 CDCP or sec 142 CPC).       
47 Patakyová, 2013. 
48 From 1 of November 2012 to 9 of June 2013 the wording of sec 3 para 5 CPA entitled consumer 
associations to claim monetary compensations in cases of violations of consumer rights. The legal 
grounds and measure of compensation however remained questionable; therefore this part of the 
relevant provision remained in practice inapplicable. District Court Bratislava I in its decision of 20 
February 2013, no 15C/234/2012 points out that the provision sec 3 para 5 CPA does not contain a 
comprehensive substantive rules to establish the claim for unjust enrichment in favour of consumer 
associations. The court emphasised that the existence of unjust enrichment cannot be hypothetical, 
successful action is possible only if conditions are fulfilled for reimbursement of the unjust enrichment 
under CC. 
49 See discussion on Law blog lexforum.sk, available at http://www.lexforum.cz/417 or decision of District 
Court Bratislava I of 20 February 2013, no 15C/234/2012 
50 Straka, 2010. 
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Another problem is that until the success of the CDPC (1 of July 2016), procedural 
regulation of protection of collective interests of consumers explicitly had not existed. 
The former CPC did not expressly regulate the specific questions of abstract control of 
unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices in consumer contracts. The 
above mentioned substantive provisions of the CPA (generally) or CommC (in relation 
to unfair competition) presupposed the protection of collective interests of consumers, 
but they were not reflected by procedural provisions. These rights could have been 
exercised only by the application of the general provisions of CPC, but this solution 
had not been ideal one. 
As a result of the abovementioned state of affairs, protection of collective interests of 
consumers in private law was not ideal, but it does not mean that it completely did not 
function. Regional Court in Prešov (decision of 12 October 2011, no 6Co/177/2011) 
established the interim measure and ordered the defendant (trader) to refrain from 
any extrajudicial recovery of claims established by distance consumer contract 
concluded at given website except claims admitted by court decision. The Regional 
Court in Prešov in decision of 26 May 2011, no 6Co/84/2011, established interim 
measure and ordered the trader to refrain from conduct by which he or she persuades, 
induces or otherwise influences the consumer in order to achieve the feigned state 
that credit is for purpose of consumer’s profession or business. District Court Prešov in 
its decision of 3 February 2012, no 12 C 1/2012 ordered interim measure and 
prohibited any assignment of claims from the defendant (trader) to another third 
person except claims held by court decision and ordered the defendant (trader) to 
refrain from any extrajudicial recovery of mentioned claims. According to the Regional 
Court in Banská Bystrica (decision of 28 October 2011, no 14Co 346/2011), if the 
consumer association can claim the protection of consumer rights in court (sec 3 para 
5 CPA), then it can also apply for an interim measure in favour of consumers. The 
Regional Court in Banská Bystrica in the mentioned decision even expresses the 
opinion that local jurisdiction of court is defined by domicile of consumer association. 
Reasoning of this legal opinion is based on the provision of CPC that a court applicable 
for proceedings shall also include a court in the district in which the consumer is 
domiciled when a dispute arising from or in connection with a consumer contract is 
concerned. These cases prove that court may under sec 74 para 1 of CPC order the 
interim measure until the final decision.  
The abovementioned problems are solved (although not completely) in the new CDPC 
which regulates the proceedings for abstract control in consumer affairs (sec 301 to 
306 CDCP). It is a new type of proceeding where the court will review the unfairness 
of contract terms and the unfairness of commercial practices in consumer contracts 
and in other contractual documents related to the consumer contract, irrespective of 
the circumstances of the individual case. Introduction of the control is justified by the 
implementation of the Directive 2009/22/ES. The right to file an action belongs to the 
consumer organization or to the competent national authority (defined by particular 
legislation e.g. STI, National Bank of Slovakia). The court is not obliged to hold an oral 
hearing; it is possible to decide on the basis of the documentary evidence. The court 
may also introduce evidence other than that proposed by the participants, if the 
introduction thereof is necessary for establishing the decision. If the court holds that 
the action is successful, it will specify the unfairness and text of the unfair contract 
term and/or unfair commercial practice in the court decision. The plaintiff (consumer 
organization or other authority) is entitled to ensure the publication of that judgment 
in the appropriate form. The trader cannot use the unfair contract term (unfair 
commercial practice) defined in dictum or an unfair contract term (unfair commercial 
practice) with the same meaning in any consumer contracts or other related 
documents. The dictum of the judgment is binding for everyone (sec 306 CDPC).51 It 
51 This provision is new in the Slovak legal order and there is not yet any application in practice, so the 
extent of this effect is so far unknown. This provision may be understood as binding for state authorities 
acting in administrative proceedings and imposing fines on the trader (party of proceeding) and as 
binding for the trader (party of proceeding) to not use these clauses in any of its consumer contracts. 
Proceeding strictly under the wording of this provision, it could be speculated that the judgment would be 
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constitutes an enforcement order and the enforcement authority is entitled to impose 
fine up to EUR 30 000 to the trader for the violation of that judgment (sec 192 para 
1 Enforcement Order).  
It is important to distinguish between the abstract control of unfair contract terms 
(unfair commercial practice) independent of the concrete circumstances of the case 
and sec 53a CC which has procedural expression in sec 298 CDPC (sec 153 para 3 and 
4 CPC) and is based on the relationship between individual consumer and individual 
trader. 
With regard to the parties in the abstract control in consumer affairs, consumers are 
not a participants in this proceeding, the parties are the consumer organization (or 
other competent authority) and the trader.  
Another possibility is the right of the consumer organization to bring a proposal to a 
competent national authority (Slovak Trade Inspection) to request an interim measure 
if the trader violates the collective interests of consumers (under sec 21 CPA). 
Consumer organizations are allowed to request interim measures only if, after sending 
the written notice to cease the unlawful conduct, the trader does not refrain from 
harming the collective interests of consumers within two weeks of the receipt of this 
notice. The competent national authority may order interim measures ex officio (sec 
21 para 2 CPA). STI quite frequently use this measure (summary proceeding) in 
practice (there are dozens of cases in which STI ordered interim measures and 
subsequently started proceedings in which they imposed sanctions, mainly fines, e.g. 
decision of STI of 23 September 2013, no SK/0619/99/2013, in which a fine of 
EUR 6 000 was imposed and this decision was preceded by an interim measure). 
Recently STI ordered an interim measure to be applied to a relatively well-known 
travel agency CK Hechter Slovakia, spol. s r. o. (interim measure of STI of 22 July 
2016, no 2069/04/2016). The STI ordered cessation of the use of unfair commercial 
practice consisting of concluding package travel contracts with consumers, because 
the travel agency does not have compulsory insurance against bankruptcy or any bank 
guarantee. This summary procedure is very effective in stopping immediately evident 
violations of collective interests of consumers. In these cases the national competent 
authority opens the administrative proceeding and imposes fine on the trader up to 
EUR 66 400, in cases of repeated violations within twelve months up to EUR 166 000 
(sec 24 para 1 CPA). In cases of significant excess STI can prohibit the trader from 
selling products or providing services to consumers for up to three years, and if the 
trader harms the collective interests of consumers within 12 months after that, the 
trader is punished for violation of collective consumer interests (sec 20a para 2 CPA).  
The Slovak legal order allows that an interim measure can be ordered by a court 
under sec 325 para 1 CDPC (sec 74 para 1 CPC) or a relevant competent authority 
under sec 21 CPA.52 Under legislation effective from 1 January 2015 interim measures 
in cases of breach of collective interests of consumers in sector of financial services 
can be ordered by the National Bank of Slovakia (sec 35e para 3 Act No 747/2004 
Coll.). The National Bank of Slovakia orders the trader to refrain from the violation of 
consumer rights and immediately initiates the proceedings against a supervised entity. 
In subsequent procedures the National Bank of Slovakia can impose fines on the 
trader or (in cases of non-compliance with interim measure by trader) the National 
Bank of Slovakia can cancel the license of the trader for provision of financial services 
(sec 35g para 1 Act No 747/2004 Coll.).    
As mentioned above, it is possible to use the summary procedure in the court under 
sec 325 CDPC (in past under 74 CPC) or at the competent authority, which is a very 
useful option when consumer rights are immediately threatened. Consumer 
organization has a right to bring an action in these cases.  
an enforcement order for all traders using the same clause, but it is a very problematic issue and it 
cannot be presumed how the application in practice will develop. 
52 Budjač, 2013. 
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Prior consultation with the trader is mandatory only before a request for an interim 
measure to the national authority is filed (administrative method, sec 21 CPA). In 
other cases prior consultation is not mandatory. 
The real use of the injunction procedure in Slovakia is functioning mainly in 
administrative law (mainly by activity of STI, as the competence of National Bank of 
Slovakia relating to the order interim measure in sector of financial services is 
effective only from 1 January 2015). It is expected that new procedural norms 
effective from 1 July 2016 on abstract control (independently on individual case) 
limited to unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practices in consumer contracts 
will be effective in this way. Sec 3 para 5 CPA is general and abstract provision which 
can cover cases which are not governed by special norms. It is not possible to 
estimate to what extent the use of the injunction procedure has caused the reduction 
in the number of infringements of consumer protection rules and reduction in 
consumer detriment, but this number will be increased because of the effectiveness of 
new and clear procedural norms (sec 301-306 CDPC) in this context. 
In cases of cross-border actions, sec 25 para 1 letter b) CPA refers to legal persons 
created or established for the purpose of consumer protection listed in the list of 
qualified entities maintained by the Commission53 and their right to request interim 
measures under CPA or to propose initiation of civil proceeding. As stakeholders 
(consumer organizations, authority bodies) mentioned, they do not have experiences 
with cross-border actions for the protection of collective interests of consumers. Cross-
border protection in this context is not very effective. Stakeholders (administrative 
bodies) accentuate cross-border cooperation between national authorities. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
The right of consumer organizations under sec 3 para 5 CPA in context of protection of 
collective consumer interests is expressed generally without further specification. It is 
not restricted to the specific area of consumer law or specific directives. CPA has a 
general character providing wide range of consumers’ protection. 
Competence of the National Bank of Slovakia in this regard is limited to the scope of 
financial services provided to consumer. 
Proceedings for abstract control in consumer affairs under sec 31 to 306 CDPC is 
limited to review of unfair contract terms and unfair commercial practice in consumer 
contracts and other documents related to consumer contract. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
The new CDPC effective from 1 of July 2016 aspires to increase efficiency of 
protection. Sec 21 of CPA covering collective consumers’ interest is effective from 1 
November 2012 and this section seems to be effective in administrative 
protection. Under legislation effective from 1 January 2015 there is a division of 
competence with respect to the administrative way of ordering interim measures. In 
cases of breach of collective interests of consumers in the sector of financial services, 
the National Bank of Slovakia can order interim measure (sec 35e para 3 Act No 
747/2004 Coll.). The Slovak legal order does not recognize the right of a consumer 
organization (or competent authority) to demand financial claims in favour of 
consumers in cases of violation of their collective interest.  
53 Notification from the Commission concerning Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, which codifies 
Directive 98/27/EC, concerning the entities qualified to bring an action under Article 2 of this Directive - 
2016/C 87/01. 
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 • In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Coverage of the ID could be defined generally, so the collective interests of consumers 
would be protected in all sectors.  
Government officials proposed to add into Annex I:  
a) Directive 2014/92/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 23 July 
2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account 
switching and access to payment accounts with basic features and 
b) Directive 2014/17/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 4 February 
2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property 
and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010. 
It can be stated with regards to current legal regulation and statements of 
stakeholders that it is not necessary to contemplate the extension of the coverage of 
the ID to collective business interests.  
The Slovak legal order adequately regulates protection of collective consumer 
interests, balancing between protection in the private and public law. Taking into 
account the unsatisfactory state of the consumer organizations in Slovakia (insufficient 
funding and personal base), the effective option for protection of consumer interests is 
an interim measure ex officio under sec 21 CPA or under sec 35e para 3 Act No 
747/2004 Coll. (only administrative proceeding); and abstract control proceedings 
(sec 301 to 306 CDPC, civil proceeding) initiated either by a consumer organization, or 
by the national competent authority. As the courts of the second instance decide 
about the actions in the first instance (specifically defined in CDPC - Regional Courts in 
Bratislava, Banská Bystrica and Košice) and the Supreme Court decides on appeals in 
this type of proceeding, the principle of legal certainty and requirement of accustomed 
uniform judicial making seems to be ensured. 
The work and the legal status of Commission on Assessment could be inspirational. 
The Commission on Assessment itself does not have a decision-making competence 
but it is entitled to bring suggestions to the competent authority if the Commission on 
Assessment finds out the cases of violations of the consumer rights (including 
violations of collective interests of consumers). Reasoning in the statements issued by 
the Commission on Assessment are often mentioned in the justifications of the court 
decisions or the decisions of the state authorities in the consumer affairs thanks to 
their persuasive character (decision of Slovak Trade Inspection of 11 March 2014 no 
SK/0215/99/2014 or District Court Košice I of 4 June 2014 no 39C/448/2009).  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Stakeholders stated they did not have any experience with the injunction procedure in 
cases of infringements originating in another EU country. In Slovakia there are many 
entities (all of them are consumer organizations) which have been recognised as the 
qualified entities to bring actions for an injunction under Article 2 of Directive 
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2009/22/EC.54 However, they do not have any experience with this type of procedure, 
nor were they able to provide any information about injunction actions from the 
Slovak consumer associations for infringements originating in another EU country. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
It is indisputable that the most serious obstacle for the injunction action filed by 
Slovak subject in another Member State is their low knowledge of foreign procedural 
law, although substantive law is determined by the domicile of the consumer. Logistic 
aspects of that action could be also expensive (court hearing in another member state, 
travel costs). There are also obstacles related to language skills. All these problems 
create obstacles for further developments and the real effectiveness of the injunction 
procedure in other Member States. In addition, a sufficient tradition of collective rights 
protection has not been established in the Slovak Republic yet. It can be assumed that 
qualified entities would prefer the option under which the injunction action against the 
trader from another Member State may be brought in Slovakia in the Slovak 
jurisdiction (as allowed under Regulation (EU) no 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters). 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
There are different procedures in cases of breach of collective interests of consumers 
available: 1) the interim measure (summary proceeding) ordered by STI (under sec 
21 CPA, in consumer law generally); 2) The interim measure ordered (summary 
proceeding) by The National Bank of Slovakia (under sec 35e para 3 Act No 747/2004 
Coll., in sector of financial services); 3) The interim measure (summary proceeding) 
ordered by court (without specific provision); and 4) The judgment ordered by court in 
the review of unfairness of contract terms and unfairness of commercial practices 
(under sec 301-306 CDPC). The coherence between these procedures is ensured 
because some of them have preliminary character and some have character of final 
decision. Decisions of administrative bodies (STI, National Bank of Slovakia) in cases 
of collective interests of consumers do not affect court decisions so court jurisdiction is 
preserved. 
54 Notification from the Commission concerning Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, which codifies 
Directive 98/27/EC, concerning the entities qualified to bring an action under Article 2 of this Directive - 
2016/C 87/01. 
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 1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
The protection against unfair commercial practices and particularly unfair standard 
terms in contracts is granted at the court proceeding ex officio, i.e. the court is obliged 
to review the contract terms in consumer contract and their validity without any need 
of consumer’s activity. Unfair terms are not binding. Provided that the consumer files 
the suit as the plaintiff, the consumer is not obliged to pay court fees. The consumers 
have to be aware of the risk that if they are not successful at the court proceedings, 
they may be obliged to reimburse costs of the court proceedings to the court and to 
the successful participant. Legal advice may be generally costly, but the amount of 
solicitor fees is restricted for consumer cases. Moreover, cheaper ways of alternative 
dispute resolution are at the consumer’s disposal. A complaint at the administrative 
authority may solve the problem of a consumer without any costs. The factor of time 
and stress should not be disregarded but generally there is no hesitance in the society 
that the benefits clearly prevail, and that the legal position of consumers would be 
worse without protection granted by the UCTD and also the UCPD.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
The harmonised legal regulation (particularly in the case of fully harmonised rules) 
reduces costs of traders in cross-border transaction (the need of the legal advice in 
this area is not so urgent). 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Precise data is not available, as the amount of the costs for traders differs in relation 
to various criteria: scale of business, sector of business, whether the trader uses 
standard contract terms, engagement in the e-commerce, and use of advertising. In 
the area of legal services it could be roughly estimated that preparation of basic 
standard contract terms for a middle enterprise may cost at least EUR 1000 and every 
update at least EUR 500.  
Business associations point out the costs for preserving the goodwill of traders, their 
costs increase under pressure of the public, consumers, and consumer organisations 
to accommodate the requirements of consumers out of court, i.e. in case where the 
goods are defective, they have to cover all costs incurred. They assume that costly 
legal advice is inevitable in more complex relations between businesses.      
To sum up, it looks like sector specific directives presuppose higher costs for 
businesses, as does the PID. UCPD, UCTD and MCAD are not extremely costly for 
SMEs provided that they have no tendency to cross over the border of fairness and 
decency in the business relations.  
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 • What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
The responsible government authorities provided the general answer that the costs 
involved in the public enforcement of these rules were considerable, but it seems to be 
indispensable to incur them in order to secure the consumers’ protection. 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
The implementation of MCAD has been frequently criticised55 as it is divided between a 
public law act, the Act on Advertisement (comparative advertising), and a private law 
code, CommC (misleading advertising as a part of unfair competition). Moreover, as 
already stated above, misleading advertising is close to unfair commercial practices 
incorporated in CPA, as under Slovak legal order the criteria of consumer is added to 
the general clause of the unfair competition. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
No relevant answer from the stakeholders, but note that the length of court 
proceedings in some regions of Slovakia creates a serious obstacle in the enforcement 
of consumer protection. The average length of civil proceedings in the Slovak republic 
in 2015 was 14.4 months.56  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
UCPD and UCTD are applied in the practice by national authorities and courts for 
contracts in the regulated sectors without any doubt regularly and frequently. Unfair 
practices and unfair terms are very often detected in the contracts with mobile phone 
operators or in the sector of financial services. Same applies to energy providers. 
Their application is also useful in the area of passenger transport, particularly in 
relation to package travel contracts and the conduct of travel agencies.57  
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
55 Vozár, 2013. 
56 Available at: https://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Sudy/Statistika-priemerna-dlzka-konania.aspx  
57 Jurčová, 2014. 
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affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The general administrative enforcement authority is the Slovak Trade Inspection 
(STI), i.e. if the special act does not nominate a special body, the authority in the area 
of consumer protection shall belong to STI (sec 20 para 1 CPA). 
The authority of STI is regulated by the Act no. 128/2002 Coll. on State Control of 
Internal Market in Consumer’s Matters. Under sec 10 para 2 of this Act STI cooperates 
with consumer organisations and it applies their complaints and notices during the 
course of inspections.  
The sector specific protection and horizontal protection as represented by the 
scrutinized directives are unified in the area of the protection of the financial 
consumer. The authority responsible for enforcement is National Bank of Slovakia 
(NBS); this body is responsible for enforcement in the area of unfair commercial 
practices, unfair terms and in the case where collective interests of consumers are 
endangered it may order the interim measure, i.e., its competence at the area of the 
protection of financial consumer is equal to that of STI in other sectors. This 
competence belongs to NBS from January 2015, where under Act no. 747/2004 Coll. 
NBS became the competent authority for consumer protection in the Slovak financial 
market, and as such it oversees the protection of the rights of financial consumers so 
as to support the secure and sound functioning of the financial market. 
To sum up, authority in the area of unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms in administrative level generally belongs to STI except where NBS is authorized 
in the area of financial consumer protection.  
The Commission on the Assessment of Terms in Consumer Contracts and of Unfair 
Commercial Practices established at the Ministry of Justice cannot issue decisions or 
orders, but by providing their findings, giving notices to STI or to consumer 
organisations to file a suit it proved to be an effective professional body. 
The Regulatory Office for Network Industries does not have an authority in the area of 
unfair commercial practices or unfair contract terms, but it is authorised to approve of 
the contract terms of providers of the universal service in the area of gas and 
electricity supply.58 STI is authorised to apply protection against unfair contract terms 
and unfair commercial practices in these sectors.59  
Concerning the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications and Postal 
Services, this body is not explicitly authorised for enforcement of horizontal 
directives,60 this competence probably belongs to STI. The relevant act regulates 
cooperation between this regulatory Authority and STI.61 The division of the 
competence between STI and this authority is not however absolutely clear. This can 
be demonstrated by the notice of STI published in April 2015 on their web pages, 
where they issued the instruction that in the area of the fees for services of electronic 
communication (quality and price), the Regulatory Authority for Electronic 
Communications and Postal Services is the authorised body. The problem occurred in 
the case of traders Skylink and CS link.62 Under sec 6 para 3 d) of the Act on 
Electronic Communication Act, the regulatory authority shall protect the interests of 
end-users in regard to the quality and price of services. It is however difficult to 
separate the unfair terms and the price and other fees. 
58 Sec. 9 para 1 b) 2. in connection to sec. 13 para 2  m) of Act no. 250/2012 Coll. on Regulation in Network 
Sectors. 
59 Sec. 1 para 1 a) of Act no. 128/2002 Coll. on State Control of Internal Market in Consumer’s Matters. In 
the past there was a problem in regard to the competence, as the proof of these difficulties may serve 
also the decision of the Supreme Court of 16 February 2011, no. 2SžO 540/2009, where there the court 
had to decide on the conflict of competence between State Energy Inspection (this authority has been 
from September 2012 substituted by the Regulatory Office for Network Industries) and STI.   
60 Act no. 351/2011 Coll. on Electronic Communication, act no. 324/2011 Coll. on Post Services 
61 Sec. 8 para1 g) of Act no. 351/2011 Coll. on Electronic Communication. 
62 http://www.soi.sk/sk/Informacie-pre-verejnost/Servisny-poplatok-Skylink.soi?ind=3  
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In the area of passenger transport, (Package Travel Directive and respective 
regulations in the area of passenger transport), the authorised body is STI.  
Regarding the MCAD, the administrative enforcement is divided among approximately 
seven authorities according to the relevant sector (sec. 10 of Act on Advertisement). 
In relation to misleading advertising, private law enforcement seems to be most 
important.  
The consumer organisations emphasised that STI does not have sufficient number of 
employees to cover satisfactorily its broad competence in the field of consumer 
protection.63  
The governmental officials acknowledge that the cooperation between administrative 
enforcement authorities is not institutionally arranged and the division between 
general inspection (STI) and the sectoral state authorities does cause difficulties in the 
application of law. 
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Governmental officials expressed the opinion that horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules do not provide for a clear and coherent legal framework and such 
incoherence may have detrimental effects on traders, leading sometimes to their 
confusion and loss of orientation. As mentioned in the previous bullet, the conflict of 
competence may be caused by complementary application of the horizontal directives 
to sectoral legislation. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
Governmental officials expressed the opinion that application of the horizontal 
directives is important in the regulated sectors and its benefits have been proved in 
the recent years. They do not recommend the separate regulation of these matters in 
the sectoral legislation. No quantitative information is available.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
Clarification is definitely needed. As the example may serve the case law on the 
amendments of consumer contracts in the regulated sectors and its applicability on 
other fields of consumer law, this relation is not clear and the approach of the CJEU 
(e.g. C-92/11- RWE Vertrieb or partly also C-359/11, C-400/11) to mix the norms 
(UCTD and sector-specific rules) does not help either.64 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
63 STI is the state authority working under supervision of the Ministry of Economy, number of its employees 
was 283 at the end of 2015. STI is divided to the Central Inspection Body in Bratislava and 8 Inspection 
Bodies in the regions. 
64 Csach, 2015a. 
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(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The general legal definition of consumer contract under Slovak law is so broad that the 
consumer-to-business contract is not automatically excluded under sec 52 para 1 of 
CC (1) Any contract regardless of the legal form that is concluded between the 
provider and the consumer constitutes a consumer contract. Therefore some tools of 
protection (unfair commercial practices, unfair contract terms) could be used also in 
C2B synallagmatic remunerative contracts. 
The opinion of government officials seems to be open-ended and not very clear and 
decisive on this point.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
As already stated above in 1.1.1, the national authorities and courts adopted the 
concepts of ‘consumer’, ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ and they 
actively refer to these concepts in dealing with the consumer cases. Government 
officials also support the use of these concepts particularly in relation to the unfair 
commercial practices where notion of the average consumer (and in the special cases 
also the higher protection of vulnerable consumer) is inevitable. 
The sectoral legislation providing special protection for vulnerable customers in 
connection to provision of universal service is an idea that should be promoted and 
intertwined in the UCPD and UCTD.   
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Stakeholders generally assume that current legislation is satisfactory in this regard. 
Government officials do not recommend introducing this notion in other directives. 
Consumer organisations expressed the opinion that they would recommend the 
inclusion of specific provisions into the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.  
 
1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The implementation both of the UCTD and UCPD has been a positive step forward. The 
Slovak economy in the last 25 years has been a typical economy in transition. 
Consumers, particularly those raised in the socialist era, have not been educated on 
how to behave in the market economy, and the traders tended to interpret the notion 
‘party autonomy’ in the most liberal way. Standard contract terms in contracts 
represented an unknown danger for consumers (and SMEs as well). Same applied for 
the courts. The abuse of the stronger contractual position has been almost tolerated 
by the courts and the protection of the weaker party at the beginning of the 21st 
century was disregarded. Such a situation had created an ideal place for all possible 
forms of abuse of the traders’ position. Therefore the implementation of the UCTD 
may be considered as one of the first positive measures to protect consumers 
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effectively. The protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices and unfair 
standard terms in contracts has improved significantly after approximately 10 years of 
their application and it has been improved also by subsequent improvements in the 
level of implementation.   
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
The improvement is evident; consumers are encouraged to make reasonable decisions 
thanks to information about unit prices displayed on the products.   
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Evident progress has not been found. The regulation of unfair competition itself 
provides the legal basis where majority of relevant cases may be solved satisfactorily. 
The input of MCAD lies mainly in the clarification of admissibility of comparative 
advertising; however, this marketing tool is not frequently used in Slovakia. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
As generally stated above, the directives under consideration significantly contributed 
to consumer protection. Efficient tools for clarification of legal issues for easier cross-
border purchases were provided also by the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). In this 
regard the expectations are bound also to On-line Sales Directive (COM (2015) 635). 
On the other hand it is evident that the directives under consideration have served as 
an important educative basis for creation of more uniform commercial practices in the 
EU generally and thus enabled the development of cross-border trade also for 
consumers’ shopping.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Slovakia  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts 
Act no. 40/1964 Coll. as 
amended (Civil Code) 
  
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in 
all circumstances 
Yes Article 53 
para 4 
 As stated in 1.2.1 there is not 
a clear consensus as to 
whether the list is ‘black’ or 
‘grey’ one.       
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
No Article 53 
para 4 
 
 Extensions of the application of Directive 
to individually negotiated terms  
No Article 53 
para 1 
 
 Extensions of the application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
No Article 53 
para 1 
 
Directive 2005/29/EC concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the 
internal market 
Act no. 250/2007 Coll. on 
Consumer Protection as 
amended 
 Provisions regarding financial services 
going beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
 Provisions regarding immovable going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
 Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No   
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Directive 98/6/EC on consumer 
protection in the indication of the 
prices of products offered to 
consumers 
Act no. 250/2007 Coll. on 
Consumer Protection as 
amended   
 Extension of the application to other 
sectors (e.g. for immovable property) 
No   
   Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations 
No   
Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising 
Act no. 147/2001 Coll. on 
Advertisement as 
amended  
 Comparative advertising  Article 4  
Act no. 513/1991 Coll. 
Commercial Code as 
amended 
 Misleading advertising  Articles 44, 
45 
 
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of 
consumers' interests 
sec 3 para 5 CPA 
sec 20a para 2 CPA 
sec 21 CPA 
     
sec 301 – 306 CDPC      
sec 35e para 3 Act No 
747/2004 Coll. 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive –SLOVAKIA  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the 
Injunctions Directive regulated in your country 
separately (as a separate procedure or/and in 
a separate legal act) from the enforcement 
procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer 
Law Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the Consumer 
Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in 
separate legal 
acts 
There are 4 procedures in cases of breach of 
collective interests of consumers:  
1) Interim measure (summary proceeding) 
ordered by STI (under sec 21 CPA)  
2) Interim measure ordered (summary 
proceeding) by The National Bank of 
Slovakia (in sector of financial services)  
3) Interim measure (summary proceeding) 
ordered by court (without specific provision)  
4) Judgment ordered by court in review of 
unfairness of contract terms and unfairness 
of commercial practices (under sec 301-306 
CDPC) 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an 
injunction? 
- Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
 
Under sec 302 CDPC qualified entities are 
consumer associations or supervisory 
authorities stated in special statutes (e. g. 
STI, The National Bank of Slovakia). Abstract 
control in consumer affairs under CDPC is 
limited to review only unfair contract terms 
and unfair commercial practice in consumer 
contracts. 
Under sec 21 CPA a qualified entity is a 
consumer association – an interim measure 
ordered by STI in cases of collective interests 
in consumer law in general. STI can initiate 
proceedings ex officio, too. 
Under 35e para 3 Act No 747/2004 Coll. 
National Bank of Slovakia can order interim 
measures ex officio in cases of breaches of 
collective interests of financial consumers 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms 
of the procedure, please explain in the 
comments column for which infringements 
the court or administrative procedure is 
foreseen 
- Both forms of 
procedure 
Court procedure –  
1. Abstract control of unfair contract terms 
and unfair commercial practice in consumer 
contracts  
2. Interim measure (under general 
provision, special provisions does not exist) 
Administrative procedure –  
1. STI  - injunction procedure (interim 
measure) in consumer law in general  
2. National Bank of Slovakia - injunction 
procedure (interim measure) in sector of 
financial services 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- The costs are as 
a rule borne by 
the losing party 
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Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law that 
are not part of Annex I of the Directive, or 
consumer law in general? 
- Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to 
cover consumer 
law in general 
Under CPA as substantive statute (general 
procedural norms do not exist), special 
procedural norms exist only in cases of 
unfairness of contract terms and unfair 
commercial practice 
Is protection of business' interests covered by 
the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the same 
economic sector or their associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in 
the injunction procedures? (not including the 
consultation stage under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, 
requirement for 
party seeking 
injunction to 
consult with the 
defendant 
 
This requirement applies only for interim 
measures in cases of breaches of collective 
interests of consumers ordered by STI on the 
proposal of a consumer association under 
sec 21 CPA 
Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in the 
comments column. 
- Yes 
 
It is possible to order interim measures by 
STI (generally) or by National Bank of The 
Slovakia (sector of financial services) – 
without time limits. Courts permit the 
application of interim measures in CDPC to 
breaches of collective interests of 
consumers (time limits to decide on 
proposal - 30 days) 
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Are there sanctions for non-compliance with 
the injunction order (Article 2(1) of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  
please specify in the comments column to 
who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of 
a fine for each 
day of non-
compliance 
- Yes, other 
sanction  
 
In a court procedure the dictum of the 
judgment in case of abstract control in 
consumer contracts is binding for everyone 
(sec 306 CDPC). It constitutes an 
enforcement order and the enforcement 
authority is entitled to impose fine up to 
EUR 30 000 to the trader for the violation of 
that judgment (sec 192 para 1 Enforcement 
Act). The fine is paid to state. The National 
Bank of Slovakia can cancel a license 
(permission) if a person in the sector of 
financial services violates the court decision 
In an administrative procedure –  
1. STI can impose a fine for breaches of 
consumer rights under CPA (including 
collective interests of consumer) up to 
EUR 66 400, in cases of repeated violations 
within twelve months up to EUR 166 000 
(sec 24 para 1 CPA).  
2. The National Bank of Slovakia can cancel 
a license (permission) for a person who is 
entitled to provide financial services. It can 
also impose fines, up to EUR 700 000, in 
cases of repeated violations up to 
EUR 1 400 000 (sec 35g para 1  and sec 35f 
para 1 and 2 Act No 747/2004 Coll. Fines 
are paid to the state (Slovak Republic). STI 
can prohibit the trader from selling a 
product or providing services to consumers 
for up to three years in cases when the 
seller violates a previous decision within 12 
months. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a corrective 
statement? 
- Yes 
 
Under sec 305 para 2 CDPC the plaintiff is 
entitled to ensure the publication of the 
judgment in abstract control in consumer 
contracts in appropriate form. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are paid 
to the public purse or to other beneficiary be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the 
qualified entity or the public purse be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
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Can individual consumers base their individual 
claims for damages/remedies on the 
injunctions order?  
- Yes 
 
However not explicitly. If the court in 
abstract control of consumer contracts in 
the dictum of judgment determines 
unfairness of contractual terms or 
determines unfairness of a commercial 
practice, under sec 306 CDPC dictum of that 
judgment is binding for everyone. So when 
the court decides on the individual proposal 
of consumer for remedies based on an 
unfair contract term (unfair commercial 
practice) specified in the dictum of 
judgment in abstract control of consumer 
contracts it is obliged take this fact into 
account. 
Can the qualified entity claim other measures 
beyond the injunction, e.g. evidence of 
compliance with the judgment? 
- No But the enforcement authority is entitled to 
impose a fine up to EUR 30 000 on the 
trader for the violation of the judgment in 
abstract control of consumer contracts (sec 
192 para 1 Enforcement Act). The National 
Bank of Slovakia can cancel a license 
(permission) if an entity of sector of 
financial services violates the court decision. 
So the enforcement entities can claim 
evidence of compliance with the judgment 
for purpose if the judgment is respected. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders 
extended to the future infringements and/or 
same or similar illegal practices (of other 
traders)? 
- Yes 
 
It is applied only in court procedure and is 
limited to unfairness of contract terms and 
commercial practices. Under sec 306 CDPC 
dictum of the judgment in abstract control 
of consumer contracts is binding for 
everyone. 
In individual cases, under 53a CC,  if the 
court determined some contractual 
condition in the consumer contract made in 
multiple cases, and it is usual that the 
consumer does not affect the content of the 
contract in a significant way, or in the 
general business conditions, to be invalid 
due to the unacceptability of such condition, 
or did not award the performance to the 
provider due to such condition, the provider 
shall refrain from using such condition or 
any condition with the same meaning in 
contracts with all consumers. The provider 
shall have the same obligation even if the 
court ordered the provider to render the 
consumer unjust enrichment, compensate 
for damages or pay adequate financial 
compensation on grounds of such condition. 
The legal successor of the provider shall 
have the same obligation. 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
n.a.         
 
There is no evidence recording how many disputes have been decided in B2C 
relations. Therefore it is not possible to provide the number of disputes decided on the 
basis of directives covered by this study or decided on any other consumer directives. 
From 1 July 2016 new procedural codes are effective and under its implementing 
legislation (Statute of Ministry of Justice no. 206/2016 Coll. amending the Statute of 
Ministry of Justice no. 543/2005 Coll.) new evidences of consumer disputes are going 
to be created: a) register of consumer disputes; b) register of disputes on abstract 
control on consumer matters. 
All that can be provided is a number of civil law disputes filed in courts in 2015: 
871 155; number of disputes decided in 2015: 889 217. It should be noted that these 
numbers include also C2C (P2P) cases, therefore it is not possible to separate out B2C 
disputes.65 
From 1 January 2015 the act no. 335/2014 Coll. on Consumer Arbitration is effective 
(as a part of the implementing legislation for the Directive on consumer ADR).  The 
need to have this act was enhanced by the crisis situation under which the inadequacy 
of the commercial arbitration merged together with the consumer arbitration proved 
to be highly detrimental for the consumer. The new legislation on consumer arbitration 
has supported the creation of specialized consumer arbitration courts under strict legal 
requirements, upon evidence provided by 7 out of total number of 8 existing consumer 
arbitration courts we are able to provide number of 18 333 disputes filed on these 
courts in 2015. The consumer arbitration courts are not obliged to differentiate 
numbers of consumer cases according to the any criteria. 
65 Available at: https://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Sudy/Statistika-priemerna-dlzka-konania.aspx 
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According to annual reports of STI, occurrence of unfair commercial practices in the 
regulated subjects was as follows:66  
Year  Number of cases 
2015 233 
2014 253 
2013 328 
2012 276 
2011 254 
2010 298 
2009 182 
2008 326 
 
    
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).67  
66 The number of cases until 2013 includes also misleading actions under the CPA. This separate provision 
was repealed in 2014, as the issue was fully covered by the unfair commercial practices concept from the 
UCPD, and from 2014 it is this latter concept that is being referred to below. 
67 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 0 EUR 450 EUR 100 48  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
0 EUR 450 EUR 100 24 
Consumer 
arbitration 
proceedings 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 0 Not applied 
Maximum 
EUR 5 12 
Act no. 391/2015 
on alternative 
resolution of 
consumer 
disputes 
Notes: Lower court procedure:  
Court fees: Under sec 4 para 2 u) of Act on Court Fees the consumer does not pay the court fee in the consumer 
dispute, regardless whether they are a claimant or a defendant.  
Lawyer’s fees: Under sec 11 para 1 b) of the Statute of Ministry of Justice no. 655/2004 Coll. on prices and 
reimbursements to solicitors, the basic fee for a solicitor in the consumer case provided that a client is a consumer is 
1/13 of the accounting basis. The accounting basis comes out of the average wage (EUR 858), so the basic fee 
represents the sum of EUR 66, plus reimbursement of other costs up to EUR 8.58. Provided that the solicitor is subject 
to VAT, a tax of 20% is added to the basic fee. If the client choses the solicitor from a town other than their domicile, 
the solicitor may ask other payments (travel costs, loss of time). To sum up, one act of a legal service costs EUR 74.58  
(or EUR 89.48 with VAT).  It is evident that the fee in consumer cases does not depend on the sum of claim. It is 
assumed that minimally three acts of legal service have to be provided (consultation with client, preparation of the 
petition, the court proceeding), but the number of lawyer’s acts will be probably higher one (more acts on the court), so 
the approximate costs are estimated at EUR 447.45 (EUR 536.94 with VAT). Consumers may be also represented by a 
consumer organisation, but these organisations lack professional and material sources for legal aid as well.  Another 
possibility for the consumer is to agree with the solicitor on different terms, but such agreement will not be probably 
advantageous for consumer. If the consumer is in a material need (e.g. their income is lower than EUR 316.94 and they 
are without other property), they will be entitled to the free legal aid provided by the Centre of Legal Aid. 
It should be noted that if the consumer fails to be successful in their claim, he or she may be obliged to provide the 
reimbursement of costs to the successful participant. The consumer’s position is however protected as the amount the 
other participant paid to their solicitor is not fully reimbursed, only up to the sum of legal aid as regulated by the same 
scheme for solicitor fees as mentioned above. If the other party does not have a representative, the other party may 
claim only incurred costs. Exceptionally, if there are substantial reasons, the consumer will not be obliged to reimburse 
the costs to other participant, depending on the court’s discretion. If the consumer is successful, he or she is entitled to 
ask for reimbursement of their costs. 
Estimation of time involved for the consumer depends on many factors. The consumer’s domicile is decisive for the 
competent court, it saves time, but other elements may enter into the calculations (the eligible solicitor, participation in 
the court hearings, consultations, the level of knowledge and activity of consumer). 
Consumer arbitration: If there is a valid arbitration agreement between the consumer and the trader, the arbitration 
court may decide the case. The consumer does not pay any fees, the costs of legal advice are same as at the court 
proceedings and this type of dispute resolution may be faster. According to the annual reports of the consumer 
arbitration courts, the average length of arbitration is about 4 and half months. It should be emphasized that the length 
of the court proceeding varies according the locally competent court. The courts in the capital and in the bigger towns 
tend to have longer proceedings due to the overload of the cases filed there, so it may happen that in rare cases the 
court proceeding would also provide a timely solution. 
One last remark should be given in regard to the enforcement of claims. The successful consumer should sometimes 
enforce the decision if the trader is not willing to fulfil their duty. The costs of enforcement should be paid by the 
obliged person (debtor) but if there is not any property of the debtor, the creditor will be obliged to pay some basic 
sums at the enforcement. However, the sum is low: its lowest threshold is EUR 33.19.   
Complaints and other notices to the Slovak Trade Inspection or any other administrative authorities are not subject to 
any fees.  
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Act no. 391/2015 on alternative resolution of consumer disputes is effective from 1 February 2016. Slovak Trade 
Inspection, the Regulatory Office for Network Industries and the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Communications 
and Postal Services as well as other subjects are authorised to function as the alternative resolution bodies. State 
authorities do not charge any fees, other subjects maximally EUR 5. 
Mediation is a possible way to proceed. The consumer pays a maximum of the sum of 10% of the price of the 
mediation; the rest of the sum should be paid by the other party (sec 4 para 3 Act.no 420/2004 on mediation). In the 
course of mediation, the parties may conclude an agreement. If this agreement should constitute an enforcement 
order, it has to be concluded in the form of the notary record. Price of the notary record in this case is about EUR 50. 
This type of solution seems not very effective in Slovakia for this type of case   
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
There are no statistics available. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Union of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications Business association 22.06.2016 
Association of Trade and Tourism of Slovak Republic Business association 06.07.2016 
Slovak Banking Association Business association 12.07.2016 
National Bank of Slovakia National consumer enforcement 
authority 
29.06.2016 
The Regulatory Office for Network Industries National regulatory authority 23.06.2016 
Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic Ministry 15.07.2016 
Ministry of Justice Ministry 30.06.2016 
European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 01.07.2016 
OMBUDSPOT, Association for Protection of 
Consumer Rights 
Consumer organisation 20.06.2016 
Association of Slovak Consumer Entities Consumer organisation 03.07.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Sour
ce  
Year Title of publication 
Budjač, M. 2015 Števček, M., Dulak, A., Bajánková, J., Fečík, M.,  Sedlačko, F., Tomašovič, M. 
a kol. Občiansky zákonník I. § 1- 459. Komentár, C. H. Beck, Praha, pp. 435-674.  
Budjač, M. 2013 ‘Nekalé obchodné praktiky ako potenciálny zdroj a akcelerátor sústavného 
používania neprijateľných zmluvných podmienok a ich vplyv na platnosť 
spotrebiteľskej zmluvy’, Ingerencia súdov do súkromnoprávnych zmlúv: Zásahy 
súdov do kontraktačného procesu, Justičná akadémia, Pezinok, pp. 109-124 
Biroščáková, J. 2007 ‘Katalógové firmy, ich zmluvy, obchodné praktiky z pohľadu práva.’ Bulletin 
Slovenskej advokácie, Vol.13, no. 7-8, 2007, pp. 25-31. 
Cirák, J. 2009 ‘Vymožiteľnosť spotrebiteľských práv v kontexte úpravy nekalých klauzúl v 
spotrebiteľských zmluvách’ Vymožiteľnosť práva v Slovenskej republike’, 
Justičná akadémia SR, Pezinok, 2009,  pp. 31-44. 
Csach, K. 2009 ‘Štandardné zmluvy’ , Aleš Čeněk, Plzeň, 2009, pp.109-125, 178. 
Csach, K. 2014 ‘Nesúdna ingerencia do zmlúv a možnosti jej súdnej korekcie’ Ingerencia súdov 
do súkromnoprávnych zmlúv: Zásahy súdov do obsahu súkromnoprávnych 
zmlúv’, Justičná akadémia SR, Pezinok, 2014, pp. 52-66.  
Csach, K. 2015 ‘Jednostranná zmena zmluvy (nielen) o finančných službách’,   
Súkromné právo, Vol. 1, no. 3, 2015, pp.2-7. 
Csach, K. 2015 ‘Ochrana dodávateľa obchodných reťazcov prostriedkami súkromného práva’, 
XXXII. Karlovarské právnické dny, spolek Karlovarské právnické dny,Praha, 
2015, pp. 425- 443. 
Csach, K. 2016 ‘ A Pair of Wings: Air Passenger Rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’ Air 
Passenger Rights. Ten Years On, Hart Publishing, Oxford ,2016, pp. 131-144  
Dobrovodský, R. 2013 ‘Test nekalosti správania sa podnikateľov k spotrebiteľom v slovenskom 
práve’, Ingerencia súdov do súkromných zmlúv: Zásahy súdov do 
kontraktačného procesu, Justičná akadémia Slovenskej republiky, Pezinok, 
2013, pp.125-151. 
Fekete, I. 2014 Občiansky zákonník. 1. Zväzok. (Všeobecná časť).Veľký komentár, 2.ed. 
Eurokódex, Bratislava, 2014,p. 622. 
Graban, A. 2012 ‘Priemerný spotrebiteľ z pohľadu objektivizácie súdneho uváženia.’ In 
Hamuľák, O. -Madleňáková, L. (eds.). Limity práva - Sborník z konference 
Olomoucké debaty mladých právníků 2012, Leges, Praha, 2012,pp.200-208. 
Jančo, M. et al. 2010  Introduction to Slovak Civil law , Aleš Čenek, Plzeň, 2010, p.36. 
Jakab, R. 
 
2005 
 
‘Problémy právnej regulácie porovnávacej reklamy. Justičná revue, Vol. 57, No. 
4, 2005, pp. 517-524.  
Jurčová, M. 2014 ‘Zmluva o obstaraní zájazdu’ In Jurčová, M., Dobrovodský, R., Nevolná, Z., 
Olšovská, A. Právo cestovného ruchu, C.H. Beck, Bratislava, , 2014. pp. 21-122. 
Kršková, M., 
Pániková, N. 
2016 Sexistické reklamy na Slovensku alebo čo má spoločné sťahovanie, prášková 
lakovňa a bankové služby , Slovenské národné stredisko pre ľudské práva, 
Bratislava, 2016. 
Kubinec, M. 2005 ‘Ešte raz k problémom právnej regulácie porovnávacej reklamy.’ Justičná 
revue, Vol. 57, No. 8-9, 2005, pp. 1007-1082. 
Lando, O. 2014 ‘CISG and CESL: Simplicity, Fairness and Social Justice’, English and Europeean 
perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law, Essays in Honour of Hugh 
Beale, Hart Publishing, 2014, pp.237-250. 
Lazíková, J., 
Števček, M. 
2013 ‘Ochrana spotrebiteľa v civilnom procese’,  Bulletin Slovenskej advokácie, Vol. 
XIX., No. 6, 2013, pp. 20-30. 
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Maslák, M. 2015 ‘Nová právna úprava spotrebiteľského rozhodcovského konania’, Súkromné 
právo, Vol.1, no.3, 2015, pp.18- 27. 
Magál, M., 
Kubina, P. 
2008 ‘Rozhodcovské doložky v spotrebiteľských zmluvách’, Justičná revue, Vol. 60, 
No. 4, 2008, pp. 616-627. 
Machútová, N. 2013 Nekalé obchodné praktiky a ochrana spotrebiteľa v SR. Diploma thesis, 2013. 
http://www.crzp.sk/crzpopacxe?fn=*recview&uid=1227798&pageId=resultfor
m&full=0&  
Ovečková, O. 2011 ‘Výklad a aplikácia dobrých mravov a zásad poctivého obchodného styku v 
rozhodovacej činnosti súdov’ Právny obzor, Vol. 94, No. 4, 2011, pp. 350-364. 
Patakyová, M. 2013 ‘Commentary of sec 54 CommC ‘ Patakyová, M a kol. Obchodný zákonník. 
Komentár, C. H. Beck, Bratislava, 2013, p. 122. 
Rostáš, D. 2014 ‘ Rácio ochrany podnikateľov v postavení slabšej zmluvnej strany- súčasné 
možnosti a budúce perspektívy. Postavení podnikatele v závazkověprávních 
vztazích, VŠEHRAD, Praha:, 2014, pp. 106-123. 
Straka, P. 2013 ‘Ustanovenie §53a nie je o precedensoch’, Postavenie precedensu v našom 
právnom prostredí, Univerzita Komenského, Bratislava, 2013, p. 66.  
Straka, P. 2010 
 
‘Vymožiteľnosť spotrebiteľského práva’, Vymožiteľnosť práva v Slovenskej 
republike, Justičná akadémia, Pezinok, 2010, pp. 135-172. 
Straka, P. 
 
2009 ‘Vymožiteľnosť spotrebiteľského práva kolektívna ochrana spotrebiteľa v 
občianskom súdnom konaní’ in Vymožiteľnosť práva v Slovenskej republike, 
Justičná akadémia SR, Pezinok, 2009, pp. 17-24. 
Vozár, J., 
Lapšanský, L 
2011 ‘Porovnávacia reklama v slovenskom právnom poriadku.’ Právny obzor. Vol. 
94, No. 6, 2011, pp. 558-576. 
Vozár, J. 2013 Právo proti nekalej súťaži. Bratislava, Veda, 2013, p. 103, 121-146,287-291. 
Vozár, J. 2016 ‘Niekoľko úvah k problematike ochrany finančného spotrebiteľa’ Právny obzor. 
Vol. 99, No. 2, 2016, pp. 61-70. 
Vuongová, A. 
 
2011 
 
Súčasná rozhodovacia prax slovenských súdov vo veciach nekalej súťaže. 
Diploma thesis, available at: 
is.muni.cz/th/238573/pravf_m/diplomova_praca.pdf 
Výboch, J. 2013 ‘Niektoré otázky rozhodcovských doložiek v spotrebiteľských zmluvách z 
pohľadu posudzovania ich prijateľnosti’, Právny obzor, Vol.96, no.3, 2013, pp. 
240-262. 
Závadová, D. 2015 ‘Nekalé obchodné praktiky a ich vplyv na platnosť právnych úkonov vo 
finančných službách’, Súkromné právo, Vol.1 , No.2, 2015, pp. 16-20. 
Závadová, D. 2015 ‘Generálne klauzuly v procese aplikácie práva’, Právny obzor, vol. 98, No. 4, 
2015, pp. 338-353  
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1073
Additional links to relevant sources 
 
The annual reports of Slovak Trade Inspection: 
http://www.soi.sk/sk/Kontrolna-cinnost/Vyrocne-spravy.soi 
 
The answer of Slovak officials to the Green Paper on unfair trading practices in the 
business-to-business food and non-food supply chain in Europe: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/unfair-trading-
practices/docs/contributions/public-authorities/slovak-republic-ministry-agriculture-
and-rural-devlopments_en.pdf 
 
Consumer Policy Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the years 2014 – 2020 
http://www.mhsr.sk/strategie-spotrebitelskej-politiky-slovenskej-republiky-na-roky-
2014---2020/137628s 
 
Warning of STI for consumers 
http://www.soi.sk/files/documents/rspotreb/spotrebite%C4%BEsk%C3%BD%20pries
kum%20nekal%C3%A9%20praktiky.pdf 
 
Information of STI for public 
http://www.soi.sk/sk/Informacie-pre-verejnost/Servisny-poplatok-Skylink.soi?ind=3 
 
Discussion on Law blog ‘najpravo.sk”  
http://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/nazor-ochrana-spotrebitela-napriek-jeho-nesuhlasu-
alebo-ks-presov-urcuje-co-je-pre-priemerneho-spotrebitela-najlepsie.html?print=1 
 
Discussion on Law blog ‘lexforum.sk” 
http://www.lexforum.cz/417  
 
Control finding of STI (the control of electric appliances) 
http://www.soi.sk/sk/Kontrolna-cinnost/Vysledky-kontrol-SOI/Vyhodnotenie-
sektoroveho-programu-dohladu-SOI-nad-trhom-pre-elektricke-zariadenia-pouzivane-
v-u.soi?ind= 
 
Statistic data from Ministry of Justice 
https://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Sudy/Statistika-priemerna-dlzka-konania.aspx 
 
Daily press on unfair commercial practices 
http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/4208482/padlo-prve-rozhodnutie-sudu-o-zakaze-nekalej-
obchodnej-praktiky.html 
 
Local media on the quality of products 
http://www.hlavnespravy.sk/vieme-co-kupujeme-rozdielne-zlozenie-potravin-pod-
rovnakou-znackou-problem-celej-post-komunistickej-europy/649441  
http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/300757/europoslankyne-si-dupli-nechcu-iny-tovar-
pre-zapadny-a-vychodny-trh/  
http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/velke-porovnanie-potravin-nas-rakusku-
rovnaky-tovar-ina-kvalita.html 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report SLOVENIA 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
A legal regulation always aims to strike the appropriate balance between the abstract, 
all-encompassing principles and case related answers to concrete legal questions. The 
general-clause-based approach of the UCPD is considered by all interviewed 
stakeholders and legal writers as the right approach to the problem of unfair 
commercial practices. The UCPD combines two levels of general clauses – the general 
prohibition from Art 5 (1) UCPD with explanations as to the unfairness from Art. 5 (2) 
UCPD, and the prohibitions of misleading practices from Art. 6 UCPD and aggressive 
practices from Art. 8 UCPD. The advantage of the principle based approach is that it 
enables sanctioning of a very broad circle of unfair practices including those who 
haven’t yet been introduced by the businesses. This principle is combined with the 
black list of unfair commercial practices. 
The enforcement of Consumer Protection against Unfair Commercial Practices Act 
(implementation of the UCPD) is in the hands of the Market Inspectorate. If the latter, 
after carrying out an inspection finds an unfair commercial practice, it may issue a 
decision prohibiting such practice (Art. 12 Consumer Protection against Unfair 
Commercial Practices Act). Against this decision, a complaint (a claim) may be filed 
and the matter is decided by Administrative Court. This is the biggest source of case 
law with regard to unfair commercial practices. Against its judgment a revision may be 
filed. If the revision concerns an important legal question, the Supreme Court of 
Slovenia will accept it and adopt a judgement. An unfair commercial practice is also 
punishable with a fine for a minor offence, ranging from EUR 3 000 to 40 000 
(EUR 1 200 – 15 000 for sole traders), see Art. 15 Consumer Protection against Unfair 
Commercial Practices Act. The responsible person of the company may also be 
punished with a fine (EUR 300 – 2 000).  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The understanding of the black list does not require legal skills, as does the application 
of the general clause. It seems that the practice relies quite heavily on the black list. If 
a case cannot be subsumed to one of the examples from the black list, difficulties 
have been reported to arise. One of the possible explanations might be, that not all of 
the so called ‘market-inspectors’ - the representatives of the state body responsible 
among other things for the supervision of the Act, implementing the UCPD – have 
legal education. Furthermore, sometimes also the courts seem to have difficulties with 
the use of general clauses. In this sense, the black list seems to be the preferred 
regulatory technique. 
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• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Slovenia did not make use of the possibility from Art.3 (9) UCPD. The general rules on 
unfair commercial practises and advertising apply. Furthermore, Art. 48-48a 
Consumer Protection Act prescribes the pre-contractual information duties with regard 
to distance marketing of consumer financial services, as demanded by the Directive 
2002/65 on distance marketing of consumer financial services.  
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
According to the stakeholders, the Act implementing the UCPD (Consumer Protection 
against Unfair Commercial Practices Act, OJ 53/07) hasn’t yet been applied in the field 
of the energy market or in the context of environmental claims. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no need for action. There is a lot of advertising in the media 
referring to ‘green energy’ and similar expressions.  
Art. 328 Energy Act contains some rules with regard to advertising of energy products 
and services. Firstly, any advertising of a product should contain the information on 
the energy efficiency class or the information on energy use (Par. 7). Furthermore, 
showing of other signs, symbols of stickers which are not conforming to this Act, is 
prohibited if it is misleading for the final consumers with regard to the use of energy 
or other essential sources (Par. 8). Misleading advertising of energy characteristics or 
savings is prohibited. Advertising is misleading if it contains incorrect or incomplete 
information on energy or cost efficiency of a product regarding its admissible use. 
Moreover, when advertising with statements on costs or savings, environmental or 
other characteristics of a product any information which is essential with regard to the 
manner or purpose of use of a product must not be left out or presented in a less 
visible way (Par. 9).  
While the Energy Agency of the Republic of Slovenia has general jurisdiction over the 
supervision of Energy Act, the Market Inspectorate should supervise the advertising of 
energy products (Art. 451 Energy Act). It would appear that the Energy Agency has 
much more expert knowledge needed to address these issues than the Market 
Inspectorate. Furthermore the latter has limited resources. There have been some 
questions as to the jurisdiction in individual cases. This issue is settled now: the 
general inspection jurisdiction of the Market Inspectorate also covers advertising of 
energy. No case law is recorded. Also, in the recent “VW-Dieselgate” affair (2015), 
neither Market Inspectorate nor other state bodies have initiated any procedures 
against VW or their representatives in Slovenia.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
The directive uses the reference point of an ‘average consumer’. According to the case 
law of the CJEU (e.g. C-210/96), an average consumer is ’reasonably well-informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect’.  
The question whether an average consumer may be misled by a certain commercial 
practice is very often at the heart of the dispute. The Market Inspectorate and the 
Administrative Court seem to follow the concept of an average consumer of the CJEU, 
although without any concrete reference to the EU legislation and case law of the CJEU 
(e.g. Administrative Court I U 372/2014 from 2.9.2014).   
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For example, the Court held (Administrative Court, I U 651/2012 from 2.10.2013) that 
an average consumer is reasonably well informed, observant and circumspect that he 
or she cannot be misled solely due to the fact that the numbers indicating greater 
discount are bigger than the numbers indicating smaller discount. However, if the 
numbers or the letters are so small that they can hardly be read, this can represent a 
misleading omission. E.g. in the case before the Administrative Court (I U 1360/2012 
from 20.8.2014), the claimant (filing a claim against the decision prohibiting the use 
of unfair practice by the Market Inspectorate) was advertising mobile phones ‘for 1 
EUR’ in the media and on big billboards, with a very little sign (*) referring to a hardly 
readable explanation of essential terms which were quite different. The Court found 
that the information provided in such an unclear way is misleading to an average 
consumer. In another case, the Administrative Court has even explicitly refused to 
accept the standard of reasonably well informed, observant and circumspect 
consumer, as the notion of “average consumer” is not defined in national legislation; 
however, the Court upheld the prohibition of misleading practice by the Market 
Inspector (Administrative Court, I U 526/2015 from 3.5.2015).  
 
Stakeholders have different views on the question whether the standard of an average 
consumer should be set higher or lower. The Consumer protection organisation pleads 
for lowering the standards. However, all stakeholders seem to agree that the 
introduction of the EU standard of an average consumer by the Consumer Protection 
against Unfair Commercial Practices Act raised the standard applied before that. They 
are also unanimous in their view that an average Slovenian consumer is significantly 
less informed and circumvent than the standard of the CJEU.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
In addition to the categories of vulnerable consumers from Art. 5 (3) UCPD, i.e. due to 
mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity, no further categories were developed on 
the basis of the Consumer Protection against Unfair Commercial Practices Act. 
However, with regard to the Consumer Credit Act, the Market Inspectorate developed 
some criteria for the protection of the borrowers with very poor credit ranking who are 
granted loans by the non-banking creditors.  
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
The Slovenian Advertising Code is a self-regulation tool for the advertisers, who are 
members of the Advertising Chamber. It contains principles and rules, aiming to 
ensure that the advertising is decent, fair, truthful and in accordance with the law.1 An 
Advertising tribunal assesses the conformity of advertising with the Code. Its decisions 
are published.2 There have been 278 decisions since 1994, an average of 12.6 per 
year. However, the stakeholders seem to agree that the effect of self-regulation in 
fighting unfair commercial practices is rather limited. The decisions of the tribunal are 
only effective against the members of the Chamber. The membership is not 
mandatory and not all advertisers are members.  
 
1 Available at: http://www.soz.si/oglasevalsko_razsodisce/slovenski_oglasevalski_kodeks  
2 Available at: http://www.soz.si/oglasevalsko_razsodisce/arhiv-razsodb 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
So far, no concrete suggestions to extend or modify the black list of the UCPD have 
been presented. It seems, however, that an extension of the list would be seen as 
beneficial.   
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
According to the stakeholders, particular problems arise from the fact that some unfair 
commercial practices are performed by business in other Member States, which are 
very difficult to persecute. The example given does not refer to B2C but to B2B 
practices (Invitations to join a ‘European business register’, followed by invoices and 
with difficult cancellation). However, the stakeholders suggest that an enhancement of 
cooperation between the responsible bodies in different Member States would be very 
useful. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
PID was transposed in Slovenian law by the Rules on price indication for goods and 
services (original Slovenian title: Pravilnik o načinu označevanja cen blaga in storitev, 
OJ 63/99, last amended 65/03, hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Rules’) in 1999, 
which was five year prior to the accession of Slovenia to the European Union. The 
Rules were issued by the Minister of Economy. Price indication is one of the areas 
where relatively good regulation and its supervision by the Market Inspectorate 
existed already prior to the implementation of the PID. 
The stakeholders are unanimous that the consumers are well informed about the unit 
selling price, especially when it is indicated per 1 kg or 1 litre. In practice, prices of 
specific food products, especially tropical fruit (e.g. avocado), are sometimes indicated 
per unit. Despite the fact that the price per unit is also marked with the price per 1 kg, 
this might still be confusing to the consumer.  
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The Rules on price indication for goods and services do not prescribe that the unit 
price for specific products should be indicated per product’s performance. However, in 
practice such indications do exist (e.g. number of glasses for instant vitamin drink, 
number of bread slices for spread, number of washloads for detergents). All 
stakeholders consider that consumers prefer measurement unit per 1 kg or 1 litre and 
that such indication shouldn’t be replaced by the indication per product’s performance.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
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Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rules on price indication for goods and services businesses 
with a selling area of less than 500 m2 are not bound by the provision of the Rules 
which imposes an obligation to mark the products with a unit price. It seems, 
however, that the derogation for small businesses is not causing significant problems 
in practice, since they mainly comply with the provision on the unit price contained in 
the Rules, even though they are not technically obliged to do so.  Small businesses 
seek to act consumer friendly as well and are therefore following the rules on unit 
price marking. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
For B2B relations, Articles 12-15a of the Consumer Protection Act (OJ 20/98, last 
amendment 19/15), implementing the MCAD (Directive 2006/114) contain rules on 
misleading and comparative advertising. These provisions also apply to non-
consumers, i.e. businesses (competitors). With regard to misleading advertising to 
consumers, a reference is made to the Consumer Protection against Unfair 
Commercial Practices Act.  
Indeed, the notion of ‘advertising’ is much narrower than the notion of a ‘commercial 
practice’. In this sense the MCAD cannot be considered as providing complete 
protection to business against unfair commercial practices by other business. There is, 
however, other legislation protecting the competitors against unfair business practices. 
Firstly, unfair competition is prohibited by Art. 74 (3) of Constitution of the Republic of 
Slovenia. Further, Art. 63a of the Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act 
(ZPOmK-1, OJ 36/08, 40/09, 26/11, 87/11, 57/12, 39/13, 63/13, 33/14 in 76/15) 
contains a general clause of the law of unfair competition: Unfair competition is 
prohibited. Unfair competition involves acts of a business at the market, which are not 
compatible with good commercial practices and which cause or may cause damage to 
competitors. Art. 63 a (3) Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act provides eight 
examples of acts of unfair competition. A competitor has a right to claim damages for 
the damage caused, furthermore, a prohibition of further such acts, destruction of the 
objects used as well as publication of the judicial decision in the media may be claimed 
(See Art. 63 b Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act). However, it seems that 
the business rarely opts for private enforcement as the case law is scarce. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
The principle-based approach to misleading advertising, as prescribed in Art. 2 (b) and 
Art. 3 MCAD seems to adequately address misleading advertising.  
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
The Consumer Protection Act contains some provisions, which also apply B2B and 
which go beyond the provisions of the MCDA on misleading advertising: a prohibition 
of indecent advertising (Art. 12a Consumer Protection Act), a demand that advertising 
messages must be written in a language easily understood by the consumers in 
Slovenia (Art. 12 Consumer Protection Act) and a special rule that advertising may not 
contain any elements, which cause or may cause bodily, psychic or other harm to 
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children, nor any elements exploiting or potentially exploiting their trustfulness or 
inexperience (Art. 15). 
As stated earlier, Art. 63a of the Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (ZPOmK-
1) contains a general clause of the law of unfair competition: Unfair competition is 
prohibited. Unfair competition means acts of a business at the market, which are not 
compatible with good commercial practices and which cause or may cause damage to 
competitors. Art. 63 a (3) Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act provides some 
examples which ‘in particular’ represent acts of unfair competition. The third example 
refers to ‘sale of goods with denominations, marks or information which cause or could 
cause confusion as to the origin, production, quantity, quality or other characteristics 
of the goods’.  
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Art. 4 MCAD is implemented in Art. 12c (1) and (2) Consumer Protection Act. The 
provision applies to B2B relations. Art. 12c (3) Consumer Protection Act contains an 
additional rule, according to which any comparison, relating to a special offer, is to 
clearly state the date the offer ends. If the offer is not yet effective, the date of its 
coming into effect is to be stated, too. If a special offer only relates to limited amounts 
of goods or services, this must be clearly stated, too.  
The effect of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising are difficult 
to assess, as the publicly available databases reveal no case law and as the literature 
doesn’t seem to address this issue.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
In Slovenia, the rules protecting the competitors from misleading and non-conforming 
comparative advertising are enforced by a combination of private and public 
enforcement. A competitor may file a claim at the civil court for the recovery of 
damages, prohibition of further acts, destruction of the objects used as well as 
publication of the judicial decision in the media. Very little case law has been 
published. This may be partly attributed to the fact that the Slovenian judiciary is 
burdened with serious backlogs and that it generally enjoys a very low confidence in 
the public.  
With regard to cross border transactions the European international private law and 
the law of European civil procedure apply.  
According to Art 6 (2) Rome II Regulation (No 864/2007), if an act of unfair 
competition affects exclusively the interest of a specific competitor, the applicable law 
is the law of the country in which the damage occurs. In case of a competitor 
damaged in Slovenia this means Slovenian law. Slovenian law would also be applicable 
where an act of unfair competition affects the competitive relations or the collective 
interests of consumers in Slovenia, see Art. 6 (1) Rome II.  
The Brussels I Regulation (No 44/2001) contains rules on the international jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. In 
addition to the general rule from Art. 2 (2) according to which any defendant may be 
sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled Art. 5(3) provides for an 
additional possibility for delicts: the courts of the Member state where the harmful 
event occurred or may occur. Regulation 1393/2007 contains rules on the service of 
documents in other Member States.  
Public enforcement means that the Market Inspectorate my impose penalties for the 
breach of rules on misleading or comparative advertising, see Art. 77 (1) Nr. 3-6. With 
regard to enforcement of penalties against business in other Member States the 
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Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties and Convention of 29 May 
2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union are relevant, in addition to bilateral conventions.  
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
No such measures or practices have been suggested.  
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Surely, the application of the national laws transposing the UCPD is not uniform. The 
national differences in the application and implementation of the UCPD are among the 
factors the businesses have to take into account. However, the business 
representatives haven’t reported any impact on cross-border trade due to these 
disparities. It seems that the disparities, if any, did not influence their business 
strategies. Also, Slovenian companies don’t do that much retail business abroad. 
Foreign businesses, when coming to Slovenia, usually set up a branch and are then 
subject to Slovenian law. In this respect, the business associations haven’t reported 
any problems mentioned by the question. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Unlike the general clause, where there is some room for disparities between the 
Member States in its application, the application of the black list is much more 
uniform. In this sense, the impact on the black list on the elimination of obstacles to 
the free movement of goods and services is greater than the impact of the general 
clause. However, the stakeholders haven’t reported concretely on these effects.  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
The stakeholders haven’t reported about any such barriers.  
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
Theoretically, such disparities are possible. But the business associations haven’t 
reported any, nor their impact on cross-border trade. It seems that the regulation on 
EU level succeeded in establishing uniform concepts.  
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• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Again, this seems reasonable. But the stakeholders have not identified any such 
barriers.  
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
It seems that the full harmonisation of Art. 4 of the MCAD is an appropriate legal 
framework for cross-border advertising. However, the stakeholders offered no 
concrete answers.  
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
It would appear that a cross-border enforcement mechanism would certainly 
contribute to elimination of barriers in cross-border trade. However, no answers to this 
effect were offered by the stakeholders.  
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
It seems that the traders are much less aware of the information requirements from 
Art. 7(4) UCPD than they are aware of the information requirements from the CRD. 
Not many misleading omission are being reported by the Market Inspectorate. It 
seems that one of the reasons could also be the legislative technique of the UCPD. 
Stakeholders agree that clearly stated concrete information duties would be much 
more effective than a prohibition of misleading omission, indirectly establishing a 
general duty to provide essential information. Furthermore, it would seem reasonable 
to have all information to be provided to the consumers regulated in one act. This 
would benefit the businesses, too.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
There is some overlap with regard to information duties but no extra costs due to this 
problem have been reported.  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
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• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
Whether such an extension would bring benefits for cross-border trade is difficult to 
say. It would certainly contribute to a clearer and more uniform regulatory framework 
of law of unfair competition, which would be beneficial per se.  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
The limitation of the sphere of application to B2C relations was subject to criticism 
already before the adoption of UPCD. It was suggested that the interests of 
consumers, competitors and general public are inseparably connected and that the 
limitation of UCPD to B2C relations causes fragmentation of law of unfair competition.  
In Slovenia, the regulation is fragmented as well. The Consumer Protection against 
Unfair Commercial Practices Act, implementing the UCPD, only regulates B2C 
relations. However, the Consumer Protection Act, implementing the MCAD, regulates 
mostly B2B relations, with some provisions (Art. 12a – prohibition of indecent 
advertising), Art. 12 (advertising in the language easily understood by the consumers 
in Slovenia) and Art. 15 (advertising may not contain elements which may harm the 
children or exploit trustfulness or inexperience) applicable also B2C. Art. 63a of the 
Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (ZPOmK-1) contains the general clause of 
the law of unfair competition for B2B.  
Already before the transposition of the UCPD it was suggested that the legislator 
should add its application to B2B relations, as there is little sense in fragmenting the 
law of unfair competition. The argument was put forward that the core of the general 
clause of UCPD and the Slovenian general clause for B2B is the same or very similar: 
acts contrary to good commercial practices which affect the decisions of consumers or 
cause or may cause damage to competitors.   
It has been suggested that very small businesses (‘micro-companies’) need protection 
as they are often victims of unfair commercial practices. In this respect, the extension 
of the UCPD would be beneficial. 
However, both regimes cannot be fully aligned. Already the idea of private 
enforcement through damages in B2B relations cannot be automatically transferred to 
B2C relations.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
It would appear that a complex regulation of unfair commercial practices should cover 
unfair commercial practices during and after the transaction, too.  
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
Yes, a black list seems beneficial also in the field of B2B marketing. Such a black list is 
already a part of Slovenian B2B law of unfair competition - Art. 63 a (3) Prevention of 
Restriction of Competition Act.  
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area; 
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According to the stakeholders some kind of enforcement cooperation in the B2B area 
would be very beneficial; however, no concrete suggestions were made.  
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
There seems to be no such need.  
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No such suggestions were put forward.  
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
In Slovenian law, there are no provisions on the contractual consequences of unfair 
commercial practices. There is also no case law to this effect yet. But it is not 
impossible to imagine that a court would declare a contract, concluded as a 
consequence of an unfair commercial practice, null, in particular when the contract is 
also contrary to the principle of good faith (Art. 35 Obligations Code) or it contains a 
non-individually negotiated clause which is contrary to good faith, or causes a 
significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer or contains a ‘surprise clause’ 
(Art. 24 Consumer Protection Act). For example, the Administrative Court (II U 
296/2013 from 12.3.2014) held an unfair commercial practice (overcharging the cost 
of payment reminder under insurance contracts, triggering a decree by the Market 
Inspector against which a claim was filed and dismissed) to represent also an unfair 
term. No reference to EU law was made.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
There is no pressing need to establish contractual consequences of unfair commercial 
practices. In civil law, there are some traditional institutes which seem sufficient for 
situations, where it would be unjust to enforce a contract. They are a result of careful 
balancing between the general interest that the contracts be upheld (pacta sunt 
servanda) and the interest of the prejudiced party as well as the public interest about 
fair conclusion of contracts.  
Firstly, there is mistake (Art. 46 Obligations Code) and fraud (Art. 49 Obligations 
Code). Some of these situations may be similar to (misleading) unfair commercial 
clauses as defined in the UCPD. A mistake must be essential (i.e. regarding essential 
elements of contract) and excusable. A fraud means that a party causes mistake of 
the other party or keeps her in mistake with the intention of concluding a contract. In 
both cases, contract is avoidable within one year after the claimant has learned of the 
circumstances that enable avoidance, and not later than three years after the 
conclusion (Art. 99 Obligations Code). According to the case law, only a court can 
dissolve a contract due to mistake, fraud or threat. As a consequence, the case law is 
almost non-existent.  
Furthermore, a usurious contract is not just avoidable, but automatically void. Usury 
means that someone abuses someone’s difficult situation, state of distress, or difficult 
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economic position or inexperience, or light-mindedness or dependence to conclude a 
contract where his obligation is clearly disproportionate to the obligation of the other 
party (Art. 119 Obligations Code).   
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
Before we assess the effectiveness of the national law transposing the directive, some 
important differences in comparison with the UCTD should be highlighted as they 
concern the general clause.  
Firstly, Slovenian law contains no reference to non-individually-negotiated-clauses, but 
refers only to ‘contractual terms, determined by the business, in particular those in 
the form of a formular contract (not defined) or general terms of operation (not 
defined)’, see Art. 22 (1) Consumer Protection Act. 
Secondly, in order for the ‘contractual terms’ to become a part of contract, the 
consumer must be ‘acquainted with their entire wording’, Art. 22(2) Consumer 
Protection Act. It is presumed, that the consumer got acquainted with them, if the 
business made an explicit reference to them and if they were easily accessible to the 
consumer, Art. 22 (3) Consumer Protection Act. Furthermore, the contract terms 
should be clear and understandable, Art. 22 (4) Consumer Protection Act; otherwise 
they do not become a part of the contract.3  
Thirdly and most importantly, the general clause from the UCTD was transferred into 
Slovenian law in a peculiar way. The general clause Art. 3 (1) UCTD is made out of 
two elements: contrariety to good faith and significant imbalance in rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer. However, the general clause in 
Slovenian law does not contain these two elements. Unfair terms are forbidden and 
null (Art. 23). A term is unfair, if it either a) causes significant imbalance in the rights 
and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the consumer, or b) contravenes the 
good faith principle, or c) cause the performance of contract unjustifiably to be 
detrimental to the consumer, or d) cause the performance of contract essentially 
different of what the consumer had reasonably expected it to be. However, there is 
little case law where a term would be considered unfair without both elements of the 
general clause of the UCTD (i.e. violation of good faith and significant imbalance).4 
 
There are also some further differences in Slovenian law in comparison to the UCTD. 
Art. 4 (1) of the UCTD (no assessment of core terms) was not transposed. Therefore 
the Consumer Protection Act enables assessment of the definition of the subject 
matter or the adequacy of price. There is, however, no case law to support it.  
3 See Higher Court of Ljubljana, II Cp 1518/2015 from 15 July 2015. However, the Court held an unclear 
term is null and void. 
4 See e.g. Administrative Court, II U 41/2013 from 6 November 2013. The Court upheld the decree by the 
Market Inspector prohibiting the use of an unfair term (allowing for overcharging the cost of payment 
reminder in case of default with instalments and complaint of the consumer). The Court, although arguing 
that the contract is void according to the general clause of Art. 24 (1) Consumer Protection Act, which is 
different form the UCPD, however, the Court also applied two of the examples from the grey list of Art. 24 
(3) Consumer Protection Act.  
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Furthermore, according to Art. 25 (2) Consumer Protection Act, goods or service must 
be sold to all consumers under the same terms.5  
In Slovenian law, a contractual term in a B2C contract can be regarded unfair under 
fundamentally different conditions than under the UCTD. It can be alternatively 
contrary to good faith or cause significant imbalance (even if not contrary to good 
faith), or cause the performance to be detrimental or surprising for the consumer.  
This provision was adopted in 1998. It seems that it was modelled after the general 
clause, in force at the time- Art. 143 Act on obligations (Yugoslavia, 1978), which 
contained a general clause on unfair terms (contract terms “determined” by one party 
are null, if they are contrary to the purpose of contract or good commercial practices). 
The Consumer Protection Act became a lex specialis for B2B contracts. It seems that 
in the negotiation procedures before the accession of Slovenia to the EU it was 
somehow established that the standards from the UCTD were satisfied.   
However, although the possibilities for annulling contracts due to unfairness in 
Slovenian law are very wide, it seems that they are rarely used. The available case 
law of civil courts is scarce.6 One of the reasons for scarce case law of the civil courts 
is that the decisions of first instance courts are not publicly available in Slovenia. 
Secondly, the consumers don’t decide for filing claims at the courts also because of 
high cost, long duration of procedures and general distrust in the judicial system.  
There are some, but not many (10) decisions of Administrative, which has jurisdiction 
over complaints against the decrees of the Market Inspectorate (after their review by 
the second instance body – the ministry of economic affairs).7 The latter may prohibit 
sale of goods and services based on unfair terms, but it cannot annul the contract. The 
Administrative Court proves whether the contractual term was unfair and the decree 
of Market Inspectorate justified (8 out of 9 cases). In none of the decisions the courts 
made references to the UCTD or the case law of the CJEU. There is also relatively little 
legal literature on unfair contract terms in Slovenia.  
Overall, the principle-based approach under the UCTD is effective. However, due to 
the peculiarities of its implementation into Slovenian law (i.e. substantially different 
general clause) the effectiveness of its general clause in Slovenia is difficult to assess.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The indicative list of the UCPD (‘grey list’) was transposed in Art. 24 (3)  Consumer 
Protection Act. In principle, it should be applied as an indicative list, i.e. the elements 
of general clause should still be assessed. However, it seems that the courts often rely 
on examples from the list without proving the general clause.8 It may therefore be 
concluded that the indicative list is effective.  
 
5  See Supreme Court of Slovenia, II Ips 248/2006 from 8 May 2008; claimant bought an apartment from 
defendant. He found out that the defendant sold apartments of the same kind to third parties for a lower 
price and claimed nullity of the contract. The Supreme Court rejected the claim on the grounds that a 
contract can only be null if ground for nullity exist at the time of conclusion.  
6  See e.g. Higher Court in Ljubljana, VSL I Cp 1816/2011 from 18 January2012; VSL I Cp 292/2009 from 4 
March 2009; VSL II Cp 1467/2015 from 4 November 2015; VSL II Cp 1753/2015, from 19 August 2015; 
VSL II Cp 1956/2012, 12 December 2012.  
7  Administrative Court, UPRS I U 563/2013 from 1 April 2014; UPRS II I 296/2013 from 12 March 2014; 
UPRS II I 470/2012 from 20 November 2013; UPRS II U 41/2013 from 6 November 2013; UPRS I  U 
1432/2012 from 23 May 2013; UPRS I U 1144/2012 from 12 March 2013; UPRS I U 1955/2011 from 10 
July 2012; UPRS I U 1499/2099 from 20 OCtober 2010; UPRS U 172/2004 from 10 October 2006; UPRS 
II U 203/2014 from 15 October 2014.  
8 See e.g. Higher Court in Ljubljana, VSL II Cp 1753/2015, from 19 August 2015 and VSL II Cp 1647/2015 
from 4 November 2015; Administrative Court, UPRS I U 563/2013 from 1 April 2014. 
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• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The list was meant to be an indicative list. Art. 24 (3) Consumer Protection Act, 
containing the list of 20 situations, refers explicitly to the general clause. However, as 
it was already mentioned, the courts rely quite strongly on the indicative list. If they 
find that the case corresponds to one of the situations from the list, they usually find 
that there is an unfair term without much debate on the general clause.  
In any case, the list is very useful for the practice of the courts and of the Market 
Inspectorate.  
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
A civil court may only find that an unfair contract terms is null. However, a Market 
Inspectorate, although formally not entitled to annul the contract, may issue a decree 
forbidding the business the selling of goods or services under contracts containing 
unfair terms. E.g. the Market Inspectorate has forbidden to the business the sale of 
electronic communication services until the business stops using unfair contract terms 
(in casu, the contract provided the possibility for the mobile phone network operator 
to unilaterally change the customers phone number).9 This means that the decision of 
the Market Inspectorate is extended to all contracts of the trader containing unfair 
clauses. However, the contracts of other traders containing the same or similar 
clauses are not affected.  
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The stakeholders agree that in practice, contract terms are often not clear and 
understandable. However, it seems that this issue never comes up in the courts. 
Furthermore, the Market Inspectorate has no jurisdiction over the transparency 
requirement.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
As mentioned earlier, in Slovenia the courts can assess the adequacy of price and the 
main subject matter, as Art. 4 (1) UCTD was not transposed. However, there are no 
actual court cases on this issue yet. The stakeholders disagree whether this option is 
an advantage for consumer protection; the consumer associations seem to think that 
it is, while the regulators and ministries call the attention to the fact that this idea is 
contrary to the principles of contractual justice in Slovenian law. Namely, in order for a 
9  See Administrative Court, UPRS I U 563/2013 from 1 April 2014.  
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contract to be considered usurious, inadequacy of price must be accompanied by 
abuse of undue influence on one of the parties. In principle, there are no reasons why 
B2C relations shouldn’t be treated along these lines, too.  
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The sanction foreseen by the UCTD, i.e. the term is null, is only relevant in the civil 
courts. These cases are very rare, also because the consumers fear the costs, the 
length of procedures and the uncertainty of outcome. The Market Inspectorate does 
not have the possibility to annul the contract but can, more importantly, prohibit the 
use of unfair clauses to the business.  
The national courts do not follow the instructions of the CJEU regarding the ex officio 
invoking of unfairness. They rely on a demand of the party and only consider facts 
which were put forward by the parties.10 In execution procedure, the possibilities of 
invoking any kind of substantive law issues are even smaller.11  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
A better implementation of the UCTD and above all, the attention to the case law of 
the CJEU would certainly improve the effectiveness of UCTD in establishing a high 
level of consumer protection in Slovenia. In addition, the jurisdiction of Market 
Inspectorate, acting ex officio which represents an essential advantage, as the 
consumer bears no costs, should be continued.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested  that the legislation should provide for 
standardized sets of information for consumers – not in the sense of long lists of pre-
contractual information to be provided (as in the CRD), but as short, clear and 
understandable messages which would effectively ‘warn’ the consumer of the risks 
involved, in plain an intelligible language.  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
The Slovenian version of the general fairness clause (see supra) can serve as a proof 
of existence of disparities in the understanding of this principle. For various reasons 
there is, however, very little case law on unfair terms in Slovenia.  
10 See e.g. Higher Court in Celje, Cp 1283/2006 from 24 May 2007; High Court in Ljubljana, VSL I Cp 
1214/2012 from 21 November 2012.  
11 See e.g. Higher Court in Celje I Ip 181(2011 from 14.7.2011; II Ip 169/2011 from 6 October 2011.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1088
Surely, these disparities have to be taken into account by the businesses. But, as it 
seems, not to an extent of any noticeable effect on cross border trade.   
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
The stakeholders report of no such influences. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Theoretically, any modification in the implementation and application of the directives 
in the Member States can represent a barrier to cross-border trade. But not all of 
them do in fact hinder cross-border trade. For example, although in Slovenia there is a 
possibility of fairness assessment of the adequacy of the price and main subject, it 
hasn’t been applied in practice. Differences in legislation can have some influence on 
cross border trade, but if they are not used in practice, this influence is minimal.  
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
A possibility to invoke an unfair term in B2B contracts already exists in Slovenian law 
(Art. 121-122 Obligations Code). From this point of view an extension of the UCTD to 
B2B contracts is not needed. However, the existing regulation has some shortcomings 
(see supra). From this point of view an improvement would be welcome. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
It appears that a system of protection based on the concept of good faith and 
significant imbalance would be appropriate also for B2B transactions. Under the 
existing regulation, a contractual term is unfair if it is ‘contrary the purpose of the 
contract or good commercial practices’, Art. 121 (1) Obligations Code. There is no 
mention of a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations. However, a 
reference, although indirect, to significant imbalance may be deduced from Art. 121 
(2) Obligations Code, which gives some examples of unfair clauses. In any case, there 
is little case law regarding unfair terms in B2B relations.  
A uniform general clause would be appropriate for both B2B and B2C contracts, with 
modifications as to its interpretation.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
It seems that neither businesses nor consumers are in need of UCTD-protection with 
regard to individually negotiated terms and the adequacy of price and main subject-
matter of the contract. Some decisions should be left up to contractual parties. Any 
potential unfair consequences can be averted by using ‘classical’ institutes such as the 
notion of a usurious contract (Art. 119 Obligations Code).  
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 • Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
In practice, such terms probably exist but they were not identified by the 
stakeholders.  
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
The same general clause for unfair contract terms should apply for both B2C and B2B 
contracts. However, this doesn’t mean that the level of protection should be the same 
in both categories of contracts. In the application of the general clause, the question 
of the parties to the contract (i.e. whether there is a B2C or a B2B contract) is of 
crucial importance.  
If the legislator should opt for the extension of the UCTD to B2B transactions, the 
transparency requirement should be extended to these contracts, too. But it should be 
interpreted differently as the need for protection is fundamentally different with regard 
to consumers and business. However, the contra proferentem rule is applicable to B2B 
and B2C relations equally.  
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
In principle, the extension of the UCTD to B2B transactions could be beneficial to 
cross-border trade as it would help reduce the disparities between the Member States. 
However, from the point of view of Slovenia (where B2B contract terms can be 
assessed, but this rarely happens), it seems that such an extension would hardly bring 
about concrete benefits. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
The stakeholders did not mention any such effect.  
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
As already mentioned (see supra), Slovenian law already provides for a possibility of 
fairness assessment of standard terms in B2B contracts.  
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?12 
12  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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The injunction procedure as prescribed by the Injunctions Directive was transposed 
into Slovenian law by the Consumer Protection Act (Art. 74 and 75). The injunction 
procedure is a court procedure and is one of the enforcement mechanisms for 
protection of consumer rights beside the administrative procedure and minor offence 
procedure regulated in the Consumer Protection Act. However, in contrast to the 
administrative procedure and minor offence procedure, the publicly available 
databases reveal no case law on injunction actions. The Consumer Association and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which are qualified entities for bringing 
injunction actions according to Art. 75 of Consumer Protection Act, have not filed any 
injunction lawsuits yet. It would appear that the costs were the main reason for 
inactivity on this matter. Namely, if they lose the litigation before the court, they are 
obliged to refund the costs incurred by the winning party according to Art. 154 of the 
Civil Procedure Act (OJ 26/99, last amended 48/15). If the Consumer Association 
notices a breach of consumer rights in practice, it informs the Market Inspectorate to 
start an administrative procedure pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act (e. g. to 
issue an administrative order) instead of filing an injunction action. It should be noted 
that this inactivity of the qualified legal entities regarding the injunction actions has 
already been criticised by legal scholars in Slovenia.13 It has been expressly pointed 
out that the burden of costs should not be a reason for inactivity on this issue, 
particularly in the light of the fact that some consumer organisations have been 
abundantly financed by the State.14 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
As no injunction action has been filed before the court yet, the effectiveness of 
measures as implemented in Consumer Protection Act is difficult to assess. It would 
appear that the measures are not effective at all. As explained above, the rules on 
costs of proceedings are deemed to be too burdensome in the eyes of the authorized 
entities. Since the Consumer Protection Act does not contain any specific rules 
regarding the costs of proceedings, the general rules of civil procedure apply. 
According to these rules the losing party bears the costs of the winning party.  
It is generally accepted among the stakeholders that the sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order are regulated appropriately. Since the Consumer Protection 
Act does not contain any specific rules on this issue, Articles 226 and 227 of the Claim 
Enforcement and Security Act (OJ 51/98, last amended 76/15) apply. According to 
these provisions, the court orders the infringer to cease the violations. At the same 
time a penalty for acting against the order is determined. For natural persons it can 
amount to EUR 10 000 and for legal entities and sole traders up to EUR 500 000. If 
the infringer acts against the order, the court executes the penalty (fine) and sets the 
next one higher. This can be repeated. The publication of the decision is also 
considered to be efficient. The summary procedure and the prior consultation are not 
regulated in the national legislation.  
     
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Slovenia has extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure in a way 
that an injunction may be commenced in cases where companies are using unfair 
terms, business practices or advertising activities contrary to this act and the act on 
13 See Galič, Skupinske tožbe na področju potrošniškega prava, Pravni letopis 2011, p. 221.  
14 Ibidem. 
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the protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices, the act on consumer 
credit, the acts governing medicine and media, and by doing so are damaging the 
collective interests of consumers. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
The main obstacle to the effective use of the injunction procedure in Slovenia seems 
to be the burden of costs. Namely, according to the rules of the civil procedure, the 
losing party is obliged to refund the costs incurred by the winning party. The qualified 
entities for filing the injunction actions are not able or willing to bear the financial risk. 
The Consumer Association would be hardly able to pay the costs of the winning party, 
if it would lose a case before the court. As mentioned above, the criticism of such 
excuse for inactivity is widespread among the scholars. Nevertheless, there hasn’t 
been any progress in removing this obstacle since 2012. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
The stakeholders are of the opinion that there is currently no need to extend the scope 
of protection of the Injunctions Directive. It should be noted, that Slovenia has already 
extended the scope of protection as foreseen by the Directive. According to Art. 74 of 
the Consumer Protection Act, the injunction claims can be brought against companies 
which, in business with consumers, are using unfair contract terms, business practices 
or advertising activities contrary to the Consumer Protection Act and the Act on the 
protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices, the Act on consumer 
credit, the acts governing medicine and media, and, by doing so, are damaging the 
collective interests of consumers.  
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
Publicly available databases reveal no case law regarding the injunctions addressing 
infringements originating in another EU country. According to the data of the European 
Consumer Centre in Slovenia such injunctions haven’t been filed yet. Neither the 
literature nor the stakeholders have explained the inactivity on this matter. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
According to the Notification from the Commission concerning Article 4(3) of Directive 
2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests, which codifies Directive 98/27/EC, concerning the 
entities qualified to bring an action under Article 2 of this Directive (OJ of the EU 
2016/C 87/01) there are 14 entities in Slovenia, which are entitled to bring an 
injunction action in another Member State. Beside the Chamber of Commerce and 
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Industry and the Chamber of Craft all of them are non-governmental consumer 
organisations. The qualified entities haven’t filed any injunction actions in other 
Member States yet. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
All the stakeholders are well informed about the injunction procedure as regulated in 
the Consumer Protection Act. They seem to agree that the procedure is regulated 
properly and that there is no need to change the legislation on this issue. In spite of 
that the injunction procedure is ineffective in practice. The main reason for 
ineffectiveness at national level is financial risk. In analysing the reasons for 
ineffectiveness of the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country, similar conclusions can be drawn. Further reasons for inactivity of 
qualified entities on this issue could be a foreign language and the foreign law, also 
causing extra cost.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
The injunction procedure is regulated in the Consumer Protection Act and represents a 
uniform model of court procedure as foreseen by other EU Consumer Directives 
(UCPD, UCTD and CRD). For the questions of the injunction procedure, which are not 
regulated in the Consumer Protection Act, the general rules of civil procedure as 
contained in the Civil Procedure Act and executive rules as contained in the Claim 
Enforcement and Security Act apply. Other procedures which represent 
implementation of enforcement measures from other EU Consumer Law Directives are 
of administrative nature, mainly inspector orders, and minor offence procedures in 
which fines can be imposed on infringers. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The injunction procedure is a court procedure and is governed by the rules of civil 
procedure. Beside the court procedure, other enforcement procedures are regulated in 
the Consumer Protection Act (as foreseen by other EU Consumer Law Directives). 
These are administrative procedures and minor offence procedures. In administrative 
procedures the inspectors (mainly the Market Inspectorate) are entitled to issue 
orders. Many breaches of provisions which implement EU Consumer Law Directives are 
treated as minor offences and infringers are punished by a fine.  
It should be noted that administrative measures are not applicable to all cases 
covered by the injunction procedure, since the scope of protection as foreseen by the 
national provisions implementing the Injunctions Directive is wider. Moreover, the 
injunction procedure as a court procedure goes beyond measures foreseen by the 
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Injunctions Directive as it provides a possibility to bring an action for finding the 
contract between a defendant and a consumer invalid. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
Both the UCPD and UCTD have doubtlessly contributed to a higher level of consumer 
protection in Slovenia. In this respect, particular importance can be attributed to the 
Market Inspectorate of Slovenia – an independent body within the Ministry of the 
Economy, responsible for supervision over compliance with the legislation in the areas 
such as consumer protection, fair competition, and copyrights. The Market 
Inspectorate has the power to forbid selling or advertising products or services based 
on unfair commercial practice or unfair contract terms. Furthermore, it may impose 
financial penalties for breaches of legislation. However, it cannot annul a contract or 
award damages. The Market Inspectorate can start an inspection procedure on its own 
motion, in practice this procedure is often based on complaints by the consumers. For 
them, this bears no costs. As the consumers in Slovenia are not prone to file claims in 
the court (due to, among other reasons, their fear of high cost and the length of 
disputes), the public enforcement of consumer protection legislation via the Market 
Inspection is the most effective means of achieving protection from unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard contract terms. Individual (private) enforcement via the 
courts is much less effective. Among the reasons are costs, duration, uncertainty 
about the outcome and the general distrust in the judicial system.  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
A level playing field for honest traders in the sense of creating harmonised rules on 
consumer protection is a long-term benefit for the traders. Not only it creates a much 
more harmonized legal environment to conduct business across the EU, but it also 
helps improving consumer trust and thus contributes to the growth of economy.  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Compliance with the legislation bears costs. However, the stakeholders suggest that 
these costs are relatively low. Also, businesses who invest in compliance with 
consumer protection legislation tend to be more successful in the long run.  
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
Of course, the public enforcement of consumer protection rules bears costs, too. The 
Market Inspectorate employs about 100 inspectors and 25 of other staff. Its yearly 
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budget is about EUR 4.8 million.15 However, the Inspectorate has a wide range of 
competences, by far exceeding consumer protection. It is our estimation that these 
costs are relatively well spent as the Market Inspectorate offers effective protection at 
no extra costs for the consumers. It has, however, limited resources and powers.  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
There are no such indications.  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
There is certainly room for improvement. If the judicial system worked, more 
consumers would opt for individual enforcement. This would also contribute to much 
more clear answers to legal questions connected to the application of the directives, 
particularly the UCTD. As there is only very little case law there is a lot of uncertainty 
as to how the courts would apply the legislation.  
Slovenia is a very small country, with not that many people writing about law in 
general, and consumer protection law in particular. The market of legal literature is 
small. For example, there is no usable commentary of Consumer Protection Act. As a 
consequence, there is not enough adequate literature and commentaries. This is a 
further reason for uncertainty as to what exactly the law is or should be. If the state 
or EU would financially support making of such literature (e.g. a commentary of 
Consumer Protection act or Consumer Protection against Unfair Commercial Practices 
Act) or adopt detailed guidelines for the application of the UCTD and UCPD this would 
contribute to legal certainty and better and more cost-efficient enforcement of the 
legislation.  
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
The stakeholders seem to suggest that the level of awareness of businesses and 
consumers with the horizontal EU consumer legislations in the sense of UCPD and 
UCTD is relatively low.  
The UCPD and the UCTD represent general legal bases for combating unfair 
commercial practices and unfair contract terms in the sectors of electronic 
communications, energy, passenger transport and consumer financial services 
(consumer credit, distance marketing of financial services). However, there is very 
little case law of the courts and of the Market Inspectorate in these areas.  
15  See Yearly report of the Market Inspectorate for 2014, available at:  
http://www.ti.gov.si/fileadmin/ti.gov.si/pageuploads/dokumenti/TirsPoslovnoPorocilo2014.pdf 
(20.7.2016) 
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 • Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
The Market Inspectorate is responsible for the enforcement of horizontal EU consumer 
law in the areas of electronic communications, energy and consumer financial services 
(consumer credit, distance marketing of financial services). In the field of passenger 
traffic, there are specialized agencies, such as Civil Aviation Agency, responsible for 
the supervision of passenger rights under the regulations No 261/2004 and (EC) No 
1107/2006. The case law of the courts (exercising judicial control over the decrees of 
the Market Inspectorate) seems to suggest that the Market Inspectorate is rarely 
active in the mentioned areas. Limited resources (and a wide range of competences) 
as well as lack of specialized skills of the Market Inspectorate might be among the 
reasons.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
From the point of view of the legislation, the combination of UCPD and UCTD and 
sector-specific rules seems to provide for a relatively clear legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising. There is, very little enough publicly available case law (i.e. 
decisions of the courts of first instance and Market Inspectorate are not publicly 
available, only decisions of Administrative Court, Higher Courts and the Supreme 
Court) for an assessment as to how this legal framework is functioning in practice.  
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
It would appear that the application of the same general principles of consumer 
protection is a benefit of applicability of horizontal consumer provisions in regulated 
sectors.  
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
A clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific rules and horizontal EU 
consumer law would provide a clearer regulatory framework. Any future horizontal EU 
consumer law legislation should contain a list (e.g. in an Annex) of all EU sector 
specific rules, which it affects or which represent a special regulation.  
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
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The stakeholders did not see any need for the application of consumer law directives 
in C2C relations.  
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The concepts of ‘consumer’, ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’ as 
currently defined in the EU directives and case law of the CJEU are valid and fit for 
purpose.  
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
The existing UCPD rules on the protection of vulnerable consumers represent an 
adequate basis for their protections. However, so far there is no case law with regard 
to corresponding provision of national law – Art. 3 (4) Consumer Protection against 
Unfair Commercial Practices Act.  
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Certainly, the implementation of UCTD and UCPD has substantially improved the 
consumer protection against unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in 
Slovenia. Prior to the implementation of the UCPD, there was some legislation in force 
(Zakon o varstvu konkurence, OJ 18/93), but it focussed on the B2B aspect. The UCPD 
has set up a coherent legal framework. Particularly the black list has improved the 
situation, as it offered very clear examples to the enforcement authorities (Market 
Inspectorate).  
Prior to the implementation of the UCTD (2004) there was a general clause on unfair 
standard contract terms as from 1978 (Yugoslav Act on Obligations), applicable both 
in B2B and B2C relations, but with very little case law. The Consumer Protection Act in 
1998 has established a general clause, very different from the general clause of the 
UCTD (see supra) which remained in force even after the accession to the EU. 
However, in the application the differences are not that great. With regard to the case 
law it should be pointed out that Slovenian courts never make any reference to the 
UCTD and case law of the CJEU. With regard to the latter some fundamental 
differences exist with regard to the application of the UCTD, in particular regarding the 
duties of the court ex officio. Slovenian courts do not follow the instructions of the 
CJEU.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
The stakeholders agree that the information of consumers has improved.  
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• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
The stakeholders agree that the protection of business has against unfair marketing 
has improved since the implementation of the MCAD. However, the case law is scarce 
and the exact degree of the improvement is difficult to assess.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
The stakeholders agree that the EU consumer protection legislation has made it easier 
for the businesses to trade to final consumers across borders. However, there are not 
that many businesses in Slovenia trading in this way. The regulatory framework is 
certainly not one of the reasons for this situation. 
It has also become easier for consumers to shop from traders in other EU countries, 
above all, over the internet. Harmonization of consumer protection rules by the UCTD 
and UCPD might be one of the factors, contributing to greater trust of the consumers. 
In the opinion of the stakeholders, however, the majority of consumers care little for 
the legal framework of their transactions or advertising. Much more important are 
other factors or barriers to the cross border trade, such as relatively high cost of 
delivery to Slovenia which is, as a rule, disproportionally higher than for deliveries e.g. 
to the neighbouring Austria.   
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – SLOVENIA  
Directive Transposition 
legislation 
(National law, 
Article) 
Comments Specific provisions 
going beyond 
minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC 
on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts 
Art. 1 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
A general provision on the scope of the 
Consumer Protection Act. The Unfair 
Contract Terms are not specifically 
mentioned. 
'Black list' of terms 
considered unfair in all 
circumstances 
No   
Art. 22 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
 'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
Yes Art. 24 (3) of 
the 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 
 
Art. 22 (1) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Any contract term, drafted by the 
seller/supplier, especially in the form of a 
pre-formulated standard contract or 
general contract terms. 
Extensions of the application 
of Directive to individually 
negotiated terms 
No   
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Art. 22 (2) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Contract terms are only binding on the 
consumer if, prior to the conclusion of the 
contract, he was acquainted with their text. 
Extensions of the application 
of Directive terms on the 
adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
Yes  Art. 4 (2) of the Directive - as 
regards the non-assessment 
of the adequacy of price – was 
not transposed. The possibility 
of the assessment therefore 
exists in Slovenian law. There 
is, however, no known case 
law of such assessment.  
Art. 22 (5) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Contra proferentem rule: interpretation 
most favourable to the consumer shall 
prevail. 
    
Art. 23 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
     
Art. 23 (2) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Unfair Contract Terms shall be null and 
void. The express provision on a continuing 
existence of the rest of the contract is 
lacking. 
    
Art. 24 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
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Art. 24 (1) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Terms are regarded as unfair if they either: -
cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations; -are contrary to the 
requirement of good faith; -cause that the 
performance of the contract is to an 
unacceptable detriment of the consumer; -
cause that the performance of the contract 
substantially differs from what the 
consumer could reasonably anticipate. 
Contrary to Directive, the conditions are 
alternative and not cumulative. It is not 
required that the contractual term has not 
been individually negotiated. 
    
Art. 24 (2) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
A provision on the circumstances which 
have to be taken into account in assessing 
the unfairness of a contractual term 
    
 
Art. 24 (3) of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
Grey list 'Grey list' of terms which 
may be considered unfair 
(the general clause must still 
be applied) 
   
 
Art. 24 (3) 1st indent 
of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
A vague transposition: Contract term is 
unfair if the seller may unilaterally dissolve 
the contract at any time. 
    
 
Art. 24 (3) 6th indent 
of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
A vague (inaccurate) transposition: Contract 
term is unfair if the seller may unilaterally 
alter the fundamental provisions of the 
contract. 
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 Art. 24 (3) 9th indent 
of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
Possibility of transferring the rights and 
obligations to a third person, whose name is 
not specifically mentioned in the contract. 
The absence of the consumer’s consent is 
not a requirement under Slovenian 
Consumer Protection Act. 
    
 
Art. 22 (5) of the 
Private International 
Law and Procedure 
Act 
By choosing the applicable law, the 
consumer shall not be deprived of the 
mandatory rules protecting his rights under 
the laws of the country of his domicile. The 
provision is included in Private International 
Law and Procedure Act. 
    
 
Art. 74 (1), Art. 76 of 
the Consumer 
Protection Act 
Consumer protection organizations (legal 
persons) may take legal action before court 
in order to have unfair contract terms 
declared null and void. A positive 
judgement has an “erga omnes” effect: 
anybody may rely on its wording. 
    
Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Art. 1 – 15 of the 
Consumer Protection 
against Unfair 
Commercial Practices 
Act 
 Provisions regarding 
financial services going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
  Provisions regarding 
immovable property going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
No   
  Application of UCPD to B2B 
transactions 
No   
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 
12, 15 of the Rules 
on Price Indication 
for Goods and 
Services 
 Extension of the application 
to other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
Art. 1 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
 Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
No   
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Art. 12, 12b  – 14, 
15a of the Consumer 
Protection Act 
These rules apply also to non-consumers, 
i.e. businesses (competitors). With regard 
to misleading advertising to consumers, a 
reference is made to the Consumer 
Protection against Unfair Commercial 
Practices Act. 
    
Art. 63a of the 
Prevention of 
Restriction of 
Competition Act 
This rule represents legislation protecting 
the competitors against unfair business 
practices (it contains a general clause of the 
law of unfair competition). 
    
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Art. 74 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
     
Art. 75 of the 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – SLOVENIA  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the Injunctions 
Directive regulated in your country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a legal act) from the enforcement 
procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer Law Directives 
(the Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the Consumer 
Rights Directive)? 
 
No, single 
procedure.  
 
The scope of protection 
provided by an action for an 
injunction as regulated in the 
Consumer Protection Act is 
broader than the one 
foreseen by the Injunctions 
Directive. Art. 74 (1) of the 
Consumer Protection Act 
stipulates that an action for 
an injunction may be 
commenced in cases, where 
companies are using unfair 
terms, business practices or 
advertising activities 
contrary to this act and the 
act on the protection of 
consumers against unfair 
commercial practices, the act 
on consumer credit, the acts 
governing medicine and 
media, and by doing this are 
damaging the collective 
interests of consumers.   
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction? - Designated 
public bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Other  
Pursuant to Art. 75 of the 
Consumer Protection Act also 
a commercial association or 
chamber, in which the 
defendant is a member, are 
entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction.  
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative procedure is 
foreseen 
Court 
procedure. 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. consumer 
organisations are entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain the characteristic of 
such exemption in the comments column. 
The costs are as 
a rule borne by 
the losing party. 
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Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to cover 
areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
Yes, scope of 
application 
extended to 
cover areas of 
consumer law 
that are not part 
of Annex I of the 
Directive. 
Pursuant to Art. 74 (1) of the 
Consumer Protection Act the 
scope of application is 
extended, so that it covers all 
injunctions which are 
brought against companies 
which, in business with 
consumers, are using unfair 
contract terms, business 
practices or advertising 
activities contrary to the 
Consumer Protection Act and 
the act on the protection of 
consumers against unfair 
commercial practices, the act 
on consumer credit, the acts 
governing medicine and 
media, and, by doing so, are 
damaging the collective 
interests of consumers.  
Is protection of business' interests covered by the injunctions 
procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of business' 
interests, please provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure 
No.  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
No.  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the injunction 
procedures? (not including the consultation stage under Art. 
5 of the ID) 
No.  
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the prior consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
No such 
requirement. 
After the amendment of the 
Consumer Protection Act the 
requirement regarding the 
prior consultation with the 
state Office for the 
protection of consumers was 
left out.   
Does the national legislation provide for measures ensuring 
summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure (subject 
matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
No.  
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Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please specify 
in the comments column to who exactly should they be paid 
Yes, sanctions in 
form of fine. 
Art. 226 and 227 of the Claim 
Enforcement and Security Act 
provide the procedure for 
execution of claims in cases 
of omissions. Pursuant to 
these articles the court 
orders the debtor to stop his 
activity, together with 
penalty for the case of acting 
against the order, for natural 
persons up to 10.000 EUR 
and for legal entities and sole 
traders up to 500.000 EUR, 
with regard to circumstances 
of every particular case; if 
the debtor acts against the 
order, the court executes the 
penalty (fine) and sets the 
next one higher. This can be 
repeated until the amount 
reaches 10 times the first 
penalty. 
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
Yes. 
 
Pursuant to Art. 74 (2) of the 
Consumer Protection Act the 
plaintiff can demand the 
legal decision to be published 
on the defendant’s costs. The 
court may decide whether 
and to what extent the 
reasons for the decision are 
published. 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure for 
sanctions for the infringement? 
Yes. 
 
Art. 76 of the Consumer 
Protection Act provides a 
possibility to bring an action 
for finding the contract 
between a defendant and a 
consumer invalid. This can be 
claimed also within the 
injunction procedure. A fine 
cannot be claimed within the 
injunction procedure.  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a result 
of infringements, including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other beneficiary be brought 
within the injunction procedure? 
No.  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified entity 
or the public purse be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No.  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
No. According to the proposal of 
the Class Action Act from 
2016 the qualified entity can 
also claim damages to be 
paid to the consumers. The 
proposal is currently in a 
legislative procedure.  
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Can individual consumers base their individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Yes. 
 
If consumers bring an action 
for damages, they bear a 
burden to prove three 
elements of damage liability. 
Firstly, they must prove the 
existence of damage, 
secondly, an unlawful 
(illegal) act of the defendant, 
and thirdly, a causal link 
between damages and 
unlawful act. In order to 
prove that the defendant has 
acted unlawfully, the plaintiff 
can base his argumentation 
on the injunction order.   
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond the 
injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
Yes. The qualified entity can claim 
also to find the contract 
between a defendant and a 
consumer invalid. 
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders extended to 
the future infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
No.  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type of 
data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2015 Court statistics 25 28 % 12 % 0 % 56 % 4 %  
2014 Court statistics  23 35 % 8.7 % 4.3 % 47.7 % 4.3 %  
2013 Court statistics 25 28 % 16 % 0 % 44 % 12 %  
2012 Court statistics 29 17.2 % 17.2 % 0 % 55.2 % 10.4 %  
2011 Court statistics 10 30 % 10 % 0 % 60 % 0 %  
2010 Court statistics 20 25 % 20 % 5 % 35 % 15 %  
Note: The survey of case law is incomplete in Slovenia, the decisions of Courts of first instance are not publicly available. 
Only the decisions of Administrative Court, Higher Courts (courts of appeal) and the Supreme Court are public (in 
anonymized form). Source of court statistics: http://www.iusinfo.si/   
Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).16  
16 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 255 
(according to 
the Court 
Fees Act, OJ 
37/08, last 
amended 
30/16)  
EUR 640.38 
(according to 
the Attorney 
Tariff, OJ 2/15; 
the estimated 
lawyer’s fee 
contains a fee 
for an action, a 
fee for a written 
submission, a 
fee for a main 
hearing and a 
fee for 
administrative 
costs) 
 
- 
14 - 22 hours (The 
calculation is based 
on the assumption 
that the consumer 
would authorize an 
attorney for the 
proceedings before 
the court. The 
consumer would 
spend 4 - 6 hours 
for contacting the 
travel agency, 4 – 6 
hours for contacting 
the Consumer 
Association and the 
Market 
Inspectorate, 4 – 6 
hours for 
correspondence 
with his attorney 
and 2 - 4  hours for 
a hearing before the 
court.)             
This calculation is 
based on the 
assumption that 
the value of the 
matter in this 
dispute is 
EUR 5 000. The 
estimated court 
fee should be 
paid in advance 
by the plaintiff. 
The estimation of 
the lawyer’s fee 
represents the 
costs of plaintiff’s 
attorney. In 
practice smaller 
lawyers 
associations 
usually agree 
with their clients 
to be paid for 
their services 
pursuant to the 
Attorney Tariff. 
However, some 
of the lawyers 
also charge for 
their services on 
an hourly basis.     
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
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• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
The Out-of-Court Resolution of Consumer Disputes Act was adopted 2015 (OJ 81/15) 
and is in force from 14 November 2015. No information on its application has been 
published yet. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Commercial Chamber of Slovenia Business association 26 July 2016 
Tržni Inšpektorat Republike Slovenije (Market 
Inspectorate) 
National enforcement authority 19 July 2016 
Ministry of Economic Development and Technology, 
Consumer and Competition Protection Division 
Ministry – national regulatory 
authority 
26 July 2016 
Evropski potrošniški center European Consumer Centre 27 July 2016 
Zveza za varstvo potrošnikov (Slovene Consumers’ 
Association) 
Consumer organisation 25 July 2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Andrić, Andrej, Pravna 
praksa 2/2003, p. 19.  
2003 Uveljavitev directive 93/13/EGS o nepoštenih klavzulah v 
potrošniških pogodbah v pravnem sistemu Republike Slovenije 
(The implementation of the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms 
in consumer contracts in the law of the Republic of Slovenia) 
Rajko Knez, Podjetje in 
delo, 6-7/200z, p. 1125.  
2007 Spremembe potrošniškega prava in prakse zaradi sodb Sodišča ES 
(Changes in consumer law and practice due to t e judgements of 
the ECJ) 
Trstenjak, Verica/Knez, 
Rajko/Možina, Damjan 
2005 Evropsko pravo varstva potrošnikov (European consumer 
protection Law) 
Varanelli, Luigi, Pravna 
praksa 27/2004, p. 23 
2004 Nepošteni pogodbeni pogoji po zakonu o varstvu potrošnikov 
(Unfair contract terms in Consumer Protection Act) 
Aleš Ferčič, Pravna 
praksa 2/2010, p. 9-11.  
2010 (Nepošteni) pogodbeni pogoji v potrošniških pogodbah ((Unfair) 
terms in consumer contracts) 
Klemen Podobnik, 
Podjetje in delo 6-
7/2006, p. 1289-1295. 
2006 Implementacija Direktive o nepoštenih poslovnih praksah 
(Implementation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) 
Zoran Skubic, Pravna 
praksa 5/2014, p. 26 
2014 Znatno neravnotežje pravic pogodbenih strank in nepoštenost 
pogojev potrošniških pogodb (Significant imbalance in the rights 
of contractual parties and unfairnes of terms in consumer 
contracts) 
Damjan Možina, Podjetje 
in delo, 6-7/2006, p. 
1296-1308.  
2006 Direktiva o nepoštenih poslovnih praksah – odprta vprašanja 
(Unfair commercial practices directive – open issues),  
  
Damjan Možina, Podjetje 
in delo, 6-7/2004, p. 
1139-1352. 
2004 Razvojne težnje v evropskem pravu nelojalne konkurence in 
varstva potrošnikov (Development trends in the Europan law of 
unfair competition and consumer protection) 
Damjan Možina, Podjetje 
in delo, 6-7/2012, p. 
1437- 
2012 Kaj je narobe z Zakonom o varstvu potrošnikov? (What is wrong 
with the Consumer Protection Act?) 
 
Luka Rejc, Pravna praksa 
37/2011, p. 15.  
2011 Pavšalni zneske v luči ZVPNPP (Lums sums from the point of view 
of Act on the protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices 
Robert Geisler, Pravna 
praksa 13/2013, p. 9.  
 
2013 Pogodbena kazen v potrošniški pogodbi o posredovanju kot 
nepošteni pogodbeni pogoj (Contractual penalty in the consumer 
brokerage contract as an unfair term) 
Zoran Skubic, Pravna 
praksa 2/2014, p. 29. 
2014 Je manjkajoči izdelek v akciji že sam po sebi nepoštena poslovna 
praksa? (Is a not-available product, advertised as discount, an 
unfair business practice per se?) 
Katarina Vatovec, Pravna 
praksa 47/2010, p. 24.  
2010 Prodaja časopisa z možnostjo nagrade (še) ne pomeni nepoštene 
poslovne prakse (The sale of newspaper with a possibility of a 
prize is not (yet) an unfair commercial practice) 
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Peter Grilc, in: 
Hilty/Henning-Bodewig 
(ed.), Law against unfair 
competition, Springer  
2007 Unfair Competition Law in Slovenia 
 
Bojan Zabel  1999 Tržno pravo (Market law) 
Aleš, Galič, Pravni letopis 2011 Skupinske tožbe na področju potrošniškega prava (Class actions in 
the field of consumer law) 
Aleš, Galič, Podjetje in 
delo 
2000 Procesni vidiki prava varstva potrošnikov (Procedural aspects of 
consumer protection law) 
Ana Vlahek, Matija, 
Damjan (ed.) 
2015 Pravo in politika sodobnega varstva potrošnikov (Law and policy 
of modern consumer protection law)  
Ministrstvo za 
pravosodje (Ministry of 
Justice) 
2016 Predlog Zakona o kolektivnih tožbah (Class Action Act proposal) 
Državni zbor (Parliament) 2012 Resolucija o Nacionalnem programu varstva potrošnikov 2012 – 
2017 (National program of consumer protection law 2012 – 2017) 
Vanja, Žgur, Pravna 
praksa 
2010 Ukrepi proti oglaševanju v nasprotju z zakonom so v praksi 
neučinkoviti (Measures against unlawful advertisement are in 
practice ineffective) 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report SPAIN  
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
As in the UCPD, Article 4 of Act 3/1991 in Spain foresees a general test of fairness:  
‘1. Any behaviour that objectively fails to abide by the requirements of good 
faith shall be deemed unfair.  
In relations with consumers and users, entrepreneurs or professionals shall be 
deemed to be in breach of the requirements of good faith where their conduct 
is in breach of professional diligence, the latter meaning the standard of special 
skill and care which an entrepreneur may reasonably be expected to exercise 
towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice, and 
significantly distorts or could significantly distort the economic behaviour of the 
average consumer or of the average member of the target group of the 
practice in question if the latter is a commercial practice targeting a particular 
group of consumers.  
For the purposes of this Act, economic behaviour of consumers or users shall 
mean any decision taken by the latter to act or refrain from acting having 
regard to:  
a) The selection of an offer or offeror.  
b) The engagement of a good or service and, if relevant, the way in which and 
under what conditions it is engaged.  
c) Payment of the price, total or partial, or any other form of payment. d) The 
conservation of the good or service.  
e) The exercise of contractual rights having regard to goods and services.  
Also, for the purposes of this Act, significantly distorting the economic 
behaviour of the average consumer means using a commercial practice to 
appreciably impair consumers' capacity to adopt an informed decision thus 
causing them to make a decision on their economic behaviour which they 
otherwise would not have made’. 
The general unfairness clause receives meaning via a double test. Firstly, professional 
diligence of traders has to be determined and, secondly, the actual commercial 
behavior of the individual trader has to be assessed against this standard. The 
violation of the standard is a pre-condition for unfairness.  
However, setting optimal standards is no easy task. Several factors make this task 
very difficult in this setting: 
• Firms engaging in commercial practices are extremely diverse. To determine the 
professional diligence standards for all of them on the basis of a general 
formulation seems almost unrealistic; 
• The optimal determination of professional diligence standards in commercial B2C 
practices cannot be accomplished without looking at the harm resulting from the 
alternative feasible practices; 
• The likelihood that legislators, regulators and Courts may have divergent views 
upon the role and content of such standard is very high. In order to effectively  
govern the behavior of firms and effectively protect consumers, the likely results of 
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the unfairness test applied to commercial practices have to be anticipated, at least 
approximately, so that firms can plan their commercial strategies in accordance 
with the required standards; 
• Finally, standards of behavior in the commercial setting are notoriously difficult to 
establish because legislators and Courts are not business experts. 
On the other hand, the material distortion notion corresponds, broadly speaking, to 
the idea of effective and relevant harm to the ‘average consumer’. However, the 
notion of ‘average consumer’ also remains controversial (see infra). 
In the opinion of the Catalan Consumer Agency (ACC), the UCPD would be more 
effective if it had been implemented through a consumer law (Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007) instead of a law that basically refers to unfair competition (Act 29/2009). 
A representative from the Spanish Agency for Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and 
Nutrition (AECOSAN) said that  the UCPD has had a significant impact in relationships 
between businesses and consumers. Companies have become increasingly aware that 
certain clauses, offers and sales are subject to European legislation. The UCPD has 
also had a double impact for consumers: firstly, it has fostered a greater demand of 
respect for their rights and for the principle of good faith (the so-called ‘fair play’ in 
European directives) and, secondly, it has fostered the awareness that those rights are 
enforceable in all EU companies that sell products and offer services in the EU. The 
latter is significant since there is a current opinion among Spanish consumers and 
associations that buying products from non-EU companies involves lack of protection 
and rights in potential disputes with sellers. 
Consumer associations see the effectiveness of the UCPD as relative because 
implementation of general principles is not an easy task. 
To sum up, the effectiveness of the principle-based approach under UCPD is not 
absolute due to uncertainty or vagueness inherent to general principles. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
Annex I of UCPD was transposed by Act 29/2009 by providing new content to Articles 
20-31 of Act 3/1991 (‘commercial practices with consumers and users’).  
These provisions make it easier to identify commercial practices that are prohibited in 
all circumstances (1) by providing both legal certainty to consumers and a valuable 
guide to courts and administrative authorities in their application, and (2) by avoiding 
case-by-case assessments against other provisions of Act 3/1991 (in particular, the 
general clause of unfairness foreseen by Article 4 and the requirements of unfair 
commercial practices foreseen by Articles 5-18). Accordingly, consumers do not have 
to provide evidence that a commercial practice is objectively contrary to good faith 
requirements or to the rules of professional diligence, that it contains misleading 
information or that this information, due to its content or presentation, is likely to 
induce consumers to mistake, etc. 
Due to recent incorporation, case law does not provide evidence about the practical 
application and the practical benefits of the black list of unfair commercial practices.  
According to the ACC, the black list has allowed them to sanction the following 
practices: (1) telephone companies that indicated prices of services without including 
taxes payable by users; (2) bait advertising cases; (3) aggressive marketing practices 
by electricity suppliers that coerced consumers or asked them for invoices and 
financial data regarding their contractual link with their current supplier of electricity. 
According to AECOSAN, the best example of the practical benefits of the black list can 
be found in point 7 of Annex I UCPD: ‘Falsely stating that a product will only be 
available for a very limited time, or that it will only be available on particular terms for 
a very limited time, in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of 
sufficient opportunity or time to make an informed choice’. This provision has given 
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legal basis for controlling offers and imposing administrative sanctions in bait 
advertising cases. 
Consumer associations consider that the black list facilitates both the detection and 
punishment of unfair commercial practices. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
As in Article 3.9 of UCPD, Article 19.5 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 states that 
Spanish legislators can impose rules that establish a greater degree of protection to 
consumers and users in the field of financial services and immovable property. This 
rule is consistent with both the complexity of transactions dealing with financial 
services and housing as well as the serious risks facing consumers in these fields. Both 
financial services and immovable property involve complex transactions where 
investments of money can be significant. As consumers are potentially exposed to 
more important losses in these fields, and given that enforcement levels are not likely 
to be increased due to the current fiscal crisis in Spain, it appears advisable to keep 
the exemption and to allow legislators to subject financial entities and individuals who 
participate in the sale or lease of housing to more specific requirements and 
obligations in order to improve consumers’ protection. 
In the field of financial services, Article 19.4 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 states 
that rules on unfair commercial practices in respect of consumer credit, distance 
marketing of financial services addressed to consumers and users, collective 
investment in transferable securities and public offering will prevail, in case of conflict, 
over general legislation on unfair commercial practices. In general terms, the level of 
protection provided by the Spanish legislative framework is higher than that provided 
by the UCPD since several specific provisions exist that try to improve the 
transparency of financial transactions and to protect the rights and interests of 
financial clients. These provisions deal with the following issues: the obligation of 
financial entities to inform about the essential features of financial products and their 
effects; the obligation of financial entities to observe rules on financial advertising and 
to establish internal controls to guarantee that these rules are met; the obligation of 
financial entities to establish mechanisms (for example, claim services) to protect their 
clients, and the obligation of some financial firms or some financial transactions to be 
registered. The most common unfair commercial practices in Spain are precisely 
related to the breach of these obligations. As these practices are covered by Spanish 
legislation that deals with the transparency of financial transactions and the protection 
of financial clients, it is possible to conclude that their prevalence is mainly not a 
product of legislative gaps but of problems regarding enforcement of the rules by 
financial entities. 
In the field of immovable property, two types of rules on unfair commercial practices 
must be distinguished:  
• Rules applicable to commercial practices on financial products addressed to fund 
the acquisition of immovable property (see Directive 2014/17/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for 
consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/201, which has not 
been transposed yet into the Spanish legal system); and  
• Rules addressed to regulate the acquisition of this type of property (see, for 
instance, Article 64 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 that enumerates the 
information that must be provided for first-time sales). In this field, specific 
provisions exist that deal with the pre-contractual information that must be 
provided to those who purchase or lease housing in offers, promotions and 
advertising. The most common unfair commercial practices seem to be related to 
misdescription or omission of the essential features of the property and misleading 
advertising. As these practices are covered by Spanish legislation, again it is fair to 
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conclude that their prevalence is not due to legislative gaps but mainly to problems 
regarding enforcement of the Spanish rules on immovable property. 
ACC notes that since 2015, Catalan Act 22/2010 contains provisions on advertising 
and pre-contractual and contractual information in consumer loans and mortgage 
loans. For instance, art. 262-1.3 of the Catalan Act 22/2010 states that the ACC must 
inspect periodically contractual documentation to guarantee that it does not contain 
unfair clauses. If unfair practices or clauses are discovered, the Agency may initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against banks ex officio. 
According to AECOSAN, unless contractual information in consumer credit contracts 
(and the control of consumer credit contracts signed by financial entities that are not 
registered in the Bank of Spain), financial services have been excluded from the scope 
of Spanish consumer authorities. 
Consumer associations consider that minimum harmonization clauses for financial 
services provide legal certainty. However, they should be more explicit due to high 
specialization of financial contracts and the trust relationship between the parties in 
this sector. 
 
• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market? How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness and practical benefits of Act 3/1991 in these 
fields because Spanish courts have applied this Act to disputes that deal directly or 
indirectly with environmental and energy issues in few cases: 
• SJMer Barcelona num. 5, 1.4.2014 (JUR 2015\31151): Asociación Nacional de 
Empresas de Aguas de Bebida Envasadas filed an injunction against Brita Iberia, 
S.L.U. alleging that its water filter advertisements on the TV, its webpage and 
Youtube were unlawful and unfair according to Article 3 of Act 34/1988 and Article 
5 of Act 3/1991, respectively. The first instance court ruled in favour of the plaintiff 
and stated that advertisements were misleading because they put on the same 
level filtered water and bottled mineral water and they conferred filtered water 
advantages in economic and environment terms that were misleading. Moreover, 
they contained environmental information without any reference to the 
environmental policy of the entities represented by the claimant and hence they 
gave information that was able to harm the reputation of bottled water businesses 
in the market; 
• SJMer Madrid num. 10, 19.5.2014 (AC 2016\755): Iberdrola, S.A. filed an 
injunction against Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios alleging that the 
advertisement Iberdrola: reclame lo que es suyo! (‘Iberdrola: claim what is 
yours!’), where it charged the energy company with an illicit capital increase and 
encourage consumers to seek legal advice in order to bring a claim against the 
company, was unfair according to Articles 5 and 9 of Act 3/1991. The first instance 
court ruled in favour of the plaintiff. The information about the capital increase was 
misleading and led consumers to seek legal advice and to present a claim against 
Iberdrola, S.A. Moreover, it was able to cause harm to the reputation of the 
company and to have influence on consumers’ preferences and decisions.  
According to the ACC, these sectors are not supervised by consumer authorities, but 
the Catalan Ministries for Energy and for Business and Knowledge. From the point of 
view of misleading advertising, no relevant complaints have been received. 
AECOSAN notes that environmental and energy authorities deal with environmental 
and energy issues, respectively, by applying sectoral rules. The UCPD only applies to 
offers of energy supply. Both consumer and energy authorities deal with fuel supply. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1117
While consumer authorities control both the fuel quality and the price information, 
energy authorities control the veracity of the amount supplied. 
Furthermore, according to AECOSAN, complaints in the field of energy after 
liberalization have increased because of the following reasons: (1) a continuous 
increase of prices; (2) an aggressive practice with off-premises contracts that has 
even led to arrest commercial agents because of signature falsification; (3) 
subcontractors checking meter boxes without the presence of consumers have allowed 
supplier companies to penalize consumers with EUR 1000 – 2000. This practice has 
been sanctioned by regional energy authorities and is being investigated by the 
ombudsman. 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
As interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the concept of ‘average 
consumer’ refers to the person who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect, considering social, cultural and linguistic factors. 
Therefore, this is not a static concept but a dynamic one.1 In order to establish the 
concept of average consumer, three steps are considered useful: firstly, to determine 
the group of persons to whom the commercial practice is addressed; secondly, to 
determine the degree of attention and formation as well as the standards of conduct 
of this group; finally, to determine the existence of causation between the commercial 
practice and the decision-making. 
Several criticisms have been raised against this concept and the average consumer 
test. First, the notion of average consumer has no immediate real world 
correspondence. There is no average consumer, just individual consumers each with 
his or her own endowment of information, attention, and set of beliefs and 
preferences. Furthermore, the average consumer test is not a statistical test. Courts 
and authorities have to exercise their own faculty of judgement to determine the 
typical reaction of the average consumer in a given case.  
For some legal scholars, the best way to know the opinion of the average consumer 
consists of conducting surveys based on objective and verifiable criteria that represent 
the average consumer of the group to whom the commercial practice is addressed.  
In the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, the concept of ‘average consumer’ has a 
limited application because relevance is put on how businesses fulfil the requirements 
foreseen by consumer law (for instance, the provision of pre-contractual information). 
The ACC considers that the concept of ‘average consumer’ is applied in a relaxed way, 
allowing greater flexibility and adaptability to the specific circumstances. 
According to AECOSAN, the concept of ‘average consumer’ is firmly recognized by 
consumer authorities and Spanish courts. 
Consumer associations stated that the concept of average consumer is not applied in a 
strict sense, but on a case-by-case basis. 
 
1 See, after the transposition of the UCPD by Act 29/2009, STS, 1ª, 1.6.2013 (RJ 2013\6716), SAP 
Barcelona 4.7.2011 (JUR 2011\425697). 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Article 5.3 of UCPD has been incorporated into the Spanish legal system by Article 4.3 
of Act 3/1991 in identical terms: ‘commercial practices which are likely to materially 
distort the economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who 
are particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of their 
mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could 
reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the perspective of the 
average member of that group. This is without prejudice to the common and 
legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which 
are not meant to be taken literally’. This provision has not recognized other categories 
of vulnerable consumers different to that foreseen by the UCPD.  
There is no case law on the application of Article 4.3 of Act 3/1991 after its 
implementation by Act 29/2009. However, legal scholars consider that this exception 
to the application of the average consumer test must be applied restrictively. 
In the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, indebted debtors and mortgage debtors with 
limited resources who have given their habitual residence as a guarantee in mortgage 
loan agreements receive protection beyond the concept of ‘consumer’ through special 
rules (see, for instance, Royal Decree-Law 6/2012, Act 1/2013 and Royal Decree-Law 
1/2015). 
According to the ACC, courts and arbitration boards recognise different levels of 
vulnerable consumers in the field of basic utilities (water, electricity) and financial 
services (for instance, mortgage loan agreements). 
AECOSAN notes that in regional laws, childhood, youth, the elderly and persons with 
disabilities are collectives that need special protection. The concept of ‘consumer 
affected by energy poverty’ has also been developed to guarantee the provision of 
basic utilities (electricity, water and gas). 
According to consumer associations, different categories of vulnerable consumers have 
been recognised because the concept of ‘vulnerable consumer’ is constantly adapted 
by Courts to current circumstances. However, this recognition has not always involved 
a real benefit for consumers. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
According to Article 37.1 of Act 3/1991, commercial, professional and consumer 
corporations, associations and organizations can adopt voluntary codes of conduct on 
commercial practices with consumers to increase their protection. Additionally, Article 
37.3 states that public administrations will promote the participation of business and 
professional organizations on the elaboration of these codes at EU level. Finally, Article 
37.4 orders the creation of independent organisms to control companies that 
voluntarily adhere to these codes. Codes of conduct will include, among others, 
individual or collective self-control previous measures for advertisements and out-of-
court systems for dealing with consumer complaints. These systems will be notified to 
the European Commission according to the Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a 
Community-wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial settlement of 
consumer disputes. 
AUTOCONTROL (Association for Self-Regulation of Commercial Communications) is a 
non-profit organization that deals with the advertising self-regulation in Spain. It fulfils 
the requirements foreseen by Article 37 of Act 3/1991: (1) it consists of businesses 
that have adopted and submitted themselves voluntarily to a code of conduct; (2) 
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businesses accept to be judged by a Jury of independent persons if they violate the 
code of conduct; and (3) the European Commission was informed about its existence.  
AUTOCONTROL only deals with advertising activities. Therefore, it is not a self-
regulation system for unfair activities other than advertising. 
In 2015, the Association received 27 271 inquiries from advertisers, agencies and 
media. A total of 21 716 of these inquiries asked for the Advice Copy service, which is 
a voluntary, confidential and non-binding service to analyse draft campaigns from an 
ethical and legal perspective. 85% of the ads submitted to review received a positive 
assessment; in 11.5% of cases, modifications were suggested; finally, in 3.5% of 
cases media campaigns were not recommended. Similarly, in 2015, the Advertising 
Jury of AUTOCONTROL solved 305 claims, which means that it is the preferred dispute 
resolution system in Spain for advertising. 
Press releases sum up the advantages and effects of AUTOCONTROL’s activities:2 
• The advertising industry is increasingly responsible; 
• Self-regulation improves the quality of commercial communication; 
• The diversity of sectors and stakeholders participating in AUTOCONTROL ensures its 
credibility and independence; 
• It does not generate costs to taxpayers or the Administration because its activities 
are funded by the contribution of partners depending on the use that they do of its 
services; 
• Self-regulation is extremely useful for courts and, therefore, for the society as a 
whole since it allows that courts focus on other types of conflicts; 
• It provides a model for conflict resolution in the field of advertising that has been 
proven effective, fast and free to citizens. 
Possible challenges in this field refer to (1) the globalization of self-regulation, (2) the 
consolidation of the self-regulation system for commercial communication disputes 
and (3) the configuration of the decisions of the Jury as a prerequisite for the 
admission of claims before courts. 
The Ministry of Justice considers that self-regulation is a useful instrument for 
advertising as it reduces court’s workload and provides for a faster and cheaper 
mechanism to deal with consumer complaints. 
According to the ACC, self-regulation and co-regulation are not consolidated 
mechanisms because they are not known by consumers. 
AECOSAN notes that codes of conduct usually duplicate European or national rules. 
Moreover, they do not foresee penalty mechanisms for companies that do not adhere 
to codes. The breach of the code usually results in an administrative sanction. 
According to consumer associations, self-regulation and co-regulation actions are not 
known by consumers and their enforcement is difficult. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Legal scholars have noted that Annex I of UCPD does not refer to passive misleading 
commercial practices. This would be a field where the black list can be extended. 
Additionally, some practices included in the list are irrelevant or incidental in practice. 
For instance: claiming to be a signatory to a code of conduct when the trader is not; 
claiming that a code of conduct has an endorsement from a public or other body which 
2  See: http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/NP_Aniversario_AUTOCONTROL.pdf; 
http://www.autocontrol.es/pdfs/NP_Balance_AUTOCONTROL_2015_17.03.2016.pdf; 
http://www.lawyerpress.com/news/2015_04/2404_15_006.html 
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it does not have; and undertaking to provide after-sales service to consumers with 
whom the trader has communicated prior to a transaction in a language which is not 
an official language of the Member State where the trader is located and then making 
such service available only in another language without clearly disclosing this to the 
consumer before the consumer is committed to the transaction or creating the false 
impression that after-sales service in relation to a product is available in a Member 
State other than the one in which the product is sold.  
Finally, some unfair commercial practices are not ‘always’ able to distort the economic 
behaviour of consumers or do not ‘always’ present the misleading element (for 
instance, claiming that products are able to facilitate winning in games of chance). 
Given that commercial practices evolve rapidly, especially in areas linked to new 
technologies or new marketing channels, a system that dynamically allows including 
new practices may be helpful. It is true that there are general notions and clauses that 
could be able to cover such developments, but still, in theory, if some of the 
detrimental practices in the past have been specifically considered, there does not 
seem to be a reason why the new ones should only be addressed through the general 
clauses. 
ACC stated that the black list should include objective practices (for instance, 
invitations to purchase) and should explain omissions in detail (for instance, in high-
cost short-term credits, the ACC proposes that the offeror provides a clear and concise 
graphical information in form of graphic labels with gradual symbols and colours 
depending on the risk of the product). 
According to AECOSAN, it is expected that the list in Annex I of the UCPD will not be 
interpreted similarly in all EU countries. It is important to periodically review the Guide 
on the application of the UCPD to promote the application of uniform criteria. There 
are three cases where the revision of the list is considered necessary: (1) Prohibition 
of codes of conduct that do not improve the relationship between companies and 
consumers; (2) the obligation to inform about the existence of some rights (Paragraph 
10 of Annex I UCPD) set out by the Directive 2011/83/EU may lead to confusion when 
assessing certain contractual conditions or information; (3) practices consisting of 
falsely claiming that a product can cure illnesses, dysfunction or malformations 
(Paragraph 17 of Annex I UCPD) need to be clarified to collect the reality of these 
practices, since AECOSAN finds allegations as ‘adjuvant’, ‘potential effects’ or the like. 
Moreover, advertising claims in this regard are endorsed by the opinions of non-EU 
doctors or legal scholars, making it impossible to verify the scientific sources, and 
pseudoscientific movements, such as homeopathy. 
From the perspective of the public authorities, the case law of ECJ and the Application 
Guide of the UCPD published by the European Commission is very important to justify 
the requirements and administrative measures, including sanctions.  
The list of Annex I of the UCPD was a step forward in consumer protection. However, 
some practices require a complex evidentiary proof. See, for instance, section 27 of 
Annex I of the UCPD: ‘Making persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone, fax, 
e-mail or other remote media except in circumstances and to the extent that is 
justified, under national law, to enforce a contractual obligation’. Complaints by 
consumers that receive repeated phone calls for hiring services such as telephony or 
power supply are difficult to prove because, unless it is expressly requested by the 
customer, there is no record of incoming calls. Moreover, in some cases, harassment 
is done by subcontractors and contractors reject any responsibility. 
Finally, it must be noted that assessment of unfair commercial practices is made by 
courts of different nature: actions brought by individual or consumer associations will 
be known by a commercial or civil court; when companies appeal an administrative 
measure, actions will be known by administrative courts. This has involved a curious 
situation: a sexist advertisement was sanctioned by a regional authority and an 
injunction was brought by the State authority. A commercial court dismissed the 
injunction and the administrative sanction has been appealed before an administrative 
court that can conclude that the administrative measure is correct. 
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Consumer associations argue that an effective mechanism should be found to ensure 
that the black list is periodically updated. It should be a very interesting way to share 
experiences and to prevent unfair commercial practices. 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
As most relevant unfair commercial practices are covered by Spanish legislation, the 
ineffectiveness of Act 3/1991 is not a product of legislative gaps but of problems 
regarding enforcement of the rules. Improvement of procedures for collective actions 
for injunctive relief, definition of contractual remedies for individual claims and 
promotion of cooperation between national authorities in cross-border transactions 
would ensure a high level of consumer protection. 
According to the ACC, it is necessary to extend the black list of unfair commercial 
practices through self-regulation actions. The ACC is collaborating with financial 
service providers to elaborate codes of conduct in the field of high-cost short-term 
credit. 
AECOSAN considers that it is necessary for there to be a joint assessment of unfair 
commercial practices and unfair terms. 
Consumer associations think that existing measures are correct. Emphasis should be 
put on enforcement. 
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID was transposed into the Spanish legal system by Royal Decree 3423/2000 
and rules adopted by the Spanish regions with exclusive competence on consumer 
protection (in particular, the Catalan Decree 73/2002)3. 
Articles 1 and 3 of Royal Decree 3423/2000, and Articles 1 and 3 of the Catalan 
Decree 73/2002, foresee a general obligation to indicate the selling price and the unit 
price for all products, regardless of whether they are food or non-food products, to 
enable consumers to evaluate and compare their prices in an optimum manner and 
hence to make informed choices on the basis of simple comparisons. Products supplied 
in the course of the provision of a service, sales by auction and sales of works of art 
and antiques are excluded from the scope of application of these rules. 
Businesses are exempted from the obligation to indicate the unit price when it does 
not provide any useful information to consumers. According to Articles 3.3 of Royal 
Decree 3423/2000 and 3.3 of the Catalan Decree 73/2002, the unit price need not be 
indicated (a) if it is identical to the selling price and (b) for the following products: 
products sold in quantities less than 50 g or ml, products of different nature sold in 
the same package; products sold by automatic vending machines; individual portions 
of ice cream; wines and alcoholic drinks with a controlled denomination of origin or a 
typical geographic indication; fantasy food products). Additionally, Article 4 of the 
3  Spanish Courts have stated that the purpose of the PID and Royal Decree 3423/2000 is to ensure that 
the consumer has clear, precise and detailed information about the selling price, id est, the amount that 
he/she has to pay for the purchase of the product (the 'purchase price'), so that it cannot be extrapolated 
to the criminal protection against theft of goods: SAP Madrid 12.5.2014 (ARP 2014\1237); SAP Madrid 
22.9.2014 (JUR 2014\289003). 
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Catalan Decree 73/2002 states that jewellers and furriers are exempted from the 
obligation to indicate prices for security reasons. 
Special units of measurement are recognized by Royal Decree 3423/2000 and Catalan 
Decree 73/2002 for cosmetic products and food complements (100 g or 100 ml), pipe 
tobacco (100 g) and eggs (dozen). Royal Decree 3423/2000 also establishes a specific 
unit of measurement for household detergents (necessary amount for washing in 
normal dirt and water hardness of 25 French degrees).  
Articles 4 of Royal Decree 3423/2000 and 5 of the Catalan Decree 73/2002 state that 
the selling price and the unit price must be unambiguous, easily identifiable and 
clearly legible, standing in the same visual field and remaining visible to the consumer 
without having to request such information. Article 3.1 of the Catalan Decree also 
requires that the initials PVP goes before the selling price. In packing products where 
the net weight and the drained net weight must be indicated, it is enough to indicate 
the unit price of the drained net weight. 
Regional consumer authorities and businesses have formulated several questions to 
AECOSAN (Agency for Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and Nutrition) regarding the 
interpretation of Royal Decree 3423/2000.4 These questions provide evidence of 
difficulties experienced by traders to indicate the price per measurement unit. 
After the appraisal of the PID in 2004,5 no recent surveys have been conducted in 
Spain to assess to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price.  
According to the ACC, the Spanish legislation is clear; prices are displayed correctly 
and consumers are familiar with the system. 
AECOSAN considers that the PID allows consumers to compare products with different 
presentations. For products that add 14% or 33% over the ordinary format, their real 
value can only be known by comparing them with sizes of 1 kg or 1 litre. Annex IX of 
Regulation 1169/2011 has created uncertainty about the application of the PID 
because information about net amounts is not compulsory for food in this rule. 
Consumer associations differ in this respect. While some of them consider that 
consumers are in general effectively informed, others understand that there is lack of 
information and that labels usually lead to confusion. 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
A measurement unit for a product's performance is not foreseen by Spanish law. 
In the opinion of the ACC, a product’s performance is not an objective and 
standardized standard. 
According to AECOSAN, a product’s performance is an inadequate measure because it 
cannot be verified by independent experts or administrative authorities. The price per 
kilogram or litre should be added. 
Consumer associations consider that a product’s performance can be a way to verify 
that the information corresponds to that foreseen by the package or label.  
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
4  See: http://www.aecosan.msssi.gob.es/AECOSAN/web/consumo/subseccion/interpretaciones_normativa 
_consumo.htm 
5  See the final report published at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/cons_int/safe_shop/price_ind/disclaimer_en.pdf  
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relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
No derogation for small businesses from the requirement to indicate the unit price is 
foreseen in the Spanish legal system. 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses  
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
According to Article 2 of Act 34/1988, advertising consists of ‘every form of 
communication made by an individual or legal person, public or private, in the exercise 
of a commercial, industrial, craft or professional activity in order to promote directly or 
indirectly the hiring of movable or immovable property, services, rights and 
obligations’. This definition, which is similar to that foreseen by Article 2 of the MCAD, 
has been regarded as too generic and ambiguous to prevent actual and future 
misleading commercial practices. The reference to ‘every form of communication’ 
emphasizes that the advertising activity does not only refer to written or spoken texts 
but also to graphics, photos, sounds, etc. Moreover, advertising is not restricted to 
‘information’ since forms of communication that prima facie do not intend to inform 
their addressees fall within the scope of application of Act 34/1998.  
The Ministry of Justice is of the opinion that the national laws transposing MCAD give 
effective protection both in national and cross-border transactions. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
According to Article 3 of Act 34/1998, misleading advertising is a form of unlawful 
advertising and must be regarded as an unfair commercial practice if requirements 
foreseen by Act 3/1991 are met6. On the effectiveness of the principle-based approach 
under Act 3/1991 see section 1.1.1. 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCDA, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Rules on advertising are usually classified into four groups: 
a) General laws applicable to advertising: Act 34/1988, Act 3/1991, Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007, the Penal Code and Consumers Codes of the Regions (for 
instance, Catalan Act 22/2010). 
b) Sectoral rules on advertising included in legislation on commercial sectors and 
practices (industrial products, food products, special offers, repair shops, supply of 
services on durable goods, housing, sending SMS messages, indoor tanning 
centres, travel agencies, financial sector, medical devices, etc.). 
c) Sectoral legislation on certain advertising media: audiovisual media and the 
Internet. 
6  For some examples of misleading advertising, see SAP Barcelona 26.6.2014 (AC 2014\1457), SAP Madrid 
17.6.2011 (AC 2011\1476), AJMerc 3.9.2015 (AC 2015\1375). Cfr. SAP Madrid 23.6.2009 (AC 
2009\1912) and SJMerc 21.1.2014 (AC 2014\628). 
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d) Self-regulation and deontological rules and, in particular, codes of conduct 
developed by certain business sectors (including advertising sector itself). Rules 
and principles contained in these codes only become binding for businesses that 
have voluntarily committed to fulfil them. 
These rules deal essentially with B2C transactions.  
Spain has not passed a ‘general’ Act protecting advertising in B2B transactions. 
However, some rules on advertising applicable to both consumers and businesses can 
be found in sectoral laws. For instance, in the field of financial services, Article 5 of 
Order EHA/2899/2011 states that advertising by financial entities must be clear, 
objective and non-misleading according to Order EHA/1718/2010 and Circular of the 
Banco de España 6/2010. 
According to AECOSAN, it is necessary to review the MCAD to develop the concept of 
parasitic advertising on the Internet (advertising that is found when, after introducing 
the search for specific brands or official technical services, competitors or technical 
services other than those of the manufacturer are listed first). Some judgments and 
administrative sanctions for this type of advertising already exist. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
In the Spanish literature there does not seem to be a position on this issue. Arguably, 
given the very different contexts that Member States present in terms of the cultural 
circumstances that affect modes of advertising and responses to it, full harmonisation 
seems too rigid an approach. 
According to AECOSAN, no particular problems have been detected in comparative 
advertising, but parasitic advertising. A particular difficulty in comparative advertising 
of food exists. 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
There is no information available. 
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Article 6 of Act 34/1998, on the actions and remedies against unlawful advertising, 
refers to the legal regime of Act 3/1991. As a consequence, actions and remedies 
foreseen by Article 32 of Act 3/1991 will be applicable to any unlawful advertising: 
‘1. The following actions may be taken against acts of unfair competition, 
including unlawful advertising:  
1. Declaratory action for bad faith.  
2. Injunction against the unfair conduct or prohibition of its continued practice. 
An injunction may also be brought to forestall the practice before it occurs.  
3. Action to counter the effect produced by the unfair practice.  
4. Action to rectify misleading, incorrect or false information.  
5. Action to compensate damage sustained though unfair practice in the event 
of fraud or fault on the part of the agent.  
6. Action against unjust enrichment, which shall only apply when the unfair 
practice prejudices a legal position protected by an exclusive right or some 
other of similar economic content.’ 
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The statute of limitations foreseen by Article 35 of Act 3/1991 will also be applicable to 
actions for unlawful advertising:  
‘The actions against unfair competition laid down in Article 32 lapse one year 
after the person entitled to take action discovered who was responsible for the 
act of unfair competition and, in any case, three years as from the time that 
such conduct ceased.  
The time bar for legal action in defence of the general, collective or diffuse 
interests of consumers and users is governed by the terms of Article 56 of the 
consolidated text of the General Consumer and User Protection Act and other 
supplementary laws’ 
It must be noted that originally the dual regime in the fields of unfair commercial 
practices and unlawful advertising was a major obstacle to bring judicial claims. The 
unification of both legal regimes has removed the problem of accumulation of actions. 
Moreover, originally Act 34/1998 did not contain rules on limitation periods and the 
silence of the Spanish legislator on this issue had led legal scholars to defend that 
actions against unlawful advertising had the 15-year statute of limitation foreseen by 
Article 1964 of the Spanish civil code for personal actions (this period has been 
reduced to 5 years by Act 42/2015). 
According to AECOSAN, there is not an effective tool for cross-border infringements, 
except for Regulation 765/2008. Judicial and administrative measures are not effective 
because its effects occur when the advertising campaign has finished. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
It seems necessary to make clear the relationship between Act 34/1988 and Act 
3/1991 by clarifying the definition of misleading commercial practices. In addition, it 
seems essential, especially to increase protection in cross-border transactions, to 
adopt measures for efficient enforcement of the Act, such as mechanisms that 
promote cooperation between national authorities, the appointment of national 
authorities that can enforce the national provisions on advertising ex officio, an 
obligation of mutual assistance between EU States or proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions applicable to infringements of Act 34/1998. 
AECOSAN comments that in campaigns of fashion products, only complaints in the 
media by consumer and feminists associations have effects. In these cases, the 
company usually alleges that a cultural element exists because no claims have been 
presented in their countries of origin. For instance, advertising campaign by Dolce & 
Gabbana was withdrawn in Spain because it promoted female submission and 
violence. Since 2012, advertising that presents the woman's body unrelated to the 
advertised product is banned  in Art. 3 of Act 34/1988: unlawful advertising made by 
professionals (individuals or public or private legal persons) to those who the 
advertisement is addressed, include ‘advertisements that portray women in a 
degrading or discriminatory fashion, either by specifically and directly using their 
bodies or parts thereof as mere objects unrelated to the product being promoted, or 
their image associated with stereotyped behaviours which violate the basis of our legal 
system while contributing to generate the sort of violence referred to in Organic Law 
1/2004 of 28 December 2004 on comprehensive protection measures against gender- 
based violence’. This prohibition has allowed consumer authorities to sanction sexist 
advertising. 
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1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
It has not been possible to obtain feedback from businesses in Spain on the 
effectiveness of UCPD in terms of reducing obstacles to cross-border trade. 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
It has not been possible to obtain feedback from businesses in Spain in this regard. 
 
1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Article 7.4 of UCPD was incorporated into the Spanish legal system by Article 20 of 
Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007:  
‘Commercial practices that, in a manner appropriate to the medium, include 
information on the characteristics of the good or service and its price, enabling 
consumer or user to make a decision on the conclusion of a contract must 
contain, if not already apparent from the context, at least the following 
information:  
(a) name, trading name and full address of the trader and, where applicable, 
name, trading name and full address of the trader on whose behalf he is 
acting;  
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(b) the main characteristics of the product, to an extent appropriate to the 
medium and the product;  
(c) the price inclusive of taxes as well as all additional increases or discounts 
that may be applicable and any additional charges;  
(d) the arrangements for payment, delivery, performance and the complaint 
handling policy, if they depart from the requirements of professional diligence;  
(e) for products and transactions involving a right of withdrawal, the existence 
of such a right’. 
There is no data available regarding the application of these information requirements. 
However, the few court decisions that apply Article 20 of Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007 provide evidence that these requirements do not seem controversial:  
• STS 11.11.2015 (RJ 2015\4986): unfairness of standard terms included in loan 
agreements with consumers whereby the firm by the borrower of a promissory note 
is foreseen as a guarantee and the amount of this promissory note is 
complemented by the lender unilaterally in trial; 
• STSJ Madrid 8.10.2015 (RJCA 2015\964): infringement by a telephone and Internet 
company of its obligation to inform about the final price to be paid by the customer; 
• SAP Madrid 16.5.2014 (AC 2014\1608): there is no infringement of the information 
requirements by a travel company because its website offer informed that 
passengers had to meet government requirements for both leaving the country and 
entering the destination. It also warned passengers to be in possession of the 
documentation required by the destination countries, indicating that they were 
responsible for carrying the ID, passport and/or visa; 
• SAP Madrid 17.5.2013 (JUR 2013\215258): infringement by a home funeral 
company of its obligation to inform about the final price to be paid by the customer, 
who contracted the funeral services under the belief that they were free for persons 
without economic sources; 
• SAP Madrid 12.6.2012 (AC 2013\539): infringement by a travel agency for failing to 
forward its client the information about his flight and booking cancellation. 
According to the ACC, advertising should not be confused with invitations to purchase 
(the latter understood as the minimum requirements about the information of the 
product and its price). In Catalonia, businesses are properly informed about these 
minimum requirements. The ACC controls the application of the European rules and 
initiate disciplinary procedures if violations are detected. Most businesses correct their 
business practices on time. 
Information requirements are regarded by the ACC as useful because the CRD 
provides that pre-contractual information must be delivered at any time prior to the 
signature of the contract and the UCPD provides that, in case of an invitation to 
purchase, information must be provided at the beginning of the negotiations so 
consumers will no longer need to search for additional information because they are 
fully informed. 
According to AECOSAN, requirements of Article 7.4 of the UCPD are known by 
businesses. The most common problem refers to the information requirements of the 
right of withdrawal foreseen by Article 7.4.e) of the UCPD because of the following 
reasons: (1) some companies ignore that the period to exercise the right of 
withdrawal was extended to 14 days; (2) some companies are reluctant to recognize 
the right of withdrawal without giving a reason. They understand that they cannot 
resell the products returned by consumers. 
A debate exists on the content of Article 7.4.a) of the UCPD in online sales. For 
instance, whether the content of labels must be incorporated into the product 
information in relation to textile products (composition, manufacturer data and 
washing conditions if they are incorporated by the manufacturer on the label), 
footwear (composition and manufacturer data), toys (CE marking, legends of warning 
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and manufacturer data) and electronic products (CE marking, instructions of use and 
manufacturer data). 
Consumer associations commented that although the level of knowledge of 
information requirements has improved, traders still use coercive systems to induce 
consumers, especially those most vulnerable, to buy or to carry out behaviours with 
unknown consequences for them. Moreover, they often implement and model rules to 
create confusion. Therefore, Information requirements are useful but overlaps may 
exist depending on the means by which the invitation to buy is made. 
To sum up, the level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at 
the advertising stage is high and the application of these requirements does not seem 
controversial, although some consumer associations point out that some traders try to 
confuse consumers about the content of these requirements.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
Act 34/2002, which transposes the E-Commerce Directive into the Spanish legal 
system, foresees information requirements in Articles 10 (General Information), 12.bis 
(Obligation to inform about safety), 20 (Information required in commercial 
communications, special promotions and tenders), 27 (Obligations before the 
conclusion of the contract), 28 (Information after the conclusion of the contract). 
Moreover, Article 19 states that commercial communications and promotional offers 
will be governed by the provisions of Act 34/2002, its specific rules and commercial 
and advertising rules.  
Act 17/2009, which transposes the Services Directive into the Spanish legal system, 
imposes on service providers the obligation to provide the information foreseen by 
Article 22 in a clear and unequivocal manner, and in an easily accessible way, before 
the conclusion of the contract or the supply of the service. 
In general terms, the information requirements in these Acts are similar. 
In the opinion of the ACC, there are overlaps that must be solved by removing them 
from the Directives. For instance, the Services Directive provides that consumers must 
receive information about the price of the service when requested while the CRD 
states that consumers must receive this information in any case; the Information 
Society Directive requires contractual information different to that required by the 
CRD, etc. 
According to AECOSAN, consumer rights should be collected in a single rule to avoid 
conflicting interpretations. The legal regime of consumer protection established by the 
E-Commerce Directive has been rendered outdated by Directive 2011/83/EU. 
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
The extension of the UCPD to B2B transactions will involve a high level of 
harmonization in the internal market provided that regulations on unfair commercial 
practices between businesses are consistent in different business areas (see, for 
instance, the Green Paper on ‘Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business 
Food and Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe’) and do not have discriminatory and 
uncertainty effects. 
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 • Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
According to legal scholars, division of legal regimes for B2B and B2C is fictitious and 
only creates legal uncertainty because Chapter II of Act 3/1991 does not typify unfair 
commercial practices addressed exclusively to businesses. Article 19 of Act 3/1991 
expressly states that practices foreseen by Articles 4, 5, 7 and 8 will be considered 
unfair practices to consumers. Moreover, many of the behaviours listed in Chapter II 
are implicitly unfair commercial practices with consumers. For instance, unlawful 
advertising foreseen by Article 18; sales at a loss foreseen by Article 17 are unfair 
when it is likely to mislead consumers about the level of prices of other products or 
services in the same establishment; acts of confusion and imitation foreseen by 
Articles 6 and 11 can be addressed against consumers, etc.  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
Given that unfair commercial practices concern both pre-contractual (both informative 
and advertising issues) as well as contractual and post-contractual issues (guarantee 
schemes, right of withdrawal, etc.), it seems appropriate to cover all stages. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
While a black-list of practices makes sense in B2C transactions, where consumers are 
homogeneous, it seems preferable to give judges discretion to assess commercial 
practices in B2B transactions, where the economic interests of businesses may be very 
different. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
There is no information available. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
There is no information available. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
According to Article 10 of Act 3/1991,  
‘Public comparison, including comparative advertising, by an explicit or implicit 
reference to a competitor will be allowed if the following requirements are met: 
a) The goods or services compared must have the same purpose or meet the 
same needs. 
b) The comparison will be made between one or more essential, relevant, 
verifiable and representative features of the goods or services, which may 
include price. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1130
c) In the case of products with a protected certificate of origin or geographical 
indication, specific name or protected traditional specialty, the comparison can 
only be made with other products of the same name. 
d) Goods or services cannot be presented as imitations or replicas of others to 
which a trademark or protected trade name is applied. 
e) The comparison may not contravene Articles 5, 7, 9, 12 and 20 relating to acts 
of deception, denigration and exploitation of another's reputation.’ 
This definition of comparative advertising has been criticised because of two reasons: 
firstly, it refers to allusive advertising, which includes several types of advertising that 
do not consist of comparative advertising despite the fact that they refer to 
competitors. Second, this definition does not refer to an essential feature of 
comparative advertising, namely that it must contrast one’s own products or services 
with those of others, emphasizing the superiority of the former against the latter. 
According to AECOSAN, Spanish legislation only refers to actions before public 
authorities in cases of antitrust. In other cases, businesses must bring a claim before 
courts. Lawsuits between companies are filled in exceptional cases where there is a 
large and quantifiable economic loss. However, they are not common due to the so-
called ‘fear factor’. 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Actions arising from unfair commercial practices in Article 32 of Act 3/1991 do not 
refer to the avoidance of the contract. The mere fact that a commercial practice can 
be regarded as unfair by misleading according to Articles 5 and 7 of Act 3/1991 does 
not mean that this practice has contractual consequences since the assessment of 
unfairness is not based on the effects of the misleading behaviour but on the decision 
of the contracting party to conclude a specific contract. However, the existence of an 
unfair practice may lead to the application of the avoidance regime foreseen by the 
Spanish Civil Code (Article 1265 CC) if there is evidence that the misleading behaviour 
has caused an essential and excusable mistake of the contracting party (Article 1266 
CC).  
According to the ECJ in Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ spol. s r.o. 
(ECJ 15.3.2012, Case C-453/10), ‘a finding that a commercial practice is unfair is one 
element among others on which the competent court may base its assessment of the 
unfairness of contractual terms under Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13. (...) That 
element, however, is not such as to establish, automatically and on its own, that the 
contested terms are unfair. It is for the referring court to decide on the application of 
the general criteria set out in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 93/13 to a specific term, 
which must be considered in relation to all the circumstances of the particular case’. 
As a consequence, where unfair commercial practices lead to an unfair term this is 
subject to the nullity regime foreseen by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 (Article 83). 
Finally, the nullity of the contract is foreseen by Article 1 of the Spanish Usury Act of 
1908 for ‘any loan agreement that stipulates a significantly higher interest rate than 
normal and manifestly disproportionate to the specific circumstances or with 
conditions that render the contract unfair, where there is reason to believe that such 
an agreement has been accepted by the borrower as a result of being in a desperate 
situation, through their inexperience or their limited mental faculties’. According to 
Article 3 of this Act, the borrower will be obliged to return only the amount received. If 
the borrower had only paid back part of the loan received, including principal and 
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interest due, the lender will have to return to the borrower any amount which exceeds 
the borrowed capital. 
According to the ACC, national provisions and courts can remove unfair clauses and 
commercial practices. However, they usually focus on the unfairness of the contracting 
terms (for instance, usury would be an unfair clause rather than an unfair commercial 
practice; the imposition of judicial jurisdiction would be an unfair clause rather than an 
unfair commercial practice, etc.). 
AECOSAN notes that the concept of unfair commercial practice has been expanded to 
cases where the use of a woman's body is unrelated to the product or service being 
offered. Courts or administrative authorities cannot act against immoral behaviours. 
Only some regional authorities prohibit offers or sales of erotic and pornographic 
products to minors. For instance, it has been established that these products cannot 
be purchased directly, as in vending machines in public places, or be offered in shop 
windows near schools or places of meeting children (such as public parks with 
elements of children's game). Usury is a controversial issue in the Spanish system. 
The only legal regulation is a rule passed in 1909, now completely out-of-date. The 
Bank of Spain avoids ruling on this question, limiting control to checking information 
requirements regarding the interest that will be charged for the loan. 
According to consumer organisations, some courts apply such contractual 
consequences based either on legal rules or the principle of good faith. 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
There is no case law on contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
Given the Spanish experience in a related field (information on financial products as 
arising from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive), where the contractual 
consequences of the infringement of information duties linked to interest rate swaps 
and hybrid securities (participaciones preferentes) has given rise to large amounts of 
litigation, and relevant debates over those issues, it is probably the case that covering 
the contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices would be a welcome 
development. See, for instance, STS, 1ª, 20.1.2014 (RJ 2014\781), on the effects of 
the violation of information duties by a financial entity in the rendering of a contract as 
voidable for mistake. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, businesses are aware of contractual consequences 
because actions are perfectly described by the law. It does not seem necessary a legal 
modification now. 
The ACC is of the opinion that the Services Directive, the UCPD and the UTPD should 
be unified and harmonized. The dispersion of consumer laws should be improved and 
overcome. 
According to AECOSAN, it seems be necessary to apply the same principle to both 
unfair terms and unfair commercial practices and to allow consumers to invoke court 
decisions or administrative sanctions to avoid their effects. 
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1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The use of the general clause of unfairness foreseen by Article 82.1 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 has had an important impact on mortgage-floor clauses. On 
May 2013, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled that floor clauses included by some 
financial entities (BBVA, Caixa Galicia and Caja Mar) in mortgage loan agreements 
were unfair contract terms and hence null and void [STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 
2013\3088)]. As a consequence, the Supreme Court ordered the abovementioned 
financial entities to remove the floor clauses from their contracts and to refrain from 
using them in the future. However, the Court did not declare the retroactivity of its 
judgment because of the risk of serious harm to public economic policy, which means 
that payments made up by consumers to the date of the publication of the judgment 
would not be reimbursed. Subsequent decisions have declared the nullity of floor 
clauses used by other Spanish financial entities. Due to the controversial nature of the 
legal reasoning of STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088), a Commercial Court in Granada 
raised a prejudicial question to the ECJ on whether banks should reimburse the 
amounts overcharged to their customers from the moment that the floor clause was 
applied instead of from 9 May 2013. The final decision of the ECJ is expected in the 
end of 2016.7 
Moreover, it must be noted that the UCTD has had important procedural effects. The 
ECJ has ruled that Spain’s mortgage law is incompatible with the UCTD in several 
occasions: 
• ECJ 14.3.2013, Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, 
Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa): Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as precluding legislation 
of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, while not 
providing in mortgage enforcement proceedings for grounds of objection based on 
the unfairness of a contractual term on which the right to seek enforcement is 
based, does not allow the court before which declaratory proceedings have been 
brought, which does have jurisdiction to assess whether such a term is unfair, to 
grant interim relief, including, in particular, the staying of those enforcement 
proceedings, where the grant of such relief is necessary to guarantee the full 
effectiveness of its final decision;8 
• ECJ 17.7.2014, Case C-169/14, Sánchez Morcillo-García Abril v. Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya, S.A.: Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as precluding a 
system of enforcement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
provides that mortgage enforcement proceedings may not be stayed by the court of 
first instance, which, in its final decision, may at most award compensation in 
respect of the damage suffered by the consumer, inasmuch as the latter, the 
7  The ECJ ruled on 21st of December 2016 that floor clauses were null and void, and that temporary 
limitation of the consequences of a clause declared null and void was contrary to European Union Law, 
and more specifically to Article 6 of Directive 93/13. A clause declared unfair or null must be understood 
as if it had never existed, and therefore, it must be possible to claim the repayment of overpaid interest, 
etc., from the beginning of the contract, and not only from the date indicated by the Spanish Supreme 
Court. 
8 The doctrine of the ECJ regarding default interests in this court decision is applied by AAP Barcelona 
27.2.2015 (AC 2015\649). Moreover, the doctrine of the ECJ regarding the term concerning the unilateral 
determination by the lender of the amount of the unpaid debt, linked to the possibility of initiating 
mortgage enforcement proceedings, is applied by AAP Girona 5.5.2016 (AC 2016\1167) 
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debtor against whom mortgage enforcement proceedings are brought, may not 
appeal against a decision dismissing his objection to that enforcement, whereas the 
seller or supplier, the creditor seeking enforcement, may bring an appeal against a 
decision terminating the proceedings or ordering an unfair term to be disapplied; 
• ECJ 21.1.2015, Case C-482/13, Unicaja Banco, SA v. José Hidalgo Rueda and 
Others and Caixabank SA v. Manuel María Rueda: Article 6 of Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be 
interpreted as not precluding a national provision under which the national court 
hearing mortgage enforcement proceedings is required to adjust the amounts due 
under a term in a mortgage-loan contract providing for default interest at a rate 
more than three times greater than the statutory rate in order that the amount of 
that interest may not exceed that threshold, provided that the application of that 
national provision is without prejudice to the assessment by that national court of 
the unfairness of such a term and does not prevent that court removing that term if 
it were to find the latter to be ‘unfair’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that 
directive;9 
• ECJ 29.10.2015, Case C-8/14, BBVA, S.A. v. Fernández Gabarro, Peñalva López, 
López Durán: Articles 6 and 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that they 
preclude a national transitional provision, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which, as regards mortgage enforcement proceedings which were 
instituted before the date of entry into force of the law of which that provision 
forms part and which were not concluded at that date, imposes a time-limit on 
consumers calculated from the day following the publication of that law, to object to 
enforcement on the basis of the alleged unfairness of contractual terms. 
Court rulings had led to mortgage law reforms and other complimentary regulatory 
changes to comply with these court decisions. Act 1/2013 and Royal Decree-Law 
11/2014 were passed in compliance with that established by ECJ Decisions of 
14.3.2013 and 17.7.2014, respectively. 
According to the ACC, the principle-based approach is assessed positively as it favours 
consumers. 
AECOSAN is of the opinion that Spain has transposed the UCTD in a tight and faithful 
way. Some legislative amendments have been made at the request of the European 
Commission in the case of PILOT projects or as a result of judgments of the ECJ, 
especially in relation to the execution procedure of mortgage loans to allow consumers 
to claim the existence of unfair terms in loan agreements. 
Consumer associations assess the principle-based approach positively as it enables 
judges to apply rules with sufficient safeguards for consumers’ rights. 
To sum up, the principle-based approach must be assessed positively since the 
application of the general clause of unfairness has allowed for specification of the 
effects of unfairness in terms of the non-retroactivity of judgments and has also led to 
important procedural reforms in Spain. 
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
In Spain, clauses foreseen by the Annex of UCTD are apparently regarded as a black 
list. However, some legal scholars have noted that the list includes some grey clauses 
(for instance, clauses foreseen by Articles 85.1 (excessively long or insufficiently 
specified term), 85.2 (deadline that effectively prevents the consumer from stating an 
intention not to automatically extend a contract), 85.3 (unilateral modification without 
9 This doctrine is applied by AAP Barcelona 27.2.2015 (AC 2015\649). 
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valid reasons), 85.4.I, second paragraph (disproportionately short term), 85.4.II 
(serious reasons), 85.6 (disproportionately high compensation), 85.10 (objective 
reasons to determine or alter the price), 86.1.I (exclusion or limitation of inadequate 
legal rights), 86.3 (reducing guarantees of the debtor), 87.6 , 88.1 (disproportionate 
guarantees)). To sum up, Articles 85 to 90 of the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 
specify a series of clauses that are unfair by combining the technique of "black list" 
and that of "grey list". Alongside clauses whose unfair character results from the 
application of objective criteria or a mechanical process consisting of including a 
specific case within the rule (black list), other rules cannot be automatically applied 
because of their vagueness and a task of interpretation and assessment is needed 
(grey list). See, in this sense, AAP Girona 5.5.2016 (AC 2016\1167). 
Article 82.4 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 group unfair clauses into 6 general 
groups:  
‘(…) unfair terms will include those which, in accordance with Articles 85 to 90: 
a) Bind the contract to the businesses’ will 
b) Limit the consumers and users’ rights 
c) Establish a lack of reciprocity in the contract 
d) Impose disproportionate guarantees on consumers and users or wrongfully 
impose the burden of proof upon them 
e) Are disproportionate in relation to the performance or execution of the 
contract, or 
f) Contravene the rules on competence and applicable law’. 
Some criticisms have been raised against the list of unfair clauses. Firstly, it is said 
that Articles 85 to 90 contain a long, tedious and non-systematic list.  Secondly, the 
list repeats some situations (for instance, Articles 85.4 and 87.3, Articles 85.5 and 
86.5, Articles 86.5 and 87.1). Thirdly, the basis of unfairness is not homogeneous. In 
some cases the material basis of unfairness is considered (for instance, Articles 84.4 
a), b) and c) whereas in other cases the type of relationship or the clause’s subject-
matter are relevant (Article 84 d), e) and f). Finally, it combines specific clauses that 
sometimes replicate legal obligations with general clauses (for instance, Article 86.7). 
To sum up, the indicative list of unfair clauses theoretically facilitates the judicial task 
and provides certainty to consumers. However, it cannot be considered as completely 
effective in terms of its application due to the length of the list, the lack of 
systematization of the terms foreseen by the list and the repetition of contents.  
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The black list foreseen by Articles 85-90 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 has a 
number of advantages. It facilitates the judicial task and provides foreseeability to 
consumers regarding the result of proceedings. Additionally, it provides criteria to 
solve cases that are not explicitly foreseen by the list through the use of the general 
clause of Article 82.1. Finally, it encourages businesses to adapt their contractual 
clauses to the standards legally established. 
The impression of the Ministry of Justice is that the functioning of the list is correct in 
practice. 
AECOSAN comments that it would be necessary to include clauses that were regarded 
as unfair by the ECJ. 
ACC notes that in Spain, a grey list exists, but some courts interpret it as a black list. 
Consumer organisations, in contrast, comment that a black list exists in Spain. Gray 
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lists are used where judgments of value are needed. The indicative list currently 
covers or can cover current unfair clauses. According to consumer organisations, this 
list works in practice but a faster mechanism is needed to update it. 
Having this list makes a difference since courts do not have to analyse whether 
clauses are unfair and they can declare them unfair ex officio. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
According to Article 221.1.b) of Act 1/2000, that deals with judgments passed in 
procedures initiated by consumers’ associations, ‘if a specific activity or behaviour is 
declared illicit or contrary to the law (...), the judgement shall determine whether this 
declaration shall have procedural effects beyond those who had been a party to the 
corresponding proceedings’. However, case law has denied the spread of these effects 
when clauses are illicit due to lack of information. In these cases, procedural effects 
are limited to defendants. For instance, in STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088), 
beneficiaries of the judgment were those consumers that had concluded mortgage 
loan agreements with the sued financial entities and whose standard terms included 
identical clauses to that considered unfair and non-transparent by the judgement. 
According to the court, ‘identical’ clauses were those that, despite the fact of using 
different words, had essentially identical content because they had the same effects. 
According to the ACC, in Spain, effects are limited because injunctions only affect the 
plaintiffs and defendants. The rest of consumers affected must present collective 
claims. 
In the opinion of AECOSAN, individual and collective actions must be distinguished. In 
collective actions, effects of judicial decisions benefit all consumers. In individual 
actions, effects of judicial decisions can be invoked by third parties or public 
authorities if they have public effects (for instance, because they have been included 
in legislative collections). In collective actions, companies usually do not adhere to 
judgments. For instance, Ryanair has not eliminated the clause that states that the 
contract is governed by Irish law despite the fact that two commercial courts stated 
that this clause was null and void; or banks have not eliminated settlement clauses 
limited to those who have alleged them or floor clauses in mortgage contracts. 
Consumer authorities have initiated a market control campaign in 2017 to ensure that 
unfair terms are not still used by businesses. 
Consumer associations consider that the effects are established by the court decisions 
themselves. They must be established accurately to facilitate their enforcement. 
To sum up, in Spain the effects of court decisions establishing the unfairness of terms 
are limited to the individual relationships between the specific traders and the 
consumers, unless these court decisions extend the effects of unfairness to third 
parties. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
In the Spanish literature there does not seem to be a position on this issue.  
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Most important debate on transparency is due to STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088), 
which ruled that mortgage floor clauses were not null and void because of unfairness, 
but lack of transparency.10  
This judgement applied to mortgage floor clauses a new control of transparency that 
was independent from the incorporation control foreseen by Articles 5 of Act 7/1998 
and 80.1.b) of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, the content control foreseen by 
Articles 82 and following of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, and the control applied 
by general contract law to defects of information (for instance, the legal regime of 
mistake foreseen by Article 1266 of the Spanish Civil Code). 
This control of transparency requires providing evidence that contract terms are 
sufficiently transparent so that consumers have a real understanding of their 
importance in a reasonable performance of the contract. According to the court, ‘it is 
necessary that the information provided to the consumer allows him to notice that the 
clause defines the main object of the contract and that affects or may affect the 
content of his payment obligation, and allows him to have a real and reasonably 
complete knowledge of the role that the clause plays or may play on the contract 
economy’. However, the Supreme Court has not set the criteria to assess that 
consumers are sufficiently informed in each case.  
The ACC assesses positively the transparency requirements as they have been 
interpreted by courts in a favourable manner to consumers. 
Transparency requirements are assessed positively by consumer organisations and are 
increasingly used by courts to rule in favour of consumers. However, consumer 
organisations consider that an effective enforcement with coercive measures should be 
required. 
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Individually negotiated contract terms are excluded from the scope of application of 
both Act 7/1998 (Article 1 of this Act states that standard terms are pre-drafted 
clauses imposed in the agreement by one of the parties, without prejudice of their 
actual authority, their external appearance, their extension, and whatever other 
circumstances, having been drafted with the aim of being included within a plurality of 
agreements) and Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 (Article 82 states that unfair terms 
shall be considered to be all clauses not individually negotiated and non-authorised 
practices against good faith principles, prejudicing consumers and users, by creating 
an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties under the agreement). 
Act 7/1998 and Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 did not incorporate Article 4.2 of 
UCTD. However, STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088) and subsequent court decisions 
have considered that this provision is also applicable in Spain. As a consequence, 
courts cannot assess the unfairness of clauses defining the main subject-matter or 
dealing with the quality/price relationship ‘if these clauses have been written in a clear 
and understandable way’. 
Until 2013, the Spanish law only established a control of incorporation (formal) 
previous to a control of content (material). STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088) added a 
third control of transparency (material, not merely formal) when examining the 
validity of floor clauses in mortgage loan agreements. The Supreme Court considered 
that, although these clauses described the main object of the contract, art. 4.2 of 
Directive 93/13 was applicable because there is a first general control of incorporation 
(formal transparency) applicable to all terms that have not been individually 
10 On the lack of transparency of mortgage floor clauses, see also SJMerc Valladolid 3.12.2015 (JUR 
2015\308309). 
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negotiated and a second specific control of transparency applicable to the essential 
elements of consumer contracts. If contracting terms do not pass the control of 
transparency, they will be regarded as unfair. 
According to the ACC, case law and public authorities recognize that unfair clauses can 
exist in individual contracts (mortgages) or when fixing rates to update prices. This is 
a benefit for consumers because they do not remain helpless or vulnerable. 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
Article 83 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, which was modified by Act 3/2014 in 
order to comply with ECJ 14.6.2012 (Case C-618-10, Banco Espańol de Crédito SA v 
Joaquín Calderón Camino), states that unfair contract terms are null and void, and 
cannot be modified or revised by judges.11 
Act 42/2015 has modified Articles 552.1 and 815.4 of Act 1/2000. According to this 
provision, judges will be able to control ex officio unfairness of contract terms included 
in consumer contracts in enforcement procedures and payment procedures 
(procedimiento monitorio). 
ACC is of the opinion that the sanction works in practice, but it does not always benefit 
consumers. It would be good that judges could moderate it. It is not sufficient to have 
CJEU guidance. The Catalan Consumer Code allows consumer authorities to recognize 
damages to consumers in administrative proceedings, although this practice is not 
usual.  
AECOSAN comments that administrative sanctions are the usual measures used by 
public authorities for unfair commercial practices. They are effective in cases where a 
consumer has filed a complaint against a company before the public authorities. First, 
mediation is tried. If the mediation agreement is not accepted or there are other 
consumers affected, disciplinary proceedings are initiated. Businesses are given the 
opportunity to correct their irregularities. If they do not take the required measures, 
disciplinary proceedings are initiated. The amount of sanctions depends on the number 
of affected consumers, whether the company has corrected the irregularities and 
whether consumers have recovered their rights. Moreover, this sanction can be 
appealed by the company before administrative judges, which can confirm or cancel 
the sanction to be paid. Companies do not usually appeal sanctions due to fear that 
the clauses are deemed unfair. The administrative sanction is not usually effective for 
consumers who have not filed the claim or complaint before the public authority, but it 
has an important deterrent effect to force companies to rectify certain behaviors. A 
good example can be found on the market control campaign conducted in 2015 that 
involve that most companies corrected their webpages. However, this campaign 
revealed that small businesses did not have a high level of knowledge of requirements 
foreseen by the EU Directives so they often copy the content and organization of their 
webpages imitating greater businesses. 
According to AECOSAN, the experience shows that alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms are not enough for companies that have several claims or complaints. 
Administrative sanctions must be imposed to prevent unfair behaviour being repeated. 
11 See, in this sense, SAP Granada 19.1.2016 (AC 2016\988). The clause included on an elevator 
maintenance contract was unfair because it stated an automatic extension of contractual relationship up 
to ten years and it sanctioned consumer who wanted to terminate the contract within the period of 
extension to pay the total amount, for services not provided, for more than four years. 
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In a recent conference organized by a consumer association with judges, judges said 
that the obligation to assess ex officio the existence of unfair terms involved a novelty 
that they were incorporating into its working procedures. 
Judges have different views depending on the jurisdiction. While civil and commercial 
judges seem to have understood that they must act ex officio, it does not seem to be 
the approach taken by administrative judges when resolving appeals against 
administrative sanctions. 
AECOSAN considers that the European acquis is very important. A systematized and 
easily searchable compilation of court decisions should exist within Eurlex and the 
website of the European Commission on the UCPD. 
According to consumer organisations, the sanction works in practice, but it is not 
sufficient because the consequence for traders is the same as if the unfair term had 
not been included in the contract. Courts take up an active role by invoking unfairness 
ex officio in some procedures. It is not sufficient to have CJEU guidance.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
There is evidence that consumers, in e-transactions and in other forms of contracting 
relying on standard form terms governing the contract, do not commonly read the 
contract terms before entering into the contract, do not have the capacity, or the 
willingness, to read and understand the implications of standard contract terms, and 
do not value the opportunity to read the terms prior to contract, nor they value 
typically the more advantageous contract terms they may hypothetically be able to 
find if they read standard contract terms in advance and shop around for more 
favourable ones. Moreover, there is also evidence that the opportunity to read the 
standard terms before signing the contract does not change the substantive content of 
the contract terms. Thus, the available empirical evidence does not seem to give a 
clear indication that imposing duties to disclose standard contract terms and providing 
consumers with opportunities to read them actually improve the material situation of 
consumers in terms of the welfare they obtain from the transaction. 
The ACC proposes the practice to inform in a graphic and symbolic way about the level 
of risk of financial products.  
According to AECOSAN, in Spain, there is a tendency to group pre-commercial 
information in a ‘Legal Notice’ section of the website where the identification of the 
company and some consumer rights are included. On the contrary, information about 
the right of withdrawal is not clear and identifiable for consumers. Confusion exists 
between the right of withdrawal and the return of the product due to non-conformity. 
Moreover, the model of withdrawal foreseen by Directive 2011/83 is not usually used. 
It is necessary to organise this online information into sections or paragraphs and to 
establish when and how the information concerning the characteristics of the product 
(composition, manufacturer, CE marking) must be given to consumers (for instance, 
whether it should appear next to the product or in a link). 
Regarding best practices, it must be noted that Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 
introduced the concept of ‘abusive practice’ to cover cases where a contractual term 
correctly formulated was interpreted or applied differently (for instance, telephone 
companies charge consumers for violating the period of permanence with an amount 
different to that foreseen by the penalty clause or they use a different method of 
calculation). 
In the opinion of consumer organisations, measures that improve the drafting of terms 
and the training of consumers would improve the effectiveness of the UCTD. 
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1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
It is not possible to conclude about the effectiveness of UCTD in terms of eliminating 
obstacles to cross-border trade due to lack of feedback from Spanish associations and 
authorities. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
In Spain, a general rule that allows the application of the concept of ‘unfair contract 
term’ to non-individually negotiated clauses in B2B contracts does not exist. It is not 
possible to apply to B2B transactions either the general content control applicable to 
unfair contract terms nor the control of transparency of clauses that refer to essential 
elements of contracts (Article 4.2 UCTD) according to the requirements established by 
STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\1388). As a consequence, protection of businesses must 
be articulated through traditional instruments of civil law. 
Spanish courts, notaries and registrars have not applied the controls for B2C contracts 
to B2C transactions. Recently, STS, 1ª, 3.6.2016 (JUR 2016\126397) confirmed that 
the control of transparency was limited to unfair contract terms included in B2C 
contracts. However, a dissenting opinion exists arguing that the control of 
transparency should be integrated within the control of incorporation and hence it 
would be applicable to businesses. Similarly, Resolution of the General Directorate for 
Registries and Public Notaries of 10.2.2016 did not apply the control of transparency 
to a clause of excessive interest rates included in a business mortgage loan. 
However, legal scholars state that major protection to businesses without bargaining 
power or with a limited bargaining power (for instance, because they depend 
economically on large companies that control the market) is needed.  
Spanish legal scholars and case law have given several options to be able to submit 
unfair contract terms to a content control: 
• The integration of the control of transparency within the incorporation control, 
which is applicable to both B2C and B2B transactions [SAP Soria 18.2.2016 (JUR 
2016\58367)]; 
• The application of the unfair contract terms regime for B2C transactions is foreseen 
by Legislative Royal Decree 1/2007 to B2B contracts by using analogy. However, 
STS, 1ª, 3.6.2016 has explicitly said that the aim of legislator was not to put on the 
same level the content control of unfair contract terms in B2C and B2B 
transactions; 
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• The literal meaning of the Preamble of Act 7/1998: ‘nothing prevents that an unfair 
contract term may be legally declared invalid when it is contrary to good faith and 
cause a significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties, 
even in the case of contracts between professionals or entrepreneurs. But it must 
take into account in each case the specific features of the contracts between 
companies’; 
• The relationship between the Preamble of Act 7/1998 and Articles 1255 (public 
order), 1256 (the prohibition to leave validity and performance of contracts to the 
discretion of one of the contracting parties) and 1258 (contracts bind parties to all 
consequences in compliance with good faith) of the Spanish Civil Code; 
• The violation of mandatory or prohibitive rules, although it must be noted that 
private autonomy prevails in B2B contracts. 
AECOSAN is of the opinion that conditions established by companies for B2B 
transactions do not resemble to that for B2C transactions. The bargaining power is 
quite different depending on the sector. For instance, the average term of guarantees 
in the sale of industrial products is a six months period. A two years period exists for 
the sales of these products to consumers. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
As standard terms are widely used in B2B transactions and may cause problems 
similar to those affecting B2C contacts, the system of protection established by Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 would be appropriate for B2B transactions. However, 
special features of B2B transactions as commercial relationships should be considered. 
In particular, the content control should take into account the need of protection of 
businesses by considering several criteria (for instance, their bargaining power, the 
legal and economic advice received, etc.).  
As a rule, the concept of good faith should not be so rigidly applied in B2B 
transactions. In these transactions, businesses usually know each other, they act in 
closed business sectors, they usually conclude standard term contracts, they enter 
into long-term contracts where the contracting party is an essential term of 
the contract, etc. As a consequence, response of businesses to unfair clauses is not as 
important as in B2C transactions. On the contrary, when unfair clauses affect small 
businesses linked by occasional or unique contracts, the general clause of good faith 
should be applied as rigidly as in B2C transactions.  
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
No information is available. 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
Some court decisions that have been able to deal with the unfairness of standard 
terms in B2B contracts should be mentioned:  
• STS, 1ª, 10.3.2014 (RJ 2014\1467): Ascensores Zener Elevadores SLU vs. Sanitas 
Residencial SL. The content control of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 is not 
applied to a penalty clause with disproportionate compensation foreseen in a 
contract for elevator maintenance; 
• STS, 1ª, 28.5.2014 (RJ 2014\3354): Augusto (lawyer) vs. ‘INMO CONSULT 
INVESTMENTS, S.L.’ and ‘PONDERANCE 2000, S.L.’. The content control of Royal 
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Legislative Decree 1/2007 is not applied to termination clauses in a contract for the 
sale of a professional office; 
• STS, 1ª, 24.11.2014 (RJ 2014\5985): ‘ONAGE PROMOCIONES E INVERSIONES S.L.’, 
‘BAHER 93 S.L.’ y ‘CRISMORA S.L.’ c. ‘CAJA DE AHORROS Y MONTE DE PIEDAD DEL 
CÍRCULO CATÓLICO DE OBREROS DE BURGOS’. The content control of Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007 is not applied to an acceleration clause in a mortgage loan; 
• STS, 1ª, 30.4.2015 (RJ 2015\2019): ‘Promoción Urbana Logroñesa, S.L.’ vs. Cirilo 
(businessperson that buys houses for resale). The content control of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 is not applied to a clause that imposes on the buyer the 
obligation to pay expenses, taxes, etc; 
• STS, 1ª, 3.6.2016 (RJ 2016\2306): Teodora (businessperson) vs. Banco Pastor. 
The content control of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 is not applied to a floor 
clause. 
In addition, some sectoral rules foresee content control for B2B transactions that refer 
to some unfair contract terms: 
• According to Article 9 of Act 3/2004, ‘in any case, clauses agreed by the parties or 
practices that are contrary to the requirements to ask for default interest (...) or 
those that exclude the payment of such default interest or the compensation for 
costs payment (...) are void. Clauses and practices agreed by the parties that 
exclude default interest, or any other on the legal default interest (...) will also be 
void when they have an abusive content to the detriment of the creditor, 
understanding that the content is abusive when the agreed interest rate is 70 
percent lower than the default legal interest, unless (...) it can be proved that the 
interest charged is not abusive (...)’; 
• Article 41.3 of Act 15/2009, concerning default clauses in transport contracts, 
refers to the rules of Article 9 of Act 3/2004. Additionally, Article 38.4 states that 
any agreement that excludes the revision of prices according to fluctuations in fuel 
prices will be void when it has a clearly unfair content to the detriment of the 
carrier; 
• According to Article 3.1 of Act 50/1980, ‘standard terms, which shall in no case be 
prejudicial for policyholders, will be included by the insurer in the insurance 
proposal and necessarily in the policy contract or in an accompanying document, to 
be signed by the insured, who will receive a copy thereof. The general and 
particular conditions shall be written clearly and precisely. Clauses limiting the 
rights of policyholders will be highlighted in a special way and must be specifically 
accepted in writing; 
• Standard terms shall be subject to the supervision of the Public Administration 
under the terms provided by law; 
• Once the Supreme Court declares the nullity of a standard term, the competent 
Public Administration will force the insurers to modify identical clauses in their 
policies’; 
• According to Article 1 of Usury Act of 1908, ‘any loan agreement that stipulates a 
significantly higher interest rate than normal and manifestly disproportionate to the 
specific circumstances or with conditions that render the contract unfair, where 
there is reason to believe that such an agreement has been accepted by the 
borrower as a result of being in a desperate situation, through their inexperience or 
their limited mental faculties’, will be void; 
• See also rules on financial transparency (Order EHA2899/2011). 
According to AECOSAN, there are some clauses that should be unfair in all 
circumstances and economic sectors. For instance, the right to conclude the 
relationship with a very short notice term (between 7 days and one month) without 
having to provide a reason. 
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• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
As some sectoral rules on transparency requirements exist for some B2B transactions 
(for instance, requirements of transparency in the field of financial services foreseen 
by Order EHA2899/2011), it would probably be a welcome development to provide 
generally for the contractual transparency requirements to apply to B2B transactions. 
According to AECOSAN, the problem is not transparency, but the absence of claims 
and complaints to enforce them because of the abovementioned ‘fear factor’. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade; Whether the consequences of such an 
extension would have an effect on innovation by or market opportunities for SME 
providers/suppliers;  
An extension of the UCTD to B2B transactions can be attractive because the likelihood 
that strong companies can easily impose standard terms depending on their interests 
or the need to negotiate the applicable law are significant obstacles to cross-border 
trade. 
AECOSAN considers that an extension of the UCTD to B2B transactions will only be 
effective if national authorities are entitled to adopt administrative measures without 
any need for previous complaints. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
According to AECOSAN, the ‘fear factor’ will prevent the extension of the scope of the 
Directive if specific measures are not adapted to the business reality. Codes of conduct 
will be more effective in B2B transactions (for instance, by establishing alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms). 
 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1143
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?12  
The injunction is considered, from a deterrent perspective, a preventive mechanism to 
protect collective interests of consumers and users. This deterrent effect is usually 
related to the publication of the judgment. According to Article 21 of Act 7/1998, final 
judgments resulting from collective actions as well as affected clauses may be ordered 
by judges to be published in the Official Gazette of the Commercial Registry or/and in 
a newspaper of the largest circulation in the province where the judgment has been 
passed. The costs of publication will be borne by the losing defendant in a period of 15 
days from the notification of the judgment. Similarly, Article 221.2 of Act 1/2000 
states that judges may order the total or partial publication of a judgement granting 
an injunction at the defendant’s expense or, where the effects of the infringement may 
persist over time, a corrective statement.  
Legal scholars raised the issue of whether courts could agree on the publication of the 
judgment ex officio as it could be contrary to the request or rogation principle. SAP 
Salamanca 26.2.2013 (JUR 2013\130394) concluded that the publication foreseen by 
Articles 21 of Act 7/1998 and 221.2 of Act 1/2000 consisted of a judicial faculty that 
could be adopted ex officio or at the parties’ request. It did not consist of a principal 
but a secondary action that depended on the judge’s discretion. 
Due to the reputational impact of these measures and the consequent risk of losing 
clients, businesses will adopt measures to avoid negative publicity (for instance, by 
avoiding unfair clauses in both standard term contracts and consumer contracts). 
According to AECOSAN, injunctions have a limited effect due to the lack of 
enforcement of judgments. For instance, Ryanair has not yet removed an unfair clause 
on the applicable law to conflicts with consumers. On the contrary, judgments on 
unfair commercial practices and unfair terms used by financial institutions have had a 
great social impact. Consumer associations have requested both the enforcement of 
judgments and the spread of their effects to all companies of the same sector. 
Consumer associations comment that in Spain there is little experience in bringing 
injunctions. Although they are useful, their effectiveness is difficult due to problems of 
workload in courts. 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
In Spain there are several such measures: 
• Summary procedure: according to Article 250.1.12º of Act 1/2000, injunctions 
consist of a summary procedure that is faster and less complex than the ordinary 
procedure; 
• Publication of the decision and/or the publication of a corrective statement (see 
above); 
12  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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• Sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order: according to Article 711 of 
Act 1/2000, a judgement granting an injunction will impose a fine ranging from 
EUR 600 to EUR 60 000 per day of delay in the enforcement of the judgement 
within the time limit set forth therein. The amount will depend on the nature and 
relevance of the damage caused and the economic capacity of the condemned 
party. Such fine shall be paid to the Public Treasury; 
• Prior consultation: such requirement is not foreseen by Act 1/2000 or Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007. Some sectoral laws foresee prior requirements to be 
able to bring a claim. Article 13 of Act 7/1998 states the possibility to ask for a 
conciliation opinion before the registrar of standard terms. Article 105 of Act 
29/2006 foresees a request to the person conducting the advertising activity to 
avoid the subsequent procedure. Finally, Articles 38 and 39 of Act 3/1991 state 
preliminary actions against persons responsible for codes of conduct or 
entrepreneurs and professionals who are signatories of codes of conduct; 
• Effects of judgments: according to Article 221.1 of Act 1/2000, judgements are 
subject to the following rules:  
1. The judgement upholding the claim shall individually determine the 
consumers and users who shall be deemed as beneficiaries from the 
judgement. Where an individual determination of such users or consumers is 
not possible, the judgement shall set forth the necessary details, 
characteristics and requirements to be in a position to require payment or, 
as appropriate, apply for enforcement. Article 519 of Act 1/2000 states that, 
when judgments referred to in Article 221.1.1º do not state the individual 
consumers or users benefiting from this, at the request of one or several of 
the parties concerned and with a hearing of the losing party, the court for 
the enforcement shall issue a court order to decide whether it recognises the 
applicants as beneficiaries of the judgment. 
2. If a specific activity or behaviour is deemed illicit, the judgement shall 
determine whether this declaration shall have procedural effects beyond 
those who had been parties in the proceedings.  
This rule was interpreted by STS, 1ª, 1.7.2010 (RJ 2010\6554). According to 
this decision, the effects of the judgment can be extended ultra partes, id 
est, beyond the parties in the proceedings. However, these effects cannot be 
extended to those who offer ‘similar’ clauses but only to those who offer 
‘identical’ clauses to that regarded as null and void by the judgment. 
Similarly, see SSAP Asturias 28.3.2014 (AC 2014\491), Barcelona 
14.10.2014 (AC 2014\1849), Asturias 23.1.2015 (JUR 2015\94221).  
3. If individual consumers or users have appeared before the court, the 
judgement shall expressly issue a ruling on their pleas. 
According to AECOSAN, when a public authority intends to bring an injunction, a prior 
request to the company should be made. Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 states that 
the public prosecutor can bring the injunction. As a consequence, consumer 
associations do not need to submit the case before the court directly, but may 
encourage an action by the public prosecutor. 
Consumer associations comment that publication and effects of court decisions are 
especially effective. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Before Act 39/2002, several specific sectors had specific regulations of injunctions: 
• Advertising: Article 25 of Act 34/1998; 
• Unfair commercial practices: Article 32 of Act 3/1991; 
• Standard contract terms: Article 19 of Act 7/1998. 
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Act 39/2002 implemented Directive 98/27/EC, modified Act 1/2000 (Articles 6, 11, 15, 
52, 221, 250, 711 and 788) and introduced an injunction of general application in the 
field of consumer law through the Third Additional Provision of Act 26/1984: ‘in the 
absence of specific sectoral rules’, it is possible to exercise the injunction against 
‘behaviours of businessmen or professionals contrary to this Act that are detrimental 
to collective or diffuse interests of consumers and users’. This provision is the 
precedent of the general injunction foreseen by Article 54.3 of the Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007. This general injunction co-exists with sectoral injunctions. In this 
sense, Act 39/2002 modified various sectoral laws to introduce the injunction 
procedure into them or to accommodate this procedure to the European legislation in 
cases where injunctions were already foreseen. In addition to modifications of the 
abovementioned Acts 34/1998, 3/1991 and 7/1998, the following consumer laws were 
modified to introduce specific injunction procedures:  
• Time-share property for tourist use (originally, Article 16 bis of Act 42/1998; now 
Article 21 of Royal Decree-Law 8/2012); 
• Advertising of drugs and medical devices (originally, Articles 120 and 121 of Act 
25/1990; now Articles 105 and 106 of Act 29/2006); 
• Television broadcasting (originally, Articles 21 and 22 of Act 25/1994; this act was 
repealed by Act 7/2010, which does not foresee a specific injunction); 
• Consumer credit contracts (originally, Article 20 of Act 7/1995; now Article 36 of 
Act 16/2011). 
After Act 39/2002, injunctions have been regulated in other sectors: 
• Services of the information society and electronic commerce (Articles 30 and 31 of 
Act 34/2002); 
• Spanish Agency of Food Safety and Nutrition (Article 2 of Act 11/2001); 
• Distance marketing of consumer financial services (Article 15 of Act 22/2007); 
• Loans, mortgages and intermediation services with consumers (Article 11 of Act 
2/2009) 
The ID was transposed into national law by Act 29/2009. This Act modified, among 
others, Act 3/1991, whose Article 32.1.2.ª refers to the injunction that can be brought 
against acts of unfair competition and unlawful advertising. Moreover, it expressly 
allows the exercise of this procedure against behaviours that have not been occurred. 
According to the provisions of Article 2 of Directive 2009/22/EC, this specific injunction 
allows consumers to ask for the cessation of the unfair activity, the prohibition that 
the behaviour is repeated in the future and the preventive ban of a future conduct 
which has not yet occurred.  
Directive 2006/123 was implemented in Spain by Act 17/2009, whose Article 26 states 
that it is possible to bring the injunction provided by Article 53 of the Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007 against behaviours that violate the provisions of this Act that may 
affect collective or diffuse interests of consumers and users. 
According to AECOSAN, the scope of application of the injunction procedure has also 
been extended to sexist advertising. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
A number of obstacles can be identified. 
1) Lack of uniformity regarding rules on legal standing:  
• Designated public bodies (National Institute of Consumer Affairs and its 
counterparts in the Regions and Local Governments, Chambers of Commerce): 
Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 53 Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007; 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1146
• Specified consumer associations: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 
11 of Act 1/2000, 53 Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
• Consumers: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991 (individual consumers, natural or legal 
persons), 6 and 11 of Act 1/2000 (individual consumers, natural or legal 
persons; groups of consumers whose members are determined or easily 
determined); 
• Associations, professional corporations or representatives of economic 
interests: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998; 
• Organisations from other EU Member States that protect collective and the 
diffuse interests of consumers and users: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 
7/1998, 53 Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
• The Public Prosecutor: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 11 of Act 
1/2000, 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
• Entities authorised pursuant to EU Regulations to exercise injunctions in 
defence of collective interest and the diffuse interest of consumers and users: 
Articles 6 and 11 of Act 1/2000. 
2) Length of proceedings: according to Article 447 of Act 1/2000, judgments in 
summary proceedings will be passed within 10 days after the termination of the 
hearing; 
3) Free legal aid and costs of proceedings: citizens who, while engaged in or 
intending to initiate any kind of legal action, lack sufficient assets to litigate, may 
apply for free legal aid (Act 1/1996). The right to free legal aid is recognised for 
those individuals who lack sufficient assets and have a gross annual household 
income, computed for all items, falling below the following thresholds: 
• Twice the Multi-Purpose Public Income Index (IPREM, per its Spanish initials) in 
force when the application is made in the case of people who are not part of a 
household. (By 2016 EUR 12 780.26); 
• Two and a half times the Multi-Purpose Public Income Index (IPREM, per its 
Spanish initials) in force when the application is made in the case of individuals 
from a household type with less than four members. (By 2016 EUR 15 975.33); 
• Three times the IPREM in the case of households made up of four or more 
members. (By 2016 EUR 19 170.39). 
Specifically, the following shall be entitled to free legal assistance: (1) Spanish 
citizens, natives of other European Member States and foreigners resident in 
Spain, when they can demonstrate insufficient means for litigation; (2) 
Management Entities and Social Security Common Services; (3) The following 
entities, when they can demonstrate insufficient means for litigation: Public 
Interest Associations and foundations registered in the corresponding 
Administrative Register. 
Moreover, consumer associations are exempted from costs without having to prove 
lack of sources to bring a claim (Second Additional Provision of Act 1/1996). 
The right to free legal assistance covers, broadly speaking, the following benefits: 
(1) Free advice and guidance prior to the start of the proceedings; (2) assistance 
of a lawyer for the arrested individual or prisoner; (3) free defence and 
representation by a lawyer and court lawyer during the legal proceedings; (4) free 
publication of the announcement or edicts, in the course of the proceedings, which 
must be prescriptively published in official newspapers; (5) exemption from the 
payment of deposits for the lodging of appeals; (6) free assistance from experts 
during the proceedings; (7) free procurement of copies, testimonies, writs and 
notary certificates; (8) eighty percent reduction in tariffs corresponding to certain 
notary actions; (9) eighty percent reduction in tariffs corresponding to certain 
actions carried out in relation to the Land and Company Registers. 
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According to Article 394 of Act 1/2000, costs are as a rule borne by the losing 
party, unless the case poses serious de facto or de iure doubts. If the upholding or 
dismissal is partial in the first instance, each party shall pay the costs involved in 
his proceedings and the common costs shall be shared equally, unless there are 
reasons to impose the costs on one of these as she litigated recklessly. On appeal, 
none of the litigants shall be ordered to pay the costs of appeals; 
4) Enforcement: When judgments referred to in the first rule of Article 221 of Act 
1/2000 do not state the individual consumers or users benefiting from this, the 
competent court for the enforcement shall issue a court order in which it shall 
decide, in accordance with the data, characteristics and requirements established 
in the judgement, whether it recognises the applicants as its beneficiaries. After 
Act 16/2011, which entered into force in September 25, 2011, the Public 
Prosecutor will be able to ask for the enforcement of the judgment on behalf of the 
consumers and users; 
5) Accumulation of actions: Articles 12.2 of Act 7/1998 and 53 of Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007 state that it is possible to accumulate injunctions (principal action) 
and other actions (accessory actions). According to Article 12.2 of Act 7/1998, 
injunction may be cumulated to actions for the restitution of profits and damages. 
Similarly, Article 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, after its modification by 
Act 3/2014, states that, at request of the parties, it is possible to accumulate 
injunctions with claims for absolute and relative nullity, termination, restitution of 
profits and damages. These secondary actions will be solved by the judges 
responsible of the principal action. This rule will also be applicable in cases where 
injunctions have been brought by consumers and users associations13; 
6) Lack of a preliminary procedure (see above); 
7) Cross-border rules: there is no official data regarding cross-border injunctions in 
Spain. Spanish legislation refers only to legal standing in these injunctions. 
According to Article 55 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, AECOSAN and the 
similar bodies or agencies in Regions and local administrations, as well as 
consumer and users associations participating in the Council of Consumers and 
Users, when included on the list published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities, will be able to bring an injunction in other EU Member States 
On the other hand, Article 6 of Regulation 593/2008 and Articles 17-19 of 
Regulation 1215/2012 foresee rules on the applicable law and the jurisdiction 
applicable to consumer contracts but there is no specific provision regarding 
injunctions. Similarly, Article 6 of Regulation 864/2007 only refers to non-
contractual obligations arising out of an act of unfair competition. 
According to AECOSAN, the main obstacle to the effective use of the injunction 
procedure is the lack of enforcement of judgments (the case of Ryanair is significant). 
According to consumer organisations, the main pitfalls are to the complexity and costs 
of the injunction procedure. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
13 For instance, in SAP Alava 21.11.2013 (AC 2014\624), two consumers who had concluded a loan with 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. brought a claim accumulating an injunction to declare the nullity of 
a mortgage-floor clause (principal action) and an action to recover the amount unduly paid because of the 
application of this clause (accessory action). First instance court, appeal court and Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the consumers. STS, 1ª, 25.3.2015 (RJ 2015\735) stated that, when according to STS, 1ª, 
9.5.2013, a floor clause was deemed unfair and therefore null and void, the borrower was entitled to 
recover interests that had been unduly paid from the date in which the STS, 1ª, 9.5.2013 had been 
published. 
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protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
In the opinion of the Ministry of Justice, the main challenge consists in creating a 
specific regulation for injunctions in Act 1/2000. 
According to AECOSAN, it is important to update periodically the ID and its 
implementation Guide in order to include the case law of the ECJ. 
According to consumer organisations, measures should be addressed to have a faster 
and more effective injunction procedure. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
In the opinion of the ACC, cooperation between legitimized institutions is the most 
effective mechanism, in particular through the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) 
network, the Regulation 2006/2004 and the electronic communication and 
coordination system. 
According to AECOSAN, except for the two actions against Ryanair brought by a 
consumer and a consumer association before Spanish courts, there is no knowledge of 
actions of this kind in Spain. 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
There is no data about injunctions sought by institutions foreseen by Article 55 of 
Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 in other EU Member States. 
According to the ACC, the experience shows that consumer authorities do not bring 
injunctions because they are little known and effective. 
AECOSAN has no knowledge about actions of this nature. Consumer authorities 
receive information about infringements through the system implemented by 
Regulation 765/2008. 
Consumer associations consider that they do not have sufficient information and 
means to bring injunctions in other countries. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
According to legal scholars, the following measures can improve the effectiveness of 
the ID in establishing a high level of consumer protection:  
• Clarification of the applicable law in cross-border cases; 
• Clarification of the extension of effects of injunctions obtained in a domestic 
context; 
• Mutual recognition of judgments in consumer collective mechanisms; 
• Establishment of a European enforcement system; 
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• Introduction of the power to ask for compensation and creation of mechanisms to 
establish the loss caused and to identify beneficiaries. 
According to AECOSAN, a best practice was introduced by Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007 by recognizing legal standing to the public prosecutor. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
There is not a separate regulation. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
Not applicable. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
It must be emphasized the important impact for both financial entities and financial 
clients of case law on mortgage-floor clauses in terms of costs and benefits because 
Spanish Courts have forbidden extending the retroactivity of court decisions 
establishing the unfairness of mortgage-floor clauses.  
In 2013, the Spanish Supreme Court concluded that mortgage-floor clauses were null 
and void, and ordered defendant entities to remove them from their mortgage 
contracts. However, the Supreme Court did not declare the retroactivity of the 
judgement because of the risk of serious harm to public economic policy. As a 
consequence, financial entities only had to reimburse payments made in excess by 
consumers due to the unfair mortgage-floor clauses since 9 May 2013.  
Subsequent judgments upheld the Supreme Court decision and required other Spanish 
financial entities to eliminate the mortgage-floor clauses of their agreements. 
Nevertheless, some first instance courts ignored the position of the Supreme Court 
and ordered banks to reimburse the amounts received in excess from the date on 
which the floor clause was implemented.  
This led to the ECJ being asked about the retroactivity of mortgage-floor clauses.  
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1150
Although the final decision of the ECJ is expected at the end of this year, the report of 
Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi of the EU Court of Justice says that the banks 
should not be required to fully reimburse borrowers. 
According to the Association of Users of Banks, Saving Banks and Insurance 
(ADICAE), there are 2 000 000 consumers affected by mortgage-floor clauses. Most 
mortgage contracts were signed during the property boom in Spain. 
A report of the Banco de España points out that if the ECJ rules in favour of 
consumers, financial entities will have to reimburse more than EUR 7 600 million 
(EUR 5 000 million for payments made in excess before 9 May 2013 and EUR 2 600 
million for payments between 9 May 2013 and 31 December 2015). Moreover, 
International Financial Analysts (AFI), a leading Spanish provider of advisory, 
consultancy and training services in economics and finance, assesses that that the lost 
profit of financial entities, assuming that most of them have removed floor-clauses 
from their agreements, will amount to EUR 6 022 million between 2016 and 2019.  
The reimbursement of payments in excess will also have tax effects for consumers. If 
taxpayers only recover the interests paid in excess, they will not have to pay tax on 
them. If taxpayers apply the deduction for investment property, they will have to 
regularize their tax situation by returning part of what was deducted at that time. 
Those who sued a bank to remove the floor-clause will be able to deduct legal 
expenses incurred. Legal fees will be added to the mortgage payments to calculate the 
amount of the deduction in the year when the judgment that declares the clause null 
and void becomes final, with a total limit of EUR 9 040, according to the criteria set by 
the Tax Agency.14 
According to AECOSAN, the benefits of the consumer directives are undeniable. 
Consumer associations are reluctant to bring injunctions due to several reasons: the 
cost of legal representation, the risk of liability for unjustified claims and the duration 
of the procedure. They prefer filing complaints before consumer authorities because of 
their knowledge on the subject-matter, their experience and the duration of 
disciplinary procedures (6 months; appeal: 3 months). 
According to consumer associations, the exercise of consumer rights results in 
excessive costs of time and money. 
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
According to AECOSAN, entrepreneurs consider that all traders must fulfil the same 
rules and that those who act dishonestly must be punished. Moreover, they consider 
that compliance with the law promotes confidence and security, since it prevents 
consumers from requesting rights that are not foreseen by the Directives or that have 
not been offered by the company. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
No information available. 
 
14  Sources: http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/04/08/5706c3e622601d5d638b460d.html; 
http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/06/03/5744271dca474133328b4627.html; 
http://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2016-06-08/bce-banca-espanola-clausulas-suelo_1213378/; 
http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2016/06/09/mercados/1465492496_358832.html.  
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• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
According to AECOSAN, it is difficult to assess the cost of public resources addressed 
to ensure the compliance with these directives. Consumer authorities in Spain devote 
all their resources to the protection of consumer rights (webpages to inform about the 
rights of consumers and the obligations of businesses; revision of training and 
competence of the officials responsible of controlling the compliance with the 
directives, etc.). 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner?  
There are no indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in a cost-effective manner. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
According to AECOSAN, in addition to suggestions made in previous sections, costs of 
implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives would be reduced by passing 
sectoral Directives, since horizontal legislation does not give an adequate answer to 
specific problems of specific sectors (for instance, in the field of car rental without 
driver, which is generating cross-border complaints, a directive is necessary to provide 
for pre-contractual information requirements in relation to additional charges, such as 
the cost of additional insurance or the amount of bail that must be paid in cash or by 
credit card). 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
According to the ACC, companies are increasingly aware that they must comply with 
both sectoral and general consumer rules. Several requests were made to national 
agencies, such as the Spanish Agency of Air Security, the Bank of Spain, the National 
Commission of Competition and Markets, etc., to make them see that sectoral 
contracts were also subject to consumer rules. 
AECOSAN notes that business associations often invoke the UCPD before public 
authorities to claim against companies that perform unfair commercial practices. 
However, they do not usually bring claims because of the existence of unfair terms (an 
exception may be found in the field of car rental without a driver). On the other hand, 
consumer associations bring both types of claims. Finally, consumer authorities take 
into account both Directives to undertake the market control. 
According to consumer associations UCPD and UCTD are sufficiently known by judges, 
who usually refer to national or regional legislation in their court decisions. They are 
also known by traders and this explains that they try to avoid their application.  
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 • Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
According to the ACC, except for some exceptional cases, consumer authorities 
(regions) are responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law. 
National bodies are responsible for the enforcement of sectoral legislation. There is no 
institutionalized cooperation between regional and national entities. Cooperation only 
occurs in specific cases. 
AECOSAN notes that consumer authorities are responsible for the enforcement of the 
UCPD and UCTD but, at the same time, there is sectoral legislation that makes 
companies of energy supply, banking and financial services and, to a lesser extent, 
phone companies reluctant to supervisory actions by consumer authorities. Particularly 
problematic has been the case of banks that refused to submit their contracts to have 
them checked for the presence of unfair terms, which led to legislative amendments to 
force them to send this information. In this sector, regulations of the Bank of Spain 
have been strongly criticized by consumer associations due to the following reasons: 
decisions of the Claims Service are not mandatory for the Bank and the Inspection 
Service does not give value to the evidence provided by the Claims Service. 
Consumers must submit their complaints before the customer service or the customer 
ombudsman before filling a complaint before the Claims Service of the Bank of Spain. 
If the decisions of the Claims Service are favorable to consumers, their enforcement 
by the bank or financial institution is voluntary. If the decisions are not enforced, 
consumers can contact the Inspection Service of the Bank of Spain to start a new 
procedure. However, the decisions of the Claims Service will not have value in this 
new procedure. 
There are no agreements of institutionalized cooperation between consumer 
authorities and sectoral authorities. In the field of telecommunications, there are 
decisions of sectoral bodies (such as the Secretary of State for Telecommunications 
and Information Society) that have considered correct behaviors of phone companies 
that had been sanctioned by consumer authorities. 
Although it is not strictly an authority, attention must be drawn to the European 
Consumer Centre (ECC). There is no coordination between the ECC and consumer 
authorities. As a consequence, they apply different criteria for conflict resolution (for 
instance, the ECC considered that the airline company was not responsible for damage 
to baggage, while consumer authorities sanctioned the company).  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Legal scholars agree that the wide range of both State and regional legislation existing 
in different texts and sectors prevents a general understanding of problems in practice 
and creates legal uncertainty for consumers and businesses.  
Coordination of general/sectoral consumer legislation has been regulated by Article 
59.2 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007. According to this provision, the contractual 
regime of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 is applicable anywhere and in any sector, 
unless there are sectoral (or special) rules establishing a higher level of protection, 
where possible, according to the EU law: 
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‘Contracts with consumers and users shall be governed, in respect of all that is 
not expressly established herein or in special laws, by the general rules of civil 
contract law. 
The sectoral regulation of consumer contracts must comply with the level of 
protection established by this law, without prejudice that sectoral provisions 
prevail for those issues expressly provided for in the EU law. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, sectoral regulation 
may raise the level of protection conferred by this law provided that, in any 
case, it complies with the provisions of EU law’. 
In the opinion of the ACC, horizontal and sectoral rules are not coordinated (additional 
requirements are required by sectoral rules and companies consider that they are not 
obliged to fulfil them). Contradictions also exist between sectoral rules. 
AECOSAN notes that Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 created the concept of ‘abusive 
practice’ to identify cases where unwritten terms apply, standard terms are differently 
applied or different terms apply depending on the customer. 
Consumer associations consider that in general terms, the coordination is fine. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
Regarding benefits, the ACC considers that a high level of protection for consumers 
has been achieved. As to costs, duplication of administrative procedures and high 
costs for companies to fulfill requirements exist. These costs are not quantifiable. 
As to costs, AECOSAN points out the lack of collaboration between horizontal and 
sectoral authorities (for instance, sectoral authorities do not inform consumer 
authorities about irregularities of the UCPD and UCTD directives). 
Consumer associations consider that in general terms, complementary application is 
beneficial. 
 
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
According to the ACC, there is a need for clarification of the interplay between the EU 
sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law. An only judicial body –
administrative or judicial- is needed to check the enforcement of horizontal-sectoral 
rules, at least in terms of consumer protection. This function should fall into a 
specialized body. 
AECOSAN considers that there is no need for clarification of the interplay between the 
EU sector-specific rules and horizontal EU consumer law because in Spain this issue 
has been solved by introducing the concept of ‘abusive practice’. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The ACC is of the opinion that consumer directives must be applied to C2B 
relationships. In Spain and Catalonia, competent authorities are working to expand 
the concept of ‘consumer’ (for instance, service platforms in collaborative economics). 
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AECOSAN is of the opinion that the concept of ‘consumer’ applies to C2B relationships. 
For instance, some years ago, at the onset of the economic crisis, shops that bought 
gold or jewellery from consumers increased and control actions were taken because of 
the misleading information about prices in both advertising and establishments. In 
sales of foreign currency in currency exchange offices, the concept of consumer also 
applies. 
Consumer associations also consider that consumer law directives should be applied to 
C2B relationships, since the aim of these rules is both to protect consumers and to 
avoid the dominant position of some companies. 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
According to Article 3 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, the Spanish concept of 
consumer refers to both (1) individuals acting for purposes that fall outside their 
trade, business or professional activity, and (2) non-profit legal persons and entities 
without legal personality acting in a field that fall outside their trade or business 
activity. This notion does not seem to be controversial. 
Regarding the concepts of ‘vulnerable consumer’ and ‘average consumer’, see section 
1.1.1 above. 
In the opinion of the ACC, these concepts are valid and suitable, consolidated by case 
law. 
AECOSAN states that the concept of average consumer is applied to assess 
commercial business practices of businesses. Children and youth, the elderly and 
disabled consumers are considered vulnerable consumers. The concept of ‘energy 
poverty’, as well as the protection of consumers in situations of economic insolvency in 
specific and limited situations, has been introduced in consumer legislation. 
According to consumer associations, the definition of vulnerable consumer is not clear 
enough in both regional and state laws. As these concepts are generic, analysis by 
courts is made on a case-by-case basis. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
In the opinion of the ACC, the UCPD protects vulnerable consumers and the grey list 
should contain a differentiated treatment for these consumers. 
According to AECOSAN, some Spanish courts consider unfair the practice that consists 
of transferring non-performing loans to third parties, for a lower amount than its 
nominal value, because the debtor is insolvent or several years have passed since the 
loan was given. Note that, in the Spanish legislation, approval or prior notice to 
debtors is not needed in credit transfers to third parties. According to some Spanish 
judges, in the case of personal loans and mortgages, a prior offer to the debtor for 
repurchasing should exist. It does not make sense that the consumer loses his home 
and maintains his obligation to pay a higher debt than that the third party has paid to 
the bank. 
Consumer associations commented that the rules of the UCPD are appropriate to 
protect vulnerable consumers, but they should be periodically updated. 
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 1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms 
in contracts has improved in Spain since the implementation of the UCPD and the 
UCTD in Spanish legislation because these rules have provided legal certainty to 
consumers and have given a valuable guide for courts and administrative authorities 
to identify, assess and sanction these practices and terms. 
According to AECOSAN, the UCPD and the UCTD have given consumers, consumer 
associations and authorities some instruments to react against infringements of 
consumers’ rights. They have also promoted the adoption of measures by business 
associations to comply with the consumer Directives. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Information of consumers regarding unit prices has improved since the 
implementation of the PID in Spanish legislation. Both consumers and traders have 
become increasingly familiar to the unit selling price system. However, stakeholders 
point out that a revision of rules that deal with indication of prices is needed to avoid 
inconsistencies or overlaps. 
According to the ACC, the information about price per unit of measurement is known 
and implemented. 
AECOSAN considers a revision of Regulation 1169/2011 is needed because it 
establishes unjustified exceptions that have left the PID without effect. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Protection of businesses against unfair marketing has improved since the 
implementation of the MCAD in the Spanish legislation. However, the use of co-
regulation and self-regulation actions must be promoted and an effective tool to deal 
with cross-border infringements must be established. 
According to AECOSAN, protection of businesses against unfair marketing has 
improved but some limits exist. Decisions of AUTOCONTROL are binding only for 
companies that sign the code of conduct; in other cases, companies must bring a 
claim before Spanish courts. Moreover, it seems necessary to regulate parasitic 
advertising on the Internet. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Cross-border trade has become easier for businesses and consumers in recent years. 
However, it seems necessary that bringing claims in other EU countries also becomes 
easier. 
In the opinion of the ACC, cross-border trade is easier for all parties. Economy, as 
trade, has become more globalized. 
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According to AECOSAN, the e-commerce and the number of companies or individual 
businesses that have created webpages to sell products in different EU countries have 
increased. It is necessary that mandatory information on webpages become 
homogeneous to increase consumers’ confidence in cross-border transactions. 
 
• Consumer associations: cross-border purchases are easier but bringing claims is 
more difficult.To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned 
directives?  
According to the general impression provided by lawyers, the Ministry of Justice 
concludes that protection of consumers has improved after incorporation of the 
directives into the Spanish legal system. 
In the opinion of AECOSAN, the consumer law directives have had an important 
impact on cross-border trade. Companies are aware that authorities are supervising 
their activities and consumers rely on EU transactions because they have national 
authorities whom they can address. In order to increase confidence, ECCs should 
inform national authorities about irregularities. 
Consumer associations commented however that improvements do not depend on the 
rules on consumer protection, but on technical progress.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – SPAIN 
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation 
requirements/use of 
exemptions 
Included in 
national legislation 
Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Act 7/1998. This Act 
modified Article 10 of Act 
26/1984, which was the 
main legislation about 
unfair terms in consumer 
contracts before the 
adoption of the Directive  
Act 26/1984 was included 
within the Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 
Act 7/1998 only regulates the 
incorporation and 
interpretation control of 
standard terms in B2B and 
B2C contracts. Royal Decree 
1/2007 regulates the content 
control for B2C contracts 
'Black list' of terms considered 
unfair in all circumstances, 
although some legal scholars 
understand that some terms 
are grey clauses 
Yes Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007, 
Articles 85-91 
National provisions going beyond 
Directive 93/13/EEC: Articles 85.1, 
85.3, 85.4, 85.5, 85.10, 85.8, 85.11, 
86.1 (2nd paragraph), 86.5, 86.6, 
86.7, 87.5, 87.6, 88.1, 88.2, 88.3, 
89.2, 89.3, 89.4, 89.5, 89.6, 89.7, 
89.8, 90.1, 90.2, 90.3, 91 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 
  Extensions of the application of 
Directive to terms on the 
adequacy of the price and the 
main subject-matter, even in 
the case where those terms 
are drafted in plain, intelligible 
language 
Yes Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007 of 
November 16, 
Article 19.5 
Article 4.2 of the Directive was not 
explicitly transposed. This led to 
contradictory opinions and case 
law regarding the control of the 
main subject matter of the contract 
and the adequacy of price [cfr. ECJ 
3.6.2010 (C-484/08, Caja de 
Ahorros v. Ausbanc), and the 
Spanish Supreme Court Decision 
9.5.2013 (RJ 2013\3088)] 
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Act 29/2009. This Act 
modified, among others, 
Act 3/1991 and the 
abovementioned Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 
 Provisions regarding financial 
services going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
Yes Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007, 
Article 19.5 
 
  Provisions regarding 
immovable property going 
beyond minimum 
harmonisation requirements 
Yes   
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Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer 
protection in the 
indication of the 
prices of products 
offered to 
consumers 
Royal Decree 3423/2000 
and Catalan Decree 
73/2002 
 Extension of the application to 
other sectors (e.g. for 
immovable property) 
No   
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Royal Decree 
3423/2000 
Article 1.2, 
Catalan Decree 
73/2002 Article 
1.3 
Formal 
requirements: 
Royal Decree 
3423/2000, 
Article 4.1 
Catalan Decree 
73/2002, Article 
3.1 and 5 
Use of option with regard to 
products supplied in the course of 
the provision of a service (Traders 
are not obliged to indicate the unit 
price for products supplied in the 
course of the provision of a service) 
Use of option with regard to sales 
by auction (Traders are not obliged 
to indicate the unit price for 
products sold by auction)  
Use of option with regard to sales 
of works of art and antiques 
(Traders are not obliged to indicate 
the unit price for works of art and 
antiques) 
Formal requirements (Stricter 
provisions: price must be located in 
the same visual ambit. Moreover, 
Catalan Decree requires that the 
initials PVP goes before the selling 
price) 
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  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Royal Decree 
3423/2000, 
Article 3.3, 
Annex I 
Catalan Decree 
73/2002, Article 
3.3 and 4 
Exclusions of the obligation to 
indicate the unit price: products 
with a selling price identical to the 
unit price; products sold in 
quantities less than 50 g or ml, 
products of different nature sold in 
the same package; products sold 
by automatic vending machines; 
individual portions of ice cream; 
wines and alcoholic drinks with 
geographic nomination; fantasy 
food products. In Catalan Decree, 
jewellers and furriers are exempted 
for security reasons 
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
Yes Royal Decree 
3423/2000, Sole 
Transitory 
Provision 
Derogation for a transitional 
period that expired on 30 June 
2002. Legislative competence was 
delegated to the Regions, which 
had the faculty to establish a 
transitional period to indicate the 
unit price for products pre-
wrapped in pre-fixed quantities 
and distributed by small retail 
businesses where the sale was 
concluded by a seller who dealt 
personally with the customer and 
offers the products, and also in the 
case of itinerant traders 
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Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Act 29/2009. This Act 
modified, among others, 
Act 3/1991 of January 10 
on Unfair Competition 
and Act 34/1988 of 
November 11 on 
Advertisement 
Sole Additional Provision of 
Act 3/1991 states that 
“advertising” is defined by 
reference to Article 2 of Act 
34/1988. 
Article 18 of Act 3/1991 states 
that unlawful advertising 
according to Law 34/1988 is 
also unfair. If they affect the 
economic behaviour of 
consumers, misleading and 
comparative advertising are 
subject to the legal regime for 
misleading and comparative 
unfair commercial practices in 
Act 3/1991 
    
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the 
protection of 
consumers' 
interests 
Act 3/1991, Articles 32-
36 
Other Acts on consumer 
protection that regulate 
injunctions: (1) Act 7/1996, 
Second Additional Provision; 
(2) Act 34/2002, Articles 30-
31; (3) Act 22/2007, Article 
15; (4) Act 16/2011, Article 
36; (5) Act 4/2012, Article 21. 
    
Act 7/1998, Articles 12, 
13, 16, 17, 19  
    
Act 1/2000, Articles 6, 11, 
13, 15, 52, 221, 249, 250, 
256, 711 and 728 
    
Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007, Articles 53-56 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – SPAIN 
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive regulated in your 
country separately (as a separate 
procedure or/and in a separate legal act) 
from the enforcement procedures 
foreseen by other EU Consumer Law 
Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in a 
single legal act 
 
 
Act 3/1991 regulates (1) standing, (2) 
statute of limitations and (3) preliminary 
proceedings for actions against unfair 
commercial practices, including injunctions 
Act 7/1998 regulates collective actions 
against standard terms contrary to the law, 
including injunctions. It refers to (1) the 
possibility to submit the case to a previous 
conciliation; (2) standing and (3) statute of 
limitation 
Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 regulates 
injunctions specifically. It contains rules on 
national and cross-border injunctions as well 
as standing and statute of limitations.  
All these rules contain cross-references to 
external legal texts (usually, Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 and Act 1/2000).  
Act 1/2000 does not provide for tailor-made 
rules for injunctions (id est, a single 
procedure), but general rules on civil 
procedure. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking 
an injunction? 
- Designated public 
bodies 
- Specified 
consumer 
associations 
- Individual 
consumers 
- Other  
- Designated public bodies (National Institute 
of Consumer Affairs and its counterparts in 
the Regions and Local Governments, 
Chambers of Commerce): Articles 32 of Act 
3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 53 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
- Specified consumer associations: Articles 32 
of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 11 of Act 
1/2000, 53 of Royal Legislative Decree 
1/2007; 
- Consumers: Articles 32 of Act 3/1991 
(individual consumers, natural or legal 
persons), 6 and 11 of Act 1/2000 (individual 
consumers, natural or legal persons; groups 
of consumers whose members are 
determined or easily determined); 
- Associations, professional corporations or 
representatives of economic interests: 
Articles 32 of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998; 
- Organisations from other EU Member 
States that protect collective and the diffuse 
interests of consumers and users: Articles 32 
of Act 3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 53 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007; 
-The Public Prosecutor: Articles 32 of Act 
3/1991, 16 of Act 7/1998, 11 of Act 1/2000, 
53 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007. 
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Is the injunction procedure a court or an 
administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both 
forms of the procedure, please explain in 
the comments column for which 
infringements the court or administrative 
procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer organisations are 
entitled to an exemption   of some/all cost 
related to the procedure please explain 
the characteristic of such exemption in the 
comments column. 
- Costs are as a rule 
borne by the losing 
party: Articles 394.1 
(first instance) and 
398.1 (appeal) of 
Act 1/2000 
- Each party bears 
its own costs and 
share common 
costs if cases are 
partially upheld or 
dismissed: Article 
394.2 of Act 1/2000 
-The qualified 
entities are 
exempted from 
costs: Second 
Additional Provision 
of Act 1/1996 
The costs are as a rule borne by the losing 
party, unless the case poses serious de facto 
or de iure doubts. 
If the upholding or dismissal is partial in the 
first instance, each party shall pay the costs 
involved in his proceedings and the common 
costs shall be shared equally, unless there 
are reasons to impose the costs on one of 
these as she litigated recklessly. In appeal, 
none of the litigants shall be ordered to pay 
the costs of appeals. 
Consumer associations are exempted from 
costs without having to prove lack of sources 
to bring a claim (Second Additional Provision 
of Act 1/1996). A new Project of Law on 
Legal Aid  (Ministry of Justice, 2014) 
intended to limit the application of this 
exemption to superregional consumer 
associations, legally established and 
registered in the State Registry of Consumer 
Associations. 
Is the scope of application of injunctions 
extended to cover areas of consumer law 
that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- Yes  
 
General application of Royal Legislative 
Decree 1/2007 and Act 1/2000. 
Is protection of business' interests covered 
by the injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the 
protection of business' interests, please 
provide details in the comments column 
regarding  type of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action 
jointly against several traders from the 
same economic sector or their associations 
- Yes This situation is explicitly foreseen by Article 
17 of Act 7/1998 for traders from the same 
economic sector and their associations when 
they use identical standard terms that are 
considered null and void. 
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage 
in the injunction procedures? (not 
including the consultation stage under Art. 
5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
 
Article 13 of Act 7/1998 states that parties 
are able to submit controversial standard 
terms to the standard terms Registrar before 
the injunction procedure. The opinion of the 
Registrar is not binding 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the prior consultation 
(Article 5 of the Injunctions Directive)? 
- No such 
requirement 
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Does the national legislation provide for 
measures ensuring summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the 
procedure (subject matter/time limits) in 
the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
Summary procedure is regulated by Act 
1/2000. According to Article 250, it applies, 
among others, to (1) injunctions for the 
protection of collective and diffuse 
consumers’ interests, regardless of their 
amount; (2) claims whose amount does not 
exceed EUR 6 000. 
Main characteristics (Articles 437-447 Act 
1/2000): (i) written claim/counterclaim; (ii) if 
it is not requested by any of the parties, 
hearing is not necessary; (iii) legal 
representatives are needed unless for claims 
whose amount does not exceed EUR 2 000; 
(iv) no time limits foreseen by the law. 
Are there sanctions for non-compliance 
with the injunction order (Article 2(1) of 
the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen  please specify in the comments 
column to who exactly should they be paid 
- Yes, penalty of a 
fine for each day of 
non-compliance 
 
According to Article 711 of Act 1/2000, a 
judgement upholding an injunction will 
impose a fine ranging from EUR 600 to 
EUR 60 000 of delay in the enforcement of 
the judgement within the time limit set forth 
therein. The amount of this fine will depend 
on the nature and relevance of the damage 
caused and the economic capacity of the 
party who has been condemned. Such fine 
shall be paid to the Public Treasury. 
Has your Member State taken specific 
measures regarding the publication of the 
decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- Yes 
 
Total or partial publication of the decision 
and publication of a corrective statement are 
foreseen by Articles 32 of Act 3/1991 and 
221.2 of Act 1/2000 
Is it possible to claim within the injunction 
procedure for sanctions for the 
infringement? 
- No 
 
 
Can an action for the restitution of profits 
obtained as a result of infringements, 
including an order that those profits are 
paid to the public purse or to other 
beneficiary be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- Yes Articles 12.2 of Act 7/1998 and 53 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 state that it is 
possible to accumulate injunctions (principal 
action) and actions for the restitution of 
profits (accessory action) 
Can an action for damages to be paid to 
the qualified entity or the public purse be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be 
paid to the consumers concerned be 
brought within the injunction procedure? 
- Yes Articles 12.2 of Act 7/1998 and 53 of Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2007 state that it is 
possible to accumulate injunctions (principal 
action) and actions for the restitution of 
profits (accessory action) 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for damages/remedies on 
the injunctions order?  
- No 
 
 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- No  
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Are the effects of individual injunctions 
orders extended to the future 
infringements and/or same or similar 
illegal practices (of other traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
n.a.         
 
No official data is available on B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law 
directives covered by this study. 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).15  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure 
EUR 175 EUR 3 150 EUR 150 
(procurador) 
6 months  
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
0 0 0 6 months  
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' 
rights to compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid 
€ 2000 per person. The holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 
hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not working at all. The safari trip took 
place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they were 
transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour 
operator and asked for compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for 
the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time and enjoyment). The tour 
operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. 
When the consumer asked, her local consumer association told her that terms 
which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case of inadequate contractual 
performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-
treatment/unfair-contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
ADR procedures on unfairness: no official information is available.  
General information on consumer arbitration in some regions has been obtained from 
press releases and stakeholders:  
15 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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• Madrid (1994-2015): 49 000 cases16  
• Extremadura: 1 070 cases (2012), 700 cases (2014)17 
• Catalonia: 1 672 arbitration awards (2011), 1 430 arbitration awards 
(2012), 11 771 arbitration awards (2013)18 
• Valencia (2015): 44.50% of 11.594 claims referred to contractual offers (29.4% 
referred to telecommunication claims). 2 423 requests for arbitration before the 
Consumer Arbitration Board of Valencia of a total of 3 167 requests referred to 
contractual issues. 740 disciplinary proceedings were opened in Valencia (25 
referred to unfair commercial practices and 11 to unfair terms).19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Source: http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/espana/noticias/6541466/03/15/La-Comunidad-ha-resuelto-
49000-casos-de-arbitrajes-de-consumo-en-22-anos.html. 
17 Source: http://www.hoy.es/extremadura/201603/16/caen-arbitrajes-consumo-20160316002356-v.html. 
18 Source: http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/AppJava/govern/notespremsa/255272/lagencia-catalana-
consum-consolida-mecanisme-defensa-drets-consumidors-catalunya.html. 
19 Source: AECOSAN. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder 
type 
Date 
Ministry of Justice Ministry 29.7.2016 
Agencia Española de Consumo, Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutrición 
(AECOSAN; Spanish Agency for Consumer Affairs, Food Safety and 
Nutrition)  
Ministry 2.9.2016 
Agència Catalana del Consum (ACC) – Generalitat de Catalunya (Catalan 
Consumer Agency – Catalan Government) 
Ministry 14.10.2016 
CUS: Salut, Consum i Alimentació Consumer 
associations 
16.11.2016 
Federació Unió Cívica de Consumidors i Mestresses de Casa de Catalunya 
(UNAE) 
Consumer 
associations 
16.11.2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Albiez Dohrmann, 
K. J. 
2009 La protección juridical de los empresarios en la contratación con 
condiciones generales, Thomson Civitas 
Alfaro, J. 2015 La transparencia de las cláusulas suelo según las Audiencias Provinciales 
Ariza Colmenarejo, 
M. J. 
2012 La Acción de cesación como medio para la protección de consumidores y 
usuarios, Aranzadi 
Asencio Mellado, J. 
M. (coord.) 
2013 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil comentada y con jurisprudencia, La Ley 
Bercovitz 
Rodríguez-Cano, A. 
(dir.) 
2011 Comentarios a la Ley de Competencia Desleal, Aranzadi 
Bercovitz 
Rodríguez-Cano, R. 
(coord.) 
2015 Comentario del Texto Reundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los 
Consumidores y Usuarios y otras Leyes Complementarias, Aranzadi 
Cámara Lapuente, 
S. 
2016 Control de cláusulas predispuestas en contraltos entre empresarios, 
Almacen de Derecho (http://almacendederecho.org/) 
Cámara Lapuente, 
S. 
2013 ¿De verdad puede controlarse el precio de los contraltos mediante la 
normative de cláusulas abusivas?, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 5 
(2), pp. 209-233 
Carrasco Perera, Á. 2010 Derecho de contratos, Aranzadi 
Carrasco Perera, Á. 2012 Un mapa de situación: directivas de cláusulas abusivas, de prácticas 
desleales y de ‘derechos’ de los consumidores, Revista CESCO de Derecho 
de consumo, núm. 1/2012 (http://www.revista.uclm.es/index.php/cesco) 
Carrasco Perera, 
Á.; Cordero Lobato, 
E. 
2013 El espurio control de transparencia sobre condiciones generales de la 
contratación, Revista CESCO de Derecho de consumo, núm. 7/2013 
(http://www.revista.uclm.es/index.php/cesco) 
Collins, H. 2005 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, European Review of Contract 
Law 1(4), pp. 417-441 (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23465/1/Collins_Unfair-
commercial-practices-directive_2005.pdf) 
Cordero, E. 
  
2014 ¿Protección sectorial y protección consumerista general? De minimis y de 
maximis. Sobre la reforma del artículo 59.2 del TRLCU, Revista CESCO de 
Derecho de consumo, núm. 9/2014 
(http://www.revista.uclm.es/index.php/cesco) 
Fernández 
Cornago, M. 
2015 La retroactividad de la declaración de nulidad de las cláusulas abusivas, 
REDUR 13/2015, pp. 249-268 
(http://www.unirioja.es/dptos/dd/redur/numero13/fernandez.pdf) 
Gomez Pomar, F. 2006 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: A Law and Economics 
Perspective, InDret 1/2006 (http://www.indret.com/pdf/330_en.pdf) 
Gomez Pomar, F.; 
Ganuza, J. J. 
2014 The Role of Choice in the Legal Regulation of Consumer Markets: A Law 
and Economic Analysis, InDret 1/2014 
(http://www.indret.com/pdf/1035.pdf) 
González Vaqué, L. 2014 La protección de los consumidores vulnerables en el derecho del consumo 
de la UE [el Programa plurianual para el período 2014-2020], Revista 
CESCO de Derecho de consumo, núm. 10/2014 
(http://www.revista.uclm.es/index.php/cesco) 
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González Vaqué, L. 2013 La Directiva UE sobre las prácticas comerciales desleales: una cosa es 
predicar y otra dar trigo..., Deloitte - CISS (grupo Wolters Kluwer) Iss. No. 77 
(http://works.bepress.com/luis_gonzalez_vaque/33/) 
Lema Devesa, C. 
(Dir.) 
2012 Prácticas comerciales desleales de las empresas en sus relaciones con los 
competidores y consumidores, Bosch 
Mambrilla Rivera, 
V. 
2008, 
2009, 
2010 
Prácticas comerciales y competencia desleal: Estudio del derecho... (I), (II), 
(III), Revista de Derecho de la Competencia y la Distribución , 2008, (4): 89-
120; 2009, (5): 107-152; 2010, (6): 75-116 
Marín Castán, F. 
(dir.) 
2015 Comentarios a la Ley de enjuiciamiento civil, Tirant lo Blanch 
Marín López, M. J.  2010 La ‘lista negra’ de prácticas comerciales engañosas con consumidores 
(http://www.administracion.usmp.edu.pe/institutoconsumo/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Practicas-comerciales-enga%C3%B1osas-
Espa%C3%B1a-2010.pdf)  
Martí Moya, 
Vanessa 
2012 Consecuencias del principio de armonización plena de la Directiva 2005/29 
sobre prácticas comerciales desleales, a la luz de la reciente jurisprudencia 
del TJUE, Revista de Derecho mercantil2 283, pp. 325-342 
Massaguer, J. 2006 El nuevo derecho contra la competencia desleal, Thomson Civitas 
Newman 
Rodríguez, S. 
2010 La protección de los competidores en Europa: comentario a la Directiva 
2006/114/CE sobre publicidad engañosa y publicidad comparative (version 
codificada), Revista General de Derecho Europeo 22 
(http://www.iustel.com/v2/revistas/detalle_revista.asp?id=13&numero=2
2) 
Pertiñez Vilchez, F. 2013 Información precontractual obligatoria, error, prácticas comerciales 
desleales, in Carrasco Perera, Á. (dir.), Tratado de la compraventa, vol. I, 
Aranzadi, pp. 379-388 
Pertiñez Vilchez, F. 2013 Falta de transparencia y carácter abusivo de la cláusula suelo en los 
contratos de préstamo hipotecario, InDret 3/2013 
(http://www.indret.com/pdf/995.pdf) 
Ribón Seisdedos, E. 
(coord.) 
2010 Las prácticas comerciales desleales, CEACCU 
(https://www.uclm.es/profesorado/mjmarin/invest_cap_16.pdf) 
Ruiz Peris, J. I. 2011 La Reforma de la ley de competencia desleal, Tirant lo Blanch 
Schulte-Nölke, H; 
Twigg-Flesner, Ch.; 
Ebers, M. (eds.) 
2008 EC Consumer Law Compendium, Sellier 
Tejedor Muñoz, L. 2010 Algunos supuestos de publicidad engañosa, Revista crítica de 
derecho inmobiliario 717, pp. 337-350 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law – 
Country report SWEDEN 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD is transposed into Swedish law in the Marketing Act (2008:486). The aim of 
the Act is to promote the interests of consumers and business regarding the marketing 
of products and to work against unfair marketing practices in the interests of 
consumers and business operators. The Marketing Act is based partly on three general 
provisions and partly on a number of more detailed prohibitions (catalogue rules). The 
first general provision concerns good marketing practices. The second concerns 
aggressive practices. The third general provision concerns advertising that is 
misleading. The catalogue rules apply to specific types of unfair marketing. The 
Swedish national system covers both court and administrative injunction procedure. 
Claims can be brought to the Patent- and Market Court (MD)1 by the Consumer 
Ombudsman or a business operator affected by the advertising or an association of 
consumers, business operators or employees. Less important cases can be determined 
by the Consumer Ombudsman themselves based on an administrative injunction 
procedure, which procedure is only available for the Consumer Ombudsman. If the 
Consumer Ombudsman decides not to take action in a particular case, an individual 
business operator who has been affected by the advertisement or an association of 
business operators can take action. 
As mentioned above, the aim of the Marketing Act is to set a general standard on 
marketing and market competition. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the 
Marketing Act and other related acts are effective.2 According to Nordell,3 the market 
is considered to function effectively. The number of court cases from the Patent- and 
Market court is approximately 30 cases per year. Given that today's average consumer 
is relatively aware and familiar with modern methods of marketing and knowledgeable 
about their legal protection, many have started to ask if some parts of legislation for 
marketing are becoming over-regulated. On the other hand, there are still a number 
of unfair marketing measures that also stubbornly recur. The clearest example relates 
to weight loss and health products, but also to consumer credit in the form of instant 
loans. 
There are several court cases from the Patent- and Market Court referring to the black 
list. In MD 2010:15, for example, a company marketed a margarine mixture as 
‘softened butter’, but the margarine mixture did not meet the requirements to qualify 
as butter under food legislation. The Market Court stated that, according to p. 9 of the 
blacklist, it was forbidden to state or otherwise create the impression that it was legal 
to sell a product as butter when that was not the case. The marketing was therefore 
misleading under the Directive. 
The Supervisory Authority, which mainly supervises financial institutions, is satisfied 
with overall effectiveness of this Directive in the area of financial services. The 
1  In 2016 the Patent- and Market Court changed its name from the Market Court to the Patent- and Market 
Court.  
2  See Nordell, P J, Marknadsrätten, 5 ed., p. 122-124. 
3  Professor of private law and expert on intellectual property law and market law at Department of law, 
Stockholm University. 
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problem areas that exist are connected to payment services, insurance services and 
investment advisors. 
Another stakeholder expressed satisfaction with the overall effectiveness of this 
Directive. The Directive inhibits certain behaviours and harmonizes the market, but 
there is still a question of how to update the black list. The stakeholder questions the 
guidelines on the application of the UCPD which were updated on 25 May 2016. The 
purpose of the guidelines is to facilitate the proper application of the UCPD. However, 
business organisations are uncertain about the legal status of these guidelines. The 
stakeholder stresses that the UCPD is not on top of the minds of the traders just now. 
On their minds is the Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
Some stakeholders express that the Directive is effective and important for consumer 
protection, in particular because it is applicable to all situations, goods and services. 
The overall picture is that the traders generally obey the rules in the Marketing Act, 
thus the Directive is effective.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
The enforcement authority considers that it is useful to have a black list. If such a list 
would not exist, the authority would have to use the general clauses regarding good 
market practice in the Marketing Act in order to argue that a certain condition would 
be against good marketing practice. This is more difficult than using a black list. With 
a black list, the enforcement becomes more effective.  
According to the Patent- and Market Court practice, the black list is binding to all 
traders but the list should not be interpreted extensively. See court cases MD 
2009:33, 2013:3, and MD 2016:9. If a certain term is not listed on the black list, it 
means that the competent authority must argue that the condition is against good 
market practice. The list is difficult to apply, for example, in the case of credit 
agreements. In order to solve this problem, the Consumer Agency points to the 
regulation in the Act regarding insurance agreements (2005:104), which gives good 
protection for the consumers. In Chapter 2 of the Act regarding insurance agreements, 
which regulates insurance for consumers, there is minimum regulation on what kind of 
information should be given to a consumer regarding insurance. Similar provisions are 
found in Chapter 3 of the Act (2005:59) regarding distance contracts (financial 
services). There is also an agreement between the Consumer Agency and the Swedish 
Investment Fund Association regarding guidelines for marketing and information and 
advice on funds.    
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
The Supervisory Authority stresses that the Swedish legislator has been careful not to 
go further than what is required in the Directive. They adopt the perspective that it is 
better for the consumers if the rules are as harmonised as possible, as business is 
cross-border in its character. One stakeholder is positive toward minimum 
harmonization for financial services and immovable property.  
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• The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
As of yet, the enforcement authority has not applied the UCPD in the context of 
environmental claims. The stakeholders point to the fact that there are hardly any 
recent court cases. Several court cases from the Patent- and Market Court were 
decided more than ten years ago. It is also difficult to use environmental arguments 
for new technology. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the efficiency 
of the Directive. However, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules on 
marketing can provide some guidance.  
Some traders have been fined for misleading practices in the energy/environmental 
context. One stakeholder in the energy retail business acknowledges that misleading 
environmental practices are quite common in the energy area. Thus, the Consumer 
Agency has inspected the use of misleading practices on the energy market and has 
said that it will impose future measures. These two court cases MD 2011:12 and MD 
2004:12 can be mentioned as example of misleading practices. In the first case, a 
company had in its advertising for passenger cars used the term ‘environmentally 
friendly’. This advertising was inter alia considered contrary to good marketing 
practice.4 The company had also used terms like ‘green diesel’, ‘help the environment’ 
and ‘good for the environment’. This part of the marketing was not considered 
contrary to good marketing or misleading.5 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
As the preamble to the UCPD states, the concept of the average consumer is not 
static. In some cases, the circumstances require that the court must differ from the 
average consumer as a hypothetical norm. If the marketing is directed at children, it is 
desirable that the assessment is made in the perspective of the average recipient of 
this consumer group. 
The overall picture is that concept of ‘average consumer’ works well in practice as it 
can be adjusted for different markets.  Swedish consumers are also well informed and 
educated of their rights. However, Swedish consumers are usually unsure when they 
act on the energy market and therefore more vulnerable to unfair commercial 
practices. Due to the Swedish social welfare acts, ‘energy poverty’, i.e. being unable 
to afford heating or electricity, is not common. 
Some stakeholders are not content with the concept as it could be ‘narrowed down’. It 
would also be helpful if there were a better or more detailed guide explaining how to 
interpret the average consumer concept. The concept has been given different 
meanings depending on the business sector in question. In court cases, legal 
representatives have put in a lot of time to argue that an average consumer within a 
specific sector is more knowledgeable in that sector than an average consumer overall 
(see court cases MD 2011:30 and MD 2011:12). See also MD 2014:18, where the 
concept of average consumer was discussed. There is a discussion in scholarly writing 
regarding the cognitive abilities of consumers and the balance between the consumer 
4 It was contrary to 5 § of the Marketing Act, which is the first general provision in the Marketing Act on 
good market practice. See above. 
5 See also Consumer Agency's guidelines for information on new passenger car fuel consumption and carbon 
dioxide emissions (KOVFS 2010:3). 
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and the trader, especially when it comes to contracts regarding consumer credit.6 
Such contracts are more complex and when such a standard contract is used with 
consumers as a whole, there will always be a number of consumers which may not be 
adequately protected as they cannot comprehend the contract.  
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
Neither the enforcement authorities nor the courts have recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers. Unfair contracts terms for these categories of consumers are 
dealt with in section 36 of the Contract Act. This provision provides that a contract 
condition may be adjusted or disregarded if it is unfair, having regard to the content of 
the agreement, the circumstances in which the agreement was made, and the 
supervening conditions and circumstances generally. Some of the stakeholders 
suggest that senior citizens and over-indebted consumers should as a group be given 
more attention as vulnerable consumers.7 They also point to new categories of 
vulnerable consumers – migrants – due to the migration crisis. These new consumers 
that come from an entirely different market may have problems in the Swedish 
market as they may not be as well informed or educated about their rights as native 
Swedes. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
In Sweden, there is a long tradition of self-regulation in consumer affairs.8 It is also 
quite common that the Consumer Agency and the organisations of business traders 
conclude agreements on good market practices. It is common that the business 
organisations have their own ‘Complaint Boards’. The overall conclusion is that self-
regulation is useful and effective. Organisations such as the Swedish Banker’s 
Association, the Swedish Securities Dealers Association and the Association of Swedish 
Finance Houses develop industry guidance and standards of best practice for their 
members in the financial sector, which take care of many issues. In order to ensure 
that the International Chamber of Commerce's regulatory system for marketing 
measures are met in the areas not covered by the Marketing Act and related 
legislation, the business sector has on its own initiative set up the Advertising 
Ombudsman (RO) and the Advertising Ombudsman's opinion committee. RO examines 
matters of advertising that are unethical or otherwise contrary to good marketing 
ethics. It can act on its own initiative or following a complaint from the public, 
businesses, governments and other organizations. In addition, RO provides guidance 
and information regarding marketing ethics. In clear cases, RO provides an acquittal 
or a conviction decision. More complex or fundamental questions are submitted for 
consideration to the committee. 
As mentioned above, the business sector has on its own initiative taken up self-
regulation. Agreements are often reached between the Consumer Agency and the 
industry. However, sometimes the industry can without much notice deviate from the 
agreement, which can be detrimental towards consumers. As an example, the 
Consumer Agency points to an ethical rule regarding marketing that the industry now 
6 See Henrikson, Ann-Sofie, Överskuldsatt och skyldig. En rättsvetenskaplig analys av konsumentskyddet 
mot överskuldsättning, 2016, pp. 225 and there given references.  
7 See Patent- and Market court cases, MD 2007:17, MD 2010:6 and MD 2010:31. 
8 Haglund, Lars., Lagstiftning eller självreglering- vad tycker lagstiftaren? SvJT 2001 p. 263 ff. 
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ignores, namely that is not acceptable to send information through text messages in 
mobile phones to persons who have not consented to it.   
Other self-regulation initiatives are for example SWEDMA, which is an association of 
companies and organizations that work with direct and data-driven marketing. 
SWEDMA (Swedish Direct Marketing Association) contributes inter alia to the ethics 
committee for direct marketing. The Board examines matters relating to the 
implementation of good market ethics. The Board also issues opinions, holds 
discussions with the authorities and provides information on matters related to direct 
marketing. Another actor is Insurance Sweden, whose aim is to promote good 
business conditions for the insurance industry. They also work to increase confidence 
for the industry as well as knowledge of the importance of private insurance in society. 
In the energy market, there is an action plan for ethical business practices for traders 
owning the networks. The action plan deals with some infringements, for example with 
unfair contract terms and misleading advertising. The plan is prepared by the 
Consumer Authority and an organisation owned by the telecom operators. Thus, the 
Consumer Agency and this organisation have the mission to provide impartial and free 
information to consumers. A challenge in this area is the rapid technological 
development in this area: it is difficult to connect law and rules with the technology. It 
is also difficult to find a good balance between general rules and specific rules.  
To conclude, it can be drawn from the above that it is vital to stimulate the market to 
self-regulation, in dialogue with the authorities. It is a better choice in order to create 
a well-functioning market. The traders are often also willing to form sector based 
agreements and this works well. Self-regulation works more efficiently than the 
Marketing Act when it comes to protecting traders in business-to-business situations. 
Taking a case to court is time-consuming and expensive. Self-regulation is also more 
familiar to traders. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Most stakeholders do not suggest any amendments. However, the Consumer Agency 
seems to favour an extension of the list and welcomes the following changes: 
• Prohibition of the seller pretending to be an authority or organization; 
• Prohibition against indicating that the selling company is acting on someone's 
behalf, when this is not the case. It is common in Sweden for the seller claiming to 
act on behalf of a large telephone company, for example, which is not true; 
• Prohibition against subscription traps. The seller ‘lures’ the customer with a gift for 
free, but in reality, the customer agrees to buy 30 pieces of this product; 
• Prohibition against sellers that claim that they can deliver a product even though 
they cannot guarantee it. It is common that the seller advertises to sell tickets to a 
concert that will be purchased from the concert organizer, but the tickets have not 
even released by the organizer yet; 
• Prohibition of the so-called negative contractual effect. The main rule in Swedish 
law is that you have to accept an agreement to be bound by it. A consumer cannot 
be bound because of his or her inaction. Negative sales methods are not accepted. 
An example of this is that sometimes a seller submits invoices for goods without 
the consumer having ordered anything actively. As for renewals of insurance or 
subscriptions, these may be allowed with negative contractual effect: the seller can 
send out an invoice with a payment slip and the recipient becomes liable if they do 
not actively indicate that they do not want to renew the agreement. 
The Consumer Agency also emphasizes that it should be easier to introduce new 
practices to the list. They suggest that the list could be updated. 
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 • Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
In Sweden, there have been several proposals and amendments of the legislation to 
promote a higher level of protection for consumers. A good measure to strengthen 
consumer protection has been to require that the contract should be in writing if it 
concerns a service regarding pension plans and the contract has been offered by 
telephone. See Chapter 3, Section 4a § of the Swedish distance Contract Act 
(2005:59).  
The Consumer Agency points to Art. 13 in the Directive, where it is stipulated that the 
Member States shall lay down penalties for infringements of national provisions 
adopted in the Directive and take necessary measures to ensure that these are 
enforced. The penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The 
Consumer Agency suggests that it would be better to have harmonised rules for 
penalties. In Sweden the penalty is low in comparison to some other Member States. 
Stakeholders suggest that it would be better if the penalty was not a fixed sum and 
rather tied to the seller’s percentage of turnover. See also Chapter 3, 6 § in the 
Swedish Competition Act (2008:579) and the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. See also the 2016 Proposal of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (COM (2016) 283) and the current 
Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation ([EC] No. 2006/2004).  
 
1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The Pricing Act (2004:347) is partly an implementation of the PID and the codification 
of the Consumer Agency's guidelines as interpreted by the Patent- and Market Court 
practice. The purpose of this Act is to promote good price information for consumers. 
Price information must be accurate and clear, and must be submitted in such a way 
that it is clear to consumers to which product the information relates. Similar 
legislation is being implemented for financial services through Directive 2014/92/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of 
fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment 
accounts with basic features.9 
The overall picture is that the traders obey the PID rules. One stakeholder points out 
that it is difficult to judge if an advertisement is an invitation to purchase or if it is not. 
Most stakeholders have not noted any severe problems. Court cases and complaints 
are rare. However, the Consumer Agency has exercised its supervision and found that 
some prices suffered from insufficient clarity.10 According to Nordell, the Pricing Act 
runs into difficulty in practice. The requirements in the Act to specify the correct 
prices, which also apply in shop windows, are not sufficiently being observed. The 
problem is more evident in some sectors than in others. There are also few 
opportunities for the Consumer Authority to prosecute such violations.11 
9 See lag (2016:415) om förmedlingsavgifter för kortbaserade betalningstransaktioner. 
10 See Consumer Agency's regulations on price information (KOVFS 2012:1.(Konsumentverkets föreskrifter 
om prisinformation). 
11 See Nordell, J. P, Marknadsrätten, 5 ed., 2010, p. 124. 
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 • Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
Liquid products such as detergents and soaps tend to have the price per litre. 
Consumer Agency regulations for price information state that the price should be 
indicated per litre if the seller has not set a recommended dose. It has been argued 
that it would be better if the Consumer Agency demanded that the recommended dose 
be specified and that the unit price be provided per dose. With the unit price per litre 
the producers are encouraged to supply more diluted products.12 
 
• The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
Not relevant for Sweden. 
 
1.1.3 Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses   
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The Directive is implemented in the Marketing Act. The supervising authority is the 
Swedish Competition Authority. Sweden has taken advantage of the minimum 
harmonisation level of the Directive and thus introduced a wider scope of protection 
than the Directive demands. The provisions on misleading and comparative 
advertising are covered by the entire Marketing Act, which means that businesses 
enjoy the same legal protection as consumers. This wider scope has been favourable. 
The Marketing Act applies to marketing which refers to advertising and other 
measures of economic activity that are likely to promote the sale and availability of 
products to consumers and business actors. A fundamental flaw in the Swedish 
Marketing Act is that it provides no principle of protection against purely unfair 
competition. Unfair marketing is only one type of unfair competition. Against unfair 
conduct between competitors, there is not much protection. It can be compared 
against the legal situation in other countries where there is a general ban on unfair 
competition.13 However, according to 47 § Marketing act any trader can sue another 
trader for breaking the rules in the Marketing Act. The Patent- and Market Court has 
several such cases every year, but it is difficult to have an opinion about the 
effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising under this 
Directive. No authority supervises compliance with the Directive in B2B relations. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive.  
See above. 
 
12 See Domeij, Å, Kan fel jämförpris leda till mer transporter?,1st of June 2012.  
13 See Nordell PJ., Marknadsrätten, 5ed, p. 124. 
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• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
In Sweden, the Directive has been implemented in the form of a specific provision on 
comparative advertising in section 18 of the Marketing Act. As a general rule, 
comparisons in advertising with other businesses' operations and products are 
allowed. There are, however, demands that the comparisons should be accurate, 
relevant and otherwise appropriate. The Patent- and Market Court has ruled that when 
comparisons are made, high demands are put on the comparison, especially when 
referring to named competitors' goods and services. The requirements for a 
comparison to be permitted are listed in the legal provisions in eight points. The 
requirements are cumulative; all specified requirements have to be satisfied and the 
demands are high. However, the requirements largely overlap with what is already 
demanded according to the Marketing Act's general rules. According to Bernitz, it is 
difficult to design comparative advertising which simultaneously meets the 
requirements and is commercially powerful.14 
If a trader violates 18 § of the Marketing Act (accurate comparisons in advertising with 
other businesses' operations and products), the other company can bring an action 
against that trader at a general civil court, if the Consumer Ombudsman decides to 
not bring an action, according to 29 § of the Marketing Act. According to a forthcoming 
amendment in the Marketing Act, a trader whose marketing is contrary to the 
Marketing Act can either be prohibited from continuing with the particular marketing 
campaign or be required to provide information so that the marketing is no longer 
misleading. Originally, the infringing trader would have to accept the order of the 
Consumer Ombudsman within a certain amount of time for the order to become valid 
and approved as a final judgement. On the 1st of October 2016, a new law to 
strengthen the authority of the Consumer Ombudsman came into effect, proposing 
that the prohibitions and obligations which the Consumer Ombudsman may decide 
upon would no longer be dependent on whether or not the infringing trader accepted 
the order of the Consumer Ombudsman. It is proposed by the legislator that the 
Consumer Ombudsman should be given the opportunity to decide that such decisions 
should apply immediately.15  
Another observed problem is that it takes a long time from the observation of 
misleading or comparative advertising until a legal action against such advertising is 
taken. In many cases the legal action is taken too late and may introduce distortions 
of competition. 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
There are no specific effects of full harmonization. However, the general opinion is that 
full harmonisation is good. As already mentioned, however, there are overlaps 
between different acts. At the same time some questions remain unresolved. Whether 
copyright or other intellectual property rights in some cases give way to enable 
comparative advertising is still an open question. From a Swedish perspective, it may 
seem strange that an author whose work is used in comparative advertising cannot 
argue that this use constitutes copyright infringement.16 Clarifications on issues that 
distinguish lawful from unlawful comparison would be welcomed by the traders. 
 
14 See Bernitz, U, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 2, 2013 p. 133. 
15  See proposition 2015/16:168 and Ds 2015:45. 
16  See Cederlund, K., Bubbel eller champagne? Om immateriella rättigheter i jämförande reklam, Festskrift 
till Marianne Levin, 2008, s. 194. 
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• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above.  
 
• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
No specific experiences reported other than those stated above. 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
In order to protect businesses, the Swedish legislator has taken vigorous action 
against the problem of false invoices. A false invoice is an invoice that is sent out 
without prior contact between the trader and another trader or a consumer. Also 
falling within this category are invoices sent out from previously unknown suppliers, 
invoices deliberately designed to resemble an invoice from a reputable supplier and 
offers that have been designed as invoices where it is difficult to see that it is actually 
an offer. A false invoice can also refer to a claim for payment for a good or service 
that the trader/consumer has never ordered. It can also refer to a product or service 
where the cost is not in proportion to what has been delivered. As already mentioned, 
the legislator has taken vigorous action and proposed several amendments in private 
law, marketing law and penal law in order to address the problem of false invoices.17 
 
1.1.4 Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
The UCPD has been implemented in the Member States with very different methods 
and at different levels.18 Thus, this principle-based approach leaves room for 
divergences. However, the stakeholders do not report any major problems. 
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
No specific experiences reported other than above. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
No specific experiences reported other than above. 
 
17 See SOU 2015:77. 
18 Bernitz, Ulf, Den europeiska avtalsrätten och standardavtalen mellan näringsidkare. Festskrift till Lars 
Gorton, 2008 pp. 35. See also Bernitz, U., Svensk standardavtalsrätt och EG-direktivet om oskäliga 
avtalsvillkor, SvJT 1995 pp. 625. 
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What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported. 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
No specific experiences reported other than above. 
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
No specific experiences reported other than above. 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
No specific experiences reported other than above. 
 
1.1.5 Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Article 7 (4) is incorporated in § 12 of the Marketing Act. A trader or anyone acting on 
their behalf may be required to pay a special fee to the State, if the trader 
intentionally or negligently violates 12 §, cf. § 29. According to Nordell, misleading 
prices have become increasingly common.19 This is most evident particularly 
concerning marketing claiming to be the cheapest. In the court case, MD 2009:38, a 
company was forbidden to advertise its prices as the cheapest, as they could not 
prove that this was true. In another court case, MD 2015:2, marketing regarding an 
online dating service was considered to be in violation with 12 §, as the price and the 
right of withdrawal and cancellation of the contract were unclear or/and misleading, 
and contact information was incorrect. 
The level of awareness of traders regarding the information requirements is good, but 
the level is different in different sectors.20 Relatively new business operators, which 
provide for example instant loans to consumers, do not conform to the rules in the 
same way.21 The energy market is strictly regulated in the Energy Act regarding 
19 See Nordell, P J., Marknadsrätten, 5 ed, 2010, p. 72. 
20 See Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services which contains several information obligations for the 
service provider. The directive is implemented through the law (2010:751) om betaltjänster.  
21 See Persson, A. H., & Henrikson, A-S., Regulation of instant loans and other credits in Swedish law, 
Juridica International 2014 p. 57-70. 
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advertisement and how an invoice should be drafted. The traders comply with these 
regulations.  
However, one issue that attracts criticism is the amount of information that must be 
provided to the consumer, who for various reasons often will not read it. According to 
stakeholders, all information does not necessarily have to be included in an invitation 
to purchase. It should be enough that information is provided before the actual 
purchase.22 However, another issue is that the traders usually argue that there are 
limitations in the medium used which stop them from including all necessary 
information. Therefore, it should be discussed whether the information requirements 
in Article 7(4) should be applicable to all types of products depending on the medium. 
A third issue is that the information requirements in the UCPD and CRD are not the 
same.23 The stakeholders think that the information requirements should be aligned. A 
fourth issue regards misleading advertisements with pop-ups on social media, for 
example subscription traps or car evaluation services. A lot of companies do not know 
how they should make the advertisement and how clear it must be. Therefore, the 
traders often do not provide information about the cooling off period and price 
information.  
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations?  
Overlap between the UCPD and the E-commerce Directive is reported by stakeholders. 
The E-commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) is implemented in the Act (2002:562) on 
electronic commerce and other information services. According to § 8, the service 
provider must provide, inter alia, information about their name, address, email 
address, and where applicable, registration number, VAT number and the competent 
licensing authority. If the service provider is indicating prices, these must be clear and 
unambiguous. The Service Directive (2006/123/EC) is implemented in the law 
(2009:1079) on services on the internal market. According to 10 §, the service 
provider must always on their own initiative provide the consumer with information 
that makes it possible for the consumer to get in touch with the service provider. 
Where appropriate, information shall also be provided, inter alia, regarding 
registration number, contact information for the competent licensing authority, VAT 
number, standard terms and conditions, terms of applicable law and the competent 
courts. 
The multiplicity of information obligations naturally creates costs for the traders. 
These Directives should be brought in line with each other.   
 
1.1.6 Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
In Swedish law, there is already a law for combating unfair contract terms in B2B 
transactions, namely the law (1984:292) concerning contract terms between traders. 
The law is designed after the model of the law (1994:1512) on Consumer Contracts, 
22 See requirement of information before a consumer contract is entered, 22a § of the Marketing Act. 
23 See 22a § p. 4 in the Marketing Act, which is based on CRD and 12 § p. 4 in the Marketing Act, which is 
based on UCPD regarding additional costs on delivery. The requirements are not the same. Compare also 
the time to give information, 12 § Marketing Act regarding invitation to purchase and 22a § Marketing Act 
regarding information requirements before a contract is entered into.  
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which has been updated in order to fulfil the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. The 
purpose of the law concerning contract terms between traders is to prevent big 
businesses taking advantage of a smaller firm’s inferior position to extort terms to the 
smaller company's disadvantage. There are only a small numbers of court cases  from 
the Patent- and Market Court, even though the law has been in force for 30 years (see 
inter alia MD 1995:3, MD 2006:30 and MD 2010:12). According to both Bernitz and 
Nordell,24 the law on contract terms between traders has not had any real impact in 
practice. According to Bernitz, it may have played a role such as an argument in trade 
negotiations regarding standard contractual issues. There is also a possibility to adjust 
an unfair term with 36 § of the Contract Act. Such an application may only be made 
by an association of traders, by another association which has a legitimate interest in 
representing the trader or by a single trader against which the current clause has been 
set up.   
There is no specific authority that protects the small companies against the bigger 
ones. Problems with increasingly longer payment periods are still present, which may 
be a concern for small businesses. This is especially true when trading with companies 
in another country.25 One the other hand, there is no need reported that requires the 
application of consumer legislation to business-to-business transactions. 
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above. 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
No specific experiences or literature to mention other than stated above.   
 
24 Bernitz, U., Standardavtalsrätt, 8 ed. 2013, p. 204-207 and Nordell, PJ, Marknadsrätten, 2010, p. 103. 
25 Compare Directive 2011/7 on combating late payment in commercial transactions. 
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1.1.7 Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
According to Swedish law a contract is not void just because it is misleading. If a 
condition is unfair to the consumer, the Patent- and Market Court can prohibit a trader 
from using such a condition in the future, see law (1994:1512)  Consumer Contracts 
Terms Act. The ban can be combined with a fine. The application for such a prohibition 
may be made by the Consumer Ombudsman. If the Consumer Ombudsman decides 
not to file such an application, it can be made by an association of traders, consumers 
or employees.  
A contract term that is unfair can also be reconciled or disregarded according to 36 § 
of the Contract Act after being proved to be unfair in a general court or by the 
Swedish National Board for Consumer Complaints. The rule is designed in such a way 
that it can be applied in particular to benefit a weaker party, such as a consumer in 
relation to a trader, even though the rule can also be applied to equal parties to a 
contract. The idea of 36 § is that it shall serve as a last resort for situations involving 
rights worthy of protection if and when specific consumer protection legislation cannot 
be applied. 
The main scheme for settlement of disputes between individual consumers and 
individual business operators is through the Swedish National Board for Consumer 
Complaints.  This is a public body for out of court dispute settlements specializing in 
business to consumer matters. The Board’s main task is to adjudicate disputes 
between consumers and traders concerning a product, service or other commodity 
which the trader has provided to the consumer. The verdict of the Board is not 
enforceable. Nevertheless, there is a high rate of compliance to the recommendations 
of the Board, with approximately 75% of business operators following the Board’s 
recommendations. 
The stakeholders all stress that the traders are familiar with the legislation such as the 
36 § of the Contract Act, the law (1994:1512) on contracts terms in consumer 
relationships, and the fact that the consumer can turn to the National Board for 
Consumer Complaints. Some stakeholders stress that there is a need in some sectors 
to achieve better compliance with the legislation. Problems have been noticed 
regarding subscription traps and car evaluation services. According to the 
stakeholders, there should be contractual consequences if the trader does not comply 
with the legislation. The stakeholders hope that there will be a case raised in court 
regarding contractual consequences in respect of misleading advertisement and the 
outcome of that case would be that the contract should be declared void and/or 
damages awarded to the consumer. The Consumer Agency also points to 19 § of the 
Swedish Consumer Sales Law (1990:932), where it is stated that a fault exists if the 
goods do not conform to such data on the characteristics of goods or use the vendor 
supplied in the marketing. The consumer has in such a situation the right to cancel the 
contract and claim damages, 22 §.26 A similar provision can be found regarding 
services in the Consumer Services Act (1985:715). Disputes between a trader and a 
consumer regarding a fault in the goods are decided by the general courts or National 
Board of Consumer Complaints (ARN), not the Consumer Agency.  
 
26 See case law regarding consumer sales, ARN 1995/96 ref. 49 where a consumer bought a car that had 
electronic immobilizer that did not meet the foregoing in marketing. See similar questions in ARN 1998 
ref. 31 and ARN 1995/96 ref. 74. 
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• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
Example of case law regarding the law on contract terms towards consumers 
(1994:1512) are for example MD 2009:35. A company had used terms in a consumer 
contract for internet and telephone subscriptions to the effect that during the term of 
contract the company had the right both to immediately raise the price by 10%, and 
in some cases increase the price by up to 100% and also raise the price due to 
conditions that the company had no control over or could not reasonably foresee. 
These conditions were considered unfair.  
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
See above.  
 
1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
A new law was introduced in 1994 (SFS 1994:1512) to transpose the UCTD. However, 
Swedish law and practice already corresponded to the UCTD and the new law resulted 
only in some amendments and clarifications. An important change, however, has been 
its indicative list of unfair terms.27 
The overall impression from the evidence is that this Directive is effective and the 
application of the Directive works well. The indicative list is a good tool in order to be 
able to interpret what is meant by unfair terms. The industry wants rules that are 
applied in the same way across the single market, which the list facilitates. A 
disadvantage is that the wording of the list is sometimes unclear, which can give rise 
to competing interpretations. It is sometimes difficult to say if a term is unfair or not. 
On the other hand, the advantage with the list is that it is not limited to certain 
situations or terms. A grey list is good when an authority is having discussions with 
the business sector in order to reach market agreements. It is very handy to have 
examples from the beginning in the discussion as to what could be an unfair term. 
There are no serious problems with unfair contracts terms on the Swedish Market. 
However, some noticeable problems are connected with automatic prolonging of 
contracts, negative contractual effects etc.28 There is also a concern that the list can 
give rise to different interpretations, with the result that the Directive is being applied 
differently in different countries.29  
 
27 See Bernitz, Ulf, Standardavtalsrätt, 2013, p. 184. 
28 See court cases NJA 2012 p. 776, MD 2004:29, MD 2005:34, MD 2009:30 and MD 2009:32.   
29 The Financial Supervisory authority points to the Key Information Document (KID) (a standardized and 
simple document giving key facts on the product) which investment product manufacturers must provide 
to retail customers when they are considering buying investment products. 
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• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
In Swedish law, the list is not annexed to the legal text, but can be found in the 
travaux preparatoires to the legal text. The European Commission has brought 
infringement proceedings towards Sweden in the European Court of Justice regarding 
this matter.30 The European Court has, however, accepted the Swedish procedure with 
reference to the significance of the travaux preparatoires as a source of law in 
Sweden. Bernitz has suggested, however, that it would have clearly been more 
appropriate if the list had been submitted as part of the legal text, as there is a risk 
that one does not pay attention to the list in the travaux preparatoires.31 The Market 
Court has in several cases forbidden companies to use contract terms as they have 
been contrary to the indicative list.32 Concerning the practical application, there are 
diverging experiences. For instance, few traders look at the indicative list. 
Stakeholders suggest that several types of contracts that can be found on the internet 
in the credit and financial services sectors have unfair contract terms. Sector specific 
self-regulation would therefore be more effective, as would be the implementation of a 
black list rather than a grey list.  
  
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
See above. 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
According to Swedish law there are two different ways to combat the use of unfair 
contract terms. The first is that the Consumer Ombudsman can sue the trader in the 
Patent- and Market Court according to Consumer Contracts Terms Act. The Patent- 
and Market Court can prohibit the trader under penalty from using the unfair term in 
the future. The other way is the opportunity for an individual consumer to sue the 
trader in a general court. The court can according to 36 § of the Contract Act adjust a 
contract term or put the whole contract aside, in which case, according to Swedish 
law, the contract is not nullified but will not applied. 
If the Consumer Ombudsman has brought an action against a trader, it has an impact 
on all traders on the market. This applies also to court decisions from the Patent- and 
Market Court. However, if a consumer enters into a contract that contains a term that 
the court has prohibited the trader to use, there will be no automatic invalidity of that 
term or the contract.33 However one can expect that a general court will almost 
30 See C-478/99. 
31 See Bernitz, Ulf, Standardavtalsrätt, 2013, p. 194-195. 
32 See MD 2000:24, MD 2003:12, MD 2002:23 and MD 2004:22.  
33 Bernitz, Ulf, Standardavtalsrätt, 8 ed. 2013, p. 186. 
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always find the term unfair and set it aside. In the same way it is also likely - in a case 
where a banned term under comparable circumstances is used by a trader other than 
the one covered by the ban – that a general court will almost always find the term 
unfair and set it aside. If the Patent and Market Court has banned a trader from using 
a contract term because it is unfair, it does not have to mean that this term shall be 
deemed unfair when it occurs in older, existing contracts. The fact that the Patent and 
Market Court states that the term is not unfair does not prevent the term from being 
considered unfair by a general court according to 36 § of the Contract Act.  
Even though the decisions from the Consumer Ombudsman or the Patent- and Market 
Court have an impact towards all traders, supervision is needed. The Consumer 
Agency needs to conclude sector specific agreements (soft law) with the business 
sector. If it is a decision from the National Board of Consumer Complaints, it is not 
binding towards the trader. It is only a recommendation, although most traders 
adhere to the decision. The decision has also an impact on other traders as it is a 
guideline of what is an acceptable term or behaviour. 
In court case MD 2006:4, the Court found in an agreement on trade in financial 
instruments between online brokers and consumers, that certain conditions were 
unfair under the Consumer Contracts Terms Act (1994:1512) (based on the UCTD). 
The conditions were relating to disclaimers of liability due to outages or other 
disruptions in computing, telecommunications and electrical systems or omissions in 
the information, etc. The conditions were also relating to omissions in information 
regarding the financial instruments that were due to negligence on the part of the 
online broker. Finally, the conditions related to contractual terms that prevented the 
consumer from demanding damages caused by the online broker’s gross negligence. 
In the court case MD 2005:23, a standard contract for digital TV had as a condition a 
requirement of written cancellation of the contract by the consumer. The Court found 
the term to be unfair according to 1994:1512 on contracts terms in consumer 
relationships, but acknowledged that the trader was free to recommend a certain form 
for termination (for security reasons). The practical experience is that many 
businesses still demand written cancellations, despite this court case. The business 
sector tries to add weight to the Court's statement allowing them to recommend a 
certain form of termination. According to some stakeholders, the reason for not 
accepting the judgment from the Patent and Market Court is mainly the costs, as the 
businesses must change the terms in their standard contracts. 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
The practical experience is that the overall effectiveness of the contractual 
transparency requirements is mixed. Art. 5 in the Directive is used by the Swedish 
courts and the National Board of Consumer Complaints. On the other hand the 
wording in Art. 5 is unclear. Art 5. has been interpreted differently and therefore 
applied differently by the Members States and their authorities. The following example 
can be given. It is stated in Art. 5 that the terms must always be ‘drafted in plain, 
intelligible language’. If a term is written in English in a contract for the Swedish 
market, is the term automatically unfair? This issue should therefore be reviewed and 
resolved.  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
The question is not relevant for Sweden. 
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• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
The overall picture is that the sanction works in practice and that it helps the 
consumers. The consumers are not bound by the unfair term. There is no specific 
remuneration to the consumer. If the term is unfair, the consumer must bring an 
action for damages according to the general principles and rules in tort law.  On the 
other hand, neither the Patent- and the Market Court nor the general civil courts are 
willing to invoke unfairness ex officio. The case is brought to the National Board on 
Consumer Complaints. The courts refer to the Swedish Code of Procedure (1942:740) 
where it is stated that a court cannot go beyond what the parties have requested. 
However the case C-473/00 by the European Court of Justice, where found that the 
Directive precluded a national provision which, in proceedings brought by a seller or 
supplier against a consumer on the basis of a contract concluded between them, 
prohibited the national court, on expiry of a limitation period, from finding of its own 
motion or following a plea raised by the consumer that a term of the contract was 
unfair.34  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
The stakeholders point to different measures. First, contracts regarding financial 
services should be in writing. As there is so much information given to the consumer, 
it would be good if the most important information could be highlighted or marked in 
some way, for example, through the use of different colours.35 A graphical 
presentation could also improve the readability. Another suggestion is a provision 
regarding how a contract should look. Stakeholders suggest that a standardised 
contract would be helpful. Finally, it would be helpful to have a more harmonised 
interpretation of the Directive.  
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
The stakeholders have not seen any obstacles or noticed any disparities. There is no 
need expressed for an extended list. The stakeholders suggest that such a list could 
be an obstacle for trade. 
 
34 See also case C 377-14. 
35 Example of this kind of requirements can be seen in Chapter 2, 4 § of the Swedish Insurance Contract Act 
(2005:104). 
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• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
See above. 
 
• Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
See above. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
A deficiency in Swedish law is when the unfair contract terms affect a trader that is 
not part of the contract. According to 3 § lag (1984:292) om avtalsvillkor mellan 
näringsidkare (Traders Contracts Terms Act), an action can only be brought by an 
association of traders, by another association which has a legitimate interest in 
representing the trader or by a single trader against which the current clause has been 
set up. It could be argued that the unfair contract term is actually an unfair 
advertisement, but it is uncertain if that would be upheld in court.36 
There is no need expressed among stakeholders to strengthen the protection of 
businesses. Sweden has the 1984 law on unfair contract terms for businesses and 36 
§ of the Contract Act where a contract term can be adjusted due to imbalance 
between the parties. There is already a provision to invoke contracts contrary to good 
faith, 33 §, usury 32 § etc., all provisions in the Contract Act. As example the 
following case can be mentioned. In MD 2010:12, a company set up terms for a 
competition ban when it entered into an agreement with another trader. This contract 
term was not considered unfair under the law of contract terms between traders. 
Another case is NJA 1988 p. 230, where the dispute was whether an exclusion clause 
in a leasing contract between traders was unfair to the leasee according to § 36 of the 
Contracts Act. 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
See above. 
 
• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
See above. 
 
36 Holtz, Hajo Michael, Oskäliga avtalsvillkor som otillbörlig marknadsföring. Får konkurrenter väcka talan 
enligt marknadsföringslagen? SvJT 2016 p. 383.    
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• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
As already mentioned, the practical experience is that there are no specific contractual 
terms often used in B2B transactions which could be regarded as unfair. The problems 
for most businesses are the problems with long payment periods towards small 
companies by large ones, despite legislative changes in the Swedish Interest Rate Act 
(1975:635).37 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
A similar rule as in Art. 5 UCTD applies already by Swedish law between traders. 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
See above. 
 
• Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
See above. 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
See above. 
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?38  
In the absence of clear data, it is very difficult to assess the extent to which the use of 
the injunction procedure is contributing to the reduction in the number of 
infringements to consumer protection rules and reduction in consumers' detriment. 
Our view is that injunction procedures contribute to a higher level of consumer 
protection. Injunction procedures already existed in Sweden before the ID; therefore 
there was no need for transposition of the ID to the national legislation at the time of 
implementation of the Directive. The legislative models with injunction procedure are 
common in Sweden and can be found in a number of national laws, i.e. not only those 
transposing the ID but also laws with other aims than the protection of consumer’s 
rights. 
37 Compare directive 2011/7 on combating late payment in commercial transactions. 
38  Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
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The Directive 2009/22/EC, which, for cross-border transactions, is implemented in the 
Swedish Law (2000:1175) om talerätt för vissa utländska konsumentmydigheter och 
konsumentorganisationer has not been used. There are no data or information 
showing that the opportunities opened by the Directive with regards to cross-border 
transactions have been used in Sweden. The Consumer Agency points to the principle 
on choice of law (the EU law principle of effectiveness) which says that the question of 
whether a particular country's law should be followed in the case of conduct that 
extends across national borders should be determined on the basis of the conduct’s 
impact in the particular country. In marketing law this means that if the marketing is 
specifically aimed at a Swedish audience, the Swedish Marketing Act applies, even if it 
is carried out by a foreign company. Thus, the Consumer Agency can act against the 
foreign trader by suing it in the Swedish courts. However, the verdict may not be 
recognised or have any effect abroad. To sue the company in its home country is not a 
viable alternative as it is associated with large costs and high knowledge demands, 
and also includes difficulties with language, different procedural rules, etc. The 
conclusion is that the injunction procedure is not effective enough. The practical 
implementation rather than the legislation is the problem. The Consumer Agency 
thinks it would be helpful to have a provision like Art. 19 and 20 in 2015/848 of the 
Insolvency Regulation (recast), former Art. 16 and 17 in 2000/1346, namely a general 
provision on the recognition and effects of a judgement.  
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
This is difficult to assess on the basis of the interviews conducted and the available 
data. If for example a business operator is in breach of the market Act by using 
aggressive marketing or misleading advertising, actions for issuing a prohibition or 
granting an order must be commenced in the Patent- and Market Court, subject to 
certain exceptions. Claims can be brought by the Consumer Ombudsman or a business 
operator affected by the advertising or an association of consumers, business 
operators or employees. Less important cases can be determined by the Consumer 
Ombudsman himself. The prohibition or order must be combined with a fine, Article 28 
Marketing Act. Should the business operator ignore the prohibition/order, the amount 
of the fine may be disputed. Such an action can be commenced in the Patent- and 
Market Court. If the business operator wilfully or negligently contravenes any of the 
catalogue rules as provided in Articles 7–10, 12–18,20 or points in appendix 1 
Directive 2005/29/EC, he or she may also be liable to pay a fine for market distortion. 
Actions as regards these fines may be commenced in the Patent- and Market Court, 
whose decision can be appealed to the Supreme Patent- and Market Court. If the 
Consumer Ombudsman decides not to take an action in any particular case, an 
individual business operator who has been affected by the advertising or an 
association of business operators can take an action. Finally, a business operator who 
wilfully or negligently contravenes a prohibition or order which was made under 
Articles 23–25 in the Market Act, or contravenes the rules in Articles 7–10, 12–22a in 
the Market Act or points in Appendix 1 Directive 2005/29/EC shall be liable in 
damages for the harm suffered by the individual consumer or business operator. 
Claims for damages can be commenced in the Patent- and Market Court. 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
As mentioned above, injunction procedures already existed in Sweden before the ID. 
Therefore, there was no need for transposition of the ID to the national legislation. 
The legislative models with injunction procedure are common in Sweden and can be 
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found in a number of national laws, not only those transposing the ID. As the Swedish 
Market Act has a wide scope of application, it is possible that the scope of the 
application of the injunction procedure has extended beyond the pieces of EU 
legislation listed in the Annex I to the ID. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
No opinions or data were provided on this question. 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
No opinions or data were provided on this question. 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
See answers in the previous section.  
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
See answers in the previous section.  
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
See answers in the previous section.  
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1193
For cross-border transactions, the Directive 2009/22/EC is implemented in a separate 
act, the Swedish Law (2000:1175) om talerätt för vissa utländska 
konsumentmydigheter och konsumentorganisationer. 
For national transactions, some acts have a separate injunction procedure regulated in 
the act, e.g. certain aspects of the Consumer Credit Act and the Law on Consumer 
Contracts, but other acts simply refer to the injunction procedure in the Marketing Act. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
The main difference is in practice.  
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
The overall picture according to the stakeholders is that the directives have a clear 
benefit for the consumers and the directives are an important part of sound market 
regulation. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority, these directives and 
these type of rules provide a clear benefit for the consumer. The result is that the 
consumer feels confident entering into a contract. If such rules were not implemented, 
there would be more dishonest market players, but now these dishonest market 
players are removed from the market through enforcement of consumer law.  
It is not expensive for the consumers to exercise their rights. They can turn to the 
National Board of Consumer Complaints which can handle the consumers’ claims 
against the trader free of charge. On the other hand, it is still unusual that a consumer 
brings an action to a court, due to the costs involved. All companies in the financial 
market also have a so-called ‘complaints manager’ where the consumer can turn with 
a complaint.  
The consumer organization also states that there are lots of benefits stemming from 
the rules based on the directives, but that the enforcement is not working well. The 
public enforcement takes time and does generally not lead to compensation for the 
individual consumer. Swedish consumers shop a lot on e-commerce, but avoid cross-
border shopping because they do not trust foreign traders. It is very difficult for the 
consumer to get his or her money back as a result of misleading advertisements in a 
cross border transaction. Danish traders and traders from the Baltic States are causing 
the most problems at the moment for the Swedish consumers.   
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
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The stakeholders state that there are benefits for the traders stemming from these 
rules. The business traders want rules that are applied in the same way across the 
European market. According to business stakeholders, these rules create a level 
playing field. In order to open up for more cross-border trade, it is necessary to 
minimize the fragmentation of the legislation and its application. That will bring 
confidence to the traders and the consumers. 
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
It is difficult to quantify the costs for traders in order to respect consumer law. The 
business organizations, however, remark as a general rule that if the number of rules 
increases, the costs increase as well. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
It is difficult to quantify the costs involved in public enforcement of these rules. There 
is no statistics available on the matter.  The costs for the National Board of Complaint 
are approximately EUR 330 for every decision of the board.39,40 
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
The stakeholders think that the rules have been implemented in the most cost 
effective manner. 
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
The rules have been implemented in the most cost effective manner. According to 
stakeholders, the costs could not be lowered without the level of protection also being 
lower. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
39 SOU 2014:47 p.79. 
40 The Consumer Agency presents the following annual costs for supervision and market control in 2015: For 
supervision: EUR 4 356 000 in total, approximately EUR 4 751 to EUR 110 971 for each case. For market 
control: EUR 492 983 in total, approximately EUR 1 161 for each case. Cooperation with traders in order 
to reach market agreements etc. cost EUR 802 246 in total. See: 
http://www.konsumentverket.se/Global/Konsumentverket.se/Best%c3%a4lla%20och%20ladda%20ner 
/%c3%85rsredovisning/Dokument/KOV_Arsredovisning2015.pdf 
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Electronic communications 
The practical experience is that the national authorities and the courts and the traders 
in the electronic communications sector are well informed of the requirements of the 
UCPD and UCTD. The Consumer Agency applies the legislation regularly in cases 
against traders in the electronic communication sector.  
As an example the following court case can be mentioned, MD 2010:14. Here a 
company in the marketing of mobile subscriptions on its website used the term ‘fixed-
price’ and statements that gave the impression of an unlimited use of the subscription 
at a certain fixed price with no additional charges. As the service was limited in its 
scope, the marketing was considered misleading about the actual content and the 
concepts and statements were such that they were likely to have influenced the 
consumer’s ability to make an informed business decision. In the court case MD 
2011:26, a telecommunications provider used conditions that gave the telephone 
company the right to close the subscription. The term was not considered unfair.  
There are two authorities responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal EU 
consumer law and the sector specific rules in electronic communications. The 
Consumer Agency supervises the general rules and the Swedish National Post and 
Telecom Agency supervise the specific sector rules. There is an institutionalized and 
systematic cooperation between the two Supervisory Authorities. When sector specific 
rules cannot be applied, the Consumer Agency investigates whether it can act. There 
are no overlaps between the rules of the UCPD and UCTD with the sector-specific 
rules. The benefits for both consumers and traders are more uniform and predictable 
application of the rules. The rules apply to all traders.  
Passenger transport 
The practical experience is that the traders in the passenger transportation sector 
have a basic knowledge of the requirements of the UCPD and UCTD. However, the 
trader’s knowledge could be better and the traders could have a deeper understanding 
of the rules. Consumers have a pretty good idea of their rights but they may not know 
that the rights come from a directive. Regulators have good knowledge of the rules, 
but they often refer in their judgements and decisions to Swedish law rather than to a 
specific article in existing directives.  
There are several authorities responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal EU 
consumer Law and the sector specific rules. The Consumer Agency supervises the 
general rules and the Transport Board (Transportstyrelsen) and the Transport Agency 
(Trafikverket) supervise the specific sector rules. There is no formal cooperation 
between the authorities because it is clear which authority is responsible for what. The 
authorities have meetings when necessary.  
There are no overlaps between the general rules of the UCPD and UCTD and the sector 
specific rules. The specific rules are supplemented by the general rules. Sector-specific 
rules are complemented with the sanctions in the Marketing Act. The benefits for the 
consumers and the traders are more uniform and predictable application of the rules. 
Harmonised rules on marketing and contract terms are appreciated. The sector 
specific rules fill gaps in the general rules. The rules apply to all traders. 
Energy 
The practical experience is that the traders in the energy business sector have general 
knowledge of the requirements of the UCPD and UCTD. There is better knowledge of 
the requirements among the larger companies than the smaller ones. However, an 
exception to this is the following case, MD 2014:9, in which a smaller company sued a 
larger company for deceptive marketing of electricity. The large company had in its 
advertising said that it was the only company providing environmentally clean energy. 
This comparison was not accurate, and so the advertising was found to be deceptive. 
Consumers often have a general perception that something is not allowed, but do not 
always understand the legal basis for such a perception. The Consumer Agency has of 
course very good knowledge of the rules. It has used the UCPD more than the UCTD in 
exercising supervision over the regulations. As example is the following court case. In 
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MD 2016:9, the issue was whether the marketing of management / brokerage service 
of electricity contracts were misleading. In MD 2015:8, the issue was whether 
marketing to consumers by calling the consumer's mobile phone was consistent with 
good marketing. The court approved the marketing.  
There are two authorities responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal EU 
consumer Law and the sector specific rules. The Consumer Agency supervises the 
general rules and the Energy Market Inspectorate supervises the sector specific rules. 
The Energy Market Inspectorate does not supervise the UCTD and the UCPD. It 
supervises the District Heating Act (2008:263, Fjärrvärmelagen), the Electricity Act 
(1997:857, Ellagen) and the Natural Gas Act (2005:403, Naturgaslagen). There is 
cooperation between the authorities in the form of consultation meetings, where the 
Consumer Agency, the Inspectorate and also the Energy Agency will meet and discuss 
problems. If one authority engages in an issue, it will inform the others so that 
overlapping measures will not take place. The other authorities will then know what 
has been done. Usually, the Consumer Agency sees a greater need to engage in issues 
than the other authorities. There is no reference in the Electricity Act to the Marketing 
Act, but this may not be a significant problem because the trade agreements between 
the authorities and the businesses relates to both the specific legislation and the 
Marketing Act.  
Financial services 
The practical experience is that the traders in this sector have a good knowledge of 
the requirements of the UCPD and UCTD. However, there are some problems with the 
sector-specific legislation and the general legislation. Some traders believe that they 
only need to follow the sector specific rules. That is not correct as it is clear that the 
UCPD and UCTD are applicable in the financial services sector as well.  
Here the following court cases can be mentioned. In MD 2006:4, certain terms of an 
agreement on trade in financial instruments between online brokers and consumers 
were found to be unfair. In MD 2010:6, two companies in the marketing of 
occupational pensions had compared their funds with another company savings 
product. The comparison was considered misleading and unfair because it lacked 
essential information and context regarding the time period. The companies’ argument 
that their occupational pension had given 400 percent more in return than another 
company’s form of savings was misleading and considered as unfair marketing as it 
was assumed to have affected the recipient's ability to make an informed business 
decision. In MD 2010:31, a company's marketing of funds towards consumers was 
found to be contrary to good marketing. The company was forbidden to highlight a 
certain period of time as it gave a skewed overall impression of the fund's 
performance.  
There are two authorities responsible for the enforcement of the EU consumer law and 
the sector specific rules. The Consumer Agency supervises the general rules and the 
Financial Supervisory supervises the sectoral rules. If a question relates to compliance 
with the Marketing Act, the Consumer Agency acts. There is much formalized 
cooperation between the authorities. There is a cooperation agreement and each 
authority has explicit instructions regarding who supervises what. They have several 
meetings among the administrators, at least two times per year. The specific 
legislation is complemented by the general rules on marketing. To the extent an issue 
is not specifically regulated in terms of a specific area, the general rules on marketing 
apply. Thus, if a financial service is being marketed, both the conditions under any 
specific legislation for the business and the requirements for reliable marketing under 
the Marketing Act must be met.41  
Consumer Credit  
41  See proposition 2007/2008:115 p. 125. 
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The practical experience is that the traders in the consumer credit business sector 
have good knowledge of the requirements of the UCPD and UCTD. However, there are 
some problems with instant loans. As example the following court case can be 
mentioned, MD 2009:34. Instead of interest, a company had taken a special charge 
for the consumer credit. The special charge covered the company’s expenses and 
generated its profits. The condition was found to be contrary to § 12 of the former 
Consumer Credit Act (1992:830). The term in question was also considered unfair 
under the terms of contract law. Another example is MD 2009:13. Here a creditor 
violated § 12 of the Consumer Credit Act when the creditor was using a term in a 
credit agreement towards consumers. The term specified that a special fee for the loan 
had to be paid as a predetermined percentage of the credit granted.  
There are two authorities responsible for the enforcement of the EU consumer law and 
the sector specific rules. The Consumer Agency supervises the general rules and the 
Financial Supervisory supervises the sectoral rules. If a question relates to compliance 
with the Marketing Act, the Consumer Agency acts. There is formalized cooperation 
between these authorities (see above). The Credit Consumer Law is lex specialis and 
the UCPD and UCTD are lex generalis. The Consumer Credit Act refers to the 
Marketing Act. The legislation in question is coherent and clear. 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
As stated above, it is often different authorities that are responsible for the 
enforcement of EU consumer law and sector specific rules. However, there is 
formalised cooperation between the authorities. As stated above, in the energy market 
there are two different authorities responsible for the enforcement of the horizontal EU 
consumer law and the sector specific rules, namely the Energy Market Inspection and 
the Consumer Agency. Despite this, the supervision is not complete and some actions 
can go uninspected.   
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
Stakeholders have not noticed any overlaps or conflicts between the horizontal 
consumer provisions and the sector specific rules. However, sector specific regulation 
consists now of more binding rules than before when it used non-binding guidelines. 
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
It is difficult to estimate the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD 
and UCTD. The benefit with complementary application is that provides legal certainty. 
There is a much clearer line what is permissible and what is not permissible. There is 
no data pertaining to the costs of complementary application.  
  
• Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
No need has been noticed. 
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 1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
The overall picture is very diverse and it is therefore very difficult to draw any 
conclusions. Interviewed stakeholders held different views on whether the UCPD and 
UCTD are applicable in C2B transactions. Problems with consumers selling gold to a 
traders and auctions with unexpected fees are a well-known phenomenon. According 
to the energy companies, there is a need for more regulation regarding C2B relations 
in the energy market. For example, regarding the question of whether consumers - 
owning solar or wind turbine – can sell energy to traders. This sort of business is 
getting more and more common and will probably need some form of supervision in 
the future. The Consumer Agency points to the increase in the so-called sharing 
economy. The consumer legislation must be applicable to this area, but legal certainty 
is unclear. If the consumer legislation is not applicable, it will be detrimental for the 
consumers.    
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The overall picture is that the concept of consumer, vulnerable consumer and average 
consumer is valid and fit for it purpose, but the picture is also diverse. As the concept 
is not static, it can be adjusted to fit consumers in different areas of e.g. the financial 
sector.42 However, it is argued that it is necessary to have different concepts in 
different countries. As stated above, energy poverty is not a question for the energy 
industry in Sweden, because the consumer is protected by social welfare acts. Some 
stakeholders state that there are high demands on the average consumer. The 
question is whether the average consumer really matches with the real consumer. 
There are also problems with the definition of a consumer in new business 
transactions on web-platforms. When is a consumer really a consumer and when does 
a consumer become a trader?  The consumer definition needs in this context to be 
clarified. Finally, there are sector-specific stakeholders that are not familiar with the 
specific terms consumer, average consumer and vulnerable consumer. These terms 
are not used in sector specific regulation, which they are responsible for; however, 
they are familiar with the problem that old persons or young children, in other words 
vulnerable consumers, are subjected to unfair contract terms in their sector. Thus, 
they recognize the situation but not the legal concepts. 
 
• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
42 Compare the Swedish law (2003:862) on financial advice to consumers, where the adviser has the burden 
of proving that he has dissuaded the consumer from taking measures which cannot be considered 
appropriate to the consumer's needs, financial status or other circumstances. 
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The question of whether the UCPD currently provides adequate protection for 
vulnerable consumers or whether specific provisions should be introduced is not easy 
to answer based on the available responses. The stakeholders state that vulnerable 
consumers in many situations are protected by social welfare acts. There are also 
other provisions in Swedish legislation that protect consumers. Therefore, according to 
stakeholders, there is no need for new provisions in the Market Act. The current 
provisions are sufficient and they work well.  
On the other hand the question of whether a consumer should be categorized as a 
vulnerable consumer is determined from case to case. A consumer can be vulnerable 
in a given situation but not in another. Children, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities are currently considered vulnerable, but there may be others. The 
enforcement authorities lack a more flexible interpretation of the concept. The UCPD is 
adequate to protect vulnerable consumers but the concept of vulnerability must be 
clarified. A concept of vulnerable consumers should be introduced in the UCTD. It 
would improve protection of consumers.  
 
1.4.5. EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
The stakeholders believe that the protection of consumers has improved slightly since 
the implementation of the UCPD and UCTD. The consumer protection in Sweden was 
also good before the implementation, but some stakeholders feel it has definitely 
improved. On the other hand, some stakeholders state that the level has not improved 
in Sweden but maybe on an EU level. The stakeholders stress that cross-border trade 
needs harmonised rules. It is not sufficient or satisfactory that the Member States 
have different sets of rules. On the other hand, the ‘information flow’ must be 
reconsidered. There are sometimes so many information requirements such that the 
consumer cannot perceive what is important.  
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
The practical experience according to some stakeholders is that it might have 
improved slightly or is the same as before the implementation. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
Stakeholders state that it is difficult to say if protection has improved. According to 
some stakeholders, there is probably no change. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
Business organisations state that it has not become easier for businesses to directly 
trade cross border to final consumers located in other EU countries. The reason is not 
linked to the directives. It is due to language barriers, different demands, and taxes. 
On the other hand, the consumer organisation states that it has become easier, 
maybe not because of the directives but as a result of technical improvements. 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
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According to the consumer organizations, the directives have been a suitable basis for 
developing fair market practice.  
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – Sweden  
Directive Transposition legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in 
national 
legislation 
Comments 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts 
lag (1994:1512) om avtalsvillkor i 
konsumentförhållanden 
 'Black list' of terms considered unfair in 
all circumstances 
No   
In the travaux preparatoires, prop 
1994/95:17. 
 'Grey list' of terms which may be 
considered unfair 
No   
  Extensions of the application of Directive 
to individually negotiated terms  
No   
  Extensions of the application of Directive 
terms on the adequacy of the price and 
the main subject-matter 
No   
Directive 2005/29/EC concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the 
internal market 
Marketing Act “Marknadsföringslag 
(2008:486)”  
 Provisions regarding financial services 
going beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Provisions regarding immovable going 
beyond minimum harmonisation 
requirements 
No   
  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions Yes Marketing Act, 
except 12 § 
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Directive 98/6/EC on consumer 
protection in the indication of 
the prices of products offered to 
consumers 
Prinsinformationslag 
(2004:347) 
 Extension of the application to other 
sectors (e.g. for immovable property) 
No   
  Use of specific regulatory 
choices/derogations 
No   
Directive 2006/114/EC 
concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising 
Comparative advertising: 18 § Marketing 
Act (marknadsföringslag (2008:486)) 
     
Misleading advertising: 10 § Marketing 
Act  
     
Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of 
consumers' interests 
Lag (2000:1175) om talerätt för vissa 
utländska konsumentmyndigheter och 
konsumentorganisationer  
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – Sweden  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as foreseen by the Injunctions 
Directive regulated in your country separately (as a 
separate procedure or/and in a separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by other EU Consumer 
Law Directives (the Unfair Contract Terms Directive or/and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate 
procedures in a 
single legal act. 
 
 
The relevant procedure is 
regulated in a single legal 
act, as a single procedure 
and these procedure does 
not go beyond measures 
foreseen by the ID. 
Who is entitled to bring an action seeking an injunction?  
 
A public body or a consumer 
organisation, according to a 
special list organized by the 
European Union and 
published in Official Journal 
Is the injunction procedure a court or an administrative 
procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees both forms of the 
procedure, please explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or administrative procedure 
is foreseen 
Court procedure 
 
 
Who bears the costs of an injunction procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their categories e.g. 
consumer organisations are entitled to an exemption   of 
some/all cost related to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in the comments column. 
- The costs are as a 
rule borne by the 
losing party 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of injunctions extended to cover 
areas of consumer law that are not part of Annex I of the 
Directive, or consumer law in general? 
- No, scope of the 
Directive not 
extended 
 
Is protection of business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure?  
If scope of application extended to the protection of 
business' interests, please provide details in the comments 
column regarding  type of business' interests covered by 
the injunctions procedure 
- No  
Is it possible to bring an injunction action jointly against 
several traders from the same economic sector or their 
associations 
- No  
Is there an out-of-court preliminary stage in the injunction 
procedures? (not including the consultation stage under 
Art. 5 of the ID) 
- No  
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the prior consultation (Article 5 of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement 
for party seeking 
injunction to 
consult with the 
defendant 
 
 
Does the national legislation provide for measures ensuring 
summary procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of the procedure 
(subject matter/time limits) in the comments column. 
- No  
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Are there sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction 
order (Article 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine foreseen  please 
specify in the comments column to who exactly should 
they be paid 
- No, no sanction  
Has your Member State taken specific measures regarding 
the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement? 
- No  
Is it possible to claim within the injunction procedure for 
sanctions for the infringement? 
- No  
Can an action for the restitution of profits obtained as a 
result of infringements, including an order that those 
profits are paid to the public purse or to other beneficiary 
be brought within the injunction procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages to be paid to the qualified entity 
or the public purse be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can an action for damages or redress to be paid to the 
consumers concerned be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No  
Can individual consumers base their individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions order?  
- No  
Can the qualified entity claim other measures beyond the 
injunction, e.g. evidence of compliance with the judgment? 
- No  
Are the effects of individual injunctions orders extended to 
the future infringements and/or same or similar illegal 
practices (of other traders)? 
- No  
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available). 
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
2016 
Market 
Court 
statistics 
4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
2015 6       
2014 8       
2013 4       
2012 2       
2011 5       
2010 6       
Note: Not possible to provide a breakdown of court cases by Directive, as most cases involve multiple 
Directives.  
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).43  
 
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure n.a.     
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
n.a.     
 
Beyond what has been stated in Section 1.4, there are no statistics on the costs 
available. 
 
Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)?  
No statistics available. 
 
43 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Svensk Handel Business association 8 June2016 
Energiföretagen Business association 20 June2016 
Stockholm Lokaltrafik Business association 15 June 2016 
Swedish Consumer Agency 
(Konsumentverket) 
National consumer enforcement authority / 
National regulatory authority 
21 June 2016 
Konkurrensverket National regulatory authority 29 June 2016  
Energimarknads-inspektionen Sectoral regulatory authority 13 June 2016 
Post och telestyrelsen Sectoral regulatory authority 21 June 2016 
Finansinspektion-en. Ministry 8 June 2016 
ECC Sweden European Consumer Centre 3 June 2016 
Sveriges konsumenter Consumer organisation 16 August 2016 
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Table 6: Literature reviewed for country report 
Author/Source  Year Title of publication 
Bernitz, Ulf 2013 Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 2, Norstedts juridik, Stockholm 
Bernitz, Ulf 2013 Standardavtalsrätt, 8 ed, Norstedts juridik, Stockholm 
Cederlund, Karin 2008 
 
Bubbel eller champagne? Om immateriella rättigheter i jämförande 
reklam. Festskrift till Marianne Levin, Norstedts juridik , Stockholm. 
Consumer Agency  2010 Guidelines for information on new passenger car fuel consumption and 
carbone dioxide emissions. KOVFS 2010:3. 
Consumer Agency 2012 Regulation on price information 2012:1 
Domeij, Åsa,  2012  Kan fel jämförpris leda till mer transporter? 
http://www.axfood.se/sv/Hallbarhet/Bloggar/Asa-
Domeij/Dates/2012/6/Kan-fel-jamforpris-leda-till-mer-transporter/ 
Ds 2015:45 2015 Stärkta sanktionsmöjligheter för Konsumentombudsmannen 
Ervo, Laura & 
Persson, Annina. H. 
2015 Finnish and Swedish legislation in light of the ADR-directive - boards and 
ombudsman, in Collective redress in Europe - Why and How? (ed. Lein, 
Eva et al.), 2015.British institute of international and Comparative law.  
Henrikson, Ann-Sofie 2016 Överskuldsatt och skyldig. En rättslig analys av konsumentskyddet mot 
överskuldsättning. 
http://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:915195/FULLTEXT04.pdf 
Holz, Michael Hajo 2016 Oskäliga avtalsvillkor som otillbörlig marknadsföring. Får konkurrenter 
väcka talan enligt marknadsföringslagen?, SvJT 2016. p 383. 
Nordell, Per Jonas 2010 Introduktion till marknadsrätten, 5 ed. Norstedts juridik, Stockholm 
Persson Annina H 
and Henrikson, Ann-
Sofie 
2014 Regulation of instant loans and other credits in Swedish law, Juridica 
international 2014 p. 57- 70. 
Persson, Annina H 2010 Sweden, In (Colombi Ciacchi, Aurelia & Weatherhill, Stephen. Ed.,) 
Regulation unfair banking practise in Europe. The case of personal 
suretyships, p. 547-570. Oxford university press, Oxford. 
Proposition 
2015/16:168 
2015 Stärkta sanktioner för Konsumentombudsmannen 
SOU 2015:77 2015 SOU (Statens offentliga utredningar) Fakturabedrägerier 
SOU 2014:47  
 
2015 Förbättrad tvistelösning på konsumentområdet. 
 
Årsredovisning från 
Konsument-verket 
2015 www.konsumentverket.se 
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1. Study to support the Fitness Check of EU Consumer law –  
Country report UNITED KINGDOM 
1.1. Unfair commercial practices and marketing  
1.1.1. Effectiveness of the UCPD in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
The UCPD was largely transposed in the UK by the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (CPUTR 2008).1 The CPUTR 2008, which replaced 23 earlier 
enactments, closely follow the wording of the Directive.2 A commercial practice is 
defined widely as ‘…any act, omission, course of conduct, representation or 
commercial communication (including advertising and marketing) by a trader, which is 
directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from 
consumers, whether occurring before, during or after a commercial transaction (if any) 
in relation to a product’.3 Moreover in R v. X Ltd4 the Court of Appeal confirmed that 
isolated incidents can constitute a commercial practice. Regulation 3(3)-(4) sets out 
when a commercial practice will be regarded as an unfair commercial practice: 
‘(3) A commercial practice is unfair if— 
(a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour 
of the average consumer with regard to the product. 
(4) A commercial practice is unfair if— 
(a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5; 
(b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6; 
(c) it is aggressive under the provisions of regulation 7; or 
(d) it is listed in Schedule 1.’5 
The CPUTR 2008 originally relied on a dual system of enforcement consisting of (i) 
criminal sanctions and (ii) administrative sanctions. Initially the CPUTR 2008 did not 
specially provide for private rights of redress for consumers. More recently, however, 
the CPUTR 2008 has been amended to provide such rights of redress for consumers.6 
In terms of the effectiveness of a principle-based approach under the UCPD, one 
concern is whether or not such an approach leads to an unacceptable level of 
uncertainty.7 This was certainly a concern of some of those consulted recently in 
1  SI 2008/1277. 
2  See, generally, H.G. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 
38-145ff. 
3  Regulation 2. Under the CPUTR 2008 a ‘consumer’ was initially defined as: ‘any individual who in relation 
to a commercial practice is acting for purposes which are outside his business’ (Regulation 2). This was 
subsequently amended to define a consumer as: ‘…an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or 
mainly outside that individual's business’. 
4  [2013] EWCA Crim 818. 
5  Implementing UCPD, Article 5(5) and Annex I. 
6  See 1.1.7 below. 
7  Cf. C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
2007) at 431. 
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relation to whether or not the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 should be repealed.8 
On the other hand, such an approach does allow some flexibility in responding to 
unfair commercial practices.9 Early indications of proposed prosecutions under the 
CPUTR 2008 were low10 and this, combined with the strain on the public purse post-
financial crisis,11 helped create the case for the introduction of private rights of redress 
under the CPUTR 2008.12 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the black list of unfair commercial practices 
annexed to this Directive, in particular its application in practical cases;  
A purely black list approach to unfair commercial practices might have resulted in a 
reversal of the issues under the principle-based aspects of the UCPD: more certainty 
in terms of what constitutes an unfair commercial practice13 but less flexibility in terms 
of regulating evolving commercial practices. For this reason, arguably a hybrid 
approach (consisting of a blend of principle-based provisions and rule-based 
provisions) is preferable. In terms of rule-based provisions, one issue is how to ensure 
the currency of such rules and it may be that an approach analogous to the approach 
adopted in the UK under the UCTD, whereby the Secretary of State can amend the so-
called ‘grey’ list,14 would be useful in this context.15 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers arising from the Member States' use of the 
minimum harmonisation clauses for financial services and immovable property;  
Such an approach can be justified on the grounds of the potential complexity of such 
transactions16 and, to some extent, specific existing EU interventions in relevant 
fields.17 In the UK, these justifications were reiterated for not extending specific rights 
of private redress under Part 4A, CPUTR 2008 to those areas.18 On the other hand, 
this creates the potential for added complexity and duplication which was a key 
factor19 in the recent repeal of the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991.20 
8  BIS, ‘The Regulatory Framework for Home Buying and Selling: Government response to consultations on 
the Estate Agents Act and the Property Misdescriptions Act’ (URN 12/1006 (2012)) at, for example, [39]: 
‘The Government understands the reasons why opponents to repeal of the PMA favour it over the CPRs. 
The PMA deals specifically with property and as such is easy to apply. The CPRs by contrast are not 
specific to the sector and, being principles-based, require traders to consider how they apply to their 
particular circumstances.’ 
9  Cf. C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
2007) at 431.  On the relevance of context see: Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v 
PLT Anti-Marketing Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 76. 
10 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 2.7. 
11 See J. Devenney, ‘Private Redress Mechanisms in England and Wales for Unfair Commercial Practices’, 
(2016) 5 EuCML 100.  See also J. Garside, ‘Trading standards institute: consumers are no longer 
protected’, The Guardian, 7th August 2016. 
12 See 1.1.7 below. 
13 Although some may need to be unpacked through case law (for example the meaning of falsity under 
Schedule 1, para. 17 (or para. 17 of Annex I of the UCPD). 
14 See 1.2.1 below. 
15 Although, given the overall maximum harmonisation nature of the UCPD, this would need to be done at 
an EU level. 
16 See UCPD, Recital 9. 
17 See UCPD, Recital 10. 
18 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 6.118. 
19 See BIS, ‘The Regulatory Framework for Home Buying and Selling: Government response to consultations 
on the Estate Agents Act and the Property Misdescriptions Act’ (URN 12/1006 (2012)) at para. 40: ‘The 
Government remains of the view, however, that the CPRs provide broadly similar protection to the PMA. 
The queries and concerns raised are similar to those that were raised when the CPRs were first proposed 
and these fears do not seem to have materialised in other sectors. The Government believes this situation 
will continue so long as the PMA remains in place and that repealing the PMA would not significantly 
reduce levels of consumer protection. This is disputed by some stakeholders but not others and the 
Government does not find the arguments for a loss of consumer protection convincing. The Government 
will therefore lay before Parliament an Order to repeal the PMA. The current intention is that this will 
come into force not before October 2013.’ 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1211
 • The effectiveness and practical benefits for consumers of the application of 
Directive's rules in tackling misleading environmental claims / in addressing 
misleading practices in the energy market; [Key aspects to consider are: To what 
extent has the UCPD been applied in the context of environmental claims/in the 
energy market?  How effective was it? What are the problems, if any?] 
Although there is not a discrete body of EU Law on environmental or green 
advertising, a number of EU initiatives make provision in this regard.21 For example, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and 
labelling of organic products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/9122 provides: 
 ‘Use of terms referring to organic production 
1. For the purposes of this Regulation a product shall be regarded as bearing 
terms referring to the organic production method where, in the labelling, 
advertising material or commercial documents, such a product, its ingredients 
or feed materials are described in terms suggesting to the purchaser that the 
product, its ingredients or feed materials have been obtained in accordance 
with the rules laid down in this Regulation. In particular, the terms listed in the 
Annex, their derivatives or diminutives, such as 'bio' and 'eco', alone or 
combined, may be used throughout the Community and in any Community 
language for the labelling and advertising of products which satisfy the 
requirements set out under or pursuant to this Regulation.  
In the labelling and advertising of live or unprocessed agricultural products 
terms referring to the organic production method may be used only where, in 
addition, all the ingredients of that product have also been produced in 
accordance with the requirements laid down in this Regulation. 
2. The terms referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be used anywhere in the 
Community and in any Community language for the labelling, advertising and 
commercial documents of a product which does not satisfy the requirements 
set out under this Regulation, unless they are not applied to agricultural 
products in food or feed or clearly have no connection with organic production. 
Furthermore, any terms, including terms used in trademarks, or practices used 
in labelling or advertising liable to mislead the consumer or user by suggesting 
that a product or its ingredients satisfy the requirements set out under this 
Regulation shall not be used. 
3. The terms referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be used for a product for 
which it has to be indicated in the labelling or advertising that it contains 
GMOs, consists of GMOs or is produced from GMOs according to Community 
provisions.’23 
It is also clear that the general provisions of the CPUTR 2008 can apply to 
environmental/green advertising.24 However, given the specialised nature of this 
context, there is perhaps the need for some further guidance on the application of the 
CPUTR 2008 to such claims.25 
 
20 See Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 (Repeal) Order 2013. 
21 See D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law (Lexis, 
1996- ) at 2.5.1ff. 
22 Official Journal L 189, 20/07/2007 p. 1. 
23 Article 23. 
24 See D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law (Lexis, 
1996- ) at 2.5.1ff. 
25 Cf. DEFRA, Green Claims Guidance (PB13453 (2011)). 
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• The practical benefits for consumers of the "average consumer" as the reference 
point for assessing whether a commercial practice is likely to materially distort 
economic behaviour; [Key aspects to consider are: How does the concept of 
"average consumer" work in practice? Is the concept applied in your country 
rigidly?] 
Regulations 5, 6 and 7 of the CPUTR 2008 use the concept of an ‘average consumer’ 
as a benchmark. Regulation 2(2) provides some assistance in relation to this concept: 
‘In determining the effect of a commercial practice on the average consumer 
where the practice reaches or is addressed to a consumer or consumers 
account shall be taken of the material characteristics of such an average 
consumer including his being reasonably well informed, reasonably observant 
and circumspect.’ 
Some earlier directives did not, at least explicitly, provide a means of benchmarking 
relevant provisions which, of course, provided the more potential for uncertainty and 
inconsistency.26 Thus, at a general level, the explicit indication of a relevant 
benchmark is arguably to be welcomed. Yet whether, given the non-homogeneous 
nature of consumer vulnerabilities,27 an ‘average consumer’ test always results in a 
high level of consumer protection is debatable.28 Moreover, the consumer organisation 
Which? has observed: 
‘… the evidence suggests that the main risks in the concept of the ‘average 
consumer’ are: 
• The average consumer, being defined as reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant, is mistakenly thought to refer to the real average 
consumer, which may or may not be one or both of these two things, 
likely depending on the specific context where the concept is applied. 
• The concept of the ‘average consumer’ may be too ambiguous for 
practical purposes because it varies so much depending on the sector or 
market. 
Behavioural science is an area that has developed considerably since the UCPD 
was adopted over a decade ago. In our view, REFIT provides a unique 
opportunity to modernise the UCPD in line with the way that consumers behave 
in the real world.’ 
 
• The practical benefits for consumers of the specific protection of "vulnerable 
consumers" introduced by the directive; [Key aspects to consider are: Have 
enforcement authorities/courts in your country recognised new categories of 
vulnerable consumers not listed in the UCPD (such as poor/indebted)?] 
On the other hand Regulation 2(4)-(5) of the CPUTR 2008 provides: 
‘(4) In determining the effect of a commercial practice on the average 
consumer where the practice is directed to a particular group of consumers, a 
reference to the average consumer shall be read as referring to the average 
member of that group. (5) In determining the effect of a commercial practice 
on the average consumer— (a) where a clearly identifiable group of consumers 
26  Cf. UCTD and Kásler v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt (C-26/13) [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 443. 
27  J. Devenney, ‘Conceptualising Consumers in the Law of England and Wales’ in K. Riesenhuber and F. 
Klinck (eds), Verbraucherleitbilder: Interdisziplinäre und Europäische Perspektiven (de Gruyter, 2015) at 
p.161. The Consumer Council for Northern Ireland noted: ‘Our research also found that younger 
consumers (those aged 16-24), older consumers (aged 65+), and consumers from a lower income 
bracket were less likely to feel well informed about their rights.  We therefore prioritise our education 
campaign work to target these audiences in an effort to make them less vulnerable and better informed 
consumers.’ 
28  As opposed, for example, to further internal market ambitions: see, for example, M. Himoni, European 
consumer law: a law for the consumer or the internal market?  The case of the consumer right directive 
and its application to the UK and Cypriot regimes (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Leeds, 2016). 
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is particularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of 
their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader 
could reasonably be expected to foresee, and (b) where the practice is likely to 
materially distort the economic behaviour only of that group, a reference to the 
average consumer shall be read as referring to the average member of that 
group.’ 
Thus the standard ‘average consumer’ test is, for example, adjusted where the 
commercial practice is directed at a particularly vulnerable group. For the reasons 
given above this is likely to result in a greater level of consumer protection although, 
perhaps justifiably from the point of view of the burden on traders,29 it is limited to 
situations where the trader had a particular degree of knowledge of the situation. 
 
• How and which self-and co-regulation actions in EU countries or at EU level have 
been effective in addressing unfair commercial practices. [Key aspects to consider 
are: To what extent do self/co-regulation actions work in practice, are they useful 
according to stakeholders?] 
Advertising is an area where, in the UK, there is a multi-dimensional approach to 
regulation which includes ‘…many controls – some voluntary, some moral and some 
statutory.’30 This includes self-regulation for non-broadcast advertising (through the 
independent Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)), co-regulation of broadcast 
advertising (through the ASA and Ofcom)31 and trade codes of practice.32 It also 
includes various statutory provisions including the CPUTR 2008 and s.319 of the 
Communications Act 2003 which provides: 
‘(1) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to set, and from time to time to review and 
revise, such standards for the content of programmes to be included in 
television and radio services as appear to them best calculated to secure the 
standards objectives. 
(2) The standards objectives are— 
(a) that persons under the age of eighteen are protected; 
(b) that material likely to encourage or to incite the commission of crime or to 
lead to disorder is not included in television and radio services; 
(c) that news included in television and radio services is presented with due 
impartiality and that the impartiality requirements of section 320 are complied 
with; 
(d) that news included in television and radio services is reported with due 
accuracy; 
29 In the UK, for example, there has been a deregulation agenda in recent times.  See the claim in 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.5: ‘The reforms taken together are 
estimated to be worth over £4 billion to the UK economy over 10 years in quantified net benefits. 
Clarification and simplification mean consumers should spend less time trying to understand their rights, 
less time and resource applying them, and no longer waste time when they have misunderstood their 
rights. Businesses should also spend less time having to interpret complex legislation. Where things do go 
wrong, the proposals allow wider options for redress for both businesses and consumers who have lost 
out when consumer or competition law has been broken. The proposals also reduce regulatory costs for 
business. Problems following consumer purchases should be addressed more quickly, with lower 
complaint handling costs and fewer cases taken to court.’  See also GHK, ‘Consumer rights and economic 
growth’ (Final Report, 2013).  Note also the comment from the UK European Consumer Centre: ‘We are 
aware that Financial Conduct Authority does recognise individuals with unmanageable level of debt as 
potentially vulnerable.’ 
30 See D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law (Lexis, 
1996- ) at 5.1.   
31 See Contracting Out (Functions Relating to Broadcast Advertising) and Specification of Relevant Functions 
Order 2004 (SI 2004/1975). 
32 See: http://www.tradingstandards.uk/advice/ConsumerCodes.cfm  
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(e) that the proper degree of responsibility is exercised with respect to the 
content of programmes which are religious programmes; 
(f) that generally accepted standards are applied to the contents of television 
and radio services so as to provide adequate protection for members of the 
public from the inclusion in such services of offensive and harmful material; 
(fa) that the product placement requirements referred to in section 321(3A) 
are met in relation to programmes included in a television programme service 
(other than advertisements); 
(g) that advertising that contravenes the prohibition on political advertising set 
out in section 321(2) is not included in television or radio services; 
(h) that the inclusion of advertising which may be misleading, harmful or 
offensive in television and radio services is prevented; 
(i) that the international obligations of the United Kingdom with respect to 
advertising included in television and radio services are complied with; 
(j) that the unsuitable sponsorship of programmes included in television and 
radio services is prevented; 
(k) that there is no undue discrimination between advertisers who seek to have 
advertisements included in television and radio services; and 
(l) that there is no use of techniques which exploit the possibility of conveying 
a message to viewers or listeners, or of otherwise influencing their minds, 
without their being aware, or fully aware, of what has occurred.’33 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Is there a need to extend or modify the black list 
of the UCPD? If so, please indicate the practice(s) to be added to the list. Should 
there be a mechanism for subsequent inclusion of new practices into the UCPD 
black list to respond to new developments? 
Review mechanisms have been addressed above. As will be noted below, particular 
types of contractual term might be added to the ‘black’ list.34 
 
• Are there other measures that could improve the effectiveness of the UCPD in 
establishing a high level of consumer protection in your country? Are there best 
practices or lessons learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU 
countries? 
The establishment of private rights of redress for unfair commercial practices and the 
ability to evolve, at an EU level, the ‘black’ list have been mentioned above. It could 
be suggested that it would be helpful to explore ways of further collating and 
categorising examples of unfair commercial practices arising from case law across the 
EU.35 
 
33  Emphasis added. 
34  See 1.2.1. 
35  Cf. in relation to the UCTD below. 
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1.1.2. Effectiveness of the PID in establishing a high level of consumer protection  
What is the effectiveness of the PID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of:  
• Whether and to what extent consumers are effectively informed about the unit 
selling price;  
The PID is, in general terms,36 transposed by the Price Marking Order 2004 (PMO).37 
Article 538 makes provision in relation to unit prices.39 The application of this provision, 
particularly in relation to promotional schemes, can vary.40 The Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy commented in the interview process that: 
‘We consider the Price Indication Directive to be a useful tool to enable consumers to 
identify the best deal, and that the minimum harmonisation measure is important, for 
example in allowing for other units of quantity that are widely and customarily used in 
a Member State, or the transitional derogation for certain small retail businesses.’41 
On 21 April 2015 Which? submitted a super-complaint to the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) concerning pricing practices in the groceries sector.42 The CMA did 
‘…not consider there to be a systemic problem in the groceries market in how retailers 
present prices, concluding that problems are not occurring in large numbers across the 
whole sector and that generally retailers are taking compliance with legislation 
seriously to avoid such problems occurring’.43 However, the CMA did make a number 
of recommendations specifically in relation to unit pricing (which were generally 
endorsed by the Government):44  
‘Recommendation 2: The CMA recommends that BIS produces best practice 
guidelines on the legibility of unit pricing information, to provide greater clarity 
about the requirements of the PMO in this regard. This would help TSS and 
36  Cf. Price Marking Order (Northern Ireland) 2004 (SI 2004/368). 
37  SI 2004/102. 
38  ‘(1) Subject to paragraph (2), (3) and (4) and article 9, where a trader indicates that any product is or 
may be for sale to a consumer, he shall indicate the unit price of that product in accordance with the 
provisions of this Order. 
(2) The requirement in paragraph (1) only applies in respect of products sold from bulk or required by or 
under Parts IV or V of the Weights and Measures Act 1985 to be: 
(a) marked with an indication of quantity; or 
(b) made up in a quantity prescribed by or under that Act. 
(3) The requirement in paragraph (1) shall not apply in relation to: 
(a) any product which falls within Schedule 2; 
(b) any product the unit price of which is identical to its selling price; 
(c) bread made up in a prescribed quantity which is or may be for sale in a small shop, by an itinerant 
trader or from a vending machine; or 
(d) any product which is pre-packaged in a constant quantity which is or may be for sale in a small shop, 
by an itinerant trader or from a vending machine. 
(4) The requirement in paragraph (1) applies in relation to an advertisement for a product only where the 
selling price of the product is indicated in the advertisement.’ 
39 Defined in Article 1(2): ‘‘unit price’ means the final price, including VAT and all other taxes, for one 
kilogram, one litre, one metre, one square metre or one cubic metre of a product, except (i) in respect of 
the products specified in Schedule 1, where unit price means the final price including VAT and all other 
taxes for the corresponding units of quantity set out in that Schedule; and (ii) in respect of products sold 
by number, where unit price means the final price including VAT and all other taxes for an individual item 
of the product.’ 
40 See, generally, O’Keefe, The Law of Weights and Measures (2nd. Edn., Butterworth, London, 1996-) at 
2.6539. 
41 11 August 2016. 
42 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-receives-super-complaint-from-which?  
43 See BIS, Pricing Practices in the Groceries Market: Government response to the Competition and Markets 
Authority’s report and recommendations on the super-complaint made by Which?, (BIS/15/568 (2015)) 
p.3. Similarly the UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘The UK European Consumer Centre noted: 
“Major retailers do indicate various unit prices (weight, liquid quantity) on the price tags. This information 
is provided in practical manner. The consumers can compare these prices, should they wish to do so.’ 
44 See also Trading Standards Institute, Pricing Practices Review: Call for Evidence Responses, (2014). 
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Primary Authorities assess compliance. We also recommend that retailers 
introduce any resulting changes to labelling as soon as practicable...45 
Recommendation 3: We recommend that BIS continues its review, with the 
Expert Working Group, of Schedule 1 to the PMO, but changes the focus to give 
particular consideration to: 
(a) Ways to clarify and simplify the requirements, considering evidence 
about the advantages and disadvantages of simpler and more future-
proofed approaches, with fewer exceptions, used in other countries, and 
(b) What further research, building on the findings from our qualitative 
research, is needed into how consumers use unit prices to ensure the 
requirements help as many people as possible to use them in their 
decision-making… 
Recommendation 4: To encourage a more consistent use of unit pricing for 
products on promotion,46 the CMA recommends that BIS considers reviewing 
and clarifying the legal requirements set out in Article 9 of the PMO, and the 
associated guidance. This should be done with particular reference to the 
requirements of the CPRs and the ongoing review of the PPG...47 
Recommendation 5: The CMA recommends that Which? and other consumer 
representative organisations consider whether there is a further role they can 
play in consumer education on the effective use of unit prices. Further, 
following any further work by BIS on our above recommendations, there will be 
a further need to educate consumers on any changes to unit pricing.’48 
 
• Where a recognised measurement unit for a product's performance exists and is 
displayed to consumers (e.g. number of washloads for detergents), should the "unit 
price" for such product be indicated per such "performance" measurement units 
rather than per 1 kg or 1 litre? 
The definition of ‘unit price’ and the exceptions contained in Schedule 1 have already 
been noted. The indication of ‘unit price’ in specific performance measurement units 
could, if the process does not become too complicated,49 be helpful to a consumer. 
The UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘We believe that offering this kind of weight 
indication may create confusion to consumers, as it may be more difficult to compare 
in this manner. The performance information is easier to consider by an average 
consumer at the point of purchase.’ 
45 Which? noted: ‘Article 3(1) of the PID provides that the unit price need not be indicated where it is 
identical to the sales price. While this may be an appropriate approach for many products, it is not clear 
why this is appropriate in the context of food and other consumables or groceries that are commonly 
purchased in a supermarket environment…Our fieldwork has found that - even for groceries - the unit 
price may not be shown where the selling price is the same. Yet, in an environment where unit prices are 
prolific (such as a supermarket shelf), consumers will not necessarily appreciate that this is the reason 
why the unit price is not included. Removing the requirement to provide unit prices in this scenario 
creates more, not less, confusion for shoppers. We would recommend that this exemption be removed 
for food products and groceries.’ 
46 Which? noted: ‘Our super-complaint found that unit prices were not being displayed for products that 
were on promotion (for example, ‘50% off’ or ‘buy-one-get-one-free’ special offers). The PID must make 
clear that the obligation to display unit pricing does not fall away when goods are offered at promotional 
prices and should establish clear rules for how those unit prices should be calculated.’ 
47 Which? also observed: ‘Some degree of flexibility around the units available to traders is likely to be 
necessary and appropriate. However, we would suggest that the broad language in Article 2 is narrowed 
to ensure that confusion is not caused by consumers seeing a vast array of different units being used. 
Alternatively, the Directive could make clear that the ability to use different units should be granted only 
in exceptional circumstances, where there is clear, objective evidence that detriment would be caused if 
one of the core units had to be relied upon.’ 
48  CMA, Pricing Practices in the Groceries Market Response to a super-complaint made by Which? on 21 
April 2015 (2015) at 8.6ff. 
49  Cf. See BIS, Pricing Practices in the Groceries Market: Government response to the Competition and 
Markets Authority’s report and recommendations on the super-complaint made by Which?, (BIS/15/568 
(2015)) at p.3 where there is an intention to simplify Schedule 1 in line with other EU countries. 
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 • The effects of the regulatory choices/derogations allowed by the Directive and 
applied by Member States. [Key aspects to consider are: Is the derogation 
relevant? Do companies make use of it? Are there consumer complaints because of 
this? If so, approximately how many per year?] 
The small business, or small shop,50 exemption is contained in Schedule 2. There may 
be some debate on exactly how the floor area is calculated to determine whether or 
not a shop is a small shop.51 The UK European Consumer Centre tentatively noted: 
‘Everyday observation suggests that smaller shops normally don't provide information 
about the unit price. Given the nature of our service (cross border consumer advice 
and mediation), we tend not to receive such complaints.’ 
Which? noted: ‘While this exemption is presumably designed to protect small, 
independent retailers from incurring disproportionate cost, it does not reflect the fact 
that many small shops are part of national chains. This issue was considered when the 
Directive was appraised in 2004, but it has not been resolved. At that time, it was 
recommended that only those smaller businesses for which unit pricing poses a real 
burden are exempted from the requirements. REFIT presents an opportunity to ensure 
this recommendation is expressly enshrined in the PID.’ 
 
1.1.3. Effectiveness of the MCAD in providing protection for businesses  
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of:  
• The scope of protection under the Directive, in particular whether the scope limited 
to the notion of 'advertising' provides effective protection for businesses;  
The MCAD was primarily transposed in the UK by the Business Protection from 
Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 (BPMMR 2008).52 Regulation 3 prohibits 
advertising which misleads traders, with Regulation 3(2) providing: 
 ‘Advertising is misleading which— 
(a) in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the 
traders to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches; and by reason of its 
deceptive nature, is likely to affect their economic behaviour; or 
(b) for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor.’53 
Under Regulation 2(1) advertising is defined widely to mean ‘…any form of 
representation which is made in connection with a trade, business, craft or profession 
in order to promote the supply or transfer of a product and ‘advertiser’ shall be 
50  Defined in Article 1(2) as: ‘any shop which has a ‘relevant floor area’ not exceeding 280 square metres’. 
51  See, generally, O’Keefe, The Law of Weights and Measures (2nd. Edn., Butterworth, London, 1996-) at 
2.6539. 
52  SI 2008/1276. 
53  Note also Regulation 2(3)-(5): ‘(3) In determining whether advertising is misleading, account shall be 
taken of all its features, and in particular of any information it contains concerning—(a) the 
characteristics of the product (as defined in paragraph (4)); (b) the price or manner in which the price is 
calculated; (c) the conditions on which the product is supplied or provided; and (d) the nature, attributes 
and rights of the advertiser (as defined in paragraph (5)). (4) In paragraph (3)(a) the ‘characteristics of 
the product’ include—(a) availability of the product; (b) nature of the product; (c) execution of the 
product; (d) composition of the product; (e) method and date of manufacture of the product; (f) method 
and date of provision of the product; (g) fitness for purpose of the product; (h) uses of the product; (i) 
quantity of the product; (j) specification of the product;(k) geographical or commercial origin of the 
product; (l) results to be expected from use of the product; or (m) results and material features of tests 
or checks carried out on the product. (5) In paragraph (3)(d) the ‘nature, attributes and rights’ of the 
advertiser include the advertiser's— (a) identity; (b) assets;(c) qualifications; (d) ownership of industrial, 
commercial or intellectual property rights; or (e) awards and distinctions.’ 
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construed accordingly’.54 The BPMMR 2008 do not affect the validity of an agreement55 
but they do provide criminal liability for misleading advertising.56 
 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach to misleading advertising 
under this Directive;  
Given the many different possible forms of advertising, particularly under the 
extended definition in the BPMMR 2008, it would seem that a principle-based approach 
is appropriate.57 One issue, however, surrounds the use of criminal sanctions for 
misleading advertising and, more specifically, whether or not it is appropriate (and/or 
inhibits cross-border trade) to deploy criminal liability in cases which do not amount to 
fraud.58 The BPMMR 2008 deal with that issue, to some extent, with a due diligence 
defence under Regulation 11: 
‘In any proceedings against a person for an offence under regulation 6 it is a 
defence for that person to prove— 
(a) that the commission of the offence was due to— 
(i) a mistake; 
(ii) reliance on information supplied to him by another person; 
(iii) the act or default of another person; 
(iv) an accident; or 
(v) another cause beyond his control; 
And 
(b) that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to 
avoid the commission of such an offence by himself or any person under his 
control.’ 
 
• The effects of the minimum harmonisation provisions on misleading advertising; 
[Key aspects to consider are: Which national rules that go beyond the MCAD, if 
any, have been providing a higher level of protection? If so, how? Are there other 
rules protecting B2B transactions applied by Member States (e.g. through 
extending the UCPD)?] 
Given the potential reach of the MCAD,59 it is not clear that a public enforcement 
regime, as provided under the BPMMR 2008, would in itself sufficient. However, such a 
regime is, in the UK, supplemented by the availability of various private law actions.60 
 
• The effects of the full harmonisation provisions on comparative advertising;  
The full harmonisation provisions in the MCAD are restricted to ‘…comparative 
advertising as far as the comparison is concerned’61 and this is, arguably, justified on 
54  Emphasis added. See also D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and 
Consumer Law (Lexis, 1996- ) at 227A. 
55  See Regulation 29. 
56  See Regulation 6.  Regulation 8 makes provision in relation to the liability of companies. 
57  Cf. Director General of Fair Trading v Tobyward Ltd [1989] 1 W.L.R. 517. 
58  Cf., in a slightly different context, South Australia Asset Management v. York Montague [1996] All ER 
365 at 374 per Lord Hoffmann.  See also J. Devenney, ‘Re-Examining Damages for Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation: Towards a More Measured Response to Compensation and Deterrence’, in L. Di 
Matteo, K. Rowley, Q. Zhou & S. Santier, Current Issues in Commercial Contracts: Transatlantic 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press,  2013). 
59  Cf. Recital 4. 
60  See, for example, A.M. Dugdale, M. Jones and M. Simpson, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (21st edn., Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2015) at 23-18. 
61  MCAD, Article 8(1). 
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the effect comparative advertising can have on competition.62 Regulation 4 of the 
BPMMR 2008 provides: 
‘Comparative advertising shall, as far as the comparison is concerned, be 
permitted only when the following conditions are met— 
(a) it is not misleading under regulation 3; 
(b) it is not a misleading action under regulation 5 of the Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 or a misleading omission under 
regulation 6 of those Regulations; 
(c) it compares products meeting the same needs or intended for the same 
purpose; 
(d) it objectively compares one or more material, relevant, verifiable and 
representative features of those products, which may include price; 
(e) it does not create confusion among traders— 
(i) between the advertiser and a competitor, or 
(ii) between the trade marks, trade names, other distinguishing marks or 
products of the advertiser and those of a competitor; 
(f) it does not discredit or denigrate the trade marks, trade names, other 
distinguishing marks, products, activities, or circumstances of a competitor; 
(g) for products with designation of origin, it relates in each case to products 
with the same designation; 
(h) it does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade 
name or other distinguishing marks of a competitor or of the designation of 
origin of competing products; 
(i) it does not present products as imitations or replicas of products bearing a 
protected trade mark or trade name.’ 
 
• Whether the comparative advertising rules provide an effective legal framework for 
modern types of marketing where a competitor or a product offered by a 
competitor can be identified;  
Regulation 4 of the BPMMR 2008 is enforced, under Part 3, by various enforcers 
including the CMA. Again it is not clear that a public enforcement regime, as provided 
under the BPMMR 2008, would in itself be sufficient. However, such a regime is, in the 
UK, supplemented by the availability of various private law actions.63 
 
62  Recital 6. 
63  See, for example, A.M. Dugdale, M. Jones and M. Simpson, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (21st edn., Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2015) at 23-18.  Note, however,  Lord Herschell’s statement in White v Mellin [1895] A.C. 
154 at 165 that the courts should not become ‘…a machinery for advertising rival productions by 
obtaining a judicial determination which of the two was the better’. 
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• Whether the current rules on enforcement set in the MCAD provide an effective 
enforcement framework, especially in the context of cross-border transactions. 
Part 3 of BPMMR 2008 outlines enforcement powers given, for example, to the CMA.64 
Thought should be given to whether or not the MCAD should also set-out private 
rights of redress.65 
 
• Are there measures that could improve the effectiveness of the MCAD in providing 
protection for businesses (see also 1.1.6 below)? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
This has been covered under the last item. 
 
1.1.4. Effectiveness of current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCPD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
By way of background, the relevant literature identifies some disparities in approach 
to the UCPD in Member States.66 However, as will be noted below, the impact of non-
harmonised law on cross-border trade is keenly contested.67  
 
• The effects of the uniform black list of unfair commercial practices annexed to this 
directive on the free movement of goods and services;  
Again by way of background, as will be noted below, the impact of non-harmonised 
law on cross-border trade is keenly contested. Moreover, as the (now) CJEU case law 
indicates, it is not clear that there is a single ‘black’ list.68 
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation derogation under this directive allowing 
national rules on financial services and immovable property represents a barrier to 
cross-border trade. [Do the national differences play a role in a business 
perspective? Have they caused problems?] 
Again by way of background, as will be noted below, the impact of non-harmonised 
law on cross-border trade is keenly contested. Nevertheless, given the complexity of 
this area of law,69 it is possible to make a case that the minimum harmonisation 
64 Regulation 18 provides: ‘(1) The court on an application by an enforcement authority may grant an 
injunction on such terms as it may think fit to secure compliance with regulation 3, 4 or 5. (2) Before 
granting an injunction the court shall have regard to all the interests involved and in particular the public 
interest. (3) An injunction may relate not only to particular advertising but to any advertising in similar 
terms or likely to convey a similar impression. (4) The court may also require any person against whom 
an injunction (other than an interim injunction) is granted to publish in such form and manner and to 
such extent as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of eliminating any continuing effects of the 
advertising— (a) the injunction; and (b) a corrective statement.’ 
65 Cf. 1.1.7. 
66 Cf. G. Howells, H-W. Micklitz and T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Towards a better understanding of unfair commercial 
practices’, (2009) 51 Int. J.L.M. 69. 
67 See, for example, R. Halson and D. Campbell, ‘Harmonisation and its Discontents: A Transaction Costs 
Critique of a European Contract Law’ in J. Devenney and M. Kenny (eds), The Transformation of European 
Private Law, (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
68 See European Commission, Report on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market, (COM(2013) 139 final) at 3.1ff. 
69 On which see above. See also J. Devenney & M. Kenny, ‘Omission of Personal Property from the Proposed 
CESL: The Hamlet Syndrome...Without the Prince?’ [2015] The Journal of Business Law 607. 
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derogation under the UCPD having, at least, some, negative, impact on cross-border 
trade.70 
 
What is the effectiveness of the MCAD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the principle-based approach under this Directive in 
different Member States shows disparities in the understanding of its principles and, 
if so, whether these disparities have an impact on cross-border trade;  
By way of background and analogy, it should be noted that the relevant literature 
identifies some disparities in approach to the UCPD (the sister directive to the MCAD) 
in Member States.71 However, as will be noted below, the impact of non-harmonised 
law on cross-border trade is keenly contested.72  
 
• Whether the minimum harmonisation character of provisions on misleading 
advertising represents a barrier to cross-border trade;  
Again by way of background, as will be noted below, the impact of non-harmonised 
law on cross-border trade is keenly contested.  
 
• Whether the fully harmonised provisions on comparative advertising provide an 
appropriate legal framework in cross-border trade for advertising where a 
competitor or a product offered by a competitor can be identified;  
As noted above, the full harmonisation provisions in the MCAD are restricted to 
‘…comparative advertising as far as the comparison is concerned’73 and this is, 
arguably, justified on the effect comparative advertising can have on competition.74 
One challenge for the EU legislator is how to maintain the ‘currency’ of the MCAD 
following, for example, multiple decisions from the (now) CJEU.75 
 
• Whether the lack of cross-border enforcement mechanism in B2B relations 
constitutes a barrier to cross-border trade. 
By way of background, it can be argued that the remedies/enforcement regime in 
relation to EU directives is, sometimes, insufficient and this can impact on the 
effectiveness of a particular directive.76 This can also apply to the cross-border 
enforcement dimension.77 
 
70 Cf. L. Poro, ‘Unfair commercial practices in financial services: is the EU legal framework sufficient to 
protect consumers?’ (2014) 29 J.I.B.L.R. 422. 
71 Cf. G. Howells, H-W. Micklitz and T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Towards a better understanding of unfair commercial 
practices’, (2009) 51 Int. J.L.M. 69. 
72 See, for example, R. Halson and D. Campbell, ‘Harmonisation and its Discontents: A Transaction Costs 
Critique of a European Contract Law’ in J. Devenney and M. Kenny (eds), The Transformation of Private 
Law, (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
73 MCAD, Article 8(1). 
74 Recital 6. 
75 On which, in relation to comparative advertising, see D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, 
Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law (Lexis, 1996- ) at 229. 
76 J. Devenney, M. Kenny & L. Gillies, ‘The EU Optional Instrument: Absorbing the Private International Law 
Implications of a Common European Sales Law’, (2012) Yearbook of Private International Law 315 at 
335-336. 
77 See J. Devenney & T. Pfeiffer, ‘Control of Standard Terms (Collective Proceedings)’ in G. Dannemann & S. 
Vogenauer, The Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law and its Interaction with English 
and German Law (Oxford University Press,  2013). 
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1.1.5. Interplay amongst UCPD information requirements according to Article 7(4) 
with the information requirements in the horizontal consumer law instruments  
Regarding the information requirements according to Article 7(4) UCPD ("invitation to 
purchase") in the advertising stage, please analyse: 
• The level of awareness of traders as regards information requirements at the 
advertising stage, as in particular demonstrated by their practical application; [Key 
aspects to consider are: How are these rules applied in practice? To what extent do 
traders implement these rules? Are these information requirements under the UCPD 
useful in view of the more comprehensive pre-contractual information requirements 
of the CRD?] 
Regulation 6 of the CPUTR 2008 provides: 
‘(1) A commercial practice is a misleading omission if, in its factual context, 
taking account of the matters in paragraph (2)78— 
(a) the commercial practice omits material information, 
(b) the commercial practice hides material information, 
(c) the commercial practice provides material information in a manner which is 
unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely, or 
(d) the commercial practice fails to identify its commercial intent, unless this is 
already apparent from the context, 
and as a result it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise.’79 
Regulation 6(4), emanating from Article 7(4) of the UCPD, outlines ‘material 
information’ in the context of invitations to purchase: 
‘(4) Where a commercial practice is an invitation to purchase, the following 
information will be material if not already apparent from the context in addition 
to any other information which is material information under paragraph (3)— 
(a) the main characteristics of the product, to the extent appropriate to the 
medium by which the invitation to purchase is communicated and the product; 
(b) the identity of the trader, such as his trading name, and the identity of any 
other trader on whose behalf the trader is acting; 
(c) the geographical address of the trader and the geographical address of any 
other trader on whose behalf the trader is acting; 
(d) either— 
(i) the price, including any taxes; or 
(ii) where the nature of the product is such that the price cannot reasonably be 
calculated in advance, the manner in which the price is calculated; 
(e) where appropriate, either— 
(i) all additional freight, delivery or postal charges; or 
78  ‘(2) The matters referred to in paragraph (1) are— 
(a) all the features and circumstances of the commercial practice; 
(b) the limitations of the medium used to communicate the commercial practice (including limitations of 
space or time); and 
(c) where the medium used to communicate the commercial practice imposes limitations of space or time, 
any measures taken by the trader to make the information available to consumers by other means.’ 
79  Emphasis added. Regulation 6(3) provides: ‘(3) In paragraph (1) ‘material information’ means—(a) the 
information which the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed 
transactional decision; and (b) any information requirement which applies in relation to a commercial 
communication as a result of an EU obligation.’ 
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(ii) where such charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact 
that such charges may be payable; 
(f) the following matters where they depart from the requirements of 
professional diligence— 
(i) arrangements for payment, 
(ii) arrangements for delivery, 
(iii) arrangements for performance, 
(iv) complaint handling policy; 
(g) for products and transactions involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation, 
the existence of such a right.’ 
The OFT provided detailed guidance on this provision (now adopted by the CMA).80 
However, the extent to which traders are aware of these requirements is unclear.81 On 
the other hand the UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘Overall [there is a] good 
level of awareness in the United Kingdom. There are incidents where the companies 
may not provide some of the required information, this is dealt with by the appropriate 
Trading Standards authorities, based on proportionality… Generally speaking traders 
tend to adhere to the rules. This is only based on anecdotal knowledge of the market 
and complaints received.’ 
 
• Is there any overlap with the provisions of the Services Directive and the E-
commerce Directive that apply to advertising? If so, are there any costs arising for 
public authorities and/or businesses due to this multiplicity of information 
obligations? 
By way of background, it should, first, be noted that the precise impact on consumer 
protection of the provision of information is contested and will vary depending on the 
context.82 Secondly, it should be noted that there are now a plethora of information 
duties affecting contracts with consumers. For example, s.12 of the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015 (‘[o]ther pre-contract information included in contract’) provides: 
‘(1) This section applies to any contract to supply goods. (2) Where regulation 
9, 10 or 13 of the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and 
Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134)83 required the trader to 
provide information to the consumer before the contract became binding, any 
of that information that was provided by the trader other than information 
about the goods and mentioned in paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the 
Regulations (main characteristics of goods) is to be treated as included as a 
term of the contract.’ 
This provision is not straightforward, not least as s.12(1) states that it ‘applies to any 
contract to supply goods’ whereas the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation 
80 OFT, Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 Guidance on the Implementation of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, (OFT 1008 (2008)) at 7.20ff. The UK European Consumer Centre 
noted: ‘These information requirements are generally the same as in the CRD. We believe these are 
useful, as a part of the UCPD (as well as national regulations), because the weight of breach of these 
tends to be considered as bigger than the information requirements under CRD.’ 
81 Some of the requirements would, it is submitted, be routinely provided in many cases (e.g. the price). 
82 Cf. J. Luzak, ‘Online disclosure rules of the Consumer Rights Directive: Protecting passive or active 
consumers?’ (2015) 3 Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 79. 
83 Which partially implement the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) (Directive 2011/83/EC). 
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and Additional Charges) Regulations 201384 sometimes limit a particular information 
requirement to a particular type of contract (for example a sales contract85).86 
Moreover it is not always clear exactly how some of these terms, emanating from the 
provision of particular information, is to operate,87 particularly when read with s.12(3), 
Consumer Rights Act 2015.88 For example, under Schedule 1, paragraph (b) ‘the 
identity of the trader (such as the trader's trading name), the geographical address at 
which the trader is established and the trader's telephone number…’. Presumably this 
does not mean that, for example, the trader cannot change telephone number or 
cannot change it without the agreement of the consumer (or all relevant consumers!)? 
Is the relevant requirement to somehow make available89 changes to a telephone 
number?90 
There is also the risk of unnecessary overlap or fragmentation as demonstrated by 
Regulation 691 the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 200292 or the 
84 These Regulations, of course, implement Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights [2011] O.J. L304/64, 
Article 3(1) of which is expressed in wide terms: ‘This Directive shall apply, under the conditions and to 
the extent set out in its provisions, to any contract concluded between a trader and a consumer. It shall 
also apply to contracts for the supply of water, gas, electricity or district heating, including by public 
providers, to the extent that these commodities are provided on a contractual basis.’ The Regulations do 
not apply to a number of situations including contracts ‘…(b) for services of a banking, credit, insurance, 
personal pension, investment or payment nature…’ (Regulation 6). 
85  Defined by Regulation 5. 
86  See, for example, Schedule 2, para. (p). 
87  See also Regulation 18. 
88  ‘A change to any of that information, made before entering into the contract or later, is not effective 
unless expressly agreed between the consumer and the trader.’ 
89  See Regulation 8: ‘For the purposes of this Part, something is made available to a consumer only if the 
consumer can reasonably be expected to know how to access it.’ 
90 In Schedule 2 the corresponding requirement is expressed in slightly different terms: ‘…(c) the 
geographical address at which the trader is established and, where available, the trader's telephone 
number, fax number and e-mail address, to enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and 
communicate efficiently…’. 
91 ‘(1) A person providing an information society service shall make available to the recipient of the service 
and any relevant enforcement authority, in a form and manner which is easily, directly and permanently 
accessible, the following information— 
(a) the name of the service provider; 
(b) the geographic address at which the service provider is established; 
(c) the details of the service provider, including his electronic mail address, which make it possible to 
contact him rapidly and communicate with him in a direct and effective manner; 
(d) where the service provider is registered in a trade or similar register available to the public, details of 
the register in which the service provider is entered and his registration number, or equivalent means of 
identification in that register; 
(e) where the provision of the service is subject to an authorisation scheme, the particulars of the 
relevant supervisory authority; 
(f) where the service provider exercises a regulated profession— 
(i) the details of any professional body or similar institution with which the service provider is registered; 
(ii) his professional title and the member State where that title has been granted; 
(iii) a reference to the professional rules applicable to the service provider in the member State of 
establishment and the means to access them; and 
(g) where the service provider undertakes an activity that is subject to value added tax, the identification 
number referred to in Article 22(1) of the sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the member States relating to turnover taxes—Common system of value 
added tax: uniform basis of assessment 1. 
(2) Where a person providing an information society service refers to prices, these shall be indicated 
clearly and unambiguously and, in particular, shall indicate whether they are inclusive of tax and delivery 
costs.’ 
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Financial Services (Distance Marketing) Regulations 2004.93 On a more general level 
the Consumer Council for Northern Ireland reported: 
‘…the Consumer Council undertook with NI businesses, we found just under a 
third of NI businesses, particularly SME’s, reported finding it difficult to keep up 
to date with consumer law […] A key factor to the successful implementation of 
new consumer law is the education campaign that accompanies them. 
Increasingly there has been a move towards producing concise, user-friendly, 
plain language guides that communicate key changes and signpost to more 
detailed guidance where needed. This is to be commended. However, there 
remains a challenge in ensuring such information is disseminated as widely as 
possible and that it reaches those who need it most, when they need it.’  
 
1.1.6. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of unfair commercial practices/marketing, please analyse: 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to B2B 
transactions or a revision/extension of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising 
Directive would bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
As noted above,94 the CPUTR 2008 only apply to B2C95 transactions although the 
definition of a consumer has been slightly widened recently.96 As will be noted below, 
some (particularly small) businesses are affected by similar vulnerabilities to some 
consumers.97 Nevertheless in the B2B context, creating, for example, a ‘black’ list of 
unfair commercial practices, which in line with the CPUTR 2008 attract criminal 
sanctions, is likely to be controversial and may, depending on the approach adopted, 
be regarded as too burdensome on businesses.98 That is not, of course, to claim that 
there are not some commercial practices which in a B2B context would be regarded as 
being on a ‘virtual’ black list.99  
The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy commented: ‘In general 
the UK Government believes in the principle of freedom to contract for businesses. 
Our call for evidence on small businesses as consumers demonstrated that extension 
of Unfair Contract Terms to Business to Business was not needed and that there were 
risks involved in doing so. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy also published a consultation exploring whether certain further protections 
for the smallest businesses were needed when dealing with the non-regulated sectors. 
Responses are currently being analysed and a full Government response, together 
92 SI 2002/2013, transposing Article 5 of the Electronic Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC).  
Regulation 6 refers to ‘information society service’ which is defined, in complicated terms, in Regulation 
2: ‘’information society services’ (which is summarised in recital 17 of the Directive as covering ‘any 
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the 
processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient 
of a service’) has the meaning set out in Article 2(a) of the Directive, (which refers to Article 1(2) of 
Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations, as amended 
by Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July 1998)’. 
93  SI 2004/2095 transposing Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services [2002] OJ L271/16.  Financial services are excluded from the Consumer Contracts (Information, 
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134): see Regulation 6(1)(b). 
94  See 1.1.1. 
95  See also, for example, Regulation 27A(2)(b) on C2B transactions. 
96 Under the CPUTR 2008 a “consumer” was initially defined as: “any individual who in relation to a 
commercial practice is acting for purposes which are outside his business” (Regulation 2). This was 
subsequently amended to define a consumer as: “…an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or 
mainly outside that individual's business”. 
97 See 1.2.3. 
98 See above at 1.1.3. 
99 See, for example, the Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Act 1927, s.1. It also needs to be considered 
whether the harmonisation of such individual rules would contribute to cross-border trade. 
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with any recommendations, will be issued later this year. Issues to be considered 
include freedom to contract, the needs of different sectors, competitiveness of SMEs 
and market functions, the impact on consumers of relevant case law and the potential 
weakening of consumer rights.’100  
 
• Whether it is appropriate to keep separate legal regimes for B2B and B2C 
transactions in the area of commercial practices and to what extent both regimes 
could be aligned;  
In recent years in the UK there has been some move to separate B2B and B2C 
regimes, most notably with the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which largely separates the 
laws on supply of goods and unfair terms along these lines. One reason for such a split 
is that different policy considerations may be involved in these two contexts.101  
 
• The appropriate scope of the protection in B2B transactions – whether the 
protection should cover only the pre-contractual stage (i.e. misleading or 
aggressive marketing) or should also cover unfair commercial practices during and 
after the transaction;  
As suggested below,102 there is an argument to cover the use of some types of 
contractual term in unfair commercial practices legislation even in the B2B context. 
Yet, overall, from a UK perspective this is likely to be controversial, not least due to 
what might be, at least, perceived as an interface with a doctrine of ‘good faith’ in 
contract performance.103 
 
• Whether there is a need to have a black-list of practices in the business-to-business 
marketing area;  
There may be some difficulty in drafting such a list. An alternative would be to 
supplement legislation with detailed indicative guidance.104 
 
• What should be the enforcement cooperation mechanism in the business-to-
business marketing area;  
This has been commented on above.105 
 
• Whether there is a need to develop contractual consequences linked to the 
breaches of the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive;  
This has been commented on above.106 
 
• Whether there is a need to adapt the rules on comparative advertising of the 
current Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive. 
As noted above,107 on 21st April 2015 Which? submitted a super-complaint to the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) concerned pricing practices in the groceries 
100 11 August 2016 
101 Cf. H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-462. 
102 See 1.2.3.  
103 Cf., for example, MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789 at [45] 
per Moore-Bick LJ (hostility to concept of good faith). 
104 Although cf. the rather brief OFT, Business to Business Promotions and Comparative Advertisements: A 
Quick Guide to the Business Protection from Marketing Regulations 2008 (OFT 1056 (2008)). 
105 See 1.1.3. 
106 See 1.1.3. 
107 See 1.1.2.  
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sector.108 The CMA did ‘…not consider there to be a systemic problem in the groceries 
market in how retailers present prices, concluding that problems are not occurring in 
large numbers across the whole sector and that generally retailers are taking 
compliance with legislation seriously to avoid such problems occurring’.109 However, a 
further recommendation made by the CMA was: 
‘Recommendation 6: The CMA recommends that retailers ensure the 
information they provide about their price match schemes is as clear and 
transparent as possible in terms and conditions, online FAQs and in store. In 
particular, consideration should be given to whether the information is 
sufficiently accessible and in plain English.’110 
 
1.1.7. Relevance of contractual consequences of unfair commercial practices  
Please analyse whether there are in your country: 
• Any national law provisions providing contractual consequences in case of breaches 
to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or national provisions on the avoidance 
of the contract e.g. in cases of usury or other immoral behaviour; 
Initially the CPUTR 2008 did not give consumers specific rights of private redress; a 
position buttressed by the original version of Regulation 28 which provided that ‘[a]n 
agreement shall not be void or unenforceable by reason only of a breach of these 
Regulations.’ Instead a consumer wanting private redress from an unfair commercial 
practice had to fashion a remedy from pre-existing doctrines: 
‘The Regulations concern public enforcement rather than private redress. They 
do not give consumers the right to start civil actions to obtain compensation or 
other remedies. Instead, consumers must rely on existing private law 
doctrines, such as the law of misrepresentation and duress.’ 111 
Yet such an exercise was not always straightforward.112 To some extent this was the 
result of the law of misrepresentation being an amalgam of (i) common law, equity 
and statute (e.g. Misrepresentation Act 1967) and (ii) tort and contract law.113 
However, there were wider issues. First, the concept of a misleading action under 
CPUTR is not necessarily the same as under the general law of misrepresentation.114 
Secondly, there are limited remedies for misleading omissions under the general law 
of misrepresentation.115 Thirdly, there are particular limitations on the right to rescind 
including (i) the general unavailability of a right of partial rescission116 and (ii) 
uncertainty on how long a right of rescission lasts.117 Fourthly, there are difficulties in 
108 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-receives-super-complaint-from-which?  
109 See BIS, Pricing Practices in the Groceries Market: Government response to the Competition and Markets 
Authority’s report and recommendations on the super-complaint made by Which?, (BIS/15/568 (2015)). 
110 CMA, Pricing Practices in the Groceries Market Response to a super-complaint made by Which? on 21 
April 2015 (2015) at 8.15. 
111 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) viii 
(referring to the original Regulations). 
112 ‘This is problematic: the law of misrepresentation is complex and uncertain…’ (Law Commission, 
Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) viii); and on the various 
ways in which the misleading and aggressive practices concepts may be broader than traditional English 
private law doctrines like misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, see M. Koutsias and C. Willett, 
‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in the UK’ (2012) 5(4) Erasmus Law Review. 
113 See, generally, Devenney, ‘Re-Examining Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Towards a More 
Measured Response to Compensation and Deterrence’, in Di Matteo, Rowley, Zhou & Santier, Current 
Issues in Commercial Contracts: Transatlantic Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2013) especially 
at pp.417-418. 
114 See, for example, OFT v. Purely Creative Ltd [2011] EWHC 106 (Ch) where Briggs J. thought that the 
causation test was more onerous under the CPUTR 2008 than under the general law of misrepresentation. 
115 See, for example, Turner v. Green [1895] 2 Ch 205. 
116 See, generally, J. Poole and A. Keyser, Justifying Partial Rescission in English Law [2005] 121 LQR 273. 
117 Cf. also Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) Law Com 317). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1228
the assessment of damages for misrepresentation118 including possibly the types of 
losses a consumer might be able to claim.119 Finally, there are issues surrounding the 
ability and willingness of a consumer to bring an action. 
Similarly a consumer who has been subject to aggressive practices under the CPUTR 
2008 might be able to fashion a private remedy from, for example, the general law of 
duress and/or undue influence (usually rescission). Yet these doctrines were/are not 
unproblematic in this context: 
‘…the present private law provides only patchy and inadequate safeguards 
against aggressive practices. The doctrines of duress and undue influence are 
ill-fitted to deal with high-pressure sales techniques used to exploit consumers. 
Furthermore, the law of unconscionable bargains is too uncertain to deliver 
effective consumer protection. Finally, the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 can be useful protection against a course of conduct, but does not usually 
apply to one-off incidents.’120  
The foregoing resulted in calls for reform, especially against the backdrop of the strain 
on the public purse post-financial crisis: 
‘In 2009, Consumer Focus called for a private right of redress for all consumers 
who suffered loss through a breach of the Regulations. They pointed out that 
scams are all too common but relatively few prosecutions are brought. They 
thought that enforcement would be more effective if public authorities and 
consumers ‘worked in tandem’, using both private and public enforcement 
sanctions.’121  
The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (CPAR 2014) inserted a new 
Part 4A into CPUTR 2008 giving consumers specific private rights of redress in relation 
to the CPUTR 2008: the remedies are the unwinding of a contract, a discount and 
damages. This is part of a significant overhaul of consumer law in the UK.122 
Consumers are given these private redress rights in relation to misleading actions and 
aggressive practices but not specifically misleading omissions.123 Generally, and 
subject to rules on double recovery, these remedies operate in addition to existing 
possibilities for private redress under the general law.124  
Unfortunately the CPAR 2014 is not a model of clarity in drafting. Regulation 27A is 
the gateway into the new provisions, setting out three preliminary conditions for the 
rights in Part 4A to be engaged. First, there must be a particular transaction involving 
a consumer. The relevant transactions are set out in Regulation 27A(2): 
‘(a) the consumer enters into a contract with a trader for the sale or supply of 
a product by the trader (a ‘business to consumer contract’), 
118 See J. Poole & J. Devenney, Reforming Damages for Misrepresentation: The Case for Coherent Aims and 
Principles [2007] Journal of Business Law 269-305. 
119 Generally damages for disappointment and distress are not available in the Contract Law of England and 
Wales.  However, in an action for misrepresentation damages for such losses may be available, at least 
for fraudulent misrepresentation: see Archer v. Brown [1985] Q.B. 401.  See, generally, H. McGregor, 
McGregor on Damages, (19th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) para. 5-012. 
120 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 3.51. In 
deed in Niersmans v. Pesticcio [2004] EWCA Civ 372 at [2] Mummery L.J. lamented:  ‘…The striking 
feature of this appeal is that fundamental misconceptions [about the doctrine of undue influence] persist, 
even though the doctrine is over 200 years old and its basis and scope were examined by the House of 
Lords in depth…less than 3 years ago in the well-known case of ...Etridge (No.2)... The continuing 
confusions matter.  Aspects of the instant case demonstrate the need for a wider understanding, both in 
and outside the legal profession, of the circumstances in which the court will intervene to protect the 
dependant and the vulnerable in dealings with their property.’ 
121 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) viii. 
122 See, in particular, the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the aims of which were: to streamline consumer 
rights; to clarify aspects of consumer law; to modernise consumer law, particularly for the digital age; to 
deregulate for businesses; and to selectively enhance consumer protection in the UK. 
123 CPUTR 2008, Regulation 27B. 
124 See CPUTR 2008, Regulation 27L but cf. Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(4). 
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(b) the consumer enters into a contract with a trader for the sale of goods to 
the trader (a ‘consumer to business contract’), or 
(c) the consumer makes a payment to a trader for the supply of a product (a 
‘consumer payment’).’ 
The second condition is that the trader (or possibly the producer125) engages in a 
prohibited practice (viz., for these purposes, a misleading action or aggressive 
practice).The third condition is that the prohibited practice is a ‘significant factor’ in 
the consumer entering the contract or making the relevant payment.126 
The remedy of unwinding is contained in the (amended) CPUTR 2008, Regulations 
27E-H, with Regulations 27E-F dealing with business to consumer contracts.127 The 
consequences of unwinding are that the contract comes to an end, the trader may 
have to give the consumer a refund and the goods must be made available for 
collection by the trader.128 Under 27E(1) unwinding is available ‘…if the consumer 
indicates to the trader that the consumer rejects the product, and does so (a) within 
the relevant period [90 days], and (b) at a time when the product is capable of being 
rejected.’ Regulation 27E(8) provides:  
‘…a product remains capable of being rejected only if— 
(a) the goods have not been fully consumed, 
(b) the service has not been fully performed, 
(c) the digital content has not been fully consumed, 
(d) the lease has not expired, or 
(e) the right has not been fully exercised…’ 
Significantly a consumer is generally not required to account for use of the product:129  
‘We believe that in most cases, requiring an allowance for use would remove 
the simplicity and usefulness of the remedy. Any over-compensation would be 
limited because the complaint must be made within three months. Given that 
the trader has acted in a misleading or aggressive way, this is not wholly 
inappropriate.’130 
In terms of the remedy of a discount Regulation 27L(1) provides:  
‘A consumer has the right to a discount in respect of a business to consumer 
contract if—(a) the consumer has made one or more payments for the product 
to the trader or one or more payments under the contract have not been made, 
and (b) the consumer has not exercised the right to unwind in respect of the 
contract.’ 
125 ‘The second condition is that— 
(a) the trader engages in a prohibited practice in relation to the product, or 
(b) in a case where a consumer enters into a business to consumer contract for goods or digital content— 
(i) a producer engages in a prohibited practice in relation to the goods or digital content, and 
(ii) when the contract is entered into, the trader is aware of the commercial practice that constitutes the 
prohibited practice or could reasonably be expected to be aware of it.’ 
126 Regulation 27A(6) provides: ‘The third condition is that the prohibited practice is a significant factor in 
the consumer's decision to enter into the contract or make the payment.’ 
127 See above: ‘a contract with a trader for the sale or supply of a product by the trader’. Regulations 27G 
and 27H deal respectively with the unwinding of a consumer to business contract and a consumer 
payment. 
128 Regulation 27F(1): ‘Where a consumer has the right to unwind in respect of a business to consumer 
contract—(a) the contract comes to an end so that the consumer and the trader are released from their 
obligations under it, (b) the trader has a duty to give the consumer a refund (subject as follows), and (c) 
if the contract was wholly or partly for the sale or supply of goods the consumer must make the goods 
available for collection by the trader.’ 
129 Cf. Regulation 27F(7) in relation to, for example, continuous contracts such as some utility contracts. 
130 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 8.91. 
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The (amended) CPUTR 2008 also provide a, fairly crude, sliding scale of the quantum 
of discounts.131 In terms of damages, which is of course an established remedy for 
misrepresentation in England and Wales,132 significantly a consumer is given the right 
to claim damages for ‘alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort’ subject 
to a remoteness test.133 Unlike the other remedies, there is a due diligence defence 
(s27J(5)(b): ‘the trader took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence 
to avoid the occurrence of the prohibited practice’). 
 
• Any case law (enforcement decisions, court rulings) providing for such 
consequences; 
This has been covered under the last item. 
 
• Whether there is, based on past experience in your country, a need and potential to 
develop contractual consequences linked to the use of unfair commercial practices. 
As a result of the CPAR 2014 the UK now has specific private law remedies for some 
unfair commercial practices. Yet these remedies, which largely operate alongside 
remedies under the general law, have added complexity to this area of consumer law, 
not least as a result of the legislative drafting. Indeed, with concerns about 
fragmentation in mind, there is an argument that these reforms should have been 
absorbed into the Consumer Rights Act 2015. Moreover there are significant 
continuing issues around the ability and willingness of consumers to make full use of 
such remedies134 as well as issues of consumer education; and it is ultimately those 
issues which may dull the potency of these reforms. 
 
131 Regulation 27I (4):  ‘Subject to paragraph (6), the relevant percentage is as follows— 
(a) if the prohibited practice is more than minor, it is 25%, 
(b) if the prohibited practice is significant, it is 50%, 
(c) if the prohibited practice is serious, it is 75%, and 
(d) if the prohibited practice is very serious, it is 100%.’ 
Regulation 27I(6) concerns products where the contract price exceeds £5,000. 
132 There is some authority that damages (or a similar remedy) may be awarded for undue influence and/or 
duress: see Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All E.R. 61 and Law Commission, Consumer Redress for 
Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 3.57. 
133 Regulation 27J (1): ‘Subject as follows, a consumer has the right to damages if the consumer— 
(a) has incurred financial loss which the consumer would not have incurred if the prohibited practice in 
question had not taken place, or 
(b) has suffered alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort which the consumer would not 
have suffered if the prohibited practice in question had not taken place. 
(2) The right to damages is the right to be paid damages by the trader for the loss or the alarm, distress 
or physical inconvenience or discomfort in question. 
(3) The right to be paid damages for financial loss does not include the right to be paid damages in 
respect of the difference between the market price of a product and the amount payable for it under a 
contract. 
(4) The right to be paid damages under this regulation is a right to be paid only damages in respect of 
loss that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the prohibited practice’. 
134 Cf. H.G. Beale, ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in J 
Beatson & D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, (1995, Clarendon, Oxford) on the 
importance of collective measures. 
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1.2. Contract conclusion and performance 
1.2.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms 
of: 
• The overall effectiveness of the principle-based approach under this Directive;  
It is not clear that the main focus of the UCTD is on establishing a high level of 
consumer protection;135 nor is it clear that a high level of consumer protection 
necessarily, or at least proportionately, contributes to increased consumer 
participation in the internal market.136 Nevertheless it is clear that the regulation of 
terms in consumer contracts contributes to the level of consumer protection in any 
legal system.137 Prior to the transposition of the UCTD in the UK, terms in consumer 
contracts were ‘policed’ in a number of ways in the UK. Thus terms in consumer 
contracts were regulated, for example, through approaches to interpretation,138 
principles of incorporation139 and the rule against penalty clauses.140 Parliament had 
also made provision for the regulation of terms in consumer contracts, most notably 
through the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA 1977). In general terms, UCTA 
1977 regulated exclusion/limitation clauses141 in certain consumer and non-consumer 
contracts.142 In relation to consumer contracts under UCTA 1977 some clauses were 
automatically rendered unenforceable143 whilst others were rendered unenforceable if 
unreasonable.144 The technique of automatically rendering some clauses unenforceable 
may have advantages145 in terms of consumer protection but it also has 
135 See, generally, J. Devenney, ‘Gordian Knots in Europeanised Private Law: Unfair Terms, Bank Charges 
and Political Compromises’ [2011] NILQ 33. 
136 It may, for example, place too much burden on smaller businesses. Cf. Press Release IP/11/1175 (on the 
then proposed Common European Sales Law): ‘On October 11th 2011, the European Commission 
proposed an optional Common European Sales Law will help break down these barriers and give 
consumers more choice and a high level of protection. It will facilitate trade by offering a single set of 
rules for cross-border contracts in all 27 EU countries. If traders offer their products on the basis of the 
Common European Sales law, consumers would have the option of choosing a user-friendly European 
contract with a high level of protection with just one click of a mouse. …’ 
137 Cf. I. Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Market (2nd. Edn., 
Hart Publishing, 2007) Ch. 4. 
138 See, for example, Houghton v. Trafalgar Insurance Co [1954] 1 QB 247. 
139 See, for example, Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] Q.B. 433.  See, 
for example, p.445 where Bingham LJ stated: ‘The crucial question in the case is whether the plaintiffs 
can be said fairly and reasonably to have brought condition 2 to the notice of the defendants… In my 
opinion the plaintiffs did not do so… The defendants are not to be relieved of that liability because they 
did not read the condition, although doubtless they did not; but in my judgment they are to be relieved 
because the plaintiffs did not do what was necessary to draw this unreasonable and extortionate clause 
fairly to their attention.’ 
140 See, for example, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 but note 
the recent consideration of that case by the Supreme Court in Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV; 
ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67. 
141 Note the expanded definition of relevant clauses in s.13, UCTA 1977. 
142 Note s.12 on ‘dealing as consumer’. 
143 See, for example, S.2(1), UCTA 1977: ‘A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice 
given to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal 
injury resulting from negligence.’ 
144 See, for example, S.3, UCTA 1977 [pre-Consumer Rights Act 2015 version]: ‘(1) This section applies as 
between contracting parties where one of them deals as consumer or on the other's written standard 
terms of business. (2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract term— (a) 
when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of his in respect of the breach; or (b) 
claim to be entitled— (i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was 
reasonably expected of him, or (ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to 
render no performance at all, except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned above in this subsection) 
the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.’ 
145 Cf. C. Scott & J. Black, Cranston’s Consumers and the Law (3rd edn., Butterworths, 2000) at 96. 
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disadvantages.146 The UCTD’s principle-based approach is arguably more suitable for 
applying to a wide range of contractual terms147 although, as will be noted below, it 
also presents challenges in interpretation/application.148 The UK initially149 transposed 
the UCTD alongside UCTA 1977, thus arriving at a blend of a principle-based 
approach150 and a rule-based approach.151 Thereafter the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
(CRA 2015)152 introduced significant structural reform in this area of law in the UK. In 
particular, UCTA 1977 was essentially confined to non-consumer cases;153 and the 
UTCCR 1999 were repealed and replaced by a regime for ‘policing’ terms in consumer 
contracts in Part 2 of the CRA 2015. Significantly the latter regime includes a blend of 
principle-based approaches154 and rule-based approaches.  
 
• The practical effectiveness of the indicative list of unfair terms annexed to the 
Directive, in particular its application in practical cases; [Key aspects to consider 
are: How is the indicative list of the Directive interpreted in your MS? Does this 
work in practice or are there problems?] 
The UTCCR 1999 essentially replicated in Schedule 2 the indicative list from the Annex 
of the UCTD (sometimes referred to as a ‘grey’ list). The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
and now the Competition and Markets Authority have made use of the indicative list in 
their guidance155 and enforcement activity.156 In so doing there was, at times, 
evidence of an expansive approach.157 Moreover it seems that, following the bank 
charges litigation,158 the grey list has gained greater prominence.159 The relevant case 
146 See Law Commission, Report No 69, Second Report on Exemption Clauses in Contracts, 1975, para 58:  
‘It may still be said, however, that although a complete ban on exemptions from liability for negligence 
applicable to consumer and commercial transactions alike cannot be justified, there should be a complete 
ban in relation to consumer transactions. The arguments advanced in favour of this proposal are that the 
private consumer is at a serious disadvantage in the matter of bargaining power since normally he has no 
alternative but to accept the terms and conditions of a standard form contract imposed on him by a 
monopolistic or near-monopolistic industry; and that he is less likely to be insured than is a person 
receiving the service in the course of his business. Our Working Party rejected this proposal as being too 
rigid and in our joint document we agreed with their conclusion. There are many situations in which the 
arguments in support of the proposal should prevail, but we are convinced from the evidence we have 
summarised in the two preceding paragraphs that there are also situations in which such a ban would not 
operate to the advantage of consumers. Suppliers are not all monopolists; monopolists do not always 
insist on using standard forms of contracts which they will not vary; customers are sometimes given a 
choice between accepting the risk of loss and paying a lower rate for the service or paying a higher rate 
and leaving the risk with the supplier. In any event, where the liability in question is liability for death or 
personal injury the distinction between ‘commercial’ and ‘consumer’ transactions is irrelevant. In our view 
it would not be right to recommend a complete ban on exclusion or restriction of liability for negligence in 
all consumer transactions.’ 
147 Cf. C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
2007) at 431. 
148 See 1.2.2. 
149 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1994 (1994/3159), later replaced by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (1999/2083). 
150 For example, under UTCCR 1999, Regulation 5. 
151 For example, under UCTA 1977, s.2(1). 
152 The relevant provisions of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 came into force on 1 October 2015 (see 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Commencement No. 3, Transitional Provisions, Savings and Consequential 
Amendments) Order 2015/1630) and do not have retrospective effect. 
153 See Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 4 paras 2-27. 
154 S.62(4) provides: ‘(4) A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.’ 
155 See, for example, CMA, ‘Contract Terms Guidance: Guidance on the Unfair Terms Provisions in the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (CMA37 (2015)), p.63ff.  
156 See, for example, OFT, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, (OFT311, (2008)). 
157 For example, in relation to exclusion or limitation clauses under paragraphs (a), (b) or (q).  See OFT, 
‘Unfair Terms Guidance’ (OFT311 (2008)) para. 1.5: ‘If a term achieves the same effect as an unfair 
exemption clause, it will be unfair whatever its form or mechanism. This applies, for instance, to terms 
which ‘deem' things to be the case, or get consumers to declare that they are-whether they really are or 
not-with the aim of ensuring no liability arises in the first place.’ 
158 Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6. 
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law demonstrates the role of interpretation of the relevant contract term(s) as a 
precursor to the application of the unfairness test, with or without reference to the 
indicative list.160 The (now) Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has, of course, 
developed a jurisprudence around the ‘grey’ list. Thus in Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi 
Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt161 the ECJ noted that: 
‘If the content of the annex does not suffice in itself to establish automatically 
the unfair nature of a contested term, it is nevertheless an essential element 
on which the competent court may base its assessment as to the unfair nature 
of that term.’162 
That case, in effect, involved a provision which allowed the trader to vary the fees 
charged for a service (telephone services).163 It thus touched upon paragraphs 1(j) 
and 1 (l) of the ‘grey’ list as well as paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d).164 The ECJ, after 
referring to Article 5 of the UTCD (plain intelligible language requirement) concluded: 
‘Moreover, as is clear from the 20th recital in the preamble to the Directive, the 
consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms 
appearing in the GBC and the consequences of those terms. Further, the 
obligation to draft terms in clear, intelligible language is laid down in Article 5 
of the Directive… Consequently, in the assessment of the ‘unfair’ nature of a 
term, within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive, the possibility for the 
consumer to foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the 
amendments, by a seller or supplier, of the GBC with regard to the fees 
connected to the service to be provided is of fundamental importance.’165 
There is some doubt whether or not some of the relevant case law in the UK166 is 
sufficiently in tune with this ruling from the ECJ (the consumer being able to foresee 
the amendments), although that case law did pre-date this ECJ ruling.167  
159 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 5.3. 
160 See, for example, Spreadex Ltd v Cochrane [2012] EWHC 1290 (Comm) at [12]. 
161 (C-472/10) April 26, 2012. 
162 Cf. Peabody Trust Governors v Reeve [2008] EWHC 1432 (Ch) at [49] per Gabriel Moss QC “It follows 
from the judgment of the European Court of Justice [in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH 
Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Hofstetter (C237/02) April 1, 2004] that even if Mr Bastin is correct in locating 
the present provision both within Schedule 2, paragraph 1(j) as a typically unfair provision but yet one 
which is  not  to be regarded as typically unfair by reason of Schedule 2, paragraph 2(b) , this takes the 
matter no further forward and is of no assistance to him.” 
163 See Nemzeti at [17]. 
164 “(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason 
which is specified in the contract… 
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of goods 
or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving the consumer the 
corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when 
the contract was concluded… 
2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l)… 
(b) Subparagraph (j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial services reserves 
the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due to the latter, or the amount of other 
charges for financial services without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is 
required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the 
latter are free to dissolve the contract immediately.  
Subparagraph (j) is also without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier reserves the right to 
alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate duration, provided that he is required to 
inform the consumer with reasonable notice and that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract…  
(d) Subparagraph (l) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, provided that the 
method by which prices vary is explicitly described.” 
165 [27]-[28]. 
166 In particular, Du Plessis v. Fontgary Leisure Parks Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 409.   
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Prior to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Law Commission gave further advice to 
the Government in 2013 on the regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts.168 In 
2005 the Law Commission had recommended the rewriting of the ‘grey list’ in clearer 
terms.169 However, in its advice to the Government in 2013 advising against this 
course of action, not least on the grounds of the risk of wrongly implementing the 
UCTD.170 The CRA 2015 does, however, make some minor adjustments in drafting to 
the ‘grey’ list (for example using the term ‘trader’ instead of ‘seller or supplier’) and 
there are some additions to the list.171 The CRA 2015 also provided two further 
important clarifications: (i) terms listed on the ‘grey’ list will not be excluded from an 
assessment of fairness by the exclusion in Article 4(2) of the UCTD;172 and (ii) the 
terms listed in Part 2 of Schedule 2 (this qualifies the list in Part 1 of Schedule 2) are 
assessable for fairness.173 
 
• Whether the "black" and/or "grey" list of unfair contract terms adopted in certain 
Member States represent an advantage for consumer protection compared to the 
purely indicative list of the Directive; [Note: If a black/grey list exists in your 
country, key aspects to consider are: How does the list work in practice? Does it 
make a difference to have such a list?] 
The ‘black’ listed terms, and the advantages/disadvantages of such a technique, have 
been discussed above.174 Which? noted: ‘A clear prohibition against certain terms not 
only assists consumers and traders in understanding what is acceptable, it also allows 
for swift enforcement in clear-cut cases…The Commission should look across the black 
lists implemented by Member States and ensure that such prohibitions - derived from 
years of practical experience - are not lost.’ Above the extended ‘grey’ list under the 
CRA 2015 has been noted. Two further points need to be made here. First, s.63(3)-(5) 
of the CRA 2015 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend (including adding 
to) the ‘grey’ list. Secondly, the OFT compiled a list, based on its experience, of terms 
likely to be unfair175 and this has been adopted by the CMA.176 At one level, and 
167 See H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-288: 
‘Although the Court of Justice's guidance in Invitel was given in the context of a different type of 
consumer contract and a different type of variation clause, it is submitted that, had the Court of Appeal in 
Du Plessis v Fontgary Leisure Parks Ltd the benefit of the guidance given by the Court of Justice in 
Invitel, it might have reached a different conclusion on the fairness of the tariff review clause before it in 
that case. For, while the circumstances taken into account by the Court of Appeal would still have argued 
in favour of the fairness of the term, it could have been argued that the term which provided for an 
increase in the fee payable by the caravan owner (the consumer) having regard to ‘any other relevant 
factor’ (even though it describes the method of variation explicitly) did not allow the caravan owner ‘to 
foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the amendments’ of the fees, a possibility which the 
Court of Justice in Invitel considered to be of ‘fundamental importance’.’ 
168 Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (March 2013). 
169 Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts’, (Law Com 292, (2005)) at para. 3.116. 
170 See 5.41. 
171 Additions to the list since the UTCCR 1999 are: ‘A term which has the object or effect of requiring that, 
where the consumer decides not to conclude or perform the contract, the consumer must pay the trader 
a disproportionately high sum in compensation or for services which have not been supplied’ (5); ‘A term 
which has the object or effect of permitting the trader to determine the characteristics of the subject 
matter of the contract after the consumer has become bound by it’ (12); and ‘A term which has the 
object or effect of giving the trader the discretion to decide the price payable under the contract after the 
consumer has become bound by it, where no price or method of determining the price is agreed when 
the consumer becomes bound’ (14). 
172 S.64(6). 
173 S.63(2).   
174 See, for example, 1.1.1. 
175 See OFT, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Guidance’ (OFT311 (2008)) at [18]. 
176 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unfair-contract-terms-guidance--2. Note also the view 
of Which? to the effect: ‘Similarly, many Member States have supplemented the Annex to the UCTD with 
additional grey list terms in response to emerging practices either across markets or within specific 
sectors. This experience should be captured in any update to the UCTD and, in our view, Member States 
should remain free to add terms to national grey lists where serious problems are identified which are 
specific to a local market or national jurisdiction.’ 
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subject to the comments above in respect of the approach to the ‘grey’ list, it can be 
argued that this is an advantage for consumer protection. The UK European Consumer 
Centre noted: ‘this assists judges in courts, as well as helps the authorities and some 
more savvy consumers to formulate arguments in disputes.’ Yet the extent to which 
most consumers are aware of formal or more informal ‘grey’ lists is debatable.177 The 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy commented to us: 
‘In general, the UK’s preference is for grey lists rather than black lists which we 
view as potentially less effective because black lists can reduce flexibility for 
enforcers.’178 
 
• The effects of limiting a court decision establishing the unfairness of an unfair term 
to the individual relationship between the specific trader and the consumer, rather 
than, for example, extending the effect of such court decision to all contracts 
concluded with a given trader, even outside injunctions under Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, or to all contracts containing the same contract term; [Key aspects to 
consider are: In your country, have the effects of court decisions establishing the 
unfairness of an unfair term been extended to all contracts of the trader concerned 
or to the contracts of any other trader containing such a term? If so, how does this 
work in practice? What are the impacts on businesses? If there are no such effects 
of court decisions on unfair terms: what are the effects of this situation?] 
S.62(1) of the CRA 2015 provides that an unfair term is not binding on the 
consumer.179 Such a finding may, broadly, also impact on other consumers either 
through the doctrine of precedent180 or through its impact on CMA formal and more 
informal enforcement activity.181 Yet whether or not a finding that a particular term is 
unfair in a dispute between a consumer and a trader should impact more directly on 
the terms in like, or similar, contracts is more debatable. The circumstances of 
individual cases may differ materially182 and so a non-rebuttable presumption of 
unfairness in other cases involving like or similar terms might be regarded as ‘unfair’ 
to the trader. Yet similar challenges arise when, for example, the CMA seeks a 
preventative injunction. The Court of Appeal in OFT v. Foxtons Ltd183 confirmed that, 
although preventive proceedings do not generally bind subsequent individual 
proceedings by way of res judicata,184 such an injunction can cover existing as well as 
future contracts.185 In such cases the drafting of the injunction against the trader will 
be crucial.186 
 
177 Cf. I. Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Market (2nd Edn, 
Hart Publishing, 2007) at p.510. 
178 11 August 2016. 
179 Note s.62(3): ‘This does not prevent the consumer from relying on the term or notice if the consumer 
chooses to do so.’ Cf. Mayhook v. National Car Parks, unreported, November 29, 2012 where, 
surprisingly, the UTCCR 1999 affected the position of a third party (the owner, not the driver, of a car). 
180 See, for example, in the context of UCTA 1977 RÖHLIG (UK) Ltd v Rock Unique Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 18 
at [23] per Moore-Bick LJ: ‘In principle the question must be considered separately in each case because 
the circumstances surrounding the contract may differ from case to case, but where a standard condition 
of this kind is involved I do not think that the court should be astute to draw fine distinctions between 
cases that in broad terms are very similar. It is important for those engaged in any commercial activity, 
whether as providers of goods or services or as customers, to know whether a particular clause will 
generally be regarded as reasonable in the context of contracts of a routine kind made between 
commercial parties.’ 
181 See OFT, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance, (OFT311, (2008)). 
182 Cf. s.62(5)(b). 
183 [2009] EWCA Civ 288. 
184 Ibid. at [71]. 
185 See [43]-[44]. 
186 See [71]. 
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• The overall effectiveness of the contractual transparency requirements under the 
Directive;  
Regulation 7 of the UTCCR 1999, following closely the language of Article 5 of the 
UCTD,187 provided: 
‘(1) A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is 
expressed in plain, intelligible language. 
(2) If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation 
which is most favourable to the consumer shall prevail but this rule shall not 
apply in proceedings brought under regulation 12.’ 
A number of issues arose in connection with Article 5 of the UCTD and its transposition 
in the UK by Regulation 7 of the UTCCR 1999. First, did the requirement of plain, 
intelligible language extend to, for example, legibility and availability?188 Recital 20 
and case law of the (now) CJEU189 suggested that this was so. Secondly, what were 
the consequences of a lack of transparency beyond, in effect, the contra proferentem 
rule in Regulation 7(2)? For example could a lack of transparency itself found a claim 
for unfairness under the UCTD (as has been suggested in some Member States190)? 
Thirdly, could enforcement bodies act on the basis of a breach of Regulation 7?191 
Finally, what was the precise relationship between the transparency requirements and 
Article 4(2)192 of the UCTD?193 
The CRA 2015 attempted to tackle some of these uncertainties. First, s.68(1) requires 
written terms in consumer contracts to be ‘transparent’. The concept of transparency 
in respect of contractual terms is mapped in s.64(3): ‘A term is transparent for the 
purposes of this Part if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and (in the 
case of a written term) is legible.’194 This seems to better map the contours of the 
UCTD as interpreted by the (now) CJEU195 although the standard to be applied in 
assessing those concepts is not, at least explicitly, clear in the CRA 2015.196 Secondly, 
although the Law Commission stopped short of recommending that a lack of 
transparency always renders the term in question unfair,197 CMA guidance places 
187 ‘In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms 
must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language.’ 
188 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 6.60: ‘We have considered whether the legislation should specify that 
terms may be unfair principally or solely because they are not transparent. Given the strong arguments 
put by many consultees in favour of keeping the current fairness test, we have decided not to make this 
change. We think that the courts will be strongly influenced by the fact that terms are not transparent, 
but the fairness test must take account of ‘all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract.’ 
We would not wish to suggest that non-transparent terms are almost always unfair.’ 
189 See, for example, RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV (C-92/11) [2013] 3 
C.M.L.R. 10. 
190 See EC Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts’ (COM (2000) 248 final) at p.18. 
191 The Law Commission thought so on the basis, inter alia, of the Injunctions Directive (Directive 98/27/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, OJ 1998 L 166/51 which was replaced by a 
codifying Directive (Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ 2009 L 110/30)): see Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 6.54. 
192 ‘Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main subject 
matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against 
the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible 
language’. 
193 Cf. Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6. 
194 Note also s.69: ‘If a term in a consumer contract, or a consumer notice, could have different meanings, 
the meaning that is most favourable to the consumer is to prevail.’ 
195 Quaere: whether this revised formulation reflects the full reach of the (now) CJEU jurisprudence (cf. 
Kásler v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt (C-26/13) [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 443 (link to understanding)).  
196 Cf., for example, RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV (C-92/11) [2013] 3 
C.M.L.R. 10. 
197 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 6.5. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1237
emphasis on the link between ‘good faith’ and transparency.198 On the other hand the 
CMA note that transparency is not, alone, sufficient to render a term ‘fair’.199 Thirdly, 
s.70(1) of the CRA 2015 confirms that enforcement bodies can act on the basis of a 
breach of s.68(1).  
 
• Whether the extensions of the application of this Directive (to individually 
negotiated terms or to terms on the adequacy of the price and the main subject-
matter) put in place in certain Member States represent an advantage for consumer 
protection. [Note: Question only relevant for MS that have put in place extensions 
of application of UCTD]  
Three aspects of the transposition of the UCTD in the UK should be highlighted at this 
point. First, unlike the UTCCR 1999, the test of unfairness in the CRA 2015 is not 
limited to, in effect, standard form contracts. The significance of this should not, 
however, be over-estimated as consumers will normally in fact be dealing on standard 
terms.200 Secondly, as alluded to above, under the CRA 2015, the CMA (and other 
Regulators) are able to enforce Part 2 of the Act.201 Schedule 3 provides a framework 
for this type of enforcement action and applies to: 
‘(a) a term of a consumer contract, 
(b) a term proposed for use in a consumer contract, 
(c) a term which a third party recommends for use in a consumer contract, or 
(d) a consumer notice.’202 
The CMA, or other Regulator, is able to bring an application for an injunction (or 
interdict in Scotland) in relation to ‘the use, proposing or recommending’203 of a 
relevant term or notice.204 Significantly, however, this power extends to terms or 
notices which are prohibited without the need to assess fairness (which relate, in 
particular, to sections of the Act which broadly replicate some of the more protection 
consumer provisions formerly found in UCTA 1977): 
‘A term or notice falls within this sub-paragraph if it purports to exclude or 
restrict liability of the kind mentioned in— 
(a) section 31 (exclusion of liability: goods contracts), 
(b) section 47 (exclusion of liability: digital content contracts), 
198 ‘In order to achieve the openness required by good faith, terms should be ‘expressed fully, clearly and 
legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which 
might operate disadvantageously’ to the consumer. Consumers should not be assumed necessarily to be 
able themselves to identify (particularly in longer contracts) terms which are important, or which may 
operate to their disadvantage or which would be likely to surprise them, if drawn to their attention”: 
CMA, ‘Unfair contract terms guidance: Guidance on the unfair terms provisions in  the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015’ (July 2015) para. 2.22. The UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘Provisions are 
sufficient, [but] in some cases more education aimed at businesses may be required.’ 
199 ‘…[O]penness is not enough on its own, since good faith relates to the content of terms as well as the 
way they are expressed. Fair dealing has been authoritatively said to require that, in drafting and using 
contract terms, a trader ‘should not, whether deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage’ of the 
consumers' circumstances to their detriment…The CMA considers the CJEU’s approach demonstrates that 
businesses need, in formulating their contract terms, not just to resist the temptation to take advantage, 
but actively to take the legitimate interests of the consumer into account’: CMA, ‘Unfair contract terms 
guidance: Guidance on the unfair terms provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015’ (July 2015) para. 
2.23ff. 
200 Cf. F. Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia L 
Rev 629. 
201 See s.70. In relation to investigatory powers see Schedule 5 which enhances the powers under the 
UTCCR 1999. 
202 Schedule 3, para 1. 
203 Schedule 3, para 3. 
204 This power is significant in terms of the CMA or other Regulator obtaining ‘undertakings’ instead of 
seeking an injunction etc. - see Schedule 3, para 6. 
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(c) section 57 (exclusion of liability: services contracts), or 
(d) section 65(1) (business liability for death or personal injury resulting 
from negligence).’205 
This power also now extends to individually negotiated terms and to consumer 
notices,206 neither of which was, at least clearly, required by the Unfair Terms 
Directive.  
The public enforcement provisions in the Act are, in fact, part of tapestry of public 
enforcement provisions relevant to the regulation of unfair terms. In addition to the 
provisions under the Act, it is possible to take public enforcement action under Part 8 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 (which relates, in particular, to infringements of Community 
legislation)207 and under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
2008.208 The later provisions, or more accurately the Directive which gave rise to 
those Regulations, cause some difficulty in respect of the new provisions under the 
CRA 2015 which need to be explored at this point. The Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (‘CPUTR 2008’) largely transpose the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive209 into the UK. The CPUTR 2008, which replaced 23 
earlier enactments, closely follow the wording of the Directive.210 A commercial 
practice is defined widely as:  
‘…any act, omission, course of conduct, representation or commercial 
communication (including advertising and marketing) by a trader, which is 
directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from 
consumers, whether occurring before, during or after a commercial transaction 
(if any) in relation to a product’.211   
Moreover in R v. X Ltd212 the Court of Appeal confirmed that isolated incidents can 
constitute a commercial practice. Regulation 3(3)-(4) sets out when a commercial 
practice will be regarded as an unfair commercial practice: 
‘(3) A commercial practice is unfair if— 
(a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour 
of the average consumer with regard to the product. 
(4) A commercial practice is unfair if— 
(a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5; 
205 Schedule 3, para 3(2). 
206 Cf. H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-392. 
207 S.212 of the Enterprise Act 2002 provides: ‘In this Part a Community infringement is an act or omission 
which harms the collective interests of consumers and which—(a) contravenes a listed Directive as given 
effect by the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA State…(b) contravenes such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions which provide additional permitted protections, (c) contravenes a 
listed Regulation, or (d) contravenes any laws, regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA State 
which give effect to a listed Regulation. (2) The laws, regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA 
State which give effect to a listed Directive provide additional permitted protections if—(a) they provide 
protection for consumers which is in addition to the minimum protection required by the Directive 
concerned, and (b) such additional protection is permitted by that Directive.’ S.79 of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 enhances the measures that can be taken under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and 
includes ‘(a) measures offering compensation or other redress to consumers who have suffered loss as a 
result of the conduct which has given rise to the enforcement order or undertaking, (b) where the 
conduct referred to in paragraph (a) relates to a contract, measures offering such consumers the option 
to terminate (but not vary) that contract, (c) where such consumers cannot be identified, or cannot be 
identified without disproportionate cost to the subject of the enforcement order or undertaking, measures 
intended to be in the collective interests of consumers’ (the new s219A, Enterprise Act 2002). 
208 SI 2008/1277. 
209 Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ L149/22. 
210 See, generally, H.G. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-
145ff. 
211 Regulation 2. 
212 [2013] EWCA Crim 818. 
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(b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6; 
(c) it is aggressive under the provisions of regulation 7; or 
(d) it is listed in Schedule 1.’  
For present purposes the key point is that the use of ‘unfair terms’ might be regarded 
as an unfair commercial practice under the CPUTR 2008 and, therefore, attract the 
public enforcement regime under those Regulations.213 The difficulty is that the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive was a maximum harmonisation directive and, therefore 
within the scope of the Directive (and paying due regard to any exceptions in the 
Directive), Member States are not permitted to go beyond the protection provided by 
the Directive. Thus it is arguable214 that some of those aspects of the CRA 2015 which 
go beyond the scope of the Unfair Terms Directive with regard to public enforcement 
fall foul of the maximum harmonisation clause in the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive.215 For example, some terms (e.g. those mentioned in Schedule 3, para. 
3(2)) are always prohibited and made subject to public enforcement under the CRA 
2015. This is so whether or not an unfair commercial practice has been established for 
the purposes of the CPUTR 2008. In other words the protection extends beyond both 
directives and, arguably, conflicts with the maximum harmonisation nature of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive216 – an example, perhaps, of the unintended 
consequences of this consolidation. 
Finally the CRA 2015 provides: 
‘(1) A term of a consumer contract may not be assessed for fairness under 
section 62 to the extent that— 
(a) it specifies the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price payable under the 
contract by comparison with the goods, digital content or services supplied 
under it. 
(2) Subsection (1) excludes a term from an assessment under section 62 only 
if it is transparent and prominent.’ 
This provision is, of course, an evolution of the UTCCR 1999, Regulation 6(2). In, at 
least, two respects s.64(1)(b) appears to reinforce aspects of Office of Fair Trading v. 
Abbey National Plc.217 First, s.64(2) states that ‘[s]ubsection (1) excludes a term from 
an assessment under section 62 only if it is transparent and prominent’ which chimes 
with the analysis of Office of Fair Trading v. Foxtons218 by the Supreme Court in Office 
of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc. Secondly, s.64(1)(b) clearly inclines to Lord 
Walker’s view that only monetary payment terms are caught by Article 4(2) of the 
Directive.219 Yet the bigger issue is whether the controversial reading of the exclusions 
from the test of unfairness Article 4(2) of the Directive by the Supreme Court in Office 
of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc should be used in relation to s.64(1)(b) of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
213 See, for example, Office of Fair Trading v. Ashbourne Management Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch). 
214 Cf. H.G. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-393 for 
a possible contrary argument in relation to Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of 
consumers' interests, [2009] O.J. L110/30. 
215 Article 4. 
216 Unless it can be argued that the public enforcement regime in the CRA 2015 is contract law under Recital 
(9) of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: ‘Directive is without prejudice to individual actions 
brought by those who have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice. It is also without prejudice to 
Community and national rules on contract law, on intellectual property rights, on the health and safety 
aspects of products, on conditions of establishment and authorisation regimes, including those rules 
which, in conformity with Community law, relate to gambling activities, and to community competition 
rules and the national provisions implementing them...’ 
217 [2009] UKSC 6. 
218 [2009] EWHC 1681. See above at 29. 
219 S.64(1)(b) is framed in terms of: ‘…the price payable under the contract…’. 
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On the one hand, the legislative history of s.64 suggests an intention that such an 
approach should be retained. More specifically s.64 can be traced back to the Law 
Commission’s advice that the issues surrounding the impact of Office of Fair Trading v. 
Abbey National Plc could be dealt with by the use of transparency and prominence 
requirements (rather than reverting to a previous interpretation of provisions 
transposing Article 4(2)): 
‘price or main subject matter terms should be exempt from review only if they 
are transparent and prominent. Both approaches distinguish between the terms 
which consumers take into account in their decision to buy the product and 
those which become lost in small print. The emphasis on prominence, however, 
offers a practical way of distinguishing between a headline price and other 
charges. It also emphasises that whether a term is exempt is within the control 
of the trader.’220 
Leaving aside the concepts of transparency and prominence this approach creates a 
number of problems. First, as the Law Commission recognised, it is far from clear that 
such an approach is in conformity with EU Law: 
‘We think that the words of the judgment may be lulling some businesses into 
a false sense of security. There are other ways to interpret the judgment – and 
it could be overturned by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
The German Federal Supreme Court takes a different view on the UTD and has 
reviewed ancillary bank charges for fairness […] In a world of price comparison 
websites, there is increasing pressure on traders to advertise low headline 
prices, whilst earning their profits through other charges. Given this potential 
undermining of competition, the law should provide effective tools to prevent 
abuse […] The current uncertainty has the potential to damage businesses as 
well as consumers. If a business uses an ancillary price term to subsidise a low 
headline price, the business is put at risk if the term is later found to be unfair. 
It faces the substantial costs of litigation; the reputational damage to its 
business; the cost of repaying consumers; and the demise of its business 
model…we recommend that the exemption for subject matter and price should 
be reformed. The current law is unacceptably uncertain. It requires significant 
legal expertise to navigate, and even then the outcome is unpredictable. Both 
consumers and traders may suffer from this uncertainty.’221 
Indeed subsequent judgments of the CJEU have cast more suspicion on the 
appropriateness of the approach in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc. For 
example in Kásler v. OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt222 the CJEU, in the context of a consumer 
credit agreement, held that a term which provided the exchange rate for the 
repayment of a loan in a foreign currency could be assessed for unfairness: 
‘in so far as it contains a pecuniary obligation for the consumer to pay, in 
repayment instalments of the loan, the difference between the selling rate of 
exchange and the buying rate of exchange of the foreign currency, cannot be 
considered as ‘remuneration', the adequacy of which as consideration for a 
service supplied by the lender cannot be subject of an examination as regards 
unfairness under Article 4(2).’223 
Given the incomplete nature of the map left by the Supreme Court,224 it is not easy to 
compare the approach of the CJEU in Kásler v. OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt with the approach 
in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc. Nevertheless the approach of the CJEU 
220 Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at S.18. 
221 Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at S.18. Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at S.11-S.14. 
222 (C-26/13); [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 443. 
223 Ibid. at [59]. 
224 See, generally, J. Devenney, ‘Gordian Knots in Europeanised Private Law: Unfair Terms, Bank Charges 
and Political Compromises’ [2011] NILQ 33. 
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does appear to be more nuanced than the rather more blunt focus on monetary terms 
by the Supreme Court.225 For this reason, it has been stated by one distinguished 
commentator:  
‘…that in these circumstances English courts should seek to give effect to the 
interpretation and guidance of the Court of Justice of the EU in their application 
of s.64(1)(b) of the 2015 Act following the principle of the conforming 
interpretation of UK legislation implementing EU directives, though the difficulty 
in doing so would be whether the English court would consider this ‘possible’ 
given the wording of s.64(1)(b) and its background in the Law Commissions' 
earlier Advice.’226 
Moreover Which? argued: ‘In our experience, the exemptions for price and other core 
terms in Article 4(2) have proved deeply problematic to apply in practice. We believe 
they add disproportionate complexity and uncertainty to the regime and should be 
removed…This significant loophole in the effectiveness of the UCTD needs to be 
closed. In our view, the exemptions are not in line with modern behavioural economic 
evidence and should be abolished.’ 
 
• The effectiveness of the sanction foreseen by the UCTD for unfair contract terms 
(term is not binding). [Key aspects to consider are: How does this sanction work in 
practice? Does it help consumers? Do the national courts take up the active role 
imposed by the Court of Justice (invoking unfairness ex officio, taking measures of 
instruction)? Is it sufficient to have CJEU guidance in this regard? Is there 
administrative remedy in this area for consumers?] 
As noted above, s.62(1) of the CRA 2015 provides that an unfair term is not binding 
on the consumer. As is well known, the (now) CJEU placed a duty on national courts, 
in certain circumstances, to consider the fairness of a particular term of its own 
motion.227 Such a duty is, perhaps, a little unusual from the perspective of UK courts 
who, sometimes, adopted quite a technical, pleadings based approach to proceedings 
under the UTCCR 1999.228 Following a recommendation from the Law Commission,229 
the CRA 2015 sought to ‘codify’ this duty with s.71 providing: a ‘court must consider 
whether the term is fair even if none of the parties to the proceedings has raised that 
issue or indicated that it intends to raise it.’230 The extent to which courts will use this 
provision remains to be seen.231 
 
225 ‘The services that banks offer to their current account customers are a comparable package of services. 
These include the collection and payment of cheques, other money transmission services, facilities for 
cash distribution (mainly by ATM machines either at manned branches or elsewhere) and the provision of 
statements in printed or electronic form’: Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6 at 
[40] per Lord Walker.  See also Matei and another v SC Volksbank România SA (C-143/13); [2015] 1 
W.L.R. 2385. 
226 H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-368. 
227 See, for example, Pannon GSM Zrt v Erzsé bet Sustikné Györfi (C-243/08) [2009] E.C.R. I-4713. 
228 This was particularly the case in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6. 
229 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills’ (2013) at 7.90: ‘We think that it would be helpful to have an express statement in 
legislation spelling out the effect of the CJEU case law. Although this is already the law, we think that it 
would be helpful to state it explicitly in order to bring this obligation to the attention of the courts. It 
should be particularly helpful in raising the awareness of the lower courts that this is in fact an obligation 
rather than just a power given to the courts’. 
230 This ‘does not apply unless the court considers that it has before it sufficient legal and factual material to 
enable it to consider the fairness of the term’ (s.71(3)). For an argument that the duty under the Act is 
formulated in narrower terms than under the ECJ/CJEU see H.G. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd 
Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-361. 
231 Cf. J. Devenney, ‘Gordian Knots in Europeanised Private Law: Unfair Terms, Bank Charges and Political 
Compromises’ [2011] NILQ 33. 
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• In a forward looking perspective: Are there other measures that could improve the 
effectiveness of the UCTD in establishing a high level of consumer protection in 
your country? Would a graphical presentation model improve the readability and 
comprehension by consumers of the T&Cs? Are there best practices or lessons 
learnt in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries? 
In addition to clarifying some of the issues mentioned above, some of which stem 
from a lack of clarity in the aims of the UCTD itself,232 two factors need highlighting. 
First, it can be argued233 that the regulation of unfair terms requires a multi-
dimensional approach including, for example, a consideration of the role standard 
industry terms can, and could play, in this context.234 Moreover Which? have argued: 
‘This assessment of the ‘good faith’ caveat has essentially stripped the unfair 
terms protections of any meaningful application in the UK. This is not what was 
intended when the UCTD was drafted. In our view, either: 
• terms that create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer should be unfair and 
unenforceable, whether or not the trader imposed those terms ‘in good 
faith’; or 
• the meaning of ‘good faith’ must be made clear on the face of the 
Directive so that it cannot be used as a loophole to undermine the 
purpose and effect of the UCTD in practice.’ 
Secondly, if the regulation does impact on consumer confidence,235 further thought, 
perhaps, needs to be given to strategies to disseminate consumer rights/protections in 
this regard.236 The UK European Consumer Centre also noted: ‘[There are]… 
[s]ufficient legal provisions in place within a number of laws. In some cases, more 
swift and robust enforcement action may be the way forward, whenever traders 
choose to ignore the requirements or misinterpret the law.’ 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market  
What is the effectiveness of the UCTD (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in 
eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in terms of: 
• Whether the application of the general fairness clause in different Member States 
shows disparities in the understanding of this principle and, if so, whether 
disparities have an impact on cross-border trade; [Key aspects to consider are: Do 
national differences in the application/implementation of the Directive play a role 
for businesses? Have these differences led to changes in their business strategy? 
Have these differences caused problems?] 
By way of background, two points should be highlighted. First, under the CRA 2015 
the test of unfairness is set-out, in reasonably familiar terms,237 in s.62(4):  
‘(4) A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to 
the detriment of the consumer.’ 
232 See generally, J. Devenney, ‘Gordian Knots in Europeanised Private Law: Unfair Terms, Bank Charges 
and Political Compromises’ [2011] NILQ 33. 
233 J. Devenney & M. Kenny, ‘The Regulation of Unfair Terms in Non-Professional Suretyship Agreements: 
Lessons for the Wider EU Harmonisation Agenda’ in K. Fairweather, P. O'Shea and R. Grantam (eds.), 
Credit, Consumer and the Law: After the Global Storm (in press, Ashgate 2016). 
234 C. Scott & J. Black, Cranston’s Consumers and the Law (3rd edn., Butterworths, 2000) at pp.101-102. 
235 Cf. 1.2.1. 
236 Cf. Cf. I. Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Market (2nd. 
Edn., Hart Publishing, 2007) at p.510. 
237 Regulation 5(1) previously provided: ‘A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall 
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’ 
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Under the UTCCR 1999 there was evidence of some differences in approach by the 
courts in respect of the interrelationship between the constituent elements of the 
unfairness test;238 and indeed there was a question mark as to whether or not some of 
the approaches adopted were consistent with the case law of the (now) CJEU.239 
Accordingly it is disappointing that the opportunity was not taken to further unpack 
the unfairness test. It is, of course, true that the CMA has provided guidance on the 
interplay between the constituent elements to the unfairness test but some guidance 
is rather general.240  
Secondly, even if the unfairness test is being interpreted consistently throughout the 
EU, the application may be different as a result of local considerations. To some 
extent, this was recognised in Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & 
Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter241 where the (now) CJEU noted that 
it ‘may interpret general criteria used by the Community legislation in order to define 
the concept of unfair terms. However, it should not rule on the application of these 
general criteria to a particular term’.242  More specifically this issue can be illustrated 
by the interaction of the unfairness test under the Unfair Terms Directive and 
background rules such as personal property law: 
‘the application of the same general criterion in two Member States may give 
rise to very different decisions, as a result of the divergences between the rules 
of substantive law that apply to different contracts. Hence harmonisation under 
the Directive is more apparent than real.’243  
Thus in UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v Francis244 the (non-harmonised) 
protection that could be offered by courts in England and Wales in possession 
proceedings contributed to a finding that a term in a sale and leaseback arrangement 
was not unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
Indeed Which? has noted: ‘Any move toward maximum harmonisation in this area 
must take into account the important additional protections that have been identified 
throughout the EU as essential for the adequate protection of consumers.’ 
 
• Whether any of the extended indicative lists, "black" and/or "grey" lists of unfair 
contract terms adopted in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-
border trade; 
By way of background, it should be noted that the impact of non-harmonised law on 
cross-border trade is keenly contested.245 
238 See, for example, the differing nuances of Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn in Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank Plc [2001] UKHL 52.  Lord Bingham (at [17]) appeared to view ‘good faith’ 
as concerned with procedural fairness whereas Lord Steyn (at [36]-[37]) appeared to view good faith as 
concerned with procedural and substantive fairness. Cf. West v Ian Finlay & Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 
316. 
239 ‘With regard to the question of the circumstances in which such an imbalance arises ‘contrary to the 
requirement of good faith', having regard to the sixteenth recital in the preamble to the directive … the 
national court must assess for those purposes whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably 
with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in 
individual contract negotiations’: Aziz v Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa 
(Catalunyacaixa) (C-415/11) [2013] 3 C.M.L.R. 5. 
240 ‘The fairness test thus includes the following main elements: significant imbalance to the detriment of 
the consumer and good faith. It must, however, be emphasised that the overall requirement is a unitary 
one – the question is whether a term is unfair… A rigid approach to assessing fairness, involving an 
artificial exercise broken into separate parts, is not appropriate’: CMA, Unfair contract terms guidance: 
Guidance on the unfair terms provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (July 2015) para. 2.10. 
241 [2004] ECR-I 3403. 
242 At [22]. 
243 Report on Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in Consumer Contracts, [Com (2000) 248 final] at p.30. 
244 [2010] EWCA Civ 117. 
245 See, for example, R. Halson and D. Campbell, ‘Harmonisation and its Discontents: A Transaction Costs 
Critique of a European Contract Law’ in J. Devenney and M. Kenny (eds), The Transformation of Private 
Law, (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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 • Whether the other extensions of the application of this Directive (i.e. to individually 
negotiated terms and to terms dealing with the adequacy of price and main subject 
matter) in certain Member States represent a barrier to cross-border trade. 
Again by way of background, it should be noted that the impact of non-harmonised 
law on cross-border trade is keenly contested. 
 
1.2.3. Relevance for business-to-business transactions  
Regarding the area of contractual fairness and in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, please analyse: 
• Whether there is a need to strengthen the protection of businesses, especially SMEs 
and in particular micro enterprises, with regard to unfair contract terms;  
A case can be made for strengthening the position of SMEs in relation to unfair 
contract terms. Thus the Federation of Small Businesses reported: 
• ‘Half (52%) of small firms have been stung by unfair contract terms with 
suppliers, costing nearly £4 billion in the last three years. 
• Suppliers are failing to make auto-rollover clauses clear up front (24%), 
tying businesses into lengthy notice periods (22%), charging high early 
termination fees (20%) and concealing details in small print (20%). 
• Two in five (40%) respondents said they felt powerless to do anything 
about unfair contract terms because the supplier was too important or 
powerful to challenge. 
• 42 per cent said that the contract terms that most negatively affected 
their business came from a contract with a supplier of energy, 
communications or financial services.’ 
However, the Federation of Small Businesses does not necessarily endorse 
strengthening the position of SMEs in relation to unfair terms in this context: ‘FSB 
considers this to be a complicated area. Considerable nuance is needed re any policy 
action. FSB don't think the policy response should be crudely extending consumer 
protections to small businesses for example. FSB previously expressed a high degree 
of scepticism about extending aspects of consumer rights to small businesses and B2B 
transactions when this possibility was raised recently by the Commission in relation to 
digital consumer rights and the purchase of goods online. There are potentially big 
downsides to blunt measures, which will damage the flexibility and other benefits that 
small businesses enjoy under current English and Welsh contract law and we have 
argued in previous consultation responses that any measures along these lines are for 
Member States to decide.’ 
In 2005246 the Law Commission recommended, in broad terms, to extend the scope of 
the (then) UTCCR 1999 to small businesses: 
‘…subject to one proviso, there is wide support for protecting small businesses, 
particularly those that can be considered quasi-consumers because of their 
vulnerability in the market. The support came from many sectors of industry, 
law firms, the Financial Markets Law Committee and others. The proviso was 
that the regime should not apply to small businesses operating in the financial 
246 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)). 
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sector, since these are often highly sophisticated, or to businesses closely 
associated with larger firms or companies.’247 
It is more difficult to make the case, in the UK, in relation to business contracts 
generally.248 One difficulty is, of course, how to appropriately and workably define a 
small business.249 The provisions providing protection against ‘unfair’ terms in the CRA 
2015 do not250 apply to any businesses and, in contrast with the previous position 
under UCTA 1977,251 a company is not capable of being a consumer under the CRA 
2015.252 
 
• Whether the system of protection established by the Directive, based on the 
concept of good faith and the significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations, would be appropriate for B2B transactions;  
Although it is possible to argue that a different system of protection might be 
appropriate for B2B transactions,253 it may be more straightforward, particularly if the 
protection is only extended to small businesses, to use the same system of protection 
with the rider that the fact that the B2B, or more accurately business to small 
business (B2SB), context of the transaction is to be taken into account.254 The 2005 
recommendations of the Law Commission also supported the extension of public 
enforcement to this context255 although it noted difficulties with funding for such an 
extension.256 
 
247 Ibid at 2.32. The support was not, however, universal: ‘The CBI maintained that giving additional 
protection to small businesses would make it riskier to contract with them and consequently would work 
against their interests. This is an important point. However, it was the firm view of the representatives of 
small businesses who responded – and in particular the Federation of Small Businesses – that greater 
protection is very much needed. It appears that small businesses may prefer a reduction in the risks they 
face even at the possible cost of some loss of business’ (ibid at 2.33).  Cf. BIS, ‘Protection of Small 
Businesses when Purchasing Goods and Services: Call for Evidence’, (BIS/15/209 (2005)). 
248 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at 2.24ff.  Cf. also Law 
Commission, ‘An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems Advice to the UK 
Government’ (November 2012). 
249 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at 5.33ff.   
250 Although cf. Arbitration Act 1996, s.90. 
251 See R & B Customs Brokers v. United Dominions Trust [1988] 1 WLR 321.   
252 See s.2(3): ‘’Consumer’ means an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that 
individual's trade, business, craft or profession’. 
253 Cf., for example, C. von Bar and E. Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Sellier, Munich, 2009) and the discussion in P. Hellwege 
& L. Miller, ‘Control of Standard Contract Terms’, in G. Dannemann & S. Vogenauer, The Common Frame 
of Reference for European Contract Law and its Interaction with English and German Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
254 Note Article 4(1) of the UCTD: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term 
shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending 
the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it 
is dependent’. 
255 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at 5.94.   
256 ‘We accept these submissions and we would like to recommend this extension. However, our enquiries 
into the practical implementation of such a scheme have led to doubts over whether there are suitable 
enforcement bodies capable of meeting the cost and willing to do so. In particular, the Office of Fair 
Trading has indicated that it would not be willing to take on the role of policing small business contracts. 
In short, there appear to be no bodies which currently have the resources effectively to carry out this 
role. We have not, therefore, made provision in the Draft Bill for a preventive powers regime in respect of 
terms in small business contracts’: Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 
(2005)) at 5.95.   
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• The appropriate scope of B2B protection against unfair contract terms – should the 
protection, if at all needed, extend to individually negotiated terms, the main 
subject-matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price;  
The 2005 recommendation of the Law Commission to, in broad terms, extend the 
(then) UTCCR 1999 protection to small businesses also included a recommendation 
not to extend the protection afforded to small businesses in respect of unfair terms to 
negotiated terms,257 not least as it seemed there was little appetite for such an 
extension.258 On the other hand, it can be argued, given some of the vulnerabilities 
potentially faced by small businesses and by analogy with the position with consumers 
following the CRA 2015, that such an extension, at least from a consumer protection 
perspective, is desirable.259 
 
• Whether there are specific contractual terms often used in B2B transactions which 
could be regarded as unfair in all circumstances or presumed to be unfair;  
From a UK perspective there are some terms which, even between large businesses, 
would be regarded as ‘unfair’.260 A more difficult question is whether terms which 
exclude liability for breach of statutory implied terms (e.g. ss13-15 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979) should be prohibited by analogy to the provisions preventing 
exclusion of analogous terms in consumer contracts under the CRA 2015.261 On 
balance, in the light of the many different types of small businesses, it can be argued 
that such terms should not be ‘unfair’ per se but should be subject to an unfairness 
test. 
 
• Whether there is a need for contractual transparency requirements in B2B 
transactions, similar to the requirement of plain, intelligible language in the 
Directive; 
From a UK perspective, this may not be too controversial given, for example, 
approaches to interpretation,262 the Interfoto line of authority263 etc. However, much 
would depend, for example, on the standard to be applied in assessing those concepts 
and the consequences of non-compliance.264 
 
• Whether an extension of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to B2B transactions 
can bring benefits for cross-border trade;  
As noted above,265 the impact of harmonised law on cross-border trade is keenly 
contested. Much will, of course, depend on the merits of the relevant rules selected.266 
However, as hinted at above, there seems to be more of a case in relation to small 
businesses given that such business may not have access to appropriate legal advice 
etc.267 
257 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at 5.68. 
258 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at 1.13. 
259 A slightly different question is whether public enforcement, given the potential cost, should be extended 
to non-negotiated terms in this context. 
260 See, for example, UCTA 1977, s.2(1): “A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice 
given to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal 
injury resulting from negligence.” 
261 See above at 1.2.1. 
262 Cf., for example, Houghton v. Trafalgar Insurance Co [1954] 1 QB 247. 
263 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] Q.B. 433. 
264 See above at 1.2.1. 
265 See 1.1.4. 
266 Cf.  J. Devenney, M. Kenny & L. Gillies, ‘The EU Optional Instrument: Absorbing the Private International 
Law Implications of a Common European Sales Law’, (2012) Yearbook of Private International Law 315 at 
329. 
267 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts’, (Law Com 292, (2005)) at para. 5.15. 
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 • Whether the consequences of such an extension would have an effect on innovation 
by or market opportunities for SME providers/suppliers;  
As noted above, there seems to be a case that small businesses are prevented from 
making full use of the internal market by the absence of such rules, given that such 
businesses may not have access to appropriate legal advice etc.268 
 
• Whether the benefits of extending the scope to business-to-business transactions 
would exceed the negative consequences of such an extension.  
As noted above,269 the impact of harmonised law on cross-border trade is keenly 
contested.  
 
1.3. Injunctions  
1.3.1. Effectiveness of the current rules in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection 
What is the effectiveness of the ID (i.e. the national laws transposing it) in terms of: 
• To what extent is the use of the injunction procedure in your country contributing 
to the reduction in the number of infringements to consumer protection rules and 
reduction in consumers' detriment?270  
The ID has been transposed in the UK, in fairly complex terms, by Part 8 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002. Part 8 distinguishes between ‘domestic infringements’271 and 
‘community infringements’.272 It also distinguishes between general enforcers,273 
268 See Law Commission, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts’, (Law Com 292, (2005)) at para. 5.15. 
269 See 1.1.4. 
270 Consumers' detriment should be understood as consumers' financial loss caused or that could have been 
caused by the infringements as defined by article 1(2) of the Injunctions Directive. 
271 See s.211: ‘(1) In this Part a domestic infringement is an act or omission which—(a) is done or made by 
a person in the course of a business, (b) falls within subsection (2), and (c) harms the collective interests 
of consumers. (1A) But an act or omission which satisfies the conditions in subsection (1) is a domestic 
infringement only if at least one of the following is satisfied— (a) the person supplying (or seeking to 
supply) goods or services has a place of business in the United Kingdom, or (b) the goods or services are 
supplied (or sought to be supplied) to or for a person in the United Kingdom (see section 232). (2) An act 
or omission falls within this subsection if it is of a description specified by the Secretary of State by order 
and consists of any of the following— (a) a contravention of an enactment which imposes a duty, 
prohibition or restriction enforceable by criminal proceedings; (b) an act done or omission made in 
breach of contract; (c) an act done or omission made in breach of a non-contractual duty owed to a 
person by virtue of an enactment or rule of law and enforceable by civil proceedings; (d) an act or 
omission in respect of which an enactment provides for a remedy or sanction enforceable by civil 
proceedings; (e) an act done or omission made by a person supplying or seeking to supply goods or 
services as a result of which an agreement or security relating to the supply is void or unenforceable to 
any extent; (f) an act or omission by which a person supplying or seeking to supply goods or services 
purports or attempts to exercise a right or remedy relating to the supply in circumstances where the 
exercise of the right or remedy is restricted or excluded under or by virtue of an enactment; (g) an act or 
omission by which a person supplying or seeking to supply goods or services purports or attempts to 
avoid (to any extent) liability relating to the supply in circumstances where such avoidance is restricted 
or prevented under an enactment.’ 
272 See s.212: ‘(1) In this Part a Community infringement is an act or omission which harms the collective 
interests of consumers and which—(a) contravenes a listed Directive as given effect by the laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA State, (b) contravenes such laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions which provide additional permitted protections, 2(c) contravenes a listed 
Regulation, or (d) contravenes any laws, regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA State which 
give effect to a listed Regulation. (2) The laws, regulations or administrative provisions of an EEA State 
which give effect to a listed Directive provide additional permitted protections if—(a) they provide 
protection for consumers which is in addition to the minimum protection required by the Directive 
concerned, and (b) such additional protection is permitted by that Directive’. 
273 S.213(1). 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1248
designated enforcers,274 community enforcers275 and CPC enforcers.276 Enforcement 
procedures are set out in ss.214-223, with s.217 making provision in respect of 
enforcement orders.277 S.221 provides: 
 ‘(1) Subsection (2) applies to— 
(a) every general enforcer; 
(b) every designated enforcer which is a public body. 
(2) An enforcer to which this subsection applies has power to take proceedings 
in EEA States other than the United Kingdom for the cessation or prohibition of 
a Community infringement. 
(3) Subsection (4) applies to— 
(a) every general enforcer; 
(b) every designated enforcer; 
(c) every CPC enforcer. 
(4) An enforcer to which this subsection applies may co-operate with a 
Community enforcer— 
(a) for the purpose of bringing proceedings mentioned in subsection (2); 
(b) in connection with the exercise by the Community enforcer of its functions 
under this Part.’ 
The CMA regard these powers as an important part of its consumer protection 
armoury.278 However Which? has identified cost risk as limiting the effectiveness of 
this procedure: 
‘The principal reason why the power to take injunctive action has been so little 
used in the UK is because enforcers face substantial cost risk. Court action in 
the UK is very expensive. Not only does the enforcer have to bear its own costs 
of bringing proceedings, if the enforcer loses the action then it also has to pay 
the trader’s legal costs, which could be very significant. This problem is often 
exacerbated by an inequality of arms as between a consumer organisation or 
public enforcer on the one hand, and a large corporation with a substantial 
274 S.213(2). 
275 S.213(5): ‘A Community enforcer is a qualified entity for the purposes of the Injunctions Directive—(a) 
which is for the time being specified in the list published in the Official Journal of the European Union in 
pursuance of Article 4.3 of that Directive, but (b) which is not a general enforcer, a designated enforcer 
or a CPC enforcer.’ CPC enforcers may make applications for enforcement orders: see s.215(4A). 
276 S.213(5A).  This relates to Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer laws (OJ No L364/1, 9.12.2004) as amended. 
277 ‘(3) If this section applies the court may make an enforcement order against the person. (4) In 
considering whether to make an enforcement order the court must have regard to whether the person 
named in the application— (a) has given an undertaking under section 219 in respect of conduct such as 
is mentioned in subsection (3) of that section; (b) has failed to comply with the undertaking. (5) An 
enforcement order must— (a) indicate the nature of the conduct to which the finding under subsection 
(1) or (2) relates, and (b) direct the person to comply with subsection (6).’ 
278 See OFT, Enforcement of consumer protection legislation, (OFT512 (2008)) which has now been adopted 
by the CMA.  See also ‘Benchmarking the performance of the UK framework supporting consumer 
empowerment through comparison against relevant international comparator countries: A report 
prepared for BERR by the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy University of East Anglia Norwich’ (2008) at 
p.21: ‘Overall, we conclude that the UK is on a par with the best in respect of the legislative framework 
(with the caveat that the volume and complexity of the legislation could be simplified). The UK is on a par 
with the best in terms of its provision of consumer information and advice, and consumer advocacy. In 
respect of redress mechanisms, the UK’s position on ADR could be further improved and likewise the 
small claims procedure (which currently takes a year on average) could be enhanced. The UK’s system is 
underpinned by a strong public enforcement regime. In the light of forthcoming legislative changes, the 
key enforcement agencies will have a number of different types of enforcement powers which will enable 
them to regulate business in a responsive way. There is also evidence that the UK does focus its 
enforcement resources to deal with systemic market problems, and has challenging targets against which 
performance is measured.’ 
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litigation budget on the other […] The Directive itself is silent on costs. For 
Which?, the cost of litigating, and our exposure to the risk of paying the 
trader’s costs, has inevitably been a key consideration when contemplating 
action. The same is true for Trading Standards, who tell us that pursuing civil 
cases is often too costly for them, and that adverse costs risk – particularly in 
the context of falling local authority budgets – is a significant factor in deterring 
actions. Importantly, Trading Standards do not have rights of audience in the 
civil courts (as opposed to the criminal courts, where they do) which means 
they have the additional cost of hiring counsel.’ 
 
• What measures in your national legislation on injunction procedure are considered 
to be particularly effective, if any: measures regarding the cost of the procedure, 
the summary procedure, the publication of the decision and/or the publication of a 
corrective statement, the sanctions for non-compliance with the injunction order 
(Art. 2(1) of the Injunctions Directive), the prior consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive), and the effects of the injunction order?  
S.214 makes provision in respect of prior consultation with the person against whom 
an enforcement order might be sought and s.219 makes provision in respect of 
undertakings from such person that they will not, for example, continue or repeat 
certain conduct.279 There is evidence, albeit in the context of the UCTD, of the 
effectiveness of this preliminary type of enforcement practice.280 
 
• Has your country extended the scope of application of the injunction procedure 
beyond the pieces of EU legislation listed in the Annex I to the Injunction Directive? 
If yes, what are the additional consumer rights covered? 
Above ‘domestic infringements’281 and the application of Part 8 to situations where the 
UK has gone beyond the minimum harmonisation requirements in particular directives 
have been discussed. 
 
• Analysis of the obstacles to the effective use of the injunction procedure, in 
particular by analysing which progress in removing obstacles has been made and/or 
new difficulties that have emerged in your country since 2012.  
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 added new ss.219A-219C into the Enterprise Act 
2002.282 This provides for ‘enhanced consumer measures’: 
‘The aim of Schedule 7 is to provide greater flexibility for public enforcers and 
the civil courts in relation to the contents of enforcement orders and 
undertakings made under Part 8 of the EA. If they are deemed suitable for a 
particular case, public enforcers and the civil courts will be able to attach 
(where they consider it just and reasonable) enhanced consumer measures to 
enforcement orders and undertakings. The enhanced consumer measures will 
need to fall into at least one of three specified categories (referred to as the 
redress, compliance and choice categories). Measures in the redress category 
will offer compensation or other redress to consumers who have suffered loss 
as a result of the breach of consumer law. Compliance measures are intended 
to increase business compliance with the law and to reduce the likelihood of 
further breaches. Measures in the choice category will help consumers obtain 
279 S.219(4). 
280 See S. Bright, ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 331.  Although 
the UK European Consumer Centre did not: ‘It needs to be appreciated that in most cases it is needed to 
go to court to get this kind of decision.’ 
281 Note also D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law 
(Lexis, 1996- ) at 1.64: ‘The areas covered are mainly those civil and criminal measures which do not fall 
or only partially fall under the definition of a Community infringement under s212.”’  
282 See s.79 and Schedule 7 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
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relevant market information to enable them to make better purchasing 
decisions.’283,284 
In terms of the cost risk identified above, Which? has proposed: 
‘We suggest that the Directive incorporates a principle that enforcers should 
not be required to pay the trader’s costs where an action is unsuccessful - in 
recognition of the public interest function of the proceedings - so long as the 
enforcer does not act unreasonably…Any argument that this would lead to more 
unmeritorious or spurious enforcement cases is unfounded. There are (and 
there will inevitably remain) significant pressures on enforcers - such as 
budgetary constraints and reputational considerations - which incentivise them 
to prioritise those cases that will have the greatest public benefit for the 
resources deployed. However, if Member States felt that a financial incentive 
was also needed, then in unsuccessful cases an enforcer could be required to 
pay a fixed fee of (say) several thousand Euro toward the trader's costs. This 
model has proved successful in other Member States, such as Belgium.’ 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Should the coverage of the Injunctions Directive 
be extended (by including additional legislation into Annex I to the Directive)? If so, 
which EU legislation should be included? Are there other measures that could 
improve the effectiveness of the ID in establishing a high level of consumer 
protection? Should the scope of the Injunctions Directive be extended to the 
protection of collective business' interests? Are there best practices in your country 
that could be relevant for other countries and considered as model for the 
injunction procedure at EU level?  
Subject to the comments above285 about the MCAD, there is a case for extending the 
protection in the ID to business interests, at least where there is a clear internal 
market need. 
 
1.3.2. Effectiveness of the current rules in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market 
What is the effectiveness of the ID in eliminating obstacles to the Internal Market in 
terms of: 
• How effective is the injunction procedure in addressing infringements originating in 
another EU country?  
The procedures outlined above286 seem to represent a fairly comprehensive package287 
although it will, for example, depend on the level of effectiveness of cross-border co-
283 See Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes at [383]. For further guidance see BIS, Enhanced 
Consumer Measures: Guidance for Enforcers of Consumer Law, (BIS/15/292 (2015)).  
284 Which? noted: ‘ECMs represent a welcome addition to the domestic enforcement toolkit in the UK. We 
would encourage the Commission to consider introducing similar measures at an EU level.’ Which? also 
noted: ‘In the UK, enforcers do not currently have the power to impose fines or monetary penalties for 
breaches of consumer protection law. This is in stark contrast to the position around breaches of 
competition law, for which the European Commission (and domestically the CMA) can impose significant 
fines. It is also inconsistent with the position in relation to (i) consumer law enforcement in other 
jurisdictions, both in other Member States and outside the EU; and (ii) the powers of other sector 
regulators in the UK, such as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Claims Management Regulator, 
which have fining powers… We believe that the introduction of fining powers would strengthen 
compliance incentives for business and operate as a significant deterrent against breaches. It would also 
ensure a greater degree of consistency across the enforcement landscape…The level of any fines should 
be calculated to ensure a real deterrent effect, as opposed to token amounts which are likely to be 
considered simply as ‘the cost of doing business’. Fines should therefore be set in a proportionate and 
meaningful way whilst ensuring flexibility. Linking fines to turnover may be appropriate, as the 
Commission does in relation to competition law fines.’ 
285 See 1.1.3. 
286 See 1.3.1. 
287 See, in particular, s.215(4). 
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operation.288 The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
commented as part of the interview process that: 
‘Injunctions are an effective part of the enforcement toolkit, but need to be 
accompanied by other tools such as cross border enforcement. Some 
clarification of the interplay and coherence between the Injunctions Directive 
and other provisions on the enforcement of consumer rights would help 
strengthen the consumer protection regime.’289 
 
• How effective is it to address infringements originating in another EU country that 
qualified entities in your country are enabled to seek injunctions in the other 
Member State (Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive)?  
This framework has already been outlined above,290 and no particular issues were 
identified by the CMA in its publication Enforcement of consumer protection 
legislation.291 
 
• In a forward looking perspective: Are there non-legislative or/and legislative 
measures that could improve the effectiveness of the injunction procedure in 
addressing infringements originating in another EU country? Are there best 
practices in your country that could be relevant for other EU countries and could be 
considered as a model for the injunction procedure at EU level? 
It can be argued292 that non-legislative harmonisation is a key ingredient in the 
effectiveness of EU consumer legislation, particularly in terms of regulators and 
enforcers from different EU Member States developing a shared understanding of, for 
example, unfairness under the UCTD. 
 
1.3.3. Interplay between the Injunctions Directive and other enforcement instruments 
of consumer law  
Please analyse: 
• Is the injunction procedure as designed by the Injunctions Directive regulated 
separately in your country (in a separate legal act or as a separate procedure 
regulated within the same legal act) from the enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives (UCPD, UCTD and by the Consumer Rights 
Directive)? 
There is some scope for the streamlining of the relevant provisions in the UK. For 
example, under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the CMA (and other Regulators) are 
able to enforce Part 2 of the Act.293 Schedule 3 provides a framework for this type of 
enforcement action and applies to: 
‘(a) a term of a consumer contract, 
(b) a term proposed for use in a consumer contract, 
(c) a term which a third party recommends for use in a consumer contract, or 
288 Cf. ‘Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 initiatives to make it happen’ [2015] EU 
Focus 1. 
289 Interview feedback, 11 August 2016. 
290 See 1.3.1. 
291 (CMA7, (2014)). 
292 J. Devenney and M. Kenny, ‘Unfair Terms and the Draft Common Frame of Reference: The Role of Non-
Legislative Harmonisation and Administrative Co-Operation?’ in J. Devenney and M. Kenny, European 
Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
293 See s.70. In relation to investigatory powers see Schedule 5 which enhances the powers under the 
UTCCR 1999. 
Study for the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law
1252
(d) a consumer notice.’294 
The CMA, or other Regulator, is able to bring an application for an injunction (or 
interdict in Scotland) in relation to ‘the use, proposing or recommending’295 of a 
relevant term or notice.296 Significantly, however, this power extends to terms or 
notices which are prohibited without the need to assess fairness (which relate, in 
particular, to sections of the Act which broadly replicate some of the more protective 
consumer provisions formerly found in UCTA 1977): 
‘A term or notice falls within this sub-paragraph if it purports to exclude or 
restrict liability of the kind mentioned in— 
(a) section 31 (exclusion of liability: goods contracts), 
(b) section 47 (exclusion of liability: digital content contracts), 
(c) section 57 (exclusion of liability: services contracts), or 
(d) section 65(1) (business liability for death or personal injury resulting 
from negligence).’297 
This power also now extends to individually negotiated terms298 and to consumer 
notices,299 neither of which was, at least clearly in relation to the latter, required by 
the UCTD.  
The public enforcement provisions in the Act are, in fact, part of the tapestry of public 
enforcement provisions relevant to the regulation of unfair terms. In addition to the 
provisions under the Act, it is possible to take public enforcement action under Part 8 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 (which relates, in particular, to infringements of Community 
legislation) and under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. 
 
• If these procedures are regulated separately: What are the main differences 
between them? How is the coherence between these procedures ensured? If these 
procedures are regulated in a single legal act (possibly as a single procedure): In 
what way do these procedures (or this procedure) go beyond measures foreseen by 
the Injunctions Directive? 
This has been covered under the last item. 
 
1.4. Cross-cutting issues  
1.4.1. Cost and benefits of the directives covered by the study 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for consumers stemming from the 
protection provided by both the minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised 
consumer rules, e.g. in terms of benefits for consumers from the protection against 
unfair commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; [Note: a 
relevant aspect in this context is whether the costs for consumers in exercising 
their rights under these directives are limiting these benefits or not.] 
It can be argued that consumers benefit, in general, from the regime established by 
the minimum and fully harmonised EU consumer rules aimed at unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts; and that, moreover, consumers 
294 Schedule 3, para 1. 
295 Schedule 3, para 3. 
296 This power is significant in terms of the CMA or other Regulator obtaining ‘undertakings’ instead of 
seeking an injunction etc. - see Schedule 3, para 6. 
297 Schedule 3, para 3(2). 
298 See 1.2.1. 
299 Cf. H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-392. 
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benefit from the interplay of different public, private and criminal law regimes. In 
addition, the case can be made that the effective enforcement of consumer protection 
is enhanced through a diverse regime of collective redress300,301 and methods of 
alternative and online dispute resolution (ADR and ODR).302 Many argue that this 
diverse regime is required given the potential for consumer disputes, the relative low 
value of individual cases and the imbalance of bargaining power. The OECD has 
recommended that all states should adopt mechanisms enabling consumers to be able 
to resolve disputes whether individually, collectively or through public authorities, 
stressing a need for a combination of mechanisms, and for direct negotiation as the 
first option.303 
That this diversity is required inter alia because many consumer losses are so small as 
to be not worth pursuing through private litigation clearly raises the issue of the 
relative efficiency of consumer protection under the consumer protection rules. One 
consistent concern which is expressed relates to the costs for consumers of exercising 
their rights under the directives. The UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘In the 
UK, most of consumer disputes are within the upper limit of small claims value wise. 
This can sometimes be more problematic with cross border disputes, where there is 
the need to take legal action in another country. This is due to the requirement to be 
represented by a lawyer, which can be cost prohibitive for consumers sometimes.’ 
Beyond the issue of litigation costs, some have argued (as noted above) that it is not 
clear that the main focus, for example, of the UCTD is on establishing a high level of 
protection; nor that the nexus between a high level of consumer protection and 
increased participation in the internal market is proven.304 Moreover, given the 
contested prevalence of information requirements in the relevant directives, the 
precise extent of consumer protection will vary on the context of the transaction; 
there are, additionally, now a plethora of cross-cutting national and EU information 
duties which further complicate the consumer’s position.  
Litigation therefore needs to be placed in a matrix of collective redress, ADR and ODR. 
ADR, furthermore, is encouraged in sector specific secondary legislation (seen in 
Telecoms, Energy, Consumer Credit, Payment Services and Universal Services 
300 Encouraged by the European Parliament (EP). See EP Report ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress’ (A7-0012-2012, 12 January 2012): para 25: ‘…the availability of an effective judicial 
redress system would act as a strong incentive for parties to agree an out-of-court settlement, which is 
likely to avoid a considerable amount of litigation; encourages the setting-up of ADR schemes at 
European level so as to allow fast and cheap settlement of disputes as a more attractive option than 
court proceedings, and suggests that judges performing the preliminary admissibility check for a 
collective action should also have the power to order the parties involved to first seek a collective 
consensual resolution of the claim before launching collective court proceedings; believes that the criteria 
developed by the Court should be the starting point for the establishment of this power; stresses, 
however, that these mechanisms should remain, as the name indicates, merely an alternative to judicial 
redress, not a precondition therefore…’   
301 Which? noted: ‘Currently, individualised private enforcement of consumer rights through the courts is 
largely untenable. Despite the European Commission’s Recommendation on collective redress being 
published in 2013, the UK is yet to introduce a viable collective mechanism by which UK consumers can 
enforce their consumer rights. We understand that the position is similar in many other Member States. 
In addition, while the ADR Directive has led to the availability of ADR in all sectors, the use of ADR by 
traders is not mandatory and take-up outside of the regulated sectors has been minimal […] In our view, 
EU legislation is now required to set a minimum standard for the availability of collective redress 
mechanism for breaches of consumer law, based on an opt-out model. This issue should be addressed as 
part of the REFIT programme, given the pivotal role of private enforcement in the wider compliance 
landscape.’ 
302 See, for example, Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
on Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2009/22 (OJ L165, 18.6.2013, p.63), Regulation 524/2013/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) (OJ L165, 
18.6.2013, p.1) pursuant to: 2011 Commission Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution 
for Consumer Disputes, COM(2011) 793/2. Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR) for Consumer Disputes, COM(2011) 794/2.  
303 OECD, Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress (Paris: OECD, 2007) at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf. 
304 See above. 
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Directives)305 and in the elaborations of end-user and EU citizenship rights (see 
below). Notwithstanding criticism of ADR,306 it is still too early to assess the success of 
EU initiatives aimed at introducing/improving methods of collective redress and ADR 
and ODR. Similarly, it is too early to judge the impact of the introduction of new 
remedies.307  
 
• To what extent is there evidence for benefits for traders stemming from both the 
minimum harmonised and the fully harmonised consumer rules, e.g. in terms of 
creating a level playing field for honest traders by providing a legal basis to 
eliminate or at least constrain dishonest market practices, such as the use of unfair 
standard terms in contracts or unfair commercial practices, including through the 
application of the Injunctions Directive; 
Traders, too, can benefit, in general, from the consumer rights’ floor and the level 
playing field provided through the EU regime of consumer protection. However 
countervailing concerns can be expressed as regards the regulatory burden placed, in 
particular, on small traders (see below). More subtly, traders may be lulled into a false 
sense of security by ‘misapplications’ of EU directives (see Abbey National and 2012 
OFT Issues Paper).  
 
• What are costs for traders due to the need to respect the requirements under the 
directives covered by the study? [Note: Such as costs of research, legal advice and 
compliance as well as the amount of time necessary to comply with the directives] 
Traders may express a concern that the rules lead to excessive regulatory burden, 
especially on small traders. However, as noted above, in the UK national flanking 
measures have been taken which aim to address the regulatory burden.308 Similarly, 
some traders may argue that traders are adversely affected by rules directed, in 
particular, at the protection of vulnerable consumers.  
Meanwhile, the case could be made, seen above, that the minimum harmonisation 
derogation under the UCPD has a negative impact and dampening effect on cross-
border trade; this means that minimum harmonisation derogations do not necessarily 
improve or promote the internal market and reduce the benefits traders had 
expected.309 Furthermore, the application of the UCPD through the ‘blacklist’ of unfair 
commercial practices attracting criminal sanctions may create additional burdens on 
business, and especially small businesses, as previously analysed. Although, as 
observed above, a virtual blacklist appeared to have been already operating in this 
area. 
Similarly, on the implementation of the MCAD there may be concerns, despite the 
general view that the principle-based approach was appropriate, with the use of 
305 Seen, inter alia, in E-commerce, Postal Services and MiFiD Directives. 
306 P. H. Lindblom, ‘ADR - The Opiate of the Legal System? Perspectives on Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Generally and in Sweden’ (2008) 1 ERPL 63-93 at 89. ‘In the worst case, ADR may function as an opiate 
to the legal system. The legislature and the courts are made passive. Citizens are lulled into a false sense 
of readily available and qualitative access to justice in society.  The judiciary functions of behaviour 
modification, judicial lawmaking, judicial and administrative review - as well as the court’s communicative 
functions - are weakened and impeded. The pros of ADR are few compared to the cons.’ Similarly, J. 
Davies & E. Szyszczak ‘ADR: effective protection of consumer rights?’ (2010) E.L.Rev. 695 at 707: 
‘Allowing and encouraging a significant number of consumer-supplier disputes to be settled by ADR 
processes as a general principle denies the role of law to move beyond the contractual content of USO 
settlement of the individual dispute to the creation of stronger qualitative concepts of USOs which are at 
the heart of new consumer citizenship objectives in the EU.’ 
307 BIS, Misleading and aggressive practices – Guidance on new rights for consumers:  BIS Guidance on the 
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations, 2014. 
308 For example: BIS Press Release 16 October 2014: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/street-trading-
and-pedlary-laws-to-be-modernised. The UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘These rules are fairly 
clear and concise and in most cases it is possible to seek business advice from Trading Standards 
departments at no cost.’ 
309 See above at 1.1.4. 
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criminal sanctions for misleading advertising; especially where, particularly in the 
absence of fraud, such sanctions have a dampening effect on cross-border trade. 
 
• What are the costs involved in the public enforcement of these rules? 
On paper Regulators have an impressive array of powers. For example, in the area of 
financial services, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) may take a wide variety of 
measures.310 Impressive though these powers are, there have been concerns that the 
regulatory authorities do not have the resources to expedite their tasks.311 To an 
extent the inefficiency of public enforcement may therefore be attributed to 
underfunding and this position has worsened in the wake of the financial crisis. 
According to Garside levels of funding for consumer protection are no longer relevant 
to optimal levels of protection: amounting to £1.99 [approx. EUR 2.30] per citizen per 
year.312 Moreover, the case for a mix of enforcement tools only works if public 
enforcement is adequately funded. Given the poor funding of the regulatory 
authorities, implementation of consumer protection may not be as effective as it could 
be.  
Yet there are important counter arguments relating to the place of public enforcement 
and one-dimensional models of public enforcement. First, what appears to be 
influential, beyond the level of funding, for public enforcement is its interplay with 
other forms of self- and co-regulation.313 Similarly, the reliance on one-dimensional 
models of public enforcement, such as the criminal and administrative sanctions 
originally introduced under the CPUTR, have proven to be inefficient.314  
 
• Are there indications that the directives covered by the study are not implemented 
in your country in a cost-effective manner? 
Again in the area of unfair contract terms there is concern in the UK, highlighted in the 
non-referral to the CJEU of the interpretation of Reg. 6(2) of the UTCCR, in OFT v 
Abbey National (see discussion above).315 Abbey National presents the issue of 
improperly implemented and applied directives. This was addressed by the 2012 Law 
Commissions’ Issues Paper on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,316 which 
concluded that the case lulls traders into a false sense of security.317 The question of 
the fairness review was subsequently ‘resolved’ on the basis of transparency of the 
relevant terms and changes brought about in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It has, 
however, been disputed whether this reliance on the transparency of information 
works to improve consumer protection, especially in the area of financial services.318 
Moreover, if a question arises on the correct interpretation of a transposed directive, 
there is the further issue of ensuring the referral to the CJEU; referral is not the 
claimant’s right but is in the gift of the national court.319 
Finally, finding the right balance between public and private enforcement is important 
in ensuring efficient implementation of consumer protection directives. As seen above, 
the original enforcement model for the CPUTR foresaw reliance on a regime of 
criminal/administrative sanctions; a model which simply did not work effectively. This, 
310 https://www.the-fca.org.uk/about/enforcement . 
311 See generally above in 1.1.1. 
312 See generally above in 1.1.1. 
313 See above at 1.1.1. 
314 See above at 1.1.1. 
315 OFT v Abbey National (2009) UKSC 6. 
316 Law Commission, ‘Issues Paper, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: a new approach?’ 25 July 2012. 
317 Ibid para 8.1.2. 
318 Adequacy of the information paradigm in consumer protection. See generally: A. Colombi-Ciacchi & S. 
Weatherill Regulating Unfair Banking Practices in Europe (OUP, 2010). 
319 Famously the CILFIT doctrine (Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, paras.14 & 16) addresses the 
limited cases in which the national court need not refer questions of interpretation to the CJEU. 
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in turn, established the case for the introduction of private redress rights under the 
CPUTR 2008.320  
 
• Could the costs for implementing and enforcing the rules of the directives covered 
by the study be reduced without lowering the level of protection for consumers? If 
so, how? 
The majority view seems to be that funding for implementation and enforcement is 
already at dangerously low levels. Any further reduction in expenditure is likely to be 
counter-productive; even modest increases in funding would help optimise the level of 
consumer protection. However, one suggestion which might partially counter this view 
is the proposition that broadening the circle of super-complainants might raise the 
overall efficiency of consumer protection. 
 
1.4.2. Interplay with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation  
Regarding the interplay of the horizontal EU consumer legislation [mainly UCPD and 
UCTD] with EU sector-specific consumer protection legislation in the areas of 
electronic communications, passenger transport, energy and consumer financial 
services, please: 
• Analyse the levels of awareness of the requirements of the horizontal EU consumer 
legislation (mainly UCPD and UCTD) of businesses and consumers and the specific 
public enforcement bodies in the relevant sectors, as in particular demonstrated by 
their practical application; [Key question here is: Are UCPD and UCTD applied in 
practice by national authorities and courts as a legal basis to combat unfair 
commercial practices and unfair standard terms in contracts in the regulated 
sectors?]  
Consumer Financial Services: As discussed above there has been a significant issue 
on the applicability of the fairness review under the UCTD in the area of consumer 
financial services in the wake of Abbey National. This debate on the correct application 
of the UTCCR, is ongoing even after the introduction of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
It can therefore be argued that awareness of the horizontal requirements of the UCTD 
is distinct from the correct interpretation and application of the relevant horizontal 
provision.  
Passenger Transport: the horizontal EU regime is overshadowed by national 
legislation on exclusion clauses.321 For example, the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the 
Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 provide, respectively, that any antecedent 
agreement or understanding between the user of a motor vehicle and his passenger(s) 
which purports to restrict the driver’s liability to that passenger in respect of risks for 
which compulsory insurance cover is required322 is void under s.149(2) of the Road 
Traffic Act 1988. Meanwhile the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, section 29,323 
invalidates a provision contained in a contract for the carriage of a passenger in a 
public service vehicle where that provision purports to restrict the liability of a person 
in respect of a claim which may be made against that person in respect of the death or 
personal injury to a passenger while being carried in, or who is entering or is alighting 
from the vehicle, or which purports to impose any conditions as to the enforcement of 
such liability.  
Air transport: Meanwhile, in Air Transport national and EU sectoral measures 
intervene in the treatment of unfair terms and unfair commercial practices. In this 
context The Carriage by Air Acts (Implementation of the Montreal Convention 1999) 
320 See above, 1.1.1.  
321 R. Lawson, Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms, (11th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at 6-004. 
322 See s.143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
323 Cf. Rights of Passengers in Bus and Coach Transport (Exemptions and Enforcement) Regulations 
2013/1865. 
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Order 2002,324 under the heading ‘Liability of the Carrier and Extent of Compensation 
for Damage’, provides that any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to 
fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in the Convention shall be null and void. 
An identical provision also applies in relation to combined carriage.325 The limit is 
currently approximately EUR 1134.71.326 A passenger can increase this by making an 
advance declaration and paying a supplementary fee.327 
Electronic communications: Finally, in Electronic Communications, The Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 impose certain obligations 
in relation to electronic communications. Regulation 27 provides that any contract 
term between subscriber and the provider of a public electronic communications 
service or, between the provider of such a service and the product of an electronic 
communications network, inconsistent with any such right, shall be void.328 
 
• Specify whether in your country the same authority is responsible for the 
enforcement of the horizontal EU consumer law and the sector specific rules, or 
whether there are different authorities responsible for these two sets of rules; [If 
different entities are responsible, key aspects are: Is there an institutionalised 
cooperation between them? Does the institutional arrangement for enforcement 
affect the use of UCPD/UCTD in the regulated sectors, as specified in the previous 
bullet?]  
There are frequently overlaps between the enforcement powers of regulators which 
may be seen as inefficient and requires coordination.  
 
• Assess to what extent the combination of horizontal consumer provisions and 
sector-specific rules provide for a clear and coherent legal framework concerning 
contractual fairness, unfair commercial practices, and information obligations 
regarding advertising; [Key aspects to consider are: How do they work together 
with the sectoral legislation? Are there issues/overlaps/conflicts etc.?]  
In theory, the variety of public, private, criminal, regulatory and co- and self-
regulatory regimes form a sophisticated regime with a number of control mechanisms. 
In practice, the system of public enforcement appears underfunded, while private 
litigation is subject to limits to redress and a welter of cross-cutting sectoral regimes. 
Moreover, there appear to be important issues/overlaps and conflicts between the 
horizontal and the sector-specific rules, for example, on the treatment of vulnerable 
consumers (see below). 
It can be argued that neither domestically (CRA 2015) nor at EU level (Consumer 
Rights Directive 2011) has legislation gone far enough to consolidate the complexity of 
the law in consumer protection; consumers seem either reluctant or less than willing 
to engage with the full suite of remedies.329  
 
• What are the benefits of the complementary application of the UCPD and UCTD in 
the regulated sectors? What are the costs due to the complementary application 
with the sectoral EU consumer protection legislation?  
See above. 
324 SI 2002/263. The Order amends the Carriage by Air Act 1961, and disapplies s.1 of that Act in relation to 
Community carriers to the extent that Council Regulation 2027/97 has the force of law in the UK. The 
Convention entered into force in the EU on June 28, 2004. The Convention itself came into force on 
November 3, 2003.  
325 Combined carriage: Carriage partly by air and partly by some other mode. 
326 R. Lawson, Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms, (11th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2014). 
327 R. Lawson, Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms, (11th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2014). 
328 R. Lawson, Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms, (11th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2014). 
329 Report p.21. 
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 • Assess any need for clarification of the interplay between the EU sector-specific 
rules and horizontal EU consumer law.  
The full complexity of provision (as seen above), in particular the interplay of EU 
sector specific rules, horizontal rules and non-consumer law provisions, is seen most 
tangibly in the treatment of vulnerable consumers (see below, 1.4.4.). Furthermore, 
the interplay of different models of self- and co- regulation may be seen as making 
this area ripe for clarification, especially in the light of what some regard as the 
failures of the CRA 2015 and 2011 Consumer Rights Directive to consolidate the law. 
 
1.4.3. Relevance of consumer law directives for consumer-to-business transactions 
• Please analyse the need and potential for the application of the consumer law 
directives (mainly UCPD and UCTD) to consumer-to-business (C2B) relations. This 
concerns situations where the consumer sells goods or provides services to a trader 
(e.g. where the consumer sells gold jewellery to a trader or supplies digital content 
to business against remuneration).  
See above. In relation to C2B contracts, the UK European Consumer Centre noted: 
‘This is still most likely to be considered a B2C agreement, where the existing rules 
apply.’ 
 
1.4.4. Specific protection for vulnerable consumers 
Please analyse: 
• Whether the concepts of "consumer", "vulnerable consumer" and "average 
consumer" as currently defined in the consumer law directives and relevant 
jurisprudence, and as applied by national authorities and courts in your country, 
continue to be valid and fit for purpose. 
Traditionally English law has not specified a consistent and unambiguous definition of 
a ‘consumer’.330 A consumer transaction in English law generally involved three 
elements: 
• the ‘consumer’ must be a person/organisation not acting in a business capacity’;  
• the seller or supplier must act in ’in the course of business’ and;  
• the goods/services must be intended for private and not business use. 
The traditional English definition was thus quite narrow and did not admit a particular 
category of ‘vulnerable’ consumers.331 To Reich the advent of the consumer-citizen, 
through a broad reading of Articles 20 and 169 TFEU, broadened the definition of the 
European consumer.332 The notion of the vulnerable consumer has been with us, 
330 The most common domestic definition of a consumer was that of an individual who purchases goods or 
acquires services from a commercial organisation. In some contexts, however, a commercial organisation 
acquiring goods or services from another may be deemed a ‘consumer’.  More widely, consumers can be 
equated with ‘citizens’, to the extent that the enforcement of rights are concerned, so that potential 
recipients of social security benefits could be seen as consumers as would the recipients of other services 
provided in the ‘public’ sphere.  Cf. now the CRA 2015, s.2. 
331 R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominions Trust [1988] 1 WLR 321. Ashington Piggeries v Christopher 
Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441. 
332 N. Reich, H. Micklitz & P. Rott, Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2009) at 48: ‘The term 
‘consumer’ in Article 169 TFEU and ‘citizen of the Union’ in Article 20 TFEU are substantially concurrent: 
each describes a subject with a certain EU legal status, a definition which goes beyond the scope of the 
classical fundamental EU freedoms.  With regard to the EU citizen the freedom of movement and the 
rights based on information and protection of legitimate interests constitute the central reference points 
for the granting of subjective rights which can be further developed by a network of secondary law.’ 
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arguably, since the landmark case of Buet.333 The importance of a high level of 
consumer protection reaffirmed in Mostaza Claro.334 Waddington, meanwhile, observes 
that whereas EU consumer protection law has, in general, not sufficiently protected 
the vulnerable,335 vulnerable consumers are protected, to an extent, in a variety of 
sectoral measures, inter alia: 
• Services of General Economic Interest.336 
• Electricity Market Directive337 vulnerability in the context of ‘household 
customer’. 
• Gas Market Directive338 ‘household customer’. 
• Universal services.339  
• Services Directive340 Article 4 (3) providing that the ‘recipient’ of services means 
any natural person who is a national of a Member State or who benefits from 
rights conferred upon him by Community acts, or any legal person as referred 
to in Article 48 of the Treaty and established in a Member State, who, for 
professional or non-professional purposes, uses, or wishes to use, a service. 
• Payment Services Directive341 Article 4 (10): the ‘payment service user’ means a 
natural or legal person making use of a payment service in the capacity of either 
payer or payee, or both’. 
• Air Passenger Rights Regulation342 ‘passenger rights’. 
However, though the Commission has mapped out some sectoral contours of 
vulnerability, for example, in the energy sector,343 Bartl observes that great 
differences emerge between the Member States on the concept of vulnerability and 
333 Case 382/87 Buet and Educational Business Services v Minstère Public [1989] E.C.R. 1235; [1993] 3 
C.M.L.R. 659. para. 13 ‘…there is greater risk of an ill-considered purchase when the canvassing is for 
enrolment for a course of instruction or the sale of educational material. The potential purchaser often 
belongs to a category of people who... are behind with their education and are seeking to catch up. That 
makes them particularly vulnerable when faced with salesmen of educational material who attempt to 
persuade them that if they use that material they will have better employment prospects...’ See: J. 
Stuyck, ‘The Notion of the Empowered and Informed Consumer in Consumer Policy and How to Protect 
the Vulnerable Under Such a Regime’; The Yearbook of Consumer Law (2007), p.167. 
334 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421, para.38: ‘The nature and 
importance of the public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on consumers 
justify, moreover, the national court being required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual 
term is unfair, compensating in this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the 
seller or supplier.’ 
335 L. Waddington, ‘Vulnerable and Confused: the protection of ‘vulnerable’ consumers in EU law’ (2013) 
38(6) ELRev 757 at 781: ‘EU law both fails to adopt such an approach, and, to the extent that EU 
instruments provide for full harmonisation, also hampers any efforts of Member States to take such 
action. However, examples of such targeted measures from areas outside "classic" consumer protection 
law can be found in EU legal instruments. Measures relating to Services of General Economic Interest, 
such as the supply of energy, do provide additional protection for consumers who are regarded as 
"vulnerable" in specific ways, for example because of fuel poverty. In addition to universal service 
obligations, such instruments can also contain particular duties owed to specific groups of vulnerable 
consumers. Elsewhere, some EU instruments establish an obligation to provide information in non-
standard and accessible formats and, more generally, to take measures to avoid indirect discrimination. 
However, in spite of the emphasis placed on providing consumers with information… no equivalent 
obligations can be found in EU consumer protection law.’ 
336 Directive on Services of General Economic Interest. 
337 Directive 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54 [2009] OJ L211/55 (Electricity Market Directive). 
338 Directive 2009/73 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 2003/55 (Gas Market Directive) [2009] OJ L211/94. 
339 Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks 
and services (Universal Services Directive) [2002] OJ L108/51. 
340 Services Directive 2006/123/EC.   
341 Payment Services Directive 2007/64. 
342 Air Passenger Rights Regulation 261/2004. 
343 European Commission Staff Working Paper, "An Energy Policy for Consumers" SEC(2010)1407 final, 
fn.17 at p.11 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/forum_citizen_energy/sec(2010)1407.pdf   
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the degree of protection actually provided (if at all).344 Moreover, Waddington 
observes that the failure to protect vulnerable consumers may, in light of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, itself potentially amount 
to a breach of the European Union’s obligations under international human rights 
law.345 As Waddington concludes, much more needs to be done to protect the 
vulnerable consumer.346 Vanessa Mak, meanwhile, has explored the difficulties in 
defining the European consumer; arguing that a ‘pluriform’ concept of the consumer 
has emerged; with a variation of treatment depending on whether consumer 
protection is being relied upon in justifying national measures in a free movement 
context, or when invoking the average consumer in the context of measures of 
positive integration.347  
The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy commented to us: ‘We 
recognise that difficulties exist over a rigid definition of vulnerable consumer. 
Consumers will find themselves in vulnerable positions according to circumstances not 
just physical characteristics. Any changes in the definition of vulnerable consumers 
should take into account the resulting impact on existing case law and consider any 
unintended consequences. Similarly, changes to ‘average consumer’ would need to 
take account of behavioural evidence. If small business owners were to be considered 
‘consumers’ then the overall ‘average’ might be complicated and the threshold for 
effectively consumers increased because in general small business owners can be 
expected to be better informed and perhaps more circumspect in their purchasing 
decisions. There is some advantage in definitions that remain flexible and adaptable to 
the circumstances.’348  
In conclusion, this survey has underscored that the ‘average’ consumer definition may 
have important implications for internal market purposes, but it is, on its own, unlikely 
to achieve a high level of consumer protection.349 The introduction of the notion of the 
‘vulnerable’ consumer has, in general, been seen as a positive move towards a higher 
level of consumer protection, with the caveats that the definition is limited to 
situations where traders have particular degrees of knowledge350 and that some 
traders fear the wider application of the concept from a transaction cost perspective. 
Given the plurality of sectoral definitions it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a 
further measure of consolidation is needed in this area. 
 
344 M. Bartl, ‘The Affordability of Energy: How Much Protection for the Vulnerable Consumers’ (2010) 33 
Journal of Consumer Policy 225. 
345 Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2010/48) [2010] OJ L303/16. For a broader discussion of the 
implications of the conclusion of the Convention for the EU: L. Waddington, ‘The European Union and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared 
Competences’ (2011) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 431. 
346 Waddington, above. ‘It is not difficult to conclude that, under the Convention, the [EU] should be taking 
specific steps to protect consumers with disabilities where necessary. Of course, disability or impairment 
is only one of many potential causes of consumer ‘vulnerability’, and not all persons with disabilities will 
be ‘vulnerable’. The [EU] must therefore not only pay greater attention to the need to protect ‘vulnerable’ 
consumers who are disabled, but all consumers who find themselves in a situation which renders them 
vulnerable. Greater recognition of the diversity of all consumers could create a framework within which to 
do this.’ 
347 V. Mak, ‘Standards of Protection: In Search of the 'Average Consumer' of EU Law in the Proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive,’ (TISCO), Working Paper Series No.04/2010, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1626115. 
348 11 August 2016.  Cf. UK European Consumer Centre: ‘We believe these to be valid and fit for purpose. 
The current arrangements offer appropriate balance between the rights of parties, which does not impede 
trade, at the same time offering significant degree of protection.’ 
349 Devenney cited above. 
350 Report p.5. 
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• To what extent the existing rules under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
are adequate to protect vulnerable consumers and whether, based on the 
experiences in your country, specific provisions should be introduced in other 
directives concerned, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. 
Waddington argues that the coverage of vulnerability in the horizontal directives is 
inadequate; and this would seem to be underscored in the elaborations of vulnerability 
in the fragmented patchwork inter alia of the services and utility market directives 
(see above). As for the UCTD, the UK has, as analysed above, had a possibly unique 
testing of the directive as it applies to vulnerable consumers in Abbey National in 
which the Supreme Court came to the controversial conclusion that the UCTD had 
intended to advance contractual freedom rather than fairness.351 More could possibly 
be done in that sector-specific ‘services’ and utilities legislation and in the UCTD to 
ensure the protection of vulnerable consumers. However the case can be made, given 
the fragmentation of the law on vulnerable consumers, that (a) broader consolidation 
measure(s) need to be adopted. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the CMA, with the objective inter alia of addressing 
the fall-out from Abbey National, launched a market investigation into retail 
banking.352 The CMA report on retail banking, issued on 9 August 2016, specified 
measures to ensure greater transparency and the voluntary capping of bank charges 
especially for (vulnerable?) consumers without arranged overdrafts. The consumer 
organisation Which? has subsequently challenged whether such voluntary schemes 
can work, especially in the light of recent research into behavioural economics;353 
arguing that more stringent standards need to be laid down in legislation. As Alex 
Niell, Director of Policy and Campaigns at the consumer organisation Which? 
commented on the CMA proposals:  
‘The steps outlined today, to provide customers with better information and an 
improved switching experience, are welcome. However it is questionable 
whether these measures will be enough, not only to increase competition but 
also to ensure banks deliver a better service for their customers….’ ‘It is 
disappointing that the monthly charge cap is not actually a cap and banks will 
be allowed to continue to charge exorbitant fees for so called unauthorised 
overdrafts, rather than protect those customers that have been identified as 
among the most vulnerable.’354 
 
1.4.5.  EU added value 
• Overall, would you consider that protection of consumers against unfair commercial 
practices and unfair standard terms in contracts has improved in your country since 
the implementation of the UCPD and the UCTD in national legislation? 
Generally a positive balance, yet still some concerns remain as to how the regime 
could be optimised and as to how, on particular interpretations of EU law, the correct 
application of consumer protection can be ensured in the absence of referral of the 
relevant case to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU (see above). The Consumer Council 
for Northern Ireland also noted: 
‘It is the Consumer Council’s view that the effectiveness of EU legislation, and 
the domestic laws that implement them, largely depends on levels of 
351 Abbey National, above, fn.168; H. Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) OJLS 229. 
352 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-paves-the-way-for-open-banking-revolution. 
353 Commission Guidance on the Implementation/Application of the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 
SEC(2009) 1666, pp32-33: ‘It is then for the national courts and administrative authorities to assess the 
misleading character of commercial practices by reference, among other considerations, to the current 
state of scientific knowledge, including the most recent findings of behavioural economics. Thus, for 
example, the use of defaults (…) or the provision of unnecessarily complex information may, according to 
the circumstances of the case, prove misleading.’  
354 Which on CMA report into retail banking: http://www.which.co.uk/campaigns/better-banks/CMA-
banking-inquiry-FCA-better-banks/. 
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awareness that exist amongst consumers and businesses. Without sufficient 
awareness, businesses may deliberately or inadvertently fail to comply with 
legal requirements and consumers will not utilise the laws that have been put 
in place to protect them.  
The Consumer Council conducts research every four years which assesses 
consumers’ proficiency, including awareness of their rights. Since the research 
began in 1998, the proportion of NI consumers who feel well informed about 
their rights has increased, with awareness in 2015 returning to levels last seen 
in 2007… 
In our latest research study, three fifths of NI consumers felt they were well 
informed about their rights. However, when survey participants were tested 
against true/false statements relating to everyday applications of consumer 
law, it was evident that many, including those who felt well informed, were not 
as proficient as they thought.’ 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the information of consumers regarding unit prices 
has improved since the implementation of the PID in national legislation?  
Some would say that there is much greater transparency on price in the wake of the 
Price Information Directive; others, however, point to discounting, particularly 
prevalent on the UK retail market, which can sometimes confuse consumers as to the 
correct price indications. As noted above, there has been a super-complaint raised by 
Which? on the implementation of the PID and pricing practices in the groceries sector. 
While the CMA did not consider that pricing practices were systemically abusive, they 
nevertheless made a number of recommendations to improve practice.355 
 
• Overall, would you consider that the protection of businesses against unfair 
marketing in your country has improved since the implementation of the MCAD in 
national legislation?  
The overall protection of business has been improved since the implementation of the 
MCAD, and the introduction of a more level playing field. Perhaps inevitably, however, 
some small businesses may continue to be concerned at the regulatory burden. 
 
• Overall, would you consider that it has become easier for businesses in your 
country to directly trade cross-border to final consumers located in other EU 
countries in recent years? Has it become easier for consumers in your country to 
directly purchase cross-border from traders located in other EU countries? 
It seems that businesses, generally, have found it easier to trade cross-border in 
recent years and certainly consumers appear to be more willing to trade across 
borders. But further vigilance is needed to monitor up-take and further statistics are 
required. The UK European Consumer Centre noted: ‘It is easier thanks to the rules 
being more uniform across the community. This, however, is mostly thanks to other 
laws concerning sale of goods, distance sales, etc.’ 
 
• To what extent are these improvements, if any, due to the mentioned directives?  
The directives have certainly helped in creating a more level playing field and 
increasing consumer confidence. Yet other factors have also played a role: modern 
technology makes cross-border transactions far easier to engage in than was once the 
case; moreover, consumers have adapted to a more inter-connected Europe: borders 
have become more porous and consumers have more confidence in cross-border 
transactions. 
355 Report p.8. 
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Annex 
A. Transposition fact sheet 
Table 1: Fact sheet on transposition of directives in Member States' law – United Kingdom  
Directive Transposition 
legislation (National 
law, Article) 
Comments Specific provisions going beyond 
minimum harmonisation 
requirements/use of exemptions 
Included in national legislation Comments 
Directive 
93/13/EEC on 
unfair terms in 
consumer 
contracts 
Consumer Rights Act 2015.  'Black list' of terms considered unfair in all circumstances Yes 
See, in particular, ss. 31, 
47, 57 and 65  
 'Grey list' of terms which may be considered unfair Yes 
See Schedule 2, discussed 
above at P.28.  
 Extensions of the application of Directive to individually negotiated terms  Yes See s.2.  
 
Extensions of the application of Directive terms 
on the adequacy of the price and the main 
subject-matter 
No See s.64. 
It is debatable 
whether s.64 
properly 
transposes the 
UCTD. 
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Directive 
2005/29/EC 
concerning 
unfair 
business-to-
consumer 
commercial 
practices in the 
internal market 
Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 
2008 
 Provisions regarding financial services going 
beyond minimum harmonisation requirements 
Yes Various: See C. Willett & 
Peter Sparkes’ Country 
Report for Civic 
Consulting: ‘Study on the 
application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in 
the EU part - Final report 
and country reports’ 
(2011) -
http://ec.europa.eu/justic
e/consumer-
marketing/files/ucpd_stud
y_country_reports.pdf  
 
  Provisions regarding immovable going beyond 
minimum harmonisation requirements 
Yes Various (Accommodation 
Agencies Act 1953): See C. 
Willett & Peter Sparkes’ 
Country Report for Civic 
Consulting: ‘Study on the 
application of Directive 
2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices in 
the EU part - Final report 
and country reports’ 
(2011) -
http://ec.europa.eu/justic
e/consumer-
marketing/files/ucpd_stud
y_country_reports.pdf  
 
  Application of UCPD to B2B transactions No See, in particular, 
Regulation 2. 
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Directive 
98/6/EC on 
consumer 
protection in 
the indication 
of the prices of 
products 
offered to 
consumers 
Price Marking Order 2004  Extension of the application to other sectors 
(e.g. for immovable property) 
The UK has 
taken 
advantage of 
various 
exclusions. 
The relevant provisions 
only apply to ‘products’.  
However, the relevant 
provisions are not 
applicable to products 
supplied in the course of a 
service (Regulation 3); not 
applicable to sales by 
auction and 
artwork/antiques 
(Regulation 3); not 
applicable to vending 
machines (Regulation 
5(3)); not applicable in 
relation to small 
businesses (Schedule 2). 
 
 Use of specific regulatory choices/derogations See above. See above.  
Directive 
2006/114/EC 
concerning 
misleading and 
comparative 
advertising 
Business Protection from 
Misleading Marketing 
Regulations 2008 
     
Directive 
2009/22/EC on 
injunctions for 
the protection 
of consumers' 
interests 
Enterprise Act 2002, Part 8 
(as amended) 
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Table 2: Fact sheet on Injunctions Directive – United Kingdom  
Issue Answer Comments 
Is the injunction procedure as 
foreseen by the Injunctions Directive 
regulated in your country separately 
(as a separate procedure or/and in a 
separate legal act) from the 
enforcement procedures foreseen by 
other EU Consumer Law Directives 
(the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
or/and the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive or/and by the 
Consumer Rights Directive)? 
 
- Yes, separate procedures in 
separate legal acts 
 
 
As noted above in the report, there 
is some scope from streamlining the 
procedures in the Enterprise Act 
2002 with other enforcement 
provisions (e.g. under the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015). 
Who is entitled to bring an action 
seeking an injunction? 
- Designated public bodies 
- Specified consumer associations 
 
See, in particular, ss.213 and 219C. 
See also Enterprise Act 2002 (Part 8) 
(Designation of the Consumers' 
Association) Order 2005/917. 
 
Is the injunction procedure a court or 
an administrative procedure? 
If your country legislation foresees 
both forms of the procedure, please 
explain in the comments column for 
which infringements the court or 
administrative procedure is foreseen 
- Court procedure 
 
See s.217. 
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Who bears the costs of an injunction 
procedure? 
If qualified entities (or some of their 
categories e.g. consumer 
organisations are entitled to an 
exemption  of some/all cost related 
to the procedure please explain the 
characteristic of such exemption in 
the comments column. 
- Which? noted: ‘Court action in 
the UK is very expensive. Not only 
does the enforcer have to bear its 
own costs of bringing 
proceedings, if the enforcer loses 
the action then it also has to pay 
the trader’s legal costs, which 
could be very significant. This 
problem is often exacerbated by 
an inequality of arms as between 
a consumer organisation or public 
enforcer on the one hand, and a 
large corporation with a 
substantial litigation budget on 
the other…The Directive itself is 
silent on costs. For Which?, the 
cost of litigating, and our 
exposure to the risk of paying the 
trader’s costs, has inevitably been 
a key consideration when 
contemplating action. The same is 
true for Trading Standards, who 
tell us that pursuing civil cases is 
often too costly for them, and 
that adverse costs risk – 
particularly in the context of 
falling local authority budgets – is 
a significant factor in deterring 
actions. Importantly, Trading 
Standards do not have rights of 
audience in the civil courts (as 
opposed to the criminal courts, 
where they do) which means they 
have the additional cost of hiring 
counsel.’ 
 
 
 
 
Is the scope of application of 
injunctions extended to cover areas 
of consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive, or consumer 
law in general? 
- Yes, scope of application 
extended to cover areas of 
consumer law that are not part of 
Annex I of the Directive 
 
See s.211 (‘domestic 
infringements’). 
Is protection of business' interests 
covered by the injunctions 
procedure?  
If scope of application extended to 
the protection of business' interests, 
please provide details in the 
comments column regarding type of 
business' interests covered by the 
injunctions procedure 
No Although note that under s.210 that 
a ‘consumer’ can include situations 
where ‘the individual receives or 
seeks to receive the goods or 
services with a view to carrying on a 
business but not in the course of a 
business carried on by him.’ 
Is it possible to bring an injunction 
action jointly against several traders 
from the same economic sector or 
their associations 
- Yes 
 
S.217 applies to a ‘person’ and, 
under the Interpretation Act 1978, 
s.6, that would include ‘persons’. 
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Is there an out-of-court preliminary 
stage in the injunction procedures? 
(not including the consultation stage 
under Art. 5 of the ID) 
- Yes 
- No 
This is central to, for example, the 
CMA’s enforcement strategy. 
Has your Member State taken 
specific measures regarding the prior 
consultation (Article 5 of the 
Injunctions Directive)? 
- Yes, requirement for party 
seeking injunction to consult with 
the defendant 
 
See s.214 (and s.216 on co-
ordination). 
Does the national legislation provide 
for measures ensuring summary 
procedure? 
Please specify main characteristics of 
the procedure (subject matter/time 
limits) in the comments column. 
- Yes 
 
 
Are there sanctions for non-
compliance with the injunction order 
(Article 2(1) of the Injunctions 
Directive)? 
If sanctions in form of penalty or fine 
foreseen please specify in the 
comments column to who exactly 
should they be paid 
- Yes, other sanction (please 
specify) 
 
A fine and potentially imprisonment 
(see s.220 and Phillimore v. Surrey 
County Council [2010] EWCA Civ 
61). 
Has your Member State taken 
specific measures regarding the 
publication of the decision and/or the 
publication of a corrective 
statement? 
- Yes 
 
See, for example, s.217(8). 
Is it possible to claim within the 
injunction procedure for sanctions 
for the infringement? 
See comments. S.215 deals with jurisdiction. 
Criminal proceedings are in addition 
to this enforcement route. 
Can an action for the restitution of 
profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order 
that those profits are paid to the 
public purse or to other beneficiary 
be brought within the injunction 
procedure? 
- No Not specifically mentioned in the 
new ‘enhanced consumer measures’ 
but might have some form of 
restitution, in the widest sense, 
under the general law (e.g. Powers 
of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
2000, s.130(4)). 
Can an action for damages to be paid 
to the qualified entity or the public 
purse be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- No 
 
S.219A(2) states, in relation to the 
redress category, ‘where such 
consumers cannot be identified, or 
cannot be identified without 
disproportionate cost to the subject 
of the enforcement order or 
undertaking, measures intended to 
be in the collective interests of 
consumers.’ In the relevant 
guidance (Enhanced Consumer 
Measures: Guidance for Enforcers of 
Consumer Law (BIS/15/292, (2015)) 
BIS noted that this money could not 
be paid to the Treasury (see p.13) 
but could, for example, be paid to a 
charity (see[63]-[64]). 
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Can an action for damages or redress 
to be paid to the consumers 
concerned be brought within the 
injunction procedure? 
- Yes Under s.219A(2). 
Can individual consumers base their 
individual claims for 
damages/remedies on the injunctions 
order?  
- Yes 
 
To some extent: cf. OFT v. Foxtons 
Ltd. 
Can the qualified entity claim other 
measures beyond the injunction, e.g. 
evidence of compliance with the 
judgment? 
- Yes 
 
S.217(8) provides: ‘An enforcement 
order may require a person against 
whom the order is made to publish 
in such form and manner and to 
such extent as the court thinks 
appropriate for the purpose of 
eliminating any continuing effects 
of the infringement— 
(a) the order; (b) a corrective 
statement.’ Note also the enhanced 
consumer measures in ss.219A-C. 
Are the effects of individual 
injunctions orders extended to the 
future infringements and/or same or 
similar illegal practices (of other 
traders)? 
- Yes 
 
See s.217(6): ‘A person complies 
with this subsection if he—(a) does 
not continue or repeat the conduct; 
(b) does not engage in such conduct 
in the course of his business or 
another business; (c) does not 
consent to or connive in the carrying 
out of such conduct by a body 
corporate with which he has a 
special relationship (within the 
meaning of section 222(3)).’ 
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B. Data tables  
Number of B2C disputes  
Please indicate how many B2C disputes have been decided in your country on the 
basis of consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a 
proportion of the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national 
consumer legislation (based on statistics, or based on estimates by enforcement 
authorities and other stakeholders, where this is not the available).  
  
Table 3: B2C disputes decided on the basis of consumer law directives 
covered by this study in comparison with total B2C disputes decided on the 
basis of other legislation (most recent year for which data is available)  
Year  Type 
of data 
Total 
number 
of B2C 
disputes 
(num-
ber of 
cases) 
Share of B2C disputes decided on basis of … Comments 
 
See 
comments 
below. 
UCPD UCTD PID other EU 
consumer 
protection 
legislation 
(e.g. CRD, 
Sales 
Directive, 
sectoral 
legislation) 
national 
consumer 
legislation 
not based 
on EU 
directives 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
See 
comments 
below. 
 
Given, for example, the way in which B2C disputes are often addressed through 
discussion between the trader and a relevant authority, it is impossible to accurately 
estimate how many B2C disputes have been decided in the UK on the basis of the 
consumer law directives covered by this study (UCPD, UCTD, PID) as a proportion of 
the total number of B2C disputes decided on the basis of other national consumer 
legislation. However, note that: (i) the low number of proposed prosecutions under 
the CPUTR 2008 was a key driver in the UK introducing a specific private right of 
redress in respect of unfair commercial practices; (ii) there is very little case law 
specifically on the PMO 2004;356 and (iii) particularly in connection with unfair terms, 
there is evidence of the effectiveness of negotiation by relevant bodies prior to formal 
enforcement action being sought.357 
356 Cf. also D. Parry, R. Rowell, B.W. Harvey and C. Ervine, Butterworths Trading and Consumer Law (Lexis, 
1996- ) at 2.43ff. 
357 See S. Bright, ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 331.  Although 
the UK European Consumer Centre did not: ‘It needs to be appreciated that in most cases it is needed to 
go to court to get this kind of decision.’ 
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Costs of obtaining redress for a hypothetical case of invoking unfairness of a standard 
contract term 
• Please estimate the costs, including time, for consumers in obtaining redress when 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms in a contract they concluded. Please provide the estimate for the hypothetical 
example below, focusing on costs (and needed time) of a lower court procedure and 
the use of ADR or other relevant procedure (if applicable).358  
Table 4: Estimate of costs for consumers in obtaining redress when invoking 
the unfairness of standard contract terms in a contract they concluded (for 
the hypothetical example provided in the box below) 
Redress 
mechanism  
Estimated 
court fees 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
lawyer’s fees 
(national 
currency) 
Other 
costs, if 
any 
(national 
currency) 
Estimated 
time 
involved for 
consumer 
(hours) 
Comments 
Lower court 
procedure     
See comments 
below. 
ADR or other 
relevant 
procedure 
    See comments below. 
Notes: This is a debated issue359 in the UK and is, of course, dependent on a number of variables.360 For 
example in response to a 2011 call for evidence,361 BIS noted that ‘…no evidence specific to consumer to 
business disputes was forthcoming.’362 
‘ADR can offer a cheaper and quicker alternative to the courts for disputes where a consumer is 
not able to resolve their complaint directly with the business from whom they made their 
purchase. It is estimated that ADR costs are between 1/8th and 1/3rd of the cost of going to court 
and the European Commission have estimated that it only takes up to 90 days for most disputes 
referred to ADR to be resolved. ADR in the UK tends to be free for the consumer, as it is often 
funded through businesses paying membership fees, levies or case fees to the ADR provider.’363 
BIS also noted: 
‘Indeed, UK ADR providers report that a significant number of the cases they currently deal with 
would never have gone to court. Other stakeholders noted that in their view very small value 
claims may not be suitable for either court action or ADR….A few stakeholders suggested ADR is 
not always a lower cost or quicker option compared to court action, particularly for complex cases. 
One stakeholder noted that there would only be cost-savings if the outcome of ADR were followed, 
as otherwise disputes may still end up in court.’364 
358 For the hypothetical example it is assumed that both the provider and the consumer are located in your 
country. 
359 See BIS, Government Response to Call for Evidence: EU proposals on Alternative (URN 12/674 (2012)). 
360 Cf. BIS, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers: Government response to the consultation on 
implementing the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive and the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation 
(BIS/14/1122 (2014)) p.8: ‘ADR in the UK tends to be free for the consumer, as it is often funded 
through businesses paying membership fees, levies or case fees to the ADR provider.’ 
361 BIS, Call for Evidence on EU proposals on Alternative Dispute Resolution, (URN 11/1372, (2011)). 
362 See BIS, Government Response to Call for Evidence: EU proposals on Alternative (URN 12/674 (2012)). 
363 BIS, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers: Government response to the consultation on 
implementing the Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive and the Online Dispute Resolution Regulation 
(BIS/14/1122 (2014)) p.8. 
364 See BIS, Government Response to Call for Evidence: EU proposals on Alternative (URN 12/674 (2012)). 
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Hypothetical example: Terms which inappropriately exclude/limit consumers' rights to 
compensation 
A consumer went on a package holiday with a friend to Kenya for which they paid € 2000 per person. The 
holiday was a disaster. The flight was delayed by 12 hours. The air conditioning in the hotel was not 
working at all. The safari trip took place but not in the park they had been promised; on top of that, they 
were transported there by bus instead of by plane. They complained to the tour operator and asked for 
compensation amounting to a total of €5,000 (€4,000 for the cost of the package and €1,000 for lost time 
and enjoyment). The tour operator agreed to compensate them €1,000 only, pointing to a provision in the 
contract limiting the organiser's liability to 25% of the total cost of the holiday. When the consumer asked, 
her local consumer association told her that terms which inappropriately limit the trader's liability in case 
of inadequate contractual performance are most probably unfair. The consumer decided to take the tour 
operator to court to enforce her rights. 
[Example adapted from http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-
contract-terms/index_en.htm] 
 
• Please estimate how often court and ADR procedures are used in your country for 
invoking the unfairness, and thereby the non-binding character of standard contract 
terms (i.e. the number of cases per year)? 
As noted above, public enforcement is the cornerstone of the enforcement of the 
UCTD in the UK. Moreover, as also noted above, there is evidence of the effectiveness 
of negotiation by relevant bodies prior to formal enforcement action being sought.365 
 
 
 
365 See S. Bright, ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 331. Although 
the UK European Consumer Centre did not: ‘It needs to be appreciated that in most cases it is needed to 
go to court to get this kind of decision.’ 
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C. Interviews conducted and literature reviewed 
Table 5: Interviews conducted for this study 
Organisation  Stakeholder type Date 
Federation of Small Businesses Business association  30 August 2016 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) 
(formerly BIS) 
Ministry 11 August 2016 
European Consumer Centre European Consumer Centre 26 August 2016 
Which? Consumer organisation 28 August 2016 
Consumer Council of Northern Ireland Consumer organisation 31 August 2016 
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Consumers’ (2010) 33 Journal of Consumer Policy 225. 
H.G. Beale 1995 ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts’ in J Beatson & D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law, (1995, Clarendon, Oxford). 
H.G. Beale (ed.) 2015 Chitty on Contracts (32nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) 
S. Bright 2000 ‘Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms’ (2000) 20 Legal 
Studies 331. 
A. Colombi-Ciacchi & S. 
Weatherill  
2010 Regulating Unfair Banking Practices in Europe (OUP, 2010). 
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Kenny 
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Devenney and M. Kenny, European Consumer Protection: Theory and 
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